.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz
+SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz

.xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.metadata

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+ae980a7deeb7cad9f3cd253f3b1ddca5bb26aafa SOURCES/xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz

0001-dix-fix-valuator-copy-paste-error-in-the-DeviceState.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 4c8de123f04e80a1c14c64064ebcec5497d2ec4b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 14:22:12 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] dix: fix valuator copy/paste error in the
- DeviceStateNotify event
-
-Fixes 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5
-
-(cherry picked from commit 133e0d651c5d12bf01999d6289e84e224ba77adc)
-
-Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1452>
----
- dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
-index 7b7ba1098..c1e6ac600 100644
---- a/dix/enterleave.c
-+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
-@@ -619,11 +619,11 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
-     ev->first_valuator = first;
-     switch (ev->num_valuators) {
-     case 6:
--        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
-+        ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
-     case 5:
--        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
-+        ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
-     case 4:
--        ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
-+        ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
-     case 3:
-         ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
-     case 2:
--- 
-2.44.0
-

0001-render-Avoid-0-or-less-animated-cursors.patch

@@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
-From 1d154fa2d5c52fa144c9cf0499affeba7be4f29e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 09:43:52 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/6] render: Avoid 0 or less animated cursors
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-Animated cursors use a series of cursors that the client can set.
-
-By default, the Xserver assumes at least one cursor is specified
-while a client may actually pass no cursor at all.
-
-That causes an out-of-bound read creating the animated cursor and a
-crash of the Xserver:
-
- | Invalid read of size 8
- |    at 0x5323F4: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
- |    by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
- |    by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
- |    by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
- |    by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
- |    by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
- |  Address 0x59aa010 is 0 bytes after a block of size 0 alloc'd
- |    at 0x48468D3: reallocarray (vg_replace_malloc.c:1803)
- |    by 0x52D3DA: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1802)
- |    by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
- |    by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
- |    by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
- |    by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
- |
- | Invalid read of size 2
- |    at 0x5323F7: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
- |    by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
- |    by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
- |    by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
- |    by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
- |    by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
- |  Address 0x8 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
-
-To avoid the issue, check the number of cursors specified and return a
-BadValue error in both the proc handler (early) and the animated cursor
-creation (as this is a public function) if there is 0 or less cursor.
-
-CVE-2025-49175
-
-This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
-reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 9304e31035f97ddbfcc1d5f3c178da1d04a472ad)
----
- render/animcur.c | 3 +++
- render/render.c  | 2 ++
- 2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/render/animcur.c b/render/animcur.c
-index ef27bda27..77942d846 100644
---- a/render/animcur.c
-+++ b/render/animcur.c
-@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@ AnimCursorCreate(CursorPtr *cursors, CARD32 *deltas, int ncursor,
-     int rc = BadAlloc, i;
-     AnimCurPtr ac;
- 
-+    if (ncursor <= 0)
-+        return BadValue;
-+
-     for (i = 0; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++)
-         if (!GetAnimCurScreen(screenInfo.screens[i]))
-             return BadImplementation;
-diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
-index 456f156d4..e9bbac62d 100644
---- a/render/render.c
-+++ b/render/render.c
-@@ -1788,6 +1788,8 @@ ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor(ClientPtr client)
-     ncursor =
-         (client->req_len -
-          (bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq)))) >> 1;
-+    if (ncursor <= 0)
-+        return BadValue;
-     cursors = xallocarray(ncursor, sizeof(CursorPtr) + sizeof(CARD32));
-     if (!cursors)
-         return BadAlloc;
--- 
-2.49.0
-

0001-render-Avoid-possible-double-free-in-ProcRenderAddGl.patch

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-From c3c2218ab797516e4d63a93a078d77c6ce872d03 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 15:24:49 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] render: Avoid possible double-free in
- ProcRenderAddGlyphs()
-
-ProcRenderAddGlyphs() adds the glyph to the glyphset using AddGlyph() and
-then frees it using FreeGlyph() to decrease the reference count, after
-AddGlyph() has increased it.
-
-AddGlyph() however may chose to reuse an existing glyph if it's already
-in the glyphSet, and free the glyph that was given, in which case the
-caller function, ProcRenderAddGlyphs() will call FreeGlyph() on an
-already freed glyph, as reported by ASan:
-
-  READ of size 4 thread T0
-    #0 in FreeGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:252
-    #1 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1174
-    #2 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
-    #3 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
-    #4 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
-    #5 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
-    #6 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
-    #7  (/usr/bin/Xwayland+0x44fe4)
-  Address is located 0 bytes inside of 64-byte region
-  freed by thread T0 here:
-    #0 in __interceptor_free libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:52
-    #1 in _dixFreeObjectWithPrivates xserver/dix/privates.c:538
-    #2 in AddGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:295
-    #3 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1173
-    #4 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
-    #5 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
-    #6 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
-    #7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
-  previously allocated by thread T0 here:
-    #0 in __interceptor_malloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
-    #1 in AllocateGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:355
-    #2 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1085
-    #3 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
-    #4 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
-    #5 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
-    #6 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
-  SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free xserver/render/glyph.c:252 in FreeGlyph
-
-To avoid that, make sure not to free the given glyph in AddGlyph().
-
-v2: Simplify the test using the boolean returned from AddGlyph() (Michel)
-v3: Simplify even more by not freeing the glyph in AddGlyph() (Peter)
-
-Fixes: bdca6c3d1 - render: fix refcounting of glyphs during ProcRenderAddGlyphs
-Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/issues/1659
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 337d8d48b618d4fc0168a7b978be4c3447650b04)
-
-Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1478>
----
- render/glyph.c | 2 --
- 1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c
-index d5fc5f3c9..f5069d42f 100644
---- a/render/glyph.c
-+++ b/render/glyph.c
-@@ -291,8 +291,6 @@ AddGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, GlyphPtr glyph, Glyph id)
-     gr = FindGlyphRef(&globalGlyphs[glyphSet->fdepth], signature,
-                       TRUE, glyph->sha1);
-     if (gr->glyph && gr->glyph != DeletedGlyph && gr->glyph != glyph) {
--        FreeGlyphPicture(glyph);
--        dixFreeObjectWithPrivates(glyph, PRIVATE_GLYPH);
-         glyph = gr->glyph;
-     }
-     else if (gr->glyph != glyph) {
--- 
-2.44.0
-

0001-xkb-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-_XkbSetCompatMap.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-From 26120df7aae6b5bf8086fb4d871d3b1a07ddacdb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 10:37:28 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in _XkbSetCompatMap()
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The _XkbSetCompatMap() function attempts to resize the `sym_interpret`
-buffer.
-
-However, It didn't update its size properly. It updated `num_si` only,
-without updating `size_si`.
-
-This may lead to local privilege escalation if the server is run as root
-or remote code execution (e.g. x11 over ssh).
-
-CVE-2024-9632, ZDI-CAN-24756
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Tested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 85b776571487f52e756f68a069c768757369bfe3)
-
-Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1735>
----
- xkb/xkb.c | 8 ++++----
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
-index 8d52e25df..8b63e34b5 100644
---- a/xkb/xkb.c
-+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
-@@ -2990,13 +2990,13 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
-         XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
-         unsigned int skipped = 0;
- 
--        if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->num_si) {
--            compat->num_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
-+        if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
-+            compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
-             compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,
--                                                 compat->num_si,
-+                                                 compat->size_si,
-                                                  sizeof(XkbSymInterpretRec));
-             if (!compat->sym_interpret) {
--                compat->num_si = 0;
-+                compat->num_si = compat->size_si = 0;
-                 return BadAlloc;
-             }
-         }
--- 
-2.47.0
-

0002-Xi-ProcXIGetSelectedEvents-needs-to-use-unswapped-le.patch

@@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
-From bd16cc8368afc6959bebfb2b15cfdb93bcac6fee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:51:45 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] Xi: ProcXIGetSelectedEvents needs to use
- unswapped length to send reply
-
-CVE-2024-31080
-
-Reported-by: https://debbugs.gnu.org/cgi/bugreport.cgi?bug=69762
-Fixes: 53e821ab4 ("Xi: add request processing for XIGetSelectedEvents.")
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 96798fc1967491c80a4d0c8d9e0a80586cb2152b)
-
-Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1464>
----
- Xi/xiselectev.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xiselectev.c b/Xi/xiselectev.c
-index edcb8a0d3..ac1494987 100644
---- a/Xi/xiselectev.c
-+++ b/Xi/xiselectev.c
-@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client)
-     InputClientsPtr others = NULL;
-     xXIEventMask *evmask = NULL;
-     DeviceIntPtr dev;
-+    uint32_t length;
- 
-     REQUEST(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq);
-     REQUEST_SIZE_MATCH(xXIGetSelectedEventsReq);
-@@ -418,10 +419,12 @@ ProcXIGetSelectedEvents(ClientPtr client)
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    /* save the value before SRepXIGetSelectedEvents swaps it */
-+    length = reply.length;
-     WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(xXIGetSelectedEventsReply), &reply);
- 
-     if (reply.num_masks)
--        WriteToClient(client, reply.length * 4, buffer);
-+        WriteToClient(client, length * 4, buffer);
- 
-     free(buffer);
-     return Success;
--- 
-2.44.0
-

0002-os-Do-not-overflow-the-integer-size-with-BigRequest.patch

@@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
-From 6049e1b120c1aa93f23781c0976b1aad64f05f10 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 16:13:34 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/6] os: Do not overflow the integer size with
- BigRequest
-MIME-Version: 1.0
-Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
-Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
-The BigRequest extension allows request larger than the 16-bit length
-limit.
-
-It uses integers for the request length and checks for the size not to
-exceed the maxBigRequestSize limit, but does so after translating the
-length to integer by multiplying the given size in bytes by 4.
-
-In doing so, it might overflow the integer size limit before actually
-checking for the overflow, defeating the purpose of the test.
-
-To avoid the issue, make sure to check that the request size does not
-overflow the maxBigRequestSize limit prior to any conversion.
-
-The caller Dispatch() function however expects the return value to be in
-bytes, so we cannot just return the converted value in case of error, as
-that would also overflow the integer size.
-
-To preserve the existing API, we use a negative value for the X11 error
-code BadLength as the function only return positive values, 0 or -1 and
-update the caller Dispatch() function to take that case into account to
-return the error code to the offending client.
-
-CVE-2025-49176
-
-This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
-reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
-(cherry picked from commit b380b0a6c2022fbd3115552b1cd88251b5268daa)
----
- dix/dispatch.c | 9 +++++----
- os/io.c        | 4 ++++
- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
-index ba01de6cf..c71098ce9 100644
---- a/dix/dispatch.c
-+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
-@@ -464,9 +464,10 @@ Dispatch(void)
- 
-                 /* now, finally, deal with client requests */
-                 result = ReadRequestFromClient(client);
--                if (result <= 0) {
--                    if (result < 0)
--                        CloseDownClient(client);
-+                if (result == 0)
-+                    break;
-+                else if (result == -1) {
-+                    CloseDownClient(client);
-                     break;
-                 }
- 
-@@ -487,7 +488,7 @@ Dispatch(void)
-                                           client->index,
-                                           client->requestBuffer);
- #endif
--                if (result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
-+                if (result < 0 || result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
-                     result = BadLength;
-                 else {
-                     result = XaceHookDispatch(client, client->majorOp);
-diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
-index 5b7fac349..5fc05821c 100644
---- a/os/io.c
-+++ b/os/io.c
-@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
-                 needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
-         }
-         client->req_len = needed;
-+        if (needed > MAXINT >> 2) {
-+            /* Check for potential integer overflow */
-+            return -(BadLength);
-+        }
-         needed <<= 2;           /* needed is in bytes now */
-     }
-     if (gotnow < needed) {
--- 
-2.49.0
-

0003-Xi-ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice-needs-to-use-unswapped-le.patch

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-From 672b26d1f8e1cbe67d289786e3ce887988052b64 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 18:56:27 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] Xi: ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice needs to use
- unswapped length to send reply
-
-CVE-2024-31081
-
-Fixes: d220d6907 ("Xi: add GrabButton and GrabKeysym code.")
-Signed-off-by: Alan Coopersmith <alan.coopersmith@oracle.com>
-(cherry picked from commit 3e77295f888c67fc7645db5d0c00926a29ffecee)
-
-Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1464>
----
- Xi/xipassivegrab.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-index c9ac2f855..896233bec 100644
---- a/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-+++ b/Xi/xipassivegrab.c
-@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-     GrabParameters param;
-     void *tmp;
-     int mask_len;
-+    uint32_t length;
- 
-     REQUEST(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq);
-     REQUEST_FIXED_SIZE(xXIPassiveGrabDeviceReq,
-@@ -247,9 +248,11 @@ ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice(ClientPtr client)
-         }
-     }
- 
-+    /* save the value before SRepXIPassiveGrabDevice swaps it */
-+    length = rep.length;
-     WriteReplyToClient(client, sizeof(rep), &rep);
-     if (rep.num_modifiers)
--        WriteToClient(client, rep.length * 4, modifiers_failed);
-+        WriteToClient(client, length * 4, modifiers_failed);
- 
-  out:
-     free(modifiers_failed);
--- 
-2.44.0
-

0003-os-Check-for-integer-overflow-on-BigRequest-length.patch

@@ -1,35 +0,0 @@
-From 205be7f7bf6850b364e9f10fe9f27ce6360670c9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:39:02 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/6] os: Check for integer overflow on BigRequest
- length
-
-Check for another possible integer overflow once we get a complete xReq
-with BigRequest.
-
-Related to CVE-2025-49176
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Suggested-by: Peter Harris <pharris2@rocketsoftware.com>
-Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2028>
-(cherry picked from commit 4fc4d76b2c7aaed61ed2653f997783a3714c4fe1)
----
- os/io.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
-index 5fc05821c..064d69ea3 100644
---- a/os/io.c
-+++ b/os/io.c
-@@ -395,6 +395,8 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
-                     needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
-             }
-             client->req_len = needed;
-+            if (needed > MAXINT >> 2)
-+                return -(BadLength);
-             needed <<= 2;
-         }
-         if (gotnow < needed) {
--- 
-2.49.0
-

0004-os-Account-for-bytes-to-ignore-when-sharing-input-bu.patch

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From 9cd6d7efb87d6d51a9ddce152d103ac087287c52 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 10:46:03 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/6] os: Account for bytes to ignore when sharing
- input buffer
-
-When reading requests from the clients, the input buffer might be shared
-and used between different clients.
-
-If a given client sends a full request with non-zero bytes to ignore,
-the bytes to ignore may still be non-zero even though the request is
-full, in which case the buffer could be shared with another client who's
-request will not be processed because of those bytes to ignore, leading
-to a possible hang of the other client request.
-
-To avoid the issue, make sure we have zero bytes to ignore left in the
-input request when sharing the input buffer with another client.
-
-CVE-2025-49178
-
-This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
-reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit b0c1cbf4f8e6baa372b1676d2f30512de8ab4ed3)
----
- os/io.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
-index 064d69ea3..83986af92 100644
---- a/os/io.c
-+++ b/os/io.c
-@@ -444,7 +444,7 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
-      */
- 
-     gotnow -= needed;
--    if (!gotnow)
-+    if (!gotnow && !oci->ignoreBytes)
-         AvailableInput = oc;
-     if (move_header) {
-         if (client->req_len < bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xBigReq) - sizeof(xReq))) {
--- 
-2.49.0
-

0004-render-fix-refcounting-of-glyphs-during-ProcRenderAd.patch

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-From 01941a831811c9fd47ffed5ea96375abeb20c9fc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 13:13:35 +1000
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] render: fix refcounting of glyphs during
- ProcRenderAddGlyphs
-
-Previously, AllocateGlyph would return a new glyph with refcount=0 and a
-re-used glyph would end up not changing the refcount at all. The
-resulting glyph_new array would thus have multiple entries pointing to
-the same non-refcounted glyphs.
-
-AddGlyph may free a glyph, resulting in a UAF when the same glyph
-pointer is then later used.
-
-Fix this by returning a refcount of 1 for a new glyph and always
-incrementing the refcount for a re-used glyph, followed by dropping that
-refcount back down again when we're done with it.
-
-CVE-2024-31083, ZDI-CAN-22880
-
-This vulnerability was discovered by:
-Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
-
-(backported from commit bdca6c3d1f5057eeb31609b1280fc93237b00c77)
-
-Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1464>
----
- render/glyph.c    |  5 +++--
- render/glyphstr.h |  3 +++
- render/render.c   | 15 +++++++++++----
- 3 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c
-index f3ed9cf4c..d5fc5f3c9 100644
---- a/render/glyph.c
-+++ b/render/glyph.c
-@@ -245,10 +245,11 @@ FreeGlyphPicture(GlyphPtr glyph)
-     }
- }
- 
--static void
-+void
- FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format)
- {
-     CheckDuplicates(&globalGlyphs[format], "FreeGlyph");
-+    BUG_RETURN(glyph->refcnt == 0);
-     if (--glyph->refcnt == 0) {
-         GlyphRefPtr gr;
-         int i;
-@@ -354,7 +355,7 @@ AllocateGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi, int fdepth)
-     glyph = (GlyphPtr) malloc(size);
-     if (!glyph)
-         return 0;
--    glyph->refcnt = 0;
-+    glyph->refcnt = 1;
-     glyph->size = size + sizeof(xGlyphInfo);
-     glyph->info = *gi;
-     dixInitPrivates(glyph, (char *) glyph + head_size, PRIVATE_GLYPH);
-diff --git a/render/glyphstr.h b/render/glyphstr.h
-index 2f51bd244..fb6589d3e 100644
---- a/render/glyphstr.h
-+++ b/render/glyphstr.h
-@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@ HashGlyph(xGlyphInfo * gi,
- extern void
-  AddGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, GlyphPtr glyph, Glyph id);
- 
-+extern void
-+FreeGlyph(GlyphPtr glyph, int format);
-+
- extern Bool
-  DeleteGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, Glyph id);
- 
-diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
-index 456f156d4..5bc2a204b 100644
---- a/render/render.c
-+++ b/render/render.c
-@@ -1076,6 +1076,7 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
- 
-         if (glyph_new->glyph && glyph_new->glyph != DeletedGlyph) {
-             glyph_new->found = TRUE;
-+            ++glyph_new->glyph->refcnt;
-         }
-         else {
-             GlyphPtr glyph;
-@@ -1168,8 +1169,10 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
-         err = BadAlloc;
-         goto bail;
-     }
--    for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
-+    for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) {
-         AddGlyph(glyphSet, glyphs[i].glyph, glyphs[i].id);
-+        FreeGlyph(glyphs[i].glyph, glyphSet->fdepth);
-+    }
- 
-     if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
-         free(glyphsBase);
-@@ -1179,9 +1182,13 @@ ProcRenderAddGlyphs(ClientPtr client)
-         FreePicture((void *) pSrc, 0);
-     if (pSrcPix)
-         FreeScratchPixmapHeader(pSrcPix);
--    for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++)
--        if (glyphs[i].glyph && !glyphs[i].found)
--            free(glyphs[i].glyph);
-+    for (i = 0; i < nglyphs; i++) {
-+        if (glyphs[i].glyph) {
-+            --glyphs[i].glyph->refcnt;
-+            if (!glyphs[i].found)
-+                free(glyphs[i].glyph);
-+        }
-+    }
-     if (glyphsBase != glyphsLocal)
-         free(glyphsBase);
-     return err;
--- 
-2.44.0
-

0005-record-Check-for-overflow-in-RecordSanityCheckRegist.patch

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-From acc5a83e0d813403fa0377d9ed405c3ca2f9a39d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 11:47:15 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 5/6] record: Check for overflow in
- RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients()
-
-The RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients() checks for the request length,
-but does not check for integer overflow.
-
-A client might send a very large value for either the number of clients
-or the number of protocol ranges that will cause an integer overflow in
-the request length computation, defeating the check for request length.
-
-To avoid the issue, explicitly check the number of clients against the
-limit of clients (which is much lower than an maximum integer value) and
-the number of protocol ranges (multiplied by the record length) do not
-exceed the maximum integer value.
-
-This way, we ensure that the final computation for the request length
-will not overflow the maximum integer limit.
-
-CVE-2025-49179
-
-This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
-reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit ea52403bf222f8bd6ee4c509bed5e34f0c789b00)
----
- record/record.c | 8 ++++++++
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c
-index e123867a7..018e53f81 100644
---- a/record/record.c
-+++ b/record/record.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ and Jim Haggerty of Metheus.
- #include "inputstr.h"
- #include "eventconvert.h"
- #include "scrnintstr.h"
-+#include "opaque.h"
- 
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <assert.h>
-@@ -1298,6 +1299,13 @@ RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients(RecordContextPtr pContext, ClientPtr client,
-     int i;
-     XID recordingClient;
- 
-+    /* LimitClients is 2048 at max, way less that MAXINT */
-+    if (stuff->nClients > LimitClients)
-+        return BadValue;
-+
-+    if (stuff->nRanges > (MAXINT - 4 * stuff->nClients) / SIZEOF(xRecordRange))
-+        return BadValue;
-+
-     if (((client->req_len << 2) - SIZEOF(xRecordRegisterClientsReq)) !=
-         4 * stuff->nClients + SIZEOF(xRecordRange) * stuff->nRanges)
-         return BadLength;
--- 
-2.49.0
-

0006-randr-Check-for-overflow-in-RRChangeProviderProperty.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From b33673deffe92ff7d5b4be5dd944eed2718ee3a0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:18:19 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH xserver 6/6] randr: Check for overflow in
- RRChangeProviderProperty()
-
-A client might send a request causing an integer overflow when computing
-the total size to allocate in RRChangeProviderProperty().
-
-To avoid the issue, check that total length in bytes won't exceed the
-maximum integer value.
-
-CVE-2025-49180
-
-This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
-reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
-
-Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
-Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
-(cherry picked from commit 1b0bf563a3a76b06ddcd6fc4d8e72d81f6773699)
----
- randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-index b79c17f9b..7088570ee 100644
---- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ RRChangeProviderProperty(RRProviderPtr provider, Atom property, Atom type,
- 
-     if (mode == PropModeReplace || len > 0) {
-         void *new_data = NULL, *old_data = NULL;
--
-+        if (total_len > MAXINT / size_in_bytes)
-+            return BadValue;
-         total_size = total_len * size_in_bytes;
-         new_value.data = (void *) malloc(total_size);
-         if (!new_value.data && total_size) {
--- 
-2.49.0
-

SPECS/xorg-x11-server-Xwayland.spec

@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
 Summary:   Xwayland
 Name:      xorg-x11-server-Xwayland
 Version:   21.1.3
-Release:   18%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
+Release:   15%{?gitdate:.%{gitdate}git%{shortcommit}}%{?dist}
 
 URL:       http://www.x.org
 %if 0%{?gitdate}
@@ -81,30 +81,6 @@ Patch10037:   0007-dix-when-disabling-a-master-float-disabled-slaved-de.patch
 Patch10038:   0008-glx-Call-XACE-hooks-on-the-GLX-buffer.patch
 # Fix for CVE-2024-0409
 Patch10039:   0009-ephyr-xwayland-Use-the-proper-private-key-for-cursor.patch
-# Fix for copy/paste error in previous CVE fix
-Patch10040:  0001-dix-fix-valuator-copy-paste-error-in-the-DeviceState.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-31080
-Patch10041:  0002-Xi-ProcXIGetSelectedEvents-needs-to-use-unswapped-le.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-31081
-Patch10042:  0003-Xi-ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice-needs-to-use-unswapped-le.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-31083, ZDI-CAN-22880
-Patch10043:  0004-render-fix-refcounting-of-glyphs-during-ProcRenderAd.patch
-# Fix for the fix for CVE-2024-31083
-# https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/issues/1659
-Patch10044: 0001-render-Avoid-possible-double-free-in-ProcRenderAddGl.patch
-# Fix for CVE-2024-9632
-Patch10045: 0001-xkb-Fix-buffer-overflow-in-_XkbSetCompatMap.patch
-# CVE-2025-49175: Out-of-bounds access in X Rendering extension
-Patch10046: 0001-render-Avoid-0-or-less-animated-cursors.patch
-# CVE-2025-49176: Integer overflow in Big Requests Extension
-Patch10047: 0002-os-Do-not-overflow-the-integer-size-with-BigRequest.patch
-Patch10048: 0003-os-Check-for-integer-overflow-on-BigRequest-length.patch
-# CVE-2025-49178: Unprocessed client request via bytes to ignore
-Patch10049: 0004-os-Account-for-bytes-to-ignore-when-sharing-input-bu.patch
-# CVE-2025-49179: Integer overflow in X Record extension
-Patch10050: 0005-record-Check-for-overflow-in-RecordSanityCheckRegist.patch
-# CVE-2025-49180: Integer overflow in RandR extension
-Patch10051: 0006-randr-Check-for-overflow-in-RRChangeProviderProperty.patch
 
 License:   MIT
 
@@ -212,17 +188,6 @@ rm -Rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb
 %{_libdir}/pkgconfig/xwayland.pc
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Jun 18 2025 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-18
-- CVE fix for: CVE-2025-49175 (RHEL-97278), CVE-2025-49176 (RHEL-97299,
-               CVE-2025-49178 (RHEL-97374), CVE-2025-49179 (RHEL-97417),
-               CVE-2025-49180 (RHEL-97249)
-
-* Wed Oct 30 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-17
-- Fix for CVE-2024-9632 - (RHEL-61995)
-
-* Thu Apr  4 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-16
-- CVE fix for: CVE-2024-31080, CVE-2024-31081, CVE-2024-31083
-
 * Tue Jan 16 2024 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 21.1.3-15
   Fix for CVE-2023-6816, CVE-2024-0229, CVE-2024-21885, CVE-2024-21886,
   CVE-2024-0408, CVE-2024-0409

gating.yaml

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
---- !Policy
-product_versions:
-  - rhel-8
-decision_context: osci_compose_gate
-rules:
-  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: desktop-qe.desktop-ci.tier1-gating.functional}

sources

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-SHA512 (xwayland-21.1.3.tar.xz) = 24147ef788cce3fa16cd5604d293ffbe7ef4c6dc5fc2b1a1018d78ca4c0f10ade7b99c1ad6a8cdca5c581ff40f5834d7e34b2a314acca665a527eed700993594