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Removed DigiNoTar patch

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This commit is contained in:
Jan Horak 2011-09-06 15:03:39 +02:00
parent 5d92af393b
commit 9f2e080e59
2 changed files with 0 additions and 326 deletions
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2
thunderbird.spec
View File

@ -61,7 +61,6 @@ Source100: find-external-requires
Patch0: thunderbird-version.patch
Patch7: crashreporter-remove-static.patch
Patch8: xulrunner-6.0-secondary-ipc.patch
Patch9: xulrunner-diginotar.patch
%if %{official_branding}
# Required by Mozilla Corporation
@ -143,7 +142,6 @@ sed -e 's/__RPM_VERSION_INTERNAL__/%{version_internal}/' %{P:%%PATCH0} \
cd mozilla
%patch7 -p2 -b .static
%patch8 -p2 -b .secondary-ipc
%patch9 -p1 -b .diginotar
cd ..
%if %{official_branding}

324
xulrunner-diginotar.patch
View File

@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
# HG changeset patch
# User Kai Engert <kaie@kuix.de>
# Date 1314714745 14400
# Node ID d172106979730bdd967073f2c1e6188e708ca911
# Parent 078215b4d425df355ae87f0ec47d66261ad58c5a
Bug 682927 - Dis-trust DigiNotar root certificate, all parts together; r=bsmith
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp
--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp
@@ -118,28 +118,16 @@ static struct nsMyTrustedEVInfo myTruste
SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
"5F:43:E5:B1:BF:F8:78:8C:AC:1C:C7:CA:4A:9A:C6:22:2B:CC:34:C6",
"MDsxGDAWBgNVBAoTD0N5YmVydHJ1c3QsIEluYzEfMB0GA1UEAxMWQ3liZXJ0cnVz"
"dCBHbG9iYWwgUm9vdA==",
"BAAAAAABD4WqLUg=",
nsnull
},
{
- // E=info@diginotar.nl,CN=DigiNotar Root CA,O=DigiNotar,C=NL
- "2.16.528.1.1001.1.1.1.12.6.1.1.1",
- "DigiNotar EV OID",
- SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
- "C0:60:ED:44:CB:D8:81:BD:0E:F8:6C:0B:A2:87:DD:CF:81:67:47:8C",
- "MF8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMRIwEAYDVQQKEwlEaWdpTm90YXIxGjAYBgNVBAMTEURp"
- "Z2lOb3RhciBSb290IENBMSAwHgYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhFpbmZvQGRpZ2lub3Rhci5u"
- "bA==",
- "DHbanJEMTiye/hXQWJM8TA==",
- nsnull
- },
- {
// CN=SwissSign Gold CA - G2,O=SwissSign AG,C=CH
"2.16.756.1.89.1.2.1.1",
"SwissSign EV OID",
SEC_OID_UNKNOWN,
"D8:C5:38:8A:B7:30:1B:1B:6E:D4:7A:E6:45:25:3A:6F:9F:1A:27:61",
"MEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNIMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxTd2lzc1NpZ24gQUcxHzAdBgNVBAMT"
"FlN3aXNzU2lnbiBHb2xkIENBIC0gRzI=",
"ALtAHEP1Xk+w",
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp
@@ -1029,16 +1029,63 @@ static struct nsSerialBinaryBlacklistEnt
{ 16, "\x3e\x75\xce\xd4\x6b\x69\x30\x21\x21\x88\x30\xae\x86\xa8\x2a\x71" },
{ 17, "\x00\xe9\x02\x8b\x95\x78\xe4\x15\xdc\x1a\x71\x0a\x2b\x88\x15\x44\x47" },
{ 17, "\x00\xd7\x55\x8f\xda\xf5\xf1\x10\x5b\xb2\x13\x28\x2b\x70\x77\x29\xa3" },
{ 16, "\x04\x7e\xcb\xe9\xfc\xa5\x5f\x7b\xd0\x9e\xae\x36\xe1\x0c\xae\x1e" },
{ 17, "\x00\xf5\xc8\x6a\xf3\x61\x62\xf1\x3a\x64\xf5\x4f\x6d\xc9\x58\x7c\x06" },
{ 0, 0 } // end marker
};
+// Bug 682927: Do not trust any DigiNotar-issued certificates.
+// We do this check after normal certificate validation because we do not
+// want to override a "revoked" OCSP response.
+PRErrorCode
+PSM_SSL_BlacklistDigiNotar(CERTCertificate * serverCert,
+ CERTCertList * serverCertChain)
+{
+ PRBool isDigiNotarIssuedCert = PR_FALSE;
+
+ for (CERTCertListNode *node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(serverCertChain);
+ !CERT_LIST_END(node, serverCertChain);
+ node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
+ if (!node->cert->issuerName)
+ continue;
+
+ if (strstr(node->cert->issuerName, "CN=DigiNotar")) {
+ isDigiNotarIssuedCert = PR_TRUE;
+ // Do not let the user override the error if the cert was
+ // chained from the "DigiNotar Root CA" cert and the cert was issued
+ // within the time window in which we think the mis-issuance(s) occurred.
+ if (strstr(node->cert->issuerName, "CN=DigiNotar Root CA")) {
+ PRTime cutoff = 0, notBefore = 0, notAfter = 0;
+ PRStatus status = PR_ParseTimeString("01-JUL-2011 00:00", PR_TRUE, &cutoff);
+ NS_ASSERTION(status == PR_SUCCESS, "PR_ParseTimeString failed");
+ if (status != PR_SUCCESS ||
+ CERT_GetCertTimes(serverCert, &notBefore, &notAfter) != SECSuccess ||
+ notBefore >= cutoff) {
+ return SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // By request of the Dutch government
+ if (!strcmp(node->cert->issuerName,
+ "CN=Staat der Nederlanden Root CA,O=Staat der Nederlanden,C=NL") &&
+ CERT_LIST_END(CERT_LIST_NEXT(node), serverCertChain)) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (isDigiNotarIssuedCert)
+ return SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER; // user can override this
+ else
+ return 0; // No DigiNotor cert => carry on as normal
+}
+
+
SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCallback(void* client_data, PRFileDesc* fd,
PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer) {
nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker;
CERTCertificate *serverCert = SSL_PeerCertificate(fd);
CERTCertificateCleaner serverCertCleaner(serverCert);
if (serverCert &&
@@ -1074,40 +1121,54 @@ SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCal
if (server_cert_comparison_len == locked_cert_comparison_len &&
!memcmp(server_cert_comparison_start, locked_cert_comparison_start, locked_cert_comparison_len)) {
PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE, 0);
return SECFailure;
}
}
}
-
+
SECStatus rv = PSM_SSL_PKIX_AuthCertificate(fd, serverCert, checksig, isServer);
// We want to remember the CA certs in the temp db, so that the application can find the
// complete chain at any time it might need it.
// But we keep only those CA certs in the temp db, that we didn't already know.
if (serverCert) {
nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*) fd->higher->secret;
nsRefPtr<nsSSLStatus> status = infoObject->SSLStatus();
nsRefPtr<nsNSSCertificate> nsc;
if (!status || !status->mServerCert) {
nsc = nsNSSCertificate::Create(serverCert);
}
- if (SECSuccess == rv) {
+ CERTCertList *certList = nsnull;
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
+ certList = CERT_GetCertChainFromCert(serverCert, PR_Now(), certUsageSSLCA);
+ if (!certList) {
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ } else {
+ PRErrorCode blacklistErrorCode = PSM_SSL_BlacklistDigiNotar(serverCert,
+ certList);
+ if (blacklistErrorCode != 0) {
+ infoObject->SetCertIssuerBlacklisted();
+ PORT_SetError(blacklistErrorCode);
+ rv = SECFailure;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (rv == SECSuccess) {
if (nsc) {
PRBool dummyIsEV;
nsc->GetIsExtendedValidation(&dummyIsEV); // the nsc object will cache the status
}
- CERTCertList *certList = CERT_GetCertChainFromCert(serverCert, PR_Now(), certUsageSSLCA);
-
nsCOMPtr<nsINSSComponent> nssComponent;
for (CERTCertListNode *node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList);
!CERT_LIST_END(node, certList);
node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) {
if (node->cert->slot) {
// This cert was found on a token, no need to remember it in the temp db.
@@ -1133,16 +1194,19 @@ SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCal
PK11_ImportCert(slot, node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
nickname, PR_FALSE);
PK11_FreeSlot(slot);
}
}
PR_FREEIF(nickname);
}
+ }
+
+ if (certList) {
CERT_DestroyCertList(certList);
}
// The connection may get terminated, for example, if the server requires
// a client cert. Let's provide a minimal SSLStatus
// to the caller that contains at least the cert and its status.
if (!status) {
status = new nsSSLStatus();
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h
--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h
@@ -50,16 +50,19 @@
char* PR_CALLBACK
PK11PasswordPrompt(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void* arg);
void PR_CALLBACK HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, void *client_data);
SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCallback(void* client_data, PRFileDesc* fd,
PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer);
+PRErrorCode PSM_SSL_BlacklistDigiNotar(CERTCertificate * serverCert,
+ CERTCertList * serverCertChain);
+
SECStatus RegisterMyOCSPAIAInfoCallback();
SECStatus UnregisterMyOCSPAIAInfoCallback();
class nsHTTPListener : public nsIStreamLoaderObserver
{
private:
// For XPCOM implementations that are not a base class for some other
// class, it is good practice to make the destructor non-virtual and
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp
@@ -221,17 +221,18 @@ nsNSSSocketInfo::nsNSSSocketInfo()
mForSTARTTLS(PR_FALSE),
mHandshakePending(PR_TRUE),
mCanceled(PR_FALSE),
mHasCleartextPhase(PR_FALSE),
mHandshakeInProgress(PR_FALSE),
mAllowTLSIntoleranceTimeout(PR_TRUE),
mRememberClientAuthCertificate(PR_FALSE),
mHandshakeStartTime(0),
- mPort(0)
+ mPort(0),
+ mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted(PR_FALSE)
{
mThreadData = new nsSSLSocketThreadData;
}
nsNSSSocketInfo::~nsNSSSocketInfo()
{
delete mThreadData;
@@ -3437,16 +3438,20 @@ nsNSSBadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDes
cvout[0].value.pointer.log = verify_log;
cvout[1].type = cert_po_end;
srv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(peerCert, certificateUsageSSLServer,
survivingParams->GetRawPointerForNSS(),
cvout, (void*)infoObject);
}
+ if (infoObject->IsCertIssuerBlacklisted()) {
+ collected_errors |= nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_UNTRUSTED;
+ }
+
// We ignore the result code of the cert verification.
// Either it is a failure, which is expected, and we'll process the
// verify log below.
// Or it is a success, then a domain mismatch is the only
// possible failure.
CERTVerifyLogNode *i_node;
for (i_node = verify_log->head; i_node; i_node = i_node->next)
diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h
--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h
+++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h
@@ -197,16 +197,22 @@ public:
/* Set SSL Status values */
nsresult SetSSLStatus(nsSSLStatus *aSSLStatus);
nsSSLStatus* SSLStatus() { return mSSLStatus; }
PRBool hasCertErrors();
PRStatus CloseSocketAndDestroy();
+ PRBool IsCertIssuerBlacklisted() const {
+ return mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted;
+ }
+ void SetCertIssuerBlacklisted() {
+ mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted = PR_TRUE;
+ }
protected:
nsCOMPtr<nsIInterfaceRequestor> mCallbacks;
PRFileDesc* mFd;
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mCert;
nsCOMPtr<nsIX509Cert> mPreviousCert; // DocShellDependent
enum {
blocking_state_unknown, is_nonblocking_socket, is_blocking_socket
} mBlockingState;
@@ -224,16 +230,17 @@ protected:
PRPackedBool mCanceled;
PRPackedBool mHasCleartextPhase;
PRPackedBool mHandshakeInProgress;
PRPackedBool mAllowTLSIntoleranceTimeout;
PRPackedBool mRememberClientAuthCertificate;
PRIntervalTime mHandshakeStartTime;
PRInt32 mPort;
nsXPIDLCString mHostName;
+ PRErrorCode mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted;
/* SSL Status */
nsRefPtr<nsSSLStatus> mSSLStatus;
nsresult ActivateSSL();
nsSSLSocketThreadData *mThreadData;
diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h b/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h
--- a/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h
+++ b/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h
@@ -72,18 +72,18 @@
* ...
* - NSS 3.29 branch: 250-255
*
* NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MINOR is a CK_BYTE. It's not clear
* whether we may use its full range (0-255) or only 0-99 because
* of the comment in the CK_VERSION type definition.
*/
#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAJOR 1
-#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MINOR 83
-#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION "1.83"
+#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MINOR 85
+#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION "1.85"
/* These version numbers detail the semantic changes to the ckfw engine. */
#define NSS_BUILTINS_HARDWARE_VERSION_MAJOR 1
#define NSS_BUILTINS_HARDWARE_VERSION_MINOR 0
/* These version numbers detail the semantic changes to ckbi itself
* (new PKCS #11 objects), etc. */
#define NSS_BUILTINS_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAJOR 1