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import CS openssh-9.9p1-4.el9

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This commit is contained in:
AlmaLinux RelEng Bot 2026-03-30 10:02:13 -04:00
parent 88fdf9a2a3
commit 22cebc4f1e
83 changed files with 6688 additions and 8399 deletions
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2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

2
.openssh.metadata
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@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
dbb35b4e9ae3f72b930a82c6fd5e83e9dcd7b193 SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
8719032c1e47732c8fdb14adfb24b5e9e71de802 SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
5ded7eb0add0b02b5d1a1c4bf5cb2c89d2117b53 SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
66dd8274346fd006ff40f525c082cfb701085b5f SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

10
SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
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@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
--- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe 2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
+++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c 2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
fdlim_set(maxfd);
fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
+
+ signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+
read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
read_wait[j].fd = -1;

101
SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
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@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
--- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp 2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c 2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
{
- AES_KEY aes_ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX ecbctx;
u_char aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
};
@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
{
struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
size_t n = 0;
- u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
+ u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
+ u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
if (len == 0)
return (1);
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
return (0);
- while ((len--) > 0) {
+ for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
+ u_int r,a,b;
+
if (n == 0) {
- AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
- ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ int outl, i, buflen;
+
+ buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
+
+ for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
+ memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+ }
+
+ EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
+ ctrbuf, buflen);
}
- *(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
- n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
+
+ memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
+ memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
+ r = a ^ b;
+ memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
+ src += sizeof(a);
+ dest += sizeof(r);
+
+ n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
}
+ memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
+ memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
return (1);
}
@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
}
- if (key != NULL)
- AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
- &c->aes_ctx);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
+
+ if (key != NULL) {
+ const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
+ switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
+ case 128:
+ cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
+ break;
+ case 192:
+ cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
+ break;
+ case 256:
+ cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
+ }
+ if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
+ fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
+ }
if (iv != NULL)
memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
return (1);
@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
free(c);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

36
SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
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@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c 2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
int on_stderr)
@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
if (on_stderr)
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h 2021-05-06 11:34:22.349925757 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot 2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h 2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
int log_change_level(LogLevel);
int log_is_on_stderr(void);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-05-06 11:33:37.671575348 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
#ifdef GSSAPI
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h 2021-05-06 11:32:25.180006819 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot 2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h 2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
int m_log_sendfd;
struct kex **m_pkex;
@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
struct Authctxt;
void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.166006709 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
static int is_child = 0;
@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h 2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
struct passwd;
@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
void sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c 2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
}
@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
-sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
+sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
{
fd_set *rset, *wset;
int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
ssize_t len, olen;
@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
extern char *__progname;
@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
* On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c 2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
return 1;
}
@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-serve
- return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
+ return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
}
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot 2021-05-06 11:32:25.177006795 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 11:32:25.182006834 +0200
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot 2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c 2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
}
#endif
/* New socket pair */
- monitor_reinit(pmonitor);

28
SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
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@ -93,19 +93,17 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
- debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+ debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
oldctx, newctx);
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c (date 1703108053912)
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
- debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
+ debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
__func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@ -118,10 +116,10 @@ index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
#endif
#ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
--- a/sshd-session.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
demote_sensitive_data();

9
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
View File

@ -38,16 +38,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ typedef enum {
sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
- sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+ sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
@@ -600,14 +600,16 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@ -129,3 +129,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
# Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
# and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
diff -up openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx 2024-07-11 13:51:19.969960781 +0200
+++ openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c 2024-07-11 13:51:30.938231250 +0200

17
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts 2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd.c 2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
--- openssh/sshd-session.c.ip-opts 2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c 2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
@@ -1507,12 +1507,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@ -21,11 +21,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+ case 130:
+ case 133:
+ case 134:
+ i += opts[i + 1];
+ break;
+ if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
+ i += opts[i + 1];
+ break;
+ }
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
+ /* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
+ * source routing options. */
+ * or incorrect source routing options. */
+ text[0] = '\0';
+ for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
+ snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
@ -35,5 +38,5 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
+ }
+ } while (i < option_size);
}
return;
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
}

14
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
View File

@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
+SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
@ -54,20 +54,20 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
.SUFFIXES: .lo
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
XMSS_OBJS=\
ssh-xmss.o \
@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat 2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern int inetd_flag;
extern int rexeced_flag;
+/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
+int
@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
- rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+ rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
if (inetd_flag) {
use_current = "1";
} else {
use_current = "";

18
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
View File

@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
* because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
* to access these files aren't available yet. */
- if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
+ if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
+ && k5login_exists) {
+ if (k5login_exists &&
+ ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
retval = 1;
logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
@ -196,11 +196,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
+The default is
+.Cm yes .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
offer to clients.
@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm IPQoS ,
.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,

23
SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
View File

@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
platform_setusercontext(pw);
- if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
+ if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
+ if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
(LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.privsep-selinux 2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c 2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
@ -109,13 +109,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
/* Demote the child */
if (privsep_chroot) {
/* Change our root directory */
@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ if (0) {
+ /* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
#else
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
* fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
* special privileges to begin with.
*/
-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
+#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
skip_privdrop = 1;
#endif

287
SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
View File

@ -1,37 +1,3 @@
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
return -1;
- if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+ if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
return -1;
+ }
if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
n) == -1) {
@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
return -1;
- if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
+ if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
return -1;
+ }
if (sa != NULL) {
- if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
+ if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
+ freeaddrinfo(ai);
return -1;
+ }
memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
}
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
@ -51,40 +17,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
return oerrno;
}
/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
return r;
}
/* success */
+ sshbuf_free(b);
return 0;
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
c->self, strerror(err));
/* Try next address, if any */
- if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
+ if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
close(c->sock);
c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
&hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
freerrset(fingerprints);
+ free(dnskey_digest);
return -1;
}
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity 2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c 2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
@ -95,21 +27,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
-
+#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
+#pragma pop
+#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshbuf_free(sect);
+ /* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
return r;
}
@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
@ -149,22 +73,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
# endif
@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
ut.ut_pid = getpid();
/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
+ /* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c 2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
@ -185,17 +93,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
return ret;
}
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
else
logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
strerror(errno));
+ /* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
}
static unsigned long
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@ -217,23 +114,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
return (0);
error:
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
- if (tmp1 > 0)
+ if (tmp1 >= 0)
close(tmp1);
- if (tmp2 > 0)
- close(tmp2);
+ /*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
+ close(tmp2);*/
return 0;
}
close(tmp1);
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@ -287,23 +167,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
goto out;
}
free(arg2);
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity 2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c 2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
{
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
- waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
+ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
}
if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
- waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+ (void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
}
if (signo)
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@ -331,87 +194,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
goto done;
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
/* Environment specified by admin */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
+ /* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
}
*value++ = '\0';
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
+ free(cp);
}
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
--- a/sftp.c 2022-06-30 10:43:13.914058913 +0200
+++ b/sftp.c 2022-06-30 10:48:17.243997888 +0200
@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
pid = sshpid;
if (pid > 1) {
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
- waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+ (void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
_exit(1);
@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
}
+ free(abs_dst);
+ abs_dst = NULL;
}
out:
@@ -991,6 +993,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
error("no stat information for %s", fname);
+ free(fname);
continue;
}
lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
index 9de9afa20f..ea98d9f8d0 100644
--- a/sftp-client.c
+++ b/sftp-client.c
@@ -2195,6 +2195,7 @@ handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous,
(*nreqsp)--;
}
debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
}
int
diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
index 18d1949112..6380c4dd23 100644
--- a/sftp-server.c
+++ b/sftp-server.c
@@ -1553,6 +1553,7 @@ process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id)
npath = xstrdup(path + 2);
free(path);
xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s", cwd, npath);
+ free(npath);
} else {
/* ~user expansions */
if (tilde_expand(path, pw->pw_uid, &npath) != 0) {
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
}
free(rks);
+ free(device);
return ret;
}
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity 2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@ -423,31 +205,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
return NULL;
}
/* validate also provider from URI */
@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
sanitise_stdfd();
/* drop */
- setegid(getgid());
- setgid(getgid());
+ (void) setegid(getgid());
+ (void) setgid(getgid());
platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity 2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
+ /* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
muxclient(options.control_path);
/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity 2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c 2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
@ -460,16 +220,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
return 0;
}
@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
}
+
+ if (fdset != NULL)
+ free(fdset);
}
/*
@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
if (newstr)
@ -496,32 +246,3 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
} else {
if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
cp += 4;
@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
+ free(checkpoint);
checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ free(checkpoint);
+ if (in != stdin)
+ fclose(in);
}
static char *
diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
--- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity 2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c 2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
oerrno = errno;
error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
errno = oerrno;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;

13
SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
View File

@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
}
if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
+ if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
+ fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
#endif
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ close(paudit[1]);
+ if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
+ if (ret == 0) {
+ /*
+ * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
+ * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
return ret;
}
@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
@@ -1538,6 +1565,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
}
@ -147,12 +147,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+ int pparent = paudit[1];
+ close(paudit[0]);
+ /* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
+ if (use_privsep)
+ mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
+ mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
+#endif
+
+ /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
+ /*
+ * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
+ * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@ -176,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- /* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
- destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
- ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
- /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
- monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */

20
SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
View File

@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c 2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
--- a/channels.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/channels.c (date 1703026069921)
@@ -5075,11 +5075,13 @@
}
static int
-connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
+connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
{
int sock;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ if (len <= 0)
+ return -1;
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock == -1)
if (sock == -1) {
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
@@ -5087,11 +5089,12 @@
}
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@ -29,8 +31,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
- error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
@@ -5099,8 +5102,18 @@
connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
{
char buf[1024];

16
SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
#define NUM_SOCKS 10
/* -- X11 forwarding */
-/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
+#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
/* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
/* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
*/
int
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h 2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int permitopen_port(const char *);
void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
-int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
+int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+ sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max 2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5 2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
.Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
+.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
.Cm X11Forwarding

98
SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
View File

@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
systemd stuff
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
+# Check whether user wants systemd support
+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
+ [ --with-systemd Enable systemd support],
+ [ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+ if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
+ if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
+ SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
+ SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
+ SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
+ SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ fi
+ fi ]
+)
+
+
# Looking for programs, paths and files
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
+echo " systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e0d4923
--- /dev/null
+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+[Unit]
+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
+After=network.target
+
+[Service]
+Type=notify
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
+KillMode=process
+Restart=on-failure
+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
+
+[Install]
+WantedBy=multi-user.target
+
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
#include <prot.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
+#endif
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
}
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
+ /* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
+ sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
+#endif
+
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
&newsock, config_s);

2
SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
View File

@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_futex
SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
#endif
@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday

394
SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
@@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
#endif
}
@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
#endif /* BSM */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
@ -129,19 +129,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
+void
+audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
+ mm_audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
+}
+
+void
+audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
+ mm_audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid());
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
+{
+ PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
+ mm_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid());
+}
+
# ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
# define _SSH_AUDIT_H
@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
#endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
@@ -33,27 +33,40 @@
#include "log.h"
@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
/* Below is the sshd audit API code */
void
@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
@@ -76,49 +176,211 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
/* not implemented */
}
@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
+ if (options.use_pam)
+ break;
+ /* Fallthrough */
+ case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
+{
+#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
+ char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+ const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
+ static const char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
+ char *s;
+ int audit_fd;
+
@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
+#endif
+}
+
+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+static const char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+
+void
+audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress,
@ -661,7 +662,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
+ }
+ audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+ buf, NULL,
+ listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), /*FIXME listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh) */
+ NULL, 1);
+ audit_close(audit_fd);
+ /* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
@ -670,8 +671,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
+}
#endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
+
@ -726,28 +727,28 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
+{
+}
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.305463975 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.682061561 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
} else {
authctxt->valid = 0;
/* Invalid user, fake password information */
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
-#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
- PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
- mm_audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
-#endif
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.283463805 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.656061361 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
chost, key)) &&
- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+ PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
chost, key) &&
- mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+ mm_hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
@@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done:
@ -772,17 +773,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.344464277 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.726061899 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
- PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+ PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
- mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
+ mm_user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
@@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done:
return authenticated;
}
@ -802,11 +803,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
+}
+
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.304463967 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
record_failed_login(ssh, user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
@ -818,17 +819,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
}
if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.318464076 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
char *expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
char *authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
+int user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.697061676 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
@@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey *get_hostkey_private_by_ty
int get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
int sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
@ -837,10 +829,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
/* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
int auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
@@ -239,6 +241,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
int auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+int user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
FILE *auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
FILE *auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
@@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
};
@ -878,7 +879,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
@@ -47,7 +47,25 @@
#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
@ -907,16 +908,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.368464462 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.743062030 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
/* prototype */
static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
@@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
}
@ -1036,8 +1037,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
* Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
* Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.306463983 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.683061568 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
@@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
int kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
#endif
@ -1049,7 +1050,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
struct sshbuf **);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
@@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
}
@ -1073,7 +1074,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
int
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
@@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3
int mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
const u_char *, size_t);
@ -1082,10 +1083,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
#endif /* SSHMAC_H */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.352464339 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in 2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
@@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
kexgssc.o \
sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
- sshbuf-io.o
@ -1094,8 +1095,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.326464138 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
@ -1108,7 +1109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
+
/* State exported from the child */
static struct sshbuf *child_state;
@ -1195,9 +1196,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
- ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
- sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key),
debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
(ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
(ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
@@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
}
@ -1241,7 +1242,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
sshpam_cleanup();
#endif
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
@ -1427,8 +1428,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.326464138 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
@@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
@ -1445,8 +1446,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.307463991 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.381464563 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
@@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con
*/
@ -1536,9 +1537,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
@@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
return &ci;
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+void
+mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
@ -1620,8 +1621,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
+}
+#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.307463991 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.381464563 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st
struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
@ -1632,7 +1633,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
+int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
#ifdef GSSAPI
void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
@@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
@ -1649,7 +1650,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
struct Session;
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c 2021-05-06 12:07:38.535478683 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c 2021-04-19 16:48:46.885608837 +0200
@@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
#endif
@ -1802,7 +1803,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.382464571 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
@@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char *sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s
# undef EC_POINT
#endif
@ -1810,14 +1811,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
+void packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int);
#endif /* PACKET_H */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.340464246 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.383464578 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.722061868 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern int startup_pipe;
-extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
@ -1843,18 +1844,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+ if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
+ fatal("do_exec: command already set");
if (command != NULL)
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
- mm_audit_run_command(command);
+ s->command = xstrdup(command);
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
- PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
- mm_audit_run_command(shell);
+ s->command = xstrdup(shell);
}
+ if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
+ s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
@ -1863,7 +1864,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
- destroy_sensitive_data();
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+ /* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+ monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@ -1923,7 +1924,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+{
+ if (s->command != NULL) {
+ if (s->command_handle != -1)
+ PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
+ mm_audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
+ free(s->command);
+ s->command = NULL;
+ s->command_handle = -1;
@ -1981,7 +1982,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
@@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
if (mm_is_monitor())
- session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
+ session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
}
@ -1989,7 +1990,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.384464586 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h 2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
@@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
char *name;
char *val;
@ -2006,7 +2007,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
@@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void session_unused(int);
int session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *);
void session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int);
void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *);
void session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
-void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *));
+void session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *));
void session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
@ -2018,29 +2019,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
void session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
void do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.346464292 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.385464594 +0200
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
static char *listener_proctitle;
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
@@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
num_listen_socks = -1;
num_listen_socks = 0;
}
+/*
@ -2049,16 +2031,82 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+ */
+int listening_for_clients(void)
+{
+ return num_listen_socks >= 0;
+ return num_listen_socks > 0;
+}
+
/* Allocate and initialise the children array */
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
}
}
child_alloc(void)
@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
+ /* destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); FIXME */
close_listen_socks();
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit 2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c 2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+#include "audit.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
@@ -260,8 +261,44 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
+
+static int
+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *d;
+ const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey);
+ RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+ return d != NULL;
+ }
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
+ return priv_key != NULL;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA: {
+ const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(k->pkey);
+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdsa) != NULL;
+ }
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
+ default:
+ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
/*
@@ -377,18 +387,40 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
_exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE);
}
-/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
+/*
+ * Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. Careful,
@ -2066,7 +2114,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+ */
void
-destroy_sensitive_data(void)
+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@ -2088,12 +2136,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
+ if (fp != NULL) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+ if (privsep)
+ PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
+ pid, uid));
+ else
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
+ pid, uid);
+ audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
+#endif
+ free(fp);
+ }
@ -2163,9 +2206,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
@@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
- pid = fork();
+ pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
@ -2189,48 +2232,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
reseed_prngs();
@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void)
* from this function are in a forked subprocess.
*/
static void
-server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
+server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
{
fd_set *fdset;
int i, j, ret, maxfd;
@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
close_listen_socks();
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
#endif
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
+ server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
&newsock, config_s);
}
@@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
+ packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+ destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
+
ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
@@ -2513,6 +2572,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
+ static int in_cleanup = 0;
+ int is_privsep_child;
+
+ /* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
+ wrappers used for auditing. Make sure we don't recurse
@ -2238,77 +2254,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+ if (in_cleanup)
+ _exit(i);
+ in_cleanup = 1;
extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */
if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
}
}
@@ -2525,7 +2593,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
}
+ is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
+ if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
+ destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
+ if (the_active_state != NULL)
+ packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
- if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
- if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor())
+ if (the_active_state != NULL &&
+ (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
+ (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+ mm_is_monitor())
audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.364464431 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-05-06 12:05:27.386464602 +0200
@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
}
int
+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ switch (k->type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_RSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_RSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *d;
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
+ return d != NULL;
+ }
+ case KEY_DSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_DSA: {
+ const BIGNUM *priv_key;
+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
+ return priv_key != NULL;
+ }
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
+ default:
+ /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
+int
sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit 2021-05-06 12:05:27.365464439 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h 2021-05-06 12:05:27.386464602 +0200
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke
int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
+int sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
/* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */

50
SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
View File

@ -1,23 +1,22 @@
diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
static char *
format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
- runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
- runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
+ runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
@ -82,14 +81,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/por
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
-extern int inetd_flag;
-extern int rexeced_flag;
-
/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
int
@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
if (r == 0) {
/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
- if (inetd_flag) {
+ if (inetd) {
security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
@ -152,7 +150,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
- if (inetd_flag) {
+ if (inetd) {
use_current = "1";
} else {
@ -216,55 +214,45 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
--- openssh/platform.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
+++ openssh/platform.c 2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
extern int use_privsep;
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
void
platform_pre_listen(void)
/* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
int
@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
}
#endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+ inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+ options.use_pam);
#endif
}
diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd.c 2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
diff -up openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor openssh/sshd-session.c
--- openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor 2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c 2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
static int test_flag = 0;
int debug_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
-static int inetd_flag = 0;
+int inetd_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
static int saved_argc;
/* re-exec */
-static int rexeced_flag = 0;
+int rexeced_flag = 0;
static int rexec_flag = 1;
static int rexec_argc = 0;
static char **rexec_argv;
/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
static int log_stderr = 0;
@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
+ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
+ (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+ inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+ options.use_pam);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM

330
SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
View File

@ -72,17 +72,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
u_int dh_estimate(int);
void dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
# include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h 2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
"rsa-sha2-256," \
"ssh-rsa"
"rsa-sha2-512," \
"rsa-sha2-256"
+#define KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
@ -268,9 +268,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h
--- openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h.xxx 2025-08-04 15:02:15.895341244 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h 2025-08-04 15:02:54.826304548 +0200
@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+#define GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
+ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID "," \
+ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
+
#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
typedef struct {
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx 2025-08-04 14:58:08.908229826 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c 2025-08-04 15:07:59.942477440 +0200
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
#include <vis.h>
#endif
@ -280,80 +295,32 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
@@ -274,6 +277,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
if (options.gss_keyex) {
- /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
- * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-
- if (options.gss_server_identity) {
- gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
- } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
- gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
- /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
- * and can not use DNS on that socket */
- if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
- free(gss_host);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
+ options.gss_keyex = 0;
+ } else {
+ /* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
+ match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+
+ if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+ gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+ } else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+ gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+ /* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+ * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+ if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+ free(gss_host);
+ gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ }
+ } else {
gss_host = xstrdup(host);
}
- } else {
- gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- }
- gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
- if (gss) {
- debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
- "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-
- /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
- * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
- orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
- xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
- "%s,null", orig);
+ gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+ options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ if (gss) {
+ debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+
+ /* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+ * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+ orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+ xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "%s,null", orig);
+ }
/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
* client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
@@ -293,7 +299,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
}
}
#endif
gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
- options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+ options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
+ free(gss_kex_filtered);
+
if (gss) {
debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
#include <grp.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#include <syslog.h>
@ -361,21 +328,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;
@@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
&key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
@ -401,7 +360,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
/*
* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
* unmounted if desired.
@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
--- a/sshd-session.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
+++ b/sshd-session.c 2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
@@ -2506,10 +2513,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
orig = NULL;
@ -423,7 +393,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
@ -440,11 +410,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
@@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
impl = keyimpls[i];
if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
continue;
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ switch (kt->type) {
+ switch (impl->type) {
+ case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
@ -455,9 +425,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
+ break;
+ }
+ }
if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
continue;
if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
@@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
}
@ -477,40 +447,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
+ break;
+ }
/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
ret->type = type;
if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
goto out;
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sshkey_free_contents(ret);
*ret = *k;
@@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
break;
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ /* Fallthrough */
case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
*lenp = 0;
if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
+ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ /* Fallthrough */
if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
@@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
compat, detailsp);
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
*detailsp = NULL;
if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
+ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips 2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c 2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
@ -522,6 +483,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
#include "cipher.h"
#define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
+#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
/*
* Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be
@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
#endif
}
@ -535,11 +504,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if (*bitsp != 1024)
@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const ch
char *name = NULL;
if (key_type_name == NULL)
- name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
else {
switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
#ifdef WITH_DSA
@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
first = 1;
printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
}
+ type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+ type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
+
+ /* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
+ if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
@ -550,13 +528,42 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+
printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
fflush(stdout);
- type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c 2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
@@ -3830,7 +3831,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
if (key_type_name == NULL)
- key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+ key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa 2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
+++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c 2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
goto out;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
+ if (FIPS_mode())
+ logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c
--- openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx 2024-10-09 10:35:56.285946080 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c 2024-10-09 10:41:52.792597194 +0200
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -565,7 +572,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
break;
#endif
case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@ -584,11 +591,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
+ }
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
+ }
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
break;
#endif
case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@ -609,11 +625,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+ &shared_secret);
+ }
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
- &shared_secret);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+ &shared_secret);
+ }
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
break;
#endif
case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@ -636,6 +663,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ }
break;
case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
- r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
- &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ } else {
+ r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+ &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
+ }
break;
default:
@ -663,13 +701,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kex.c
--- openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx 2024-10-11 12:44:08.087426597 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/kex.c 2024-10-11 14:00:10.404714521 +0200
@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
# include <openssl/kdf.h>
# include <openssl/param_build.h>
@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh
/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
if (kexalgos == NULL)
- kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
"ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
"ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)

57
SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.345143341 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h 2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h 2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
krb5_principal krb5_user;
char *krb5_ticket_file;
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
#endif /* AUTH_H */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name 2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c 2021-05-06 11:28:40.195242317 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c 2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <unistd.h>
#include <string.h>
@ -338,8 +338,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
#endif /* !HEIMDAL */
#endif /* KRB5 */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.374143558 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c 2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
}
@ -368,10 +368,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
+ if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
return;
ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c 2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
/* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
* during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
@ -484,8 +484,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
int
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.388143662 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c 2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
@ -503,16 +503,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
@@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ typedef enum {
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
+ sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
+ sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
#else
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@ -547,8 +546,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h 2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h 2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
* file on logout. */
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
@ -559,8 +558,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
int gss_keyex; /* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c 2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
* the child's environment as they see fit
@ -580,9 +579,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c 2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_authentication) {
@ -593,8 +592,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
}
#endif
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5 2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5 2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
file on logout.
The default is
@ -608,11 +607,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
+can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
+user account.
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
offer to clients.
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name 2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h 2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name 2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h 2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);

14
SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no 2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c 2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-usepam-no 2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c 2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
cfg, &includes, NULL);
"enabled authentication methods");
}
+ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
+ /* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
+ if (! options.use_pam)
+ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
+ logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
+
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
# If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
# PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
# and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
+# problems.
#UsePAM no

40
SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
View File

@ -23,23 +23,20 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
*style++ = 0;
@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
@@ -314,7 +314,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
- if (use_privsep)
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
+#endif
+ if (use_privsep) {
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
+ mm_inform_authrole(role);
+ mm_inform_authrole(role);
+#endif
+ }
userauth_banner(ssh);
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
--- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2-gss.c 2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
@ -50,7 +47,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
+ char *micuser;
struct sshbuf *b;
gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
const char *displayname;
u_char *p;
@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
mic.value = p;
@ -74,7 +71,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
+ free(micuser);
free(mic.value);
if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
authctxt->postponed = 0;
diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
--- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@ -93,7 +90,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
+#endif
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@ -147,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
+++ openssh/auth-pam.h 2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
void do_pam_setcred(int );
void do_pam_setcred(void);
void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
-int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
+int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
@ -240,14 +237,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
const u_char *p;
- char *userstyle, *cp;
+ char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
size_t len;
u_char type;
int r, fail = 0;
int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
@ -418,7 +415,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
--- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
+++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@ -472,7 +469,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
+extern ServerOptions options;
+extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+extern int inetd_flag;
+extern int rexeced_flag;
+
+/* Send audit message */
+static int
@ -678,7 +674,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
+
+ if (r == 0) {
+ /* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ if (inetd_flag) {
+ security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
+
+ if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@ -752,7 +748,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
+
+ rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
+
+ if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ if (inetd_flag) {
+ use_current = "1";
+ } else {
+ use_current = "";
@ -853,8 +849,8 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
}
diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
--- openssh/sshd-session.c.role-mls 2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c 2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
restore_uid();
}
@ -864,4 +860,4 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
+#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);
do_pam_setcred();

246
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
View File

@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
--- a/ssh_config.5 2022-07-12 15:05:22.550013071 +0200
+++ b/ssh_config.5 2022-07-12 15:17:20.016704545 +0200
@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
.Qq *.c.example.com
domains.
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5
--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 2023-06-07 10:26:48.284590156 +0200
+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5 2023-06-07 10:26:00.623052194 +0200
@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@
causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
This is the default behaviour.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@
@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
(the default),
the check will not be executed.
.It Cm Ciphers
@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@
@@ -479,13 +480,6 @@
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@
@@ -885,6 +879,11 @@
The default is
.Dq no .
.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
key exchange. Possible values are
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@
@@ -897,10 +896,8 @@
gss-curve25519-sha256-
.Ed
.Pp
@ -92,7 +92,70 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Xr ssh 1
@@ -1219,29 +1216,25 @@
@@ -919,36 +916,25 @@
but may be manually hashed using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
-to the default set instead of replacing them.
+to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
-at the head of the default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
+at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
.Pp
The
.Fl Q
@@ -1001,6 +987,17 @@
.Pp
The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+.Pp
+The proposed
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
+.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
+.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
+would break the order given by the
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
.It Cm HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
real host name when looking up or saving the host key
@@ -1330,6 +1330,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
and
.Cm pam .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
@ -101,25 +164,31 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
their preference order.
The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
@@ -1338,29 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
.Pp
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
-.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@ -127,11 +196,12 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
-.Ed
+built-in openssh default set.
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+built-in openssh default set.
The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q kex .
@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@
.It Cm KnownHostsCommand
@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
file.
This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
.It Cm MACs
@ -178,7 +248,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
@@ -1553,37 +1542,25 @@
@@ -1567,39 +1555,31 @@
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@ -214,21 +284,37 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
+built-in openssh default set.
.Pp
The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
--- a/sshd_config.5 2022-07-12 15:05:22.535012771 +0200
+++ b/sshd_config.5 2022-07-12 15:15:33.394809258 +0200
@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
+.Pp
+This option affects also
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
@@ -2265,7 +2245,9 @@
This file must be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
-.Xr ssh 1
+.Xr ssh 1 ,
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5
--- openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 2023-06-07 10:26:48.277590077 +0200
+++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5 2023-06-07 10:26:00.592051845 +0200
@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@
then no banner is displayed.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@ -251,7 +337,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
@@ -525,20 +521,25 @@
indicating not to
.Xr chroot 2 .
.It Cm Ciphers
@ -281,7 +367,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Pp
@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@
@@ -565,13 +566,6 @@
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
@ -295,7 +381,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
@@ -685,21 +679,22 @@
@@ -766,53 +760,43 @@
.Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
.It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@ -327,18 +413,27 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
@@ -799,26 +794,13 @@
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the host key signature algorithms
that the server offers.
Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
-the default set instead of replacing them.
+the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
+will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
-the head of the default set.
-The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@ -349,18 +444,48 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
+the head of the built-in openssh default set.
.Pp
The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
@@ -879,25 +863,14 @@
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+The default is handled system-wide by
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the host key signature algorithms
that the server offers.
The default for this option is:
-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
-.Pp
The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@
@@ -1025,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
@ -369,33 +494,38 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
+.Pp
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
offer to clients.
The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
@@ -1033,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
.Pp
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
-character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-instead of replacing them.
+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
+openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
-from the default set instead of replacing them.
+from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
-default set.
+built-in openssh default set.
.Pp
The supported algorithms are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
@@ -1010,15 +997,6 @@
@@ -1075,17 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
-The default is:
-.Bd -literal -offset indent
-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@ -403,10 +533,10 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
-.Ed
-.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
.It Cm ListenAddress
@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@
@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
file.
This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
.It Cm MACs
@ -437,7 +567,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@
@@ -1241,15 +1214,6 @@
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
@ -453,7 +583,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm Match
@@ -1548,37 +1522,25 @@
@@ -1633,36 +1597,25 @@
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@ -489,14 +619,24 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-ssh-ed25519,
-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
-.Ed
+built-in openssh default set.
.Pp
The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
@@ -2131,7 +2084,9 @@
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
-.Xr sshd 8
+.Xr sshd 8 ,
+.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free

720
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
View File

@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
---
digest-openssl.c | 16 ++++
digest.h | 6 ++
ssh-dss.c | 65 ++++++++++------
ssh-ecdsa.c | 69 ++++++++++-------
ssh-rsa.c | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
sshkey.c | 77 +++++++++++++++++++
sshkey.h | 4 +
7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
--- a/digest-openssl.c
+++ b/digest-openssl.c
@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
{ -1, NULL, 0, NULL },
};
+const EVP_MD *
+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
+{
+ switch (digest_type) {
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
+ return EVP_sha1();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
+ return EVP_sha256();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
+ return EVP_sha384();
+ case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
+ return EVP_sha512();
+ }
+ return NULL;
+}
+
static const struct ssh_digest *
ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
{
diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
--- a/digest.h
+++ b/digest.h
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
struct sshbuf;
struct ssh_digest_ctx;
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
+#endif
+
/* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
--- a/ssh-dss.c
+++ b/ssh-dss.c
@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
- size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+ u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
+ size_t rlen, slen;
+ int len;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ u_char *sigb = NULL;
+ const u_char *psig = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (lenp != NULL)
@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if (dlen == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
+ data, datalen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
+ }
- if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ free(sigb);
+ sigb = NULL;
DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
- size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
+ u_char *sigblob = NULL;
+ size_t len, slen;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
+ u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if (dlen == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
}
sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- /* sha1 the data */
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
-
- switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
- case 1:
- ret = 0;
- break;
- case 0:
- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+ if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
- default:
+ }
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+ sigb, slen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
DSA_SIG_free(sig);
BN_clear_free(sig_r);
BN_clear_free(sig_s);
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
--- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
+ const unsigned char *psig;
const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
int hash_alg;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t len, dlen;
+ int len;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
- (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
+ datalen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
+ }
- if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
-
if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(bb);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
- int hash_alg;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- size_t dlen;
+ int hash_alg, len;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
char *ktype = NULL;
+ unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
- (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
+ if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* fetch signature */
@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
}
sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ /* Figure out the length */
+ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ psig = sigb;
+ if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
+ }
- switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
- case 1:
- ret = 0;
- break;
- case 0:
- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
goto out;
- default:
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
+ free(sigb);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(b);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
--- a/ssh-rsa.c
+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
static const char *
rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
return -1;
}
-static int
-rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
-{
- switch (type) {
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
- return NID_sha1;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
- return NID_sha256;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
- return NID_sha512;
- default:
- return -1;
- }
-}
-
int
ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
{
@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
{
- const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
- u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
- size_t slen = 0;
- u_int dlen, len;
- int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ int len, slen = 0;
+ int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
else
hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
+
if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
- if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-
- /* hash the data */
- nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
- goto out;
+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
+ datalen);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ if (ret < 0) {
goto out;
}
- if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
if (len < slen) {
size_t diff = slen - len;
memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+
/* encode signature */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
*lenp = len;
ret = 0;
out:
- explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
freezero(sig, slen);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *alg)
{
- const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
+ size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
len = modlen;
}
- if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
- digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
- goto out;
+ ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
- key->rsa);
out:
freezero(sigblob, len);
free(sigtype);
@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
return ret;
}
-/*
- * See:
- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
- */
-
-/*
- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
- * oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
- 0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
- 0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
- 0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
- 0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
- 0x04, 0x14 /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
-};
-
-/*
- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
- * id-sha256(1) }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
- 0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
- 0x04, 0x20 /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
-};
-
-/*
- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
- * organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
- * id-sha256(3) }
- */
-static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
- 0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
- 0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
- 0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
- 0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
- 0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
- 0x04, 0x40 /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
-};
-
static int
-rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
- switch (hash_alg) {
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
- *oidp = id_sha1;
- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
- break;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
- *oidp = id_sha256;
- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
- break;
- case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
- *oidp = id_sha512;
- *oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
- break;
- default:
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- }
- return 0;
-}
+ size_t rsasize = 0;
+ const RSA *rsa;
+ int ret;
-static int
-openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
- u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
-{
- size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
- int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
- const u_char *oid = NULL;
- u_char *decrypted = NULL;
-
- if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
- return ret;
- ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
- if (hashlen != hlen) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- goto done;
- }
+ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto done;
}
- if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto done;
- }
- if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
- RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- goto done;
- }
- if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto done;
- }
- oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
- hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
- if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
- goto done;
- }
- ret = 0;
+
+ ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
+ sigbuf, siglen);
+
done:
- freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
return ret;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+int
+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
+ int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ u_char *sig = NULL;
+ int ret, slen, len;
+
+ if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+
+ slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ len = slen;
+ if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto error;
+ }
+ if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ *sigp = sig;
+ *lenp = len;
+ /* Now owned by the caller */
+ sig = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+
+error:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ free(sig);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
+ size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
+{
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int ret;
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+ EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
+ switch (ret) {
+ case 1:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ break;
+ }
+
+done:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
int
sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
+int sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
+ int *, const u_char *, size_t);
+int sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
+ size_t, u_char *, int);
int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);

674
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

7
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
View File

@ -27,16 +27,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
else
@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
plen++;
@@ -856,9 +862,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
free(msg);
break;
+ case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
+ case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
+ sshpam_account_status = 0;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_MAXTRIES:
+ case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
+ case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
- if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
- sshpam_account_status = 0;
if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)

38
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
View File

@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
index 46dfe3a9c2e..478a9403eea 100644
--- a/compat.c
+++ b/compat.c
@@ -190,26 +190,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
char *
compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
{
- char *cp = NULL;
+ char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
return xstrdup(p);
debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
- if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ if ((cp = match_filter_denylist(p,
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
- cp = p;
- if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
free(cp);
+ cp = cp2;
}
- debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
- if (*p == '\0')
+ if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
- return p;
+ debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
+ return cp;
}

323
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch
View File

@ -1,323 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index a8e87430..f2135803 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -2399,15 +2399,26 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
struct tm tm;
time_t tt;
char buf[32], *fmt;
+ const char *cp;
+ size_t l;
+ int is_utc = 0;
*tp = 0;
+ l = strlen(s);
+ if (l > 1 && strcasecmp(s + l - 1, "Z") == 0) {
+ is_utc = 1;
+ l--;
+ } else if (l > 3 && strcasecmp(s + l - 3, "UTC") == 0) {
+ is_utc = 1;
+ l -= 3;
+ }
/*
* POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
* is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
* any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
*/
- switch (strlen(s)) {
+ switch (l) {
case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
@@ -2427,10 +2438,15 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
}
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
- if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
+ if ((cp = strptime(buf, fmt, &tm)) == NULL || *cp != '\0')
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if (is_utc) {
+ if ((tt = timegm(&tm)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ } else {
+ if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
/* success */
*tp = (uint64_t)tt;
return 0;
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
index ef6fd77d..4794dbd9 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
void test_convtime(void);
@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ void
test_convtime(void)
{
char buf[1024];
+ uint64_t t;
TEST_START("misc_convtime");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
@@ -56,4 +58,64 @@ test_convtime(void)
ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3550w5d3h14m8s"), -1);
#endif
TEST_DONE();
+
+ /* XXX timezones/DST make verification of this tricky */
+ /* XXX maybe setenv TZ and tzset() to make it unambiguous? */
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_absolute_time");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345", &t), 0);
+
+ /* forced UTC TZ */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101Z", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223Z", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345Z", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTC", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223UTC", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345UTC", &t), 0);
+ ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
+
+ /* Bad month */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20001301", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000001", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ /* Incomplete */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000010", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ /* Bad day, hour, minute, second */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000199", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001019900", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010099", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101000099", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ /* Invalid TZ specifier */
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101ZZ", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101PDT", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101U", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTCUTC", &t),
+ SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
+
+ TEST_DONE();
}
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 5f429813..6aeab1cb 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -511,8 +511,11 @@ Print the full public key to standard output after signature verification.
.It Cm verify-time Ns = Ns Ar timestamp
Specifies a time to use when validating signatures instead of the current
time.
-The time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time
-in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
+The time may be specified as a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or
+in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
+Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
+suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the
+UTC time zone.
.El
.Pp
The
@@ -603,31 +606,67 @@ A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
.Pp
-The start time may be specified as the string
+The start time may be specified as:
+.Bl -bullet -compact
+.It
+The string
.Dq always
-to indicate the certificate has no specified start time,
-a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format,
-a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
-an interval in the format described in the
+to indicate the certificate has no specified start time.
+.It
+A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
+YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+.It
+A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+.It
+A relative time before the current system time consisting of a minus sign
+followed by an interval in the format described in the
TIME FORMATS section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It
+A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
+number beginning with
+.Dq 0x .
+.El
.Pp
-The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time,
-a relative time starting with a plus character or the string
+The end time may be specified similarly to the start time:
+.Bl -bullet -compact
+.It
+The string
.Dq forever
-to indicate that the certificate has no expiry date.
+to indicate the certificate has no specified end time.
+.It
+A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
+YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
+.It
+A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
+.It
+A relative time after the current system time consisting of a plus sign
+followed by an interval in the format described in the
+TIME FORMATS section of
+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
+.It
+A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
+number beginning with
+.Dq 0x .
+.El
.Pp
For example:
-.Dq +52w1d
-(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
-.Dq -4w:+4w
-(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
-.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
-(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
-.Dq -1d:20110101
-(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011),
-.Dq -1m:forever
-(valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It +52w1d
+Valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now.
+.It -4w:+4w
+Valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now.
+.It 20100101123000:20110101123000
+Valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011.
+.It 20100101123000Z:20110101123000Z
+Similar, but interpreted in the UTC time zone rather than the system time zone.
+.It -1d:20110101
+Valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011.
+.It 0x1:0x2000000000
+Valid from roughly early 1970 to May 2033.
+.It -1m:forever
+Valid from one minute ago and never expiring.
+.El
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
@@ -1206,7 +1245,10 @@ signature object and presented on the verification command-line must
match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable.
.It Cm valid-after Ns = Ns "timestamp"
Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified timestamp,
-which may be a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
+which may be a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
+Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
+suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC
+time zone.
.It Cm valid-before Ns = Ns "timestamp"
Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the specified timestamp.
.El
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 20b321cc..9b2beda0 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1916,6 +1916,21 @@ parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
}
+static void
+parse_hex_u64(const char *s, uint64_t *up)
+{
+ char *ep;
+ unsigned long long ull;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ ull = strtoull(s, &ep, 16);
+ if (*s == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
+ fatal("Invalid certificate time: not a number");
+ if (errno == ERANGE && ull == ULONG_MAX)
+ fatal_fr(SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, "Invalid certificate time");
+ *up = (uint64_t)ull;
+}
+
static void
parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
{
@@ -1938,8 +1953,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
/*
* from:to, where
- * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always"
- * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever"
+ * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "always"
+ * to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "forever"
*/
from = xstrdup(timespec);
to = strchr(from, ':');
@@ -1951,6 +1966,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
cert_valid_from = 0;
+ else if (strncmp(from, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ parse_hex_u64(from, &cert_valid_from);
else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
@@ -1958,6 +1975,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
+ else if (strncmp(to, "0x", 2) == 0)
+ parse_hex_u64(to, &cert_valid_to);
else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index 2b50514e..8ccc5bc0 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -533,8 +533,9 @@ controlled via the
option.
.It Cm expiry-time="timespec"
Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.
-The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time
-in the system time-zone.
+The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD[Z] date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] time.
+Dates and times will be interpreted in the system time zone unless suffixed
+by a Z character, in which case they will be interpreted in the UTC time zone.
.It Cm from="pattern-list"
Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the

32
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-allow-duplicate-subsystem.patch
View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index e16f9e90fc71..a3779a9d86ee 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1942,13 +1942,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
filename, linenum, keyword);
if (!*activep) {
- arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ argv_consume(&ac);
+ break;
+ }
+ found = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (found) {
+ debug("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ argv_consume(&ac);
break;
}
- for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
- if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
- fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' "
- "already defined.", filename, linenum, arg);
options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')

292
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch
View File

@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/dh.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/dh.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/dh.c 2023-05-25 09:01:23.295627077 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/dh.c 2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "dh.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
int
dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
{
- int pbits;
- const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
+ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ int pbits, r = 0;
- DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
(pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (need < 256)
need = 256;
+
+ if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
+ (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
/*
* Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
* so double requested need here.
*/
- if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-
- if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- return 0;
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
+ MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
+ EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed key generation");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* reuse context for key generation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not create or init context");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not generate keys");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
+ error_f("The public key is incorrect");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ &pub_key) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
+ &priv_key) != 1 ||
+ DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* transferred */
+ pub_key = NULL;
+ priv_key = NULL;
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ BN_clear_free(pub_key);
+ BN_clear_free(priv_key);
+ return r;
}
DH *
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kex.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/kex.c 2023-05-25 09:01:23.299627122 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.c 2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
@@ -1603,3 +1603,47 @@
return r;
}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/*
+ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
+ * The private key can be omitted.
+ */
+int
+kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
+ const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ /* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (priv != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kexdh.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/kexdh.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/kexdh.c 2023-05-25 09:01:23.237626425 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kexdh.c 2023-05-25 09:03:21.817957988 +0200
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
{
BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
u_char *kbuf = NULL;
size_t klen = 0;
- int kout, r;
+ int kout, r = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
goto out;
}
- klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
+ /* import key */
+ r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* import peer key
+ * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
+ */
+ r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not get key size");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
(shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not derive key");
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
out:
freezero(kbuf, klen);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
}
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kex.h openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.h
--- openssh-8.7p1/kex.h 2023-05-25 09:01:23.299627122 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.h 2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# include <openssl/dh.h>
# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
@@ -278,6 +281,8 @@
const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+int kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);

207
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-ecdh.patch
View File

@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
--- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ ./kexecdh.c 2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
static int
kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+static EC_KEY *
+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
+{
+ EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ const char *group_name;
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
+ (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ return client_key;
+}
+
int
kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
int r;
- if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
+ if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
*server_blobp = NULL;
*shared_secretp = NULL;
- if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
+ if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
- EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- size_t klen = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
+ size_t klen = 0, publen;
+ const char *group_name;
int r;
+ /* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
+ if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
+ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
*shared_secretp = NULL;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+
+ /* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
+ * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
+ EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
+ error_f("Peer public key import failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- sshbuf_reset(buf);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
- sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
+ EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
#endif
- if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed to get derive information");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
+ if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
goto out;
*shared_secretp = buf;
buf = NULL;
out:
- EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ freezero(pub, publen);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}

468
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-sign.patch
View File

@ -1,468 +0,0 @@
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-dss.c ./ssh-dss.c
--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-dss.c 2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
+++ ./ssh-dss.c 2023-03-08 15:34:33.508578129 +0100
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -72,9 +74,8 @@
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
+ return ret;
ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
data, datalen);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -201,11 +202,8 @@
goto out;
}
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
- EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
goto out;
- }
ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
sigb, slen);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -221,4 +219,63 @@
freezero(sigblob, len);
return ret;
}
+
+int
+ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub = NULL, *priv = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
+ DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub, &priv);
+
+ if (p != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (g != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (pub != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ pub) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (priv != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
+ priv) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c ./ssh-ecdsa.c
--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c 2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
+++ ./ssh-ecdsa.c 2023-03-08 15:40:52.628201267 +0100
@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -72,9 +74,8 @@
if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
+ return ret;
ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
datalen);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -193,11 +194,8 @@
goto out;
}
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
- EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey) != 0)
goto out;
- }
ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -212,4 +210,76 @@
return ret;
}
+int
+ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
+ const char *group_name;
+ const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
+ (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
+ group_name,
+ strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ size_t len;
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
+ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ pub,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ pub_ser,
+ len,
+ bn_ctx);
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ pub_ser,
+ len) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ free(pub_ser);
+ return ret;
+}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c ./sshkey.c
--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c 2023-03-08 15:35:14.702943628 +0100
+++ ./sshkey.c 2023-03-08 15:39:03.354082015 +0100
@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#endif
#include "crypto_api.h"
@@ -492,13 +494,14 @@
{
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
- int ret, slen, len;
+ int ret, slen;
+ size_t len;
if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
- slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
+ slen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -511,9 +514,10 @@
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto error;
}
- if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
- EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
- EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+ NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto error;
}
@@ -540,12 +544,13 @@
if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
- if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
- EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+ NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto done;
}
- ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
+ ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
switch (ret) {
case 1:
ret = 0;
@@ -5038,3 +5043,27 @@
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+EVP_PKEY *
+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
+ debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ debug2_f("Could not build param list");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
+ debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.h ./sshkey.h
--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.h 2023-03-08 15:35:14.702943628 +0100
+++ ./sshkey.h 2023-03-08 15:34:33.509578138 +0100
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
@@ -293,6 +295,13 @@
void sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+EVP_PKEY *sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *);
+int ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
+int ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
+int ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *, int, EVP_PKEY **);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c ./ssh-rsa.c
--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c 2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
+++ ./ssh-rsa.c 2023-03-08 15:34:33.509578138 +0100
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -172,9 +174,8 @@
if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
+ return ret;
ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
datalen);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -285,11 +286,8 @@
len = modlen;
}
- if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
- EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
- ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
goto out;
- }
ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
@@ -306,11 +304,9 @@
u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
size_t rsasize = 0;
- const RSA *rsa;
int ret;
- rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
+ rsasize = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -323,4 +319,87 @@
done:
return ret;
}
+
+int
+ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+ const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
+
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
+ RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, &q);
+ RSA_get0_crt_params(k->rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
+
+ if (n != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (e != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (d != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* setting this to param_build makes the creation process fail */
+ if (p != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, p) != 1) {
+ debug2_f("failed to add 'p' param");
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (q != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, q) != 1) {
+ debug2_f("failed to add 'q' param");
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (dmp1 != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, dmp1) != 1) {
+ debug2_f("failed to add 'dmp1' param");
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (dmq1 != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, dmq1) != 1) {
+ debug2_f("failed to add 'dmq1' param");
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (iqmp != NULL &&
+ EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, iqmp) != 1) {
+ debug2_f("failed to add 'iqmp' param");
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

131
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-pkcs11.patch
View File

@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c 2023-05-24 09:39:45.002631174 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c 2023-05-24 09:09:34.400853951 +0200
@@ -74,8 +74,18 @@
if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
- return ret;
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ if (is_ecdsa_pkcs11(key->ecdsa)) {
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ } else {
+#endif
+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ }
+#endif
ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
datalen);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c 2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c 2023-05-24 09:33:59.153866357 +0200
@@ -775,8 +775,24 @@
return (0);
}
+
+int
+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
+{
+ if (EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx) != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+int
+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ if (RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx) != NULL)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* remove trailing spaces */
static void
rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c 2023-05-24 09:31:16.139092673 +0200
@@ -225,8 +225,36 @@
static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static EC_KEY_METHOD *helper_ecdsa;
+
+int
+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
+{
+ const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
+ ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
+ const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey) = NULL;
+
+ meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ecdsa);
+ EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(meth, NULL, NULL, &sign_sig);
+ if (sign_sig == ecdsa_do_sign)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+int
+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
+{
+ const RSA_METHOD *meth;
+ int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
+ unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) = NULL;
+
+ meth = RSA_get_method(rsa);
+ priv_enc = RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(meth);
+ if (priv_enc == rsa_encrypt)
+ return 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
static void
wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h 2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h 2023-05-24 09:36:49.055714975 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
u_int32_t *);
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+int is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa);
+#endif
+int is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa);
+
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
#endif
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c 2023-05-24 09:39:45.003631184 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c 2023-05-24 09:31:37.019319860 +0200
@@ -174,8 +174,18 @@
if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
- return ret;
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ if (is_rsa_pkcs11(key->rsa)) {
+ if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ } else {
+#endif
+ if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ }
+#endif
ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
datalen);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

110
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
View File

@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa 2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c 2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
@@ -1657,7 +1657,8 @@ sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
static int
rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
{
- RSA *private = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -1667,20 +1668,42 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*rsap = NULL;
- if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL
+ || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
- !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
+ *rsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res);
+ if (*rsap) {
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- *rsap = private;
- private = NULL;
- ret = 0;
out:
- RSA_free(private);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(res);
BN_free(f4);
return ret;
}
@@ -1820,7 +1820,8 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
static int
ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
{
- EC_KEY *private;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
@@ -1828,20 +1829,29 @@ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, i
if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*ecdsap = NULL;
- if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(*nid)) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
+ *ecdsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res);
+ if (*ecdsap) {
+ EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(*ecdsap, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+ ret = 0;
+ } else {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
- *ecdsap = private;
- private = NULL;
- ret = 0;
out:
- EC_KEY_free(private);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(res);
return ret;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */

13
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch
View File

@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ 2021-11-29 15:27:03.032070863 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c 2021-11-29 15:27:34.736342968 +0100
@@ -2700,7 +2700,8 @@ sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, siz
time_t now;
*verify_timep = 0;
- *print_pubkey = 0;
+ if (print_pubkey)
+ *print_pubkey = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,

20
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
View File

@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
diff --color -rup a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
--- a/monitor.c 2022-07-11 15:11:28.146863144 +0200
+++ b/monitor.c 2022-07-11 15:15:35.726655877 +0200
@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
- if (!partial && !authenticated)
+ if (!partial && !authenticated) {
+#ifdef GSSAPI
+ /* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
+ * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
+ if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
+ monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
+#endif
authctxt->failures++;
+ }
if (authenticated || partial) {
auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod);

151
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch
View File

@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
--- a/sshconnect2.c 2022-07-11 17:00:02.618575727 +0200
+++ b/sshconnect2.c 2022-07-11 17:03:05.096085690 +0200
@@ -2288,9 +2288,9 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
continue;
- if (match_pattern_list(
+ if (!sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(
sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
- authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
+ authctxt->active_ktype))
continue;
/* we take and free the key */
private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
@@ -2316,7 +2316,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
goto out;
}
- debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
+ debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s using sigalg %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp, authctxt->active_ktype);
/* figure out a name for the client host */
lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
diff --color -rup a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
--- a/sshkey.c 2022-07-11 17:00:02.609575554 +0200
+++ b/sshkey.c 2022-07-11 17:12:30.905976443 +0200
@@ -252,6 +252,29 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *n
return -1;
}
+int
+sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *keyname, const char *sigalgs)
+{
+ int ktype;
+
+ if (sigalgs == NULL || *sigalgs == '\0' ||
+ (ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(keyname)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ return 0;
+ else if (ktype == KEY_RSA) {
+ return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+ } else if (ktype == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
+ return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+ sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+ sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
+ match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
+ sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+ } else
+ return match_pattern_list(keyname, sigalgs, 0) == 1;
+}
+
char *
sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
{
diff --color -rup a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
--- a/sshkey.h 2022-07-11 17:00:02.603575438 +0200
+++ b/sshkey.h 2022-07-11 17:13:01.052556879 +0200
@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey
int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
int sshkey_type_plain(int);
+
+/* Returns non-zero if key name match sigalgs pattern list. (handles RSA) */
+int sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *, const char *);
+
int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
diff --color -rup a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
--- a/ssh-keysign.c 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ b/ssh-keysign.c 2022-07-11 17:00:23.306973667 +0200
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
extern char *__progname;
static int
-valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
+valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, char **pkalgp,
u_char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = NULL;
+ if (pkalgp != NULL)
+ *pkalgp = NULL;
fail = 0;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
@@ -122,8 +124,6 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
fail++;
} else if (key->type != pktype)
fail++;
- free(pkalg);
- free(pkblob);
/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
@@ -154,8 +154,19 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
if (fail)
sshkey_free(key);
- else if (ret != NULL)
- *ret = key;
+ else {
+ if (ret != NULL) {
+ *ret = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (pkalgp != NULL) {
+ *pkalgp = pkalg;
+ pkalg = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ free(pkalg);
+ free(pkblob);
return (fail ? -1 : 0);
}
@@ -170,7 +181,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
struct passwd *pw;
int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
u_char *signature, *data, rver;
- char *host, *fp;
+ char *host, *fp, *pkalg;
size_t slen, dlen;
if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
- if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
+ if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, &pkalg, data, dlen) < 0)
fatal("%s: not a valid request", __progname);
free(host);
@@ -279,7 +290,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ pkalg, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
fatal_r(r, "%s: sshkey_sign failed", __progname);
free(data);

7
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
View File

@ -4,9 +4,8 @@
#include "includes.h"
-#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
+#if (!defined HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
+#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <unistd.h>

31
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-man-hostkeyalgos.patch
View File

@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh_config.5
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5 2023-06-02 09:14:40.279373577 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh_config.5 2023-05-30 16:01:04.533848172 +0200
@@ -989,6 +989,17 @@
.Pp
The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+.Pp
+The proposed
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
+and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
+.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
+.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
+would break the order given by the
+.Pa known_hosts
+file.
.It Cm HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
real host name when looking up or saving the host key
@@ -1564,6 +1575,9 @@
.Pp
The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+.Pp
+This option affects also
+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be

156
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
View File

@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
diff --color -rup a/compat.c b/compat.c
--- a/compat.c 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ b/compat.c 2022-07-14 17:39:23.770268440 +0200
@@ -157,11 +157,12 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
debug_f("no match: %s", version);
}
+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
char *
compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop)
{
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
- return cipher_prop;
+ return xstrdup(cipher_prop);
debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
@@ -171,11 +172,12 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh,
return cipher_prop;
}
+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
char *
compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
{
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
- return pkalg_prop;
+ return xstrdup(pkalg_prop);
debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
@@ -185,21 +187,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, c
return pkalg_prop;
}
+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
char *
compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
{
+ char *cp = NULL;
+
if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
- return p;
+ return xstrdup(p);
debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
"curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
+ cp = p;
if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ free(cp);
}
debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
if (*p == '\0')
diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
--- a/sshconnect2.c 2022-07-14 17:38:43.241496549 +0200
+++ b/sshconnect2.c 2022-07-14 17:39:23.772268479 +0200
@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s, *all_key;
+ char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -252,10 +253,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (use_known_hosts_order) {
/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
} else {
/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
}
@@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
#endif
+ /* Free only parts of proposal that were dynamically allocated here. */
+ free(prop_kex);
+ free(prop_enc);
+ free(prop_hostkey);
}
/*
diff --color -rup a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
--- a/sshd.c 2022-07-14 17:38:43.242496568 +0200
+++ b/sshd.c 2022-07-14 17:42:07.616388978 +0200
@@ -2493,14 +2493,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
+ char *hostkey_types = NULL;
+ char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
int r;
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
options.kex_algorithms);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
- options.ciphers);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
- options.ciphers);
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
+ compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
@@ -2513,8 +2514,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- ssh, list_hostkey_types());
+ hostkey_types = list_hostkey_types();
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, hostkey_types);
+ free(hostkey_types);
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
{
@@ -2606,6 +2609,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "send test");
#endif
+ free(prop_kex);
+ free(prop_enc);
+ free(prop_hostkey);
debug("KEX done");
}

207
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
View File

@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
diff --color -ru a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
--- a/clientloop.c 2022-06-29 16:35:06.677597259 +0200
+++ b/clientloop.c 2022-06-29 16:40:29.737926205 +0200
@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
+/* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
+#define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
+
/* import options */
extern Options options;
@@ -2110,8 +2113,10 @@
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
size_t i, ndone;
struct sshbuf *signdata;
- int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
+ int r, plaintype;
const u_char *sig;
+ const char *rsa_kexalg = NULL;
+ char *alg = NULL;
size_t siglen;
if (ctx->nnew == 0)
@@ -2122,9 +2127,9 @@
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
return;
}
- kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
- sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
-
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
+ ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
+ rsa_kexalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
/*
@@ -2135,6 +2140,7 @@
for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx->keys_match[i])
continue;
+ plaintype = sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type);
/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
sshbuf_reset(signdata);
if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
@@ -2148,19 +2154,33 @@
error_fr(r, "parse sig");
goto out;
}
+ if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &alg)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "server gave unintelligible signature "
+ "for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+ goto out;
+ }
/*
- * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
- * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
+ * Special case for RSA keys: if a RSA hostkey was negotiated,
+ * then use its signature type for verification of RSA hostkey
+ * proofs. Otherwise, accept only RSA-SHA256/512 signatures.
*/
- use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
- sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
- debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using %s sigalg",
- sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i,
- use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : "default");
+ if (plaintype == KEY_RSA && rsa_kexalg == NULL &&
+ match_pattern_list(alg, HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS, 0) != 1) {
+ debug_f("server used untrusted RSA signature algorithm "
+ "%s for key %zu, disregarding", alg, i);
+ free(alg);
+ /* zap the key from the list */
+ sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
+ ctx->keys[i] = NULL;
+ ndone++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using sigalg %s",
+ sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i, alg);
+ free(alg);
if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
- use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
- NULL)) != 0) {
+ plaintype == KEY_RSA ? rsa_kexalg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
goto out;
diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
index a035b381..bd49e3ac 100644
--- a/hostfile.c
+++ b/hostfile.c
@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
/* Re-add the requested keys */
want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | (ip == NULL ? 0 : HKF_MATCH_IP);
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
- if ((want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
+ if (keys[i] == NULL || (want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
continue;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
--- a/kex.c 2022-06-29 16:35:06.775599179 +0200
+++ b/kex.c 2022-06-29 16:42:00.839710940 +0200
@@ -959,6 +959,18 @@
return (1);
}
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ free(cp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
static int
kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
{
@@ -994,6 +1006,16 @@
free(ext);
}
+ /* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+ if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+ if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+ kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
+ if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+ "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+ kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
/* Algorithm Negotiation */
if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
--- a/kex.h 2022-06-29 16:35:06.766599003 +0200
+++ b/kex.h 2022-06-29 16:42:24.199168567 +0200
@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@
#define KEX_INIT_SENT 0x0001
#define KEX_INITIAL 0x0002
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
struct sshenc {
char *name;
diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
--- a/serverloop.c 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ b/serverloop.c 2022-06-29 16:45:05.902336428 +0200
@@ -684,16 +684,18 @@
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
- int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
+ int r, ndx, success = 0;
const u_char *blob;
+ const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
u_char *sig = 0;
size_t blen, slen;
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
- kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
- sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
+ ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
+ kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
@@ -726,16 +728,24 @@
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
- use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
- sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
+ sigalg = NULL;
+ if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+ if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
+ sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
+ else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
+ sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+ else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ }
+ debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sigbuf,
ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
- use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
error_fr(r, "assemble signature");
goto out;

452
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
View File

@ -1,446 +1,22 @@
diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
index 36b9d2f5..6b517db4 100644
--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
goto done;
}
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
+ options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+ logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+ goto done;
+ }
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index 962fd342..5d59febc 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
goto done;
}
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
+ options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+ logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
+ goto done;
+ }
key_s = format_key(key);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 7f26c680..42be690b 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
- oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
+ oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
} OpCodes;
@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ static struct {
{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
--- a/readconf.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/readconf.c (date 1703169891147)
@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@
{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ { "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+ { "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
@@ -2176,6 +2177,10 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
+ case oRequiredRSASize:
+ intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
+ goto parse_int;
+
case oDeprecated:
debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
@@ -2423,6 +2428,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
+ options->required_rsa_size = -1;
}
/*
@@ -2619,6 +2625,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
#endif
+ if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
+ options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
/* Expand KEX name lists */
all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
@@ -3308,6 +3316,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
+ dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
/* String options */
dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index f647bd42..ffb5ec4f 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ typedef struct {
char *known_hosts_command;
+ int required_rsa_size; /* minimum size of RSA keys */
+
char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
} Options;
{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 29df0463..423772b1 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
options->disable_forwarding = -1;
options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
+ options->required_rsa_size = -1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
@@ -441,6 +442,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+ if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
+ options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
assemble_algorithms(options);
@@ -517,6 +520,7 @@ typedef enum {
sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
+ sRequiredRSASize,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
@@ -676,6 +680,8 @@ static struct {
{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
--- a/servconf.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/servconf.c (date 1703169891148)
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@
{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@@ -2438,6 +2443,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
+ case sRequiredRSASize:
+ intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
+ goto parse_int;
+
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
@@ -2610,6 +2619,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
/*
* The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
@@ -2874,6 +2884,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
+ dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
/* formatted integer arguments */
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 8a04463e..9346155c 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ typedef struct {
int expose_userauth_info;
u_int64_t timing_secret;
char *sk_provider;
+ int required_rsa_size; /* minimum size of RSA keys */
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 559bf2af..25be53d5 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -516,14 +516,22 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
}
/*
- * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
- * fatal()ing for others.
+ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
+ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
*/
static void
-check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
+check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
{
switch (r) {
case 0:
+ /* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
+ if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
+ (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
+ options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+ error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
+ free(*k);
+ *k = NULL;
+ }
break;
case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
@@ -1578,7 +1586,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
- p, "pubkey"); \
+ &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
} while (0)
#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
@@ -1586,7 +1594,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
- check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
+ check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
+ &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
} while (0)
if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
@@ -2244,7 +2253,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
- filename, "pubkey");
+ &public, filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.identity_files[i]);
@@ -2284,7 +2293,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
continue;
xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
- filename, "pubkey");
+ &public, filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
public ? public->type : -1);
if (public == NULL) {
@@ -2315,7 +2324,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
- filename, "certificate");
+ &public, filename, "certificate");
debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.certificate_files[i]);
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index f9bd19ea..58fe98db 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
static int
verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
+ int r;
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
+ options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
+ fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
xxx_conn_info) == -1)
fatal("Host key verification failed.");
@@ -1606,6 +1611,13 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
private = NULL;
quit = 1;
}
+ if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
+ options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ private = NULL;
+ quit = 1;
+ }
if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
!(id->key && id->isprivate))
maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
@@ -1752,6 +1764,12 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
close(agent_fd);
} else {
for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
+ options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+ debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
+ continue;
+ }
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
/*
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 17eee9d8..395ef493 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1870,6 +1870,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
options.host_key_files[i]);
}
+ if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey,
+ options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+ error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
+ sshkey_free(pubkey);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ continue;
+ }
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index ed2b5dff..77093235 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -2365,18 +2365,24 @@ cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
return ret;
}
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-static int
-check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
+int
+sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
+ int nbits;
- RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
- if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
+ (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
+ return 0;
+ RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+ nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
+ if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
+ (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return 0;
}
-#endif
static int
sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
@@ -2439,7 +2445,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
goto out;
}
rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
- if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
+ if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
@@ -3642,7 +3648,7 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
goto out;
}
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
- if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(k, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
goto out;
@@ -4644,7 +4650,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index 094815e0..be254e6b 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
int sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
+int sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *, int);
/* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index b4956aec..e255b9b9 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.It RemoteCommand
.It RemoteForward
.It RequestTTY
+.It RequiredRSASize
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 24a46460..d1ede18e 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -1634,6 +1634,17 @@ and
.Fl T
flags for
.Xr ssh 1 .
+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
+.Xr ssh 1
+will accept.
+User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
+Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
+connection to be terminated.
+The default is
+.Cm 1024
+bits.
+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
.It Cm RevokedHostKeys
Specifies revoked host public keys.
Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 867a747d..f5a06637 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -1596,6 +1596,16 @@ is
.Cm default none ,
which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
+.Xr sshd 8
+will accept.
+User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
+refused.
+The default is
+.Cm 1024
+bits.
+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
.It Cm RevokedKeys
Specifies revoked public keys file, or
.Cm none
{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },

147
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
View File

@ -1,63 +1,118 @@
diff --color -rup a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh 2022-07-14 11:58:12.172786060 +0200
@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ r=$?
grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
--- openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx 2023-05-29 18:15:56.311236887 +0200
+++ openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh 2023-05-29 18:16:07.598503551 +0200
@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
+PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
+ grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
+SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
+r=$?
+if [ $r == 0 ]; then
+echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
+fi
+fi
+
trace "load hostkeys"
-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
(
printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
@@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_host
${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
@@ -32,12 +48,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private
unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
for ps in yes; do
- for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
--- a/sshconnect2.c 2022-07-14 10:10:07.262975710 +0200
+++ b/sshconnect2.c 2022-07-14 10:10:32.068452067 +0200
@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
verbose "key type $k"
+ hka=$k
+ if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
+ hka="rsa-sha2-512"
+ fi
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
@@ -50,15 +70,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
done
SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
+SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
# Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
HOSTKEYALGS=""
-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
done
-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
@@ -70,7 +93,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >>
( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
+for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
verbose "cert type $k"
opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx 2023-04-26 17:37:35.100827792 +0200
+++ openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c 2023-04-26 17:50:31.860748877 +0200
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s, *all_key;
+ char *hostkeyalgs = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
- char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
+ char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
@@ -264,14 +265,19 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (use_known_hosts_order) {
/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
- order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
+ if ((hostkeyalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo)) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("order_hostkeyalgs");
+ pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(hostkeyalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ free(hostkeyalgs);
} else {
- /* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ /* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms */
+ pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
}
+ if (pkalg == NULL)
+ fatal_f("match_filter_allowlist");
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, pkalg);
+ free(pkalg);
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -260,10 +260,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
if (use_known_hosts_order)
hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
+ : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
+ options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
+ if (hkalgs)
+ fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
+ hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ else
+ fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ }
+
kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
compression_alg_list(options.compression),
- hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ filtered_algs);
#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
#endif
free(hkalgs);
+ free(filtered_algs);
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)

217
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
View File

@ -94,47 +94,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck 2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh 2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
EXTRA_TYPES=""
rsa=""
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck 2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile 2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit
-REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
+#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
+REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
# File based tests
file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck 2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh 2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
fi
}
-SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
-SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
+SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
+SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
# generate user key
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c 2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
@ -148,15 +107,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p
ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ do_kex(char *kex)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
- do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
+ /* do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c 2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
@ -196,22 +146,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-
TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
+ /* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
+ */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c 2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
@ -241,10 +175,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openss
{
size_t len;
u_char *sig;
+ /* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
+ int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
+ /* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
+ int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
+ if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
+ expected = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
- NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
@ -277,24 +211,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openss
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-26 12:19:23.659513651 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c 2023-01-26 12:20:28.021044803 +0100
@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ tests(void)
check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
TEST_DONE();
+ /* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
TEST_START("check DSA signature");
check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
TEST_DONE();
+ */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c 2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "compat.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
@ -304,7 +231,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+ debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
+ }
debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
@ -318,99 +245,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
+ debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+ rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
+ rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
+ debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
+ }
goto out;
}
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-12 13:29:06.355711140 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c 2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
@@ -1640,6 +1651,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
int keytype;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
+ int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
@@ -1938,6 +1950,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
key = NULL;
continue;
}
+ if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA_CERT)) {
+ size_t sign_size = 0;
+ u_char *tmp = NULL;
+ u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
+ int res;
+
+ res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ free(tmp);
+ if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
+ verbose_f("sshd: SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
+ forbid_ssh_rsa = 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) {
+ size_t sign_size = 0;
+ u_char *tmp = NULL;
+ u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
+ int res;
+
+ res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ free(tmp);
+ if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
+ logit_f("sshd: ssh-dss is disabled, skipping key file %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
+ key = NULL;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
@@ -2275,6 +2306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
check_ip_options(ssh);
+ if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
+ ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+
/* Prepare the channels layer */
channel_init_channels(ssh);
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c openssh-8.7p1_patched/ssh-keygen.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c 2023-01-18 17:41:47.894515779 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1_patched/ssh-keygen.c 2023-01-18 17:41:44.500488818 +0100
@@ -491,6 +491,8 @@
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
+ char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ char *alg = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse magic");
@@ -590,6 +592,7 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters");
BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
+ alg = rsa_safe_alg;
break;
}
rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
@@ -598,9 +601,9 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b
/* try the key */
if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
- NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
+ alg, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
- NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
+ alg, 0, NULL) != 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
free(sig);
return NULL;
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck 2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c 2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
@ -424,3 +264,34 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
diff -up openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c
--- openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx 2024-07-23 15:08:14.794350818 +0200
+++ openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c 2024-07-23 15:40:21.658456636 +0200
@@ -1305,6 +1305,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
check_ip_options(ssh);
+ {
+ struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
+ rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
+ if (rsakey == NULL)
+ rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
+
+ if (rsakey != NULL) {
+ size_t sign_size = 0;
+ u_char *tmp = NULL;
+ u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
+ int res;
+
+ res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ free(tmp);
+ if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
+ verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
+ ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
/* Prepare the channels layer */
channel_init_channels(ssh);
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);

55
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-openssl-log.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx openssh-8.7p1/log.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx 2024-10-18 13:00:56.419560563 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/log.c 2024-10-18 13:22:35.954819016 +0200
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/log.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/log.c
--- openssh-9.9p1/log.c.xxx 2024-10-22 11:55:44.281939275 +0200
+++ openssh-9.9p1/log.c 2024-10-22 11:56:16.709676267 +0200
@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "match.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#endif
static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
static int log_on_stderr = 1;
@@ -438,6 +438,26 @@ sshlog(const char *file, const char *fun
va_end(args);
}
@ -38,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/log.h.xxx openssh-8.7p1/log.h
+void sshlog_openssl(int);
void sshlogv(const char *, const char *, int, int,
LogLevel, const char *, const char *, va_list);
void sshsigdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
void sshlogdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c.yyy openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c.yyy 2024-10-18 13:27:00.709055845 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c 2024-10-18 13:27:31.638784460 +0200
@ -63,3 +73,40 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/dispatch.c.yyy openssh-8.7p1/dispatch.c
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
+ }
}
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in.xxx openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in
--- openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in.xxx 2025-01-27 12:56:58.533623367 +0100
+++ openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in 2025-01-27 12:57:41.635638843 +0100
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ sshd-session$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOM
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHD_SESSION_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS)
ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
@@ -245,20 +245,20 @@ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) lib
$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lcrypto $(LIBS)
sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS)
- $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
- $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lcrypto $(LIBS)
$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \

196
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
View File

@ -1,174 +1,182 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs 2022-02-07 12:31:07.407740407 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c 2022-02-07 12:31:07.409740424 +0100
@@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
--- a/scp.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/scp.c (date 1703111453316)
@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@
if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
- SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
+ SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
src, abs_dst);
if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
- SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
errs = 1;
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c 2022-02-07 12:47:59.117516131 +0100
@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
}
diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
--- a/sftp-client.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/sftp-client.c (date 1703169614263)
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@
/* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
static char *
-do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
+sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_int expected_id, count, id;
@@ -1012,9 +1012,38 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
- error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
- error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
- path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
- free(errmsg);
- sshbuf_free(msg);
- return NULL;
+ if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir) {
+ memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
+ if ((r = do_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
+ send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
+ path, strlen(path));
+
+ get_msg(conn, msg);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse");
+
+ if (id != expected_id)
+ fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
+
+ if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
+ u_int status;
+ free(errmsg);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+ error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+ path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+ free(errmsg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ } else {
+ error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
+ error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+ path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+ free(errmsg);
+ sshbuf_free(msg);
+ return NULL;
+ }
} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
@@ -1039,9 +1067,9 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@
}
char *
-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
{
- return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+ return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
- return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+ return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
}
int
@@ -1055,9 +1083,9 @@ do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, c
@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@
{
if (!can_expand_path(conn)) {
if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
- return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+ return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
- return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
+ return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
}
- return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
+ return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
- return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
+ return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
}
int
@@ -1807,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@
char *src_canon;
int ret;
- if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+ if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
- if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+ if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
return -1;
}
@@ -2115,12 +2143,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
@@ -2365,12 +2397,12 @@
int
upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
- int follow_link_flag)
+ int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
- int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
{
char *dst_canon;
int ret;
- if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
+ if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
- if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
+ if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
return -1;
}
@@ -2557,7 +2585,7 @@ crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, st
@@ -2825,7 +2857,7 @@
char *from_path_canon;
int ret;
- if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
+ if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", from_path);
- if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
+ if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
from_path);
return -1;
}
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h
--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h 2022-02-07 12:31:07.410740433 +0100
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, cons
int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
--- a/sftp-client.h (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/sftp-client.h (date 1703111691284)
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
/* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
/* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
char *do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const
char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
* times if 'pflag' is set
*/
int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
- int, int);
+ int, int, int);
int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
- int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
/*
* Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c 2022-02-07 12:31:07.411740442 +0100
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
--- a/sftp.c (revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
+++ b/sftp.c (date 1703168795365)
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@
(rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
- fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn
if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@
if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
+ if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
- if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
+ if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
err = 1;
break;
}
@@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn,
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
- remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
+ remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".", 0);
if (remote_path == NULL)
- if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
+ if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
fatal("Need cwd");
startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);

14
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-redhat-help.patch
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
--- a/ssh.c 2025-07-21 16:24:30.348843762 +0200
+++ b/ssh.c 2025-07-21 16:27:20.477953307 +0200
@@ -174,6 +174,17 @@ static int forward_confirms_pending = -1
--- a/ssh.c 2025-07-17 14:08:37.880551301 +0200
+++ b/ssh.c 2025-07-17 15:02:09.224627879 +0200
@@ -175,6 +175,17 @@ static int forward_confirms_pending = -1
extern int muxserver_sock;
extern u_int muxclient_command;
@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+redhat_help_message(void)
+{
+ if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
+ isatty(fileno(stderr))) {
+ isatty(fileno(stderr))) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"\nThe link below provides guidance on resolving common SSH errors:\n"
+" https://red.ht/support_rhel_ssh\n");
@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
static void
@@ -1609,8 +1620,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
@@ -1648,8 +1659,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
options.connection_attempts,
if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, options.host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr,
options.port, options.connection_attempts,
- &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
+ &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) {
+ redhat_help_message();

304
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
View File

@ -1,304 +0,0 @@
diff --color -rup a/scp.c b/scp.c
--- a/scp.c 2022-07-26 14:51:40.560120817 +0200
+++ b/scp.c 2022-07-26 14:52:37.118213004 +0200
@@ -1324,12 +1324,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
- SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
src, abs_dst);
errs = 1;
}
- } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
+ } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
errs = 1;
}
@@ -1566,11 +1566,11 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
+ pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- pflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ pflag, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
err = -1;
}
free(abs_dst);
diff --color -rup a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
--- a/sftp.c 2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
+++ b/sftp.c 2022-07-26 14:52:37.119213023 +0200
@@ -666,12 +666,12 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
}
free(abs_dst);
@@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
- fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
+ fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
err = -1;
}
}
diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
--- a/sftp-client.c 2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
+++ b/sftp-client.c 2022-07-26 15:09:54.825295533 +0200
@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ progress_meter_path(const char *path)
int
do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
- int fsync_flag)
+ int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char *handle;
@@ -1498,8 +1498,8 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
&handle, &handle_len) != 0)
return -1;
- local_fd = open(local_path,
- O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
+ local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT |
+ ((resume_flag || inplace_flag) ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
if (local_fd == -1) {
error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
local_path, strerror(errno));
@@ -1661,8 +1661,11 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
/* Sanity check */
if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
- /* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
- if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
+ /*
+ * Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt,
+ * or unconditionally if writing in place.
+ */
+ if (inplace_flag || read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
if (reordered && resume_flag) {
error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
"server reordered requests", local_path);
@@ -1724,7 +1727,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
static int
download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
- int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
+ int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
{
int i, ret = 0;
SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
@@ -1781,7 +1784,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
print_flag, resume_flag,
- fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
+ fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
ret = -1;
} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
(follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
@@ -1793,7 +1796,8 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
&(dir_entries[i]->a),
- preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
+ preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
+ inplace_flag) == -1) {
error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
new_src, new_dst);
ret = -1;
@@ -1831,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
int
download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
- int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
+ int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
{
char *src_canon;
int ret;
@@ -1843,26 +1847,25 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
- follow_link_flag);
+ follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
free(src_canon);
return ret;
}
int
do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
- const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
+ const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume,
+ int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
{
int r, local_fd;
- u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
- u_int id;
- u_char type;
+ u_int openmode, id, status = SSH2_FX_OK, reordered = 0;
off_t offset, progress_counter;
- u_char *handle, *data;
+ u_char type, *handle, *data;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct stat sb;
- Attrib a, *c = NULL;
- u_int32_t startid;
- u_int32_t ackid;
+ Attrib a, t, *c = NULL;
+ u_int32_t startid, ackid;
+ u_int64_t highwater = 0;
struct request *ack = NULL;
struct requests acks;
size_t handle_len;
@@ -1913,10 +1916,15 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
}
}
+ openmode = SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT;
+ if (resume)
+ openmode |= SSH2_FXF_APPEND;
+ else if (!inplace_flag)
+ openmode |= SSH2_FXF_TRUNC;
+
/* Send open request */
- if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
- (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC),
- &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
+ if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", openmode, &a,
+ &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
close(local_fd);
return -1;
}
@@ -1999,6 +2007,12 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
++ackid;
progress_counter += ack->len;
+ if (!reordered && ack->offset <= highwater)
+ highwater = ack->offset + ack->len;
+ else if (!reordered && ack->offset > highwater) {
+ debug3_f("server reordered ACKs");
+ reordered = 1;
+ }
free(ack);
}
offset += len;
@@ -2017,6 +2031,14 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
}
+ if (inplace_flag || (resume && (status != SSH2_FX_OK || interrupted))) {
+ debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
+ attrib_clear(&t);
+ t.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
+ t.size = highwater;
+ do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &t);
+ }
+
if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
strerror(errno));
@@ -2041,7 +2063,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
static int
upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
- int follow_link_flag)
+ int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
{
int ret = 0;
DIR *dirp;
@@ -2119,12 +2141,13 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
- fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
+ fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
ret = -1;
} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) ||
(follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) {
if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
+ preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag,
+ inplace_flag) == -1) {
error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
new_src, new_dst);
ret = -1;
@@ -2144,7 +2167,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
int
upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
- int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
+ int follow_link_flag, int create_dir, int inplace_flag)
{
char *dst_canon;
int ret;
@@ -2155,7 +2178,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
}
ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
- print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag);
+ print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
free(dst_canon);
return ret;
diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
--- a/sftp-client.h 2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
+++ b/sftp-client.h 2022-07-26 14:52:37.120213042 +0200
@@ -138,28 +138,29 @@ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_c
* Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
* if 'pflag' is set
*/
-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
- Attrib *, int, int, int);
+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
+ int, int, int, int);
/*
* Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
* times if 'pflag' is set
*/
-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
- Attrib *, int, int, int, int, int);
+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
+ int, int, int, int, int, int);
/*
* Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
* if 'pflag' is set
*/
-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+ int, int, int, int);
/*
* Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
* times if 'pflag' is set
*/
-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
- int, int, int);
+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+ int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
/*
* Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to

4
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
View File

@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp 2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1 2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
By default a 32KB buffer is used.
.El
.El
+.Pp
+Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable

129
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
View File

@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
index 68aac04b..a96e95ad 100644
--- a/scp.1
+++ b/scp.1
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
.\"
.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.101 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 8 2021 $
.Dt SCP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
.Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm scp
-.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
+.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrTv
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ It uses
.Xr ssh 1
for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
same security as a login session.
-The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
-.Xr glob 3
-pattern matching.
.Pp
.Nm
will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
@@ -79,7 +76,9 @@ The options are as follows:
Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
hosts.
-Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option
+Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (via the
+.Fl O
+flag), this option
selects batch mode for the second host as
.Nm
cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
@@ -146,9 +145,10 @@ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
.It Fl O
Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
-not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
-wildcard patterns.
-This mode is the default.
+not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
+wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
+.Sq ~
+prefix for older SFTP servers.
.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to
.Nm ssh
@@ -258,16 +258,6 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
The program must understand
.Xr ssh 1
options.
-.It Fl s
-Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol.
-Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides
-more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol
-relied on the remote shell for expanding
-.Xr glob 3
-wildcards.
-.Pp
-A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default.
-This option will be deleted before the end of 2022.
.It Fl T
Disable strict filename checking.
By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
@@ -299,11 +289,23 @@ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
+.Sh CAVEATS
+The original scp protocol (selected by the
+.Fl O
+flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
+.Xr glob 3
+pattern matching.
+This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
+the remote shell, such as quote characters.
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
is based on the rcp program in
.Bx
source code from the Regents of the University of California.
+.Pp
+Since OpenSSH 8.8 (8.7 in Red Hat/Fedora builds),
+.Nm
+has use the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index e039350c..c7cf7529 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.233 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
const char *errstr;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
- enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
+ enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
char *sftp_direct = NULL;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ void
usage(void)
{
(void) fprintf(stderr,
- "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
+ "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
" [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
" [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
exit(1);

167
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch
View File

@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs 2022-02-02 14:11:12.553447509 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c 2022-02-02 14:12:56.081316414 +0100
@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@
#include "misc.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "utf8.h"
+#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
@@ -660,7 +661,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
* Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
* and no error has occurred yet
*/
- if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
+ if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && (mode == MODE_SFTP || errs == 0)) {
if (remin != -1)
(void) close(remin);
if (remout != -1)
@@ -1264,13 +1265,18 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_
static char *
prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
+ size_t nslash;
+
/* Handle ~ prefixed paths */
- if (*path != '~')
- return xstrdup(path);
if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0)
return xstrdup(".");
- if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0)
- return xstrdup(path + 2);
+ if (*path != '~')
+ return xstrdup(path);
+ if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
+ if ((nslash = strspn(path + 2, "/")) == strlen(path + 2))
+ return xstrdup(".");
+ return xstrdup(path + 2 + nslash);
+ }
if (can_expand_path(conn))
return do_expand_path(conn, path);
/* No protocol extension */
@@ -1282,10 +1288,16 @@ void
source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
{
char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
- int target_is_dir;
-
+ int src_is_dir, target_is_dir;
+ Attrib a;
+ struct stat st;
+
+ memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
+ if (stat(src, &st) != 0)
+ fatal("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ src_is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
- fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
/*
* No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
@@ -1295,8 +1307,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
cleanup_exit(255);
target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target);
if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) {
- fatal("Target is not a directory, but more files selected "
- "for upload");
+ debug("target directory \"%s\" does not exist", target);
+ a.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
+ a.perm = st.st_mode | 0700; /* ensure writable */
+ if (do_mkdir(conn, target, &a, 1) != 0)
+ cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */
+ target_is_dir = 1;
}
if (target_is_dir)
abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
@@ -1306,14 +1322,17 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
}
debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst);
- if (local_is_dir(src) && iamrecursive) {
+ if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
- fatal("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
src, abs_dst);
+ errs = 1;
}
- } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0)
- fatal("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
+ } else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
+ error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
+ errs = 1;
+ }
free(abs_dst);
free(target);
@@ -1487,14 +1506,15 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
char *abs_dst = NULL;
glob_t g;
char *filename, *tmp = NULL;
- int i, r, err = 0;
+ int i, r, err = 0, dst_is_dir;
+ struct stat st;
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
+
/*
* Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell
* expansions
*/
-
if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) {
err = -1;
goto out;
@@ -1510,11 +1530,24 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
goto out;
}
- if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !local_is_dir(dst)) {
- error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
- "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
- err = -1;
- goto out;
+ if ((r = stat(dst, &st)) != 0)
+ debug2_f("stat local \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
+ dst_is_dir = r == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+
+ if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !dst_is_dir) {
+ if (r == 0) {
+ error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
+ "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug2_f("creating destination \"%s\"", dst);
+ if (mkdir(dst, 0777) != 0) {
+ error("local mkdir \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
+ err = -1;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dst_is_dir = 1;
}
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
@@ -1525,7 +1558,7 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
goto out;
}
- if (local_is_dir(dst))
+ if (dst_is_dir)
abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
else
abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
@@ -1551,7 +1584,8 @@ out:
free(tmp);
globfree(&g);
if (err == -1) {
- fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src);
+ error("Failed to download '%s'", src);
+ errs = 1;
}
}

21
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sigpipe.patch
View File

@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 89ca1940..559bf2af 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1124,6 +1124,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
}
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+
/*
* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
* goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
@@ -1652,7 +1654,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
options.num_system_hostfiles);
tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
- ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
/* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */

2
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
View File

@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
.It ControlPersist
.It DynamicForward
+.It EnableSSHKeysign
.It EnableEscapeCommandline
.It EscapeChar
.It ExitOnForwardFailure
.It FingerprintHash
@@ -538,6 +540,8 @@
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent

25
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
View File

@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
#endif
#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
#include <net/if.h>
@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ if (geteuid() == 0 &&
+ initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+ error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
+ pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
strerror(errno));

16
SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc
View File

@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
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=xI/+
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

595
SOURCES/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/dh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c
--- openssh-9.0p1/dh.c 2023-05-25 09:24:28.730868316 +0200
+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c 2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/fips.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "dh.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
int
dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
{
- int pbits;
- const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
+ const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
+ BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ int pbits, r = 0;
- DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
+ DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
(pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (need < 256)
need = 256;
+
+ if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
+ (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
/*
* Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
* so double requested need here.
*/
- if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-
- if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
- return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
- if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- return 0;
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
+ MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
+ EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed key generation");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* reuse context for key generation */
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not create or init context");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not generate keys");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
+ error_f("The public key is incorrect");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ &pub_key) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
+ &priv_key) != 1 ||
+ DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* transferred */
+ pub_key = NULL;
+ priv_key = NULL;
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ BN_clear_free(pub_key);
+ BN_clear_free(priv_key);
+ return r;
}
DH *
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c
--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.c 2023-05-25 09:24:28.731868327 +0200
+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c 2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
@@ -1623,3 +1623,142 @@
return r;
}
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/*
+ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
+ * The private key can be omitted.
+ */
+EVP_PKEY *
+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
+ debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ debug2_f("Could not build param list");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
+ debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
+ uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
+ const char *group_name;
+ const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
+ (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
+ group_name,
+ strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
+ const EC_GROUP *group;
+ size_t len;
+
+ group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
+ len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
+ pub,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ pub_ser,
+ len,
+ bn_ctx);
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
+ pub_ser,
+ len) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ free(pub_ser);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
+ const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
+{
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int r = 0;
+
+ /* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (priv != NULL &&
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+out:
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c
--- openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c 2023-05-25 09:24:28.674867692 +0200
+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c 2023-05-25 09:25:28.494533889 +0200
@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include <openssl/dh.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
{
BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
u_char *kbuf = NULL;
size_t klen = 0;
- int kout, r;
+ int r = 0;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
goto out;
}
- klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
+
+ DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
+ DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
+ /* import key */
+ r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* import peer key
+ * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
+ */
+ r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
+ if (r != 0) {
+ error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
+ error_f("Could not get key size");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
(shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
+ BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not derive key");
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
+ dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
out:
freezero(kbuf, klen);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
}
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.h openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h
--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.h 2023-05-25 09:24:28.725868260 +0200
+++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h 2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# include <openssl/dh.h>
# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
@@ -283,6 +286,9@@
const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+int kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
+ const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
+int kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
--- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c 2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
+++ ./kexecdh.c 2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
#include <signal.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "log.h"
static int
kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+static EC_KEY *
+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
+{
+ EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ const char *group_name;
+
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
+ goto out;
+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
+ (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
+ goto out;
+ }
+out:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ return client_key;
+}
+
int
kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
int r;
- if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
+ if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
*server_blobp = NULL;
*shared_secretp = NULL;
- if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
+ if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
- EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
- u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- size_t klen = 0;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
+ OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
+ u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
+ size_t klen = 0, publen;
+ const char *group_name;
int r;
+ /* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
+ if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
+ error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
*shared_secretp = NULL;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
goto out;
- if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
+
+ /* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
+ * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
+ if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
+ OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
+ (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
+ error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
+ EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
+ error_f("Peer public key import failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- sshbuf_reset(buf);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
- sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
+ EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
#endif
- if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
- r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ ctx = NULL;
+ if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
+ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
+ error_f("Failed to get derive information");
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
- klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
- if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
- BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
#endif
+ if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
goto out;
*shared_secretp = buf;
buf = NULL;
out:
- EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
+ OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
+ OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ freezero(pub, publen);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}

57
SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
return;
}
+ /*
+ * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2. The "SSH-"
+ * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
+ * large banner which we must read and ignore. Loop while reading
+ * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
+ * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
+ * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
+ * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
+ */
for (;;) {
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
@@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
conrecycle(s);
return;
}
+ if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
+ error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
+ confree(s);
+ return;
+ }
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
confree(s);
diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
index 1e3b6398..eb2a931e 100644
--- a/sshsig.c
+++ b/sshsig.c
@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
{
char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
ssize_t n, total = 0;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
+ struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = NULL;
int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
@@ -549,9 +548,11 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
+ oerrno = errno;
sshbuf_free(b);
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ errno = oerrno;
return r;
}

52
SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
View File

@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
--- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
+++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c 2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
/*
* OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
- * within a patch series.
+ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
+ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
+ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
+ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
*/
int
@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
if (headerver == libver)
return 1;
- /* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
- if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
- mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
+ /*
+ * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
+ */
+ if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
+ mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
}
/*
- * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
- * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
+ * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
*/
mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
--- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check 2023-11-27 14:54:32.959113758 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac 2023-11-27 14:54:49.467500523 +0100
@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
;;
101*) ;; # 1.1.x
200*) ;; # LibreSSL
- 300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
+ 30*) ;; # OpenSSL 3.x series
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
;;

17
SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
View File

@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
- if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
- error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- goto fail;
- }
+ if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
+ fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
p->module->handle = handle;
/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */

33
SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
View File

@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
--- a/auth2.c 8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000 1.166
+++ b/auth2.c 28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
}
#define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
+#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
static double
user_specific_delay(const char *user)
{
@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start,
struct timespec ts;
double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
+ if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
+ debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
+ "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
+ return;
+ }
+
/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
seconds *= 2;
@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
authenticated = m->userauth(ssh);
}
- if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+ if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);

447
SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
View File

@ -1,447 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
described at:
http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
+
+OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
+a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
+RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
+initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
+"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
+may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
+are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
+if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
+
+When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
+name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
+the the protocol:
+
+a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
+ out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
+ connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
+ Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
+ that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
+ SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
+b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
+ packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
+ duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
+ SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
+
2. Connection protocol changes
2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
#endif
/* prototype */
-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
return 1;
}
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+ char *cp;
+
+ if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ free(cp);
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
* Caller must free returned string.
@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
- char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+ char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
- free(m);
+ if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
- }
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
- error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+ /* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
+ "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
+ }
+ error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
return r;
+ if (ninfo >= 1024) {
+ error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
+ "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
+ return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
+ }
for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
error_f("no kex");
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
- if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+ if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
return (1);
}
-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
static int
-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
{
- char *cp;
-
- if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
- return 0;
- free(cp);
- return 1;
+ return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
}
static int
-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct newkeys *newkeys;
@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
sprop=peer;
}
- /* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
- if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
- char *ext;
-
- ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
- kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
- free(ext);
+ /* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
+ if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ if (kex->server) {
+ kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
+ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+ "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
+ } else {
+ kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+ }
+ if (kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering");
+ if (seq != 0)
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ "strict KEX violation: "
+ "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
+ }
}
/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
u_int kex_type;
char *server_sig_algs;
int ext_info_c;
+ int kex_strict;
struct sshbuf *my;
struct sshbuf *peer;
struct sshbuf *client_version;
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
- if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+ if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
+ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+ }
logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+ }
if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
state->p_send.bytes += len;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
+ state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
+ }
+
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
- r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
- if (r != 0)
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
+
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
- if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+ if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
+ if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+ ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
+ "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+ }
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+ }
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
+ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+ debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
+ state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
+ }
if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
- if (*typep) {
- state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
- DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+ if (*typep == 0) {
+ /* no message ready */
+ return 0;
}
+ state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+ DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+
+ /* Always process disconnect messages */
+ if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
+ if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+ do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+ reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+ "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+ free(msg);
+ return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
+ * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
+ * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
+ * protocol errors.
+ */
+ if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
+ (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
+ return 0;
+ /* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
switch (*typep) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
- case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
- if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
- return r;
- /* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
- do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
- reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
- "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
- "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
- ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
- free(msg);
- return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
+ debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
free(all_key);
- if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+ "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
};
static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
- ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */
pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
}
/* ARGSUSED */
-static int
-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
-{
- return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
-}
-
void
userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
{
@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
+ ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
return 0;
}
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict 2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c 2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
struct kex *kex;
char *hostkey_types = NULL;
char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ char *cp;
int r;
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
- options.kex_algorithms);
+ if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+ "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
if (gss && orig)
xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
else if (gss)
- newstr = gss;
+ xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
else if (orig)
newstr = orig;
@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
#endif
free(prop_kex);
free(prop_enc);
+ free(cp);
free(prop_hostkey);
debug("KEX done");
}

57
SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
free(cinfo);
}
+static int
+valid_hostname(const char *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (*s == '-')
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
+ isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+valid_ruser(const char *s)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (*s == '-')
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+ if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
+ return 0;
+ /* Disallow \ in last position */
+ if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+
/*
* Main program for the ssh client.
*/
@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (!host)
usage();
+ if (!valid_hostname(host))
+ fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
+ if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
+ fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
host_arg = xstrdup(host);
/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */

4008
SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch → SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
View File

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

32
SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 26f366e263e575c4e1a18e2e64ba418f58878b37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 20:22:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Only set PAM_RHOST if the remote host is not "UNKNOWN"
When using sshd's -i option with stdio that is not a AF_INET/AF_INET6
socket, auth_get_canonical_hostname() returns "UNKNOWN" which is then
set as the value of PAM_RHOST, causing pam to try to do a reverse DNS
query of "UNKNOWN", which times out multiple times, causing a
substantial slowdown when logging in.
To fix this, let's only set PAM_RHOST if the hostname is not "UNKNOWN".
---
auth-pam.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
index e143304e3..39b4e4563 100644
--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
}
- if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
+ if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
sshpam_rhost);
--
2.44.0

30
SOURCES/openssh-9.8p1-upstream-cve-2024-6387.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx openssh-8.7p1/log.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx 2024-06-28 11:02:43.949912398 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/log.c 2024-06-28 11:02:58.652297885 +0200
@@ -455,12 +455,14 @@ void
sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
{
+#if 0
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
suffix, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
+#endif
_exit(1);
}
diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.xxx openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.xxx 2024-07-01 10:33:04.332907749 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c 2024-07-01 10:33:47.843998038 +0200
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
/* Log error and exit. */
if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid <= 0)
- cleanup_exit(255); /* don't log in privsep child */
+ _exit(255); /* don't log in privsep child */
else {
sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),

68
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-bad-hostkey.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
--- a/hostfile.c 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/hostfile.c 2025-04-30 15:52:02.792091018 +0200
@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
#include "hmac.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
+static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+
+void
+hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
+{
+ required_rsa_size = size;
+}
+
/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
static int
@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_li
struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
+ int r = 0;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_li
return 0;
}
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
+ debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
+ l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
(l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
diff --color -ruNp a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
--- a/hostfile.h 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/hostfile.h 2025-04-30 15:17:44.789206468 +0200
@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *pa
const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
+void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
#endif
diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
--- a/ssh.c 2025-04-29 15:40:27.916735894 +0200
+++ b/ssh.c 2025-04-30 15:19:48.856855308 +0200
@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "utf8.h"
+#include "hostfile.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
@@ -1395,6 +1396,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
}
}
+ hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");

120
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/auth.c b/auth.c
--- a/auth.c 2025-10-29 09:57:20.440640281 +0100
+++ b/auth.c 2025-10-29 09:57:54.747956792 +0100
@@ -476,8 +476,12 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
u_int i;
ci = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
- ci->user = user;
- ci->user_invalid = getpwnam(user) == NULL;
+ pw = getpwnam(user);
+ if (pw != NULL && options.canonical_match_user)
+ ci->user = pw->pw_name;
+ else
+ ci->user = user;
+ ci->user_invalid = pw == NULL;
parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
log_verbose_reset();
diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
--- a/servconf.c 2025-10-29 09:57:20.502465586 +0100
+++ b/servconf.c 2025-10-29 09:57:54.748205464 +0100
@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
options->unused_connection_timeout = -1;
options->sshd_session_path = NULL;
options->refuse_connection = -1;
+ options->canonical_match_user = -1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
@@ -526,6 +527,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
options->sshd_session_path = xstrdup(_PATH_SSHD_SESSION);
if (options->refuse_connection == -1)
options->refuse_connection = 0;
+ if (options->canonical_match_user == -1)
+ options->canonical_match_user = 0;
assemble_algorithms(options);
@@ -609,7 +612,7 @@ typedef enum {
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
sRequiredRSASize, sChannelTimeout, sUnusedConnectionTimeout,
- sSshdSessionPath, sRefuseConnection,
+ sSshdSessionPath, sRefuseConnection, sCanonicalMatchUser,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
@@ -798,6 +801,7 @@ static struct {
{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "refuseconnection", sRefuseConnection, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "canonicalmatchuser", sCanonicalMatchUser, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
@@ -2807,6 +2811,11 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
goto parse_multistate;
+ case sCanonicalMatchUser:
+ intptr = &options->canonical_match_user;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ goto parse_multistate;
+
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
@@ -3028,6 +3037,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
M_CP_INTOPT(unused_connection_timeout);
M_CP_INTOPT(refuse_connection);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(canonical_match_user);
/*
* The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
@@ -3368,6 +3378,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sRefuseConnection, o->refuse_connection);
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(sCanonicalMatchUser, o->canonical_match_user);
/* string arguments */
dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
--- a/servconf.h 2025-10-29 09:57:20.503199202 +0100
+++ b/servconf.h 2025-10-29 09:57:54.749236422 +0100
@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ typedef struct {
char *sshd_session_path;
int refuse_connection;
+
+ int canonical_match_user;
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
--- a/sshd_config.5 2025-10-29 09:57:20.503465608 +0100
+++ b/sshd_config.5 2025-10-29 09:57:54.749544972 +0100
@@ -1384,6 +1384,7 @@ Available keywords are
.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
.Cm PubkeyAuthOptions ,
.Cm RefuseConnection ,
+.Cm CanonicalMatchUser ,
.Cm RekeyLimit ,
.Cm RevokedKeys ,
.Cm RDomain ,
@@ -1828,6 +1829,13 @@ are enabled.
This option is only really useful in a
.Cm Match
block.
+.It Cm CanonicalMatchUser
+Some password databases allow users to define aliases for their username.
+This directive indicates that
+.Xr sshd 8
+should attempt to first obtain a canonical username from a password database before evaluating a
+.Cm Match User
+conditional block.
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or received
before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum

101
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compat-mlkem.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/compat.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/compat.c
--- openssh-9.9p1/compat.c.xxx 2026-02-25 12:58:14.083760269 +0100
+++ openssh-9.9p1/compat.c 2026-02-25 13:28:21.154300255 +0100
@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/fips.h>
/* determine bug flags from SSH protocol banner */
void
@@ -143,13 +145,40 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
}
+/*
+ * 0 - unavailable
+ * 1 - available in non-FIPS mode
+ * 2 - available always
+ */
+static int is_mlkem768_available()
+{
+ static int is_fetched = -1;
+
+ if (is_fetched == -1) {
+ EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = NULL;
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ is_fetched = (mlkem768 == NULL) ? 0 : 2;
+ if (is_fetched == 0 && FIPS_mode() == 1) {
+ mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", "provider=default,-fips");
+ is_fetched = (mlkem768 == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
+ }
+ EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ }
+
+ return is_fetched;
+}
+
/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
char *
compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *p)
{
char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
+ int ml_kem_available = is_mlkem768_available();
- if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+ if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0 && is_mlkem768_available() == 2)
return xstrdup(p);
debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
@@ -164,6 +199,25 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, con
free(cp);
cp = cp2;
}
+ if (ml_kem_available == 2)
+ return cp ? cp : xstrdup(p);
+ if (ml_kem_available == 1 && FIPS_mode()) {
+ if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
+ "mlkem768x25519-sha256")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ free(cp);
+ cp = cp2;
+ }
+ if (ml_kem_available == 0) {
+ if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
+ "mlkem768x25519-sha256,"
+ "mlkem768nistp256-sha256,"
+ "mlkem1024nistp384-sha384")) == NULL)
+ fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ free(cp);
+ cp = cp2;
+ }
+
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c
--- openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c.xxx 2026-02-25 14:52:59.802597974 +0100
+++ openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c 2026-02-25 15:31:13.376020525 +0100
@@ -291,8 +291,14 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
- if (FIPS_mode())
- error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+ if (FIPS_mode()) {
+ if ((strcmp(p, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0)) {
+ debug("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+ continue;
+ }
+ else
+ error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
+ }
else
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
free(s);

13
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compression-directive.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 9f559269..777739d6 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -3410,6 +3410,8 @@ fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val)
switch (code) {
case oAddressFamily:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
+ case oCompression:
+ return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
case oUpdateHostkeys:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask);

22
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c
--- a/session.c 2025-04-29 11:20:59.475107377 +0200
+++ b/session.c 2025-04-29 11:23:16.638538968 +0200
@@ -2284,7 +2284,8 @@ session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh,
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
- !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
+ !options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
+ options.disable_forwarding) {
debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
return 0;
}
@@ -2709,7 +2710,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Se
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
return 0;
}
- if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
+ if (!options.x11_forwarding || options.disable_forwarding) {
debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
return 0;
}

42
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
diff -up openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/gss-genr.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/gss-genr.c
--- a/gss-genr.c.xxx 2025-09-01 17:15:41.070677784 +0200
+++ b/gss-genr.c 2025-09-01 17:31:20.376362078 +0200
@@ -149,19 +149,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
(*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
+ EVP_MD_CTX * ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_MD *md5 = NULL; /* Here we don't use MD5 for crypto purposes */
+ unsigned int md_size = sizeof(digest);
deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
-
- if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
- (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 ||
- (r = ssh_digest_update(md,
- gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
- gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
- (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
+ if ((md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, "MD5", "provider=default,-fips")) == NULL)
+ fatal_fr(r, "MD5 fetch failed");
+ if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md5);
+ fatal_fr(r, "digest ctx failed");
+ }
+ if (EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md5) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, deroid, 2) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+ gss_supported->elements[i].length) <= 0
+ || EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, digest, &md_size) <= 0) {
+ EVP_MD_free(md5);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
- ssh_digest_free(md);
- md = NULL;
+ }
+ EVP_MD_free(md5); md5 = NULL;
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL;
encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)
* 2);

471
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index afdf5142..1b4b55c5 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ rtrim(char *s)
}
}
+/*
+ * returns pointer to character after 'prefix' in 's' or otherwise NULL
+ * if the prefix is not present.
+ */
+const char *
+strprefix(const char *s, const char *prefix, int ignorecase)
+{
+ size_t prefixlen;
+
+ if ((prefixlen = strlen(prefix)) == 0)
+ return s;
+ if (ignorecase) {
+ if (strncasecmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (strncmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return s + prefixlen;
+}
+
/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
int
set_nonblock(int fd)
diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
index 11340389..efecdf1a 100644
--- a/misc.h
+++ b/misc.h
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct ForwardOptions {
char *chop(char *);
void rtrim(char *);
void skip_space(char **);
+const char *strprefix(const char *, const char *, int);
char *strdelim(char **);
char *strdelimw(char **);
int set_nonblock(int);
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index 3d9cc6db..9f559269 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host,
int final_pass, int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
- char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *host, *criteria;
+ char *arg, *oattrib = NULL, *attrib = NULL, *cmd, *host, *criteria;
const char *ruser;
int r, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
full_line, host, original_host);
- while ((oattrib = attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
+ while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
+ attrib = oattrib = xstrdup(attrib);
/* Terminate on comment */
if (*attrib == '#') {
argv_consume(acp);
@@ -777,9 +778,23 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
continue;
}
+
+ /* Keep this list in sync with below */
+ if (strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "originalhost=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "localuser=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "localnetwork=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "tagged=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "exec=", 1) != NULL) {
+ arg = strchr(attrib, '=');
+ *(arg++) = '\0';
+ } else {
+ arg = argv_next(acp, avp);
+ }
+
/* All other criteria require an argument */
- if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL ||
- *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
+ if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
@@ -856,6 +871,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
criteria == NULL ? "" : criteria,
criteria == NULL ? "" : "\"");
free(criteria);
+ free(oattrib);
+ oattrib = attrib = NULL;
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
@@ -865,6 +882,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
out:
if (result != -1)
debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+ free(oattrib);
free(host);
return result;
}
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index 89b8413e..dd774f46 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.418 2024/09/15 03:09:44 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.419 2024/09/25 01:24:04 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
int line, struct connection_info *ci)
{
int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
- char *arg, *attrib;
+ char *arg, *attrib = NULL, *oattrib;
if (ci == NULL)
debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", full_line);
@@ -1047,7 +1047,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
}
- while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
+ while ((oattrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
+ attrib = xstrdup(oattrib);
/* Terminate on comment */
if (*attrib == '#') {
argv_consume(acp); /* mark all arguments consumed */
@@ -1062,16 +1063,20 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
*arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) {
error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
"Match attributes");
- return -1;
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
}
if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#')
argv_consume(acp); /* consume remaining args */
- return 1;
+ result = 1;
+ goto out;
}
/* Criterion "invalid-user" also has no argument */
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "invalid-user") == 0) {
- if (ci == NULL)
+ if (ci == NULL) {
+ result = 0;
continue;
+ }
if (ci->user_invalid == 0)
result = 0;
else
@@ -1078,11 +1081,26 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
debug("matched invalid-user at line %d", line);
continue;
}
+
+ /* Keep this list in sync with below */
+ if (strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "group=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "address=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "localaddress=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "localport=", 1) != NULL ||
+ strprefix(attrib, "rdomain=", 1) != NULL) {
+ arg = strchr(attrib, '=');
+ *(arg++) = '\0';
+ } else {
+ arg = argv_next(acp, avp);
+ }
+
/* All other criteria require an argument */
- if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL ||
- *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
+ if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
- return -1;
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
@@ -1105,7 +1123,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user");
switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
case -1:
- return -1;
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
case 0:
result = 0;
}
@@ -1141,7 +1160,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
- return -1;
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
@@ -1166,13 +1186,15 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
- return -1;
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
arg);
- return -1;
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
}
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
result = 0;
@@ -1200,16 +1222,21 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line);
} else {
- error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
- return -1;
+ error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", oattrib);
+ result = -1;
+ goto out;
}
+ free(attrib);
+ attrib = NULL;
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
return -1;
}
- if (ci != NULL)
+ out:
+ if (ci != NULL && result != -1)
debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
+ free(attrib);
return result;
}
diff --git a/regress/cfginclude.sh b/regress/cfginclude.sh
index d442cdd6..97fd816f 100644
--- a/regress/cfginclude.sh
+++ b/regress/cfginclude.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="config include"
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aa
-Match host b # comment
+Match host=b # comment
Hostname bb
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Match host c
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
Hostname cc
-Match host m
+Match host=m !user xxxyfake
Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # comment
Host d
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Match host xxxxxx
_EOF
cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
-Match host a
+Match host=a
Hostname aaa
Match host b
@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
Match host a
Hostname aaaa
-Match host b
+Match host=b !user blahblahfake
Hostname bbbb
-Match host c
+Match host=c
Hostname cccc
Host d
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ trial a aa
# cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
-# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="config include"
diff --git a/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
index 05a66685..2737a5f9 100644
--- a/regress/cfgmatch.sh
+++ b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.13 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.14 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="sshd_config match"
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ start_client()
kill $client_pid
fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
fi
- done
+ done
}
stop_client()
@@ -119,40 +119,42 @@ stop_client
# requires knowledge of actual group memberships user running the test).
params="user:user:u1 host:host:h1 address:addr:1.2.3.4 \
localaddress:laddr:5.6.7.8 rdomain:rdomain:rdom1"
-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
-echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
-for i in $params; do
- config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
- criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
- value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
- cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
- Match $config $value
- Banner /$value
+for separator in " " "=" ; do
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
+ echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+ for i in $params; do
+ config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
+ criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+ value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+ cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
+ Match ${config}${separator}${value}
+ Banner /$value
EOD
-done
+ done
-${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
- fail "validate config for w/out spec"
-
-# Test matching each criteria.
-for i in $params; do
- testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
- expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
- spec=""
- for j in $params; do
- config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
- criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
- value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
- if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
- spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
- else
- spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
+ ${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
+ fail "validate config for w/out spec"
+
+ # Test matching each criteria.
+ for i in $params; do
+ testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+ expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+ spec=""
+ for j in $params; do
+ config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
+ criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
+ value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
+ if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
+ spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
+ else
+ spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
+ fi
+ done
+ trace "test spec $spec"
+ result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
+ awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
+ if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
+ fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
fi
done
- trace "test spec $spec"
- result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
- awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
- if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
- fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
- fi
done
diff --git a/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
index 518a703d..f67c3caa 100644
--- a/regress/servcfginclude.sh
+++ b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ tid="server config include"
cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-Match host a
+Match host=a
Banner /aa
Match host b
Banner /bb
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
-Match host c
+Match host=c
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
Banner /cc
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Match Host e
Banner /ee
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-Match Host f
+Match Host=f
Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
Banner /ff
@@ -47,13 +47,13 @@ Match host b
Match host c
Banner /ccc
-Match Host d
+Match Host=d
Banner /ddd
Match Host e
Banner /eee
-Match Host f
+Match Host=f
Banner /fff
_EOF
@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
Match host a
Banner /aaaa
-Match host b
+Match host=b
Banner /bbbb
Match host c # comment
Banner /cccc
-Match Host d
+Match Host=d
Banner /dddd
Match Host e

98
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
index 679446e9..2b5d3960 100644
--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:59 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2023 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
#include <stdbool.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
+# include <endian.h>
+#endif
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
diff --git a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
index a82d60e8..b8ac1436 100644
--- a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
+++ b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $ */
+
/* Extracted from libcrux revision 84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35 */
/*
@@ -160,18 +161,19 @@ static inline void Eurydice_slice_to_array3(uint8_t *dst_tag, char *dst_ok,
// CORE STUFF (conversions, endianness, ...)
static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes(uint64_t v, uint8_t buf[8]) {
+ v = htole64(v);
memcpy(buf, &v, sizeof(v));
}
static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[8]) {
uint64_t v;
memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v));
- return v;
+ return le64toh(v);
}
static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[4]) {
uint32_t v;
memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v));
- return v;
+ return le32toh(v);
}
static inline uint32_t core_num__u8_6__count_ones(uint8_t x0) {
diff --git a/mlkem768.sh b/mlkem768.sh
index 2fdc2831..3d12b2ed 100644
--- a/mlkem768.sh
+++ b/mlkem768.sh
@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.2 2024/09/04 05:11:33 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.3 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
#
-WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main"
+#WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main"
+WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35"
FILES="
libcrux/libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h
@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ echo '#define KRML_NOINLINE __attribute__((noinline, unused))'
echo '#define KRML_HOST_EPRINTF(...)'
echo '#define KRML_HOST_EXIT(x) fatal_f("internal error")'
echo
+
for i in $FILES; do
echo "/* from $i */"
# Changes to all files:
@@ -56,11 +58,16 @@ for i in $FILES; do
-e 's/[ ]*$//' \
$i | \
case "$i" in
- # XXX per-file handling goes here.
+ */libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h)
+ # Replace endian functions with versions that work.
+ perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes.*\n)([^}]*\n)/\1 v = htole64(v);\n\2/' |
+ perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le64toh(v);/s' |
+ perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le32toh(v);/s'
+ ;;
# Default: pass through.
*)
- cat
- ;;
+ cat
+ ;;
esac
echo
done

12
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-non-supported-keys-err-msg.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
--- a/sshkey.c 2025-04-29 11:20:59.484832762 +0200
+++ b/sshkey.c 2025-04-29 11:28:32.349323029 +0200
@@ -3599,6 +3599,8 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long
}
case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}

385
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
index ec840c1f..c0d3be11 100644
--- a/kex-names.c
+++ b/kex-names.c
@@ -90,6 +90,19 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
};
+static int is_mlkem768_available()
+{
+ static int is_fetched = -1;
+
+ if (is_fetched == -1) {
+ EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
+ EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
+ }
+
+ return is_fetched;
+}
+
static char *
kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
{
@@ -98,6 +111,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+ && !is_mlkem768_available())
+ continue;
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
@@ -117,6 +133,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
+ if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
+ && !is_mlkem768_available())
+ return NULL;
+
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
return k;
diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
index 2b5d3960..670049dc 100644
--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
@@ -48,10 +48,127 @@
#ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
#include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+static int
+mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
+ || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
+ secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
+ pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
+ || secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
+ || outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
+ secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
+
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
+ privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL
+ || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
+ || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
+ || secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto err;
+ }
+ r = 0;
+
+ err:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
+ ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
+
+ return r;
+}
int
kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
{
+#if 0
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
size_t need;
@@ -86,6 +203,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
+#else
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ u_char *cp = NULL;
+ size_t need;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
+ crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+#endif
+ cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ kex->client_pub = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+#endif
}
int
@@ -93,6 +240,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
{
+#if 0
struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
const u_char *client_pub;
@@ -185,12 +333,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
sshbuf_free(server_blob);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
+#else
+ struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *client_pub;
+ u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t need;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
+
+ *server_blobp = NULL;
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ /* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
+ need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+ if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
+ crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
+ dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
+ client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
+ CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+
+ /* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+ /* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
+ if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
+ kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* append ECDH shared key */
+ client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+ dump_digest("server cipher text:",
+ enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
+ dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
+ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ /* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *server_blobp = server_blob;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ server_blob = NULL;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
+ explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
+ sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+#endif
}
int
kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
{
+#if 0
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
@@ -258,6 +491,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
+#else
+ struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+ u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ size_t need;
+ int r;
+
+ *shared_secretp = NULL;
+
+ need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
+ if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
+ server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
+ /* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
+ if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
+ dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
+#endif
+ if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
+ buf, 1)) < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
+ hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
+ dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
+ ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
+#endif
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *shared_secretp = buf;
+ buf = NULL;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
+ explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
+ return r;
+#endif
}
#else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
int

59
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
--- a/ssh.c 2025-12-03 15:22:36.754555231 +0100
+++ b/ssh.c 2025-12-03 16:12:16.715320349 +0100
@@ -662,6 +662,8 @@ valid_ruser(const char *s)
if (*s == '-')
return 0;
for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+ if (iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+ return 0;
if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
return 0;
/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
@@ -683,6 +685,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
+ int user_on_commandline = 0;
char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile;
char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
struct stat st;
@@ -1039,8 +1042,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
}
break;
case 'l':
- if (options.user == NULL)
+ if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = optarg;
+ user_on_commandline = 1;
+ }
break;
case 'L':
@@ -1143,6 +1148,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = tuser;
tuser = NULL;
+ user_on_commandline = 1;
}
free(tuser);
if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
@@ -1157,6 +1163,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = p;
p = NULL;
+ user_on_commandline = 1;
}
*cp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cp);
@@ -1459,6 +1466,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
cinfo->locuser = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
cinfo->jmphost = xstrdup(options.jump_host == NULL ?
"" : options.jump_host);
+
+ if (user_on_commandline && !valid_ruser(options.user))
+ fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+
cinfo->conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(cinfo->thishost,
cinfo->remhost, cinfo->portstr, cinfo->remuser, cinfo->jmphost);

24
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/misc.c b/misc.c
--- a/misc.c 2025-12-03 16:19:11.255135131 +0100
+++ b/misc.c 2025-12-03 16:21:53.769590836 +0100
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ urldecode(const char *src)
size_t srclen;
if ((srclen = strlen(src)) >= SIZE_MAX)
- fatal_f("input too large");
+ return NULL;
ret = xmalloc(srclen + 1);
for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) {
switch (*src) {
@@ -1006,9 +1006,10 @@ urldecode(const char *src)
*dst++ = ' ';
break;
case '%':
+ /* note: don't allow \0 characters */
if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
- (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
+ (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1 || ch == 0) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}

437
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
diff --color -ruNp a/regress/scp3.sh b/regress/scp3.sh
--- a/regress/scp3.sh 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/regress/scp3.sh 2025-10-29 16:00:59.815068193 +0100
@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ tid="scp3"
COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
DIR=${COPY}.dd
DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
+DIFFOPT="-rN"
+
+# Figure out if diff does not understand "-N"
+if ! diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then
+ DIFFOPT="-r"
+fi
maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd
@@ -63,6 +69,15 @@ for mode in scp sftp ; do
echo b > ${COPY2}
$SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${DATA} hostA:${COPY} hostB:${COPY2}
cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+
+ # scp /blah/.. is only supported via the sftp protocol.
+ # Original protocol scp just refuses it.
+ test $mode != sftp && continue
+ verbose "$tag: recursive .."
+ forest
+ $SCP $scpopts -r hostA:${DIR}/subdir/.. hostB:${DIR2} || \
+ fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
scpclean
diff --color -ruNp a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
--- a/regress/scp.sh 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/regress/scp.sh 2025-10-29 16:00:59.810765653 +0100
@@ -199,6 +199,19 @@ for mode in scp sftp ; do
echo b > ${COPY2}
$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2}
cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
+
+ # scp /blah/.. is only supported via the sftp protocol.
+ # Original protocol scp just refuses it.
+ test $mode != sftp && continue
+ verbose "$tag: recursive local .. to remote dir"
+ forest
+ $SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR}/subdir/.. somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+ verbose "$tag: recursive remote .. to local dir"
+ forest
+ $SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR}/subdir/.. ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
+ diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
scpclean
diff --color -ruNp a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
--- a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh 2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
+++ b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh 2025-10-29 16:00:59.813392901 +0100
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
tid="sftp commands"
+DIFFOPT="-rN"
+# Figure out if diff does not understand "-N"
+if ! diff -N ${SRC}/sftp-cmds.sh ${SRC}/sftp-cmds.sh 2>/dev/null; then
+ DIFFOPT="-r"
+fi
+
# test that these files are readable!
for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)`
do
@@ -24,207 +30,246 @@ SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ space
# File with glob metacharacters
GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt"
+sftpserver() {
+ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1
+}
+
+sftpserver_with_stdout() {
+ ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1
+}
+
+forest() {
+ rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ rm -rf ${COPY}.dd2
+ mkdir -p ${COPY}.dd/a ${COPY}.dd/b ${COPY}.dd/c ${COPY}.dd/a/d
+ echo 'A' > ${COPY}.dd/a/A
+ echo 'B' > ${COPY}.dd/a/B
+ echo 'C' > ${COPY}.dd/a/C
+ echo 'D' > ${COPY}.dd/a/D
+}
+
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
mkdir ${COPY}.dd
verbose "$tid: lls"
-printf "lcd ${OBJ}\nlls\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+printf "lcd ${OBJ}\nlls\n" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
grep copy.dd >/dev/null || fail "lls failed"
verbose "$tid: lls w/path"
-echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+echo "lls ${OBJ}" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
grep copy.dd >/dev/null || fail "lls w/path failed"
verbose "$tid: ls"
-echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "ls failed"
+echo "ls ${OBJ}" | sftpserver || fail "ls failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: shell"
-echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
+echo "!echo hi there" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
egrep '^hi there$' >/dev/null || fail "shell failed"
verbose "$tid: pwd"
-echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "pwd failed"
+echo "pwd" | sftpserver || fail "pwd failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: lpwd"
-echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "lpwd failed"
+echo "lpwd" | sftpserver || fail "lpwd failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: quit"
-echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "quit failed"
+echo "quit" | sftpserver || fail "quit failed"
# XXX always successful
verbose "$tid: help"
-echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "help failed"
+echo "help" | sftpserver || fail "help failed"
# XXX always successful
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: get"
-echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get $DATA $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: get quoted"
-echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY}
verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes"
-echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes"
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY}
rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY}
cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY"
verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces"
-echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces"
rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY}
cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY"
verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters"
-echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed"
+echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \
fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: get to directory"
-echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob get to directory"
-echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
done
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: get to local dir"
-printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget $DATA\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget $DATA\n" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir"
-printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget /bin/l*\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "get failed"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget /bin/l*\n" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
done
+forest
+verbose "$tid: get recursive absolute"
+echo "get -R ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: get recursive relative src"
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\n get -R . ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: get relative .."
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd/b\n get -R .. ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd2
+verbose "$tid: get recursive relative .."
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd/b\n lcd ${COPY}.dd2\n get -R ..\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "get failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "$tid: put"
-echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes"
-echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes"
rm -f "$SPACECOPY"
verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces"
-echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: put to directory"
-echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob put to directory"
-echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
done
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: put to local dir"
-printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput $DATA\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput $DATA\n" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir"
-printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput /bin/l*\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "put failed"
+printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput /bin/l*\n" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
for x in $GLOBFILES; do
cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
done
+forest
+verbose "$tid: put recursive absolute"
+echo "put -R ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: put recursive relative src"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\n put -R . ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+verbose "$tid: put recursive .."
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd/b\n put -R .. ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
+forest
+mkdir ${COPY}.dd2
+verbose "$tid: put recursive .. relative"
+printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd/b\n cd ${COPY}.dd2\n put -R ..\n" | sftpserver || \
+ fail "put failed"
+diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
+
verbose "$tid: rename"
-echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "rename failed"
+echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | sftpserver || fail "rename failed"
test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename"
cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename"
verbose "$tid: rename directory"
-echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \
- ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
+rm -rf ${COPY}.dd2
+echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || \
fail "rename directory failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory"
test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory"
verbose "$tid: ln"
-echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed"
+echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "ln failed"
test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln"
cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln"
verbose "$tid: ln -s"
rm -f ${COPY}.2
-echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed"
+echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "ln -s failed"
test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s"
verbose "$tid: cp"
rm -f ${COPY}.2
-echo "cp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "cp failed"
+echo "cp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "cp failed"
cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after cp"
verbose "$tid: mkdir"
-echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "mkdir failed"
+echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "mkdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir"
# XXX do more here
verbose "$tid: chdir"
-echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "chdir failed"
+echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "chdir failed"
verbose "$tid: rmdir"
-echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "rmdir failed"
+echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "rmdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir"
verbose "$tid: lmkdir"
-echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "lmkdir failed"
+echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "lmkdir failed"
test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir"
# XXX do more here
verbose "$tid: lchdir"
-echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
- || fail "lchdir failed"
+echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "lchdir failed"
rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY"
diff --color -ruNp a/scp.c b/scp.c
--- a/scp.c 2025-10-29 15:49:51.795813258 +0100
+++ b/scp.c 2025-10-29 16:00:59.817393000 +0100
@@ -1362,6 +1362,10 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ /* Special handling for source of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Upload to dest, not dest/.. */
+
/*
* No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
* the expansions
@@ -1635,6 +1639,10 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
goto out;
}
+ /* Special handling for destination of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */
+
if (dst_is_dir)
abs_dst = sftp_path_append(dst, filename);
else
diff --color -ruNp a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
--- a/sftp.c 2025-10-29 15:49:51.796907436 +0100
+++ b/sftp.c 2025-10-29 16:00:59.819803948 +0100
@@ -687,6 +687,10 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
goto out;
}
+ /* Special handling for dest of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */
+
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
if (local_is_dir(dst)) {
abs_dst = sftp_path_append(dst, filename);
@@ -781,6 +785,9 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
err = -1;
goto out;
}
+ /* Special handling for source of '..' */
+ if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
+ filename = "."; /* Upload to dest, not dest/.. */
free(abs_dst);
abs_dst = NULL;

450
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
issuance process.
Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
---
configure.ac | 1 +
gss-serv-krb5.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
gss-serv.c | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
servconf.c | 15 ++++++-
servconf.h | 2 +
ssh-gss.h | 7 ++++
sshd_config.5 | 44 +++++++++++++++++++++
7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
+#include "match.h"
#include "ssh-gss.h"
@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
return 1;
}
+/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
+ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
+ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
+ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
+ */
+
+static int
+ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
+{
+ int ret;
+ u_int i;
+
+ /* Check indicators */
+ for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
+ options.gss_indicators, 1);
+ /* negative or positive match */
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ *matched = i;
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ /* No rule matched */
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
* GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
* Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
{
krb5_principal princ;
- int retval;
+ int retval, matched;
const char *errmsg;
int k5login_exists;
@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
if (k5login_exists &&
ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
retval = 1;
- logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
- name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
name, k5login_exists)) {
retval = 1;
- logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
- "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
- name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
} else
retval = 0;
+ if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
+ /* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
+ * so we drop the authorization result again */
+ retval = 0;
+ if (client->indicators) {
+ matched = -1;
+ retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
+ if (retval != 0) {
+ retval = (retval == 1);
+ logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
+ "krb5 principal %s is %s",
+ client->indicators[matched],
+ (char *)client->displayname.value,
+ retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
+ goto cont;
+ }
+ }
+ if (retval == 0) {
+ logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
+ "but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
+ (char *)client->displayname.value);
+ }
+ }
+cont:
+ if (retval == 1) {
+ logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
+ name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
+ }
krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
return retval;
}
diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ b/gss-serv.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
{ GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
- GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+ GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
{ NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
}
+
+/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
+ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
+ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
+ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
+
+#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
+
+/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
+static OM_uint32
+ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+{
+ gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
+ gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
+ size_t count, i;
+
+ ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
+ &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
+ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
+
+ if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
+ /* No indicators in the ticket */
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
+ /* skip anything but auth-indicators */
+ if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
+ strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
+ attrs->elements[i].value,
+ sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
+ continue;
+ count++;
+ }
+
+ if (count == 0) {
+ /* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
+ (void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
+ return (0);
+ }
+
+ client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
+ count = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
+ authenticated = 0;
+ complete = 0;
+ more = -1;
+ /* skip anything but auth-indicators */
+ if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
+ strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
+ attrs->elements[i].value,
+ sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
+ continue;
+ /* retrieve all indicators */
+ while (more != 0) {
+ value.value = NULL;
+ display_value.value = NULL;
+ ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
+ &attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
+ &complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
+ if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
+ client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
+ memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
+ client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
+ count++;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
+ (void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
+ (void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
+ return (ctx->major);
+}
+
+
/* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
* be called once for a context */
@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
}
gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
+ /* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
+ if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
+ ctx->client, client))) {
+ ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+ return (ctx->major);
+ }
/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
{
OM_uint32 lmin;
+ size_t i;
(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
+
+ if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
+ for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
+ }
+ free(gssapi_client.indicators);
+ }
+
explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
return 0;
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
+ options->gss_indicators = NULL;
options->use_kuserok = -1;
options->enable_k5users = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum {
sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
- sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
#endif
{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
+ case sGssIndicators:
+ arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum, keyword);
+ if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
+ options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
+ break;
+
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
char **allow_groups;
u_int num_deny_groups;
char **deny_groups;
+ char *gss_indicators;
u_int num_subsystems;
char **subsystem_name;
@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
+ M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644
--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ b/ssh-gss.h
@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
#include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
+#include <gssapi_ext.h>
+#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
+#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
+#endif
+
#ifdef KRB5
# ifndef HEIMDAL
# ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct {
ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
int used;
int updated;
+ char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
} ssh_gssapi_client;
typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
gss-curve25519-sha256-
.Ed
This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
+Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
+mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
+authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
+.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
+When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
+will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
+indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
+.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
+is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
+policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
+access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
+rejected.
+.Pp
+By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
+indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
+to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
+preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
+authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
+(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
+indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
+inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
+.Pp
+Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
+particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
+FreeIPA environments:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
+.It Cm hardened
+SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
+.It Cm pkinit
+smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
+.It Cm radius
+pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
+.It Cm otp
+TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
+.It Cm idp
+OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
+and device authorization grant flow
+.It Cm passkey
+FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
+.El
+.Pp
+The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
The default is handled system-wide by
.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
--
2.49.0

16
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=Ukrb
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

85
SOURCES/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
View File

@ -11,13 +11,96 @@ index e2efdf06..0d0f6953 100644
goto out;
}
@@ -1059,6 +1060,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
goto out;
}
if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
error_f("alloc failed");
goto out;
}
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 486f8515..9dea2cfc 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1864,6 +1864,14 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &d, &len)) != 0)
return r;
DBG(debug("Received SSH2_MSG_PING len %zu", len));
+ if (!ssh->state->after_authentication) {
+ DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING in preauth"));
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
+ DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING during KEX"));
+ break;
+ }
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_PONG)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, d, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
index 48973b2c..c27c5a95 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1220,6 +1220,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
"restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
if (*dcsp != NULL) {
error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
@@ -1229,6 +1230,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
*dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
@@ -1246,6 +1248,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
}
if (*certs != NULL) {
error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &v)) != 0 ||
@@ -1257,6 +1260,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
if (*ncerts >= AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS) {
error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
*certs = xrecallocarray(*certs, *ncerts, *ncerts + 1,
@@ -1757,6 +1761,7 @@ process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
/* record new key/sid */
if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
+ r = -1;
goto out;
}
e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
diff --git a/ssh-sk-client.c b/ssh-sk-client.c
index 321fe53a..06fad221 100644
--- a/ssh-sk-client.c
+++ b/ssh-sk-client.c
@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
}
if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
error_f("calloc failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
srk->key = key;
@@ -450,6 +451,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) {
error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks,
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index a69c4da1..1ee6000a 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c

193
SPECS/openssh.spec
View File

@ -46,10 +46,10 @@
%{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
# Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
%global openssh_ver 8.7p1
%global openssh_rel 46
%global openssh_ver 9.9p1
%global openssh_rel 4
%global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 5
%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 7
Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
Name: openssh
@ -133,12 +133,10 @@ Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
# warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
# GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
# from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
Patch800: openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
#http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
# add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
@ -169,8 +167,6 @@ Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
# Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
# Help systemd to track the running service
Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
# Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
# Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
@ -183,8 +179,6 @@ Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
# Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
Patch963: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
# Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
# sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
@ -195,20 +189,8 @@ Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
# sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
# Use SFTP protocol by default for scp command
Patch976: openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
# Implement kill switch for SCP protocol
Patch977: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
# CVE-2021-41617
Patch978: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
# fix for `ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f /dev/null -s /dev/null` (#2024902)
Patch979: openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch
# Create non-existent directories when scp works in sftp mode and some more minor fixes
# upstream commits:
# ba61123eef9c6356d438c90c1199a57a0d7bcb0a
# 63670d4e9030bcee490d5a9cce561373ac5b3b23
# ac7c9ec894ed0825d04ef69c55babb49bab1d32e
Patch980: openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch
# Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854
# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299
@ -216,90 +198,53 @@ Patch980: openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch
Patch981: openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
# https://github.com/djmdjm/openssh-wip/pull/13
Patch982: openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
# downstream only
Patch983: openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
# downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix
# From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14
Patch984: openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
# Upstream ff89b1bed80721295555bd083b173247a9c0484e, 5062ad48814b06162511c4f5924a33d97b6b2566
Patch986: openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
# Minimize the use of SHA1 as a proof of possession for RSA key (#2031868)
# upstream commits:
# 291721bc7c840d113a49518f3fca70e86248b8e8
# 0fa33683223c76289470a954404047bc762be84c
# Avoid dubious diagnostics on update known hosts (#2115246)
# 8832402bd500d1661ccc80a476fd563335ef6cdc
Patch1000: openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
# Fix for scp clearing file when src and dest are the same (#2056884)
# upstream commits:
# 7b1cbcb7599d9f6a3bbad79d412604aa1203b5ee
Patch1001: openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
# Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage
# upstream bug:
# https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455
Patch1002: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
# Always return allocated strings from the kex filtering so that we can free them
# upstream commits:
# 486c4dc3b83b4b67d663fb0fa62bc24138ec3946
# 6c31ba10e97b6953c4f325f526f3e846dfea647a
# 322964f8f2e9c321e77ebae1e4d2cd0ccc5c5a0b
Patch1003: openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
# upstream MR:
# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
Patch1004: openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
# Fix host-based authentication with rsa keys
# upstream commits:
# 7aa7b096cf2bafe2777085abdeed5ce00581f641
# d9dbb5d9a0326e252d3c7bc13beb9c2434f59409
# fdb1d58d0d3888b042e5a500f6ce524486aaf782
Patch1005: openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch
# Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation
# upstream MR:
# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
Patch1006: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
#
Patch1007: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
# CVE-2023-25136
# upstream 12da7823336434a403f25c7cc0c2c6aed0737a35
# to fix 1005
Patch1008: openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
# fips compliance for signing, dh, ecdh
Patch1009: openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-sign.patch
Patch1010: openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch
Patch1011: openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-ecdh.patch
Patch1012: openssh-8.7p1-evp-pkcs11.patch
# clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
Patch1013: openssh-8.7p1-man-hostkeyalgos.patch
# upstream commits
# ec1ddb72a146fd66d18df9cd423517453a5d8044
# b98a42afb69d60891eb0488935990df6ee571c4
# a00f59a645072e5f5a8d207af15916a7b23e2642
Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch
# upsream commit
# b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280
Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
#upstream commit b7afd8a4ecaca8afd3179b55e9db79c0ff210237
Patch1016: openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
#upstream commit 01dbf3d46651b7d6ddf5e45d233839bbfffaeaec
Patch1017: openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
#upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a
Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
#upstream commit 96faa0de6c673a2ce84736eba37fc9fb723d9e5c
Patch1020: openssh-8.7p1-sigpipe.patch
Patch1021: openssh-9.8p1-upstream-cve-2024-6387.patch
Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
Patch1015: openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
Patch1022: openssh-8.7p1-redhat-help.patch
Patch1023: openssh-8.7p1-openssl-log.patch
#upstream commit 52dfe3c72d98503d8b7c6f64fc7e19d685636c0b
Patch1024: openssh-8.7p1-allow-duplicate-subsystem.patch
# upstream 6ce00f0c2ecbb9f75023dbe627ee6460bcec78c2
# upstream 0832aac79517611dd4de93ad0a83577994d9c907
Patch1025: openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
# upstream cf3e48ee8ba1beeccddd2f203b558fa102be67a2
# upstream 0c3927c45f8a57b511c874c4d51a8c89414f74ef
Patch1026: openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch
# upstream 3f02368e8e9121847727c46b280efc280e5eb615
# upstream 67a115e7a56dbdc3f5a58c64b29231151f3670f5
Patch1027: openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch
# Downstream patch, OpenSSL based MLKEM implementation
Patch1028: openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
# upstream 8eabd2ae2ca1d7756417a1ee5b41f09c5d997634
Patch1029: openssh-9.9p1-compression-directive.patch
# upstream fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367
Patch1030: openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch
Patch1031: openssh-9.9p1-non-supported-keys-err-msg.patch
Patch1032: openssh-9.9p1-bad-hostkey.patch
# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500
Patch1033: openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
#
Patch1034: openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch
#upstream 6432b9f6a216d0f5fb43df500e9bc30bebb3f58b
#upstream 4f14ca8633a2c8c0a1a19165663421f0ab32f6ab
Patch1035: openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch
Patch1036: openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch
# upstream 35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043
Patch1037: openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch
# upstream 43b3bff47bb029f2299bacb6a36057981b39fdb0
Patch1038: openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch
Patch1039: openssh-9.9p1-compat-mlkem.patch
License: BSD
Requires: /sbin/nologin
@ -454,7 +399,6 @@ popd
%patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info
%patch707 -p1 -b .redhat
%patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
#
%patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex
%patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb
@ -471,65 +415,51 @@ popd
%patch926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
%patch939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
%patch944 -p1 -b .x11max
%patch948 -p1 -b .systemd
%patch949 -p1 -b .refactor
%patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
%patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
%patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
%patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
%patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
%patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
%patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
%patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
%patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
%patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
%patch976 -p1 -b .sftp-by-default
%patch977 -p1 -b .kill-scp
%patch978 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
%patch979 -p1 -b .find-principals
%patch980 -p1 -b .sftpdirs
%patch981 -p1 -b .scp-sftpdirs
%patch982 -p1 -b .minrsabits
%patch983 -p1 -b .evpgenrsa
%patch984 -p1 -b .ibmca
%patch986 -p1 -b .91cleanup
%patch200 -p1 -b .audit
%patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
%patch202 -p1 -b .audit-hostname
%patch700 -p1 -b .fips
%patch1000 -p1 -b .minimize-sha1-use
%patch1001 -p1 -b .scp-clears-file
%patch1002 -p1 -b .ssh-manpage
%patch1003 -p1 -b .mem-leak
%patch1004 -p1 -b .gssapi-auth
%patch1005 -p1 -b .host-based-auth
%patch1006 -p1 -b .negotiate-supported-algs
%patch100 -p1 -b .coverity
%patch1007 -p1 -b .sshrsacheck
%patch1008 -p1 -b .cve-2023-25136
%patch1009 -p1 -b .evp_fips_sign
%patch1010 -p1 -b .evp_fips_dh
%patch1011 -p1 -b .evp_fips_ecdh
%patch1012 -p1 -b .evp_pkcs11
%patch1013 -p1 -b .man-hostkeyalgos
%patch1014 -p1 -b .utc_parse
%patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
%patch1016 -p1 -b .openssl3compat
%patch1017 -p1 -b .limitdelay
%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795
%patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385
%patch1020 -p1 -b .earlypipe
%patch1021 -p1 -b .cve-2024-6387
%patch1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-kex
%patch1015 -p1 -b .pam-rhost
%patch1022 -p1 -b .redhat-help
%patch1023 -p1 -b .openssl-log
%patch1024 -p1 -b .allow-dup-subsystem
%patch1025 -p1 -b .errcode_set
%patch1026 -p1 -b .mlkembe
%patch1027 -p1 -b .match
%patch1028 -p1 -b .openssl-mlkem
%patch1029 -p1 -b .compression
%patch1030 -p1 -b .disable-forwarding
%patch1031 -p1 -b .non-supported-keys-err-msg
%patch1032 -p1 -b .bad-hostkey
%patch1033 -p1 -b .gss-indicators
%patch1034 -p1 -b .gss-fips
%patch1035 -p1 -b .scp-traversing
%patch1036 -p1 -b .canonical-match-user
%patch1037 -p1 -b .reject-cntrl-chars-in-username
%patch1038 -p1 -b .reject-null-char-in-url-string
%patch1039 -p1 -b .skip-mlkem-when-na
autoreconf
pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
@ -582,10 +512,10 @@ fi
--with-ipaddr-display \
--with-pie=no \
--without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \
--with-systemd \
--with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \
--with-security-key-builtin=yes \
--with-pam \
--enable-dsa-keys \
%if %{WITH_SELINUX}
--with-selinux --with-audit=linux \
--with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
@ -776,6 +706,7 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
%files server
%dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-session
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
@ -817,6 +748,28 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
%endif
%changelog
* Wed Feb 25 2026 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-4
- Provide a way to skip unsupported ML-KEM hybrid algorithms in FIPS mode
Resolves: RHEL-151580
* Tue Dec 09 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-3
- Enable support for DSA keys
Resolves: RHEL-127624
- CVE-2025-61984: Reject usernames with control characters
Resolves: RHEL-133959
- CVE-2025-61985: Reject URL-strings with NULL characters
Resolves: RHEL-133960
* Mon Oct 27 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-2
- Fix implicit destination path selection when source path ends with ".."
Resolves: RHEL-119515
- Canonicalize username when matching a user
Resolves: RHEL-118372
* Wed Sep 10 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-1
- Rebase to version 9.9
Resolves: RHEL-108912
* Mon Jul 21 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-46
- Move the redhat help message to debug1 log level
Resolves: RHEL-104580