import python3-3.6.8-49.el8
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From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
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<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
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Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 15:05:00 -0700
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Subject: [PATCH] 00386: CVE-2021-28861
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Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
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an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
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with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
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proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
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Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
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(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e)
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Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
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Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
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Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
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---
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Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++
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Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 ++++++++++++++++++-
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...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++
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3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
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create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
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diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py
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index 60a4dadf03..ce05be13d3 100644
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--- a/Lib/http/server.py
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+++ b/Lib/http/server.py
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@@ -323,6 +323,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
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return False
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self.command, self.path, self.request_version = command, path, version
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+ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
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+ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
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+ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
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+ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
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+ if self.path.startswith('//'):
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+ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single /
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+
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# Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
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try:
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self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
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diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
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index 66e937e04b..5a0a7c3f74 100644
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--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
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+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
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@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
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pass
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def setUp(self):
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- BaseTestCase.setUp(self)
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+ super().setUp()
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self.cwd = os.getcwd()
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basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
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os.chdir(basetempdir)
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@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
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except:
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pass
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finally:
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- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self)
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+ super().tearDown()
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def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None):
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def close_conn():
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@@ -399,6 +399,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
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self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
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data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
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+ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
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+ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
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+
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+ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
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+ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
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+
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+ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
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+ resolve into a redirect to another server.
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+ """
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+ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
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+ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
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+ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash
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+ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
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+ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
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+ response = self.request(url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ location = response.getheader('Location')
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+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
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+
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+ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
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+ attack_url = f'/{url}'
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+ response = self.request(attack_url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ location = response.getheader('Location')
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+ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
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+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
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+ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
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+ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
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+
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+ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
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+ attack3_url = f'//{url}'
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+ response = self.request(attack3_url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
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+
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+ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
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+ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
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+ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
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+ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
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+ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
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+ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
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+ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
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+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
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+ location = response.getheader('Location')
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+ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
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+ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
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+ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
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+ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
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+
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def test_get(self):
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#constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
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response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
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diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
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new file mode 100644
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index 0000000000..029d437190
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--- /dev/null
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+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
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@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
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+:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
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+when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial
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+fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.
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File diff suppressed because it is too large
Load Diff
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
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# WARNING When rebasing to a new Python version,
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# remember to update the python3-docs package as well
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Version: %{pybasever}.8
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Release: 47%{?dist}
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Release: 49%{?dist}
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License: Python
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@ -695,6 +695,67 @@ Patch378: 00378-support-expat-2-4-5.patch
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# Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
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Patch382: 00382-cve-2015-20107.patch
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# 00386 #
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# CVE-2021-28861
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#
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# Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
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# an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
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# with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
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# proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
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#
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# Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
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#
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# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
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# Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
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Patch386: 00386-cve-2021-28861.patch
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# 00387 #
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# CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int()
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#
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# gh-95778: CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int() (GH-96504)
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#
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# Converting between `int` and `str` in bases other than 2
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# (binary), 4, 8 (octal), 16 (hexadecimal), or 32 such as base 10 (decimal) now
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# raises a `ValueError` if the number of digits in string form is above a
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# limit to avoid potential denial of service attacks due to the algorithmic
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# complexity. This is a mitigation for CVE-2020-10735
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# (https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10735).
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#
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# This new limit can be configured or disabled by environment variable, command
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# line flag, or :mod:`sys` APIs. See the `Integer String Conversion Length
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# Limitation` documentation. The default limit is 4300
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# digits in string form.
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#
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# Patch by Gregory P. Smith [Google] and Christian Heimes [Red Hat] with feedback
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# from Victor Stinner, Thomas Wouters, Steve Dower, Ned Deily, and Mark Dickinson.
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#
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# Notes on the backport to Python 3.6 in RHEL:
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#
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# * Use "Python 3.6.8-48" version in the documentation, whereas this
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# version will never be released
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# * Only add _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits global variable:
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# Python 3.6 doesn't have PyConfig API (PEP 597) nor _PyRuntime.
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# * sys.flags.int_max_str_digits cannot be -1 on Python 3.6: it is
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# set to the default limit. Adapt test_int_max_str_digits() for that.
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# * Declare _PY_LONG_DEFAULT_MAX_STR_DIGITS and
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# _PY_LONG_MAX_STR_DIGITS_THRESHOLD macros in longobject.h but only
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# if the Py_BUILD_CORE macro is defined.
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# * Declare _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits in pydebug.h.
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#
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#
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# gh-95778: Mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in error message (#96874)
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#
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# When ValueError is raised if an integer is larger than the limit,
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# mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in the error message.
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#
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#
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# gh-96848: Fix -X int_max_str_digits option parsing (#96988)
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#
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# Fix command line parsing: reject "-X int_max_str_digits" option with
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# no value (invalid) when the PYTHONINTMAXSTRDIGITS environment
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# variable is set to a valid limit.
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Patch387: 00387-cve-2020-10735-prevent-dos-by-very-large-int.patch
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# (New patches go here ^^^)
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#
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# When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
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@ -1037,6 +1098,8 @@ git apply %{PATCH351}
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%patch377 -p1
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%patch378 -p1
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%patch382 -p1
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%patch386 -p1
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%patch387 -p1
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# Remove files that should be generated by the build
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# (This is after patching, so that we can use patches directly from upstream)
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@ -1962,6 +2025,14 @@ fi
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# ======================================================
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%changelog
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* Tue Oct 25 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-49
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- Security fixes for CVE-2020-10735 and CVE-2021-28861
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Resolves: rhbz#1834423, rhbz#2120642
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* Thu Oct 20 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-48
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- Release bump
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Resolves: rhbz#2136435
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* Tue Jun 14 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-47
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- Security fix for CVE-2015-20107
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Resolves: rhbz#2075390
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