diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index a2916ba..3a5b7e3 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
-SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
+SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
diff --git a/.openssh.metadata b/.openssh.metadata
index 5891957..9c348a8 100644
--- a/.openssh.metadata
+++ b/.openssh.metadata
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 dbb35b4e9ae3f72b930a82c6fd5e83e9dcd7b193 SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
-8719032c1e47732c8fdb14adfb24b5e9e71de802 SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
+5ded7eb0add0b02b5d1a1c4bf5cb2c89d2117b53 SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
 66dd8274346fd006ff40f525c082cfb701085b5f SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
index 56af045..554e346 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
 --- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
 +++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
  		fdlim_set(maxfd);
  	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- 
++ 
 +	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
 +
- 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
  
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ddcb7f1..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
- 
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
- {
--	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
- 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- };
- 
-@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
- {
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 	size_t n = 0;
--	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
-+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
- 
- 	if (len == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- 		return (0);
- 
--	while ((len--) > 0) {
-+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
-+		u_int r,a,b;
-+
- 		if (n == 0) {
--			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
--			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			int outl, i, buflen;
-+
-+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+
-+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+
-+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
-+				ctrbuf, buflen);
- 		}
--		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
--		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
-+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
-+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
-+		r = a ^ b;
-+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
-+		src += sizeof(a);
-+		dest += sizeof(r);
-+
-+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
- 	}
-+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
- 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- 	}
--	if (key != NULL)
--		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
--		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
-+			case 128:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 192:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 256:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
-+		}
-+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
-+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
-+	}
- 	if (iv != NULL)
- 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- 	return (1);
-@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
- 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
index bf3293f..0f65279 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
 @@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
  log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
      int on_stderr)
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-05-06 11:34:22.349925757 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
  typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-06 11:33:37.671575348 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
 @@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
@@ -99,8 +99,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-05-06 11:32:25.180006819 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
  	int			 m_log_sendfd;
  	struct kex		**m_pkex;
@@ -115,8 +115,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.166006709 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
  struct passwd;
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
  void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
@@ -207,8 +207,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
 -sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
  {
- 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
- 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+	ssize_t len, olen;
 @@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  	extern char *__progname;
  
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  		return 1;
  	}
@@ -237,11 +237,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-serve
 -	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
 +	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.177006795 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.182006834 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 	}
+ #endif
  
  	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
index fa9d591..96161cb 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@@ -93,19 +93,17 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  #endif
  
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
--	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
- 	    oldctx, newctx);
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(date 1703108053912)
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
+ 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
+ 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
+
+-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
  	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
-		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
+ 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+ 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -118,10 +116,10 @@ index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
 index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
 @@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
  	demote_sensitive_data();
  
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
index cccb3e0..7fef831 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@@ -38,16 +38,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ typedef enum {
  	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
  	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+@@ -600,14 +600,16 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -129,3 +129,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
  
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff -up openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx	2024-07-11 13:51:19.969960781 +0200
++++ openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c	2024-07-11 13:51:30.938231250 +0200
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
index 953d613..995e04e 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
  	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@@ -21,11 +21,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +				case 130:
 +				case 133:
 +				case 134:
-+					i += opts[i + 1];
-+					break;
++					if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
++						i += opts[i + 1];
++						break;
++					}
++					/* FALLTHROUGH */
 +				default:
 +				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
++			 	 * or incorrect source routing options. */
 +					text[0] = '\0';
 +					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
 +						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
@@ -35,5 +38,5 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
  	}
- 	return;
  #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
index 2aa14bd..4eb0998 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@@ -39,9 +39,9 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
  SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
  SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
@@ -54,20 +54,20 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
  
  .SUFFIXES: .lo
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  
  XMSS_OBJS=\
  	ssh-xmss.o \
 @@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
  ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
  ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 @@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
  	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -95,8 +95,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
 @@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
  
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
index 1831f27..e43128b 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
  	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
++	if (k5login_exists &&
++	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
  		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
@@ -196,11 +196,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 @@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
 @@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm IPQoS ,
  .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
index 8047fc3..16d98cd 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	platform_setusercontext(pw);
  
 -	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
  #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
  		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
  		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	}
  
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
 @@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
  	demote_sensitive_data();
@@ -109,13 +109,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  	/* Demote the child */
  	if (privsep_chroot) {
  		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
+ 	 * special privileges to begin with.
+ 	 */
+-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
++#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ 	skip_privdrop = 1;
  #endif
+ 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
index f12f40e..ffe0c69 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@@ -1,37 +1,3 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
- 	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
-+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
-+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
- 	    n) == -1) {
-@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
- 	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
-+	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
-+		freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 		return -1;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (sa != NULL) {
--		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
-+		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
-+			freeaddrinfo(ai);
- 			return -1;
-+		}
- 		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
- 	}
- 
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
@@ -51,40 +17,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
  			return oerrno;
  		}
  		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
- 		return r;
- 	}
- 	/* success */
-+	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
-@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
- 		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
- 		    c->self, strerror(err));
- 		/* Try next address, if any */
--		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
-+		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
- 			close(c->sock);
- 			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
- 			channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
-		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
-			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
-			freerrset(fingerprints);
-+				free(dnskey_digest);
-			return -1;
-		}
-
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
@@ -95,21 +27,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
 -
 +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
  			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
-+#pragma pop
++#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
  			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
  				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
  				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
-@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
- 	sshkey_free(key);
- 	sshbuf_free(copy);
- 	sshbuf_free(sect);
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- 	return r;
- }
- 
 @@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
  		return r;
  	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
@@ -149,22 +73,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
  	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
  	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
  # endif
-@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 
- 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
- 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
- 
-@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
- 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
- 
- 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
-+	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
- 
- 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
@@ -185,17 +93,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
  	return ret;
  }
  
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
-@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
- 	else
- 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
- 		    strerror(errno));
-+	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
- }
- 
- static unsigned long
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -217,23 +114,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  	return (0);
  
   error:
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -287,23 +167,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
  				goto out;
  			}
  			free(arg2);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
-@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -331,87 +194,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
  		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
  		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
  			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
- 	/* Environment specified by admin */
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
- 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
-+		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
- 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
- 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
- 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
- 		}
- 		*value++ = '\0';
- 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
-+		free(cp);
- 	}
- 
- 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
---- a/sftp.c	2022-06-30 10:43:13.914058913 +0200
-+++ b/sftp.c	2022-06-30 10:48:17.243997888 +0200
-@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- 	pid = sshpid;
- 	if (pid > 1) {
- 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
-@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
-+		free(abs_dst);
-+		abs_dst = NULL;
- 	}
- 
- out:
-@@ -991,6 +993,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
- 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
- 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
- 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
-+				free(fname);
- 				continue;
- 			}
- 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
-diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
-index 9de9afa20f..ea98d9f8d0 100644
---- a/sftp-client.c
-+++ b/sftp-client.c
-@@ -2195,6 +2195,7 @@ handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous,
- 		(*nreqsp)--;
- 	}
- 	debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
-+	sshbuf_free(msg);
- }
- 
- int
-diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
-index 18d1949112..6380c4dd23 100644
---- a/sftp-server.c
-+++ b/sftp-server.c
-@@ -1553,6 +1553,7 @@ process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id)
- 			npath = xstrdup(path + 2);
- 			free(path);
- 			xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s", cwd, npath);
-+			free(npath);
- 		} else {
- 			/* ~user expansions */
- 			if (tilde_expand(path, pw->pw_uid, &npath) != 0) {
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
- 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
- 	}
- 	free(rks);
-+	free(device);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -423,31 +205,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
  			return NULL;
  		}
  		/* validate also provider from URI */
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
-@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
- 		close(muxserver_sock);
- 		muxserver_sock = -1;
- 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
-+		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
- 		muxclient(options.control_path);
- 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
- 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
 @@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
  
  		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
@@ -460,16 +220,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  
  		return 0;
  	}
-@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- /*
 @@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	if (newstr)
@@ -496,32 +246,3 @@ diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		} else {
  			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
  				cp += 4;
-@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
- 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
-+			free(checkpoint);
- 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
- 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
- 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
-@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
- #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+	free(checkpoint);
-+	if (in != stdin)
-+		fclose(in);
- }
- 
- static char *
-diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
---- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
-@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
- 			oerrno = errno;
- 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
- 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
-+			ctx = NULL;
- 			errno = oerrno;
- 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- 			goto out;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
index b5895f7..57ad148 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 @@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
  	}
  	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
  #endif
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++	if (ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	return ret;
  }
  
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
  	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
  }
  
@@ -147,12 +147,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@@ -176,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
 -	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
index 0a19ecb..6db16be 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+--- a/channels.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/channels.c	(date 1703026069921)
+@@ -5075,11 +5075,13 @@
  }
- 
+
  static int
 -connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
 +connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
  {
  	int sock;
  	struct sockaddr_un addr;
- 
+
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
  	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock == -1)
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -5087,11 +5089,12 @@
+ 	}
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@@ -29,8 +31,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 -	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
  	return -1;
  }
- 
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+
+@@ -5099,8 +5102,18 @@
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
index c8a147b..e28c62e 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
 @@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ #define	NUM_SOCKS	10
  
  /* -- X11 forwarding */
 -/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 +/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
 +#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
  
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
 @@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
   */
  int
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
 @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
  
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
  int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
 -int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
  	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
 @@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 -	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 +	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
  	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
@@ -191,8 +191,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
 @@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
  .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
  .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
 +.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
  .Cm X11Forwarding
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4f9e58a..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
index 7217c64..90640a0 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
 +	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
 +#endif
  #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
  #endif
 @@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
  #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
index fa40053..2c7ddc5 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
 @@ -373,13 +373,26 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
  #endif
  }
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-bsm.c
  #endif /* BSM */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
 @@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
  #include "log.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
@@ -129,19 +129,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
 +void
 +audit_unsupported(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
 +{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what));
++	mm_audit_unsupported_body(ssh, what);
 +}
 +
 +void
 +audit_kex(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *comp, char *pfs)
 +{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid()));
++	mm_audit_kex_body(ssh, ctos, enc, mac, comp, pfs, getpid(), getuid());
 +}
 +
 +void
 +audit_session_key_free(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos)
 +{
-+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
++	mm_audit_session_key_free_body(ssh, ctos, getpid(), getuid());
 +}
 +
  # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.c
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.376464524 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
 @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
  # define _SSH_AUDIT_H
  
@@ -298,7 +298,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit.h
  #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.753062106 +0200
 @@ -33,27 +33,40 @@
  
  #include "log.h"
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  /* Below is the sshd audit API code */
  
  void
-@@ -76,49 +176,210 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
+@@ -76,49 +176,211 @@ audit_connection_from(const char *host,
  	/* not implemented */
  }
  
@@ -525,6 +525,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
 +		if (options.use_pam)
 +			break;
++	/* Fallthrough */
 +	case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_KBDINT:
  	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
@@ -564,7 +565,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +{
 +#ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
 +	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
-+	const static char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
++	static const char *name[] = { "cipher", "mac", "comp" };
 +	char *s;
 +	int audit_fd;
 +
@@ -582,7 +583,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +#endif
 +}
 +
-+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
++static const char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
 +
 +void
 +audit_kex_body(struct ssh *ssh, int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress,
@@ -661,7 +662,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +	}
 +	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
 +			buf, NULL,
-+			listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), /*FIXME listening_for_clients() ? NULL : ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh) */
 +			NULL, 1);
 +	audit_close(audit_fd);
 +	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
@@ -670,8 +671,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/audit-linux.c
 +}
  #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
 @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
 +/* $Id: auditstub.c,v 1.1 jfch Exp $ */
 +
@@ -726,28 +727,28 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auditstub.c
 +{
 +}
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.305463975 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.682061561 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
 @@ -298,9 +298,6 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		} else {
+			authctxt->valid = 0;
  			/* Invalid user, fake password information */
  			authctxt->pw = fakepw();
 -#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
--			PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER));
+-			mm_audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
 -#endif
  		}
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  		if (options.use_pam)
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.283463805 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.377464532 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.656061361 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
 @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
  	authenticated = 0;
- 	if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
- 	    chost, key)) &&
--	    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+	    PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
+ 	if (mm_hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
+ 	    chost, key) &&
+-	    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++	    mm_hostbased_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL) == 0)
  		authenticated = 1;
  
 @@ -175,6 +175,20 @@ done:
@@ -772,17 +773,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-hostbased.c
  int
  hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.344464277 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.726061899 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
 @@ -213,7 +213,7 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
  		/* test for correct signature */
  		authenticated = 0;
- 		if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
--		    PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
-+		    PRIVSEP(user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
+ 		if (mm_user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts) &&
+-		    mm_sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
++		    mm_user_key_verify(ssh, key, sig, slen,
  		    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
  		    (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
+ 		    ssh->compat, &sig_details) == 0) {
 @@ -305,6 +305,20 @@ done:
  	return authenticated;
  }
@@ -802,11 +803,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth2-pubkey.c
 +}
 +
  static int
- match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
- {
+ match_principals_file(struct passwd *pw, char *file,
+     struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.304463967 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.681061553 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
 @@ -597,9 +597,6 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
  		record_failed_login(ssh, user,
  		    auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
@@ -818,17 +819,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.c
  	}
  	if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.318464076 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
-@@ -193,6 +193,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
- 
- char	*expand_authorized_keys(const char *, struct passwd *pw);
- char	*authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *);
-+int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
-+    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
- 
- FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
- FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.697061676 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.754062114 +0200
 @@ -212,6 +214,8 @@ struct sshkey	*get_hostkey_private_by_ty
  int	 get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *, int, struct ssh *);
  int	 sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
@@ -837,10 +829,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
 +    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
  
  /* Key / cert options linkage to auth layer */
- const struct sshauthopt *auth_options(struct ssh *);
+ int	 auth_activate_options(struct ssh *, struct sshauthopt *);
+@@ -239,6 +241,8 @@ struct passwd * getpwnamallow(struct ssh
+     char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
+ int	 auth_check_authkeys_file(struct passwd *, FILE *, char *,
+     struct sshkey *, const char *, const char *, struct sshauthopt **);
++int	 user_key_verify(struct ssh *, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
+ FILE	*auth_openkeyfile(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ FILE	*auth_openprincipals(const char *, struct passwd *, int);
+ 
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
 @@ -64,25 +64,6 @@ struct sshcipher_ctx {
  	const struct sshcipher *cipher;
  };
@@ -878,7 +879,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.c
  		chachapoly_free(cc->cp_ctx);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.378464540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
 @@ -47,7 +47,25 @@
  #define CIPHER_ENCRYPT		1
  #define CIPHER_DECRYPT		0
@@ -907,16 +908,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/cipher.h
  
  const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.368464462 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.743062030 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.755062122 +0200
 @@ -65,6 +65,7 @@
- #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "digest.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "audit.h"
  
- #ifdef GSSAPI
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ /* prototype */
+ static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
 @@ -816,12 +817,16 @@ kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
  }
  
@@ -1036,8 +1037,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
   * Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
   * Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.306463983 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.683061568 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
 @@ -226,6 +226,8 @@ int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
  int	 kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
  #endif
@@ -1049,7 +1050,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/kex.h
      struct sshbuf **);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
 @@ -239,6 +239,20 @@ mac_clear(struct sshmac *mac)
  	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
  }
@@ -1073,7 +1074,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.c
  int
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.379464547 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/mac.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
 @@ -49,5 +49,6 @@ int	 mac_compute(struct sshmac *, u_int3
  int	 mac_check(struct sshmac *, u_int32_t, const u_char *, size_t,
      const u_char *, size_t);
@@ -1082,10 +1083,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/mac.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/mac.h
  
  #endif /* SSHMAC_H */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.352464339 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.731061937 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
 @@ -112,7 +112,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
  	kexgssc.o \
  	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
 -	sshbuf-io.o
@@ -1094,8 +1095,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.audit openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  SKOBJS=	ssh-sk-client.o
  
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.326464138 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.756062129 +0200
 @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@
  #include "compat.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -1108,7 +1109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
  
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
 +
  /* State exported from the child */
  static struct sshbuf *child_state;
@@ -1195,9 +1196,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  
 -	ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
 -	    sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
-	debug3_f("%s %s signature %s%s%s", auth_method, sshkey_type(key),
+	debug3_f("%s %s signature using %s %s%s%s", auth_method,
+	    sshkey_type(key), sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg,
 	    (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
-	    (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
 @@ -1576,13 +1600,19 @@ mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session
  }
  
@@ -1241,7 +1242,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  		sshpam_cleanup();
  #endif
  
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
  	while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
  		if (errno != EINTR)
@@ -1427,8 +1428,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
 +}
 +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.326464138 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.380464555 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.707061753 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
 @@ -65,7 +65,13 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY = 106, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY = 107,
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND = 108, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND = 109,
@@ -1445,8 +1446,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSSIGN = 150, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSIGN = 151,
  	MONITOR_REQ_GSSUPCREDS = 152, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUPCREDS = 153,
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.307463991 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.381464563 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
 @@ -520,7 +520,7 @@ mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, con
   */
  
@@ -1536,9 +1537,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
  }
  #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 @@ -1095,3 +1137,83 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_cc
+ 	return &ci;
  }
  
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +void
 +mm_audit_unsupported_body(struct ssh *ssh, int what)
@@ -1620,8 +1621,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +}
 +#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.307463991 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.381464563 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.685061584 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.757062137 +0200
 @@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, st
      struct sshauthopt **);
  int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
@@ -1632,7 +1633,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
 +int mm_user_key_verify(struct ssh*, const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
      const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
  
- #ifdef GSSAPI
+ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m);
 @@ -86,7 +88,12 @@ void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  #include "audit.h"
@@ -1649,7 +1650,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/monitor_wrap.h
  struct Session;
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c	2021-05-06 12:07:38.535478683 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.c	2021-04-19 16:48:46.885608837 +0200
 @@ -81,6 +81,7 @@
  #endif
  
@@ -1802,7 +1803,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.c
  ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.382464571 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/packet.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
 @@ -218,4 +218,5 @@ const u_char	*sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *, s
  # undef EC_POINT
  #endif
@@ -1810,14 +1811,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/packet.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/packet.h
 +void	 packet_destroy_all(struct ssh *, int, int);
  #endif				/* PACKET_H */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.340464246 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.383464578 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.722061868 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
 @@ -136,7 +136,7 @@ extern char *__progname;
  extern int debug_flag;
  extern u_int utmp_len;
  extern int startup_pipe;
 -extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
-+extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
++extern void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
  extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
  extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
@@ -1843,18 +1844,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +	if (s->command != NULL || s->command_handle != -1)
 +		fatal("do_exec: command already set");
  	if (command != NULL)
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(command);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(command);
  	else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
  		char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
  
  		if (shell[0] == '\0')	/* empty shell means /bin/sh */
  			shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
--		PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
+-		mm_audit_run_command(shell);
 +		s->command = xstrdup(shell);
  	}
 +	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
-+		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
++		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
  #endif
  	if (s->ttyfd != -1)
  		ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
@@ -1863,7 +1864,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  
  	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
 -	destroy_sensitive_data();
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
  	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 +	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 +	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
@@ -1923,7 +1924,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 +{
 +	if (s->command != NULL) {
 +		if (s->command_handle != -1)
-+			PRIVSEP(audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command));
++			mm_audit_end_command(ssh, s->command_handle, s->command);
 +		free(s->command);
 +		s->command = NULL;
 +		s->command_handle = -1;
@@ -1981,7 +1982,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
 @@ -2734,7 +2804,7 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
  	 * or if running in monitor.
  	 */
- 	if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
+ 	if (mm_is_monitor())
 -		session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
 +		session_destroy_all(ssh, do_cleanup_one_session);
  }
@@ -1989,7 +1990,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  /* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.384464586 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.h	2021-04-19 16:47:35.758062145 +0200
 @@ -61,6 +61,12 @@ struct Session {
  		char	*name;
  		char	*val;
@@ -2006,7 +2007,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
 @@ -71,10 +77,12 @@ void	 session_unused(int);
  int	 session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *, Channel *, const char *);
  void	 session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t, int);
- void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, void *);
+ void	 session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
 -void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(Session *));
 +void	 session_destroy_all(struct ssh *, void (*)(struct ssh*, Session *));
  void	 session_pty_cleanup2(Session *);
@@ -2018,29 +2019,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/session.h
  void	 session_close(struct ssh *, Session *);
  void	 do_setusercontext(struct passwd *);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.346464292 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.385464594 +0200
-@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
- #include "monitor_wrap.h"
-+#include "audit.h"
- #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
- #include "auth-options.h"
- #include "version.h"
-@@ -260,8 +261,8 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
- 
- /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
--void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
--void demote_sensitive_data(void);
-+void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *, int);
-+void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
- static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
- 
- static char *listener_proctitle;
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
 @@ -279,6 +280,15 @@ close_listen_socks(void)
- 	num_listen_socks = -1;
+ 	num_listen_socks = 0;
  }
  
 +/*
@@ -2049,16 +2031,82 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 + */
 +int listening_for_clients(void)
 +{
-+	return num_listen_socks >= 0;
++	return num_listen_socks > 0;
 +}
 +
+ /* Allocate and initialise the children array */
  static void
- close_startup_pipes(void)
- {
-@@ -377,18 +387,45 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
- 	}
- }
+ child_alloc(void)
+@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
+ 		if (received_sigterm) {
+ 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
+ 			    (int) received_sigterm);
++			/* destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0); FIXME */
+ 			close_listen_socks();
+ 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
+ 				unlink(options.pid_file);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.audit	2021-04-19 16:47:35.727061907 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 16:47:35.759062152 +0200
+@@ -122,6 +122,7 @@
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+ #include "monitor_wrap.h"
++#include "audit.h"
+ #include "ssh-sandbox.h"
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "version.h"
+@@ -260,8 +261,44 @@ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
  
+ /* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
+-void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
+-void demote_sensitive_data(void);
++void destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
++void demote_sensitive_data(struct ssh *);
++
++static int
++sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
++{
++      switch (k->type) {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_RSA: {
++              const BIGNUM *d;
++              const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(k->pkey);
++              RSA_get0_key(rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
++              return d != NULL;
++          }
++      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_DSA: {
++              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
++              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
++              return priv_key != NULL;
++          }
++#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
++      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
++      case KEY_ECDSA: {
++              const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(k->pkey);
++              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ecdsa) != NULL;
++              }
++#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++      case KEY_ED25519:
++              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
++      default:
++              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
++              return 0;
++      }
++}
++
+ static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -377,18 +387,40 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
+ 	_exit(EXIT_LOGIN_GRACE);
+ }
+
 -/* Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed. */
 +/*
 + * Destroy the host and server keys.  They will no longer be needed.  Careful,
@@ -2066,7 +2114,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 + */
  void
 -destroy_sensitive_data(void)
-+destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh, int privsep)
++destroy_sensitive_data(struct ssh *ssh)
  {
  	u_int i;
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
@@ -2088,12 +2136,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  			sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
 +			if (fp != NULL) {
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-+				if (privsep)
-+					PRIVSEP(audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid));
-+				else
-+					audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp,
-+						pid, uid);
++				audit_destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, fp, pid, uid);
 +#endif
 +				free(fp);
 +			}
@@ -2163,9 +2206,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
  	sshd_selinux_change_privsep_preauth_context();
 @@ -492,7 +547,7 @@ privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
  
- 	if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
- 		box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
+ 	box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
 -	pid = fork();
 +	pmonitor->m_pid = pid = fork();
  	if (pid == -1) {
@@ -2189,48 +2232,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  
  	reseed_prngs();
  
-@@ -1143,7 +1198,7 @@ server_listen(void)
-  * from this function are in a forked subprocess.
-  */
- static void
--server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
-+server_accept_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
- {
- 	fd_set *fdset;
- 	int i, j, ret, maxfd;
-@@ -1204,6 +1259,7 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 		if (received_sigterm) {
- 			logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
- 			    (int) received_sigterm);
-+			destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 0);
- 			close_listen_socks();
- 			if (options.pid_file != NULL)
- 				unlink(options.pid_file);
-@@ -2098,7 +2154,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
--		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
-+		server_accept_loop(ssh, &sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);
- 	}
- 
 @@ -2333,6 +2389,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
  
  	/* The connection has been terminated. */
 +	packet_destroy_all(ssh, 1, 1);
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +
  	ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
  	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
  	    (unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
-@@ -2513,6 +2572,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -2513,6 +2572,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  void
  cleanup_exit(int i)
  {
 +	static int in_cleanup = 0;
-+	int is_privsep_child;
 +
 +	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
 +	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
@@ -2238,77 +2254,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 +	if (in_cleanup)
 +		_exit(i);
 +	in_cleanup = 1;
+ 	extern int auth_attempted; /* monitor.c */
+ 
  	if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
- 		do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
- 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
-@@ -2525,9 +2593,16 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
- 			}
- 		}
+@@ -2525,7 +2593,9 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
  	}
-+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid == 0;
-+	if (sensitive_data.host_keys != NULL && the_active_state != NULL)
-+		destroy_sensitive_data(the_active_state, is_privsep_child);
-+	if (the_active_state != NULL)
-+		packet_destroy_all(the_active_state, 1, is_privsep_child);
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
  	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
--	if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
+-	if (the_active_state != NULL && mm_is_monitor())
 +	if (the_active_state != NULL &&
 +	    (the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&
-+	    (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
++	    mm_is_monitor())
  		audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
  #endif
- 	_exit(i);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.364464431 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:05:27.386464602 +0200
-@@ -371,6 +371,38 @@ sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
- }
- 
- int
-+sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *k)
-+{
-+      switch (k->type) {
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+      case KEY_RSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_RSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *d;
-+              RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, &d);
-+              return d != NULL;
-+          }
-+      case KEY_DSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_DSA: {
-+              const BIGNUM *priv_key;
-+              DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
-+              return priv_key != NULL;
-+          }
-+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-+      case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ECDSA:
-+              return EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) != NULL;
-+#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+      case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
-+      case KEY_ED25519:
-+              return (k->ed25519_pk != NULL);
-+      default:
-+              /* fatal("key_is_private: bad key type %d", k->type); */
-+              return 0;
-+      }
-+}
-+
-+int
- sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
- {
- 	if (k == NULL)
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h.audit	2021-05-06 12:05:27.365464439 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.h	2021-05-06 12:05:27.386464602 +0200
-@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int		 sshkey_shield_private(struct sshke
- int		 sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
- 
- int	 sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
-+int	 sshkey_is_private(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+ 	/* Override default fatal exit value when auth was attempted */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
index f7cd50f..cfe11ad 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@@ -1,23 +1,22 @@
 diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
  
  /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
  
  static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
 @@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
  	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
  	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -27,7 +26,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
 -	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
 +	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -82,14 +81,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #endif
  
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
--extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  int
@@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  	if (r == 0) {
  		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
  			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
  
@@ -152,7 +150,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
--	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
@@ -216,55 +214,45 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
 --- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
 +++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
  
- extern int use_privsep;
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+ int
 @@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+diff -up openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor openssh/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
 @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
  
  /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
 -static int inetd_flag = 0;
 +int inetd_flag = 0;
  
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
--static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
 @@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
index 704de05..9f83eee 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@@ -72,17 +72,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
  
  u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
  void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
 @@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
  
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
- # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
 @@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
  	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
  	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
@@ -121,8 +121,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
 @@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
- 	"ssh-rsa"
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256"
  
 +#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
 +	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
@@ -268,9 +268,24 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
  	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
  	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h.xxx	2025-08-04 15:02:15.895341244 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh-gss.h	2025-08-04 15:02:54.826304548 +0200
+@@ -94,6 +94,11 @@ extern char **k5users_allowed_cmds;
+ 	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
+ 	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
+ 
++#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
++	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID
++
+ #include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx	2025-08-04 14:58:08.908229826 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/sshconnect2.c	2025-08-04 15:07:59.942477440 +0200
 @@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
  #include <vis.h>
  #endif
@@ -280,80 +295,32 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+@@ -274,6 +277,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
--		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
--		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
--		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
--		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
--		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
--			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
--			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
--			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
--			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				free(gss_host);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++		char * gss_kex_filtered = FIPS_mode() ?
++			 match_filter_allowlist(options.gss_kex_algorithms, GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS) : xstrdup(options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 +
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					free(gss_host);
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
- 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
- 			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
- 
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
+ 		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+ 		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+ 		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+@@ -293,7 +299,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  		}
- 	}
- #endif
+ 
+ 		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++		    options.gss_client_identity, gss_kex_filtered);
++		free(gss_kex_filtered);
++
+ 		if (gss) {
+ 			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+ 			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
 @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #include <grp.h>
+ #endif
  #include <pwd.h>
  #include <signal.h>
 +#include <syslog.h>
@@ -361,21 +328,13 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
 @@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #endif
  
-@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
 @@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
  			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
@@ -401,7 +360,18 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  	/*
  	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
  	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ b/sshd-session.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -2506,10 +2513,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
  		orig = NULL;
  
@@ -423,7 +393,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
  #include <openssl/pem.h>
@@ -440,11 +410,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
  
  #ifdef WITH_XMSS
 @@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
- 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- 		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+ 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
  			continue;
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			switch (kt->type) {
++			switch (impl->type) {
 +			case KEY_ED25519:
 +			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
 +			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
@@ -455,9 +425,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 +			     break;
 +			}
 +		}
- 		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
- 		if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
+ 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
 @@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
  		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
  	}
@@ -477,40 +447,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 +		break;
 +	}
  	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
- 	ret->type = type;
- 	if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
-@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
-		goto out;
-
-	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
+ 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+ 	*ret = *k;
 @@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
- 		break;
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		}
-+		/* Fallthrough */
- 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
- 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
- 		r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+ 		*lenp = 0;
+ 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++	/* Fallthrough */
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
 @@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
- 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		}
- 		return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
- 		    compat, detailsp);
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+ 		*detailsp = NULL;
+ 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
@@ -522,6 +483,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
  #include <openssl/pem.h>
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #endif
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+ #include "cipher.h"
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
++#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
 @@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
  #endif
  	}
@@ -535,11 +504,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
  	switch (type) {
  	case KEY_DSA:
  		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const ch
+ 	char *name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
++		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ 	else {
+ 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
+ #ifdef WITH_DSA
 @@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
  			first = 1;
  			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
  		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
++		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
 +
 +		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
 +		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
@@ -550,13 +528,42 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
 +
  		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
  		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
  		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
  			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
  			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
+@@ -3830,7 +3831,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
++		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+ 
+ 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
+ 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
+		goto out;
+ 	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx	2024-10-09 10:35:56.285946080 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c	2024-10-09 10:41:52.792597194 +0200
 @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -565,7 +572,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
  
  #include "sshkey.h"
  #include "kex.h"
-@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
  		break;
  #endif
  	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@@ -584,11 +591,20 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
 +		}
  		break;
  	default:
  		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
+@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
  		break;
  #endif
  	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@@ -609,11 +625,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
 +		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
 +		}
  		break;
  	default:
  		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
+@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
  		break;
  #endif
  	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
@@ -636,6 +663,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
 +		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
 +		}
  		break;
  	default:
@@ -663,13 +701,33 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
  	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
  		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 @@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
- 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
  
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
  		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx	2024-10-11 12:44:08.087426597 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/kex.c	2024-10-11 14:00:10.404714521 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ # include <openssl/param_build.h>
+@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh
+ 
+ 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
+ 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
+-		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
+ 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
+ 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
index b2d2209..0b8ab02 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.345143341 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
 @@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
  	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
  	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
  #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-05-06 11:28:40.195242317 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -338,8 +338,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.374143558 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
 @@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
  }
  
@@ -368,10 +368,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
  		return;
  
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
 @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
@@ -484,8 +484,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  
  int
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.388143662 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
 @@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
@@ -503,16 +503,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 @@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -547,8 +546,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
 @@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
@@ -559,8 +558,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
 @@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
  	 * the child's environment as they see fit
@@ -580,9 +579,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
 @@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
@@ -593,8 +592,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
  	}
  #endif
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
 @@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  file on logout.
  The default is
@@ -608,11 +607,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
 @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
  	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
  	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
index feedcba..f8d7042 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
 @@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
+ 			    "enabled authentication methods");
+ 	}
  
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
 +
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
 +# problems.
  #UsePAM no
  
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
index 48f9f10..7c6d0ca 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@@ -23,23 +23,20 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
  	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
  		*style++ = 0;
  
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+@@ -314,7 +314,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
  		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
  		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
--		if (use_privsep)
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
 +#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
++         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
 +#endif
-+		}
  		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
 diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 --- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
@@ -50,7 +47,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +	char *micuser;
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
+ 	u_char *p;
 @@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
@@ -74,7 +71,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
  	free(mic.value);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
 diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 --- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -93,7 +90,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
 +#endif
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
 diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -147,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
 +++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
  void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
  void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
 -int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
 +int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
@@ -240,14 +237,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
 @@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
- {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
  	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
+ 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
 @@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
@@ -418,7 +415,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -472,7 +469,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@@ -678,7 +674,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -752,7 +748,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@@ -853,8 +849,8 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
  }
  
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
 @@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
@@ -864,4 +860,4 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 		do_pam_setcred();
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
index 502e1de..a666c5c 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
-diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
---- a/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.550013071 +0200
-+++ b/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:17:20.016704545 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
- .Qq *.c.example.com
- domains.
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.284590156 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.623052194 +0200
+@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@
+ causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
+ This is the default behaviour.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@
+@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
  (the default),
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@
+@@ -479,13 +480,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@
+@@ -885,6 +879,11 @@
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@
+@@ -897,10 +896,8 @@
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -92,7 +92,70 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1219,29 +1216,25 @@
+@@ -919,36 +916,25 @@
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
+-to the default set instead of replacing them.
++to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+-at the head of the default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+@@ -1001,6 +987,17 @@
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++The proposed
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
++.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
++would break the order given by the
++.Pa known_hosts
++file.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+ real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+@@ -1330,6 +1330,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -101,25 +164,31 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
+ their preference order.
+ The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
+@@ -1338,29 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
+ .Pp
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
+-.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@@ -127,11 +196,12 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
-+built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@
+ .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -178,7 +248,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1553,37 +1542,25 @@
+@@ -1567,39 +1555,31 @@
  The default is
  .Cm no .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -214,21 +284,37 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
---- a/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.535012771 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:15:33.394809258 +0200
-@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
++.Pp
++This option affects also
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be
+@@ -2265,7 +2245,9 @@
+ This file must be world-readable.
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+-.Xr ssh 1
++.Xr ssh 1 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.277590077 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.592051845 +0200
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
@@ -251,7 +337,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
  character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
+@@ -525,20 +521,25 @@
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
@@ -281,7 +367,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@
+@@ -565,13 +566,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -295,7 +381,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -685,21 +679,22 @@
+@@ -766,53 +760,43 @@
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
@@ -327,18 +413,27 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
-@@ -799,26 +794,13 @@
- .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the host key signature algorithms
- that the server offers.
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+-the default set instead of replacing them.
++the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
+-the head of the default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
@@ -349,18 +444,48 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -879,25 +863,14 @@
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+ The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
  .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
-@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@
+@@ -1025,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
@@ -369,33 +494,38 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+ The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
+@@ -1033,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
  If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq ^
- character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -1010,15 +997,6 @@
+@@ -1075,17 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
  sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
@@ -403,10 +533,10 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@
+@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
  file.
  This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
@@ -437,7 +567,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@
+@@ -1241,15 +1214,6 @@
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -453,7 +583,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1548,37 +1522,25 @@
+@@ -1633,36 +1597,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
@@ -489,14 +619,24 @@ diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -2131,7 +2084,9 @@
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+-.Xr sshd 8
++.Xr sshd 8 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ade0bbb..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
-From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
-
----
- digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
- digest.h         |   6 ++
- ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
- ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
- ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
- sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
- sshkey.h         |   4 +
- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
-index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
---- a/digest-openssl.c
-+++ b/digest-openssl.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-+const EVP_MD *
-+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static const struct ssh_digest *
- ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
- {
-diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
-index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
---- a/digest.h
-+++ b/digest.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
-index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
---- a/ssh-dss.c
-+++ b/ssh-dss.c
-@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
- ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
--	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-+	size_t rlen, slen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const u_char *psig = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
-+	    data, datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	free(sigb);
-+	sigb = NULL;
- 
- 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
- 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
--	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
-+	size_t len, slen;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
-@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	/* sha1 the data */
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
--
--	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-+	    sigb, slen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
---- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
- ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const unsigned char *psig;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- 	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t len, dlen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--
- 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t dlen;
-+	int hash_alg, len;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
-+		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
--static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
-+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
- 
- static const char *
- rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
-@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
--static int
--rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
--{
--	switch (type) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		return NID_sha1;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		return NID_sha256;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		return NID_sha512;
--	default:
--		return -1;
--	}
--}
--
- int
- ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
- {
-@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
- ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
--	size_t slen = 0;
--	u_int dlen, len;
--	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int len, slen = 0;
-+	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- 	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
-+
- 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
--		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
--	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--
--	/* hash the data */
--	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto out;
--	}
- 	if (len < slen) {
- 		size_t diff = slen - len;
- 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* encode signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- 	freezero(sig, slen);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	char *sigtype = NULL;
- 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
-+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
- 
-@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
--	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
--	    key->rsa);
-  out:
- 	freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * See:
-- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
-- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
-- */
--
--/*
-- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
--	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
--	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
--	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
--	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(1) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
--	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(3) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
--	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
--};
--
- static int
--rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
-+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
--	switch (hash_alg) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		*oidp = id_sha1;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		*oidp = id_sha256;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		*oidp = id_sha512;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
--		break;
--	default:
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	}
--	return 0;
--}
-+	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	const RSA *rsa;
-+	int ret;
- 
--static int
--openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
--    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
--{
--	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
--	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
--	const u_char *oid = NULL;
--	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
--
--	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
--		return ret;
--	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
--	if (hashlen != hlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--		goto done;
--	}
-+	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
--	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
--	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
--	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
-+	    sigbuf, siglen);
-+
- done:
--	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
- 	return ret;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
- }
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen, len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
index d908981..bdc4722 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.101653187 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac	2021-05-06 11:35:55.111653265 +0200
-@@ -1974,12 +1974,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-9.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.228942213 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/configure.ac	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
+@@ -2066,12 +2066,14 @@ AC_LINK_IFELSE(
  	[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
  ])
  
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
  		fi
  	]
  )
-@@ -2008,6 +2010,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
+@@ -2095,6 +2097,40 @@ AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
  AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
  
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
  # IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
  AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
  	AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
-@@ -5564,6 +5600,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support
+@@ -5708,6 +5744,7 @@ echo "                  BSD Auth support
  echo "              Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
  echo "             Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
  echo "                   PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
@@ -65,10 +65,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/configure.ac
  echo "                  U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
  
  echo ""
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.054652818 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in	2021-05-06 11:58:16.895135904 +0200
-@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.204941622 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/Makefile.in	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
  	monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
  	ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
  	msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
@@ -76,8 +76,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
 +	ssh-pkcs11.o ssh-pkcs11-uri.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
  	poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o cipher-chachapoly-libcrypto.o \
  	ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
- 	hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
-@@ -300,6 +300,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
+ 	hmac.o ed25519.o hash.o \
+@@ -299,6 +299,8 @@ clean:	regressclean
  	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT)
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
@@ -86,16 +86,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
  	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
  	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
-@@ -337,6 +339,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
+@@ -336,6 +338,8 @@ distclean:	regressclean
  	rm -f regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
  	rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
 +	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/*.o
 +	rm -f regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11
- 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
- 	if test -d pkg ; then \
- 		rm -fr pkg ; \
-@@ -511,6 +515,7 @@ regress-prep:
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ 	rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
+@@ -513,6 +517,7 @@ regress-prep:
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshsig
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
@@ -103,9 +103,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
  	$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
  	[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
  	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
-@@ -674,6 +679,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT
+@@ -685,6 +690,16 @@ regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT
  	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
- 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(TESTLIBS)
  
 +UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS=\
 +	regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.o
@@ -115,12 +115,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
 +    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
 +	$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_PKCS11_OBJS) \
 +	    regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-+	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	    -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS)
 +
  # These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
  SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
  	regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
-@@ -711,7 +726,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(RE
+@@ -720,7 +735,8 @@ regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(RE
  	regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
  	regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
  	regress/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig$(EXEEXT) \
@@ -128,24 +128,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/Makefile.in
 +	regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
 +	regress/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11$(EXEEXT) \
  
- tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
+ tests:	file-tests t-exec interop-tests extra-tests unit
  	echo all tests passed
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh	2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200
-@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ else
- 	done
- 
- 	trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
--	echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
-+	${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
- 	r=$?
- 	if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
- 		fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile	2021-05-06 11:59:24.465658383 +0200
-@@ -119,7 +119,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/regress/Makefile
+--- openssh-9.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/regress/Makefile	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
+@@ -134,7 +134,8 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
  		known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
  		modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
  		pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
@@ -155,17 +143,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/Makefil
  		rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
  		scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
  		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
-@@ -249,6 +250,7 @@ unit:
+@@ -273,8 +274,9 @@ unit:
  		V="" ; \
  		test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
  		    V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
-+		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 ; \
- 		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
- 		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
+-		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
+-		 $$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
++		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/pkcs11/test_pkcs11 ; \
++		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
++		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
  			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh	2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200
+ 		$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshsig/test_sshsig \
+ 			-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshsig/testdata ; \
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh
+--- openssh-9.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
 @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@
 +#
 +#  Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
@@ -516,21 +508,21 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11.sh.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/pkcs11
 +	trace "kill agent"
 +	${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
 +fi
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile	2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200
-@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile
+--- openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/Makefile	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
+@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
+ #	$OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.13 2023/09/24 08:14:13 claudio Exp $
  
- REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?=	yes
  SUBDIR=	test_helper sshbuf sshkey bitmap kex hostkeys utf8 match conversion
 -SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig
 +SUBDIR+=authopt misc sshsig pkcs11
  
  .include <bsd.subdir.mk>
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c	2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -559,7 +551,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 +#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
 +
-+#define EMPTY_URI compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
++#define EMPTY_URI compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL)
 +
 +/* prototypes are not public -- specify them here internally for tests */
 +struct sshbuf *percent_encode(const char *, size_t, char *);
@@ -592,6 +584,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf);
 +	else /* both should be null */
 +		ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->lib_manuf, b->lib_manuf);
++	if (b->serial != NULL)
++		ASSERT_STRING_EQ(a->serial, b->serial);
++	else /* both should be null */
++		ASSERT_PTR_EQ(a->serial, b->serial);
 +}
 +
 +void
@@ -626,7 +622,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +
 +struct pkcs11_uri *
 +compose_uri(unsigned char *id, size_t id_len, char *token, char *lib_manuf,
-+    char *manuf, char *module_path, char *object, char *pin)
++    char *manuf, char *serial, char *module_path, char *object, char *pin)
 +{
 +	struct pkcs11_uri *uri = pkcs11_uri_init();
 +	if (id_len > 0) {
@@ -637,6 +633,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +	uri->token = token;
 +	uri->lib_manuf = lib_manuf;
 +	uri->manuf = manuf;
++	uri->serial = serial;
 +	uri->object = object;
 +	uri->pin = pin;
 +	return uri;
@@ -647,47 +644,49 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +{
 +	/* path arguments */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:id=%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:id=%00%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	check_parse("pkcs11:serial=IamSerial",
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "IamSerial", NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:object=SIGN%20Key",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "SIGN Key", NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "SIGN Key", NULL));
 +	/* query arguments */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:?pin-value=123456",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "123456"));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "123456"));
 +
 +	/* combinations */
 +	/* ID SHOULD be percent encoded */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Key;id=0",
-+	    compose_uri("0", 1, "SSH Key", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("0", 1, "SSH Key", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse(
 +	    "pkcs11:manufacturer=CAC?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "CAC",
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "CAC", NULL,
 +	    "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +	check_parse(
 +	    "pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key?module-path=/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL,
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL,
 +	    "/usr/lib64/pkcs11/opencryptoki.so", "RSA Key", NULL));
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so&pin-value=123456",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, "123456"));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, "123456"));
 +
 +	/* empty path component matches everything */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI);
 +
 +	/* empty string is a valid to match against (and different from NULL) */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	/* Percent character needs to be percent-encoded */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=%25",
-+	     compose_uri(NULL, 0, "%", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	     compose_uri(NULL, 0, "%", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +}
 +
 +static void
@@ -699,7 +698,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +	check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%ZZ", EMPTY_URI, -1);
 +	/* Space MUST be percent encoded -- XXX not enforced yet */
 +	check_parse("pkcs11:token=SSH Keys",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	/* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */
 +	check_parse_rv("pkcs11:id=%01;id=%02", EMPTY_URI, -1);
 +	/* MUST NOT contain duplicate attributes of the same name */
@@ -730,29 +729,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +{
 +	/* path arguments */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x01", 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%00%01",
-+	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x00\x01", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:token=SSH%20Keys", /* space must be percent encoded */
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	/* library-manufacturer is not implmented now */
 +	/*check_gen("pkcs11:library-manufacturer=OpenSC",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));*/
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, "OpenSC", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));*/
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:manufacturer=piv_II",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	check_gen("pkcs11:serial=IamSerial",
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "IamSerial", NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:object=RSA%20Key",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "RSA Key", NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "RSA Key", NULL));
 +	/* query arguments */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +
 +	/* combinations */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%02;token=SSH%20Keys",
-+	    compose_uri("\x02", 1, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\x02", 1, "SSH Keys", NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:id=%EE%02?module-path=/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so",
-+	    compose_uri("\xEE\x02", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
++	    compose_uri("\xEE\x02", 2, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, "/usr/lib64/p11-kit-proxy.so", NULL, NULL));
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:object=Encryption%20Key;manufacturer=piv_II",
-+	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, "Encryption Key", NULL));
++	    compose_uri(NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, "piv_II", NULL, NULL, "Encryption Key", NULL));
 +
 +	/* empty path component matches everything */
 +	check_gen("pkcs11:", EMPTY_URI);
@@ -868,26 +869,31 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/regress/unittests/pkcs11/tests.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1
 +	test_parse_invalid();
 +	test_generate_valid();
 +}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c	2021-05-06 11:35:55.112653273 +0200
-@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
- #include "digest.h"
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-add.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.233942336 +0100
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
  #include "ssh-sk.h"
  #include "sk-api.h"
+ #include "hostfile.h"
 +#include "ssh-pkcs11-uri.h"
  
  /* argv0 */
  extern char *__progname;
-@@ -229,6 +230,32 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
+@@ -240,6 +241,38 @@ delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
  	return ret;
  }
  
 +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+static int update_card(int, int, const char *, int, char *);
++static int
++update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag,
++    int key_only, int cert_only,
++    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints,
++    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin);
 +
 +int
-+update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri, int qflag)
++update_pkcs11_uri(int agent_fd, int adding, const char *pkcs11_uri, int qflag,
++    struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
 +{
 +	char *pin = NULL;
 +	struct pkcs11_uri *uri;
@@ -905,58 +911,63 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-add.c
 +	}
 +	pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
 +
-+	return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, pin);
++	return update_card(agent_fd, adding, pkcs11_uri, qflag, 1, 0,
++	           dest_constraints, ndest_constraints, NULL, 0, pin);
 +}
 +#endif
 +
  static int
- add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag,
-     const char *skprovider)
-@@ -445,12 +472,11 @@ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filen
- }
- 
- static int
--update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag)
-+update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag, char *pin)
+ add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int cert_only,
+     int qflag, const char *skprovider,
+@@ -460,15 +489,14 @@ static int
+ update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag,
+     int key_only, int cert_only,
+     struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints,
+-    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts)
++    struct sshkey **certs, size_t ncerts, char *pin)
  {
 -	char *pin = NULL;
  	int r, ret = -1;
  
+ 	if (key_only)
+ 		ncerts = 0;
+ 
 -	if (add) {
 +	if (add && pin == NULL) {
  		if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
  		    RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
  			return -1;
-@@ -630,6 +656,13 @@ static int
- do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag,
-     const char *skprovider)
+@@ -656,6 +684,14 @@ do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int
+     char *file, int qflag, const char *skprovider,
+     struct dest_constraint **dest_constraints, size_t ndest_constraints)
  {
 +#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 +	if (strlen(file) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
 +	    strncmp(file, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
 +	    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
-+		return update_pkcs11_uri(agent_fd, !deleting, file, qflag);
++		return update_pkcs11_uri(agent_fd, !deleting, file, qflag,
++                   dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
 +	}
 +#endif
  	if (deleting) {
- 		if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
- 			return -1;
-@@ -813,7 +846,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 	if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
+ 		if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only,
+ 		    cert_only, qflag) == -1)
+@@ -999,7 +1035,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  		if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider,
--		    qflag) == -1)
-+		    qflag, NULL) == -1)
+ 		    qflag, key_only, cert_only,
+ 		    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints,
+-		    certs, ncerts) == -1)
++		    certs, ncerts, NULL) == -1)
  			ret = 1;
  		goto done;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c	2021-05-06 11:35:55.113653281 +0200
-@@ -847,10 +847,72 @@ no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-agent.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100
+@@ -1549,10 +1549,74 @@ add_p11_identity(struct sshkey *key, cha
+ 	idtab->nentries++;
  }
  
- #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
 +static char *
 +sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *provider)
 +{
@@ -967,6 +978,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
 +	if (provider == NULL)
 +		return NULL;
 +
++	memset(canonical_provider, 0, sizeof(canonical_provider));
++
 +	if (strlen(provider) >= strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME) &&
 +	    strncmp(provider, PKCS11_URI_SCHEME,
 +	    strlen(PKCS11_URI_SCHEME)) == 0) {
@@ -1027,25 +1040,23 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
  	char **comments = NULL;
  	int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
  	u_int seconds = 0;
-@@ -869,33 +931,28 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
- 		error_f("failed to parse constraints");
+@@ -1581,25 +1643,18 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 		    "providers is disabled", provider);
  		goto send;
  	}
 -	if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
 -		verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
 -		    provider, strerror(errno));
--		goto send;
--	}
--	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
--		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
--		    "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
-+
 +	sane_uri = sanitize_pkcs11_provider(provider);
 +	if (sane_uri == NULL)
  		goto send;
 -	}
+-	if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, allowed_providers, 0) != 1) {
+-		verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
+-		    "provider not allowed", canonical_provider);
+-		goto send;
+-	}
 -	debug_f("add %.100s", canonical_provider);
-+
  	if (lifetime && !death)
  		death = monotime() + lifetime;
  
@@ -1053,31 +1064,38 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
 +	debug_f("add %.100s", sane_uri);
 +	count = pkcs11_add_provider(sane_uri, pin, &keys, &comments);
  	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
- 		k = keys[i];
- 		if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
- 			id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
- 			id->key = k;
- 			keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
--			id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
-+			id->provider = xstrdup(sane_uri);
- 			if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
- 				id->comment = comments[i];
- 				comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
- 			} else {
--				id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
-+				id->comment = xstrdup(sane_uri);
- 			}
- 			id->death = death;
- 			id->confirm = confirm;
-@@ -910,6 +967,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 		if (comments[i] == NULL || comments[i][0] == '\0') {
+ 			free(comments[i]);
+-			comments[i] = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
++			comments[i] = xstrdup(sane_uri);
+ 		}
+ 		for (j = 0; j < ncerts; j++) {
+ 			if (!sshkey_is_cert(certs[j]))
+@@ -1609,13 +1664,13 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
+ 			if (pkcs11_make_cert(keys[i], certs[j], &k) != 0)
+ 				continue;
+ 			add_p11_identity(k, xstrdup(comments[i]),
+-			    canonical_provider, death, confirm,
++			    sane_uri, death, confirm,
+ 			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+ 			success = 1;
+ 		}
+ 		if (!cert_only && lookup_identity(keys[i]) == NULL) {
+ 			add_p11_identity(keys[i], comments[i],
+-			    canonical_provider, death, confirm,
++			    sane_uri, death, confirm,
+ 			    dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+ 			keys[i] = NULL;		/* transferred */
+ 			comments[i] = NULL;	/* transferred */
+@@ -1628,6 +1683,7 @@ process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e
  send:
  	free(pin);
  	free(provider);
 +	free(sane_uri);
  	free(keys);
  	free(comments);
- 	send_status(e, success);
-@@ -918,7 +976,7 @@ send:
+ 	free_dest_constraints(dest_constraints, ndest_constraints);
+@@ -1640,7 +1696,7 @@ send:
  static void
  process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
  {
@@ -1086,7 +1104,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
  	int r, success = 0;
  	Identity *id, *nxt;
  
-@@ -930,30 +988,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
+@@ -1652,30 +1708,29 @@ process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry
  	}
  	free(pin);
  
@@ -1123,10 +1141,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-agent.c
  	send_status(e, success);
  }
  #endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.061652873 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5	2021-05-06 11:35:55.116653304 +0200
-@@ -1063,6 +1063,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.208941721 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh_config.5	2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100
+@@ -1216,6 +1216,21 @@ may also be used in conjunction with
  .Cm CertificateFile
  in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
  the identity.
@@ -1148,10 +1166,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh_config.5
  .It Cm IgnoreUnknown
  Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
  encountered in configuration parsing.
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.060652865 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-06 12:00:07.129988275 +0200
-@@ -843,6 +843,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.208941721 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100
+@@ -882,6 +882,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
  			break;
  		case 'i':
@@ -1166,7 +1184,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  			p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
  			if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
  				fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
-@@ -1695,6 +1703,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1784,6 +1792,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	(void)pkcs11_del_provider(options.pkcs11_provider);
  #endif
@@ -1174,7 +1192,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  
   skip_connect:
  	exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, cinfo);
-@@ -2211,6 +2220,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const stru
+@@ -2307,6 +2316,45 @@ ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, const stru
  	    options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
  }
  
@@ -1220,7 +1238,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  /* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
  static void
  load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
-@@ -2225,11 +2273,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
+@@ -2321,11 +2369,6 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
  	char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
  	struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
  	int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
@@ -1232,7 +1250,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  
  	n_ids = n_certs = 0;
  	memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
-@@ -2242,33 +2285,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
+@@ -2338,33 +2381,46 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct
  	    sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
  
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
@@ -1298,10 +1316,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
  		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
  		free(cp);
  		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200
-@@ -860,8 +860,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100
+@@ -862,8 +862,11 @@ do_download(struct passwd *pw)
  			free(fp);
  		} else {
  			(void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
@@ -1315,19 +1333,19 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		}
  		free(comments[i]);
  		sshkey_free(keys[i]);
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200
-@@ -323,6 +323,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
- 	u_int nkeys, i;
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.234942360 +0100
+@@ -592,6 +592,8 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
  	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	struct helper *helper;
  
 +	debug_f("called, name = %s", name);
 +
- 	if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
- 		return (-1);
- 
-@@ -342,6 +344,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
+ 	if ((helper = helper_by_provider(name)) == NULL &&
+ 	    (helper = pkcs11_start_helper(name)) == NULL)
+ 		return -1;
+@@ -612,6 +614,7 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pi
  		*keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
  		if (labelsp)
  			*labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *));
@@ -1335,9 +1353,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-c
  		for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
  			/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
  			if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2021-05-06 11:35:55.115653297 +0200
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.xxx	2024-10-09 11:56:35.890126144 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2024-10-09 11:56:48.528459585 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/x509.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
+ 
+ #define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
+ #include "pkcs11.h"
 @@ -55,8 +55,8 @@ struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
  	int			logged_in;
  };
@@ -1521,10 +1547,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	struct pkcs11_provider *p;
 +	int rv = -1;
 +	char *provider_uri = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
++
++	debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri);
  
 -	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
-+	debug3_f("called with provider %s", provider_uri);
-+
 +	if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_uri)) != NULL) {
  		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
  		pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
@@ -1538,9 +1564,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  }
  
  static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
-@@ -195,6 +283,55 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
+@@ -195,6 +286,60 @@ static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
  static int ec_key_idx = 0;
- #endif
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
  
 +/*
 + * This can't be in the ssh-pkcs11-uri, becase we can not depend on
@@ -1555,13 +1581,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +
 +	/* sanity - is it a RSA key with associated app_data? */
 +	switch (key->type) {
-+	case KEY_RSA:
-+		k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(key->rsa, rsa_idx);
++	case KEY_RSA: {
++               const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(key->pkey);
++		k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx);
 +		break;
++		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
-+	case KEY_ECDSA:
-+		k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(key->ecdsa, ec_key_idx);
++	case KEY_ECDSA: {
++               const EC_KEY * ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(key->pkey);
++		k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx);
 +		break;
++		}
 +#endif
 +	default:
 +		error("Unknown key type %d", key->type);
@@ -1580,6 +1610,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +	uri.module_path = k11->provider->module->module_path;
 +	uri.lib_manuf = k11->provider->module->info.manufacturerID;
 +	uri.manuf = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.manufacturerID;
++	uri.serial = k11->provider->module->slotinfo[k11->slotidx].token.serialNumber;
 +
 +	p = pkcs11_uri_get(&uri);
 +	/* do not cleanup -- we do not allocate here, only reference */
@@ -1594,7 +1625,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  /* release a wrapped object */
  static void
  pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
-@@ -208,6 +345,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr,
+@@ -208,6 +349,7 @@ pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr,
  	if (k11->provider)
  		pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
  	free(k11->keyid);
@@ -1602,7 +1633,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	free(k11);
  }
  
-@@ -222,8 +360,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C
+@@ -222,8 +364,8 @@ pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, C
  	CK_RV			rv;
  	int			ret = -1;
  
@@ -1613,9 +1644,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
  		return (-1);
-@@ -262,12 +400,12 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
+@@ -260,14 +402,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
+ 	if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
+ 		verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
  	else {
- 		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
+-		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
++		snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%.32s': ",
  		    si->token.label);
 -		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
 +		if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL) {
@@ -1628,7 +1662,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	    (pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
  	if (pin != NULL)
  		freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
-@@ -297,13 +435,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
+@@ -297,13 +439,14 @@ pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider
  static int
  pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
  {
@@ -1645,7 +1679,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  }
  
  
-@@ -319,13 +458,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs
+@@ -319,13 +462,14 @@ pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs
  
  	*val = 0;
  
@@ -1663,7 +1697,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	attr.type = type;
  	attr.pValue = &flag;
-@@ -356,13 +496,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, C
+@@ -356,13 +500,14 @@ pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, C
  	int			 always_auth = 0;
  	int			 did_login = 0;
  
@@ -1681,7 +1715,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
  		if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
-@@ -439,8 +580,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con
+@@ -439,8 +584,8 @@ pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, con
  		return (-1);
  	}
  
@@ -1692,7 +1726,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
  
  	/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
-@@ -484,7 +625,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
+@@ -484,7 +629,7 @@ pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
  /* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
  static int
  pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -1701,7 +1735,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  {
  	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
  
-@@ -502,6 +643,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *
+@@ -502,6 +647,12 @@ pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *
  		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
  	}
  
@@ -1711,10 +1745,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
 +	}
 +
- 	RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
- 	RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
- 	return (0);
-@@ -532,8 +679,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,
+ 	if (RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method) != 1)
+ 		fatal_f("RSA_set_method failed");
+ 	if (RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11) != 1)
+@@ -532,8 +683,8 @@ ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst,
  		return (NULL);
  	}
  
@@ -1725,7 +1759,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
  	sig = xmalloc(siglen);
-@@ -598,7 +745,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
+@@ -598,7 +749,7 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
  
  static int
  pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -1734,20 +1768,30 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  {
  	struct pkcs11_key	*k11;
  
-@@ -614,6 +761,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
- 	k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
- 	memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
- 
+@@ -615,6 +766,12 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
+ 		k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
+ 		memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
+ 	}
 +	if (label_attrib->ulValueLen > 0 ) {
 +		k11->label = xmalloc(label_attrib->ulValueLen+1);
 +		memcpy(k11->label, label_attrib->pValue, label_attrib->ulValueLen);
 +		k11->label[label_attrib->ulValueLen] = 0;
 +	}
 +
- 	EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
- 	EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
+ 	if (EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method) != 1)
+ 		fatal_f("EC_KEY_set_method failed");
+ 	if (EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11) != 1)
+@@ -622,7 +779,8 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider
+ }
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC && HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
  
-@@ -650,8 +803,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
+-/* remove trailing spaces */
++/* remove trailing spaces. Note, that this does NOT guarantee the buffer
++ * will be null terminated if there are no trailing spaces! */
+ static char *
+ rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
+ {
+@@ -654,8 +812,8 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	session;
  	int			login_required, ret;
  
@@ -1758,7 +1802,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
  
-@@ -661,9 +814,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
+@@ -665,9 +823,9 @@ pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provid
  		error("pin required");
  		return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
  	}
@@ -1770,7 +1814,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		return (-1);
  	}
  	if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
-@@ -699,7 +852,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+@@ -703,7 +861,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
  pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
  {
@@ -1780,7 +1824,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -713,14 +867,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -717,14 +876,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  
  	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
  	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
@@ -1801,7 +1845,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -731,19 +886,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -735,19 +895,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
@@ -1825,7 +1869,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -755,8 +910,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -759,8 +919,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1836,7 +1880,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (group == NULL) {
  		ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
  		goto fail;
-@@ -767,13 +922,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -771,13 +931,13 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1853,7 +1897,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (octet == NULL) {
  		ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
  		goto fail;
-@@ -790,7 +945,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+@@ -794,7 +954,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1862,8 +1906,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		goto fail;
  
  	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -806,7 +961,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
- 	ec = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+@@ -810,7 +970,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_
+ 	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
  
  fail:
 -	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
@@ -1871,7 +1915,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
  	if (ec)
  		EC_KEY_free(ec);
-@@ -823,7 +978,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
+@@ -827,7 +987,8 @@ static struct sshkey *
  pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
  {
@@ -1881,7 +1925,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -834,14 +990,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -838,14 +999,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  
  	memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
  	key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
@@ -1902,7 +1946,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return (NULL);
-@@ -852,19 +1009,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -856,19 +1018,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  	 * ensure that none of the others are zero length.
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
@@ -1926,7 +1970,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -876,8 +1033,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -880,8 +1042,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  		goto fail;
  	}
  
@@ -1937,7 +1981,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
  		error("BN_bin2bn failed");
  		goto fail;
-@@ -886,7 +1043,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+@@ -890,7 +1052,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
  		fatal_f("set key");
  	rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
  
@@ -1946,8 +1990,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		goto fail;
  
  	key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -901,7 +1058,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
- 	rsa = NULL;	/* now owned by key */
+@@ -905,7 +1067,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_pr
+ 	key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
  
  fail:
 -	for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
@@ -1955,7 +1999,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		free(key_attr[i].pValue);
  	RSA_free(rsa);
  
-@@ -912,7 +1069,8 @@ static int
+@@ -916,7 +1078,8 @@ static int
  pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
      CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
  {
@@ -1965,7 +2009,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -936,14 +1094,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -940,14 +1103,15 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  
  	memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
  	cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
@@ -1986,7 +2030,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		return -1;
-@@ -955,18 +1114,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -959,18 +1123,19 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  	 * XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
  	 */
  	if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
@@ -2009,7 +2053,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto out;
-@@ -980,8 +1140,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -984,8 +1149,8 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  		subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
  	X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
  
@@ -2020,7 +2064,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		error("d2i_x509 failed");
  		goto out;
  	}
-@@ -1001,7 +1161,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -1005,7 +1170,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  			goto out;
  		}
  
@@ -2029,7 +2073,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  			goto out;
  
  		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1031,7 +1191,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -1035,7 +1200,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  			goto out;
  		}
  
@@ -2038,7 +2082,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  			goto out;
  
  		key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
-@@ -1051,7 +1211,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
+@@ -1055,7 +1220,7 @@ pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_p
  		goto out;
  	}
   out:
@@ -2047,7 +2091,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
  	X509_free(x509);
  	RSA_free(rsa);
-@@ -1102,11 +1262,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_U
+@@ -1106,11 +1271,12 @@ note_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_U
   */
  static int
  pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -2062,7 +2106,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1123,10 +1284,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provide
+@@ -1127,10 +1293,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provide
  	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
  	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
  
@@ -2080,16 +2124,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
 +		nattr++;
 +	}
-+
-+	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
-+	f = p->module->function_list;
  
 -	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
++	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
++	f = p->module->function_list;
++
 +	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -1207,11 +1381,12 @@ fail:
+@@ -1211,11 +1390,12 @@ fail:
   */
  static int
  pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
@@ -2104,7 +2148,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	CK_SESSION_HANDLE	 session;
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST	*f = NULL;
  	CK_RV			 rv;
-@@ -1227,10 +1402,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider
+@@ -1231,10 +1411,23 @@ pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider
  	key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
  	key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
  
@@ -2122,16 +2166,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		key_attr[nattr].ulValueLen = strlen(uri->object);
 +		nattr++;
 +	}
- 
--	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
++
 +	session = p->module->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
 +	f = p->module->function_list;
-+
+ 
+-	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
 +	rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, nattr);
  	if (rv != CKR_OK) {
  		error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
  		goto fail;
-@@ -1499,16 +1690,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct
+@@ -1503,16 +1696,10 @@ pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct
  }
  #endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
  
@@ -2150,7 +2194,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  	int ret = -1;
  	struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
  	void *handle = NULL;
-@@ -1517,164 +1699,298 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_
+@@ -1521,162 +1708,309 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_
  	CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
  	CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
  	CK_ULONG i;
@@ -2158,28 +2202,35 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +	struct pkcs11_module *m = NULL;
  
 -	if (providerp == NULL)
+-		goto fail;
+-	*providerp = NULL;
+-
+-	if (keyp != NULL)
+-		*keyp = NULL;
+-	if (labelsp != NULL)
+-		*labelsp = NULL;
 +	/* if no provider specified, fallback to p11-kit */
 +	if (uri->module_path == NULL) {
 +#ifdef PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER
 +		provider_module = strdup(PKCS11_DEFAULT_PROVIDER);
 +#else
 +		error_f("No module path provided");
- 		goto fail;
--	*providerp = NULL;
++ 		goto fail;
 +#endif
 +	} else {
 +		provider_module = strdup(uri->module_path);
 +	}
- 
--	if (keyp != NULL)
--		*keyp = NULL;
--	if (labelsp != NULL)
--		*labelsp = NULL;
 +	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
 +	p->name = pkcs11_uri_get(uri);
  
 -	if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
 -		debug_f("provider already registered: %s", provider_id);
++	if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_module, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) {
++		error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_module);
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if (lib_contains_symbol(provider_id, "C_GetFunctionList") != 0) {
+-		error("provider %s is not a PKCS11 library", provider_id);
 -		goto fail;
 +	if ((m = pkcs11_provider_lookup_module(provider_module)) != NULL
 +	   && m->valid) {
@@ -2206,14 +2257,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
  		goto fail;
  	}
- 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
- 		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
+ 	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
 -	p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
 -	p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
 -	p->handle = handle;
-+
 +	p->module->handle = handle;
  	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
  	if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
@@ -2236,28 +2284,28 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
 -		    provider_id, rv);
 +		    provider_module, rv);
-+		goto fail;
-+	}
-+	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
-+	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
-+	    strcmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID)) {
-+		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
-+		    m->info.manufacturerID);
  		goto fail;
  	}
--	rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
--	rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
-+	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
- 	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
- 	    " libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
+-	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.*s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
+-	    " libraryDescription <%.*s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
 -	    provider_id,
--	    p->info.manufacturerID,
+-	    RMSPACE(p->info.manufacturerID),
 -	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
 -	    p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
--	    p->info.libraryDescription,
+-	    RMSPACE(p->info.libraryDescription),
 -	    p->info.libraryVersion.major,
 -	    p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
 -	if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
++	rmspace(m->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(m->info.manufacturerID));
++	if (uri->lib_manuf != NULL &&
++	    strncmp(uri->lib_manuf, m->info.manufacturerID, 32)) {
++		debug_f("Skipping provider %s not matching library_manufacturer",
++		    m->info.manufacturerID);
++		goto fail;
++	}
++	rmspace(m->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(m->info.libraryDescription));
++	debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%.32s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
++	    " libraryDescription <%.32s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
 +	    provider_module,
 +	    m->info.manufacturerID,
 +	    m->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
@@ -2288,12 +2336,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  		goto fail;
  	}
 -	p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
++	m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
  	p->valid = 1;
 -	nkeys = 0;
 -	for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
 -		token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
 -		if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
-+	m->slotinfo = xcalloc(m->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
 +	m->valid = 1;
 +	for (i = 0; i < m->nslots; i++) {
 +		token = &m->slotinfo[i].token;
@@ -2310,20 +2358,25 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +			token->flags = 0;
  			continue;
  		}
- 		rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
- 		rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
- 		rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
- 		rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
+ 		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.*s> "
+ 		    "manufacturerID <%.*s> model <%.*s> serial <%.*s> "
+ 		    "flags 0x%lx",
+-		    provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
++		    provider_module, (unsigned long)i,
+ 		    RMSPACE(token->label), RMSPACE(token->manufacturerID),
+ 		    RMSPACE(token->model), RMSPACE(token->serialNumber),
+ 		    token->flags);
 +	}
 +	m->module_path = provider_module;
 +	provider_module = NULL;
 +
-+	/* insert unconditionally -- remove if there will be no keys later */
++	/* now owned by caller */
++	*providerp = p;
++
 +	TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
 +	p->refcount++;	/* add to provider list */
-+	*providerp = p;
-+	return 0;
 +
++	return 0;
 +fail:
 +	if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
 +		error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
@@ -2339,7 +2392,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +	}
 +	if (handle)
 +		dlclose(handle);
-+	return ret;
++	return (ret);
 +}
 +
 +/*
@@ -2382,29 +2435,35 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +			continue;
 +		}
 +		if (uri->token != NULL &&
-+		    strcmp(token->label, uri->token) != 0) {
-+			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%s) "
++		    strncmp(token->label, uri->token, 32) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching label (%.32s) "
 +			    "specified by PKCS#11 URI in slot %lu",
 +			    token->label, (unsigned long)i);
 +			continue;
 +		}
 +		if (uri->manuf != NULL &&
-+		    strcmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf) != 0) {
++		    strncmp(token->manufacturerID, uri->manuf, 32) != 0) {
 +			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
-+			    "manufacturerID (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
++			    "manufacturerID (%.32s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
 +			    "slot %lu", token->manufacturerID, (unsigned long)i);
 +			continue;
 +		}
- 		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> "
- 		    "model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx",
--		    provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
++		if (uri->serial != NULL &&
++		    strncmp(token->serialNumber, uri->serial, 16) != 0) {
++			debug2_f("ignoring token not matching requrested "
++			    "serialNumber (%s) specified by PKCS#11 URI in "
++			    "slot %lu", token->serialNumber, (unsigned long)i);
++			continue;
++		}
++		debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%.32s> manufacturerID <%.32s> "
++		    "model <%.16s> serial <%.16s> flags 0x%lx",
 +		    provider_uri, (unsigned long)i,
- 		    token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
- 		    token->serialNumber, token->flags);
++		    token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
++		    token->serialNumber, token->flags);
  		/*
 -		 * open session, login with pin and retrieve public
 -		 * keys (if keyp is provided)
-+		 * open session if not yet openend, login with pin and
++		 * open session if not yet opened, login with pin and
 +		 * retrieve public keys (if keyp is provided)
  		 */
 -		if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
@@ -2436,7 +2495,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +			pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys, uri);
 +		}
 +		if (nkeys == 0 && uri->object != NULL) {
-+			debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%s) ",
++			debug3_f("No keys found. Retrying without label (%.32s) ",
 +			    uri->object);
 +			/* Try once more without the label filter */
 +			char *label = uri->object;
@@ -2465,8 +2524,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
 -		free(p->slotlist);
 -		free(p->slotinfo);
 -		free(p);
-+ 		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
-+		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
++		TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
++	      	pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
  	}
 -	if (handle)
 -		dlclose(handle);
@@ -2524,7 +2583,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
  	if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
-@@ -1683,7 +1999,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, c
+@@ -1685,7 +2019,37 @@ pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, c
  		pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
  	}
  	if (nkeys == 0)
@@ -2563,9 +2622,9 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.c
  
  	return (nkeys);
  }
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2021-05-06 11:35:55.115653297 +0200
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri	2023-12-18 15:59:50.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2024-01-12 14:25:25.235942385 +0100
 @@ -22,10 +22,14 @@
  #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED		4
  #define	SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED		5
@@ -2581,10 +2640,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11.h
  #ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
  struct sshkey *
  	pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c	2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,419 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.235942385 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c	2024-01-12 14:25:25.235942385 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -2627,13 +2686,14 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +#define PKCS11_URI_OBJECT "object"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF "library-manufacturer"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_MANUF "manufacturer"
++#define PKCS11_URI_SERIAL "serial"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH "module-path"
 +#define PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE "pin-value"
 +
 +/* Keyword tokens. */
 +typedef enum {
-+	pId, pToken, pObject, pLibraryManufacturer, pManufacturer, pModulePath,
-+	pPinValue, pBadOption
++	pId, pToken, pObject, pLibraryManufacturer, pManufacturer, pSerial,
++	pModulePath, pPinValue, pBadOption
 +} pkcs11uriOpCodes;
 +
 +/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
@@ -2646,6 +2706,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_OBJECT, pObject },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_LIB_MANUF, pLibraryManufacturer },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_MANUF, pManufacturer },
++	{ PKCS11_URI_SERIAL, pSerial },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_MODULE_PATH, pModulePath },
 +	{ PKCS11_URI_PIN_VALUE, pPinValue },
 +	{ NULL, pBadOption }
@@ -2804,6 +2865,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +			goto err;
 +	}
 +
++	/* Write serial */
++	if (uri->serial) {
++		struct sshbuf *serial = percent_encode(uri->serial,
++		    strlen(uri->serial), PKCS11_URI_WHITELIST);
++		path = pkcs11_uri_append(path, PKCS11_URI_PATH_SEPARATOR,
++		    PKCS11_URI_SERIAL, serial);
++		if (path == NULL)
++			goto err;
++	}
++
 +	/* Write module_path */
 +	if (uri->module_path) {
 +		struct sshbuf *module = percent_encode(uri->module_path,
@@ -2846,6 +2917,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +	free(pkcs11->object);
 +	free(pkcs11->lib_manuf);
 +	free(pkcs11->manuf);
++	free(pkcs11->serial);
 +	if (pkcs11->pin)
 +		freezero(pkcs11->pin, strlen(pkcs11->pin));
 +	free(pkcs11);
@@ -2941,6 +3013,11 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +			charptr = &pkcs11->manuf;
 +			goto parse_string;
 +
++		case pSerial:
++			/* CK_TOKEN_INFO -> serialNumber */
++			charptr = &pkcs11->serial;
++			goto parse_string;
++
 +		case pLibraryManufacturer:
 +			/* CK_INFO -> manufacturerID */
 +			charptr = &pkcs11->lib_manuf;
@@ -3004,10 +3081,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.c.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +}
 +
 +#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
-diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
---- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri	2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h	2021-05-06 11:35:55.114653289 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h
+--- openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri	2024-01-12 14:25:25.235942385 +0100
++++ openssh-9.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h	2024-01-12 14:25:25.235942385 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2017 Red Hat
 + *
@@ -3039,6 +3116,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.h.pkcs11-uri openssh-8.6p1/ssh-pkcs11-uri.
 +	char *object;
 +	char *lib_manuf;
 +	char *manuf;
++	char *serial;
 +	/* query */
 +	char *module_path;
 +	char *pin; /* Only parsed, but not printed */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
index dbdbe93..b7ab965 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
@@ -27,16 +27,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
  		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
  	else
-@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 			plen++;
+@@ -856,9 +862,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
  			free(msg);
  			break;
-+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
-+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
 +			sshpam_account_status = 0;
 +			/* FALLTHROUGH */
  		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
 -			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -				sshpam_account_status = 0;
  			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ca661ee..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
-index 46dfe3a9c2e..478a9403eea 100644
---- a/compat.c
-+++ b/compat.c
-@@ -190,26 +190,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
- char *
- compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
- {
--	char *cp = NULL;
-+	char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
- 		return xstrdup(p);
- 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
--		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
-+		if ((cp = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
--		cp = p;
--		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
-+		if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 		free(cp);
-+		cp = cp2;
- 	}
--	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
--	if (*p == '\0')
-+	if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
- 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
--	return p;
-+	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
-+	return cp;
- }
- 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1fd953d..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,323 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index a8e87430..f2135803 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -2399,15 +2399,26 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
- 	struct tm tm;
- 	time_t tt;
- 	char buf[32], *fmt;
-+	const char *cp;
-+	size_t l;
-+	int is_utc = 0;
- 
- 	*tp = 0;
- 
-+	l = strlen(s);
-+	if (l > 1 && strcasecmp(s + l - 1, "Z") == 0) {
-+		is_utc = 1;
-+		l--;
-+	} else if (l > 3 && strcasecmp(s + l - 3, "UTC") == 0) {
-+		is_utc = 1;
-+		l -= 3;
-+	}
- 	/*
- 	 * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
- 	 * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
- 	 * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
- 	 */
--	switch (strlen(s)) {
-+	switch (l) {
- 	case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */
- 		fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
- 		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
-@@ -2427,10 +2438,15 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
- 	}
- 
- 	memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
--	if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--	if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
-+	if ((cp = strptime(buf, fmt, &tm)) == NULL || *cp != '\0')
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-+	if (is_utc) {
-+		if ((tt = timegm(&tm)) < 0)
-+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-+	} else {
-+		if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
-+			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
-+	}
- 	/* success */
- 	*tp = (uint64_t)tt;
- 	return 0;
-diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
-index ef6fd77d..4794dbd9 100644
---- a/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
-+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
- 
- #include "log.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- 
- void test_convtime(void);
- 
-@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ void
- test_convtime(void)
- {
- 	char buf[1024];
-+	uint64_t t;
- 
- 	TEST_START("misc_convtime");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
-@@ -56,4 +58,64 @@ test_convtime(void)
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3550w5d3h14m8s"), -1);
- #endif
- 	TEST_DONE();
-+
-+	/* XXX timezones/DST make verification of this tricky */
-+	/* XXX maybe setenv TZ and tzset() to make it unambiguous? */
-+	TEST_START("misc_parse_absolute_time");
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345", &t), 0);
-+
-+	/* forced UTC TZ */
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101Z", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223Z", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345Z", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTC", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223UTC", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345UTC", &t), 0);
-+	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
-+
-+	/* Bad month */
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20001301", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000001", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	/* Incomplete */
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000010", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	/* Bad day, hour, minute, second */
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000199", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001019900", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010099", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101000099", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	/* Invalid TZ specifier */
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101ZZ", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101PDT", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101U", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTCUTC", &t),
-+	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
-+
-+	TEST_DONE();
- }
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
-index 5f429813..6aeab1cb 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -511,8 +511,11 @@ Print the full public key to standard output after signature verification.
- .It Cm verify-time Ns = Ns Ar timestamp
- Specifies a time to use when validating signatures instead of the current
- time.
--The time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time
--in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
-+The time may be specified as a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or
-+in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
-+Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
-+suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the
-+UTC time zone.
- .El
- .Pp
- The
-@@ -603,31 +606,67 @@ A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
- certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
- of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
- .Pp
--The start time may be specified as the string
-+The start time may be specified as:
-+.Bl -bullet -compact
-+.It
-+The string
- .Dq always
--to indicate the certificate has no specified start time,
--a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format,
--a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
--an interval in the format described in the
-+to indicate the certificate has no specified start time.
-+.It
-+A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
-+YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
-+.It
-+A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
-+.It
-+A relative time before the current system time consisting of a minus sign
-+followed by an interval in the format described in the
- TIME FORMATS section of
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.It
-+A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
-+number beginning with
-+.Dq 0x .
-+.El
- .Pp
--The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time,
--a relative time starting with a plus character or the string
-+The end time may be specified similarly to the start time:
-+.Bl -bullet -compact
-+.It
-+The string
- .Dq forever
--to indicate that the certificate has no expiry date.
-+to indicate the certificate has no specified end time.
-+.It
-+A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
-+YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
-+.It
-+A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
-+.It
-+A relative time after the current system time consisting of a plus sign
-+followed by an interval in the format described in the
-+TIME FORMATS section of
-+.Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.It
-+A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
-+number beginning with
-+.Dq 0x .
-+.El
- .Pp
- For example:
--.Dq +52w1d
--(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
--.Dq -4w:+4w
--(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
--.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
--(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
--.Dq -1d:20110101
--(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011),
--.Dq -1m:forever
--(valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds
-+.It +52w1d
-+Valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now.
-+.It -4w:+4w
-+Valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now.
-+.It 20100101123000:20110101123000
-+Valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011.
-+.It 20100101123000Z:20110101123000Z
-+Similar, but interpreted in the UTC time zone rather than the system time zone.
-+.It -1d:20110101
-+Valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011.
-+.It 0x1:0x2000000000
-+Valid from roughly early 1970 to May 2033.
-+.It -1m:forever
-+Valid from one minute ago and never expiring.
-+.El
- .It Fl v
- Verbose mode.
- Causes
-@@ -1206,7 +1245,10 @@ signature object and presented on the verification command-line must
- match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable.
- .It Cm valid-after Ns = Ns "timestamp"
- Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified timestamp,
--which may be a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
-+which may be a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
-+Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
-+suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC
-+time zone.
- .It Cm valid-before Ns = Ns "timestamp"
- Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the specified timestamp.
- .El
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 20b321cc..9b2beda0 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -1916,6 +1916,21 @@ parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
- 	return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+parse_hex_u64(const char *s, uint64_t *up)
-+{
-+	char *ep;
-+	unsigned long long ull;
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	ull = strtoull(s, &ep, 16);
-+	if (*s == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
-+		fatal("Invalid certificate time: not a number");
-+	if (errno == ERANGE && ull == ULONG_MAX)
-+		fatal_fr(SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, "Invalid certificate time");
-+	*up = (uint64_t)ull;
-+}
-+
- static void
- parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
- {
-@@ -1938,8 +1953,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * from:to, where
--	 * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always"
--	 *   to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever"
-+	 * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "always"
-+	 *   to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "forever"
- 	 */
- 	from = xstrdup(timespec);
- 	to = strchr(from, ':');
-@@ -1951,6 +1966,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
- 		cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
- 	else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
- 		cert_valid_from = 0;
-+	else if (strncmp(from, "0x", 2) == 0)
-+		parse_hex_u64(from, &cert_valid_from);
- 	else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
- 		fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
- 
-@@ -1958,6 +1975,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
- 		cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
- 	else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
- 		cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
-+	else if (strncmp(to, "0x", 2) == 0)
-+		parse_hex_u64(to, &cert_valid_to);
- 	else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
- 		fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
- 
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index 2b50514e..8ccc5bc0 100644
---- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -533,8 +533,9 @@ controlled via the
- option.
- .It Cm expiry-time="timespec"
- Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.
--The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time
--in the system time-zone.
-+The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD[Z] date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] time.
-+Dates and times will be interpreted in the system time zone unless suffixed
-+by a Z character, in which case they will be interpreted in the UTC time zone.
- .It Cm from="pattern-list"
- Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
- name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-allow-duplicate-subsystem.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-allow-duplicate-subsystem.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 22fe73b..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-allow-duplicate-subsystem.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index e16f9e90fc71..a3779a9d86ee 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -1942,13 +1942,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
- 			    filename, linenum, keyword);
- 		if (!*activep) {
--			arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
-+			argv_consume(&ac);
-+			break;
-+		}
-+		found = 0;
-+		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++) {
-+			if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
-+				found = 1;
-+				break;
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if (found) {
-+			debug("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
-+			    filename, linenum, arg);
-+			argv_consume(&ac);
- 			break;
- 		}
--		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
--			if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
--				fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' "
--				    "already defined.", filename, linenum, arg);
- 		options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
- 		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
- 		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ec04910..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/dh.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/dh.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:01:23.295627077 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
-@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "dh.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
-@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
- int
- dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
- {
--	int pbits;
--	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
-+	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	int pbits, r = 0;
- 
--	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
- 
- 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
- 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
-@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 	if (need < 256)
- 		need = 256;
-+
-+	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	/*
- 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
- 	 * so double requested need here.
- 	 */
--	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
--		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--
--	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
--	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--	return 0;
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
-+		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed key generation");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* reuse context for key generation */
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not create or init context");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate keys");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
-+	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
-+	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* transferred */
-+	pub_key = NULL;
-+	priv_key = NULL;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
-+	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
-+	return r;
- }
- 
- DH *
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kex.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:01:23.299627122 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
-@@ -1603,3 +1603,47 @@
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+/* 
-+ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
-+ * The private key can be omitted.
-+ */
-+int
-+kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
-+    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int r = 0;
-+
-+	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (priv != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+out:
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return r;
-+}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kexdh.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/kexdh.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:01:23.237626425 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:03:21.817957988 +0200
-@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
-@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
- kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
- {
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
- 	size_t klen = 0;
--	int kout, r;
-+	int kout, r = 0;
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
- 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
-@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
- 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
-+
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
-+	/* import key */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* import peer key 
-+	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
-+	 */
-+	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
-+	if (r != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
-+		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Could not get key size");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
- 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
--	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
-+	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not derive key");
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
--	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
-+	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
- 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
-  out:
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kex.h openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:01:23.299627122 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
-@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
- # include <openssl/bn.h>
- # include <openssl/dh.h>
- # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-+# include <openssl/evp.h>
-+# include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+# include <openssl/param_build.h>
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #  include <openssl/ec.h>
- # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-@@ -278,6 +281,8 @@
-     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-+int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
-+    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
- 
- #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
- void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-ecdh.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-ecdh.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0313c6f..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-ecdh.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
---- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
-@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
- #include <signal.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/err.h>
- 
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "kex.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- #include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- 
- static int
- kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
-     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
- 
-+static EC_KEY *
-+generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
-+{
-+	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	const char *group_name;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+out:
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+	return client_key;
-+}
-+
- int
- kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
- {
-@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
--	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto out;
--	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
- 	*server_blobp = NULL;
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
--	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto out;
--	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
-+	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
--	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
--	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
--	size_t klen = 0;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
-+	size_t klen = 0, publen;
-+	const char *group_name;
- 	int r;
- 
-+	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
-+	if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
-+		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
- 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
- 	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
-+
-+	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
-+	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	sshbuf_reset(buf);
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
-+	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
-+	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	sshbuf_reset(buf);
- 
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
--	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
- #endif
--	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
--		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	ctx = NULL;
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
-+		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
--	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
--	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
--	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
- 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
- #endif
-+	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	*shared_secretp = buf;
- 	buf = NULL;
-  out:
--	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
- 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
- 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
-+	freezero(pub, publen);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- 	return r;
- }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-sign.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-sign.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fc71678..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-sign.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,468 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-dss.c ./ssh-dss.c
---- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-dss.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
-+++ ./ssh-dss.c	2023-03-08 15:34:33.508578129 +0100
-@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/dsa.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -72,9 +74,8 @@
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
--	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
--		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
-+    		return ret;
- 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
- 	    data, datalen);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-@@ -201,11 +202,8 @@
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
--	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	}
- 	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
- 	    sigb, slen);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-@@ -221,4 +219,63 @@
- 		freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	return ret;
- }
-+
-+int
-+ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub = NULL, *priv = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+
-+  	if (k == NULL)
-+  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	  	goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
-+  	DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub, &priv);
-+
-+  	if (p != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (q != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (g != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (pub != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+	        pub) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (priv != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
-+	        priv) != 1) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c ./ssh-ecdsa.c
---- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
-+++ ./ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-03-08 15:40:52.628201267 +0100
-@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
- #include <openssl/ec.h>
- #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include <string.h>
- 
-@@ -72,9 +74,8 @@
- 	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
--	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
--		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
-+		return ret;
- 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
- 	    datalen);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-@@ -193,11 +194,8 @@
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
--	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
--		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	if (ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	}
- 	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-@@ -212,4 +210,76 @@
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+int
-+ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
-+  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL; 
-+  	const char *group_name;
-+  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	if (k == NULL)
-+    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
-+      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
-+     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
-+                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
-+                group_name,
-+                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+	}
-+  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
-+    		const EC_GROUP *group;
-+    		size_t len;
-+
-+		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
-+		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
-+		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
-+		    pub,
-+		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len,
-+		    bn_ctx);
-+		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
-+		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
-+		    pub_ser,
-+		    len) != 1) {
-+			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
-+	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
-+               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+    		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
-+  	free(pub_ser);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c ./sshkey.c
---- ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.702943628 +0100
-+++ ./sshkey.c	2023-03-08 15:39:03.354082015 +0100
-@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
- #include <openssl/fips.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -492,13 +494,14 @@
- {
- 	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 	u_char *sig = NULL;
--	int ret, slen, len;
-+	int ret, slen;
-+	size_t len;
- 
- 	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 	}
- 
--	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
- 	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
-@@ -511,9 +514,10 @@
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto error;
- 	}
--	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto error;
- 	}
-@@ -540,12 +544,13 @@
- 	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 	}
--	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
- 	switch (ret) {
- 	case 1:
- 		ret = 0;
-@@ -5038,3 +5043,27 @@
- 	return 0;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_XMSS */
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+EVP_PKEY *
-+sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
-+{
-+  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
-+  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
-+  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
-+  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
-+  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
-+  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
-+  		return NULL;
-+  	}
-+  	return ret;
-+}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.h ./sshkey.h
---- ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.h	2023-03-08 15:35:14.702943628 +0100
-+++ ./sshkey.h	2023-03-08 15:34:33.509578138 +0100
-@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- #include <openssl/rsa.h>
- #include <openssl/dsa.h>
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- #  include <openssl/ec.h>
- #  include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
-@@ -293,6 +295,13 @@
- 
- void	 sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+EVP_PKEY  *sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *);
-+int   ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
-+int   ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
-+int   ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *, int, EVP_PKEY **);
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+
- #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
- int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
-     u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c ./ssh-rsa.c
---- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
-+++ ./ssh-rsa.c	2023-03-08 15:34:33.509578138 +0100
-@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
- 
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
-+#include <openssl/core_names.h>
-+#include <openssl/param_build.h>
- 
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -172,9 +174,8 @@
- 	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
--	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
--		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
-+		return ret;
- 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
- 	    datalen);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-@@ -285,11 +286,8 @@
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
- 
--	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
--	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	}
- 	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-@@ -306,11 +304,9 @@
-     u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
- 	size_t rsasize = 0;
--	const RSA *rsa;
- 	int ret;
- 
--	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
--	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
-+	rsasize = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -323,4 +319,87 @@
- done:
- 	return ret;
- }
-+
-+int
-+ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
-+{
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+  	int ret = 0;
-+  	const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
-+  	const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
-+
-+  	if (k == NULL)
-+  	  	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
-+  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
-+  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+  	  	goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
-+  	RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, &q);
-+  	RSA_get0_crt_params(k->rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
-+
-+  	if (n != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n) != 1) {
-+  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+  		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (e != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (d != NULL &&
-+  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+  	/* setting this to param_build makes the creation process fail */
-+  	if (p != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, p) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'p' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (q != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, q) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'q' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (dmp1 != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
-+  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, dmp1) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmp1' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (dmq1 != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
-+  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, dmq1) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmq1' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+  	if (iqmp != NULL &&
-+  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
-+  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, iqmp) != 1) {
-+		debug2_f("failed to add 'iqmp' param");
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+  	}
-+
-+out:
-+  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
-+  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+  	return ret;
-+}
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-pkcs11.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-pkcs11.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 44e0b8f..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-pkcs11.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-05-24 09:39:45.002631174 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-05-24 09:09:34.400853951 +0200
-@@ -74,8 +74,18 @@
- 	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
--		return ret;
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+	if (is_ecdsa_pkcs11(key->ecdsa)) {
-+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+		    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	} else {
-+#endif
-+		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
-+			return ret;
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
- 	    datalen);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-05-24 09:33:59.153866357 +0200
-@@ -775,8 +775,24 @@
- 
- 	return (0);
- }
-+
-+int
-+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
-+{
-+	if (EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx) != NULL)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
- 
-+int
-+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
-+{
-+	if (RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx) != NULL)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* remove trailing spaces */
- static void
- rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-05-24 09:31:16.139092673 +0200
-@@ -225,8 +225,36 @@
- static RSA_METHOD	*helper_rsa;
- #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
- static EC_KEY_METHOD	*helper_ecdsa;
-+
-+int
-+is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
-+{
-+	const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
-+	ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
-+		const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey) = NULL;
-+
-+	meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ecdsa);
-+	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(meth, NULL, NULL, &sign_sig);
-+	if (sign_sig == ecdsa_do_sign)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
- #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
- 
-+int
-+is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
-+{
-+	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
-+	int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
-+        	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) = NULL;
-+
-+	meth = RSA_get_method(rsa);
-+	priv_enc = RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(meth);
-+	if (priv_enc == rsa_encrypt)
-+		return 1;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
- static void
- wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-05-24 09:36:49.055714975 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
- 	    u_int32_t *);
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
-+int is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa);
-+#endif
-+int is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa);
-+
- #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
- #undef ENABLE_PKCS11
- #endif
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-05-24 09:39:45.003631184 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c	2023-05-24 09:31:37.019319860 +0200
-@@ -174,8 +174,18 @@
- 	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
--		return ret;
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+	if (is_rsa_pkcs11(key->rsa)) {
-+		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+		    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	} else {
-+#endif
-+		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
-+			return ret;
-+#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
-+	}
-+#endif
- 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
- 	    datalen);
- 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 1af9b49..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,110 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
-@@ -1657,7 +1657,8 @@ sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
- static int
- rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
- {
--	RSA *private = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -1667,20 +1668,42 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	    bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	*rsap = NULL;
--	if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL
-+		|| (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
--	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
-+	*rsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res);
-+	if (*rsap) {
-+		ret = 0;
-+	} else {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	*rsap = private;
--	private = NULL;
--	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	RSA_free(private);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
- 	BN_free(f4);
- 	return ret;
- }
-@@ -1820,7 +1820,8 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
- static int
- ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
- {
--	EC_KEY *private;
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
-@@ -1828,20 +1829,29 @@ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, i
- 	if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	*ecdsap = NULL;
--	if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
-+
-+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(*nid)) <= 0
-+	   || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
-+	*ecdsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res);
-+	if (*ecdsap) {
-+		EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(*ecdsap, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
-+		ret = 0;
-+	} else {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
--	*ecdsap = private;
--	private = NULL;
--	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	EC_KEY_free(private);
-+	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
- 	return ret;
- }
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c6594b..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ	2021-11-29 15:27:03.032070863 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-11-29 15:27:34.736342968 +0100
-@@ -2700,7 +2700,8 @@ sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, siz
- 	time_t now;
- 
- 	*verify_timep = 0;
--	*print_pubkey = 0;
-+	if (print_pubkey)
-+		*print_pubkey = 0;
- 	for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
- 		if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
- 			if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 6908cad..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -rup a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
---- a/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:11:28.146863144 +0200
-+++ b/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:15:35.726655877 +0200
-@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
- 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
- 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
- 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
--			if (!partial && !authenticated)
-+			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
-+				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
-+				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
-+					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
-+#endif
- 				authctxt->failures++;
-+			}
- 			if (authenticated || partial) {
- 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
- 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 23efe91..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
---- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-11 17:00:02.618575727 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-11 17:03:05.096085690 +0200
-@@ -2288,9 +2288,9 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
- 			    authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
- 				continue;
--			if (match_pattern_list(
-+			if (!sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(
- 			    sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
--			    authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
-+			    authctxt->active_ktype))
- 				continue;
- 			/* we take and free the key */
- 			private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
-@@ -2316,7 +2316,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
-+	debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s using sigalg %s",
-+		sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp, authctxt->active_ktype);
- 
- 	/* figure out a name for the client host */
- 	lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
-diff --color -rup a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
---- a/sshkey.c	2022-07-11 17:00:02.609575554 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.c	2022-07-11 17:12:30.905976443 +0200
-@@ -252,6 +252,29 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *n
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
-+int
-+sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *keyname, const char *sigalgs)
-+{
-+	int ktype;
-+
-+	if (sigalgs == NULL || *sigalgs == '\0' ||
-+	    (ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(keyname)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
-+		return 0;
-+	else if (ktype == KEY_RSA) {
-+		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
-+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
-+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", sigalgs, 0) == 1;
-+	} else if (ktype == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
-+		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
-+		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
-+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
-+		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
-+		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
-+		    sigalgs, 0) == 1;
-+	} else
-+		return match_pattern_list(keyname, sigalgs, 0) == 1;
-+}
-+
- char *
- sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
- {
-diff --color -rup a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
---- a/sshkey.h	2022-07-11 17:00:02.603575438 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.h	2022-07-11 17:13:01.052556879 +0200
-@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey
- int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
- int	 sshkey_type_plain(int);
-+
-+/* Returns non-zero if key name match sigalgs pattern list. (handles RSA) */
-+int	 sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *, const char *);
-+
- int	 sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
- int	 sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
-diff --color -rup a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
---- a/ssh-keysign.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-keysign.c	2022-07-11 17:00:23.306973667 +0200
-@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
- extern char *__progname;
- 
- static int
--valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
-+valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, char **pkalgp,
-     u_char *data, size_t datalen)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *b;
-@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
- 
- 	if (ret != NULL)
- 		*ret = NULL;
-+	if (pkalgp != NULL)
-+		*pkalgp = NULL;
- 	fail = 0;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
-@@ -122,8 +124,6 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
- 		fail++;
- 	} else if (key->type != pktype)
- 		fail++;
--	free(pkalg);
--	free(pkblob);
- 
- 	/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
-@@ -154,8 +154,19 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
- 
- 	if (fail)
- 		sshkey_free(key);
--	else if (ret != NULL)
--		*ret = key;
-+	else {
-+		if (ret != NULL) {
-+			*ret = key;
-+			key = NULL;
-+		}
-+		if (pkalgp != NULL) {
-+			*pkalgp = pkalg;
-+			pkalg = NULL;
-+		}
-+	}
-+	sshkey_free(key);
-+	free(pkalg);
-+	free(pkblob);
- 
- 	return (fail ? -1 : 0);
- }
-@@ -170,7 +181,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	struct passwd *pw;
- 	int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
- 	u_char *signature, *data, rver;
--	char *host, *fp;
-+	char *host, *fp, *pkalg;
- 	size_t slen, dlen;
- 
- 	if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
-@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
--	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
-+	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, &pkalg, data, dlen) < 0)
- 		fatal("%s: not a valid request", __progname);
- 	free(host);
- 
-@@ -279,7 +290,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
--	    NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
-+	    pkalg, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "%s: sshkey_sign failed", __progname);
- 	free(data);
- 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
index c9c12ee..88914bf 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
@@ -4,9 +4,8 @@
  
  #include "includes.h"
  
--#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
-+#if (!defined HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
  
  #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <sys/param.h>
-
+ #include <unistd.h>
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-man-hostkeyalgos.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-man-hostkeyalgos.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 92c53b1..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-man-hostkeyalgos.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-02 09:14:40.279373577 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-05-30 16:01:04.533848172 +0200
-@@ -989,6 +989,17 @@
- .Pp
- The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
-+.Pp
-+The proposed
-+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-+during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
-+.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
-+and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
-+.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
-+.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
-+would break the order given by the
-+.Pa known_hosts
-+file.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlias
- Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
- real host name when looking up or saving the host key
-@@ -1564,6 +1575,9 @@
- .Pp
- The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-+.Pp
-+This option affects also
-+.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
- .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
- Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
- The argument to this keyword must be
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c9ac80..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -rup a/compat.c b/compat.c
---- a/compat.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/compat.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.770268440 +0200
-@@ -157,11 +157,12 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
- }
- 
-+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
- char *
- compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop)
- {
- 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
--		return cipher_prop;
-+		return xstrdup(cipher_prop);
- 	debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
- 	if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
- 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
-@@ -171,11 +172,12 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh,
- 	return cipher_prop;
- }
- 
-+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
- char *
- compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
- {
- 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
--		return pkalg_prop;
-+		return xstrdup(pkalg_prop);
- 	debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
- 	if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
- 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
-@@ -185,21 +187,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, c
- 	return pkalg_prop;
- }
- 
-+/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
- char *
- compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
- {
-+	char *cp = NULL;
-+
- 	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
--		return p;
-+		return xstrdup(p);
- 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
- 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
-+		cp = p;
- 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
- 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
- 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
-+		free(cp);
- 	}
- 	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
- 	if (*p == '\0')
-diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
---- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.241496549 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.772268479 +0200
-@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- 	char *s, *all_key;
-+	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
- 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-@@ -252,10 +253,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 
- 	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
--	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
-+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
-@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
- 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
- 		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
- 	} else {
- 		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- 	}
- 
-@@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
- #endif
-+	/* Free only parts of proposal that were dynamically allocated here. */
-+	free(prop_kex);
-+	free(prop_enc);
-+	free(prop_hostkey);
- }
- 
- /*
-diff --color -rup a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
---- a/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.242496568 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:42:07.616388978 +0200
-@@ -2493,14 +2493,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
- 	struct kex *kex;
-+	char *hostkey_types = NULL;
-+	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
- 	    options.kex_algorithms);
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
--	    options.ciphers);
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
--	    options.ciphers);
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-+	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
-+	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- 
-@@ -2513,8 +2514,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- 		    options.rekey_interval);
- 
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
--	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
-+	hostkey_types = list_hostkey_types();
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
-+	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, hostkey_types);
-+	free(hostkey_types);
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	{
-@@ -2606,6 +2609,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "send test");
- #endif
-+	free(prop_kex);
-+	free(prop_enc);
-+	free(prop_hostkey);
- 	debug("KEX done");
- }
- 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fc517da..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,207 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
---- a/clientloop.c	2022-06-29 16:35:06.677597259 +0200
-+++ b/clientloop.c	2022-06-29 16:40:29.737926205 +0200
-@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
- #endif
- 
-+/* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
-+#define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
-+
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
- 
-@@ -2110,8 +2113,10 @@
- 	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
- 	size_t i, ndone;
- 	struct sshbuf *signdata;
--	int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
-+	int r, plaintype;
- 	const u_char *sig;
-+	const char *rsa_kexalg = NULL;
-+	char *alg = NULL;
- 	size_t siglen;
- 
- 	if (ctx->nnew == 0)
-@@ -2122,9 +2127,9 @@
- 		hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
- 		return;
- 	}
--	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
--	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
--
-+	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
-+	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
-+		rsa_kexalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
- 	if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
- 	/*
-@@ -2135,6 +2140,7 @@
- 	for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
- 		if (ctx->keys_match[i])
- 			continue;
-+		plaintype = sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type);
- 		/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
- 		sshbuf_reset(signdata);
- 		if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
-@@ -2148,19 +2154,33 @@
- 			error_fr(r, "parse sig");
- 			goto out;
- 		}
-+		if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &alg)) != 0) {
-+			error_fr(r, "server gave unintelligible signature "
-+				"for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
-+			goto out;
-+		}
- 		/*
--		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
--		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
-+		 * Special case for RSA keys: if a RSA hostkey was negotiated,
-+		 * then use its signature type for verification of RSA hostkey
-+		 * proofs. Otherwise, accept only RSA-SHA256/512 signatures.
- 		 */
--		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
--		    sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
--		debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using %s sigalg",
--		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i,
--		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : "default");
-+		if (plaintype == KEY_RSA && rsa_kexalg == NULL &&
-+		    match_pattern_list(alg, HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS, 0) != 1) {
-+			debug_f("server used untrusted RSA signature algorithm "
-+				"%s for key %zu, disregarding", alg, i);
-+			free(alg);
-+			/* zap the key from the list */
-+			sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
-+			ctx->keys[i] = NULL;
-+			ndone++;
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using sigalg %s",
-+			sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i, alg);
-+		free(alg);
- 		if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
- 		    sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
--		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
--		    NULL)) != 0) {
-+		    plaintype == KEY_RSA ? rsa_kexalg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
- 			error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
- 			    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
- 			goto out;
-diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
-index a035b381..bd49e3ac 100644
---- a/hostfile.c
-+++ b/hostfile.c
-@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
- 	/* Re-add the requested keys */
- 	want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | (ip == NULL ? 0 : HKF_MATCH_IP);
- 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
--		if ((want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
-+		if (keys[i] == NULL || (want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
- 			continue;
- 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
- 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
-diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
---- a/kex.c	2022-06-29 16:35:06.775599179 +0200
-+++ b/kex.c	2022-06-29 16:42:00.839710940 +0200
-@@ -959,6 +959,18 @@
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
-+static int
-+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
-+{
-+	char *cp;
-+
-+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+	free(cp);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- static int
- kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
-@@ -994,6 +1006,16 @@
- 		free(ext);
- 	}
- 
-+	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
-+	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
-+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+		    "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
-+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
-+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+		    "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
-+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
- 	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
- 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
-diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
---- a/kex.h	2022-06-29 16:35:06.766599003 +0200
-+++ b/kex.h	2022-06-29 16:42:24.199168567 +0200
-@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@
- 
- #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
- #define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
-+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED      0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
-+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED      0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
- 
- struct sshenc {
- 	char	*name;
-diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
---- a/serverloop.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-29 16:45:05.902336428 +0200
-@@ -684,16 +684,18 @@
- 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
- 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
--	int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
-+	int r, ndx, success = 0;
- 	const u_char *blob;
-+	const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
- 	u_char *sig = 0;
- 	size_t blen, slen;
- 
- 	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
- 
--	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
--	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
-+	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
-+	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
-+		kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
- 	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
- 		sshkey_free(key);
- 		key = NULL;
-@@ -726,16 +728,24 @@
- 		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
- 		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
- 		 */
--		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
--		    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
-+		sigalg = NULL;
-+		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
-+			if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
-+				sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
-+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
-+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
-+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
-+		}
-+		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
-+		sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
- 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sigbuf,
- 		    ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
--		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
--		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
-+		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
- 			error_fr(r, "assemble signature");
- 			goto out;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
index b53c383..d8577d2 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@@ -1,446 +1,22 @@
-diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
-index 36b9d2f5..6b517db4 100644
---- a/auth2-hostbased.c
-+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
-@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
- 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
-+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
-+		goto done;
-+	}
- 
- 	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
- 		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
-diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
-index 962fd342..5d59febc 100644
---- a/auth2-pubkey.c
-+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
-@@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
- 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
-+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
-+		goto done;
-+	}
- 	key_s = format_key(key);
- 	if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
- 		ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
 diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
-index 7f26c680..42be690b 100644
---- a/readconf.c
-+++ b/readconf.c
-@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
- 	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
- 	oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
--	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
-+	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
- 	oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
- } OpCodes;
- 
-@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+--- a/readconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/readconf.c	(date 1703169891147)
+@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@
  	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
  	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
-+	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
 +	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
- 
- 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
- };
-@@ -2176,6 +2177,10 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
- 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case oRequiredRSASize:
-+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case oDeprecated:
- 		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
- 		    filename, linenum, keyword);
-@@ -2423,6 +2428,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
- 	options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
- 	options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
- 	options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
-+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
- }
- 
- /*
-@@ -2619,6 +2625,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
- 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
- #endif
-+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
-+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
- 
- 	/* Expand KEX name lists */
- 	all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
-@@ -3308,6 +3316,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
- 	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
- 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
- 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
-+	dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
- 
- 	/* String options */
- 	dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
-diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
-index f647bd42..ffb5ec4f 100644
---- a/readconf.h
-+++ b/readconf.h
-@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ typedef struct {
- 
- 	char   *known_hosts_command;
- 
-+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
-+
- 	char	*ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
- }       Options;
- 
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+ 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
 diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index 29df0463..423772b1 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
- 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
- 	options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
-+	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
- }
- 
- /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
-@@ -441,6 +442,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
- 		options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
- 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
- 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
-+	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
-+		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
- 
- 	assemble_algorithms(options);
- 
-@@ -517,6 +520,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
- 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
- 	sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
-+	sRequiredRSASize,
- 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
- 
-@@ -676,6 +680,8 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
+--- a/servconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/servconf.c	(date 1703169891148)
+@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@
  	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
- 
-@@ -2438,6 +2443,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
- 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sRequiredRSASize:
-+		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
-+		goto parse_int;
-+
- 	case sDeprecated:
- 	case sIgnore:
- 	case sUnsupported:
-@@ -2610,6 +2619,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
- 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
-+	M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
-@@ -2874,6 +2884,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
- 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
-+	dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
- 	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
- 
- 	/* formatted integer arguments */
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 8a04463e..9346155c 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ typedef struct {
- 	int	expose_userauth_info;
- 	u_int64_t timing_secret;
- 	char   *sk_provider;
-+	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
- }       ServerOptions;
- 
- /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 559bf2af..25be53d5 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -516,14 +516,22 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
- }
- 
- /*
-- * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
-- * fatal()ing for others.
-+ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
-+ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
-  */
- static void
--check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
-+check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
- {
- 	switch (r) {
- 	case 0:
-+		/* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
-+		if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
-+		    (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
-+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+			error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
-+			free(*k);
-+			*k = NULL;
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
- 	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
-@@ -1578,7 +1586,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
- 		fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
- 	check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
--	    p, "pubkey"); \
-+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
- } while (0)
- #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
- 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
-@@ -1586,7 +1594,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
- 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
- 		fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
--	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
-+	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
-+	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
- } while (0)
- 
- 		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
-@@ -2244,7 +2253,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
- 		free(cp);
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
--		    filename, "pubkey");
-+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
- 		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
- 		    public ? public->type : -1);
- 		free(options.identity_files[i]);
-@@ -2284,7 +2293,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 			continue;
- 		xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
--		    filename, "pubkey");
-+		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
- 		debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
- 		    public ? public->type : -1);
- 		if (public == NULL) {
-@@ -2315,7 +2324,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 		free(cp);
- 
- 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
--		    filename, "certificate");
-+		    &public, filename, "certificate");
- 		debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
- 		    public ? public->type : -1);
- 		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index f9bd19ea..58fe98db 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
- static int
- verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
- {
-+	int r;
-+
-+	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
-+	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
-+		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
- 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
- 	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
- 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
-@@ -1606,6 +1611,13 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
- 			private = NULL;
- 			quit = 1;
- 		}
-+		if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
-+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+			debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
-+			sshkey_free(private);
-+			private = NULL;
-+			quit = 1;
-+		}
- 		if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
- 		    !(id->key && id->isprivate))
- 			maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
-@@ -1752,6 +1764,12 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
-		close(agent_fd);
-	} else {
- 		for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
-+			if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
-+			    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+				debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
-+				    sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
-+				continue;
-+			}
- 			found = 0;
- 			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
- 				/*
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 17eee9d8..395ef493 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1870,6 +1870,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 				fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
- 				    options.host_key_files[i]);
- 		}
-+		if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey,
-+		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
-+			error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
-+			sshkey_free(pubkey);
-+			sshkey_free(key);
-+			continue;
-+		}
- 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
- 		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
- 
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ed2b5dff..77093235 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -2365,18 +2365,24 @@ cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
--static int
--check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
-+int
-+sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
- {
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	int nbits;
- 
--	RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
-+	    (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
-+		return 0;
-+	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
-+	nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
-+	if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
-+	    (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	return 0;
- }
--#endif
- 
- static int
- sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
-@@ -2439,7 +2445,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
--		if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
-+		if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- #ifdef DEBUG_PK
- 		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
-@@ -3642,7 +3648,7 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 		rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
--		if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
-+		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(k, 0)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- 		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
-@@ -4644,7 +4650,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
- 			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 			goto out;
- 		}
--		if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
-+		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- 	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
- 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 094815e0..be254e6b 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
- int	sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
-     int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
- 
-+int sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *, int);
- /* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
- int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index b4956aec..e255b9b9 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
- .It RemoteCommand
- .It RemoteForward
- .It RequestTTY
-+.It RequiredRSASize
- .It SendEnv
- .It ServerAliveInterval
- .It ServerAliveCountMax
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 24a46460..d1ede18e 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -1634,6 +1634,17 @@ and
- .Fl T
- flags for
- .Xr ssh 1 .
-+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
-+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
-+.Xr ssh 1
-+will accept.
-+User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
-+Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
-+connection to be terminated.
-+The default is
-+.Cm 1024
-+bits.
-+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
- .It Cm RevokedHostKeys
- Specifies revoked host public keys.
- Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 867a747d..f5a06637 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1596,6 +1596,16 @@ is
- .Cm default none ,
- which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
- of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
-+.It Cm RequiredRSASize
-+Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
-+.Xr sshd 8
-+will accept.
-+User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
-+refused.
-+The default is
-+.Cm 1024
-+bits.
-+Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
- .It Cm RevokedKeys
- Specifies revoked public keys file, or
- .Cm none
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
index 2fb9297..c4d86e7 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@@ -1,63 +1,118 @@
-diff --color -rup a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
---- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2022-07-14 11:58:12.172786060 +0200
-@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ r=$?
- grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
- echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+--- openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx	2023-05-29 18:15:56.311236887 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2023-05-29 18:16:07.598503551 +0200
+@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
+ 
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
  
 +PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
 +    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
 +SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
++echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r == 0 ]; then
++echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
++fi
++fi
 +
  trace "load hostkeys"
 -for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
  	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
- 	(
- 		printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
-@@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_host
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
+ 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
+@@ -32,12 +48,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private
+ 
  unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  
- for ps in yes; do
--	for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
-+	for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
- 		verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
- 		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
- 		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
-diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
---- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:07.262975710 +0200
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:32.068452067 +0200
-@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "key type $k"
++	hka=$k
++	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
++	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
++	fi
+ 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
++	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
++	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
+ 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+@@ -50,15 +70,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ done
+ 
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+ 
+ # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ HOSTKEYALGS=""
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
+ 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
+ done
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
+@@ -70,7 +93,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >>
+ ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
+   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "cert type $k"
+ 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx	2023-04-26 17:37:35.100827792 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-04-26 17:50:31.860748877 +0200
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
  {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
- 	char *s, *all_key;
-+	char *hostkeyalgs = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
- 	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
++	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
-@@ -264,14 +265,19 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
- 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
--		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
--		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
-+		if ((hostkeyalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo)) == NULL)
-+			fatal_f("order_hostkeyalgs");
-+		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(hostkeyalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
-+		free(hostkeyalgs);
- 	} else {
--		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
--		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
--		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms */
-+		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
- 	}
-+	if (pkalg == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("match_filter_allowlist");
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
-+	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, pkalg);
-+	free(pkalg);
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -260,10 +260,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
+ 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ 
++	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
++		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
++				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
++		if (hkalgs)
++			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++		else
++			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	}
++
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+-	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++	    filtered_algs);
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
++	free(filtered_algs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
index 5c54e78..dae0932 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@@ -94,47 +94,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
  	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
  
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh	2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
-@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
- cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
- cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
- 
--PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
-+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
-+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
- EXTRA_TYPES=""
- rsa=""
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
-@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
- 
- tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
- 
--REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
-+#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
-+REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
- 
- # File based tests
- file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
-@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
- 	fi
- }
- 
--SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
--SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
-+#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
-+SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
-+SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
- 
- for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
- 	# generate user key
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
@@ -148,15 +107,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p
  	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
  	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
  	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
-@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ do_kex(char *kex)
- {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
--	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
-+	/* do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); */
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
- #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
@@ -196,22 +146,6 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-
  
  	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
  	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
-@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
- 	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
- 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
-@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
- 	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
- 	sshkey_free(k1);
- 	TEST_DONE();
-+	*/
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
@@ -241,10 +175,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openss
  {
  	size_t len;
  	u_char *sig;
-+	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
-+	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
 +	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
-+		expected = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
  
  	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
 -	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
@@ -277,24 +211,17 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openss
  	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
  	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
  	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:19:23.659513651 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c	2023-01-26 12:20:28.021044803 +0100
-@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ tests(void)
- 	check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
- 	TEST_DONE();
- 
-+	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
- 	TEST_START("check DSA signature");
- 	check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
- 	TEST_DONE();
-+	*/
- 
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
 @@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
  			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
  				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
@@ -304,7 +231,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
 +			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
 +		}
  		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
- 		sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
  		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
@@ -318,99 +245,12 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
 +			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
 +
 +			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
-+				rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
 +				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
 +		}
  		goto out;
  	}
  
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.355711140 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
-@@ -1640,6 +1651,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	int keytype;
- 	Authctxt *authctxt;
- 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
-+	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
- 
- #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
- 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
-@@ -1938,6 +1950,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		    key = NULL;
- 		    continue;
- 		}
-+		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA_CERT)) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			verbose_f("sshd: SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
-+		    	forbid_ssh_rsa = 1;
-+		    }
-+		}
-+		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) {
-+		    size_t sign_size = 0;
-+		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
-+		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
-+		    int res;
-+
-+		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
-+		    free(tmp);
-+		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
-+			logit_f("sshd: ssh-dss is disabled, skipping key file %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
-+			key = NULL;
-+			continue;
-+		    }
-+		}
- 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
- 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
- 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
-@@ -2275,6 +2306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 
- 	check_ip_options(ssh);
- 
-+	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
-+		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
-+
- 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
- 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
- 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
-diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c openssh-8.7p1_patched/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2023-01-18 17:41:47.894515779 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1_patched/ssh-keygen.c	2023-01-18 17:41:44.500488818 +0100
-@@ -491,6 +491,8 @@
- 	BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
-+	char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-256";
-+	char *alg = NULL;
- 
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
- 		fatal_fr(r, "parse magic");
-@@ -590,6 +592,7 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b
- 		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
- 			fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters");
- 		BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
-+		alg = rsa_safe_alg;
- 		break;
- 	}
- 	rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
-@@ -598,9 +601,9 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b
- 
- 	/* try the key */
- 	if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
--	    NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
-+	    alg, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
- 	    sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
--	    NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
-+	    alg, 0, NULL) != 0) {
- 		sshkey_free(key);
- 		free(sig);
- 		return NULL;
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
@@ -424,3 +264,34 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
  			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
  			goto out;
  		}
+diff -up openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx	2024-07-23 15:08:14.794350818 +0200
++++ openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c	2024-07-23 15:40:21.658456636 +0200
+@@ -1305,6 +1305,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	{
++		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
++		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
++		if (rsakey == NULL)
++			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
++
++		if (rsakey != NULL) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++		    }
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-openssl-log.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-openssl-log.patch
index 9c9a3f5..35f444c 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-openssl-log.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-openssl-log.patch
@@ -1,6 +1,16 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx openssh-8.7p1/log.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx	2024-10-18 13:00:56.419560563 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/log.c	2024-10-18 13:22:35.954819016 +0200
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/log.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/log.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/log.c.xxx	2024-10-22 11:55:44.281939275 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/log.c	2024-10-22 11:56:16.709676267 +0200
+@@ -52,6 +52,9 @@
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
+ static int log_on_stderr = 1;
 @@ -438,6 +438,26 @@ sshlog(const char *file, const char *fun
  	va_end(args);
  }
@@ -38,7 +48,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/log.h.xxx openssh-8.7p1/log.h
 +void	 sshlog_openssl(int);
  void	 sshlogv(const char *, const char *, int, int,
      LogLevel, const char *, const char *, va_list);
- void	 sshsigdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
+ void	 sshlogdie(const char *, const char *, int, int,
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c.yyy openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c.yyy	2024-10-18 13:27:00.709055845 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/auth2-pubkey.c	2024-10-18 13:27:31.638784460 +0200
@@ -63,3 +73,40 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/dispatch.c.yyy openssh-8.7p1/dispatch.c
  		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
 +	}
  }
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in.xxx openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in
+--- openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in.xxx	2025-01-27 12:56:58.533623367 +0100
++++ openssh-9.9p1/Makefile.in	2025-01-27 12:57:41.635638843 +0100
+@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ sshd-session$(EXEEXT): libssh.a	$(LIBCOM
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHD_SESSION_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ 
+ scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+@@ -245,20 +245,20 @@ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) lib
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
+ 
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
+ 
+ sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lcrypto $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS)
+-	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
++	$(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+ 
+ # test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
+ logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
++	$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lcrypto $(LIBS)
+ 
+ $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
+ 	if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
index 25765fb..17c340e 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
@@ -1,174 +1,182 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2022-02-07 12:31:07.407740407 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.409740424 +0100
-@@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
- 
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+--- a/scp.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/scp.c	(date 1703111453316)
+@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@
+
  	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
- 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
--		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
-+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
- 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
- 				src, abs_dst);
+ 		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
  			errs = 1;
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c	2022-02-07 12:47:59.117516131 +0100
-@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 
+ 		}
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+--- a/sftp-client.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/sftp-client.c	(date 1703169614263)
+@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@
+
  /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
  static char *
--do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
-+do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
+-sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
++sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
  {
  	struct sshbuf *msg;
  	u_int expected_id, count, id;
-@@ -1012,9 +1012,38 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
- 
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
  			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
--		error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
+-		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
+-		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
+-		free(errmsg);
 -		sshbuf_free(msg);
 -		return NULL;
 +		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
 +			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
-+			if ((r = do_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
++			if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
 +				sshbuf_free(msg);
 +				return NULL;
 +			}
-+
++			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
 +			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
 +					path, strlen(path));
 +
 +			get_msg(conn, msg);
 +			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
-+					(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
++			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
 +				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
 +
 +			if (id != expected_id)
 +				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 +
 +			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
-+				u_int status;
++				free(errmsg);
 +
-+				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
++				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
++				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
 +					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
-+				error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
++				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++				free(errmsg);
 +				sshbuf_free(msg);
 +				return NULL;
 +			}
 +		} else {
-+			error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
++			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
++			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
++			free(errmsg);
 +			sshbuf_free(msg);
 +			return NULL;
 +		}
  	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
  		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
  		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
-@@ -1039,9 +1067,9 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
+@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@
  }
- 
+
  char *
--do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
-+do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
+-sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
++sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
  {
--	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
-+	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
  }
- 
+
  int
-@@ -1055,9 +1083,9 @@ do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, c
+@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@
  {
- 	if (!can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ 	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
  		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
--		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
-+		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
+-		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
  	}
--	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
-+	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
+-	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
++	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
  }
- 
+
  int
-@@ -1807,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
+@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@
  	char *src_canon;
  	int ret;
- 
--	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
- 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
+
+-	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
++	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
  		return -1;
  	}
-@@ -2115,12 +2143,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+@@ -2365,12 +2397,12 @@
  int
- upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+ sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
      int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
--    int follow_link_flag)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
+-    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
  {
  	char *dst_canon;
  	int ret;
- 
--	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
- 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
+
+-	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
++	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
  		return -1;
  	}
-@@ -2557,7 +2585,7 @@ crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, st
+@@ -2825,7 +2857,7 @@
  	char *from_path_canon;
  	int ret;
- 
--	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
-+	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
- 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", from_path);
+
+-	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
++	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
+ 		    from_path);
  		return -1;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h
---- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h	2022-02-07 12:31:07.410740433 +0100
-@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, cons
- int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
- 
+diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+--- a/sftp-client.h	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/sftp-client.h	(date 1703111691284)
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
+ int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+
  /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
--char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-+char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
- 
+-char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
++char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+
  /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
- char *do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
-@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const
+ char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
   * times if 'pflag' is set
   */
- int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
--    int, int);
-+    int, int, int);
- 
+ int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    int, int, int, int, int, int);
++    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
+
  /*
   * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.411740442 +0100
-@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+--- a/sftp.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/sftp.c	(date 1703168795365)
+@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@
+ 		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
  			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
  				err = -1;
  		} else {
- 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
-@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn
+ 			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@
  		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
  			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
- 		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
--		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
-+		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+-		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
++		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
  			err = 1;
  			break;
  		}
-@@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn,
+@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@
  	}
  #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
- 
--	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
-+	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".", 0);
- 	if (remote_path == NULL)
+
+-	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
++	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
  		fatal("Need cwd");
  	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-redhat-help.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-redhat-help.patch
index 0d1753b..35a3991 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-redhat-help.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-redhat-help.patch
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
---- a/ssh.c	2025-07-21 16:24:30.348843762 +0200
-+++ b/ssh.c	2025-07-21 16:27:20.477953307 +0200
-@@ -174,6 +174,17 @@ static int forward_confirms_pending = -1
+--- a/ssh.c	2025-07-17 14:08:37.880551301 +0200
++++ b/ssh.c	2025-07-17 15:02:09.224627879 +0200
+@@ -175,6 +175,17 @@ static int forward_confirms_pending = -1
  extern int muxserver_sock;
  extern u_int muxclient_command;
  
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
 +redhat_help_message(void)
 +{
 +	if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
-+	    isatty(fileno(stderr))) {
++           isatty(fileno(stderr))) {
 +		fprintf(stderr,
 +"\nThe link below provides guidance on resolving common SSH errors:\n"
 +"          https://red.ht/support_rhel_ssh\n");
@@ -19,10 +19,10 @@ diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
  /* Prints a help message to the user.  This function never returns. */
  
  static void
-@@ -1609,8 +1620,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1648,8 +1659,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- 	if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
- 	    options.connection_attempts,
+ 	if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, options.host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr,
+ 	    options.port, options.connection_attempts,
 -	    &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
 +	    &timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0) {
 +		redhat_help_message();
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c033da..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,304 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -rup a/scp.c b/scp.c
---- a/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.560120817 +0200
-+++ b/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.118213004 +0200
-@@ -1324,12 +1324,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
- 
- 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
- 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
--		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
-+		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
- 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
- 				src, abs_dst);
- 			errs = 1;
- 		}
--	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
-+	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
- 		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
- 		errs = 1;
- 	}
-@@ -1566,11 +1566,11 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
- 		debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
- 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
--			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
-+			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
--			    pflag, 0, 0) == -1)
-+			    pflag, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
- 		free(abs_dst);
-diff --color -rup a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
---- a/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
-+++ b/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.119213023 +0200
-@@ -666,12 +666,12 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
- 		free(abs_dst);
-@@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
- 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		} else {
- 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
- 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
--			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
-+			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
- 				err = -1;
- 		}
- 	}
-diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
---- a/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 15:09:54.825295533 +0200
-@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ progress_meter_path(const char *path)
- int
- do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
-     const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
--    int fsync_flag)
-+    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *msg;
- 	u_char *handle;
-@@ -1498,8 +1498,8 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0)
- 		return -1;
- 
--	local_fd = open(local_path,
--	    O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
-+	local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT |
-+	((resume_flag || inplace_flag) ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
- 	if (local_fd == -1) {
- 		error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
- 		    local_path, strerror(errno));
-@@ -1661,8 +1661,11 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- 	/* Sanity check */
- 	if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
- 		fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
--	/* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
--	if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
-+	/*
-+	 * Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt,
-+	 * or unconditionally if writing in place.
-+	 */
-+	if (inplace_flag || read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
- 		if (reordered && resume_flag) {
- 			error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
- 			    "server reordered requests", local_path);
-@@ -1724,7 +1727,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
- static int
- download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
--    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
-+    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	int i, ret = 0;
- 	SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
-@@ -1781,7 +1784,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- 			if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- 			    depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
- 			    print_flag, resume_flag,
--			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
-+			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
- 				ret = -1;
- 		} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
- 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
-@@ -1793,7 +1796,8 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- 			if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- 			    S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
- 			    &(dir_entries[i]->a),
--			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
-+			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
-+			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
- 				error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
- 				    new_src, new_dst);
- 				ret = -1;
-@@ -1831,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
- int
- download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
--    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
-+    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	char *src_canon;
- 	int ret;
-@@ -1843,26 +1847,25 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
- 
- 	ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
- 	    dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
--	    follow_link_flag);
-+	    follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
- 	free(src_canon);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
- int
- do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
--    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
-+    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume,
-+    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	int r, local_fd;
--	u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
--	u_int id;
--	u_char type;
-+	u_int openmode, id, status = SSH2_FX_OK, reordered = 0;
- 	off_t offset, progress_counter;
--	u_char *handle, *data;
-+	u_char type, *handle, *data;
- 	struct sshbuf *msg;
- 	struct stat sb;
--	Attrib a, *c = NULL;
--	u_int32_t startid;
--	u_int32_t ackid;
-+	Attrib a, t, *c = NULL;
-+	u_int32_t startid, ackid;
-+	u_int64_t highwater = 0;
- 	struct request *ack = NULL;
- 	struct requests acks;
- 	size_t handle_len;
-@@ -1913,10 +1916,15 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	openmode = SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT;
-+	if (resume)
-+		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_APPEND;
-+	else if (!inplace_flag)
-+		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_TRUNC;
-+
- 	/* Send open request */
--	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
--	    (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC),
--	    &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
-+	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", openmode, &a,
-+	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
- 		close(local_fd);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -1999,6 +2007,12 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 			    ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
- 			++ackid;
- 			progress_counter += ack->len;
-+			if (!reordered && ack->offset <= highwater)
-+				highwater = ack->offset + ack->len;
-+			else if (!reordered && ack->offset > highwater) {
-+				debug3_f("server reordered ACKs");
-+				reordered = 1;
-+			}
- 			free(ack);
- 		}
- 		offset += len;
-@@ -2017,6 +2031,14 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
- 	}
- 
-+	if (inplace_flag || (resume && (status != SSH2_FX_OK || interrupted))) {
-+		debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
-+		attrib_clear(&t);
-+		t.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
-+		t.size = highwater;
-+		do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &t);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
- 		error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
- 		    strerror(errno));
-@@ -2041,7 +2063,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- static int
- upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
--    int follow_link_flag)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	int ret = 0;
- 	DIR *dirp;
-@@ -2119,12 +2141,13 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- 
- 			if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
- 			    depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
--			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
-+			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
- 				ret = -1;
- 		} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) ||
- 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) {
- 			if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
--			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
-+			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag,
-+			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
- 				error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
- 				    new_src, new_dst);
- 				ret = -1;
-@@ -2144,7 +2167,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
- int
- upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
-     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
--    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
-+    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir, int inplace_flag)
- {
- 	char *dst_canon;
- 	int ret;
-@@ -2155,7 +2178,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
- 	}
- 
- 	ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
--	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag);
-+	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
- 
- 	free(dst_canon);
- 	return ret;
-diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
---- a/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:52:37.120213042 +0200
-@@ -138,28 +138,29 @@ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_c
-  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
--    Attrib *, int, int, int);
-+int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
-+    int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
--    Attrib *, int, int, int, int, int);
-+int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
-+    int, int, int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
-  * if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
-+int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
-+    int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
-  * times if 'pflag' is set
-  */
--int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
--    int, int, int);
-+int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
-+    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
- 
- /*
-  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
index 6710304..161ab2d 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
@@ -13,8 +13,8 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
 --- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
 @@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
- This is helpful in
- debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+ By default a 32KB buffer is used.
+ .El
  .El
 +.Pp
 +Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index ec25944..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,129 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
-index 68aac04b..a96e95ad 100644
---- a/scp.1
-+++ b/scp.1
-@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
- .\"
- .\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
- .\"
--.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $
-+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.101 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $
- .\"
--.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
-+.Dd $Mdocdate: September 8 2021 $
- .Dt SCP 1
- .Os
- .Sh NAME
-@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
- .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
- .Sh SYNOPSIS
- .Nm scp
--.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
-+.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrTv
- .Op Fl c Ar cipher
- .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
- .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
-@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ It uses
- .Xr ssh 1
- for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
- same security as a login session.
--The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
--.Xr glob 3
--pattern matching.
- .Pp
- .Nm
- will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
-@@ -79,7 +76,9 @@ The options are as follows:
- Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
- Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
- hosts.
--Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option
-+Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (via the
-+.Fl O
-+flag), this option
- selects batch mode for the second host as
- .Nm
- cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
-@@ -146,9 +145,10 @@ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
- .It Fl O
- Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
- Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
--not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
--wildcard patterns.
--This mode is the default.
-+not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
-+wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
-+.Sq ~
-+prefix for older SFTP servers.
- .It Fl o Ar ssh_option
- Can be used to pass options to
- .Nm ssh
-@@ -258,16 +258,6 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
- The program must understand
- .Xr ssh 1
- options.
--.It Fl s
--Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol.
--Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides
--more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol
--relied on the remote shell for expanding
--.Xr glob 3
--wildcards.
--.Pp
--A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default.
--This option will be deleted before the end of 2022.
- .It Fl T
- Disable strict filename checking.
- By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
-@@ -299,11 +289,23 @@ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
- .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
- .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
- .Xr sshd 8
-+.Sh CAVEATS
-+The original scp protocol (selected by the
-+.Fl O
-+flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
-+.Xr glob 3
-+pattern matching.
-+This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
-+the remote shell, such as quote characters.
- .Sh HISTORY
- .Nm
- is based on the rcp program in
- .Bx
- source code from the Regents of the University of California.
-+.Pp
-+Since OpenSSH 8.8 (8.7 in Red Hat/Fedora builds),
-+.Nm
-+has use the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
- .Sh AUTHORS
- .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
- .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
-diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
-index e039350c..c7cf7529 100644
---- a/scp.c
-+++ b/scp.c
-@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
--/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */
-+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.233 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
-  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
-@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	const char *errstr;
- 	extern char *optarg;
- 	extern int optind;
--	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
-+	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
- 	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
- 
- 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
-@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ void
- usage(void)
- {
- 	(void) fprintf(stderr,
--	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
-+	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
- 	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
- 	    "           [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
- 	exit(1);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index a549170..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs	2022-02-02 14:11:12.553447509 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2022-02-02 14:12:56.081316414 +0100
-@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "progressmeter.h"
- #include "utf8.h"
-+#include "sftp.h"
- 
- #include "sftp-common.h"
- #include "sftp-client.h"
-@@ -660,7 +661,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	 * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
- 	 * and no error has occurred yet
- 	 */
--	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
-+	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && (mode == MODE_SFTP || errs == 0)) {
- 		if (remin != -1)
- 		    (void) close(remin);
- 		if (remout != -1)
-@@ -1264,13 +1265,18 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_
- static char *
- prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
- {
-+	size_t nslash;
-+
- 	/* Handle ~ prefixed paths */
--	if (*path != '~')
--		return xstrdup(path);
- 	if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0)
- 		return xstrdup(".");
--	if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0)
--		return xstrdup(path + 2);
-+	if (*path != '~')
-+		return xstrdup(path);
-+	if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
-+		if ((nslash = strspn(path + 2, "/")) == strlen(path + 2))
-+			return xstrdup(".");
-+		return xstrdup(path + 2 + nslash);
-+	}
- 	if (can_expand_path(conn))
- 		return do_expand_path(conn, path);
- 	/* No protocol extension */
-@@ -1282,10 +1288,16 @@ void
- source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
- {
- 	char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
--	int target_is_dir;
--
-+	int src_is_dir, target_is_dir;
-+	Attrib a;
-+	struct stat st;
-+
-+	memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
-+	if (stat(src, &st) != 0)
-+		fatal("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
-+	src_is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
- 	if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
--		fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno));
-+		fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
-@@ -1295,8 +1307,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
- 		cleanup_exit(255);
- 	target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target);
- 	if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) {
--		fatal("Target is not a directory, but more files selected "
--		    "for upload");
-+		debug("target directory \"%s\" does not exist", target);
-+		a.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
-+		a.perm = st.st_mode | 0700; /* ensure writable */
-+		if (do_mkdir(conn, target, &a, 1) != 0)
-+			cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */
-+		target_is_dir = 1;
- 	}
- 	if (target_is_dir)
- 		abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
-@@ -1306,14 +1322,17 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
- 	}
- 	debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst);
- 
--	if (local_is_dir(src) && iamrecursive) {
-+	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
- 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
- 		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
--			fatal("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
-+			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
- 				src, abs_dst);
-+			errs = 1;
- 		}
--	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0)
--		fatal("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
-+	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
-+		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
-+		errs = 1;
-+	}
- 
- 	free(abs_dst);
- 	free(target);
-@@ -1487,14 +1506,15 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
- 	char *abs_dst = NULL;
- 	glob_t g;
- 	char *filename, *tmp = NULL;
--	int i, r, err = 0;
-+	int i, r, err = 0, dst_is_dir;
-+	struct stat st;
- 
- 	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell
- 	 * expansions
- 	 */
--
- 	if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) {
- 		err = -1;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -1510,11 +1530,24 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !local_is_dir(dst)) {
--		error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
--		    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
--		err = -1;
--		goto out;
-+	if ((r = stat(dst, &st)) != 0)
-+		debug2_f("stat local \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
-+	dst_is_dir = r == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
-+
-+	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !dst_is_dir) {
-+		if (r == 0) {
-+			error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
-+			    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
-+			err = -1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		debug2_f("creating destination \"%s\"", dst);
-+		if (mkdir(dst, 0777) != 0) {
-+			error("local mkdir \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
-+			err = -1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		dst_is_dir = 1;
- 	}
- 
- 	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
-@@ -1525,7 +1558,7 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
- 			goto out;
- 		}
- 
--		if (local_is_dir(dst))
-+		if (dst_is_dir)
- 			abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
- 		else
- 			abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
-@@ -1551,7 +1584,8 @@ out:
- 	free(tmp);
- 	globfree(&g);
- 	if (err == -1) {
--		fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src);
-+		error("Failed to download '%s'", src);
-+		errs = 1;
- 	}
- }
- 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sigpipe.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sigpipe.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index be73b2c..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sigpipe.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 89ca1940..559bf2af 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1124,6 +1124,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
- 	 * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
-@@ -1652,7 +1654,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    options.num_system_hostfiles);
- 	tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
- 
--	ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
- 	ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- 
- 	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
index 04e4c06..c7f6f1e 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
@@ -14,9 +14,9 @@ diff --color -ru a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
  .It ControlPersist
  .It DynamicForward
 +.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EnableEscapeCommandline
  .It EscapeChar
  .It ExitOnForwardFailure
- .It FingerprintHash
 @@ -538,6 +540,8 @@
  .It IdentitiesOnly
  .It IdentityAgent
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 15d49f2..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
-index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
---- a/misc.c
-+++ b/misc.c
-@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
- # include <paths.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #endif
- #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
- #include <net/if.h>
-@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
- 		}
- 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- 
-+		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
-+		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
-+			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
-+			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
- 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
- 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
- 			    strerror(errno));
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc
deleted file mode 100644
index 1bdc93b..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
------BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-
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diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..36fd1cf
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/dh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.730868316 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
++
++	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
++		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed key generation");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* reuse context for key generation */
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not create or init context");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not generate keys");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
++	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* transferred */
++	pub_key = NULL;
++	priv_key = NULL;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
++	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.731868327 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -1623,3 +1623,142 @@
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++/* 
++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
++ * The private key can be omitted.
++ */
++EVP_PKEY *
++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
++{
++  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
++  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
++  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
++  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL;
++  	const char *group_name;
++  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (k == NULL)
++    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
++     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
++                group_name,
++                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++	}
++  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
++    		const EC_GROUP *group;
++    		size_t len;
++
++		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
++		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
++		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
++		    pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len,
++		    bn_ctx);
++		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len) != 1) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++  	free(pub_ser);
++  	return ret;
++}
++
++int
++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
++    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++
++	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (priv != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return r;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:24:28.674867692 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:25:28.494533889 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
++	/* import key */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* import peer key 
++	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
++	 */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not get key size");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
++	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.0p1/kex.h openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h
+--- openssh-9.0p1/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:24:28.725868260 +0200
++++ openssh-9.0p1-patched/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:23:44.841379532 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -283,6 +286,9@@
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
++int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
++    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
++int    kex_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
+--- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
+@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++static EC_KEY *
++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
++{
++	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	const char *group_name;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
++	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
++		goto out;
++	}
++out:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	return client_key;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
++	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
++	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
++	size_t klen = 0, publen;
++	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
++	if ((r = kex_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
++
++	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
++	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
++	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
++	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 57112be..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
-index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
---- a/ssh-keyscan.c
-+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
-@@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2.  The "SSH-"
-+	 * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
-+	 * large banner which we must read and ignore.  Loop while reading
-+	 * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
-+	 * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
-+	 * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
-+	 * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
-+	 */
- 	for (;;) {
- 		memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 		bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
-@@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
- 		conrecycle(s);
- 		return;
- 	}
-+	if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
-+		error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
-+		confree(s);
-+		return;
-+	}
- 	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
- 		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
- 		confree(s);
-diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
-index 1e3b6398..eb2a931e 100644
---- a/sshsig.c
-+++ b/sshsig.c
-@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
- {
- 	char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
- 	ssize_t n, total = 0;
--	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
-+	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = NULL;
- 	int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
-@@ -549,9 +548,11 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
- 	/* success */
- 	r = 0;
-  out:
-+	oerrno = errno;
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ssh_digest_free(ctx);
- 	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	errno = oerrno;
- 	return r;
- }
- 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 0efbdec..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
---- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
-+++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
-@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
- 
- /*
-  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
-- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
-- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
-- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
-- * within a patch series.
-+ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
-+ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
-+ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
-+ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
-  */
- 
- int
-@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
- 	if (headerver == libver)
- 		return 1;
- 
--	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
--	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
--		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
-+	/*
-+	 * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
-+	 */
-+	if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
-+		mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
- 		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
--	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
--	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
-+	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
-+	 * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
- 	 */
- 	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
- 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
---- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check	2023-11-27 14:54:32.959113758 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2023-11-27 14:54:49.467500523 +0100
-@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
- 				;;
- 			101*)   ;; # 1.1.x
- 			200*)   ;; # LibreSSL
--			300*)   ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
-+			30*)   ;; # OpenSSL 3.x series
- 		        *)
- 				AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
- 		                ;;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 5632ba1..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
---- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
-+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
- 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
--		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
--		goto fail;
--	}
-+	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
-+		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 
- 	p->module->handle = handle;
- 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 8c1cbcb..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
---- a/auth2.c	8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000	1.166
-+++ b/auth2.c	28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
-@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
- }
- 
- #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
-+#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
- static double
- user_specific_delay(const char *user)
- {
-@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, 
- 	struct timespec ts;
- 	double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
- 
-+	if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
-+		debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
-+		    "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
- 	while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
- 		seconds *= 2;
-@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
- 		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh);
- 	}
--	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
-+	if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
- 		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
- 		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
- 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 7f710db..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,447 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
-index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
---- a/PROTOCOL
-+++ b/PROTOCOL
-@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
- described at:
- http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
- 
-+1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
-+
-+OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
-+a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
-+RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
-+initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
-+"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
-+may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
-+are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
-+if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
-+
-+When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
-+name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
-+the the protocol:
-+
-+a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
-+   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
-+   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
-+   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
-+   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
-+   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
-+b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
-+   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
-+   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
-+   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
-+
- 2. Connection protocol changes
- 
- 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- /* prototype */
--static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
-+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
- static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- 
- static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
-@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
-+static int
-+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
-+{
-+	char *cp;
-+
-+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+	free(cp);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
-  * Caller must free returned string.
-@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- char *
- kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
- {
--	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
-+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
- 	size_t len;
- 
- 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
-@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
- 	}
- 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
--		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
--			free(m);
-+		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
- 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
--		}
- 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
- 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
- 			free(tmp);
-@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	int r;
- 
--	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
-+	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
-+	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
-+		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
-+	}
-+	error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
- 		return r;
-+ 	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
-+ 		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
-+ 		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
-+		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
-+ 	}
- 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
- 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
- 			return r;
-@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		error_f("no kex");
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	}
--	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
-+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
- 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
- 		return r;
-@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
- 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
- 			return r;
--	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 
- 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
-@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
--/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
- static int
--has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
-+kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
- {
--	char *cp;
--
--	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
--		return 0;
--	free(cp);
--	return 1;
-+	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
- }
- 
- static int
--kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
-+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
- {
- 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
-@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		sprop=peer;
- 	}
- 
--	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
--	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
--		char *ext;
--
--		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
--		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
--		free(ext);
-+	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
-+	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
-+		if (kex->server) {
-+			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
-+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
-+			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
-+		} else {
-+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
-+			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
-+		}
-+		if (kex->kex_strict) {
-+			debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering");
-+			if (seq != 0)
-+				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
-+				    "strict KEX violation: "
-+				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
- 	u_int	kex_type;
- 	char	*server_sig_algs;
- 	int	ext_info_c;
-+	int	kex_strict;
- 	struct sshbuf *my;
- 	struct sshbuf *peer;
- 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
-diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
-index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
---- a/packet.c
-+++ b/packet.c
-@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
- #endif
- 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
--	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
-+	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
-+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
-+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
-+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
-+		}
- 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
-+	}
- 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
- 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
- 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
-@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
- 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
- 
-+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
-+		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
- 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
- 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
-@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
- 	for (;;) {
- 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
--		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
--		if (r != 0)
-+		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
- 			break;
- 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
- 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
-@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
- 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
--	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
-+	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
-+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
-+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
-+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
-+		}
- 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
-+	}
- 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
- 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
- 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
-@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- #endif
- 	/* reset for next packet */
- 	state->packlen = 0;
-+	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
-+		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
-+	}
- 
- 	if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
- 		return r;
-@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
- 		if (r != 0)
- 			return r;
--		if (*typep) {
--			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
--			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
-+		if (*typep == 0) {
-+			/* no message ready */
-+			return 0;
- 		}
-+		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
-+		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
-+
-+		/* Always process disconnect messages */
-+		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
-+				return r;
-+			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
-+			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
-+			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
-+			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
-+			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
-+			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
-+			free(msg);
-+			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
-+		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
-+		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
-+		 * protocol errors.
-+		 */
-+		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
-+		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
- 		switch (*typep) {
- 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
- 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
-@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
- 			free(msg);
- 			break;
--		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
--			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
--			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
--				return r;
--			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
--			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
--			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
--			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
--			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
--			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
--			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
--			free(msg);
--			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
- 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
- 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
- 				return r;
-@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
-@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
-@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
- 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- 	va_end(args);
- 
-+	debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 		fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
- 	free(all_key);
- 
--	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
-+	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
-+	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
- 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
- };
- 
- static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
--static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
- 
- 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
- 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
--	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
-+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
- 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
- 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
- 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
-@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- }
- 
- /* ARGSUSED */
--static int
--input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
--{
--	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
--}
--
- void
- userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
- {
-@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
- 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
- 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
-+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict	2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
-@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	struct kex *kex;
- 	char *hostkey_types = NULL;
- 	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
-+	char *cp;
- 	int r;
- 
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
--	    options.kex_algorithms);
-+	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, 
-+	   "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
-+		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
-+
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
- 	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
-@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
- 	else if (gss)
--		newstr = gss;
-+		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
- 	else if (orig)
- 		newstr = orig;
- 
-@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- #endif
- 	free(prop_kex);
- 	free(prop_enc);
-+	free(cp);
- 	free(prop_hostkey);
- 	debug("KEX done");
- }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 3b83b5c..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 	free(cinfo);
- }
- 
-+static int
-+valid_hostname(const char *s)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	if (*s == '-')
-+		return 0;
-+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
-+		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
-+		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+valid_ruser(const char *s)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	if (*s == '-')
-+		return 0;
-+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
-+		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
-+		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Disallow \ in last position */
-+		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Main program for the ssh client.
-  */
-@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (!host)
- 		usage();
- 
-+	if (!valid_hostname(host))
-+		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
-+	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
-+		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
- 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
- 
- 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
similarity index 64%
rename from SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
rename to SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
index 64d8925..ef1f97e 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@@ -1,157 +1,41 @@
-diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
-index e7549470..b68c1710 100644
---- a/Makefile.in
-+++ b/Makefile.in
-@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
- 	kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
- 	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
- 	kexsntrup761x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
-+	kexgssc.o \
- 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
- 	sshbuf-io.o
+diff --color -ruNp a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
+--- a/auth2.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.858133241 +0200
++++ b/auth2.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.688939755 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
+ extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
+ extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
+ extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
+ #endif
  
-@@ -125,7 +126,7 @@ SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
- 	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
- 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
--	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
-+	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- 	srclimit.o sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
-diff -up a/auth.c.gsskex b/auth.c
---- a/auth.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/auth.c	2021-08-27 12:41:51.262788953 +0200
-@@ -402,7 +402,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
- 	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
- 		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
- 		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
--		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
-+		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
-+		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
- 			return 1;
- 		break;
- 	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
-@@ -730,97 +731,6 @@ fakepw(void)
- }
+@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
+ 	&method_none,
+ 	&method_pubkey,
+ #ifdef GSSAPI
++	&method_gsskeyex,
+ 	&method_gssapi,
+ #endif
+ 	&method_passwd,
+diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
+--- a/auth2-gss.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.858133241 +0200
++++ b/auth2-gss.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.689939776 +0200
+@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
+ #define SSH_GSSAPI_MAX_MECHS	2048
  
- /*
-- * Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
-- * be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
-- * called.
-- * This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
-- * attacks on based on conflation of hostnames and IP addresses.
-- */
--
--static char *
--remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
--{
--	struct sockaddr_storage from;
--	socklen_t fromlen;
--	struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
--	char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
--	const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
--
--	/* Get IP address of client. */
--	fromlen = sizeof(from);
--	memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
--	if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
--	    (struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
--		debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
--	if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
--		fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
--
--	debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
--	/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
--	if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
--	    NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
--		/* Host name not found.  Use ip address. */
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	/*
--	 * if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
--	 * someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
--	 *	1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa.	IN PTR	2.3.4.5
--	 */
--	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
--	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM;	/*dummy*/
--	hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
--	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
--		logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
--		    name, ntop);
--		freeaddrinfo(ai);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--
--	/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
--	lowercase(name);
--
--	/*
--	 * Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
--	 * address actually is an address of this host.  This is
--	 * necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
--	 * define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
--	 * name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
--	 * fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
--	 * the domain).
--	 */
--	memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
--	hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
--	hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
--	if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
--		logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
--		    "[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--	/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
--	for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
--		if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
--		    sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
--		    (strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
--				break;
--	}
--	freeaddrinfo(aitop);
--	/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
--	if (ai == NULL) {
--		/* Address not found for the host name. */
--		logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
--		    "map back to the address.", ntop, name);
--		return xstrdup(ntop);
--	}
--	return xstrdup(name);
--}
--
--/*
-  * Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
-  * connection.  The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
-  * several times.
-diff --git a/auth2-gss.c b/auth2-gss.c
-index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
---- a/auth2-gss.c
-+++ b/auth2-gss.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: auth2-gss.c,v 1.32 2021/01/27 10:15:08 djm Exp $ */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
++extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi;
  
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -54,6 +54,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
- static int input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+ static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh);
+@@ -59,6 +60,48 @@ static int input_gssapi_exchange_complet
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  
-+/*
+ /*
 + * The 'gssapi_keyex' userauth mechanism.
 + */
 +static int
-+userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh)
++userauth_gsskeyex(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
 +{
 +	Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
 +	int r, authenticated = 0;
@@ -178,10 +62,10 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
 +
 +	/* gss_kex_context is NULL with privsep, so we can't check it here */
-+	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
-+	    &gssbuf, &mic))))
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 1));
++	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss_kex_context,
++	    &gssbuf, &mic)))
++		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
++		    authctxt->pw, 1);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(b);
 +	free(mic.value);
@@ -189,66 +73,79 @@ index 9351e042..d6446c0c 100644
 +	return (authenticated);
 +}
 +
- /*
++/*
   * We only support those mechanisms that we know about (ie ones that we know
   * how to check local user kuserok and the like)
-@@ -260,7 +302,8 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+  */
+@@ -267,7 +310,7 @@ input_gssapi_exchange_complete(int type,
  	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse packet");
  
--	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+	authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+	    authctxt->pw, 1));
+-	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++ 	authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 1);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
- 	    (displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
-@@ -306,7 +349,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, NULL);
+@@ -315,7 +358,7 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  	gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
  
- 	if (!GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic))))
--		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user));
-+		authenticated = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user,
-+		    authctxt->pw, 0));
+ 	if (!GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic)))
+-		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
++		authenticated = mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user, authctxt->pw, 0);
  	else
  		logit("GSSAPI MIC check failed");
  
-@@ -326,6 +370,12 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -333,6 +376,11 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
  	return 0;
  }
  
 +Authmethod method_gsskeyex = {
-+	"gssapi-keyex",
++	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
 +	userauth_gsskeyex,
-+	&options.gss_authentication
 +};
 +
  Authmethod method_gssapi = {
- 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
  	userauth_gssapi,
-diff --git a/auth2.c b/auth2.c
-index 0e776224..1c217268 100644
---- a/auth2.c
-+++ b/auth2.c
-@@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ extern Authmethod method_passwd;
- extern Authmethod method_kbdint;
- extern Authmethod method_hostbased;
+diff --color -ruNp a/auth2-methods.c b/auth2-methods.c
+--- a/auth2-methods.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/auth2-methods.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.689939776 +0200
+@@ -50,6 +50,11 @@ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey =
+ 	&options.pubkey_authentication
+ };
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-+extern Authmethod method_gsskeyex;
- extern Authmethod method_gssapi;
- #endif
- 
-@@ -80,6 +81,7 @@ Authmethod *authmethods[] = {
- 	&method_none,
- 	&method_pubkey,
++struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gsskeyex = {
++	"gssapi-keyex",
++	NULL,
++	&options.gss_authentication
++};
+ struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_gssapi = {
+ 	"gssapi-with-mic",
+ 	NULL,
+@@ -76,6 +81,7 @@ static struct authmethod_cfg *authmethod
+ 	&methodcfg_none,
+ 	&methodcfg_pubkey,
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-+	&method_gsskeyex,
- 	&method_gssapi,
++	&methodcfg_gsskeyex,
+ 	&methodcfg_gssapi,
  #endif
- 	&method_passwd,
-diff --git a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
-index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
---- a/canohost.c
-+++ b/canohost.c
+ 	&methodcfg_passwd,
+diff --color -ruNp a/auth.c b/auth.c
+--- a/auth.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/auth.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
+@@ -356,7 +356,8 @@ auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const
+ 	case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
+ 		if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
+ 		    strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
+-		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
++		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 ||
++		    strcmp(method, "gssapi-keyex") == 0)
+ 			return 1;
+ 		break;
+ 	case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
+diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.c b/canohost.c
+--- a/canohost.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/canohost.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
 @@ -35,6 +35,99 @@
  #include "canohost.h"
  #include "misc.h"
@@ -349,10 +246,9 @@ index abea9c6e..8e81b519 100644
  void
  ipv64_normalise_mapped(struct sockaddr_storage *addr, socklen_t *len)
  {
-diff --git a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
-index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
---- a/canohost.h
-+++ b/canohost.h
+diff --color -ruNp a/canohost.h b/canohost.h
+--- a/canohost.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/canohost.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
 @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@
  #ifndef _CANOHOST_H
  #define _CANOHOST_H
@@ -363,11 +259,10 @@ index 26d62855..0cadc9f1 100644
  char		*get_peer_ipaddr(int);
  int		 get_peer_port(int);
  char		*get_local_ipaddr(int);
-diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
-index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
---- a/clientloop.c
-+++ b/clientloop.c
-@@ -112,6 +112,10 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+--- a/clientloop.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/clientloop.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.690939798 +0200
+@@ -115,6 +115,10 @@
  #include "ssherr.h"
  #include "hostfile.h"
  
@@ -375,16 +270,12 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +#endif
 +
- /* import options */
- extern Options options;
+ /* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
+ #define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
  
-@@ -1379,9 +1383,18 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
- 			break;
- 
- 		/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
--		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
-+		if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
- 			channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
+@@ -1590,6 +1594,14 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt
+ 		/* Do channel operations. */
+ 		channel_after_poll(ssh, pfd, npfd_active);
  
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +			if (options.gss_renewal_rekey &&
@@ -393,16 +284,14 @@ index ebd0dbca..1bdac6a4 100644
 +				need_rekeying = 1;
 +			}
 +#endif
-+		}
 +
  		/* Buffer input from the connection.  */
- 		client_process_net_input(ssh, readset);
- 
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -674,6 +674,30 @@ main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
+ 		if (conn_in_ready)
+ 			client_process_net_input(ssh);
+diff --color -ruNp a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+--- a/configure.ac	2024-09-16 11:45:56.870133497 +0200
++++ b/configure.ac	2024-09-16 11:46:34.691939819 +0200
+@@ -774,6 +774,30 @@ int main(void) { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeL
  	    [Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
  	AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
  	    [Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
@@ -433,20 +322,10 @@ index b689db4b..efafb6bd 100644
  	m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
  	AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
  	    AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
-diff --git a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
-index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
---- a/gss-genr.c
-+++ b/gss-genr.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-genr.c,v 1.28 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2007 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -41,9 +41,33 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-genr.c b/gss-genr.c
+--- a/gss-genr.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/gss-genr.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.708940181 +0200
+@@ -42,9 +42,33 @@
  #include "sshbuf.h"
  #include "log.h"
  #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -480,7 +359,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* sshbuf_get for gss_buffer_desc */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
-@@ -62,6 +86,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *b, gss_buffer_desc *g)
+@@ -60,6 +84,159 @@ ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf
  	return 0;
  }
  
@@ -640,7 +519,28 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  /* Check that the OID in a data stream matches that in the context */
  int
  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *ctx, void *data, size_t len)
-@@ -218,7 +398,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int deleg_creds, gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
+@@ -168,6 +345,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+ 	(*ctx)->creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+ 	(*ctx)->client = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
+ 	(*ctx)->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++	(*ctx)->first = 1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Delete our context, providing it has been built correctly */
+@@ -193,6 +371,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx)
+ 		gss_release_name(&ms, &(*ctx)->client);
+ 	if ((*ctx)->client_creds != GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL)
+ 		gss_release_cred(&ms, &(*ctx)->client_creds);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->shared_secret);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_pubkey);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_host_key_blob);
++	sshbuf_free((*ctx)->server_blob);
++	explicit_bzero((*ctx)->hash, sizeof((*ctx)->hash));
++	BN_clear_free((*ctx)->dh_client_pub);
+ 
+ 	free(*ctx);
+ 	*ctx = NULL;
+@@ -216,7 +400,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, int de
  	}
  
  	ctx->major = gss_init_sec_context(&ctx->minor,
@@ -649,11 +549,10 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	    GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG | GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG | deleg_flag,
  	    0, NULL, recv_tok, NULL, send_tok, flags, NULL);
  
-@@ -247,9 +427,43 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *host)
- 	return (ctx->major);
+@@ -246,8 +430,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *ctx, con
  }
  
-+OM_uint32
+ OM_uint32
 +ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *ctx, const char *name)
 +{
 +	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
@@ -684,7 +583,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +	return(ctx->major);
 +}
 +
- OM_uint32
++OM_uint32
  ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
  {
 +	if (ctx == NULL)
@@ -693,7 +592,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  	if ((ctx->major = gss_get_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
  	    GSS_C_QOP_DEFAULT, buffer, hash)))
  		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -257,6 +471,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t buffer, gss_buffer_t hash)
+@@ -255,6 +473,19 @@ ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer
  	return (ctx->major);
  }
  
@@ -713,7 +612,7 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
  void
  ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
      const char *context, const struct sshbuf *session_id)
-@@ -273,11 +500,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, const char *user, const char *service,
+@@ -271,11 +502,16 @@ ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *b, co
  }
  
  int
@@ -730,8 +629,8 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		ctx = &intctx;
  
  	/* RFC 4462 says we MUST NOT do SPNEGO */
- 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length && 
-@@ -287,6 +519,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+ 	if (oid->length == spnego_oid.length &&
+@@ -285,6 +521,10 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
  	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(ctx);
  	ssh_gssapi_set_oid(*ctx, oid);
  	major = ssh_gssapi_import_name(*ctx, host);
@@ -740,13 +639,13 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +		major = ssh_gssapi_client_identity(*ctx, client);
 +
  	if (!GSS_ERROR(major)) {
- 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token, 
+ 		major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(*ctx, 0, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER, &token,
  		    NULL);
-@@ -296,10 +532,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid, const char *host)
+@@ -294,10 +534,66 @@ ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **ctx
  			    GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
  	}
  
--	if (GSS_ERROR(major)) 
+-	if (GSS_ERROR(major))
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(major) || intctx != NULL)
  		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(ctx);
  
@@ -810,10 +709,303 @@ index d56257b4..763a63ff 100644
 +}
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
-index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
---- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
-+++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+--- a/gss-serv.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/gss-serv.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200
+@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
+ /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
+ 
+ /*
+- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
+  *
+  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+@@ -44,17 +44,19 @@
+ #include "session.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "uidswap.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
++#include "monitor_wrap.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+-    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
+-    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
++    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
++    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+-    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
++    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+ 
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
+@@ -141,6 +143,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss
+ }
+ 
+ /* Unprivileged */
++char *
++ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
++	if (supported_oids == NULL)
++		ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
++	return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
++	    &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL,
++	    options.gss_kex_algorithms));
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
++int
++ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
++    const char *dummy) {
++	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
++	int res;
++
++	res = !GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid));
++	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
++
++	return (res);
++}
++
++/* Unprivileged */
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
+ {
+@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *o
+ 	gss_OID_set supported;
+ 
+ 	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
+-	gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
++		return;
+ 
+ 	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
+ 		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
+@@ -276,8 +303,48 @@ OM_uint32
+ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ {
+ 	int i = 0;
++	int equal = 0;
++	gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
++	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
++		if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
++		    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
++		     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
++			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
++			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++		}
+ 
+-	gss_buffer_desc ename;
++		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
++		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++
++		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
++		    new_name, &equal);
++
++		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
++			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++			return (ctx->major);
++		}
++
++		if (!equal) {
++			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
++			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++		}
++
++		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
++
++		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
++		gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
++		client->name = new_name;
++		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
++		ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
++		client->updated = 1;
++		return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
++	}
+ 
+ 	client->mech = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ 	if (client->mech == NULL)
+ 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
+ 
++	if (ctx->client_creds &&
++	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
++	     ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
++
+ 	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
+ 	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
+ 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
+@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ 		return (ctx->major);
+ 	}
+ 
++	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+ 	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
+@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_g
+ void
+ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ {
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
+-		/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
+-		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
+-		    gssapi_client.store.filename);
+-		unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
++	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
++	krb5_error_code problem;
++
++	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
++		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
++			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
++				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
++			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
++				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
++		} else {
++			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
++			gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
++		}
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+ int
+-ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
++ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
+ 
++	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
++
+ 	if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
+ 	    gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
+ 		debug("No suitable client data");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
+-		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
++		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
++			gssapi_client.used = 1;
++			gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
+ 			return 1;
+-		else {
++		} else {
+ 			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+@@ -382,14 +471,85 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+ 	return (0);
+ }
+ 
+-/* Privileged */
+-OM_uint32
+-ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
++/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
++ * as the user, the monitor is root.
++ *
++ * In the child, we want to :
++ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
++ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
++ */
++
++/* Stuff for PAM */
++
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
++    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
+ {
+-	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
+-	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
++	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
++}
++#endif
+ 
+-	return (ctx->major);
++void
++ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
++	int ok;
++#ifdef USE_PAM
++	int ret;
++	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
++	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
++	char *envstr;
++#endif
++
++	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
++	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++		return;
++
++	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
++
++	if (!ok)
++		return;
++
++	debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
++
++	/* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
++	 * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
++	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++	 */
++#ifdef USE_PAM	
++	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
++ 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
++	if (ret)
++		return;
++
++	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
++	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
++
++	ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
++	if (!ret)
++		pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
++	pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
++#endif
++}
++
++int
++ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
++	int ok = 0;
++
++	/* Check we've got credentials to store */
++	if (!gssapi_client.updated)
++		return 0;
++
++	gssapi_client.updated = 0;
++
++	temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
++	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
++		ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
++	else
++		debug("No update function for this mechanism");
++
++	restore_uid();
++
++	return ok;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Privileged */
+diff --color -ruNp a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200
 @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
  /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv-krb5.c,v 1.9 2018/07/09 21:37:55 markus Exp $ */
  
@@ -823,7 +1015,7 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
   *
   * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
   * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_principal princ;
  	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
@@ -832,7 +1024,7 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  	const char *errmsg;
  
  	if (client->creds == NULL) {
-@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -180,11 +180,26 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  		return;
  	}
  
@@ -863,7 +1055,7 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam)
-@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+@@ -193,9 +208,76 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  
  	krb5_cc_close(krb_context, ccache);
  
@@ -950,504 +1142,67 @@ index a151bc1e..8d2b677f 100644
  };
  
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index ab3a15f0..6ce56e92 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: gss-serv.c,v 1.32 2020/03/13 03:17:07 djm Exp $ */
- 
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -44,17 +44,19 @@
- #include "session.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "servconf.h"
-+#include "uidswap.h"
- 
- #include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#include "monitor_wrap.h"
- 
- extern ServerOptions options;
- 
- static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
--    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
--    GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}};
-+    { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
-+    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
- 
- ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
--    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
-+    { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
- 
- #ifdef KRB5
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_kerberos_mech;
-@@ -140,6 +142,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID oid)
- 	return (ssh_gssapi_acquire_cred(*ctx));
- }
- 
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+char *
-+ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void) {
-+	if (supported_oids == NULL)
-+		ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
-+	return (ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(supported_oids,
-+	    &ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech, NULL, NULL,
-+	    options.gss_kex_algorithms));
-+}
-+
-+/* Unprivileged */
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **dum, gss_OID oid, const char *data,
-+    const char *dummy) {
-+	Gssctxt *ctx = NULL;
-+	int res;
-+
-+	res = !GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctx, oid)));
-+	ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctx);
-+
-+	return (res);
-+}
-+
- /* Unprivileged */
- void
- ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
-@@ -150,7 +175,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_supported_oids(gss_OID_set *oidset)
- 	gss_OID_set supported;
- 
- 	gss_create_empty_oid_set(&min_status, oidset);
--	gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(gss_indicate_mechs(&min_status, &supported)))
-+		return;
- 
- 	while (supported_mechs[i]->name != NULL) {
- 		if (GSS_ERROR(gss_test_oid_set_member(&min_status,
-@@ -276,8 +303,48 @@ OM_uint32
- ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+diff --color -ruNp a/kex.c b/kex.c
+--- a/kex.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kex.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.692939840 +0200
+@@ -297,17 +297,37 @@ static int
+ kex_compose_ext_info_server(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
- 	int i = 0;
-+	int equal = 0;
-+	gss_name_t new_name = GSS_C_NO_NAME;
-+	gss_buffer_desc ename = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
+ 	int r;
++	int have_key = 0;
++	int ext_count = 2;
 +
-+	if (options.gss_store_rekey && client->used && ctx->client_creds) {
-+		if (client->mech->oid.length != ctx->oid->length ||
-+		    (memcmp(client->mech->oid.elements,
-+		     ctx->oid->elements, ctx->oid->length) !=0)) {
-+			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different mechanism");
-+			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+		}
-+
-+		if ((ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+		    ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &new_name,
-+		    NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+			return (ctx->major);
-+		}
- 
--	gss_buffer_desc ename;
-+		ctx->major = gss_compare_name(&ctx->minor, client->name,
-+		    new_name, &equal);
-+
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(ctx->major)) {
-+			ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+			return (ctx->major);
-+		}
-+
-+		if (!equal) {
-+			debug("Rekeyed credentials have different name");
-+			return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+		}
-+
-+		debug("Marking rekeyed credentials for export");
-+
-+		gss_release_name(&ctx->minor, &client->name);
-+		gss_release_cred(&ctx->minor, &client->creds);
-+		client->name = new_name;
-+		client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
-+		ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-+		client->updated = 1;
-+		return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
-+	}
- 
- 	client->mech = NULL;
- 
-@@ -292,6 +359,13 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 	if (client->mech == NULL)
- 		return GSS_S_FAILURE;
- 
-+	if (ctx->client_creds &&
-+	    (ctx->major = gss_inquire_cred_by_mech(&ctx->minor,
-+	     ctx->client_creds, ctx->oid, &client->name, NULL, NULL, NULL))) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-+		return (ctx->major);
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((ctx->major = gss_display_name(&ctx->minor, ctx->client,
- 	    &client->displayname, NULL))) {
- 		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
-@@ -309,6 +383,8 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- 		return (ctx->major);
- 	}
- 
-+	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
-+
- 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
- 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
- 	ctx->client_creds = GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL;
-@@ -319,11 +395,20 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- void
- ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
- {
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename != NULL) {
--		/* Unlink probably isn't sufficient */
--		debug("removing gssapi cred file\"%s\"",
--		    gssapi_client.store.filename);
--		unlink(gssapi_client.store.filename);
-+	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
-+	krb5_error_code problem;
-+
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.data != NULL) {
-+		if ((problem = krb5_cc_resolve(gssapi_client.store.data, gssapi_client.store.envval, &ccache))) {
-+			debug_f("krb5_cc_resolve(): %.100s",
-+				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
-+		} else if ((problem = krb5_cc_destroy(gssapi_client.store.data, ccache))) {
-+			debug_f("krb5_cc_destroy(): %.100s",
-+				krb5_get_err_text(gssapi_client.store.data, problem));
-+		} else {
-+			krb5_free_context(gssapi_client.store.data);
-+			gssapi_client.store.data = NULL;
-+		}
- 	}
- }
- 
-@@ -356,19 +441,23 @@ ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep)
- 
- /* Privileged */
- int
--ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
-+ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
- {
- 	OM_uint32 lmin;
- 
-+	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
-+
- 	if (gssapi_client.exportedname.length == 0 ||
- 	    gssapi_client.exportedname.value == NULL) {
- 		debug("No suitable client data");
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->userok)
--		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user))
-+		if ((*gssapi_client.mech->userok)(&gssapi_client, user)) {
-+			gssapi_client.used = 1;
-+			gssapi_client.store.owner = pw;
- 			return 1;
--		else {
-+		} else {
- 			/* Destroy delegated credentials if userok fails */
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
- 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
-@@ -382,14 +471,90 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
- 	return (0);
- }
- 
--/* Privileged */
--OM_uint32
--ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
-+/* These bits are only used for rekeying. The unpriviledged child is running
-+ * as the user, the monitor is root.
-+ *
-+ * In the child, we want to :
-+ *    *) Ask the monitor to store our credentials into the store we specify
-+ *    *) If it succeeds, maybe do a PAM update
-+ */
-+
-+/* Stuff for PAM */
-+
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+static int ssh_gssapi_simple_conv(int n, const struct pam_message **msg,
-+    struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
- {
--	ctx->major = gss_verify_mic(&ctx->minor, ctx->context,
--	    gssbuf, gssmic, NULL);
-+	return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
-+}
-+#endif
- 
--	return (ctx->major);
-+void
-+ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
-+	int ok;
-+#ifdef USE_PAM
-+	int ret;
-+	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-+	struct pam_conv pamconv = {ssh_gssapi_simple_conv, NULL};
-+	char *envstr;
-+#endif
-+
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+		return;
-+
-+	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-+
-+	if (!ok)
-+		return;
-+
-+	debug("Rekeyed credentials stored successfully");
-+
-+	/* Actually managing to play with the ssh pam stack from here will
-+	 * be next to impossible. In any case, we may want different options
-+	 * for rekeying. So, use our own :)
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	/*
++	 * Currently GSS KEX don't provide host keys as optional message, so
++	 * no reasons to announce the publickey-hostbound extension
 +	 */
-+#ifdef USE_PAM	
-+	if (!use_privsep) {
-+		debug("Not even going to try and do PAM with privsep disabled");
-+		return;
++	if (ssh->kex->gss == NULL)
++	    have_key = 1;
++#endif
++	ext_count += have_key;
++
+ 
+ 	if (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL &&
+ 	    (ssh->kex->server_sig_algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 3)) != 0 ||
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ext_count)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+-	    "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0 ||
+-	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, ssh->kex->server_sig_algs)) != 0) {
++		error_fr(r, "compose");
++		return r;
 +	}
-+
-+	ret = pam_start("sshd-rekey", gssapi_client.store.owner->pw_name,
-+ 	    &pamconv, &pamh);
-+	if (ret)
-+		return;
-+
-+	xasprintf(&envstr, "%s=%s", gssapi_client.store.envvar,
-+	    gssapi_client.store.envval);
-+
-+	ret = pam_putenv(pamh, envstr);
-+	if (!ret)
-+		pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
-+	pam_end(pamh, PAM_SUCCESS);
-+#endif
-+}
-+
-+int
-+ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store) {
-+	int ok = 0;
-+
-+	/* Check we've got credentials to store */
-+	if (!gssapi_client.updated)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	gssapi_client.updated = 0;
-+
-+	temporarily_use_uid(gssapi_client.store.owner);
-+	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)
-+		ok = (*gssapi_client.mech->updatecreds)(store, &gssapi_client);
-+	else
-+		debug("No update function for this mechanism");
-+
-+	restore_uid();
-+
-+	return ok;
- }
- 
- /* Privileged */
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index ce85f043..574c7609 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -57,11 +57,16 @@
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "dispatch.h"
- #include "monitor.h"
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
- 
- #include "ssherr.h"
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "digest.h"
- 
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+#include "ssh-gss.h"
-+#endif
-+
- /* prototype */
- static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
- static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-@@ -115,15 +120,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
- #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
- };
-+static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
-+	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+	{ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
-+#endif
-+	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
-+};
- 
--char *
--kex_alg_list(char sep)
-+static char *
-+kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
- {
- 	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
- 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
- 	const struct kexalg *k;
- 
--	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
- 		if (ret != NULL)
- 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
- 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
-@@ -138,6 +156,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-+char *
-+kex_alg_list(char sep)
-+{
-+	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs);
-+}
-+
-+char *
-+kex_gss_alg_list(char sep)
-+{
-+	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs);
-+}
-+
- static const struct kexalg *
- kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- {
-@@ -147,6 +177,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
- 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
- 			return k;
- 	}
-+	for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
-+		if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
-+			return k;
-+	}
- 	return NULL;
- }
- 
-@@ -315,6 +349,29 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
- 	return r;
- }
- 
-+/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
-+int
-+kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names)
-+{
-+	char *s, *cp, *p;
-+
-+	if (names == NULL || *names == '\0')
-+		return 0;
-+	s = cp = xstrdup(names);
-+	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
-+	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
-+		if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0
-+		  || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
-+			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			free(s);
-+			return 0;
++	if (have_key) {
++	    if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "publickey-hostbound@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
++	        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
++		    error_fr(r, "compose");
++		    return r;
 +		}
 +	}
-+	debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names);
-+	free(s);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
- int
- kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
-@@ -698,6 +755,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "ping@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "0")) != 0) {
+ 		error_fr(r, "compose");
+ 		return r;
+@@ -737,6 +757,9 @@ kex_free(struct kex *kex)
  	sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
  	sshbuf_free(kex->session_id);
 +#ifdef GSSAPI
 +	free(kex->gss_host);
 +#endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 	sshbuf_free(kex->initial_sig);
+ 	sshkey_free(kex->initial_hostkey);
  	free(kex->failed_choice);
- 	free(kex->hostkey_alg);
- 	free(kex->name);
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index a5ae6ac0..fe714141 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -102,6 +102,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
- 	KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
- 	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
- 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256,
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512,
-+	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
-+	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
-+	KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256,
-+#endif
- 	KEX_MAX
- };
- 
-@@ -153,6 +162,12 @@ struct kex {
- 	u_int	flags;
- 	int	hash_alg;
- 	int	ec_nid;
-+#ifdef GSSAPI
-+	int	gss_deleg_creds;
-+	int	gss_trust_dns;
-+	char    *gss_host;
-+	char	*gss_client;
-+#endif
- 	char	*failed_choice;
- 	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
- 	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
-@@ -174,8 +189,10 @@ struct kex {
- 
- int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
- char	*kex_alg_list(char);
-+char	*kex_gss_alg_list(char);
- char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
- int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
-+int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
- 
- int	 kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *, int, const char *);
- 
-@@ -202,6 +219,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
- int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
- int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
- int	 kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
-+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-+int	 kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *);
-+int	 kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *);
-+int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
-+int	 kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
-+#endif
- 
- int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
- int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
-@@ -234,6 +257,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbuf *, const struct sshbuf *,
-     const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
-     u_char *, size_t *);
- 
-+int	 kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version,
-+    const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
-+    const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
-+    const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub,
-+    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen);
-+
- void	kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
- 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
-diff --git a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
-index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
---- a/kexdh.c
-+++ b/kexdh.c
-@@ -48,13 +48,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
+diff --color -ruNp a/kexdh.c b/kexdh.c
+--- a/kexdh.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kexdh.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.693939862 +0200
+@@ -49,13 +49,23 @@ kex_dh_keygen(struct kex *kex)
  {
  	switch (kex->kex_type) {
  	case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
@@ -1471,10 +1226,9 @@ index 67133e33..edaa4676 100644
  		kex->dh = dh_new_group16();
  		break;
  	case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
-diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
-index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
---- a/kexgen.c
-+++ b/kexgen.c
+diff --color -ruNp a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
+--- a/kexgen.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kexgen.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.693939862 +0200
 @@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
  static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
@@ -1484,12 +1238,10 @@ index 69348b96..c0e8c2f4 100644
  kex_gen_hash(
      int hash_alg,
      const struct sshbuf *client_version,
-diff --git a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..f6e1405e
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,611 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/kexgssc.c b/kexgssc.c
+--- a/kexgssc.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ b/kexgssc.c	2024-10-14 15:18:02.491798105 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,706 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -1539,38 +1291,206 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
 +
++static int input_kexgss_hostkey(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_complete(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++
++static int
++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	int r;
++
++	/*
++	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
++	 * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok
++	 */
++
++	/* compute shared secret */
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
++		r = kex_dh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
++		if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob)] & 0x80)
++			fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!");
++		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
++		if (sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob) != 65)
++			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match "
++			      "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)",
++			      sshbuf_len(gss->server_blob));
++
++		if (sshbuf_ptr(gss->server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
++			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04");
++
++		r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, gss->server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		break;
++	default:
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		break;
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version,
++			 kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer,
++			 (gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty),
++			 kex->client_pub, gss->server_blob, shared_secret,
++			 hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
++
++	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
++		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
++
++	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++
++	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
++		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob);
++		gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL;
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob);
++		gss->server_blob = NULL;
++	}
++out:
++	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
++	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
++	kex->client_pub = NULL;
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++kexgss_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++
++	gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds,
++					 token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		/* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++	}
++
++	/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++	if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr);
++
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++			fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++
++		/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++			fatal("Integrity check failed");
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++	 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++	 */
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		if (gss->first) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++			gss->first = 0;
++		} else {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok);
++
++		/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgss_complete);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* No data, and not complete */
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr);
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh);
++}
++
 +int
 +kexgss_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    gssbuf, msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
-+	u_char *msg;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	int first = 1;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	u_char c;
 +	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID)
 +		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
 +
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host))
 +		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
 +
 +	if (kex->gss_client &&
-+	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client))
 +		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
 +
 +	/* Step 1 */
@@ -1591,522 +1511,447 @@ index 00000000..f6e1405e
 +		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		return r;
 +	}
++	return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
++}
 +
-+	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
++static int
++input_kexgss_hostkey(int type,
++		     u_int32_t seq,
++		     struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	u_char *tmp = NULL;
++	size_t tmp_len = 0;
++	int r;
 +
-+	do {
-+		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
++	debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
++	if (gss->server_host_key_blob)
++		fatal("Server host key received more than once");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if ((gss->server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
++		fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
++	return 0;
++}
 +
-+		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+		    &ret_flags);
++static int
++input_kexgss_continue(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int r;
 +
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+			/* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
-+			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
-+				        SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+		}
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
 +
-+		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if  (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
++		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++	return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++}
 +
-+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
++static int
++input_kexgss_complete(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	u_char c;
++	int r;
 +
-+			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+		}
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
 +
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+		 */
-+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+			if (first) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0)
-+					fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				first = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++	if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL)
++	        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+			do {
-+				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
++	/* Is there a token included? */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (c) {
++		if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++	} else {
++		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
 +
-+					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+					if (server_host_key_blob)
-+						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
-+						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
-+				}
-+			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgss_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
 +
-+			switch (type) {
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+				if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+				if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
-+				        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &msg_tok)) != 0)
-+					fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++	return kexgss_final(ssh);
++}
 +
-+				/* Is there a token included? */
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				if (c) {
-+					if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
-+					    ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
-+						fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+				} else {
-+					/* No token included */
-+					if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+				}
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
-+					fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
-+				}
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+				debug("Received Error");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
-+			default:
-+				sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+				    type);
-+			}
-+			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+		} else {
-+			/* No data, and not complete */
-+			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
++static int
++input_kexgss_error(int type,
++		   u_int32_t seq,
++		   struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	u_char *msg;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Received Error");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->major)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &gss->minor)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt_get failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++/*******************************************************/
++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/
++/*******************************************************/
++
++int
++kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	int r;
++
++	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(kex->gss, kex->name, kex->kex_type) == GSS_C_NO_OID)
++		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++
++	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(kex->gss, kex->gss_host))
++		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++
++	if (kex->gss_client &&
++	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(kex->gss, kex->gss_client))
++		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++
++	debug("Doing group exchange");
++	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
++	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
++	kex->nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
++
++	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, &input_kexgssgex_group);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static int
++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
 +	 * server, which will have set server_blob and msg_tok
 +	 */
 +
-+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+	/* compute shared secret */
-+	switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
-+	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
-+		r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
-+		if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[sshbuf_len(server_blob)] & 0x80)
-+			fatal("The received key has MSB of last octet set!");
-+		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
-+		if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != 65)
-+			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key did not match"
-+			    "expected length (expected 65, got %zu)", sshbuf_len(server_blob));
-+
-+		if (sshbuf_ptr(server_blob)[0] != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
-+			fatal("The received NIST-P256 key does not have first octet 0x04");
-+
-+		r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+	if (r != 0)
++	/* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */
++	/* 8. C computes shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		goto out;
++	}
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	buf = NULL;
 +
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
-+	    kex->client_pub,
-+	    server_blob,
-+	    shared_secret,
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
 +
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version,
++			kex->server_version, kex->my, kex->peer,
++			(gss->server_host_key_blob ? gss->server_host_key_blob : empty),
++			kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g, pub_key,
++			dh_server_pub, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
++			hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
 +
 +	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gss, &gss->buf, &gss->msg_tok)))
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
 +
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &gss->msg_tok);
 +
 +	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(gss);
 +
 +	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
 +	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +
++	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 +
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_host_key_blob);
++		gss->server_host_key_blob = NULL;
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_blob);
++		gss->server_blob = NULL;
++	}
 +out:
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	DH_free(kex->dh);
++	kex->dh = NULL;
++	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
 +	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
-+	kex->client_pub = NULL;
 +	return r;
 +}
 +
-+int
-+kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
++static int
++kexgssgex_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		   gss_buffer_desc *token_ptr)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER,
-+	    recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, gssbuf,
-+            msg_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, *token_ptr;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status, ret_flags;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *g = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
-+	u_char *msg;
-+	int type = 0;
-+	int first = 1;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
-+	u_char c;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key;
++	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags;
 +	int r;
 +
-+	/* Initialise our GSSAPI world */
-+	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&ctxt);
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_id_kex(ctxt, kex->name, kex->kex_type)
-+	    == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+		fatal("Couldn't identify host exchange");
++	/* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */
++	debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
 +
-+	if (ssh_gssapi_import_name(ctxt, kex->gss_host))
-+		fatal("Couldn't import hostname");
++	gss->major = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gss, kex->gss_deleg_creds,
++					 token_ptr, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
 +
-+	if (kex->gss_client &&
-+	    ssh_gssapi_client_identity(ctxt, kex->gss_client))
-+		fatal("Couldn't acquire client credentials");
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		/* XXX Useless code: Missing send? */
++		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("gss_init_context failed");
++	}
 +
-+	debug("Doing group exchange");
-+	nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
++	/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
++	if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, token_ptr);
 +
-+	kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
-+	kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	kex->nbits = nbits;
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, min)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbits)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, max)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Failed to construct a packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++			fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
 +
-+	if ((r = ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Error: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
++		if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++			fatal("Integrity check failed");
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
++	 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
++	 */
++	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++		if (gss->first) {
++	                DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++			gss->first = 0;
++		} else {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++				fatal("failed to construct packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("failed to send packet: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &send_tok);
++
++		/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, &input_kexgss_hostkey);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, &input_kexgssgex_complete);
++		ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, &input_kexgss_error);
++		return 0;
++	}
++	/* No data, and not complete */
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, token_ptr);
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_group(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	BIGNUM *p = NULL;
++	BIGNUM *g = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("Received SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP, NULL);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("shpkt_get_bignum2 failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	if (BN_num_bits(p) < min || BN_num_bits(p) > max)
++	if (BN_num_bits(p) < kex->min || BN_num_bits(p) > kex->max)
 +		fatal("GSSGRP_GEX group out of range: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+		    min, BN_num_bits(p), max);
++		    kex->min, BN_num_bits(p), kex->max);
 +
 +	if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL)
 +		fatal("dn_new_group() failed");
 +	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 +
-+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
-+
-+	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
-+
-+	do {
-+		/* Step 2 - call GSS_Init_sec_context() */
-+		debug("Calling gss_init_sec_context");
-+
-+		maj_status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(ctxt,
-+		    kex->gss_deleg_creds, token_ptr, &send_tok,
-+		    &ret_flags);
-+
-+		if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+			/* XXX Useles code: Missing send? */
-+			if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
-+				        SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			fatal("gss_init_context failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/* If we've got an old receive buffer get rid of it */
-+		if (token_ptr != GSS_C_NO_BUFFER)
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
-+
-+		if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
-+			/* If mutual state flag is not true, kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Mutual authentication failed");
-+
-+			/* If integ avail flag is not true kex fails */
-+			if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+				fatal("Integrity check failed");
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have data to send, then the last message that we
-+		 * received cannot have been a 'complete'.
-+		 */
-+		if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+			if (first) {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				first = 0;
-+			} else {
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh,send_tok.value,
-+				        send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			}
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+
-+			/* If we've sent them data, they should reply */
-+			do {
-+				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
-+					char *tmp = NULL;
-+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
-+
-+					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
-+					if (server_host_key_blob)
-+						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
-+						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
-+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
-+				}
-+			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
-+
-+			switch (type) {
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+				if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+					fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
-+				if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE:
-+				debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
-+				if (msg_tok.value != NULL)
-+				        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+				        &msg_tok)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+				/* Is there a token included? */
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				if (c) {
-+					if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(
-+					        ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+					    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+					/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
-+					if (maj_status == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
-+				} else {
-+					/* No token included */
-+					if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+						sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
-+				}
-+				break;
-+			case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR:
-+				debug("Received Error");
-+				if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &maj_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &min_status)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* lang tag */
-+				    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+					fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+				fatal("GSSAPI Error: \n%.400s", msg);
-+			default:
-+				sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+				    type);
-+			}
-+			token_ptr = &recv_tok;
-+		} else {
-+			/* No data, and not complete */
-+			if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
-+				fatal("Not complete, and no token output");
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * We _must_ have received a COMPLETE message in reply from the
-+	 * server, which will have set dh_server_pub and msg_tok
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (type != SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)
-+		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
-+
-+	/* 7. C verifies that the key Q_S is valid */
-+	/* 8. C computes shared secret */
-+	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, server_blob)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	buf = NULL;
-+
-+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
++	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		DH_free(kex->dh);
++		kex->dh = NULL;
++		return r;
 +	}
 +
-+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    (server_host_key_blob ? server_host_key_blob : empty),
-+ 	    kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
-+	    dh_p, dh_g,
-+	    pub_key,
-+	    dh_server_pub,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("Failed to calculate hash: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	/* Verify that the hash matches the MIC we just got. */
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(ssh_gssapi_checkmic(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok)))
-+		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Hash's MIC didn't verify");
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+	if (kex->gss_deleg_creds)
-+		ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(ctxt);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
-+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
-+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(buf);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	DH_free(kex->dh);
-+	kex->dh = NULL;
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
-+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
-+	return r;
++	return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER);
 +}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
++
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++		fatal("GSSAPI Continue received from server when complete");
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if  (!(gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED))
++		fatal("Didn't receive a SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE when I expected it");
++	return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_complete(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	u_char c;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR, NULL);
++
++	debug("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE");
++	if (gss->msg_tok.value != NULL)
++	        fatal("Received GSSAPI_COMPLETE twice?");
++	if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &gss->server_blob)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &gss->msg_tok)) != 0)
++		fatal("Failed to read message: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	/* Is there a token included? */
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &c)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	if (c) {
++		if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0)
++			fatal("Failed to read token: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		/* If we're already complete - protocol error */
++		if (gss->major == GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: received token when complete");
++	} else {
++		if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE)
++			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: did not receive final token");
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("Expecting end of packet.");
++
++	if  (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return kexgssgex_init_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok);
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh);
++}
++
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff --git a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..60bc02de
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/kexgsss.c b/kexgsss.c
+--- a/kexgsss.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ b/kexgsss.c	2024-10-14 15:18:02.491798105 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,601 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@@ -2159,33 +2004,18 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +
++static int input_kexgss_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgss_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++static int input_kexgssgex_continue(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
++
 +int
 +kexgss_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+	 */
-+
-+	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
-+	int type = 0;
 +	gss_OID oid;
 +	char *mechs;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
 +
@@ -2201,135 +2031,94 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++		fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
-+	do {
-+		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
-+		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+		switch(type) {
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
-+				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (kex->gss == NULL)
++		fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context");
 +
-+			switch (kex->kex_type) {
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
-+			case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
-+				r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
-+				r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
-+				r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
-+				    &shared_secret);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
-+			}
-+			if (r != 0)
-+				goto out;
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgss_init);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgss_continue);
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
++	return 0;
++}
 +
-+			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++static inline void
++kexgss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		  gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
++		  gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		  OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	int r;
 +
-+			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
-+			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
-+			* buffer state->incoming_packet
-+			*/
-+			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+			    kex->hash_alg,
-+			    kex->client_version,
-+			    kex->server_version,
-+			    kex->peer,
-+			    kex->my,
-+			    empty,
-+			    client_pubkey,
-+			    server_pubkey,
-+			    shared_secret,
-+			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+				goto out;
++	gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok);
 +
-+			gssbuf.value = hash;
-+			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0)
++		fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
 +
-+			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+			client_pubkey = NULL;
++	if (gss->buf.value == NULL)
++		fatal("No client public key");
 +
-+			break;
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
-+			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+			    type);
-+		}
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	}
++}
 +
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
++static inline int
++kexgss_final(struct ssh *ssh,
++	     gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++	     OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	int r;
 +
-+		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
 +
-+		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
-+			fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		if (send_tok->length > 0) {
 +			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 +				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +		}
 +		fatal("accept_ctx died");
 +	}
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok)))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, gss->server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
++	if (send_tok->length != 0) {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0)
 +			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	} else {
 +		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
@@ -2338,13 +2127,19 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok);
++
++	hashlen = gss->hashlen;
++	memcpy(hash, gss->hash, hashlen);
++	explicit_bzero(gss->hash, sizeof(gss->hash));
++	shared_secret = gss->shared_secret;
++	gss->shared_secret = NULL;
 +
 +	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
 +	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
 +
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
@@ -2353,44 +2148,126 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 * just exchanged.  */
 +	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
 +		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(gss->server_pubkey);
++		gss->server_pubkey = NULL;
++	}
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
 +	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
-+	sshbuf_free(server_pubkey);
 +	return r;
 +}
 +
++static int
++input_kexgss_init(int type,
++		  u_int32_t seq,
++		  struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	struct sshbuf *empty;
++	struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	switch (kex->kex_type) {
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256:
++	case KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512:
++		r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256:
++		r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	case KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256:
++		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &gss->server_pubkey, &gss->shared_secret);
++		break;
++	default:
++		fatal_f("Unexpected KEX type %d", kex->kex_type);
++	}
++	if (r != 0) {
++		sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return r;
++	}
++
++	/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
++	 * client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
++	 * buffer state->incoming_packet
++	 */
++	gss->hashlen = sizeof(gss->hash);
++	r = kex_gen_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version,
++			 kex->peer, kex->my, empty, client_pubkey, gss->server_pubkey,
++			 gss->shared_secret, gss->hash, &gss->hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &recv_tok);
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		return r;
++	}
++
++	gss->buf.value = gss->hash;
++	gss->buf.length = gss->hashlen;
++
++	kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgss_continue(int type,
++		      u_int32_t seq,
++		      struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	kexgss_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgss_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++/*******************************************************/
++/******************** KEXGSSGEX ************************/
++/*******************************************************/
++
 +int
 +kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *ssh)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	OM_uint32 maj_status, min_status;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Some GSSAPI implementations use the input value of ret_flags (an
-+	 * output variable) as a means of triggering mechanism specific
-+	 * features. Initializing it to zero avoids inadvertently
-+	 * activating this non-standard behaviour.
-+	 */
-+
-+	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
-+	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
-+	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
-+	int type = 0;
 +	gss_OID oid;
 +	char *mechs;
-+	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
-+	size_t hashlen;
-+	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub = NULL;
-+	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
-+	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
-+	int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
-+	int r;
 +
 +	/* Initialise GSSAPI */
 +
@@ -2398,29 +2275,194 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 * in the GSSAPI code are no longer available. This kludges them back
 +	 * into life
 +	 */
-+	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok())
-+		if ((mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms()))
-+			free(mechs);
++	if (!ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok()) {
++		mechs = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		free(mechs);
++	}
 +
 +	debug2_f("Identifying %s", kex->name);
 +	oid = ssh_gssapi_id_kex(NULL, kex->name, kex->kex_type);
 +	if (oid == GSS_C_NO_OID)
-+	   fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
++		fatal("Unknown gssapi mechanism");
 +
 +	debug2_f("Acquiring credentials");
 +
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&ctxt, oid))))
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&kex->gss, oid)))
 +		fatal("Unable to acquire credentials for the server");
 +
-+	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
++	ssh_gssapi_build_ctx(&kex->gss);
++	if (kex->gss == NULL)
++		fatal("Unable to allocate memory for gss context");
++
 +	debug("Doing group exchange");
-+	ssh_packet_read_expect(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, &input_kexgssgex_groupreq);
++	return 0;
++}
++
++static inline void
++kexgssgex_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
++		     gss_buffer_desc *recv_tok,
++		     gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		     OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	int r;
++
++	gss->major = mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gss, recv_tok, send_tok, ret_flags);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, recv_tok);
++
++	if (gss->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok->length == 0)
++		fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
++
++	if (gss->dh_client_pub == NULL)
++		fatal("No client public key");
++
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
++		debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
++		if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++		    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	}
++}
++
++static inline int
++kexgssgex_final(struct ssh *ssh,
++		gss_buffer_desc *send_tok,
++		OM_uint32 *ret_flags)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	Gssctxt *gss = kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t hashlen;
++	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
++	int r;
++
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, NULL);
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(gss->major)) {
++		if (send_tok->length > 0) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++		}
++		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	}
++
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
++		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
++
++	if (!(*ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
++		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
++
++	/* calculate shared secret */
++	shared_secret = sshbuf_new();
++	if (shared_secret == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, gss->dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
++	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
++	r = kexgex_hash(kex->hash_alg, kex->client_version, kex->server_version,
++			kex->peer, kex->my, empty, kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max, dh_p, dh_g,
++			gss->dh_client_pub, pub_key, sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret),
++			sshbuf_len(shared_secret), hash, &hashlen);
++	sshbuf_free(empty);
++	if (r != 0)
++		fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss->buf.value = hash;
++	gss->buf.length = hashlen;
++
++	if (GSS_ERROR(mm_ssh_gssapi_sign(gss, &gss->buf, &msg_tok)))
++		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
++
++	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	if (send_tok->length != 0) {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
++		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok->value, send_tok->length)) != 0)
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	} else {
++		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
++			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	}
++	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt_send failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, send_tok);
++	gss_release_buffer(&gss->minor, &msg_tok);
++
++	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
++		gss_kex_context = gss;
++	else
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++
++	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
++	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
++		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
++
++	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
++	 * just exchanged.  */
++	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
++		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
++
++	if (kex->gss != NULL)
++		BN_clear_free(gss->dh_client_pub);
++
++out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	DH_free(kex->dh);
++	kex->dh = NULL;
++	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
++	return r;
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_groupreq(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	int min = -1, max = -1, nbits = -1;
++	int cmin = -1, cmax = -1; /* client proposal */
++	int r;
++
++	/* 5. S generates an ephemeral key pair (do the allocations early) */
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ, NULL);
++
 +	/* store client proposal to provide valid signature */
 +	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmin)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nbits)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &cmax)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
 +		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
 +	kex->nbits = nbits;
 +	kex->min = cmin;
 +	kex->max = cmax;
@@ -2428,10 +2470,11 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	max = MIN(DH_GRP_MAX, cmax);
 +	nbits = MAXIMUM(DH_GRP_MIN, nbits);
 +	nbits = MINIMUM(DH_GRP_MAX, nbits);
++
 +	if (max < min || nbits < min || max < nbits)
-+		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d",
-+		    min, nbits, max);
-+	kex->dh = PRIVSEP(choose_dh(min, nbits, max));
++		fatal("GSS_GEX, bad parameters: %d !< %d !< %d", min, nbits, max);
++
++	kex->dh = mm_choose_dh(min, nbits, max);
 +	if (kex->dh == NULL) {
 +		sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: no matching group found");
 +		fatal("Protocol error: no matching group found");
@@ -2448,152 +2491,285 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		fatal("ssh_packet_write_wait: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	/* Compute our exchange value in parallel with the client */
-+	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	do {
-+		debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_GSSAPI_INIT");
-+		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
-+		switch(type) {
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (dh_client_pub != NULL)
-+				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
-+			break;
-+		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
-+			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
-+			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
-+			    "Protocol error: didn't expect packet type %d",
-+			    type);
-+		}
-+
-+		maj_status = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(ctxt, &recv_tok,
-+		    &send_tok, &ret_flags));
-+
-+		gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &recv_tok);
-+
-+		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
-+			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
-+
-+		if (dh_client_pub == NULL)
-+			fatal("No client public key");
-+
-+		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
-+			debug("Sending GSSAPI_CONTINUE");
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+			gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+		}
-+	} while (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED);
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(maj_status)) {
-+		if (send_tok.length > 0) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+				fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+		}
-+		fatal("accept_ctx died");
++	if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0) {
++		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&kex->gss);
++		DH_free(kex->dh);
++		kex->dh = NULL;
++		return r;
 +	}
 +
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_MUTUAL_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Mutual Authentication flag wasn't set");
-+
-+	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
-+		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
-+
-+	/* calculate shared secret */
-+	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_client_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
-+	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kexgex_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    empty,
-+	    cmin, nbits, cmax,
-+	    dh_p, dh_g,
-+	    dh_client_pub,
-+	    pub_key,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		fatal("kexgex_hash failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
-+	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
-+		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
-+
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, msg_tok.value, msg_tok.length)) != 0)
-+		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	if (send_tok.length != 0) {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* true */
-+		    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value, send_tok.length)) != 0)
-+			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	} else {
-+		if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* false */
-+			fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	}
-+	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &send_tok);
-+	gss_release_buffer(&min_status, &msg_tok);
-+
-+	if (gss_kex_context == NULL)
-+		gss_kex_context = ctxt;
-+	else
-+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
-+
-+	/* Finally derive the keys and send them */
-+	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
-+		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
-+
-+	/* If this was a rekey, then save out any delegated credentials we
-+	 * just exchanged.  */
-+	if (options.gss_store_rekey)
-+		ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds();
-+out:
-+	sshbuf_free(empty);
-+	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
-+	DH_free(kex->dh);
-+	kex->dh = NULL;
-+	BN_clear_free(dh_client_pub);
-+	sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
-+	return r;
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, &input_kexgssgex_init);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE, &input_kexgssgex_continue);
++	debug("Wait SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT");
++	return 0;
 +}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_init(int type,
++		     u_int32_t seq,
++		     struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT received");
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT, NULL);
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &gss->dh_client_pub)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
++
++	kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
++static int
++input_kexgssgex_continue(int type,
++			 u_int32_t seq,
++			 struct ssh *ssh)
++{
++	Gssctxt *gss = ssh->kex->gss;
++	gss_buffer_desc recv_tok, send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh, &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
++		fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
++
++	kexgssgex_accept_ctx(ssh, &recv_tok, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++	if (gss->major & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED)
++		return 0;
++
++	return kexgssgex_final(ssh, &send_tok, &ret_flags);
++}
++
 +#endif /* defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL) */
-diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
-index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
---- a/monitor.c
-+++ b/monitor.c
-@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
+diff --color -ruNp a/kex.h b/kex.h
+--- a/kex.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kex.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.710940224 +0200
+@@ -29,6 +29,10 @@
+ #include "mac.h"
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++# include "ssh-gss.h" /* Gssctxt */
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -102,6 +106,15 @@ enum kex_exchange {
+ 	KEX_C25519_SHA256,
+ 	KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512,
+ 	KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256,
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1,
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1,
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256,
++	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512,
++	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1,
++	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
++	KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256,
++#endif
+ 	KEX_MAX
+ };
+ 
+@@ -164,6 +177,13 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_int	flags;
+ 	int	hash_alg;
+ 	int	ec_nid;
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	Gssctxt *gss;
++	int	gss_deleg_creds;
++	int	gss_trust_dns;
++	char    *gss_host;
++	char	*gss_client;
++#endif
+ 	char	*failed_choice;
+ 	int	(*verify_host_key)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
+ 	struct sshkey *(*load_host_public_key)(int, int, struct ssh *);
+@@ -189,8 +209,10 @@ int	 kex_hash_from_name(const char *);
+ int	 kex_nid_from_name(const char *);
+ int	 kex_names_valid(const char *);
+ char	*kex_alg_list(char);
++char	*kex_gss_alg_list(char);
+ char	*kex_names_cat(const char *, const char *);
+ int	 kex_has_any_alg(const char *, const char *);
++int	 kex_gss_names_valid(const char *);
+ int	 kex_assemble_names(char **, const char *, const char *);
+ void	 kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh *, char *prop[PROPOSAL_MAX],
+     const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
+@@ -224,6 +246,12 @@ int	 kexgex_client(struct ssh *);
+ int	 kexgex_server(struct ssh *);
+ int	 kex_gen_client(struct ssh *);
+ int	 kex_gen_server(struct ssh *);
++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
++int	 kexgssgex_client(struct ssh *);
++int	 kexgssgex_server(struct ssh *);
++int	 kexgss_client(struct ssh *);
++int	 kexgss_server(struct ssh *);
++#endif
+ 
+ int	 kex_dh_keypair(struct kex *);
+ int	 kex_dh_enc(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf **,
+@@ -256,6 +284,12 @@ int	 kexgex_hash(int, const struct sshbu
+     const BIGNUM *, const u_char *, size_t,
+     u_char *, size_t *);
+ 
++int	 kex_gen_hash(int hash_alg, const struct sshbuf *client_version,
++    const struct sshbuf *server_version, const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
++    const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit, const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
++    const struct sshbuf *client_pub, const struct sshbuf *server_pub,
++    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen);
++
+ void	kexc25519_keygen(u_char key[CURVE25519_SIZE], u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE])
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
+diff --color -ruNp a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+--- a/kex-names.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/kex-names.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.694939883 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,10 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+ 
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++#include "ssh-gss.h"
++#endif
++
+ struct kexalg {
+ 	char *name;
+ 	u_int type;
+@@ -83,15 +87,28 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ #endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+ };
++static const struct kexalg gss_kexalgs[] = {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++	{ KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++	{ KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID, KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
++	{ KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256,
++	    NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++	{ KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID, KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
++#endif
++	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
++};
+ 
+-char *
+-kex_alg_list(char sep)
++static char *
++kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ {
+ 	char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
+ 	size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+-	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (ret != NULL)
+ 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
+@@ -106,6 +123,18 @@ kex_alg_list(char sep)
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++char *
++kex_alg_list(char sep)
++{
++	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, kexalgs);
++}
++
++char *
++kex_gss_alg_list(char sep)
++{
++	return kex_alg_list_internal(sep, gss_kexalgs);
++}
++
+ static const struct kexalg *
+ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+@@ -115,6 +144,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+ 	}
++	for (k = gss_kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++		if (strncmp(k->name, name, strlen(k->name)) == 0)
++			return k;
++	}
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -328,3 +361,26 @@ kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const c
+ 	free(ret);
+ 	return r;
+ }
++ 
++/* Validate GSS KEX method name list */
++int
++kex_gss_names_valid(const char *names)
++{
++	char *s, *cp, *p;
++
++	if (names == NULL || *names == '\0')
++		return 0;
++	s = cp = xstrdup(names);
++	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
++	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
++		if (strncmp(p, "gss-", 4) != 0
++		  || kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
++			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			free(s);
++			return 0;
++		}
++	}
++	debug3("gss kex names ok: [%s]", names);
++	free(s);
++	return 1;
++}
+diff --color -ruNp a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+--- a/Makefile.in	2024-09-16 11:45:56.868133454 +0200
++++ b/Makefile.in	2024-09-16 11:46:34.695939904 +0200
+@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
+ 	kex.o kex-names.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
+ 	kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
+ 	kexsntrup761x25519.o kexmlkem768x25519.o sntrup761.o kexgen.o \
++	kexgssc.o \
+ 	sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+ 	sshbuf-io.o
+ 
+@@ -135,7 +136,7 @@ SSHD_SESSION_OBJS=sshd-session.o auth-rh
+ 	auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
+ 	auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
+ 	auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o auth2-pubkeyfile.o \
+-	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
++	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o \
+ 	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+@@ -529,7 +530,7 @@ regress-prep:
+ 	    ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
+ 
+ REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
+-TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
++TESTLIBS=$(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
+ 
+ regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
+diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+--- a/monitor.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.861133305 +0200
++++ b/monitor.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.696939926 +0200
+@@ -143,6 +143,8 @@ int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *
  int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -2602,7 +2778,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
-@@ -220,11 +222,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
+@@ -219,11 +221,18 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
      {MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
@@ -2621,7 +2797,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
      {MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
  #endif
-@@ -293,6 +302,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -292,6 +301,10 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  	/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
@@ -2632,7 +2808,24 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
  	while (!authenticated) {
-@@ -406,6 +419,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -344,8 +357,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+ 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+ 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
+ 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+-			if (!partial && !authenticated)
++			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
++				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
++				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
++					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++#endif
+ 				authctxt->failures++;
++			}
+ 			if (authenticated || partial) {
+ 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+ 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+@@ -413,6 +433,10 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
@@ -2643,7 +2836,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
-@@ -1713,6 +1730,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
+@@ -1793,6 +1817,17 @@ monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh,
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
  # endif
@@ -2661,7 +2854,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
-@@ -1806,8 +1834,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1885,8 +1920,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh,
  	u_char *p;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2672,7 +2865,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "parse");
-@@ -1839,8 +1867,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1918,8 +1953,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
  	OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
  	int r;
  
@@ -2683,7 +2876,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
  		fatal_fr(r, "ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc");
-@@ -1860,6 +1888,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1939,6 +1974,7 @@ mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
  		monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
@@ -2691,7 +2884,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  	}
  	return (0);
  }
-@@ -1871,8 +1900,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1950,8 +1986,8 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
  	OM_uint32 ret;
  	int r;
  
@@ -2702,7 +2895,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
-@@ -1898,13 +1927,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1977,13 +2013,17 @@ mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh,
  int
  mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
@@ -2724,7 +2917,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	sshbuf_reset(m);
  	if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
-@@ -1913,7 +1946,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -1992,7 +2032,11 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
  	debug3_f("sending result %d", authenticated);
  	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
  
@@ -2737,7 +2930,7 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
  
  	if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
  		auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
-@@ -1921,5 +1958,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
+@@ -2000,5 +2044,84 @@ mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, in
  	/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2822,11 +3015,10 @@ index 2ce89fe9..ebf76c7f 100644
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
-diff --git a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
-index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
---- a/monitor.h
-+++ b/monitor.h
-@@ -63,6 +63,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
+diff --color -ruNp a/monitor.h b/monitor.h
+--- a/monitor.h	2024-09-16 11:45:56.861133305 +0200
++++ b/monitor.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.696939926 +0200
+@@ -67,6 +67,8 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
  	MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX = 110, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX = 111,
  	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT = 112, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND = 113,
  
@@ -2835,11 +3027,10 @@ index 683e5e07..2b1a2d59 100644
  };
  
  struct ssh;
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
-index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.c
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
-@@ -993,13 +993,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
+diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
+--- a/monitor_wrap.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.862133326 +0200
++++ b/monitor_wrap.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.697939947 +0200
+@@ -1075,13 +1075,15 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss
  }
  
  int
@@ -2856,7 +3047,7 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
  
  	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
  	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
-@@ -1012,4 +1014,57 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
+@@ -1094,6 +1096,59 @@ mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
  	debug3_f("user %sauthenticated", authenticated ? "" : "not ");
  	return (authenticated);
  }
@@ -2914,11 +3105,12 @@ index 001a8fa1..6edb509a 100644
 +}
 +
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
-diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
-index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
---- a/monitor_wrap.h
-+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
-@@ -64,8 +64,10 @@ int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
+ 
+ /*
+diff --color -ruNp a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
+--- a/monitor_wrap.h	2024-09-16 11:45:56.862133326 +0200
++++ b/monitor_wrap.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.697939947 +0200
+@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ void mm_decode_activate_server_options(s
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
  OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
     gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
@@ -2930,10 +3122,10 @@ index 23ab096a..485590c1 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
---- a/readconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.c	2021-08-27 12:25:42.556421509 +0200
-@@ -67,6 +67,7 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+--- a/readconf.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/readconf.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.699939990 +0200
+@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
  #include "uidswap.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
@@ -2941,7 +3133,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  
  /* Format of the configuration file:
  
-@@ -161,6 +162,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -164,6 +165,8 @@ typedef enum {
  	oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
  	oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
  	oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
@@ -2950,7 +3142,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
  	oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
  	oHashKnownHosts,
-@@ -206,10 +209,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -210,10 +213,22 @@ static struct {
  	/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
  #if defined(GSSAPI)
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
@@ -2973,7 +3165,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
  	{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
-@@ -1113,10 +1128,42 @@ parse_time:
+@@ -1227,10 +1242,42 @@ parse_time:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3016,7 +3208,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	case oBatchMode:
  		intptr = &options->batch_mode;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2306,7 +2353,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+@@ -2542,7 +2589,13 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
  	options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
  	options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication = -1;
@@ -3030,8 +3222,8 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
-@@ -2463,8 +2516,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 		options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+@@ -2705,8 +2758,18 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 		options->pubkey_authentication = SSH_PUBKEY_AUTH_ALL;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
 +	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
@@ -3049,7 +3241,7 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -3246,7 +3309,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
+@@ -3533,7 +3596,14 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const cha
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
@@ -3064,10 +3256,10 @@ diff -up a/readconf.c.gsskex b/readconf.c
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
-diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
---- a/readconf.h.gsskex	2021-08-27 12:05:29.248142431 +0200
-+++ b/readconf.h	2021-08-27 12:22:19.270679852 +0200
-@@ -39,7 +39,13 @@ typedef struct {
+diff --color -ruNp a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+--- a/readconf.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/readconf.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.699939990 +0200
+@@ -40,7 +40,13 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     pubkey_authentication;	/* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
  	int     hostbased_authentication;	/* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* Try GSS authentication */
@@ -3081,18 +3273,18 @@ diff -up a/readconf.h.gsskex b/readconf.h
  	int     password_authentication;	/* Try password
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
-diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
---- a/servconf.c.gsskex	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.c	2021-08-27 12:28:15.887735189 +0200
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/servconf.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.700940011 +0200
+@@ -68,6 +68,7 @@
  #include "auth.h"
  #include "myproposal.h"
  #include "digest.h"
 +#include "ssh-gss.h"
  
- static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-     const char *, int);
-@@ -136,8 +137,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ #if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
+ # define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE		"sshd"
+@@ -137,8 +138,11 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
@@ -3104,7 +3296,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
  	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
-@@ -356,10 +360,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+@@ -376,10 +380,18 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
@@ -3123,15 +3315,15 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -506,6 +518,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+@@ -558,6 +570,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
  	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
  	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
-@@ -587,12 +600,22 @@ static struct {
+@@ -643,12 +656,22 @@ static struct {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -3154,7 +3346,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
  	{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
-@@ -1576,6 +1599,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1585,6 +1608,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3165,7 +3357,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sGssCleanupCreds:
  		intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -1584,6 +1611,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+@@ -1593,6 +1620,22 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -3188,7 +3380,7 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  	case sPasswordAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2892,6 +2935,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -3178,6 +3221,10 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
@@ -3199,11 +3391,10 @@ diff -up a/servconf.c.gsskex b/servconf.c
  #endif
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -132,8 +132,11 @@ typedef struct {
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+--- a/servconf.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/servconf.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.700940011 +0200
+@@ -149,8 +149,11 @@ typedef struct {
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
@@ -3215,11 +3406,10 @@ index 4202a2d0..3f47ea25 100644
  	int     password_authentication;	/* If true, permit password
  						 * authentication. */
  	int     kbd_interactive_authentication;	/* If true, permit */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -2678,13 +2678,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c
+--- a/session.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.866133411 +0200
++++ b/session.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.701940032 +0200
+@@ -2674,13 +2674,19 @@ do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *au
  
  #ifdef KRB5
  	if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
@@ -3241,135 +3431,10 @@ index 8c0e54f7..06a33442 100644
  #endif
  
  	/* remove agent socket */
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 36180d07..70dd3665 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- /* $OpenBSD: ssh-gss.h,v 1.15 2021/01/27 10:05:28 djm Exp $ */
- /*
-- * Copyright (c) 2001-2003 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-+ * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
-  *
-  * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-  * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-@@ -61,10 +61,34 @@
- 
- #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
- 
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ			40
-+#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP				41
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID				"gss-group1-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID				"gss-group14-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID			"gss-group14-sha256-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID			"gss-group16-sha512-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID				"gss-gex-sha1-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID			"gss-nistp256-sha256-"
-+#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID			"gss-curve25519-sha256-"
-+
-+#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
-+	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
-+	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
-+
- typedef struct {
- 	char *filename;
- 	char *envvar;
- 	char *envval;
-+	struct passwd *owner;
- 	void *data;
- } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
- 
-@@ -72,8 +92,11 @@ typedef struct {
- 	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
- 	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
- 	gss_cred_id_t creds;
-+	gss_name_t name;
- 	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
- 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
-+	int used;
-+	int updated;
- } ssh_gssapi_client;
- 
- typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
-@@ -84,6 +107,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
- 	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
- typedef struct {
-@@ -94,10 +118,11 @@ typedef struct {
- 	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
- 	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
- 	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
--	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
-+	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
- } Gssctxt;
- 
- extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
-+extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
- 
- int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
-@@ -109,6 +134,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(OM_uint32 *, gss_OID, int *);
- 
- struct sshbuf;
- int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *);
- 
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
-@@ -123,17 +149,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
-     const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
--int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
-+OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
-+int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
- 
- /* In the server */
-+typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
-+    const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *);
-+char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
-+    const char *, const char *);
-+gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
-+int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
-+    const char *);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
--int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
-+int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
- void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
-+char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
-+
-+int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
-+void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
-+
- #endif /* GSSAPI */
- 
- #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -503,7 +503,13 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+--- a/ssh.1	2024-09-16 11:45:56.875133603 +0200
++++ b/ssh.1	2024-09-16 11:46:34.701940032 +0200
+@@ -536,7 +536,13 @@ For full details of the options listed b
  .It GatewayPorts
  .It GlobalKnownHostsFile
  .It GSSAPIAuthentication
@@ -3383,7 +3448,7 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
  .It HashKnownHosts
  .It Host
  .It HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
-@@ -579,6 +585,8 @@ flag),
+@@ -624,6 +630,8 @@ flag),
  (supported message integrity codes),
  .Ar kex
  (key exchange algorithms),
@@ -3391,12 +3456,11 @@ index 60de6087..db5c65bc 100644
 +(GSSAPI key exchange algorithms),
  .Ar key
  (key types),
- .Ar key-cert
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -747,6 +747,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ .Ar key-ca-sign
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+--- a/ssh.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.702940054 +0200
+@@ -827,6 +827,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
  			    strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
  				cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
@@ -3405,7 +3469,7 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
  				cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
  			else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
-@@ -772,8 +774,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -857,8 +859,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  			} else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
  				cp = xstrdup(
  				    "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
@@ -3416,10 +3480,9 @@ index 15aee569..110cf9c1 100644
  			}
  			if (cp == NULL)
  				fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
-diff --git a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
-index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
---- a/ssh_config
-+++ b/ssh_config
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config b/ssh_config
+--- a/ssh_config	2024-09-16 11:45:56.884133795 +0200
++++ b/ssh_config	2024-09-16 11:46:34.702940054 +0200
 @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
  #   HostbasedAuthentication no
  #   GSSAPIAuthentication no
@@ -3427,13 +3490,12 @@ index 5e8ef548..1ff999b6 100644
 +#   GSSAPIKeyExchange no
 +#   GSSAPITrustDNS no
  #   BatchMode no
- #   CheckHostIP yes
+ #   CheckHostIP no
  #   AddressFamily any
-diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
-index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
---- a/ssh_config.5
-+++ b/ssh_config.5
-@@ -766,10 +766,68 @@ The default is
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+--- a/ssh_config.5	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh_config.5	2024-09-16 11:46:34.703940075 +0200
+@@ -938,10 +938,68 @@ The default is
  Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
  The default is
  .Cm no .
@@ -3502,21 +3564,11 @@ index 06a32d31..3f490697 100644
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -80,8 +80,6 @@
- #endif
- 
- /* import */
--extern char *client_version_string;
--extern char *server_version_string;
- extern Options options;
- 
- /*
-@@ -163,6 +161,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 	char *s, *all_key;
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.703940075 +0200
+@@ -222,6 +222,11 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
  	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3527,9 +3579,9 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	xxx_host = host;
  	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
  	xxx_conn_info = cinfo;
-@@ -206,6 +209,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- 	}
+@@ -255,6 +260,42 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+ 	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -3567,10 +3619,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +	}
 +#endif
 +
- 	if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
- 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
- 		    options.rekey_interval);
-@@ -224,16 +256,46 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
+ 	free(hkalgs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+@@ -271,15 +312,45 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
  # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
  # endif
@@ -3588,7 +3640,8 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +# endif
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
  	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
-	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
+ 	ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
  	ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
  
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -3601,10 +3654,8 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +#endif
 +
  	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
+ 	kex_proposal_free_entries(myproposal);
  
- 	/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
- 	    compat_kex_proposal(ssh, options.kex_algorithms);
 +#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 +	/* repair myproposal after it was crumpled by the */
 +	/* ext-info removal above */
@@ -3615,10 +3666,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
 +		free(gss);
 +	}
 +#endif
- 	if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "kex_prop2buf");
- 
-@@ -330,6 +392,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
+@@ -368,6 +439,7 @@ static int input_gssapi_response(int typ
  static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
  static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -3626,7 +3677,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif
  
  void	userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
-@@ -346,6 +409,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
+@@ -384,6 +456,11 @@ static char *authmethods_get(void);
  
  Authmethod authmethods[] = {
  #ifdef GSSAPI
@@ -3638,7 +3689,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	{"gssapi-with-mic",
  		userauth_gssapi,
  		userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
-@@ -716,12 +784,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -755,12 +832,32 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  	OM_uint32 min;
  	int r, ok = 0;
  	gss_OID mech = NULL;
@@ -3672,7 +3723,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  
  	/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
  	while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
-@@ -730,13 +811,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -769,13 +866,15 @@ userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
  		    elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
  		/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
  		if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
@@ -3689,7 +3740,7 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  	if (!ok || mech == NULL)
  		return 0;
  
-@@ -976,6 +1059,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1009,6 +1108,55 @@ input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t p
  	free(lang);
  	return r;
  }
@@ -3745,22 +3796,10 @@ index af00fb30..03bc87eb 100644
  #endif /* GSSAPI */
  
  static int
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -817,8 +817,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	}
- 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
- 	if (nkeys == 0)
--		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
--	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-+		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
-+	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
- 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
- 	sshbuf_free(buf);
- }
-@@ -1852,7 +1852,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshd.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200
+@@ -1551,7 +1551,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		free(fp);
  	}
  	accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
@@ -3770,80 +3809,10 @@ index 60b2aaf7..d92f03aa 100644
  		logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
  		exit(1);
  	}
-@@ -2347,6 +2348,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
- 	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
- 
-+#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
-+	{
-+	char *orig;
-+	char *gss = NULL;
-+	char *newstr = NULL;
-+	orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
-+	 * the other key exchange algorithms
-+	 */
-+
-+	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
-+		orig = NULL;
-+
-+	if (options.gss_keyex)
-+		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+	else
-+		gss = NULL;
-+
-+	if (gss && orig)
-+		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+	else if (gss)
-+		newstr = gss;
-+	else if (orig)
-+		newstr = orig;
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
-+	 * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
-+	 * host key algorithm we support
-+	 */
-+	if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = "null";
-+
-+	if (newstr)
-+		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
-+	else
-+		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
-+	}
-+#endif
-+
- 	/* start key exchange */
- 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
- 		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
-@@ -2362,7 +2405,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
- # endif
--#endif
-+# ifdef GSSAPI
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
-+	}
-+# endif
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
- 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
- 	kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
-index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -69,6 +69,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+--- a/sshd_config	2024-09-16 11:45:56.888133880 +0200
++++ b/sshd_config	2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # GSSAPI options
  #GSSAPIAuthentication no
  #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
@@ -3852,11 +3821,10 @@ index 19b7c91a..2c48105f 100644
  
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -646,6 +646,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2024-09-16 11:45:56.885133816 +0200
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2024-09-16 11:46:34.704940096 +0200
+@@ -739,6 +739,11 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3868,7 +3836,7 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
  .It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
  Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
  a client authenticates against.
-@@ -660,6 +665,32 @@ machine's default store.
+@@ -753,6 +758,32 @@ machine's default store.
  This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -3901,32 +3869,328 @@ index 70ccea44..f6b41a2f 100644
  .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
  Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
  authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 57995ee6..fd5b7724 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -154,6 +154,7 @@ static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
- 	    KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
- # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-+	{ "null", "null", NULL, KEY_NULL, 0, 0, 0 },
- 	{ NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c	2024-09-16 11:45:56.888133880 +0200
++++ b/sshd-session.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.705940118 +0200
+@@ -660,8 +660,8 @@ notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("sent %u hostkeys", nkeys);
+ 	if (nkeys == 0)
+-		fatal_f("no hostkeys");
+-	if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
++		debug3_f("no hostkeys");
++	else if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ }
+@@ -1180,8 +1180,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (!have_key)
+-		fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys");
++	/* The GSSAPI key exchange can run without a host key */
++	if (!have_key && !options.gss_keyex)
++		fatal("internal error: monitor received no hostkeys and GSS KEX is not configured");
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
+ 	new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
+@@ -1462,6 +1463,48 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
+ 
++#if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
++	{
++	char *orig;
++	char *gss = NULL;
++	char *newstr = NULL;
++	orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++	/*
++	 * If we don't have a host key, then there's no point advertising
++	 * the other key exchange algorithms
++	 */
++
++	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
++		orig = NULL;
++
++	if (options.gss_keyex)
++		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++	else
++		gss = NULL;
++
++	if (gss && orig)
++		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++	else if (gss)
++		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
++	else if (orig)
++		newstr = orig;
++
++	/*
++	 * If we've got GSSAPI mechanisms, then we've got the 'null' host
++	 * key alg, but we can't tell people about it unless its the only
++	 * host key algorithm we support
++	 */
++	if (gss && (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) == 0)
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = xstrdup("null");
++
++	if (newstr)
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
++	else
++		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "kex_setup");
+@@ -1479,7 +1522,18 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+  #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
+  #endif
+-#endif
++# ifdef GSSAPI
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1] = kexgssgex_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++		kex->kex[KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256] = kexgss_server;
++	}
++# endif
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+ 	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
+  	kex->kex[KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+--- a/ssh-gss.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-gss.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.710940224 +0200
+@@ -61,10 +61,36 @@
+ 
+ #define SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE 0x06
+ 
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT                            30
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE                        31
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_COMPLETE                        32
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY                         33
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_ERROR                           34
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUPREQ			40
++#define SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_GROUP				41
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP1_SHA1_ID				"gss-group1-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID				"gss-group14-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID			"gss-group14-sha256-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID			"gss-group16-sha512-"
++#define KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID				"gss-gex-sha1-"
++#define KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID			"gss-nistp256-sha256-"
++#define KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID			"gss-curve25519-sha256-"
++
++#define        GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA256_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP16_SHA512_ID	"," \
++	KEX_GSS_NISTP256_SHA256_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_C25519_SHA256_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GRP14_SHA1_ID "," \
++	KEX_GSS_GEX_SHA1_ID
++
++#include "digest.h" /* SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH */
++
+ typedef struct {
+ 	char *filename;
+ 	char *envvar;
+ 	char *envval;
++	struct passwd *owner;
+ 	void *data;
+ } ssh_gssapi_ccache;
+ 
+@@ -72,8 +98,11 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	gss_buffer_desc displayname;
+ 	gss_buffer_desc exportedname;
+ 	gss_cred_id_t creds;
++	gss_name_t name;
+ 	struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct *mech;
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
++	int used;
++	int updated;
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+@@ -84,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+ 	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+ typedef struct {
+@@ -94,10 +124,21 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	gss_OID		oid; /* client */
+ 	gss_cred_id_t	creds; /* server */
+ 	gss_name_t	client; /* server */
+-	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* server */
++	gss_cred_id_t	client_creds; /* both */
++	struct sshbuf *shared_secret; /* both */
++	struct sshbuf *server_pubkey; /* server */
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob; /* client */
++	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob; /* client */
++	gss_buffer_desc msg_tok; /* client */
++	gss_buffer_desc buf; /* both */
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH]; /* both */
++	size_t hashlen; /* both */
++	int first; /* client */
++	BIGNUM *dh_client_pub; /* server (gex) */
+ } Gssctxt;
+ 
+ extern ssh_gssapi_mech *supported_mechs[];
++extern Gssctxt *gss_kex_context;
+ 
+ int  ssh_gssapi_check_oid(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_set_oid_data(Gssctxt *, void *, size_t);
+@@ -108,6 +149,7 @@ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_test_oid_supported(
+ 
+ struct sshbuf;
+ int ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(struct sshbuf *, gss_buffer_desc *);
++int ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(struct ssh *, gss_buffer_desc *);
+ 
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_import_name(Gssctxt *, const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(Gssctxt *, int,
+@@ -122,17 +164,33 @@ void ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(Gssctxt **);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_sign(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_buildmic(struct sshbuf *, const char *,
+     const char *, const char *, const struct sshbuf *);
+-int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *, const char *);
++OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_client_identity(Gssctxt *, const char *);
++int ssh_gssapi_credentials_updated(Gssctxt *);
+ 
+ /* In the server */
++typedef int ssh_gssapi_check_fn(Gssctxt **, gss_OID, const char *,
++    const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(const char *, const char *, const char *);
++char *ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set, ssh_gssapi_check_fn *, const char *,
++    const char *, const char *);
++gss_OID ssh_gssapi_id_kex(Gssctxt *, char *, int);
++int ssh_gssapi_server_check_mech(Gssctxt **,gss_OID, const char *,
++    const char *);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
+-int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
++int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct passwd *, int kex);
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+ void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
++char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_oid_table_ok(void);
++
++int ssh_gssapi_update_creds(ssh_gssapi_ccache *store);
++void ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void);
++
+ #endif /* GSSAPI */
+ 
+ #endif /* _SSH_GSS_H */
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+--- a/sshkey.c	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.c	2024-09-16 11:46:34.706940139 +0200
+@@ -131,6 +131,75 @@ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_x
+ extern const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_xmss_cert_impl;
+ #endif
+ 
++static int ssh_gss_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_serialize_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
++	enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_public(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_serialize_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     enum sshkey_serialize_rep)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_deserialize_private(const char *, struct sshbuf *,
++	     struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_copy_public(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static int ssh_gss_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
++	    const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int,
++	    struct sshkey_sig_details **)
++{
++	return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
++}
++
++static const struct sshkey_impl_funcs sshkey_gss_funcs = {
++	/* .size = */		NULL,
++	/* .alloc = */		NULL,
++	/* .cleanup = */	NULL,
++	/* .equal = */		ssh_gss_equal,
++	/* .ssh_serialize_public = */ ssh_gss_serialize_public,
++	/* .ssh_deserialize_public = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_public,
++	/* .ssh_serialize_private = */ ssh_gss_serialize_private,
++	/* .ssh_deserialize_private = */ ssh_gss_deserialize_private,
++	/* .generate = */	NULL,
++	/* .copy_public = */	ssh_gss_copy_public,
++	/* .sign = */		NULL,
++	/* .verify = */		ssh_gss_verify,
++};
++
++/* The struct is intentionally dummy and has no gss calls */
++static const struct sshkey_impl sshkey_gss_kex_impl = {
++	/* .name = */		"null",
++	/* .shortname = */	"null",
++	/* .sigalg = */		NULL,
++	/* .type = */		KEY_NULL,
++	/* .nid = */		0,
++	/* .cert = */		0,
++	/* .sigonly = */	0,
++	/* .keybits = */	0, /* FIXME */
++	/* .funcs = */		&sshkey_gss_funcs,
++};
++
+ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpls[] = {
+ 	&sshkey_ed25519_impl,
+ 	&sshkey_ed25519_cert_impl,
+@@ -169,6 +238,7 @@ const struct sshkey_impl * const keyimpl
+ 	&sshkey_xmss_impl,
+ 	&sshkey_xmss_cert_impl,
+ #endif
++	&sshkey_gss_kex_impl,
+ 	NULL
  };
  
-@@ -255,7 +256,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
- 	const struct keytype *kt;
+@@ -324,7 +394,7 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
  
- 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
--		if (kt->name == NULL)
-+		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 	for (i = 0; keyimpls[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+-		if (impl->name == NULL)
++		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
  			continue;
- 		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
  			continue;
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 71a3fddc..37a43a67 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+--- a/sshkey.h	2024-07-01 06:36:28.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.h	2024-09-16 11:46:34.706940139 +0200
+@@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ enum sshkey_types {
  	KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK,
  	KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..b1b0d04
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 26f366e263e575c4e1a18e2e64ba418f58878b37 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daan De Meyer <daan.j.demeyer@gmail.com>
+Date: Mon, 20 Mar 2023 20:22:14 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] Only set PAM_RHOST if the remote host is not "UNKNOWN"
+
+When using sshd's -i option with stdio that is not a AF_INET/AF_INET6
+socket, auth_get_canonical_hostname() returns "UNKNOWN" which is then
+set as the value of PAM_RHOST, causing pam to try to do a reverse DNS
+query of "UNKNOWN", which times out multiple times, causing a
+substantial slowdown when logging in.
+
+To fix this, let's only set PAM_RHOST if the hostname is not "UNKNOWN".
+---
+ auth-pam.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
+index e143304e3..39b4e4563 100644
+--- a/auth-pam.c
++++ b/auth-pam.c
+@@ -735,7 +735,7 @@ sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 		sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
+ 		    ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+ 	}
+-	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
++	if (sshpam_rhost != NULL && strcmp(sshpam_rhost, "UNKNOWN") != 0) {
+ 		debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
+ 		sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
+ 		    sshpam_rhost);
+-- 
+2.44.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.8p1-upstream-cve-2024-6387.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.8p1-upstream-cve-2024-6387.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index fffd50a..0000000
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.8p1-upstream-cve-2024-6387.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx openssh-8.7p1/log.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/log.c.xxx	2024-06-28 11:02:43.949912398 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/log.c	2024-06-28 11:02:58.652297885 +0200
-@@ -455,12 +455,14 @@ void
- sshsigdie(const char *file, const char *func, int line, int showfunc,
-     LogLevel level, const char *suffix, const char *fmt, ...)
- {
-+#if 0
- 	va_list args;
- 
- 	va_start(args, fmt);
- 	sshlogv(file, func, line, showfunc, SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL,
- 	    suffix, fmt, args);
- 	va_end(args);
-+#endif
- 	_exit(1);
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.xxx openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.xxx	2024-07-01 10:33:04.332907749 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2024-07-01 10:33:47.843998038 +0200
-@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
- 
- 	/* Log error and exit. */
- 	if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid <= 0)
--		cleanup_exit(255); /* don't log in privsep child */
-+		_exit(255); /* don't log in privsep child */
- 	else {
- 		sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
- 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-bad-hostkey.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-bad-hostkey.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d4f11f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-bad-hostkey.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
+--- a/hostfile.c	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/hostfile.c	2025-04-30 15:52:02.792091018 +0200
+@@ -63,6 +63,14 @@
+ #include "hmac.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ 
++static int required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
++
++void
++hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int size)
++{
++	required_rsa_size = size;
++}
++
+ /* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
+ 
+ static int
+@@ -233,6 +241,7 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_li
+ 	struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
+ 	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
+ 	struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
++	int r = 0;
+ 
+ 	if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
+ 		/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
+@@ -241,6 +250,12 @@ record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_li
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(l->key, required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		debug2_f("%s:%ld: ignoring hostkey: %s",
++		    l->path, l->linenum, ssh_err(r));
++		return 0;
++	}
++
+ 	debug3_f("found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu",
+ 	    l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
+ 	    (l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
+diff --color -ruNp a/hostfile.h b/hostfile.h
+--- a/hostfile.h	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/hostfile.h	2025-04-30 15:17:44.789206468 +0200
+@@ -119,5 +119,6 @@ int hostkeys_foreach_file(const char *pa
+     const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options, u_int note);
+ 
+ void hostfile_create_user_ssh_dir(const char *, int);
++void hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(int);
+ 
+ #endif
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+--- a/ssh.c	2025-04-29 15:40:27.916735894 +0200
++++ b/ssh.c	2025-04-30 15:19:48.856855308 +0200
+@@ -109,6 +109,7 @@
+ #include "ssherr.h"
+ #include "myproposal.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
++#include "hostfile.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
+@@ -1395,6 +1396,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ 		}
+ 	}
++	hostfile_set_minimum_rsa_size(options.required_rsa_size);
+ 	if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
+ 		fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
+ 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1adf688
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/auth.c b/auth.c
+--- a/auth.c	2025-10-29 09:57:20.440640281 +0100
++++ b/auth.c	2025-10-29 09:57:54.747956792 +0100
+@@ -476,8 +476,12 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 	u_int i;
+ 
+ 	ci = server_get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
+-	ci->user = user;
+-	ci->user_invalid = getpwnam(user) == NULL;
++	pw = getpwnam(user);
++	if (pw != NULL && options.canonical_match_user)
++		ci->user = pw->pw_name;
++	else
++		ci->user = user;
++	ci->user_invalid = pw == NULL;
+ 	parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
+ 	log_change_level(options.log_level);
+ 	log_verbose_reset();
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c	2025-10-29 09:57:20.502465586 +0100
++++ b/servconf.c	2025-10-29 09:57:54.748205464 +0100
+@@ -225,6 +225,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+ 	options->unused_connection_timeout = -1;
+ 	options->sshd_session_path = NULL;
+ 	options->refuse_connection = -1;
++	options->canonical_match_user = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+@@ -526,6 +527,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
+ 		options->sshd_session_path = xstrdup(_PATH_SSHD_SESSION);
+ 	if (options->refuse_connection == -1)
+ 		options->refuse_connection = 0;
++	if (options->canonical_match_user == -1)
++		options->canonical_match_user = 0;
+ 
+ 	assemble_algorithms(options);
+ 
+@@ -609,7 +612,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
+ 	sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
+ 	sRequiredRSASize, sChannelTimeout, sUnusedConnectionTimeout,
+-	sSshdSessionPath, sRefuseConnection,
++	sSshdSessionPath, sRefuseConnection, sCanonicalMatchUser,
+ 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -798,6 +801,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "refuseconnection", sRefuseConnection, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "canonicalmatchuser", sCanonicalMatchUser, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -2807,6 +2811,11 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
+ 		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ 		goto parse_multistate;
+ 
++	case sCanonicalMatchUser:
++		intptr = &options->canonical_match_user;
++		multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
++		goto parse_multistate;
++
+ 	case sDeprecated:
+ 	case sIgnore:
+ 	case sUnsupported:
+@@ -3028,6 +3037,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(unused_connection_timeout);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(refuse_connection);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(canonical_match_user);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
+@@ -3368,6 +3378,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sRefuseConnection, o->refuse_connection);
++	dump_cfg_fmtint(sCanonicalMatchUser, o->canonical_match_user);
+ 
+ 	/* string arguments */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
+diff --color -ruNp a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+--- a/servconf.h	2025-10-29 09:57:20.503199202 +0100
++++ b/servconf.h	2025-10-29 09:57:54.749236422 +0100
+@@ -261,6 +261,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   *sshd_session_path;
+ 
+ 	int	refuse_connection;
++
++	int	canonical_match_user;
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2025-10-29 09:57:20.503465608 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2025-10-29 09:57:54.749544972 +0100
+@@ -1384,6 +1384,7 @@ Available keywords are
+ .Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
+ .Cm PubkeyAuthOptions ,
+ .Cm RefuseConnection ,
++.Cm CanonicalMatchUser ,
+ .Cm RekeyLimit ,
+ .Cm RevokedKeys ,
+ .Cm RDomain ,
+@@ -1828,6 +1829,13 @@ are enabled.
+ This option is only really useful in a
+ .Cm Match
+ block.
++.It Cm CanonicalMatchUser
++Some password databases allow users to define aliases for their username.
++This directive indicates that
++.Xr sshd 8
++should attempt to first obtain a canonical username from a password database before evaluating a
++.Cm Match User
++conditional block.
+ .It Cm RekeyLimit
+ Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted or received
+ before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed by a maximum
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compat-mlkem.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compat-mlkem.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..bc2393c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compat-mlkem.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,101 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/compat.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/compat.c.xxx	2026-02-25 12:58:14.083760269 +0100
++++ openssh-9.9p1/compat.c	2026-02-25 13:28:21.154300255 +0100
+@@ -36,6 +36,9 @@
+ #include "compat.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ /* determine bug flags from SSH protocol banner */
+ void
+@@ -143,13 +145,40 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * 0 - unavailable
++ * 1 - available in non-FIPS mode
++ * 2 - available always
++ */
++static int is_mlkem768_available()
++{
++	static int is_fetched = -1;
++
++	if (is_fetched == -1) {
++		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = NULL;
++
++		ERR_set_mark();
++		mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		is_fetched = (mlkem768 == NULL) ? 0 : 2;
++		if (is_fetched == 0 && FIPS_mode() == 1) {
++		    mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", "provider=default,-fips");
++		    is_fetched = (mlkem768 == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
++		}
++ 		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
++		ERR_pop_to_mark();
++ 	}
++
++	return is_fetched;
++}
++
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+ char *
+ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *p)
+ {
+ 	char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
++	int ml_kem_available = is_mlkem768_available();
+ 
+-	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
++	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0 && is_mlkem768_available() == 2)
+ 		return xstrdup(p);
+ 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+@@ -164,6 +199,25 @@ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 		free(cp);
+ 		cp = cp2;
+ 	}
++	if (ml_kem_available == 2)
++		return cp ? cp : xstrdup(p);
++	if (ml_kem_available == 1 && FIPS_mode()) {
++		if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
++		    "mlkem768x25519-sha256")) == NULL)
++			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
++		free(cp);
++		cp = cp2;
++	}
++	if (ml_kem_available == 0) {
++		if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
++		    "mlkem768x25519-sha256,"
++		    "mlkem768nistp256-sha256,"
++		    "mlkem1024nistp384-sha384")) == NULL)
++			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
++		free(cp);
++		cp = cp2;
++	}
++
+ 	if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
+ 	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c.xxx	2026-02-25 14:52:59.802597974 +0100
++++ openssh-9.9p1/kex-names.c	2026-02-25 15:31:13.376020525 +0100
+@@ -291,8 +291,14 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			if (FIPS_mode())
+-				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode()) {
++				if ((strcmp(p, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0)) {
++					debug("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++					continue;
++				}
++				else
++					error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			}
+ 			else
+ 				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compression-directive.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compression-directive.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..96d44e1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-compression-directive.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 9f559269..777739d6 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -3410,6 +3410,8 @@ fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val)
+ 	switch (code) {
+ 	case oAddressFamily:
+ 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
++	case oCompression:
++		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
+ 	case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
+ 	case oUpdateHostkeys:
+ 		return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..45a021e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/session.c b/session.c
+--- a/session.c	2025-04-29 11:20:59.475107377 +0200
++++ b/session.c	2025-04-29 11:23:16.638538968 +0200
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,8 @@ session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
+ 	if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
+-	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
++	    !options.allow_agent_forwarding ||
++	    options.disable_forwarding) {
+ 		debug_f("agent forwarding disabled");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -2709,7 +2710,7 @@ session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Se
+ 		ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-	if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
++	if (!options.x11_forwarding || options.disable_forwarding) {
+ 		debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c94e34c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/gss-genr.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1-build/openssh-9.9p1/gss-genr.c
+--- a/gss-genr.c.xxx	2025-09-01 17:15:41.070677784 +0200
++++ b/gss-genr.c	2025-09-01 17:31:20.376362078 +0200
+@@ -149,19 +149,29 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 	for (i = 0; i < gss_supported->count; i++) {
+ 		if (gss_supported->elements[i].length < 128 &&
+ 		    (*check)(NULL, &(gss_supported->elements[i]), host, client)) {
++			EVP_MD_CTX * ctx = NULL;
++			EVP_MD *md5 = NULL; /* Here we don't use MD5 for crypto purposes */
++			unsigned int md_size = sizeof(digest);
+ 
+ 			deroid[0] = SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE;
+ 			deroid[1] = gss_supported->elements[i].length;
+-
+-			if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)) == NULL ||
+-			    (r = ssh_digest_update(md, deroid, 2)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = ssh_digest_update(md,
+-			        gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
+-			        gss_supported->elements[i].length)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = ssh_digest_final(md, digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
++			if ((md5 = EVP_MD_fetch(NULL, "MD5", "provider=default,-fips")) == NULL)
++				fatal_fr(r, "MD5 fetch failed");
++			if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++				EVP_MD_free(md5);
++				fatal_fr(r, "digest ctx failed");
++			}
++			if (EVP_DigestInit(ctx, md5) <= 0
++			    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, deroid, 2) <= 0
++			    || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, gss_supported->elements[i].elements,
++				    gss_supported->elements[i].length) <= 0
++			    || EVP_DigestFinal(ctx, digest, &md_size) <= 0) {
++				EVP_MD_free(md5);
++				EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "digest failed");
+-			ssh_digest_free(md);
+-			md = NULL;
++			}
++			EVP_MD_free(md5); md5 = NULL;
++			EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); ctx = NULL;
+ 
+ 			encoded = xmalloc(ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5)
+ 			    * 2);
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73ea964
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,471 @@
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index afdf5142..1b4b55c5 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -107,6 +107,27 @@ rtrim(char *s)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * returns pointer to character after 'prefix' in 's' or otherwise NULL
++ * if the prefix is not present.
++ */
++const char *
++strprefix(const char *s, const char *prefix, int ignorecase)
++{
++	size_t prefixlen;
++
++	if ((prefixlen = strlen(prefix)) == 0)
++		return s;
++	if (ignorecase) {
++		if (strncasecmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0)
++			return NULL;
++	} else {
++		if (strncmp(s, prefix, prefixlen) != 0)
++			return NULL;
++	}
++	return s + prefixlen;
++}
++
+ /* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
+ int
+ set_nonblock(int fd)
+diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
+index 11340389..efecdf1a 100644
+--- a/misc.h
++++ b/misc.h
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ struct ForwardOptions {
+ char	*chop(char *);
+ void	 rtrim(char *);
+ void	skip_space(char **);
++const char *strprefix(const char *, const char *, int);
+ char	*strdelim(char **);
+ char	*strdelimw(char **);
+ int	 set_nonblock(int);
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 3d9cc6db..9f559269 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -710,7 +710,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+     struct passwd *pw, const char *host_arg, const char *original_host,
+     int final_pass, int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum)
+ {
+-	char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *host, *criteria;
++	char *arg, *oattrib = NULL, *attrib = NULL, *cmd, *host, *criteria;
+ 	const char *ruser;
+ 	int r, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
+ 
+@@ -731,7 +731,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 
+ 	debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
+ 	    full_line, host, original_host);
+-	while ((oattrib = attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
++	while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
++		attrib = oattrib = xstrdup(attrib);
+ 		/* Terminate on comment */
+ 		if (*attrib == '#') {
+ 			argv_consume(acp);
+@@ -777,9 +778,23 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 			    this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++
++		/* Keep this list in sync with below */
++		if (strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1)  != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "originalhost=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "localuser=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "localnetwork=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "tagged=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "exec=", 1) != NULL) {
++			arg = strchr(attrib, '=');
++			*(arg++) = '\0';
++		} else {
++			arg = argv_next(acp, avp);
++		}
++
+ 		/* All other criteria require an argument */
+-		if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL ||
+-		    *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
++		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
+ 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+ 			result = -1;
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -856,6 +871,8 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 		    criteria == NULL ? "" : criteria,
+ 		    criteria == NULL ? "" : "\"");
+ 		free(criteria);
++		free(oattrib);
++		oattrib = attrib = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 	if (attributes == 0) {
+ 		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+@@ -865,6 +882,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+  out:
+ 	if (result != -1)
+ 		debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
++	free(oattrib);
+ 	free(host);
+ 	return result;
+ }
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 89b8413e..dd774f46 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.418 2024/09/15 03:09:44 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.419 2024/09/25 01:24:04 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
+  *                    All rights reserved
+@@ -1033,7 +1033,7 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+     int line, struct connection_info *ci)
+ {
+ 	int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
+-	char *arg, *attrib;
++	char *arg, *attrib = NULL, *oattrib;
+ 
+ 	if (ci == NULL)
+ 		debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", full_line);
+@@ -1047,7 +1047,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 		    ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
+ 	}
+ 
+-	while ((attrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
++	while ((oattrib = argv_next(acp, avp)) != NULL) {
++		attrib = xstrdup(oattrib);
+ 		/* Terminate on comment */
+ 		if (*attrib == '#') {
+ 			argv_consume(acp); /* mark all arguments consumed */
+@@ -1062,16 +1063,20 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 			    *arg != '\0' && *arg != '#')) {
+ 				error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
+ 				    "Match attributes");
+-				return -1;
++				result = -1;
++				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			if (arg != NULL && *arg == '#')
+ 				argv_consume(acp); /* consume remaining args */
+-			return 1;
++			result = 1;
++			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		/* Criterion "invalid-user" also has no argument */
+ 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "invalid-user") == 0) {
+-			if (ci == NULL)
++			if (ci == NULL) {
++				result = 0;
+ 				continue;
++			}
+ 			if (ci->user_invalid == 0)
+ 				result = 0;
+ 			else
+@@ -1078,11 +1081,26 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 				debug("matched invalid-user at line %d", line);
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
++
++		/* Keep this list in sync with below */
++		if (strprefix(attrib, "user=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "group=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "host=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "address=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "localaddress=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "localport=", 1) != NULL ||
++		    strprefix(attrib, "rdomain=", 1) != NULL) {
++			arg = strchr(attrib, '=');
++			*(arg++) = '\0';
++		} else {
++			arg = argv_next(acp, avp);
++		}
++
+ 		/* All other criteria require an argument */
+-		if ((arg = argv_next(acp, avp)) == NULL ||
+-		    *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
++		if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0' || *arg == '#') {
+ 			error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
+-			return -1;
++			result = -1;
++			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
+ 			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
+@@ -1105,7 +1123,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 				match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user");
+ 			switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
+ 			case -1:
+-				return -1;
++				result = -1;
++				goto out;
+ 			case 0:
+ 				result = 0;
+ 			}
+@@ -1141,7 +1160,8 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 				result = 0;
+ 				break;
+ 			case -2:
+-				return -1;
++				result = -1;
++				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
+ 			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
+@@ -1166,13 +1186,15 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 				result = 0;
+ 				break;
+ 			case -2:
+-				return -1;
++				result = -1;
++				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
+ 			if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
+ 				error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
+ 				    arg);
+-				return -1;
++				result = -1;
++				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
+ 				result = 0;
+@@ -1200,16 +1222,21 @@ match_cfg_line(const char *full_line, int *acp, char ***avp,
+ 				debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at "
+ 				    "line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line);
+ 		} else {
+-			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
+-			return -1;
++			error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", oattrib);
++			result = -1;
++			goto out;
+ 		}
++		free(attrib);
++		attrib = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 	if (attributes == 0) {
+ 		error("One or more attributes required for Match");
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+-	if (ci != NULL)
++ out:
++	if (ci != NULL && result != -1)
+ 		debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
++	free(attrib);
+ 	return result;
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/regress/cfginclude.sh b/regress/cfginclude.sh
+index d442cdd6..97fd816f 100644
+--- a/regress/cfginclude.sh
++++ b/regress/cfginclude.sh
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $
++#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
+ #	Placed in the Public Domain.
+ 
+ tid="config include"
+@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i << _EOF
+ Match host a
+ 	Hostname aa
+ 
+-Match host b # comment
++Match host=b # comment
+ 	Hostname bb
+ 	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+ 
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ Match host c
+ 	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.*
+ 	Hostname cc
+ 
+-Match host m
++Match host=m !user xxxyfake
+ 	Include $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* # comment
+ 
+ Host d
+@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ Match host xxxxxx
+ _EOF
+ 
+ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.1 << _EOF
+-Match host a
++Match host=a
+ 	Hostname aaa
+ 
+ Match host b
+@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ cat > $OBJ/ssh_config.i.2 << _EOF
+ Match host a
+ 	Hostname aaaa
+ 
+-Match host b
++Match host=b !user blahblahfake
+ 	Hostname bbbb
+ 
+-Match host c
++Match host=c
+ 	Hostname cccc
+ 
+ Host d
+@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ trial a aa
+ 
+ # cleanup
+ rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.i $OBJ/ssh_config.i.* $OBJ/ssh_config.out
+-#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.4 2024/09/03 05:58:56 djm Exp $
++#	$OpenBSD: cfginclude.sh,v 1.5 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
+ #	Placed in the Public Domain.
+ 
+ tid="config include"
+diff --git a/regress/cfgmatch.sh b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
+index 05a66685..2737a5f9 100644
+--- a/regress/cfgmatch.sh
++++ b/regress/cfgmatch.sh
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.13 2021/06/08 06:52:43 djm Exp $
++#	$OpenBSD: cfgmatch.sh,v 1.14 2024/09/27 01:05:54 djm Exp $
+ #	Placed in the Public Domain.
+ 
+ tid="sshd_config match"
+@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ start_client()
+ 			kill $client_pid
+ 			fatal "timeout waiting for background ssh"
+ 		fi
+-	done	
++	done
+ }
+ 
+ stop_client()
+@@ -119,40 +119,42 @@ stop_client
+ # requires knowledge of actual group memberships user running the test).
+ params="user:user:u1 host:host:h1 address:addr:1.2.3.4 \
+     localaddress:laddr:5.6.7.8 rdomain:rdomain:rdom1"
+-cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
+-echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
+-for i in $params; do
+-	config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
+-	criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+-	value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+-	cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
+-	    Match $config $value
+-	      Banner /$value
++for separator in " " "=" ; do
++	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_config
++	echo 'Banner /nomatch' >>$OBJ/sshd_config
++	for i in $params; do
++		config=`echo $i | cut -f1 -d:`
++		criteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
++		value=`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
++		cat >>$OBJ/sshd_config <<EOD
++		    Match ${config}${separator}${value}
++		      Banner /$value
+ EOD
+-done
++	done
+ 
+-${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
+-    fail "validate config for w/out spec"
+-
+-# Test matching each criteria.
+-for i in $params; do
+-	testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
+-	expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
+-	spec=""
+-	for j in $params; do
+-		config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
+-		criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
+-		value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
+-		if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
+-			spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
+-		else
+-			spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
++	${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T >/dev/null || \
++	    fail "validate config for w/out spec"
++
++	# Test matching each criteria.
++	for i in $params; do
++		testcriteria=`echo $i | cut -f2 -d:`
++		expected=/`echo $i | cut -f3 -d:`
++		spec=""
++		for j in $params; do
++			config=`echo $j | cut -f1 -d:`
++			criteria=`echo $j | cut -f2 -d:`
++			value=`echo $j | cut -f3 -d:`
++			if [ "$criteria" = "$testcriteria" ]; then
++				spec="$criteria=$value,$spec"
++			else
++				spec="$criteria=1$value,$spec"
++			fi
++		done
++		trace "test spec $spec"
++		result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
++		    awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
++		if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
++			fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
+ 		fi
+ 	done
+-	trace "test spec $spec"
+-	result=`${SUDO} ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config -T -C "$spec" | \
+-	    awk '$1=="banner"{print $2}'`
+-	if [ "$result" != "$expected" ]; then
+-		fail "match $config expected $expected got $result"
+-	fi
+ done
+diff --git a/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
+index 518a703d..f67c3caa 100644
+--- a/regress/servcfginclude.sh
++++ b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
+@@ -4,14 +4,14 @@ tid="server config include"
+ 
+ cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+ HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+-Match host a
++Match host=a
+ 	Banner /aa
+ 
+ Match host b
+ 	Banner /bb
+ 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
+ 
+-Match host c
++Match host=c
+ 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* # comment
+ 	Banner /cc
+ 
+@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ Match Host e
+ 	Banner /ee
+ 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+ 
+-Match Host f
++Match Host=f
+ 	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+ 	Banner /ff
+ 
+@@ -47,13 +47,13 @@ Match host b
+ Match host c
+ 	Banner /ccc
+ 
+-Match Host d
++Match Host=d
+ 	Banner /ddd
+ 
+ Match Host e
+ 	Banner /eee
+ 
+-Match Host f
++Match Host=f
+ 	Banner /fff
+ _EOF
+ 
+@@ -61,13 +61,13 @@ cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+ Match host a
+ 	Banner /aaaa
+ 
+-Match host b
++Match host=b
+ 	Banner /bbbb
+ 
+ Match host c # comment
+ 	Banner /cccc
+ 
+-Match Host d
++Match Host=d
+ 	Banner /dddd
+ 
+ Match Host e
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa0c26c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
+diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+index 679446e9..2b5d3960 100644
+--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: kexmlkem768x25519.c,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:59 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * Copyright (c) 2023 Markus Friedl.  All rights reserved.
+  *
+@@ -34,6 +34,9 @@
+ #include <stdbool.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
++# include <endian.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+diff --git a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
+index a82d60e8..b8ac1436 100644
+--- a/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
++++ b/libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h
+@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
+-/*  $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.1 2024/09/02 12:13:56 djm Exp $ */
++/*  $OpenBSD: libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h,v 1.2 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $ */
++
+ /* Extracted from libcrux revision 84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35 */
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -160,18 +161,19 @@ static inline void Eurydice_slice_to_array3(uint8_t *dst_tag, char *dst_ok,
+ // CORE STUFF (conversions, endianness, ...)
+ 
+ static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes(uint64_t v, uint8_t buf[8]) {
++  v = htole64(v);
+   memcpy(buf, &v, sizeof(v));
+ }
+ static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[8]) {
+   uint64_t v;
+   memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v));
+-  return v;
++  return le64toh(v);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes(uint8_t buf[4]) {
+   uint32_t v;
+   memcpy(&v, buf, sizeof(v));
+-  return v;
++  return le32toh(v);
+ }
+ 
+ static inline uint32_t core_num__u8_6__count_ones(uint8_t x0) {
+diff --git a/mlkem768.sh b/mlkem768.sh
+index 2fdc2831..3d12b2ed 100644
+--- a/mlkem768.sh
++++ b/mlkem768.sh
+@@ -1,9 +1,10 @@
+ #!/bin/sh
+-#       $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.2 2024/09/04 05:11:33 djm Exp $
++#       $OpenBSD: mlkem768.sh,v 1.3 2024/10/27 02:06:01 djm Exp $
+ #       Placed in the Public Domain.
+ #
+ 
+-WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main"
++#WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="origin/main"
++WANT_LIBCRUX_REVISION="84c5d87b3092c59294345aa269ceefe0eb97cc35"
+ 
+ FILES="
+ 	libcrux/libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h
+@@ -47,6 +48,7 @@ echo '#define KRML_NOINLINE __attribute__((noinline, unused))'
+ echo '#define KRML_HOST_EPRINTF(...)'
+ echo '#define KRML_HOST_EXIT(x) fatal_f("internal error")'
+ echo
++
+ for i in $FILES; do
+ 	echo "/* from $i */"
+ 	# Changes to all files:
+@@ -56,11 +58,16 @@ for i in $FILES; do
+ 	    -e 's/[	 ]*$//' \
+ 	    $i | \
+ 	case "$i" in
+-	# XXX per-file handling goes here.
++	*/libcrux-ml-kem/cg/eurydice_glue.h)
++		# Replace endian functions with versions that work.
++		perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline void core_num__u64_9__to_le_bytes.*\n)([^}]*\n)/\1  v = htole64(v);\n\2/' |
++		perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint64_t core_num__u64_9__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le64toh(v);/s' |
++		perl -0777 -pe 's/(static inline uint32_t core_num__u32_8__from_le_bytes.*?)return v;/\1return le32toh(v);/s'
++		;;
+ 	# Default: pass through.
+ 	*)
+-	    cat
+-	    ;;
++		cat
++		;;
+ 	esac
+ 	echo
+ done
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-non-supported-keys-err-msg.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-non-supported-keys-err-msg.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e2adce4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-non-supported-keys-err-msg.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+--- a/sshkey.c	2025-04-29 11:20:59.484832762 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.c	2025-04-29 11:28:32.349323029 +0200
+@@ -3599,6 +3599,8 @@ translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long
+ 		}
+ 	case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++	case ERR_LIB_OSSL_DECODER:
++		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 	}
+ 	return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ }
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e39bb67
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+diff --git a/kex-names.c b/kex-names.c
+index ec840c1f..c0d3be11 100644
+--- a/kex-names.c
++++ b/kex-names.c
+@@ -90,6 +90,19 @@ static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
+ 	{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
+ };
+ 
++static int is_mlkem768_available()
++{
++	static int is_fetched = -1;
++
++	if (is_fetched == -1) {
++		EVP_KEM *mlkem768 = EVP_KEM_fetch(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++		is_fetched = mlkem768 != NULL ? 1 : 0;
++		EVP_KEM_free(mlkem768);
++	}
++
++	return is_fetched;
++}
++
+ static char *
+ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ {
+@@ -98,6 +111,9 @@ kex_alg_list_internal(char sep, const struct kexalg *algs)
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
+ 	for (k = algs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
++		if (strcmp(k->name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++			&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++			continue;
+ 		if (ret != NULL)
+ 			ret[rlen++] = sep;
+ 		nlen = strlen(k->name);
+@@ -117,6 +133,10 @@ kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
+ {
+ 	const struct kexalg *k;
+ 
++	if (strcmp(name, KEX_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256) == 0
++		&& !is_mlkem768_available())
++	return NULL;
++
+ 	for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
+ 		if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
+ 			return k;
+diff --git a/kexmlkem768x25519.c b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+index 2b5d3960..670049dc 100644
+--- a/kexmlkem768x25519.c
++++ b/kexmlkem768x25519.c
+@@ -48,10 +48,127 @@
+ #ifdef USE_MLKEM768X25519
+ 
+ #include "libcrux_mlkem768_sha3.h"
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++
++static int
++mlkem768_keypair_gen(unsigned char *pubkeybuf, unsigned char *privkeybuf)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t pubkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES, privkey_size = crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES;
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &pkey) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(pkey, pubkeybuf, &pubkey_size) <= 0
++	|| EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(pkey, privkeybuf, &privkey_size) <= 0) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++
++    if (privkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES
++	    || pubkey_size != crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES) {
++	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++        goto err;
++    }
++    ret = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (ret == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++    return ret;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_encap_secret(const u_char *pubkeybuf, u_char *secret, u_char *out)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t outlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    pubkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, out, &outlen, secret, &secretlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES
++	|| outlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
++
++static int
++mlkem768_decap_secret(const u_char *privkeybuf, const u_char *wrapped, u_char *secret)
++{
++    EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++    int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++    size_t wrappedlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES,
++	   secretlen = crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES;
++
++    pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, "mlkem768", NULL,
++		    privkeybuf, crypto_kem_mlkem768_SECRETKEYBYTES);
++    if (pkey == NULL) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++
++    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL);
++    if (ctx == NULL
++	|| EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL) <= 0
++        || EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secretlen, wrapped, wrappedlen) <= 0
++	|| secretlen != crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES) {
++	r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++	goto err;
++    }
++    r = 0;
++
++ err:
++    EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++    EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++
++    if (r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR)
++	   ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++
++    return r;
++}
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char rnd[LIBCRUX_ML_KEM_KEY_PAIR_PRNG_LEN], *cp = NULL;
+ 	size_t need;
+@@ -86,6 +203,36 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ 	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	u_char *cp = NULL;
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, need, &cp)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = mlkem768_keypair_gen(cp, kex->mlkem768_client_key)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", cp,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++#endif
++	cp += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	kexc25519_keygen(kex->c25519_client_key, cp);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key c25519:", cp, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	kex->client_pub = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -93,6 +240,7 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+    const struct sshbuf *client_blob, struct sshbuf **server_blobp,
+    struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	const u_char *client_pub;
+@@ -185,12 +333,97 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(struct kex *kex,
+ 	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *client_pub;
++	u_char server_pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], server_key[CURVE25519_SIZE];
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	size_t need;
++	int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
++	struct libcrux_mlkem768_enc_result enc; /* FIXME */
++
++	*server_blobp = NULL;
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	/* client_blob contains both KEM and ECDH client pubkeys */
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(client_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	client_pub = sshbuf_ptr(client_blob);
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client public key mlkem768:", client_pub,
++	    crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES);
++	dump_digest("client public key 25519:",
++	    client_pub + crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
++	    CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++
++	/* allocate buffer for concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	/* the buffer will be hashed and the result is the shared secret */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* allocate space for encrypted KEM key and ECDH pub key */
++	if ((server_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (mlkem768_encap_secret(client_pub, enc.snd, enc.fst.value) != 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	/* generate ECDH key pair, store server pubkey after ciphertext */
++	kexc25519_keygen(server_key, server_pub);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value))) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put(server_blob, server_pub, sizeof(server_pub))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	/* append ECDH shared key */
++	client_pub += crypto_kem_mlkem768_PUBLICKEYBYTES;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(server_key, client_pub, buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server public key 25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:",
++	    enc.fst.value, sizeof(enc.fst.value));
++	dump_digest("server kem key:", enc.snd, sizeof(enc.snd));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* string-encoded hash is resulting shared secret */
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*server_blobp = server_blob;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	server_blob = NULL;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(server_key, sizeof(server_key));
++	explicit_bzero(&enc, sizeof(enc));
++	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+     const struct sshbuf *server_blob, struct sshbuf **shared_secretp)
+ {
++#if 0
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	u_char mlkem_key[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
+ 	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
+@@ -258,6 +491,64 @@ kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(struct kex *kex,
+ 	explicit_bzero(mlkem_key, sizeof(mlkem_key));
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
++#else
++	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
++	const u_char *ciphertext, *server_pub;
++	u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
++	u_char decap[crypto_kem_mlkem768_BYTES];
++	size_t need;
++	int r;
++
++	*shared_secretp = NULL;
++
++	need = crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES + CURVE25519_SIZE;
++	if (sshbuf_len(server_blob) != need) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	ciphertext = sshbuf_ptr(server_blob);
++	server_pub = ciphertext + crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES;
++	/* hash concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key */
++	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("server cipher text:", ciphertext, crypto_kem_mlkem768_CIPHERTEXTBYTES);
++	dump_digest("server public key c25519:", server_pub, CURVE25519_SIZE);
++#endif
++	if ((r = mlkem768_decap_secret(kex->mlkem768_client_key, ciphertext, decap)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, decap, sizeof(decap))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = kexc25519_shared_key_ext(kex->c25519_client_key, server_pub,
++	    buf, 1)) < 0)
++		goto out;
++	if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(kex->hash_alg, buf,
++	    hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("client kem key:", decap, sizeof(decap));
++	dump_digest("concatenation of KEM key and ECDH shared key:",
++	    sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, hash,
++	    ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg))) != 0)
++		goto out;
++#ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
++	dump_digest("encoded shared secret:", sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
++#endif
++	/* success */
++	r = 0;
++	*shared_secretp = buf;
++	buf = NULL;
++ out:
++	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	explicit_bzero(decap, sizeof(decap));
++	sshbuf_free(buf);
++	return r;
++#endif
+ }
+ #else /* USE_MLKEM768X25519 */
+ int
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..05bbe4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+--- a/ssh.c	2025-12-03 15:22:36.754555231 +0100
++++ b/ssh.c	2025-12-03 16:12:16.715320349 +0100
+@@ -662,6 +662,8 @@ valid_ruser(const char *s)
+ 	if (*s == '-')
+ 		return 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
++			return 0;
+ 		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
+ 			return 0;
+ 		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+@@ -683,6 +685,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
+ 	int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
+ 	int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
++	int user_on_commandline = 0;
+ 	char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, *logfile;
+ 	char cname[NI_MAXHOST], thishost[NI_MAXHOST];
+ 	struct stat st;
+@@ -1039,8 +1042,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			}
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'l':
+-			if (options.user == NULL)
++			if (options.user == NULL) {
+ 				options.user = optarg;
++				user_on_commandline = 1;
++			}
+ 			break;
+ 
+ 		case 'L':
+@@ -1143,6 +1148,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			if (options.user == NULL) {
+ 				options.user = tuser;
+ 				tuser = NULL;
++				user_on_commandline = 1;
+ 			}
+ 			free(tuser);
+ 			if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
+@@ -1157,6 +1163,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 				if (options.user == NULL) {
+ 					options.user = p;
+ 					p = NULL;
++					user_on_commandline = 1;
+ 				}
+ 				*cp++ = '\0';
+ 				host = xstrdup(cp);
+@@ -1459,6 +1466,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	cinfo->locuser = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
+ 	cinfo->jmphost = xstrdup(options.jump_host == NULL ?
+ 	    "" : options.jump_host);
++
++	if (user_on_commandline && !valid_ruser(options.user))
++		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
++
+ 	cinfo->conn_hash_hex = ssh_connection_hash(cinfo->thishost,
+ 	    cinfo->remhost, cinfo->portstr, cinfo->remuser, cinfo->jmphost);
+ 
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9b2d378
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/misc.c b/misc.c
+--- a/misc.c	2025-12-03 16:19:11.255135131 +0100
++++ b/misc.c	2025-12-03 16:21:53.769590836 +0100
+@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ urldecode(const char *src)
+ 	size_t srclen;
+ 
+ 	if ((srclen = strlen(src)) >= SIZE_MAX)
+-		fatal_f("input too large");
++		return NULL;
+ 	ret = xmalloc(srclen + 1);
+ 	for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) {
+ 		switch (*src) {
+@@ -1006,9 +1006,10 @@ urldecode(const char *src)
+ 			*dst++ = ' ';
+ 			break;
+ 		case '%':
++			/* note: don't allow \0 characters */
+ 			if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
+ 			    !isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
+-			    (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
++			    (ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1 || ch == 0) {
+ 				free(ret);
+ 				return NULL;
+ 			}
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2378b3a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,437 @@
+diff --color -ruNp a/regress/scp3.sh b/regress/scp3.sh
+--- a/regress/scp3.sh	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/regress/scp3.sh	2025-10-29 16:00:59.815068193 +0100
+@@ -6,6 +6,12 @@ tid="scp3"
+ COPY2=${OBJ}/copy2
+ DIR=${COPY}.dd
+ DIR2=${COPY}.dd2
++DIFFOPT="-rN"
++
++# Figure out if diff does not understand "-N"
++if ! diff -N ${SRC}/scp.sh ${SRC}/scp.sh 2>/dev/null; then
++	DIFFOPT="-r"
++fi
+ 
+ maybe_add_scp_path_to_sshd
+ 
+@@ -63,6 +69,15 @@ for mode in scp sftp ; do
+ 	echo b > ${COPY2}
+ 	$SCP $scpopts -3 hostA:${DATA} hostA:${COPY} hostB:${COPY2}
+ 	cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
++
++	# scp /blah/.. is only supported via the sftp protocol.
++	# Original protocol scp just refuses it.
++	test $mode != sftp && continue
++	verbose "$tag: recursive .."
++	forest
++	$SCP $scpopts -r hostA:${DIR}/subdir/.. hostB:${DIR2} || \
++		fail "copy failed"
++	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ done
+ 
+ scpclean
+diff --color -ruNp a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
+--- a/regress/scp.sh	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/regress/scp.sh	2025-10-29 16:00:59.810765653 +0100
+@@ -199,6 +199,19 @@ for mode in scp sftp ; do
+ 	echo b > ${COPY2}
+ 	$SCP $scpopts ${DATA} ${COPY} ${COPY2}
+ 	cmp ${COPY} ${COPY2} >/dev/null && fail "corrupt target"
++
++	# scp /blah/.. is only supported via the sftp protocol.
++	# Original protocol scp just refuses it.
++	test $mode != sftp && continue
++	verbose "$tag: recursive local .. to remote dir"
++	forest
++	$SCP $scpopts -r ${DIR}/subdir/.. somehost:${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
++	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
++
++	verbose "$tag: recursive remote .. to local dir"
++	forest
++	$SCP $scpopts -r somehost:${DIR}/subdir/.. ${DIR2} || fail "copy failed"
++	diff ${DIFFOPT} ${DIR} ${DIR2} || fail "corrupted copy"
+ done
+ 
+ scpclean
+diff --color -ruNp a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh
+--- a/regress/sftp-cmds.sh	2024-09-20 00:20:48.000000000 +0200
++++ b/regress/sftp-cmds.sh	2025-10-29 16:00:59.813392901 +0100
+@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
+ 
+ tid="sftp commands"
+ 
++DIFFOPT="-rN"
++# Figure out if diff does not understand "-N"
++if ! diff -N ${SRC}/sftp-cmds.sh ${SRC}/sftp-cmds.sh 2>/dev/null; then
++	DIFFOPT="-r"
++fi
++
+ # test that these files are readable!
+ for i in `(cd /bin;echo l*)`
+ do
+@@ -24,207 +30,246 @@ SPACECOPY_ARG="${COPY}\ this\ has\ space
+ # File with glob metacharacters
+ GLOBMETACOPY="${COPY} [metachar].txt"
+ 
++sftpserver() {
++	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1
++}
++
++sftpserver_with_stdout() {
++	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1
++}
++
++forest() {
++	rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
++	rm -rf ${COPY}.dd2
++	mkdir -p ${COPY}.dd/a ${COPY}.dd/b ${COPY}.dd/c ${COPY}.dd/a/d
++	echo 'A' > ${COPY}.dd/a/A
++	echo 'B' > ${COPY}.dd/a/B
++	echo 'C' > ${COPY}.dd/a/C
++	echo 'D' > ${COPY}.dd/a/D
++}
++
+ rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
+ mkdir ${COPY}.dd
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: lls"
+-printf "lcd ${OBJ}\nlls\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
++printf "lcd ${OBJ}\nlls\n" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
+ 	grep copy.dd >/dev/null || fail "lls failed"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: lls w/path"
+-echo "lls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
++echo "lls ${OBJ}" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
+ 	grep copy.dd >/dev/null || fail "lls w/path failed"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: ls"
+-echo "ls ${OBJ}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "ls failed"
++echo "ls ${OBJ}" | sftpserver || fail "ls failed"
+ # XXX always successful
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: shell"
+-echo "!echo hi there" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} 2>&1 | \
++echo "!echo hi there" | sftpserver_with_stdout | \
+ 	egrep '^hi there$' >/dev/null || fail "shell failed"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: pwd"
+-echo "pwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "pwd failed"
++echo "pwd" | sftpserver || fail "pwd failed"
+ # XXX always successful
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: lpwd"
+-echo "lpwd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "lpwd failed"
++echo "lpwd" | sftpserver  || fail "lpwd failed"
+ # XXX always successful
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: quit"
+-echo "quit" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "quit failed"
++echo "quit" | sftpserver || fail "quit failed"
+ # XXX always successful
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: help"
+-echo "help" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "help failed"
++echo "help" | sftpserver || fail "help failed"
+ # XXX always successful
+ 
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+ verbose "$tid: get"
+-echo "get $DATA $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "get failed"
++echo "get $DATA $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+ 
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+ verbose "$tid: get quoted"
+-echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "get failed"
++echo "get \"$DATA\" $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+ 
+ rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
+ cp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY}
+ verbose "$tid: get filename with quotes"
+-echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "get failed"
++echo "get \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\" ${COPY}" | sftpserver  || fail "get failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after get with quotes"
+ rm -f ${QUOTECOPY} ${COPY}
+ 
+ rm -f "$SPACECOPY" ${COPY}
+ cp $DATA "$SPACECOPY"
+ verbose "$tid: get filename with spaces"
+-echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-        || fail "get failed"
++echo "get ${SPACECOPY_ARG} ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after get with spaces"
+ 
+ rm -f "$GLOBMETACOPY" ${COPY}
+ cp $DATA "$GLOBMETACOPY"
+ verbose "$tid: get filename with glob metacharacters"
+-echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | \
+-	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "get failed"
++echo "get \"${GLOBMETACOPY}\" ${COPY}" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ cmp ${COPY} "$GLOBMETACOPY" || \
+ 	fail "corrupted copy after get with glob metacharacters"
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: get to directory"
+-echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-        || fail "get failed"
++echo "get $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: glob get to directory"
+-echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-        || fail "get failed"
++echo "get /bin/l* ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+         cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+ done
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: get to local dir"
+-printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget $DATA\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-        || fail "get failed"
++printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget $DATA\n" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: glob get to local dir"
+-printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget /bin/l*\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-        || fail "get failed"
++printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\nget /bin/l*\n" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
+ for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+         cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after get"
+ done
+ 
++forest
++verbose "$tid: get recursive absolute"
++echo "get -R ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || fail "get failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
++forest
++verbose "$tid: get recursive relative src"
++printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\n get -R . ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
++	fail "get failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
++forest
++verbose "$tid: get relative .."
++printf "cd ${COPY}.dd/b\n get -R .. ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
++	fail "get failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
++forest
++mkdir ${COPY}.dd2
++verbose "$tid: get recursive relative .."
++printf "cd ${COPY}.dd/b\n lcd ${COPY}.dd2\n get -R ..\n" | sftpserver || \
++	fail "get failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
+ rm -f ${COPY}
+ verbose "$tid: put"
+-echo "put $DATA $COPY" | \
+-	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
++echo "put $DATA $COPY" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+ 
+ rm -f ${QUOTECOPY}
+ verbose "$tid: put filename with quotes"
+-echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | \
+-	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
++echo "put $DATA \"$QUOTECOPY_ARG\"" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${QUOTECOPY} || fail "corrupted copy after put with quotes"
+ 
+ rm -f "$SPACECOPY"
+ verbose "$tid: put filename with spaces"
+-echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | \
+-	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "put failed"
++echo "put $DATA ${SPACECOPY_ARG}" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+ cmp $DATA "$SPACECOPY" || fail "corrupted copy after put with spaces"
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: put to directory"
+-echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "put failed"
++echo "put $DATA ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: glob put to directory"
+-echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "put failed"
++echo "put /bin/l? ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+ for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+ 	cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+ done
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: put to local dir"
+-printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput $DATA\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "put failed"
++printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput $DATA\n" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY}.dd/${DATANAME} || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+ 
+-rm -f ${COPY}.dd/*
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd/*
+ verbose "$tid: glob put to local dir"
+-printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput /bin/l*\n" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "put failed"
++printf "cd ${COPY}.dd\nput /bin/l*\n" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
+ for x in $GLOBFILES; do
+         cmp /bin/$x ${COPY}.dd/$x || fail "corrupted copy after put"
+ done
+ 
++forest
++verbose "$tid: put recursive absolute"
++echo "put -R ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || fail "put failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
++forest
++verbose "$tid: put recursive relative src"
++printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd\n put -R . ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
++	fail "put failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
++forest
++verbose "$tid: put recursive .."
++printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd/b\n put -R .. ${COPY}.dd2\n" | sftpserver || \
++	fail "put failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
++forest
++mkdir ${COPY}.dd2
++verbose "$tid: put recursive .. relative"
++printf "lcd ${COPY}.dd/b\n cd ${COPY}.dd2\n put -R ..\n" | sftpserver || \
++	fail "put failed"
++diff ${DIFFOPT} ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "corrupted copy"
++
+ verbose "$tid: rename"
+-echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "rename failed"
++echo "rename $COPY ${COPY}.1" | sftpserver || fail "rename failed"
+ test -f ${COPY}.1 || fail "missing file after rename"
+ cmp $DATA ${COPY}.1 >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "corrupted copy after rename"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: rename directory"
+-echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | \
+-	${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
++rm -rf ${COPY}.dd2
++echo "rename ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2" | sftpserver || \
+ 	fail "rename directory failed"
+ test -d ${COPY}.dd && fail "oldname exists after rename directory"
+ test -d ${COPY}.dd2 || fail "missing newname after rename directory"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: ln"
+-echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln failed"
++echo "ln ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "ln failed"
+ test -f ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln"
+ cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after ln"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: ln -s"
+ rm -f ${COPY}.2
+-echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ln -s failed"
++echo "ln -s ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "ln -s failed"
+ test -h ${COPY}.2 || fail "missing file after ln -s"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: cp"
+ rm -f ${COPY}.2
+-echo "cp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 || fail "cp failed"
++echo "cp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2" | sftpserver || fail "cp failed"
+ cmp ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 || fail "created file is not equal after cp"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: mkdir"
+-echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "mkdir failed"
++echo "mkdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "mkdir failed"
+ test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after mkdir"
+ 
+ # XXX do more here
+ verbose "$tid: chdir"
+-echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "chdir failed"
++echo "chdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "chdir failed"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: rmdir"
+-echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "rmdir failed"
++echo "rmdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "rmdir failed"
+ test -d ${COPY}.1 && fail "present directory after rmdir"
+ 
+ verbose "$tid: lmkdir"
+-echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "lmkdir failed"
++echo "lmkdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "lmkdir failed"
+ test -d ${COPY}.dd || fail "missing directory after lmkdir"
+ 
+ # XXX do more here
+ verbose "$tid: lchdir"
+-echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | ${SFTP} -D ${SFTPSERVER} >/dev/null 2>&1 \
+-	|| fail "lchdir failed"
++echo "lchdir ${COPY}.dd" | sftpserver || fail "lchdir failed"
+ 
+ rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY}.1 ${COPY}.2 ${COPY}.dd ${COPY}.dd2
+ rm -rf ${QUOTECOPY} "$SPACECOPY" "$GLOBMETACOPY"
+diff --color -ruNp a/scp.c b/scp.c
+--- a/scp.c	2025-10-29 15:49:51.795813258 +0100
++++ b/scp.c	2025-10-29 16:00:59.817393000 +0100
+@@ -1362,6 +1362,10 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 	if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ 
++	/* Special handling for source of '..' */
++	if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
++		filename = "."; /* Upload to dest, not dest/.. */
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
+ 	 * the expansions
+@@ -1635,6 +1639,10 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
++		/* Special handling for destination of '..' */
++		if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
++			filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */
++
+ 		if (dst_is_dir)
+ 			abs_dst = sftp_path_append(dst, filename);
+ 		else
+diff --color -ruNp a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+--- a/sftp.c	2025-10-29 15:49:51.796907436 +0100
++++ b/sftp.c	2025-10-29 16:00:59.819803948 +0100
+@@ -687,6 +687,10 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
++		/* Special handling for dest of '..' */
++		if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
++			filename = "."; /* Download to dest, not dest/.. */
++
+ 		if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
+ 			if (local_is_dir(dst)) {
+ 				abs_dst = sftp_path_append(dst, filename);
+@@ -781,6 +785,9 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 			err = -1;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
++		/* Special handling for source of '..' */
++		if (strcmp(filename, "..") == 0)
++			filename = "."; /* Upload to dest, not dest/.. */
+ 
+ 		free(abs_dst);
+ 		abs_dst = NULL;
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..237e45d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,450 @@
+From 5d5a66e96ad03132f65371070f4fa475f10207d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 10 Jun 2024 23:00:03 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH] support authentication indicators in GSSAPI
+
+RFC 6680 defines a set of GSSAPI extensions to handle attributes
+associated with the GSSAPI names. MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA use
+name attributes to add information about pre-authentication methods used
+to acquire the initial Kerberos ticket. The attribute 'auth-indicators'
+may contain list of strings that KDC has associated with the ticket
+issuance process.
+
+Use authentication indicators to authorise or deny access to SSH server.
+GSSAPIIndicators setting allows to specify a list of possible indicators
+that a Kerberos ticket presented must or must not contain. More details
+on the syntax are provided in sshd_config(5) man page.
+
+Fixes: https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=2696
+
+Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
+---
+ configure.ac    |   1 +
+ gss-serv-krb5.c |  64 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ gss-serv.c      | 103 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ servconf.c      |  15 ++++++-
+ servconf.h      |   2 +
+ ssh-gss.h       |   7 ++++
+ sshd_config.5   |  44 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d92a85809..2cbe20bf3 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -5004,6 +5004,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
+ 		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
++		AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_ext.h gssapi/gssapi_ext.h])
+ 
+ 		AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
+ 			[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
+diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+index 03188d9b3..2c786ef14 100644
+--- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
++++ b/gss-serv-krb5.c
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "servconf.h"
++#include "match.h"
+ 
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ 
+@@ -87,6 +88,32 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_init(void)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* Check if any of the indicators in the Kerberos ticket match
++ * one of indicators in the list of allowed/denied rules.
++ * In case of the match, apply the decision from the rule.
++ * In case of no indicator from the ticket matching the rule, deny
++ */
++
++static int
++ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(ssh_gssapi_client *client, int *matched)
++{
++	int ret;
++	u_int i;
++
++	/* Check indicators */
++	for (i = 0; client->indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++		ret = match_pattern_list(client->indicators[i],
++					 options.gss_indicators, 1);
++		/* negative or positive match */
++		if (ret != 0) {
++			*matched = i;
++			return ret;
++		}
++	}
++	/* No rule matched */
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* Check if this user is OK to login. This only works with krb5 - other
+  * GSSAPI mechanisms will need their own.
+  * Returns true if the user is OK to log in, otherwise returns 0
+@@ -193,7 +220,7 @@ static int
+ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ {
+ 	krb5_principal princ;
+-	int retval;
++	int retval, matched;
+ 	const char *errmsg;
+ 	int k5login_exists;
+ 
+@@ -216,17 +243,42 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_userok(ssh_gssapi_client *client, char *name)
+ 	if (k5login_exists &&
+ 	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++	    errmsg = "krb5_kuserok";
+ 	} else if (ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(princ, client->exportedname.value,
+ 		name, k5login_exists)) {
+ 		retval = 1;
+-		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s "
+-		    "(ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok)",
+-		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
++		errmsg = "ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok";
+ 	} else
+ 		retval = 0;
+ 
++	if ((retval == 1) && (options.gss_indicators != NULL)) {
++		/* At this point the configuration enforces presence of indicators
++		 * so we drop the authorization result again */
++		retval = 0;
++		if (client->indicators) {
++			matched = -1;
++			retval = ssh_gssapi_check_indicators(client, &matched);
++			if (retval != 0) {
++				retval = (retval == 1);
++				logit("Ticket contains indicator %s, "
++					"krb5 principal %s is %s",
++					client->indicators[matched],
++					(char *)client->displayname.value,
++				        retval ? "allowed" : "denied");
++				goto cont;
++			}
++		}
++		if (retval == 0) {
++			logit("GSSAPI authentication indicators enforced "
++				"but not matched. krb5 principal %s denied",
++			(char *)client->displayname.value);
++		}
++	}
++cont:
++	if (retval == 1) {
++		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (%s)",
++		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value, errmsg);
++	}
+ 	krb5_free_principal(krb_context, princ);
+ 	return retval;
+ }
+diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+index 9d5435eda..5c0491cf1 100644
+--- a/gss-serv.c
++++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+ static ssh_gssapi_client gssapi_client =
+     { GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER, GSS_C_NO_CREDENTIAL,
+-    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0};
++    GSS_C_NO_NAME, NULL, {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}, 0, 0, NULL};
+ 
+ ssh_gssapi_mech gssapi_null_mech =
+     { NULL, NULL, {0, NULL}, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
+@@ -296,6 +296,92 @@ ssh_gssapi_parse_ename(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t ename, gss_buffer_t name)
+ 	return GSS_S_COMPLETE;
+ }
+ 
++
++/* Extract authentication indicators from the Kerberos ticket. Authentication
++ * indicators are GSSAPI name attributes for the name "auth-indicators".
++ * Multiple indicators might be present in the ticket.
++ * Each indicator is a utf8 string. */
++
++#define AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG "auth-indicators"
++
++/* Privileged (called from accept_secure_ctx) */
++static OM_uint32
++ssh_gssapi_getindicators(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_name_t gss_name, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
++{
++	gss_buffer_set_t attrs = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET;
++	gss_buffer_desc value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	gss_buffer_desc display_value = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
++	int is_mechname, authenticated, complete, more;
++	size_t count, i;
++
++	ctx->major = gss_inquire_name(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++				      &is_mechname, NULL, &attrs);
++	if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
++
++	if (attrs == GSS_C_NO_BUFFER_SET) {
++		/* No indicators in the ticket */
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		count++;
++	}
++
++	if (count == 0) {
++		/* No auth-indicators in the ticket */
++		(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++		return (0);
++	}
++
++	client->indicators = recallocarray(NULL, 0, count + 1, sizeof(char*));
++	count = 0;
++	for (i = 0; i < attrs->count; i++) {
++		authenticated = 0;
++		complete = 0;
++		more = -1;
++		/* skip anything but auth-indicators */
++		if (((sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != attrs->elements[i].length) ||
++		    strncmp(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG,
++			    attrs->elements[i].value,
++			    sizeof(AUTH_INDICATORS_TAG) - 1) != 0)
++			continue;
++		/* retrieve all indicators */
++		while (more != 0) {
++			value.value = NULL;
++			display_value.value = NULL;
++			ctx->major = gss_get_name_attribute(&ctx->minor, gss_name,
++					&attrs->elements[i], &authenticated,
++					&complete, &value, &display_value, &more);
++			if (ctx->major != GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
++				goto out;
++			}
++
++			if ((value.value != NULL) && authenticated) {
++				client->indicators[count] = xmalloc(value.length + 1);
++				memcpy(client->indicators[count], value.value, value.length);
++				client->indicators[count][value.length] = '\0';
++				count++;
++			}
++		}
++	}
++
++out:
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &display_value);
++	(void) gss_release_buffer_set(&ctx->minor, &attrs);
++	return (ctx->major);
++}
++
++
+ /* Extract the client details from a given context. This can only reliably
+  * be called once for a context */
+ 
+@@ -385,6 +471,12 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	gss_release_buffer(&ctx->minor, &ename);
++	/* Retrieve authentication indicators, if they exist */
++	if ((ctx->major = ssh_gssapi_getindicators(ctx,
++	    ctx->client, client))) {
++		ssh_gssapi_error(ctx);
++		return (ctx->major);
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* We can't copy this structure, so we just move the pointer to it */
+ 	client->creds = ctx->client_creds;
+@@ -447,6 +539,7 @@ int
+ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ {
+ 	OM_uint32 lmin;
++	size_t i;
+ 
+ 	(void) kex; /* used in privilege separation */
+ 
+@@ -465,6 +558,14 @@ ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user, struct passwd *pw, int kex)
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.displayname);
+ 			gss_release_buffer(&lmin, &gssapi_client.exportedname);
+ 			gss_release_cred(&lmin, &gssapi_client.creds);
++
++			if (gssapi_client.indicators != NULL) {
++				for(i = 0; gssapi_client.indicators[i] != NULL; i++) {
++					free(gssapi_client.indicators[i]);
++				}
++				free(gssapi_client.indicators);
++			}
++
+ 			explicit_bzero(&gssapi_client,
+ 			    sizeof(ssh_gssapi_client));
+ 			return 0;
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index e7e4ad046..aab653244 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
+ 	options->gss_store_rekey = -1;
+ 	options->gss_kex_algorithms = NULL;
++	options->gss_indicators = NULL;
+ 	options->use_kuserok = -1;
+ 	options->enable_k5users = -1;
+ 	options->password_authentication = -1;
+@@ -598,7 +599,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
+ 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
+ 	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
+-	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
++	sGssKeyEx, sGssIndicators, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+@@ -694,6 +695,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sGssEnablek5users, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sGssIndicators, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #else
+ 	{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -703,6 +705,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapienablek5users", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "gssapiindicators", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ #endif
+ 	{ "gssusesessionccache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "gssapiusesessioncredcache", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+@@ -1730,6 +1733,15 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			options->gss_kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sGssIndicators:
++		arg = argv_next(&ac, &av);
++		if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
++			fatal("%s line %d: %s missing argument.",
++			    filename, linenum, keyword);
++		if (options->gss_indicators == NULL)
++			options->gss_indicators = xstrdup(arg);
++		break;
++
+ 	case sPasswordAuthentication:
+ 		intptr = &options->password_authentication;
+ 		goto parse_flag;
+@@ -3351,6 +3363,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStrictAcceptor, o->gss_strict_acceptor);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssStoreRekey, o->gss_store_rekey);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sGssKexAlgorithms, o->gss_kex_algorithms);
++	dump_cfg_string(sGssIndicators, o->gss_indicators);
+ #endif
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
+ 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 7c7e5d434..7c41df417 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -181,6 +181,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	char   **allow_groups;
+ 	u_int num_deny_groups;
+ 	char   **deny_groups;
++	char   *gss_indicators;
+ 
+ 	u_int num_subsystems;
+ 	char   **subsystem_name;
+@@ -310,6 +311,7 @@ TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_allowlist); \
+ 		M_CP_STROPT(pam_service_name); \
++		M_CP_STROPT(gss_indicators); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
+ 		M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
+diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+index a894e23c9..59cf46d47 100644
+--- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -34,6 +34,12 @@
+ #include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_EXT_H
++#include <gssapi_ext.h>
++#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_EXT_H)
++#include <gssapi/gssapi_ext.h>
++#endif
++
+ #ifdef KRB5
+ # ifndef HEIMDAL
+ #  ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
+@@ -107,6 +113,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	ssh_gssapi_ccache store;
+ 	int used;
+ 	int updated;
++	char **indicators; /* auth indicators */
+ } ssh_gssapi_client;
+ 
+ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 583a01cdb..90ab87edd 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -785,6 +785,50 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.It Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++Specifies whether to accept or deny GSSAPI authenticated access if Kerberos
++mechanism is used and Kerberos ticket contains a particular set of
++authentication indicators. The values can be specified as a comma-separated list
++.Cm [!]name1,[!]name2,... .
++When indicator's name is prefixed with !, the authentication indicator 'name'
++will deny access to the system. Otherwise, one of non-negated authentication
++indicators must be present in the Kerberos ticket to allow access. If
++.Cm GSSAPIIndicators
++is defined, a Kerberos ticket that has indicators but does not match the
++policy will get denial. If at least one indicator is configured, whether for
++access or denial, tickets without authentication indicators will be explicitly
++rejected.
++.Pp
++By default systems using MIT Kerberos 1.17 or later will not assign any
++indicators. SPAKE and PKINIT methods add authentication indicators
++to all successful authentications. The SPAKE pre-authentication method is
++preferred over an encrypted timestamp pre-authentication when passwords used to
++authenticate user principals. Kerberos KDCs built with Heimdal Kerberos
++(including Samba AD DC built with Heimdal) do not add authentication
++indicators. However, OpenSSH built against Heimdal Kerberos library is able to
++inquire authentication indicators and thus can be used to check for their presence.
++.Pp
++Indicator name is case-sensitive and depends on the configuration of a
++particular Kerberos deployment. Indicators available in MIT Kerberos and
++FreeIPA environments:
++.Pp
++.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
++.It Cm hardened
++SPAKE or encrypted timestamp pre-authentication mechanisms in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm pkinit
++smartcard or PKCS11 token-based pre-authentication in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm radius
++pre-authentication based on a RADIUS server in MIT Kerberos and FreeIPA
++.It Cm otp
++TOTP/HOTP-based two-factor pre-authentication in FreeIPA
++.It Cm idp
++OAuth2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA using an external identity provider
++and device authorization grant flow
++.It Cm passkey
++FIDO2-based pre-authentication in FreeIPA, using FIDO2 USB and NFC tokens
++.El
++.Pp
++The default is to not use GSSAPI authentication indicators for access decisions.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
+ The default is handled system-wide by
+ .Xr crypto-policies 7 .
+-- 
+2.49.0
+
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9937cba
--- /dev/null
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEcWi5g4FaXu9ZpK39Kj9BTnNgYLoFAmbspccACgkQKj9BTnNg
+YLppxRAAv7eU/Xd2w9MX9vWQdhugiPByEcKg7KuKXUUs9xJGy+HbLqPqUCvn1UW6
+qodKoSAdeBuSB7AjzuIQ1lTVX7C67OmZaVPRq25ar5b+Wq4SSlv23KMRq0b4EVyw
+pOW6R9tsxqYBwYaiXQ50APcYL8SpepnGU+b/iR15f7q3SU2XMVVtkVb149UdLOqK
+smfurbDGwUKFb2Q009MUfEV/d9zq31tdSjphvkqAXCcmxc8siuOYWYcByuysie+m
+NpaOpee0047L5JIxNSLsa2yZrJZhClP8LbTCH1Vfwr7l0KE5nvL2qAtPKI2XxGQC
+3jXrDLzp10RFxV8sCym+QlY9pZyzGj9d3G7vCHtxWGQ1Y0Qt+xs18OeBpjiehRhl
+WM3Y+cjoN35jBaGhOoHdh3ePZQdTUyZ16aSv0h/cUHOohiM7i/4XW+dQtkqsJsw4
+a81O0E64WrL8ho3Ju9mwcVZ9A0aEaftJsmJPDB+qYBjF/i7xcnH32LginzP5pel7
+/W0aS2C1ZNo3QKHezI6IA9MyENMZiAMy2ybvfmN0HgLBaBY1plJ8a5GvMwJc+Qwh
+iCHLCQ6Qgf/1hh+F6liTXnhtedtFHneJdyqvd7XOoardDEipZjxcnGa4HthbDFU+
+8XdHKnWWhn4BLA+y7KB3ZGURniQK+qibwkF6J63CuMU+LmG+bvQ=
+=Ukrb
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
diff --git a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
index d42a370..692c6ac 100644
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
@@ -11,13 +11,96 @@ index e2efdf06..0d0f6953 100644
  				goto out;
  			}
 @@ -1059,6 +1060,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
- 		goto out;
+ 	}
  
  	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		error_f("alloc failed");
  		goto out;
  	}
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 486f8515..9dea2cfc 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1864,6 +1864,14 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &d, &len)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+ 			DBG(debug("Received SSH2_MSG_PING len %zu", len));
++			if (!ssh->state->after_authentication) {
++				DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING in preauth"));
++				break;
++			}
++			if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
++				DBG(debug("Won't reply to PING during KEX"));
++				break;
++			}
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_PONG)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, d, len)) != 0 ||
+ 			    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
+index 48973b2c..c27c5a95 100644
+--- a/ssh-agent.c
++++ b/ssh-agent.c
+@@ -1220,6 +1220,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 	    "restrict-destination-v00@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ 		if (*dcsp != NULL) {
+ 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0) {
+@@ -1229,6 +1230,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ 			if (*ndcsp >= AGENT_MAX_DEST_CONSTRAINTS) {
+ 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			*dcsp = xrecallocarray(*dcsp, *ndcsp, *ndcsp + 1,
+@@ -1246,6 +1248,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 		}
+ 		if (*certs != NULL) {
+ 			error_f("%s already set", ext_name);
++			r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &v)) != 0 ||
+@@ -1257,6 +1260,7 @@ parse_key_constraint_extension(struct sshbuf *m, char **sk_providerp,
+ 		while (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ 			if (*ncerts >= AGENT_MAX_EXT_CERTS) {
+ 				error_f("too many %s constraints", ext_name);
++				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			*certs = xrecallocarray(*certs, *ncerts, *ncerts + 1,
+@@ -1757,6 +1761,7 @@ process_ext_session_bind(SocketEntry *e)
+ 	/* record new key/sid */
+ 	if (e->nsession_ids >= AGENT_MAX_SESSION_IDS) {
+ 		error_f("too many session IDs recorded");
++		r = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 	e->session_ids = xrecallocarray(e->session_ids, e->nsession_ids,
+diff --git a/ssh-sk-client.c b/ssh-sk-client.c
+index 321fe53a..06fad221 100644
+--- a/ssh-sk-client.c
++++ b/ssh-sk-client.c
+@@ -439,6 +439,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ 		}
+ 		if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL) {
+ 			error_f("calloc failed");
++			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		srk->key = key;
+@@ -450,6 +451,7 @@ sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ 		if ((tmp = recallocarray(srks, nsrks, nsrks + 1,
+ 		    sizeof(*srks))) == NULL) {
+ 			error_f("recallocarray keys failed");
++			r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		debug_f("srks[%zu]: %s %s uidlen %zu", nsrks,
 diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
 index a69c4da1..1ee6000a 100644
 --- a/sshconnect2.c
diff --git a/SPECS/openssh.spec b/SPECS/openssh.spec
index 4cb5799..5477a86 100644
--- a/SPECS/openssh.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec
@@ -46,10 +46,10 @@
 %{?static_openssl:%global static_libcrypto 1}
 
 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
-%global openssh_ver 8.7p1
-%global openssh_rel 46
+%global openssh_ver 9.9p1
+%global openssh_rel 4
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.4
-%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 5
+%global pam_ssh_agent_rel 7
 
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
@@ -133,12 +133,10 @@ Patch703: openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
 Patch707: openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
 # warn users for unsupported UsePAM=no (#757545)
 Patch711: openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
-# make aes-ctr ciphers use EVP engines such as AES-NI from OpenSSL
-Patch712: openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
 
 # GSSAPI Key Exchange (RFC 4462 + RFC 8732)
 # from https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/tree/fedora/master
-Patch800: openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+Patch800: openssh-9.6p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
 #http://www.mail-archive.com/kerberos@mit.edu/msg17591.html
 Patch801: openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
 # add new option GSSAPIEnablek5users and disable using ~/.k5users by default (#1169843)
@@ -169,8 +167,6 @@ Patch926: openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
 Patch939: openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
 # Move MAX_DISPLAYS to a configuration option (#1341302)
 Patch944: openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
-# Help systemd to track the running service
-Patch948: openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
 # Pass inetd flags for SELinux down to openbsd compat level
 Patch949: openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
 # Sandbox adjustments for s390 and audit
@@ -183,8 +179,6 @@ Patch951: openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
 Patch953: openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
 # Mention crypto-policies in manual pages (#1668325)
 Patch962: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
-# Use OpenSSL high-level API to produce and verify signatures (#1707485)
-Patch963: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
 # Use OpenSSL KDF (#1631761)
 Patch964: openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
 # sk-dummy.so built with -fvisibility=hidden does not work
@@ -195,20 +189,8 @@ Patch966: openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
 Patch974: openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
 # sshd provides PAM an incorrect error code (#1879503)
 Patch975: openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
-# Use SFTP protocol by default for scp command
-Patch976: openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch
 # Implement kill switch for SCP protocol
 Patch977: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
-# CVE-2021-41617
-Patch978: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
-# fix for `ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -f /dev/null -s /dev/null` (#2024902)
-Patch979: openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch
-# Create non-existent directories when scp works in sftp mode and some more minor fixes
-# upstream commits:
-# ba61123eef9c6356d438c90c1199a57a0d7bcb0a
-# 63670d4e9030bcee490d5a9cce561373ac5b3b23
-# ac7c9ec894ed0825d04ef69c55babb49bab1d32e
-Patch980: openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch
 # Workaround for lack of sftp_realpath in older versions of RHEL
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2038854
 # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/299
@@ -216,90 +198,53 @@ Patch980: openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch
 Patch981: openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
 # https://github.com/djmdjm/openssh-wip/pull/13
 Patch982: openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
-# downstream only
-Patch983: openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch
 # downstream only, IBMCA tentative fix
 # From https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1976202#c14
 Patch984: openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
-# Upstream ff89b1bed80721295555bd083b173247a9c0484e, 5062ad48814b06162511c4f5924a33d97b6b2566
-Patch986: openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
-
-# Minimize the use of SHA1 as a proof of possession for RSA key (#2031868)
-# upstream commits:
-# 291721bc7c840d113a49518f3fca70e86248b8e8
-# 0fa33683223c76289470a954404047bc762be84c
-# Avoid dubious diagnostics on update known hosts (#2115246)
-# 8832402bd500d1661ccc80a476fd563335ef6cdc
-Patch1000: openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
-# Fix for scp clearing file when src and dest are the same (#2056884)
-# upstream commits:
-# 7b1cbcb7599d9f6a3bbad79d412604aa1203b5ee
-Patch1001: openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch
 # Add missing options from ssh_config into ssh manpage
 # upstream bug:
 # https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3455
 Patch1002: openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch
-# Always return allocated strings from the kex filtering so that we can free them
-# upstream commits:
-# 486c4dc3b83b4b67d663fb0fa62bc24138ec3946
-# 6c31ba10e97b6953c4f325f526f3e846dfea647a
-# 322964f8f2e9c321e77ebae1e4d2cd0ccc5c5a0b
-Patch1003: openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch
-# Reenable MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC after gssapi-with-mic failures
-# upstream MR:
-# https://github.com/openssh-gsskex/openssh-gsskex/pull/21
-Patch1004: openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch
-# Fix host-based authentication with rsa keys
-# upstream commits:
-# 7aa7b096cf2bafe2777085abdeed5ce00581f641
-# d9dbb5d9a0326e252d3c7bc13beb9c2434f59409
-# fdb1d58d0d3888b042e5a500f6ce524486aaf782
-Patch1005: openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch
 # Don't propose disallowed algorithms during hostkey negotiation
 # upstream MR:
 # https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/323
 Patch1006: openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
 # 
 Patch1007: openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
-# CVE-2023-25136
-# upstream 12da7823336434a403f25c7cc0c2c6aed0737a35
-# to fix 1005
-Patch1008: openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch
-
-# fips compliance for signing, dh, ecdh
-Patch1009: openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-sign.patch
-Patch1010: openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch
-Patch1011: openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-ecdh.patch
-Patch1012: openssh-8.7p1-evp-pkcs11.patch
-
-# clarify rhbz#2068423 on the man page of ssh_config
-Patch1013: openssh-8.7p1-man-hostkeyalgos.patch
-# upstream commits
-# ec1ddb72a146fd66d18df9cd423517453a5d8044
-# b98a42afb69d60891eb0488935990df6ee571c4
-# a00f59a645072e5f5a8d207af15916a7b23e2642
-Patch1014: openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch
-# upsream commit
-# b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280
-Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
-#upstream commit b7afd8a4ecaca8afd3179b55e9db79c0ff210237
-Patch1016: openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch
-#upstream commit 01dbf3d46651b7d6ddf5e45d233839bbfffaeaec
-Patch1017: openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
-#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
-Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
-#upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a
-Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
-#upstream commit 96faa0de6c673a2ce84736eba37fc9fb723d9e5c
-Patch1020: openssh-8.7p1-sigpipe.patch
-Patch1021: openssh-9.8p1-upstream-cve-2024-6387.patch
+Patch1012: openssh-9.0p1-evp-fips-kex.patch
+Patch1015: openssh-9.6p1-pam-rhost.patch
 Patch1022: openssh-8.7p1-redhat-help.patch
 Patch1023: openssh-8.7p1-openssl-log.patch
-#upstream commit 52dfe3c72d98503d8b7c6f64fc7e19d685636c0b
-Patch1024: openssh-8.7p1-allow-duplicate-subsystem.patch
 # upstream 6ce00f0c2ecbb9f75023dbe627ee6460bcec78c2
 # upstream 0832aac79517611dd4de93ad0a83577994d9c907
 Patch1025: openssh-9.9p2-error_processing.patch
+# upstream cf3e48ee8ba1beeccddd2f203b558fa102be67a2
+# upstream 0c3927c45f8a57b511c874c4d51a8c89414f74ef
+Patch1026: openssh-9.9p1-mlkembe.patch
+# upstream 3f02368e8e9121847727c46b280efc280e5eb615
+# upstream 67a115e7a56dbdc3f5a58c64b29231151f3670f5
+Patch1027: openssh-9.9p1-match-regression.patch
+# Downstream patch, OpenSSL based MLKEM implementation
+Patch1028: openssh-9.9p1-openssl-mlkem.patch
+# upstream 8eabd2ae2ca1d7756417a1ee5b41f09c5d997634
+Patch1029: openssh-9.9p1-compression-directive.patch
+# upstream fc86875e6acb36401dfc1dfb6b628a9d1460f367
+Patch1030: openssh-9.9p1-disable-forwarding.patch
+Patch1031: openssh-9.9p1-non-supported-keys-err-msg.patch
+Patch1032: openssh-9.9p1-bad-hostkey.patch
+# https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/500
+Patch1033: openssh-9.9p1-support-authentication-indicators-in-GSSAPI.patch
+#
+Patch1034: openssh-9.9p1-fips-gss.patch
+#upstream 6432b9f6a216d0f5fb43df500e9bc30bebb3f58b
+#upstream 4f14ca8633a2c8c0a1a19165663421f0ab32f6ab
+Patch1035: openssh-9.9p1-scp-traversing.patch
+Patch1036: openssh-9.9p1-canonical-match-user.patch
+# upstream 35d5917652106aede47621bb3f64044604164043
+Patch1037: openssh-9.9p1-reject-cntrl-chars-in-username.patch
+# upstream 43b3bff47bb029f2299bacb6a36057981b39fdb0
+Patch1038: openssh-9.9p1-reject-null-char-in-url-string.patch
+Patch1039: openssh-9.9p1-compat-mlkem.patch
 
 License: BSD
 Requires: /sbin/nologin
@@ -454,7 +399,6 @@ popd
 %patch703 -p1 -b .grab-info
 %patch707 -p1 -b .redhat
 %patch711 -p1 -b .log-usepam-no
-%patch712 -p1 -b .evp-ctr
 # 
 %patch800 -p1 -b .gsskex
 %patch801 -p1 -b .force_krb
@@ -471,65 +415,51 @@ popd
 %patch926 -p1 -b .sftp-force-mode
 %patch939 -p1 -b .s390-dev
 %patch944 -p1 -b .x11max
-%patch948 -p1 -b .systemd
 %patch949 -p1 -b .refactor
 %patch950 -p1 -b .sandbox
 %patch951 -p1 -b .pkcs11-uri
 %patch953 -p1 -b .scp-ipv6
 %patch962 -p1 -b .crypto-policies
-%patch963 -p1 -b .openssl-evp
 %patch964 -p1 -b .openssl-kdf
 %patch965 -p1 -b .visibility
 %patch966 -p1 -b .x11-ipv6
 %patch974 -p1 -b .keygen-strip-doseol
 %patch975 -p1 -b .preserve-pam-errors
-%patch976 -p1 -b .sftp-by-default
 %patch977 -p1 -b .kill-scp
-%patch978 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
-%patch979 -p1 -b .find-principals
-%patch980 -p1 -b .sftpdirs
 %patch981 -p1 -b .scp-sftpdirs
 %patch982 -p1 -b .minrsabits
-%patch983 -p1 -b .evpgenrsa
 %patch984 -p1 -b .ibmca
-%patch986 -p1 -b .91cleanup
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
 %patch202 -p1 -b .audit-hostname
 %patch700 -p1 -b .fips
 
-%patch1000 -p1 -b .minimize-sha1-use
-%patch1001 -p1 -b .scp-clears-file
 %patch1002 -p1 -b .ssh-manpage
-%patch1003 -p1 -b .mem-leak
-%patch1004 -p1 -b .gssapi-auth
-%patch1005 -p1 -b .host-based-auth
 %patch1006 -p1 -b .negotiate-supported-algs
 
 %patch100 -p1 -b .coverity
 
 %patch1007 -p1 -b .sshrsacheck
-%patch1008 -p1 -b .cve-2023-25136
-
-%patch1009 -p1 -b .evp_fips_sign
-%patch1010 -p1 -b .evp_fips_dh
-%patch1011 -p1 -b .evp_fips_ecdh
-%patch1012 -p1 -b .evp_pkcs11
-
-%patch1013 -p1 -b .man-hostkeyalgos
-%patch1014 -p1 -b .utc_parse
-%patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
-%patch1016 -p1 -b .openssl3compat
-%patch1017 -p1 -b .limitdelay
-%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795
-%patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385
-%patch1020 -p1 -b .earlypipe
-%patch1021 -p1 -b .cve-2024-6387
+%patch1012 -p1 -b .evp-fips-kex
+%patch1015 -p1 -b .pam-rhost
 %patch1022 -p1 -b .redhat-help
 %patch1023 -p1 -b .openssl-log
-%patch1024 -p1 -b .allow-dup-subsystem
 %patch1025 -p1 -b .errcode_set
+%patch1026 -p1 -b .mlkembe
+%patch1027 -p1 -b .match
+%patch1028 -p1 -b .openssl-mlkem
+%patch1029 -p1 -b .compression
+%patch1030 -p1 -b .disable-forwarding
+%patch1031 -p1 -b .non-supported-keys-err-msg
+%patch1032 -p1 -b .bad-hostkey
+%patch1033 -p1 -b .gss-indicators
+%patch1034 -p1 -b .gss-fips
+%patch1035 -p1 -b .scp-traversing
+%patch1036 -p1 -b .canonical-match-user
+%patch1037 -p1 -b .reject-cntrl-chars-in-username
+%patch1038 -p1 -b .reject-null-char-in-url-string
+%patch1039 -p1 -b .skip-mlkem-when-na
 
 autoreconf
 pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
@@ -582,10 +512,10 @@ fi
 	--with-ipaddr-display \
 	--with-pie=no \
 	--without-hardening `# The hardening flags are configured by system` \
-	--with-systemd \
 	--with-default-pkcs11-provider=yes \
 	--with-security-key-builtin=yes \
 	--with-pam \
+	--enable-dsa-keys \
 %if %{WITH_SELINUX}
 	--with-selinux --with-audit=linux \
 	--with-sandbox=seccomp_filter \
@@ -776,6 +706,7 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %files server
 %dir %attr(0711,root,root) %{_datadir}/empty.sshd
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-session
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sshd-keygen
 %attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
@@ -817,6 +748,28 @@ test -f %{sysconfig_anaconda} && \
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Feb 25 2026 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-4
+- Provide a way to skip unsupported ML-KEM hybrid algorithms in FIPS mode
+  Resolves: RHEL-151580
+
+* Tue Dec 09 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-3
+- Enable support for DSA keys
+  Resolves: RHEL-127624
+- CVE-2025-61984: Reject usernames with control characters
+  Resolves: RHEL-133959
+- CVE-2025-61985: Reject URL-strings with NULL characters
+  Resolves: RHEL-133960
+
+* Mon Oct 27 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-2
+- Fix implicit destination path selection when source path ends with ".."
+  Resolves: RHEL-119515
+- Canonicalize username when matching a user
+  Resolves: RHEL-118372
+
+* Wed Sep 10 2025 Pavol Žáčik <pzacik@redhat.com> - 9.9p1-1
+- Rebase to version 9.9
+  Resolves: RHEL-108912
+
 * Mon Jul 21 2025 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.7p1-46
 - Move the redhat help message to debug1 log level
   Resolves: RHEL-104580