SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2023-2828.patch

@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-From ed920ea2ae1cc1214b42b82a5149758dbec941a5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Ond=C5=99ej=20Sur=C3=BD?= <ondrej@isc.org>
-Date: Tue, 30 May 2023 08:46:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Improve RBT overmem cache cleaning
-
-When cache memory usage is over the configured cache size (overmem) and
-we are cleaning unused entries, it might not be enough to clean just two
-entries if the entries to be expired are smaller than the newly added
-rdata.  This could be abused by an attacker to cause a remote Denial of
-Service by possibly running out of the operating system memory.
-
-Currently, the addrdataset() tries to do a single TTL-based cleaning
-considering the serve-stale TTL and then optionally moves to overmem
-cleaning if we are in that condition.  Then the overmem_purge() tries to
-do another single TTL based cleaning from the TTL heap and then continue
-with LRU-based cleaning up to 2 entries cleaned.
-
-Squash the TTL-cleaning mechanism into single call from addrdataset(),
-but ignore the serve-stale TTL if we are currently overmem.
-
-Then instead of having a fixed number of entries to clean, pass the size
-of newly added rdatasetheader to the overmem_purge() function and
-cleanup at least the size of the newly added data.  This prevents the
-cache going over the configured memory limit (`max-cache-size`).
-
-Additionally, refactor the overmem_purge() function to reduce for-loop
-nesting for readability.
-
-(cherry picked from commit f1d9e9ee3859976f403914d20ad2a10855343702)
----
- lib/dns/rbtdb.c | 105 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- 1 file changed, 65 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
-index 51178cc877..75f97f5550 100644
---- a/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
-+++ b/lib/dns/rbtdb.c
-@@ -599,7 +599,7 @@ static void
- expire_header(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rdatasetheader_t *header, bool tree_locked,
- 	      expire_t reason);
- static void
--overmem_purge(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum_start, isc_stdtime_t now,
-+overmem_purge(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum_start, size_t purgesize,
- 	      bool tree_locked);
- static isc_result_t
- resign_insert(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, int idx, rdatasetheader_t *newheader);
-@@ -6802,6 +6802,16 @@ cleanup:
- 
- static dns_dbmethods_t zone_methods;
- 
-+static size_t
-+rdataset_size(rdatasetheader_t *header) {
-+	if (!NONEXISTENT(header)) {
-+		return (dns_rdataslab_size((unsigned char *)header,
-+					   sizeof(*header)));
-+	}
-+
-+	return (sizeof(*header));
-+}
-+
- static isc_result_t
- addrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
- 	    isc_stdtime_t now, dns_rdataset_t *rdataset, unsigned int options,
-@@ -6965,7 +6975,8 @@ addrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
- 	}
- 
- 	if (cache_is_overmem) {
--		overmem_purge(rbtdb, rbtnode->locknum, now, tree_locked);
-+		overmem_purge(rbtdb, rbtnode->locknum, rdataset_size(newheader),
-+			      tree_locked);
- 	}
- 
- 	NODE_LOCK(&rbtdb->node_locks[rbtnode->locknum].lock,
-@@ -6984,10 +6995,18 @@ addrdataset(dns_db_t *db, dns_dbnode_t *node, dns_dbversion_t *version,
- 		}
- 
- 		header = isc_heap_element(rbtdb->heaps[rbtnode->locknum], 1);
--		if (header != NULL && header->rdh_ttl + rbtdb->serve_stale_ttl <
--					      now - RBTDB_VIRTUAL)
--		{
--			expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked, expire_ttl);
-+		if (header != NULL) {
-+			dns_ttl_t rdh_ttl = header->rdh_ttl;
-+
-+			/* Only account for stale TTL if cache is not overmem */
-+			if (!cache_is_overmem) {
-+				rdh_ttl += rbtdb->serve_stale_ttl;
-+			}
-+
-+			if (rdh_ttl < now - RBTDB_VIRTUAL) {
-+				expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked,
-+					      expire_ttl);
-+			}
- 		}
- 
- 		/*
-@@ -10531,52 +10550,58 @@ update_header(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, rdatasetheader_t *header, isc_stdtime_t now) {
- 	ISC_LIST_PREPEND(rbtdb->rdatasets[header->node->locknum], header, link);
- }
- 
-+static size_t
-+expire_lru_headers(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum, size_t purgesize,
-+		   bool tree_locked) {
-+	rdatasetheader_t *header, *header_prev;
-+	size_t purged = 0;
-+
-+	for (header = ISC_LIST_TAIL(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum]);
-+	     header != NULL && purged <= purgesize; header = header_prev)
-+	{
-+		header_prev = ISC_LIST_PREV(header, link);
-+		/*
-+		 * Unlink the entry at this point to avoid checking it
-+		 * again even if it's currently used someone else and
-+		 * cannot be purged at this moment.  This entry won't be
-+		 * referenced any more (so unlinking is safe) since the
-+		 * TTL was reset to 0.
-+		 */
-+		ISC_LIST_UNLINK(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum], header, link);
-+		size_t header_size = rdataset_size(header);
-+		expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked, expire_lru);
-+		purged += header_size;
-+	}
-+
-+	return (purged);
-+}
-+
- /*%
-- * Purge some expired and/or stale (i.e. unused for some period) cache entries
-- * under an overmem condition.  To recover from this condition quickly, up to
-- * 2 entries will be purged.  This process is triggered while adding a new
-- * entry, and we specifically avoid purging entries in the same LRU bucket as
-- * the one to which the new entry will belong.  Otherwise, we might purge
-- * entries of the same name of different RR types while adding RRsets from a
-- * single response (consider the case where we're adding A and AAAA glue records
-- * of the same NS name).
-+ * Purge some stale (i.e. unused for some period - LRU based cleaning) cache
-+ * entries under the overmem condition.  To recover from this condition quickly,
-+ * we cleanup entries up to the size of newly added rdata (passed as purgesize).
-+ *
-+ * This process is triggered while adding a new entry, and we specifically avoid
-+ * purging entries in the same LRU bucket as the one to which the new entry will
-+ * belong.  Otherwise, we might purge entries of the same name of different RR
-+ * types while adding RRsets from a single response (consider the case where
-+ * we're adding A and AAAA glue records of the same NS name).
-  */
- static void
--overmem_purge(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum_start, isc_stdtime_t now,
-+overmem_purge(dns_rbtdb_t *rbtdb, unsigned int locknum_start, size_t purgesize,
- 	      bool tree_locked) {
--	rdatasetheader_t *header, *header_prev;
- 	unsigned int locknum;
--	int purgecount = 2;
-+	size_t purged = 0;
- 
- 	for (locknum = (locknum_start + 1) % rbtdb->node_lock_count;
--	     locknum != locknum_start && purgecount > 0;
-+	     locknum != locknum_start && purged <= purgesize;
- 	     locknum = (locknum + 1) % rbtdb->node_lock_count)
- 	{
- 		NODE_LOCK(&rbtdb->node_locks[locknum].lock,
- 			  isc_rwlocktype_write);
- 
--		header = isc_heap_element(rbtdb->heaps[locknum], 1);
--		if (header && header->rdh_ttl < now - RBTDB_VIRTUAL) {
--			expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked, expire_ttl);
--			purgecount--;
--		}
--
--		for (header = ISC_LIST_TAIL(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum]);
--		     header != NULL && purgecount > 0; header = header_prev)
--		{
--			header_prev = ISC_LIST_PREV(header, link);
--			/*
--			 * Unlink the entry at this point to avoid checking it
--			 * again even if it's currently used someone else and
--			 * cannot be purged at this moment.  This entry won't be
--			 * referenced any more (so unlinking is safe) since the
--			 * TTL was reset to 0.
--			 */
--			ISC_LIST_UNLINK(rbtdb->rdatasets[locknum], header,
--					link);
--			expire_header(rbtdb, header, tree_locked, expire_lru);
--			purgecount--;
--		}
-+		purged += expire_lru_headers(rbtdb, locknum, purgesize - purged,
-+					     tree_locked);
- 
- 		NODE_UNLOCK(&rbtdb->node_locks[locknum].lock,
- 			    isc_rwlocktype_write);
--- 
-2.40.1
-

SOURCES/bind-9.16-CVE-2023-3341.patch

@@ -1,168 +0,0 @@
-From b137e12dc8118cddee20e372e480a495585e72b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Petr Mensik <pemensik@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 19 Sep 2023 12:44:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix CVE-2023-3341
-
-6245.	[security]	Limit the amount of recursion that can be performed
-			by isccc_cc_fromwire. (CVE-2023-3341) [GL #4152]
----
- lib/isccc/cc.c                   | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h |  4 +++-
- lib/isccc/result.c               |  4 +++-
- 3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/isccc/cc.c b/lib/isccc/cc.c
-index 0be28b9057..3744d0f037 100644
---- a/lib/isccc/cc.c
-+++ b/lib/isccc/cc.c
-@@ -50,6 +50,10 @@
- 
- #define MAX_TAGS     256
- #define DUP_LIFETIME 900
-+#ifndef ISCCC_MAXDEPTH
-+#define ISCCC_MAXDEPTH \
-+	10 /* Big enough for rndc which just sends a string each way. */
-+#endif
- 
- typedef isccc_sexpr_t *sexpr_ptr;
- 
-@@ -480,19 +484,25 @@ verify(isccc_sexpr_t *alist, unsigned char *data, unsigned int length,
- 
- static isc_result_t
- table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
--	       uint32_t algorithm, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp);
-+	       uint32_t algorithm, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp);
- 
- static isc_result_t
--list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **listp);
-+list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth,
-+	      isccc_sexpr_t **listp);
- 
- static isc_result_t
--value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
-+value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth,
-+	       isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
- 	unsigned int msgtype;
- 	uint32_t len;
- 	isccc_sexpr_t *value;
- 	isccc_region_t active;
- 	isc_result_t result;
- 
-+	if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) {
-+		return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH);
-+	}
-+
- 	if (REGION_SIZE(*source) < 1 + 4) {
- 		return (ISC_R_UNEXPECTEDEND);
- 	}
-@@ -513,9 +523,9 @@ value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
- 			result = ISC_R_NOMEMORY;
- 		}
- 	} else if (msgtype == ISCCC_CCMSGTYPE_TABLE) {
--		result = table_fromwire(&active, NULL, 0, valuep);
-+		result = table_fromwire(&active, NULL, 0, depth + 1, valuep);
- 	} else if (msgtype == ISCCC_CCMSGTYPE_LIST) {
--		result = list_fromwire(&active, valuep);
-+		result = list_fromwire(&active, depth + 1, valuep);
- 	} else {
- 		result = ISCCC_R_SYNTAX;
- 	}
-@@ -525,7 +535,7 @@ value_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **valuep) {
- 
- static isc_result_t
- table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
--	       uint32_t algorithm, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp) {
-+	       uint32_t algorithm, unsigned int depth, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp) {
- 	char key[256];
- 	uint32_t len;
- 	isc_result_t result;
-@@ -535,6 +545,10 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
- 
- 	REQUIRE(alistp != NULL && *alistp == NULL);
- 
-+	if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) {
-+		return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH);
-+	}
-+
- 	checksum_rstart = NULL;
- 	first_tag = true;
- 	alist = isccc_alist_create();
-@@ -551,7 +565,7 @@ table_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_region_t *secret,
- 		GET_MEM(key, len, source->rstart);
- 		key[len] = '\0'; /* Ensure NUL termination. */
- 		value = NULL;
--		result = value_fromwire(source, &value);
-+		result = value_fromwire(source, depth + 1, &value);
- 		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
- 			goto bad;
- 		}
-@@ -589,14 +603,19 @@ bad:
- }
- 
- static isc_result_t
--list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **listp) {
-+list_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, unsigned int depth,
-+	      isccc_sexpr_t **listp) {
- 	isccc_sexpr_t *list, *value;
- 	isc_result_t result;
- 
-+	if (depth > ISCCC_MAXDEPTH) {
-+		return (ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH);
-+	}
-+
- 	list = NULL;
- 	while (!REGION_EMPTY(*source)) {
- 		value = NULL;
--		result = value_fromwire(source, &value);
-+		result = value_fromwire(source, depth + 1, &value);
- 		if (result != ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
- 			isccc_sexpr_free(&list);
- 			return (result);
-@@ -628,7 +647,7 @@ isccc_cc_fromwire(isccc_region_t *source, isccc_sexpr_t **alistp,
- 		return (ISCCC_R_UNKNOWNVERSION);
- 	}
- 
--	return (table_fromwire(source, secret, algorithm, alistp));
-+	return (table_fromwire(source, secret, algorithm, 0, alistp));
- }
- 
- static isc_result_t
-diff --git a/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h b/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h
-index 5346babefc..5b6a876d1c 100644
---- a/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h
-+++ b/lib/isccc/include/isccc/result.h
-@@ -46,8 +46,10 @@
- #define ISCCC_R_CLOCKSKEW (ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 4)
- /*% Duplicate */
- #define ISCCC_R_DUPLICATE (ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 5)
-+/*% Maximum recursion depth */
-+#define ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH (ISC_RESULTCLASS_ISCCC + 6)
- 
--#define ISCCC_R_NRESULTS 6 /*%< Number of results */
-+#define ISCCC_R_NRESULTS 7 /*%< Number of results */
- 
- ISC_LANG_BEGINDECLS
- 
-diff --git a/lib/isccc/result.c b/lib/isccc/result.c
-index 9285435209..1956cb1655 100644
---- a/lib/isccc/result.c
-+++ b/lib/isccc/result.c
-@@ -36,12 +36,14 @@ static const char *text[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = {
- 	"bad auth",	   /* 3 */
- 	"expired",	   /* 4 */
- 	"clock skew",	   /* 5 */
--	"duplicate"	   /* 6 */
-+	"duplicate",	   /* 6 */
-+	"max depth"	   /* 7 */
- };
- 
- static const char *ids[ISCCC_R_NRESULTS] = {
- 	"ISCCC_R_UNKNOWNVERSION", "ISCCC_R_SYNTAX",    "ISCCC_R_BADAUTH",
- 	"ISCCC_R_EXPIRED",	  "ISCCC_R_CLOCKSKEW", "ISCCC_R_DUPLICATE",
-+	"ISCCC_R_MAXDEPTH"
- };
- 
- #define ISCCC_RESULT_RESULTSET 2
--- 
-2.41.0
-

SPECS/bind9.16.spec

@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ Summary:  The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) DNS (Domain Name System) serv
 Name:     bind9.16
 License:  MPLv2.0
 Version:  9.16.23
-Release:  0.16%{?dist}
+Release:  0.14%{?dist}
 Epoch:    32
 Url:      https://www.isc.org/downloads/bind/
 #
@@ -126,9 +126,6 @@ Patch185: bind-9.16-CVE-2022-3094-test.patch
 Patch186: bind-9.16-CVE-2022-3736.patch
 # https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/b4a65aaea19762a3712932aa2270e8a833fbde22
 Patch187: bind-9.16-CVE-2022-3924.patch
-# https://gitlab.isc.org/isc-projects/bind9/commit/f1d9e9ee3859976f403914d20ad2a10855343702
-Patch188: bind-9.16-CVE-2023-2828.patch
-Patch189: bind-9.16-CVE-2023-3341.patch
 
 %{?systemd_ordering}
 Requires:       coreutils
@@ -440,8 +437,6 @@ in HTML and PDF format.
 %patch185 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-3094-test
 %patch186 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-3736
 %patch187 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-3924
-%patch188 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-2828
-%patch189 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-3341
 
 %if %{with PKCS11}
 %patch135 -p1 -b .config-pkcs11
@@ -1161,13 +1156,6 @@ fi;
 %endif
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Sep 20 2023 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.16.23-0.16
-- Limit the amount of recursion possible in control channel (CVE-2023-3341)
-
-* Tue Jun 20 2023 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.16.23-0.15
-- Strengten cache cleaning to prevent overflowing configured limit
-  (CVE-2023-2828)
-
 * Sat Feb 25 2023 Petr Menšík <pemensik@redhat.com> - 32:9.16.23-0.14
 - Handle subtle difference between upstream and rhel (CVE-2022-3094)