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import expat-2.2.10-9.el9

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CentOS Sources 2022-03-01 07:57:15 -05:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent bb12730907
commit 75ddd38220
6 changed files with 498 additions and 1 deletions
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62
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
index d54af683..5ce31402 100644
--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -2067,6 +2067,11 @@ XML_GetBuffer(XML_Parser parser, int len) {
keep = (int)EXPAT_SAFE_PTR_DIFF(parser->m_bufferPtr, parser->m_buffer);
if (keep > XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
keep = XML_CONTEXT_BYTES;
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (keep > INT_MAX - neededSize) {
+ parser->m_errorCode = XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ return NULL;
+ }
neededSize += keep;
#endif /* defined XML_CONTEXT_BYTES */
if (neededSize
diff --git a/tests/runtests.c b/tests/runtests.c
index e89e8220..579dad1a 100644
--- a/tests/runtests.c
+++ b/tests/runtests.c
@@ -3847,6 +3847,30 @@ START_TEST(test_get_buffer_2) {
}
END_TEST
+/* Test for signed integer overflow CVE-2022-23852 */
+#if defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
+START_TEST(test_get_buffer_3_overflow) {
+ XML_Parser parser = XML_ParserCreate(NULL);
+ assert(parser != NULL);
+
+ const char *const text = "\n";
+ const int expectedKeepValue = (int)strlen(text);
+
+ // After this call, variable "keep" in XML_GetBuffer will
+ // have value expectedKeepValue
+ if (XML_Parse(parser, text, (int)strlen(text), XML_FALSE /* isFinal */)
+ == XML_STATUS_ERROR)
+ xml_failure(parser);
+
+ assert(expectedKeepValue > 0);
+ if (XML_GetBuffer(parser, INT_MAX - expectedKeepValue + 1) != NULL)
+ fail("enlarging buffer not failed");
+
+ XML_ParserFree(parser);
+}
+END_TEST
+#endif // defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
+
/* Test position information macros */
START_TEST(test_byte_info_at_end) {
const char *text = "<doc></doc>";
@@ -11731,6 +11755,9 @@ make_suite(void) {
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_empty_parse);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_1);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_2);
+#if defined(XML_CONTEXT_BYTES)
+ tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_get_buffer_3_overflow);
+#endif
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_end);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_error);
tcase_add_test(tc_basic, test_byte_info_at_cdata);

59
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,59 @@
From 0adcb34c49bee5b19bd29b16a578c510c23597ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Mon, 27 Dec 2021 20:15:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] lib: Detect and prevent troublesome left shifts in function
storeAtts (CVE-2021-45960)
---
expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
1 file changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
index d730f41c3..b47c31b05 100644
--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -3414,7 +3414,13 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
if (nPrefixes) {
int j; /* hash table index */
unsigned long version = parser->m_nsAttsVersion;
- int nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
+ if (parser->m_nsAttsPower >= sizeof(unsigned int) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ unsigned int nsAttsSize = 1u << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
unsigned char oldNsAttsPower = parser->m_nsAttsPower;
/* size of hash table must be at least 2 * (# of prefixed attributes) */
if ((nPrefixes << 1)
@@ -3425,7 +3431,28 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
;
if (parser->m_nsAttsPower < 3)
parser->m_nsAttsPower = 3;
- nsAttsSize = (int)1 << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
+ if (parser->m_nsAttsPower >= sizeof(nsAttsSize) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
+ /* Restore actual size of memory in m_nsAtts */
+ parser->m_nsAttsPower = oldNsAttsPower;
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ nsAttsSize = 1u << parser->m_nsAttsPower;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if (nsAttsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(NS_ATT)) {
+ /* Restore actual size of memory in m_nsAtts */
+ parser->m_nsAttsPower = oldNsAttsPower;
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+#endif
+
temp = (NS_ATT *)REALLOC(parser, parser->m_nsAtts,
nsAttsSize * sizeof(NS_ATT));
if (! temp) {

43
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
From 85ae9a2d7d0e9358f356b33977b842df8ebaec2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Sat, 25 Dec 2021 20:52:08 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow on m_groupSize in function
doProlog (CVE-2021-46143)
---
expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 15 +++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
index b47c31b0..8f243126 100644
--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -5046,6 +5046,11 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
if (parser->m_prologState.level >= parser->m_groupSize) {
if (parser->m_groupSize) {
{
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (parser->m_groupSize > (unsigned int)(-1) / 2u) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
char *const new_connector = (char *)REALLOC(
parser, parser->m_groupConnector, parser->m_groupSize *= 2);
if (new_connector == NULL) {
@@ -5056,6 +5061,16 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
}
if (dtd->scaffIndex) {
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if (parser->m_groupSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(int)) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+#endif
+
int *const new_scaff_index = (int *)REALLOC(
parser, dtd->scaffIndex, parser->m_groupSize * sizeof(int));
if (new_scaff_index == NULL)

250
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,250 @@
From 9f93e8036e842329863bf20395b8fb8f73834d9e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Thu, 30 Dec 2021 22:46:03 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] lib: Prevent integer overflow at multiple places
(CVE-2022-22822 to CVE-2022-22827)
The involved functions are:
- addBinding (CVE-2022-22822)
- build_model (CVE-2022-22823)
- defineAttribute (CVE-2022-22824)
- lookup (CVE-2022-22825)
- nextScaffoldPart (CVE-2022-22826)
- storeAtts (CVE-2022-22827)
---
expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 153 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 151 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
index 8f243126..575e73ee 100644
--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -3261,13 +3261,38 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
/* get the attributes from the tokenizer */
n = XmlGetAttributes(enc, attStr, parser->m_attsSize, parser->m_atts);
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (n > INT_MAX - nDefaultAtts) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
if (n + nDefaultAtts > parser->m_attsSize) {
int oldAttsSize = parser->m_attsSize;
ATTRIBUTE *temp;
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
XML_AttrInfo *temp2;
#endif
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if ((nDefaultAtts > INT_MAX - INIT_ATTS_SIZE)
+ || (n > INT_MAX - (nDefaultAtts + INIT_ATTS_SIZE))) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
parser->m_attsSize = n + nDefaultAtts + INIT_ATTS_SIZE;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if ((unsigned)parser->m_attsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(ATTRIBUTE)) {
+ parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+#endif
+
temp = (ATTRIBUTE *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_atts,
parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(ATTRIBUTE));
if (temp == NULL) {
@@ -3276,6 +3301,17 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
}
parser->m_atts = temp;
#ifdef XML_ATTR_INFO
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+# if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if ((unsigned)parser->m_attsSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_AttrInfo)) {
+ parser->m_attsSize = oldAttsSize;
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+# endif
+
temp2 = (XML_AttrInfo *)REALLOC(parser, (void *)parser->m_attInfo,
parser->m_attsSize * sizeof(XML_AttrInfo));
if (temp2 == NULL) {
@@ -3610,9 +3646,31 @@ storeAtts(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *attStr,
tagNamePtr->prefixLen = prefixLen;
for (i = 0; localPart[i++];)
; /* i includes null terminator */
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (binding->uriLen > INT_MAX - prefixLen
+ || i > INT_MAX - (binding->uriLen + prefixLen)) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
n = i + binding->uriLen + prefixLen;
if (n > binding->uriAlloc) {
TAG *p;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (n > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if ((unsigned)(n + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+#endif
+
uri = (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, (n + EXPAND_SPARE) * sizeof(XML_Char));
if (! uri)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
@@ -3708,6 +3766,21 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
if (parser->m_freeBindingList) {
b = parser->m_freeBindingList;
if (len > b->uriAlloc) {
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (len > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if ((unsigned)(len + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+#endif
+
XML_Char *temp = (XML_Char *)REALLOC(
parser, b->uri, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
if (temp == NULL)
@@ -3720,6 +3793,21 @@ addBinding(XML_Parser parser, PREFIX *prefix, const ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId,
b = (BINDING *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(BINDING));
if (! b)
return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (len > INT_MAX - EXPAND_SPARE) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if ((unsigned)(len + EXPAND_SPARE) > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+#endif
+
b->uri
= (XML_Char *)MALLOC(parser, sizeof(XML_Char) * (len + EXPAND_SPARE));
if (! b->uri) {
@@ -6141,7 +6229,24 @@ defineAttribute(ELEMENT_TYPE *type, ATTRIBUTE_ID *attId, XML_Bool isCdata,
}
} else {
DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *temp;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (type->allocDefaultAtts > INT_MAX / 2) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
int count = type->allocDefaultAtts * 2;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if ((unsigned)count > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif
+
temp = (DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE *)REALLOC(parser, type->defaultAtts,
(count * sizeof(DEFAULT_ATTRIBUTE)));
if (temp == NULL)
@@ -6792,8 +6897,20 @@ lookup(XML_Parser parser, HASH_TABLE *table, KEY name, size_t createSize) {
/* check for overflow (table is half full) */
if (table->used >> (table->power - 1)) {
unsigned char newPower = table->power + 1;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent invalid shift */
+ if (newPower >= sizeof(unsigned long) * 8 /* bits per byte */) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
size_t newSize = (size_t)1 << newPower;
unsigned long newMask = (unsigned long)newSize - 1;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (newSize > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(NAMED *)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
size_t tsize = newSize * sizeof(NAMED *);
NAMED **newV = (NAMED **)table->mem->malloc_fcn(tsize);
if (! newV)
@@ -7143,6 +7260,20 @@ nextScaffoldPart(XML_Parser parser) {
if (dtd->scaffCount >= dtd->scaffSize) {
CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *temp;
if (dtd->scaffold) {
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (dtd->scaffSize > UINT_MAX / 2u) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if (dtd->scaffSize > (size_t)(-1) / 2u / sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD)) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+#endif
+
temp = (CONTENT_SCAFFOLD *)REALLOC(
parser, dtd->scaffold, dtd->scaffSize * 2 * sizeof(CONTENT_SCAFFOLD));
if (temp == NULL)
@@ -7212,8 +7343,26 @@ build_model(XML_Parser parser) {
XML_Content *ret;
XML_Content *cpos;
XML_Char *str;
- int allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
- + (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow.
+ * The preprocessor guard addresses the "always false" warning
+ * from -Wtype-limits on platforms where
+ * sizeof(unsigned int) < sizeof(size_t), e.g. on x86_64. */
+#if UINT_MAX >= SIZE_MAX
+ if (dtd->scaffCount > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Content)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (dtd->contentStringLen > (size_t)(-1) / sizeof(XML_Char)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+#endif
+ if (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
+ > (size_t)(-1) - dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)) {
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ const size_t allocsize = (dtd->scaffCount * sizeof(XML_Content)
+ + (dtd->contentStringLen * sizeof(XML_Char)));
ret = (XML_Content *)MALLOC(parser, allocsize);
if (! ret)

42
SOURCES/expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
From ede41d1e186ed2aba88a06e84cac839b770af3a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Pipping <sebastian@pipping.org>
Date: Wed, 26 Jan 2022 02:36:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] lib: Prevent integer overflow in doProlog
(CVE-2022-23990)
The change from "int nameLen" to "size_t nameLen"
addresses the overflow on "nameLen++" in code
"for (; name[nameLen++];)" right above the second
change in the patch.
---
expat/lib/xmlparse.c | 10 ++++++++--
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/xmlparse.c b/lib/xmlparse.c
index 5ce31402..d1d17005 100644
--- a/lib/xmlparse.c
+++ b/lib/xmlparse.c
@@ -5372,7 +5372,7 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
if (dtd->in_eldecl) {
ELEMENT_TYPE *el;
const XML_Char *name;
- int nameLen;
+ size_t nameLen;
const char *nxt
= (quant == XML_CQUANT_NONE ? next : next - enc->minBytesPerChar);
int myindex = nextScaffoldPart(parser);
@@ -5388,7 +5388,13 @@ doProlog(XML_Parser parser, const ENCODING *enc, const char *s, const char *end,
nameLen = 0;
for (; name[nameLen++];)
;
- dtd->contentStringLen += nameLen;
+
+ /* Detect and prevent integer overflow */
+ if (nameLen > UINT_MAX - dtd->contentStringLen) {
+ return XML_ERROR_NO_MEMORY;
+ }
+
+ dtd->contentStringLen += (unsigned)nameLen;
if (parser->m_elementDeclHandler)
handleDefault = XML_FALSE;
}

43
SPECS/expat.spec
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@ -3,12 +3,17 @@
Summary: An XML parser library
Name: expat
Version: %(echo %{unversion} | sed 's/_/./g')
Release: 4%{?dist}
Release: 9%{?dist}
Source: https://github.com/libexpat/libexpat/archive/R_%{unversion}.tar.gz#/expat-%{version}.tar.gz
URL: https://libexpat.github.io/
License: MIT
BuildRequires: autoconf, libtool, xmlto, gcc-c++
BuildRequires: make
Patch0: expat-2.2.10-prevent-integer-overflow-in-doProlog.patch
Patch1: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-more-integer-overflows.patch
Patch2: expat-2.2.10-Prevent-integer-overflow-on-m_groupSize-in-function.patch
Patch3: expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-troublesome-left-shifts.patch
Patch4: expat-2.2.10-Detect-and-prevent-integer-overflow-in-XML_GetBuffer.patch
%description
This is expat, the C library for parsing XML, written by James Clark. Expat
@ -36,6 +41,12 @@ Install it if you need to link statically with expat.
%prep
%setup -q -n libexpat-R_%{unversion}/expat
%patch0 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23990
%patch1 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-22822-CVE-2022-22827
%patch2 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46143
%patch3 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-45960
%patch4 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-23852
sed -i 's/install-data-hook/do-nothing-please/' lib/Makefile.am
./buildconf.sh
@ -72,6 +83,36 @@ make check
%{_libdir}/lib*.a
%changelog
* Thu Feb 10 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-9
- CVE-2022-23852 expat: integer overflow in function XML_GetBuffer
- Resolves: CVE-2022-23852
* Thu Feb 10 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-8
- CVE-2021-45960 expat: Large number of prefixed XML attributes on a single tag can crash libexpat
- Resolves: CVE-2021-45960
* Wed Feb 09 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-7
- CVE-2021-46143 expat: Integer overflow in doProlog in xmlparse.c
- Resolves: CVE-2021-46143
* Wed Feb 09 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-6
- CVE-2022-22827 Integer overflow in storeAtts in xmlparse.c
- CVE-2022-22826 Integer overflow in nextScaffoldPart in xmlparse.c
- CVE-2022-22825 Integer overflow in lookup in xmlparse.c
- CVE-2022-22824 Integer overflow in defineAttribute in xmlparse.c
- CVE-2022-22823 Integer overflow in build_model in xmlparse.c
- CVE-2022-22822 Integer overflow in addBinding in xmlparse.c
- Resolves: CVE-2022-22827
- Resolves: CVE-2022-22826
- Resolves: CVE-2022-22825
- Resolves: CVE-2022-22824
- Resolves: CVE-2022-22823
- Resolves: CVE-2022-22822
* Mon Feb 07 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-5
- CVE-2022-23990 expat: integer overflow in the doProlog function
- Resolve: rhbz#2050503
* Mon Aug 09 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 2.2.10-4
- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
Related: rhbz#1991688