From 828c949c3d8e57b826980a19f0899faa784ac33e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: eabdullin Date: Thu, 28 Mar 2024 11:18:12 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] import CS openssh-8.7p1-38.el9 --- SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch | 52 +++ SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch | 33 ++ SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch | 447 +++++++++++++++++++ SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch | 57 +++ SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf | 2 + SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf | 2 + SPECS/openssh.spec | 55 ++- 7 files changed, 638 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-) create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf create mode 100644 SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0efbdec --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +--- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100 ++++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200 +@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@ + + /* + * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status +- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0. +- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we +- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed +- * within a patch series. ++ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match. ++ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1 ++ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series. ++ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html + */ + + int +@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@ + if (headerver == libver) + return 1; + +- /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */ +- if (headerver < 0x1000000f) { +- mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */ ++ /* ++ * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match. ++ */ ++ if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) { ++ mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */ + return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask); + } + + /* +- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library +- * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. ++ * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and ++ * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header. + */ + mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */ + hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12; +diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac +--- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check 2023-11-27 14:54:32.959113758 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac 2023-11-27 14:54:49.467500523 +0100 +@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then + ;; + 101*) ;; # 1.1.x + 200*) ;; # LibreSSL +- 300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch. ++ 30*) ;; # OpenSSL 3.x series + *) + AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")]) + ;; diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c1cbcb --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c +--- a/auth2.c 8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000 1.166 ++++ b/auth2.c 28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000 +@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_ + } + + #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005 ++#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0 + static double + user_specific_delay(const char *user) + { +@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, + struct timespec ts; + double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain; + ++ if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) { ++ debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay " ++ "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000); ++ return; ++ } ++ + /* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */ + while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0) + seconds *= 2; +@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32 + debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method); + authenticated = m->userauth(ssh); + } +- if (!authctxt->authenticated) ++ if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0) + ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart, + user_specific_delay(authctxt->user)); + userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL); diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f710db --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch @@ -0,0 +1,447 @@ +diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL +index d453c779..ded935eb 100644 +--- a/PROTOCOL ++++ b/PROTOCOL +@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very + described at: + http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519 + ++1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension ++ ++OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under ++a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the ++RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the ++initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append ++"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server ++may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms ++are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored ++if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets. ++ ++When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm ++name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to ++the the protocol: ++ ++a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or ++ out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the ++ connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT. ++ Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages ++ that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as ++ SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE. ++b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the ++ packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the ++ duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first ++ SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS). ++ + 2. Connection protocol changes + + 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com" +diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c +index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644 +--- a/kex.c ++++ b/kex.c +@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ + #endif + + /* prototype */ +-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *); ++static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq); + static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + + static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { +@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) + return 1; + } + ++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ ++static int ++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) ++{ ++ char *cp; ++ ++ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) ++ return 0; ++ free(cp); ++ return 1; ++} ++ + /* + * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process. + * Caller must free returned string. +@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names) + char * + kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) + { +- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m; ++ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p; + size_t len; + + if (a == NULL || *a == '\0') +@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b) + } + strlcpy(ret, a, len); + for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) { +- if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) { +- free(m); ++ if (has_any_alg(ret, p)) + continue; /* Algorithm already present */ +- } + if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len || + strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) { + free(tmp); +@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + { + int r; + +- error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq); ++ /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */ ++ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: " ++ "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq); ++ } ++ error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) +@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error); + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0) + return r; ++ if (ninfo >= 1024) { ++ error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected " ++ "<=1024, received %u", ninfo); ++ return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh); ++ } + for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) { + if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0) + return r; +@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + error_f("no kex"); + return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; + } +- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error); + ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen); + if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0) + return r; +@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)) + if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) + return r; +- if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0) ++ if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0) + return r; + + if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL) +@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX]) + return (1); + } + +-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */ + static int +-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs) ++kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext) + { +- char *cp; +- +- if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL) +- return 0; +- free(cp); +- return 1; ++ return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext); + } + + static int +-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) ++kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq) + { + struct kex *kex = ssh->kex; + struct newkeys *newkeys; +@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh) + sprop=peer; + } + +- /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */ +- if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) { +- char *ext; +- +- ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL); +- kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL); +- free(ext); ++ /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */ ++ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { ++ if (kex->server) { ++ kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c"); ++ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, ++ "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com"); ++ } else { ++ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer, ++ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"); ++ } ++ if (kex->kex_strict) { ++ debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering"); ++ if (seq != 0) ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, ++ "strict KEX violation: " ++ "KEXINIT was not the first packet"); ++ } + } + + /* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */ +diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h +index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644 +--- a/kex.h ++++ b/kex.h +@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex { + u_int kex_type; + char *server_sig_algs; + int ext_info_c; ++ int kex_strict; + struct sshbuf *my; + struct sshbuf *peer; + struct sshbuf *client_version; +diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c +index 52017def..beb214f9 100644 +--- a/packet.c ++++ b/packet.c +@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) + sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); + #endif + /* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */ +- if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) ++ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) { ++ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number " ++ "wrapped during initial key exchange"); ++ } + logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around"); ++ } + if (++state->p_send.packets == 0) + if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) + return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; +@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh) + state->p_send.bytes += len; + sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet); + ++ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { ++ debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr); ++ state->p_send.seqnr = 0; ++ } ++ + if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) + r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT); + else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side) +@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) + /* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */ + for (;;) { + /* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */ +- r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); +- if (r != 0) ++ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0) + break; + /* If we got a packet, return it. */ + if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE) +@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) + if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0) + goto out; + } ++ + if (seqnr_p != NULL) + *seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr; +- if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) ++ if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) { ++ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) { ++ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number " ++ "wrapped during initial key exchange"); ++ } + logit("incoming seqnr wraps around"); ++ } + if (++state->p_read.packets == 0) + if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)) + return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY; +@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) + #endif + /* reset for next packet */ + state->packlen = 0; ++ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) { ++ debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr); ++ state->p_read.seqnr = 0; ++ } + + if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0) + return r; +@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) + r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p); + if (r != 0) + return r; +- if (*typep) { +- state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; +- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); ++ if (*typep == 0) { ++ /* no message ready */ ++ return 0; + } ++ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; ++ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep)); ++ ++ /* Always process disconnect messages */ ++ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) { ++ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) ++ return r; ++ /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ ++ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && ++ reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? ++ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, ++ "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" ++ "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ++ ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); ++ free(msg); ++ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; ++ } ++ ++ /* ++ * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial ++ * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed ++ * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate ++ * protocol errors. ++ */ ++ if (ssh->kex != NULL && ++ (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) ++ return 0; ++ /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */ + switch (*typep) { + case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE: + debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE"); +@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p) + debug("Remote: %.900s", msg); + free(msg); + break; +- case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: +- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 || +- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0) +- return r; +- /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */ +- do_log2(ssh->state->server_side && +- reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ? +- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, +- "Received disconnect from %s port %d:" +- "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), +- ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg); +- free(msg); +- return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED; + case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED: + if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0) + return r; +@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex) + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || +@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp) + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 || ++ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 || + (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 || +@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...) + vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args); + va_end(args); + ++ debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf); + if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 || + (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 || +diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c +index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644 +--- a/sshconnect2.c ++++ b/sshconnect2.c +@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st + fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist"); + free(all_key); + +- if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL) ++ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, ++ "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) + fatal_f("kex_names_cat"); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = +@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod { + }; + + static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); + static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *); +@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user, + + ssh->authctxt = &authctxt; + ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error); +- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info); ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info); + ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept); + ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */ + pubkey_cleanup(ssh); +@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + } + + /* ARGSUSED */ +-static int +-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh) +-{ +- return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh); +-} +- + void + userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist) + { +@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh) + free(authctxt->methoddata); + authctxt->methoddata = NULL; + authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */ ++ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error); + return 0; + } + +diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c +--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict 2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100 ++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c 2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100 +@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + struct kex *kex; + char *hostkey_types = NULL; + char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL; ++ char *cp; + int r; + +- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, +- options.kex_algorithms); ++ if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, ++ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL) ++ fatal_f("kex_names_cat"); ++ ++ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp); + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = + myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc = + compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers); +@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + if (gss && orig) + xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig); + else if (gss) +- newstr = gss; ++ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com"); + else if (orig) + newstr = orig; + +@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh) + #endif + free(prop_kex); + free(prop_enc); ++ free(cp); + free(prop_hostkey); + debug("KEX done"); + } diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b83b5c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch @@ -0,0 +1,57 @@ +diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c +index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644 +--- a/ssh.c ++++ b/ssh.c +@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo) + free(cinfo); + } + ++static int ++valid_hostname(const char *s) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ if (*s == '-') ++ return 0; ++ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) { ++ if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL || ++ isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i])) ++ return 0; ++ } ++ return 1; ++} ++ ++static int ++valid_ruser(const char *s) ++{ ++ size_t i; ++ ++ if (*s == '-') ++ return 0; ++ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) { ++ if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL) ++ return 0; ++ /* Disallow '-' after whitespace */ ++ if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-') ++ return 0; ++ /* Disallow \ in last position */ ++ if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0') ++ return 0; ++ } ++ return 1; ++} ++ + /* + * Main program for the ssh client. + */ +@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av) + if (!host) + usage(); + ++ if (!valid_hostname(host)) ++ fatal("hostname contains invalid characters"); ++ if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user)) ++ fatal("remote username contains invalid characters"); + host_arg = xstrdup(host); + + /* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */ diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf b/SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..419c529 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#Type Name ID GECOS Home directory Shell +u sshd 74 "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd - diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf b/SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1192c0b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +#Type Name ID +g ssh_keys 101 diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec index aa68685..8a7a38e 100644 --- a/SPECS/openssh.spec +++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec @@ -7,10 +7,6 @@ %global _hardened_build 1 -# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID -%global sshd_uid 74 -%global sshd_gid 74 - # Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no) %global no_gnome_askpass 0 @@ -51,7 +47,7 @@ # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1 %global openssh_ver 8.7p1 -%global openssh_rel 34 +%global openssh_rel 38 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4 %global pam_ssh_agent_rel 5 @@ -76,6 +72,8 @@ Source12: sshd-keygen@.service Source13: sshd-keygen Source15: sshd-keygen.target Source16: ssh-agent.service +Source17: openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf +Source18: openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf #https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2581 Patch100: openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch @@ -282,6 +280,14 @@ Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch # upsream commit # b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280 Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch +#upstream commit b7afd8a4ecaca8afd3179b55e9db79c0ff210237 +Patch1016: openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch +#upstream commit 01dbf3d46651b7d6ddf5e45d233839bbfffaeaec +Patch1017: openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch +#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5 +Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch +#upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a +Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch License: BSD Requires: /sbin/nologin @@ -501,6 +507,10 @@ popd %patch1013 -p1 -b .man-hostkeyalgos %patch1014 -p1 -b .utc_parse %patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408 +%patch1016 -p1 -b .openssl3compat +%patch1017 -p1 -b .limitdelay +%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795 +%patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385 autoreconf pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver} @@ -646,6 +656,8 @@ install -m744 %{SOURCE13} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen install -m755 contrib/ssh-copy-id $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/ install contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/ install -d -m711 ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}/%{_datadir}/empty.sshd +install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE17} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/openssh.conf +install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE18} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf %if ! %{no_gnome_askpass} install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass @@ -674,13 +686,10 @@ install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest/ install -m 755 regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libdir}/sshtest %pre -getent group ssh_keys >/dev/null || groupadd -r ssh_keys || : +%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE17} %pre server -getent group sshd >/dev/null || groupadd -g %{sshd_uid} -r sshd || : -getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \ - useradd -c "Privilege-separated SSH" -u %{sshd_uid} -g sshd \ - -s /sbin/nologin -r -d /usr/share/empty.sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || : +%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE18} %post server %systemd_post sshd.service sshd.socket @@ -718,6 +727,7 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ %attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh %attr(2555,root,ssh_keys) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8* +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/openssh.conf %files clients %attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh @@ -763,6 +773,7 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd.socket %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen@.service %attr(0644,root,root) %{_unitdir}/sshd-keygen.target +%attr(0644,root,root) %{_sysusersdir}/openssh-server.conf %files keycat %doc HOWTO.ssh-keycat @@ -787,6 +798,30 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \ %endif %changelog +* Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.7p1-38 +- Fix Terrapin attack + Resolves: CVE-2023-48795 + +* Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.7p1-37 +- Fix Terrapin attack + Resolves: CVE-2023-48795 + +* Wed Dec 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.7p1-36 +- Fix Terrapin attack + Resolves: CVE-2023-48795 +- Relax OpenSSH build-time checks for OpenSSL version + Related: RHEL-4734 +- Forbid shell metasymbols in username/hostname + Resolves: CVE-2023-51385 + +* Mon Oct 23 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.7p1-35 +- Relax OpenSSH checks for OpenSSL version + Resolves: RHEL-4734 +- Limit artificial delays in sshd while login using AD user + Resolves: RHEL-2469 +- Move users/groups creation logic to sysusers.d fragments + Resolves: RHEL-5222 + * Thu Jul 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.7p1-34 - Avoid remote code execution in ssh-agent PKCS#11 support Resolves: CVE-2023-38408