import CS openssh-8.7p1-38.el9

2024-03-28 11:18:12 +00:00 · 2024-03-28 11:18:12 +00:00 · 828c949c3d
commit 828c949c3d
parent d80bf06988
7 changed files with 638 additions and 10 deletions
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+--- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
+++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
+@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
+ 
+ /*
+  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+- * within a patch series.
+ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
+ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
+ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
+ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
+  */
+ 
+ int
+@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
+ 	if (headerver == libver)
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+-	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+-	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+-		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
+	/*
+	 * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
+	 */
+	if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
+		mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
+ 		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+-	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
+	 * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ 	 */
+ 	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+ 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check	2023-11-27 14:54:32.959113758 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2023-11-27 14:54:49.467500523 +0100
+@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 				;;
+ 			101*)   ;; # 1.1.x
+ 			200*)   ;; # LibreSSL
+-			300*)   ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
+			30*)   ;; # OpenSSL 3.x series
+ 		        *)
+ 				AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
+ 		                ;;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
+--- a/auth2.c	8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000	1.166
+++ b/auth2.c	28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
+@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
+ }
+ 
+ #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
+#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
+ static double
+ user_specific_delay(const char *user)
+ {
+@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, 
+ 	struct timespec ts;
+ 	double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
+ 
+	if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
+		debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
+		    "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
+		return;
+	}
+
+ 	/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
+ 	while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
+ 		seconds *= 2;
+@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
+ 		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh);
+ 	}
+-	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+	if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
+ 		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
+ 		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
+ 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
+diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
+index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
+--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
+@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
+ described at:
+ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+ 
+1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
+
+OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
+a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
+RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
+initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
+"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
+may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
+are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
+if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
+
+When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
+name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
+the the protocol:
+
+a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
+   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
+   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
+   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
+   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
+   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
+b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
+   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
+   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
+   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
+
+ 2. Connection protocol changes
+ 
+ 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* prototype */
+-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+ static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	free(cp);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+  * Caller must free returned string.
+@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			free(m);
+		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+-		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
+	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
+		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
+	}
+	error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
+ 		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
+ 		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
+		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
+ 	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		error_f("no kex");
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	}
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+ static int
+-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
+ {
+-	char *cp;
+-
+-	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+-		return 0;
+-	free(cp);
+-	return 1;
+	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ {
+ 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		sprop=peer;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+-	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+-		char *ext;
+-
+-		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+-		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+-		free(ext);
+	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
+	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+		if (kex->server) {
+			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
+		} else {
+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+		}
+		if (kex->kex_strict) {
+			debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering");
+			if (seq != 0)
+				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+				    "strict KEX violation: "
+				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
+		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
+--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_int	kex_type;
+ 	char	*server_sig_algs;
+ 	int	ext_info_c;
+	int	kex_strict;
+ 	struct sshbuf *my;
+ 	struct sshbuf *peer;
+ 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
+--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+ #endif
+ 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+-	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+		}
+ 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+	}
+ 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ 
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+		debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
+		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
+	}
+
+ 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+-		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+-		if (r != 0)
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
+
+ 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+-	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+		}
+ 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+	}
+ 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ #endif
+ 	/* reset for next packet */
+ 	state->packlen = 0;
+	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+		debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
+		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
+	}
+ 
+ 	if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ 		if (r != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-		if (*typep) {
+-			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+		if (*typep == 0) {
+			/* no message ready */
+			return 0;
+ 		}
+		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+
+		/* Always process disconnect messages */
+		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+			free(msg);
+			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
+		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
+		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
+		 * protocol errors.
+		 */
+		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
+		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
+			return 0;
+		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
+ 		switch (*typep) {
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+-		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+-			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+-				return r;
+-			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+-			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+-			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+-			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+-			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+-			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+-			free(msg);
+-			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+ 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
+	debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
+ 	free(all_key);
+ 
+-	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
+ };
+ 
+ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+ 
+ 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
+ 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ }
+ 
+ /* ARGSUSED */
+-static int
+-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+ {
+@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict	2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
+@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	struct kex *kex;
+ 	char *hostkey_types = NULL;
+ 	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+	char *cp;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+-	    options.kex_algorithms);
+	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, 
+	   "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+ 	else if (gss)
+-		newstr = gss;
+		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+ 	else if (orig)
+ 		newstr = orig;
+ 
+@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ #endif
+ 	free(prop_kex);
+ 	free(prop_enc);
+	free(cp);
+ 	free(prop_hostkey);
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	free(cinfo);
+ }
+ 
+static int
+valid_hostname(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (*s == '-')
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
+		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+valid_ruser(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (*s == '-')
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
+			return 0;
+		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
+			return 0;
+		/* Disallow \ in last position */
+		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Main program for the ssh client.
+  */
+@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
+	if (!valid_hostname(host))
+		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
+	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
+		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf
@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#Type Name ID  GECOS                     Home directory        Shell
+u     sshd 74  "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd -
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf
@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#Type Name     ID
+g     ssh_keys 101
--- a/SPECS/openssh.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec
@ -7,10 +7,6 @@

 %global _hardened_build 1

-# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
-%global sshd_uid    74
-%global sshd_gid    74
-
 # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
 %global no_gnome_askpass 0

@ -51,7 +47,7 @@

 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
 %global openssh_ver 8.7p1
-%global openssh_rel 34
+%global openssh_rel 38
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
 %global pam_ssh_agent_rel 5

@ -76,6 +72,8 @@ Source12: sshd-keygen@.service
 Source13: sshd-keygen
 Source15: sshd-keygen.target
 Source16: ssh-agent.service
+Source17: openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf
+Source18: openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf

 #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581
 Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -282,6 +280,14 @@ Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch
 # upsream commit
 # b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280
 Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+#upstream commit b7afd8a4ecaca8afd3179b55e9db79c0ff210237
+Patch1016: openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
+#upstream commit 01dbf3d46651b7d6ddf5e45d233839bbfffaeaec
+Patch1017: openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
+#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
+Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
+#upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a
+Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch

 License: BSD
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@ -501,6 +507,10 @@ popd
 %patch1013 -p1 -b .man-hostkeyalgos
 %patch1014 -p1 -b .utc_parse
 %patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
+%patch1016 -p1 -b .openssl3compat
+%patch1017 -p1 -b .limitdelay
+%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795
+%patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385

 autoreconf
 pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
@ -646,6 +656,8 @@ install -m744 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
 install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/
 install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/
 install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd
+install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE17} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/openssh.conf
+install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE18} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf

 %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
 install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
@ -674,13 +686,10 @@ install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest/
 install -m 755 regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest

 %pre
-getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || :
+%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE17}

 %pre server
-getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || :
-getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
-  useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \
-  -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /usr/share/empty.sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
+%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE18}

 %post server
 %systemd_post sshd.service sshd.socket
@ -718,6 +727,7 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
 %attr(2555,root,ssh_keys) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/openssh.conf

 %files clients
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
@ -763,6 +773,7 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target
+%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf

 %files keycat
 %doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat
@ -787,6 +798,30 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %endif

 %changelog
+* Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-38
+- Fix Terrapin attack
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
+
+* Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-37
+- Fix Terrapin attack
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
+
+* Wed Dec 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-36
+- Fix Terrapin attack
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-48795
+- Relax OpenSSH build-time checks for OpenSSL version
+  Related: RHEL-4734
+- Forbid shell metasymbols in username/hostname
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-51385
+
+* Mon Oct 23 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-35
+- Relax OpenSSH checks for OpenSSL version
+  Resolves: RHEL-4734
+- Limit artificial delays in sshd while login using AD user
+  Resolves: RHEL-2469
+- Move users/groups creation logic to sysusers.d fragments
+  Resolves: RHEL-5222
+
 * Thu Jul 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-34
 - Avoid remote code execution in ssh-agent PKCS#11 support
  Resolves: CVE-2023-38408