xorg-x11-server-Xwayland/0004-xkb-Prevent-overflow-in-XkbSetCompatMap.patch

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From c7beaec76c556870e5566b84dce7099bf28f9502 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 10 Sep 2025 16:30:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] xkb: Prevent overflow in XkbSetCompatMap()
MIME-Version: 1.0
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The XkbCompatMap structure stores its "num_si" and "size_si" fields
using an unsigned short.
However, the function _XkbSetCompatMap() will store the sum of the
input data "firstSI" and "nSI" in both XkbCompatMap's "num_si" and
"size_si" without first checking if the sum overflows the maximum
unsigned short value, leading to a possible overflow.
To avoid the issue, check whether the sum does not exceed the maximum
unsigned short value, or return a "BadValue" error otherwise.
CVE-2025-62231, ZDI-CAN-27560
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 475d9f49acd0e55bc0b089ed77f732ad18585470)
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/2088>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 6c102af0a..a77fe7ff0 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -2990,6 +2990,8 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
unsigned int skipped = 0;
+ if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > USHRT_MAX)
+ return BadValue;
if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,
--
2.51.1