Release notes:
https://github.com/git/git/raw/v2.28.0-rc0/Documentation/RelNotes/2.28.0.txt
Update git.skip-test-patterns to catch the 2GB clone test. The output
of the skipped test was changed (for the better) in upstream commit
d63ae31962 (t5608: avoid say() and use "skip_all" instead for
consistency, 2020-05-22).
From the upstream release notes¹:
With a crafted URL that contains a newline or empty host, or lacks
a scheme, the credential helper machinery can be fooled into
providing credential information that is not appropriate for the
protocol in use and host being contacted.
Unlike the vulnerability CVE-2020-5260 fixed in v2.17.4, the
credentials are not for a host of the attacker's choosing; instead,
they are for some unspecified host (based on how the configured
credential helper handles an absent "host" parameter).
The attack has been made impossible by refusing to work with
under-specified credential patterns.
¹ https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/RelNotes/2.17.5.txt
From the upstream release notes¹:
With a crafted URL that contains a newline in it, the credential
helper machinery can be fooled to give credential information for
a wrong host. The attack has been made impossible by forbidding
a newline character in any value passed via the credential
protocol.
¹ https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/RelNotes/2.17.4.txt
Adjust skipped test number in t5541-http-push-smart.sh (skipped on
aarch64, %{arm}, and %{power64}). A new test was added in upstream
6f1194246a ("remote-curl: pass on atomic capability to remote side",
2019-10-16), resulting in the "push 2000 tags over http" test number
changing.
Release notes:
https://www.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/RelNotes/2.24.0.txt
From the upstream release announcement:
These releases fix a security flaw (CVE-2018-17456), which allowed an
attacker to execute arbitrary code by crafting a malicious .gitmodules
file in a project cloned with --recurse-submodules.
When running "git clone --recurse-submodules", Git parses the supplied
.gitmodules file for a URL field and blindly passes it as an argument
to a "git clone" subprocess. If the URL field is set to a string that
begins with a dash, this "git clone" subprocess interprets the URL as
an option. This can lead to executing an arbitrary script shipped in
the superproject as the user who ran "git clone".
In addition to fixing the security issue for the user running "clone",
the 2.17.2, 2.18.1 and 2.19.1 releases have an "fsck" check which can
be used to detect such malicious repository content when fetching or
accepting a push. See "transfer.fsckObjects" in git-config(1).
Credit for finding and fixing this vulnerability goes to joernchen
and Jeff King, respectively.
References:
https://public-inbox.org/git/xmqqy3bcuy3l.fsf@gitster-ct.c.googlers.com/
The USE_LIBPCRE setting now defaults to pcre2; use it. It's still
valid to set USE_LIBPCRE2, but using the default should be cleaner in
the long-run.
The (long-unmaintained) emacs support has been dropped upstream in favor
of better alternatives. From the upstream commit¹:
The git-blame.el mode has been superseded by Emacs's own
vc-annotate (invoked by C-x v g). Users of the git.el mode are now
much better off using either Magit or the Git backend for Emacs's own
VC mode.
These modes were added over 10 years ago when Emacs's own Git support
was much less mature, and there weren't other mature modes in the wild
or shipped with Emacs itself.
These days these modes have few if any users, and users of git aren't
well served by us shipping these (some OS's install them alongside git
by default, which is confusing and leads users astray).
¹ 6d5ed4836d ("git{,-blame}.el: remove old bitrotting Emacs code", 2018-04-11)
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/git/git.git/commit/?id=6d5ed4836d
Fixes two security issues, described in the 2.13.7 release notes¹:
* Submodule "names" come from the untrusted .gitmodules file, but we
blindly append them to $GIT_DIR/modules to create our on-disk repo
paths. This means you can do bad things by putting "../" into the
name. We now enforce some rules for submodule names which will cause
Git to ignore these malicious names (CVE-2018-11235).
Credit for finding this vulnerability and the proof of concept from
which the test script was adapted goes to Etienne Stalmans.
* It was possible to trick the code that sanity-checks paths on NTFS
into reading random piece of memory (CVE-2018-11233).
¹ https://mirrors.edge.kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/RelNotes/2.13.7.txt
