SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
+index 20b9bf1..81ebb18 100644
+--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
++++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
+@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ urlInitialize(void)
+     assert(0 == matchDomainName("*.foo.com", ".foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
+     assert(0 != matchDomainName("*.foo.com", "foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
+ 
++    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", ""));
++    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnHonorWildcards));
++    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnRejectSubsubDomains));
++
+     /* more cases? */
+ }
+ 
+@@ -756,6 +760,8 @@ matchDomainName(const char *h, const char *d, MatchDomainNameFlags flags)
+         return -1;
+ 
+     dl = strlen(d);
++    if (dl == 0)
++        return 1;
+ 
+     /*
+      * Start at the ends of the two strings and work towards the

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
+index 6a9736f..0a883fa 100644
+--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
++++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
+@@ -847,11 +847,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const char *aRequestRealm)
+             break;
+ 
+         case DIGEST_NC:
+-            if (value.size() != 8) {
++            if (value.size() == 8) {
++                // for historical reasons, the nc value MUST be exactly 8 bytes
++                static_assert(sizeof(digest_request->nc) == 8 + 1, "bad nc buffer size");
++                xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
++                debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
++            } else {
+                 debugs(29, 9, "Invalid nc '" << value << "' in '" << temp << "'");
++                digest_request->nc[0] = 0;
+             }
+-            xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
+-            debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
+             break;
+ 
+         case DIGEST_CNONCE:

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+commit 77b3fb4df0f126784d5fd4967c28ed40eb8d521b
+Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
+Date:   Wed Oct 25 19:41:45 2023 +0000
+
+    RFC 1123: Fix date parsing (#1538)
+    
+    The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
+    https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/datetime-overflow.html
+    where it was filed as "1-Byte Buffer OverRead in RFC 1123 date/time
+    Handling".
+
+diff --git a/lib/rfc1123.c b/lib/rfc1123.c
+index e5bf9a4d7..cb484cc00 100644
+--- a/lib/rfc1123.c
++++ b/lib/rfc1123.c
+@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ make_month(const char *s)
+     char month[3];
+ 
+     month[0] = xtoupper(*s);
++    if (!month[0])
++        return -1; // protects *(s + 1) below
++
+     month[1] = xtolower(*(s + 1));
++    if (!month[1])
++        return -1; // protects *(s + 2) below
++
+     month[2] = xtolower(*(s + 2));
+ 
+     for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
+

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
+index 42e11e6..a68e623 100644
+--- a/src/ipc.cc
++++ b/src/ipc.cc
+@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
+ #include "SquidConfig.h"
+ #include "SquidIpc.h"
+ #include "tools.h"
++#include <cstdlib>
++
++#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
++#include <unistd.h>
++#endif
+ 
+ static const char *hello_string = "hi there\n";
+ #ifndef HELLO_BUF_SZ
+@@ -365,6 +370,22 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
+     }
+ 
+     PutEnvironment();
++
++    // A dup(2) wrapper that reports and exits the process on errors. The
++    // exiting logic is only suitable for this child process context.
++    const auto dupOrExit = [prog,name](const int oldFd) {
++        const auto newFd = dup(oldFd);
++        if (newFd < 0) {
++            const auto savedErrno = errno;
++            debugs(54, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Helper process initialization failure: " << name <<
++                   Debug::Extra << "helper (CHILD) PID: " << getpid() <<
++                   Debug::Extra << "helper program name: " << prog <<
++                   Debug::Extra << "dup(2) system call error for FD " << oldFd << ": " << xstrerr(savedErrno));
++            _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++        }
++        return newFd;
++    };
++
+     /*
+      * This double-dup stuff avoids problems when one of
+      *  crfd, cwfd, or debug_log are in the rage 0-2.
+@@ -372,17 +393,16 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
+ 
+     do {
+         /* First make sure 0-2 is occupied by something. Gets cleaned up later */
+-        x = dup(crfd);
+-        assert(x > -1);
+-    } while (x < 3 && x > -1);
++        x = dupOrExit(crfd);
++    } while (x < 3);
+ 
+     close(x);
+ 
+-    t1 = dup(crfd);
++    t1 = dupOrExit(crfd);
+ 
+-    t2 = dup(cwfd);
++    t2 = dupOrExit(cwfd);
+ 
+-    t3 = dup(fileno(debug_log));
++    t3 = dupOrExit(fileno(debug_log));
+ 
+     assert(t1 > 2 && t2 > 2 && t3 > 2);
+ 

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
+index fe2edf6..47aa935 100644
+--- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
++++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
+@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ public:
+ #endif
+     ErrorState *error; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
+     bool readNextRequest; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
++
++#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
++    size_t currentXffHopNumber = 0; ///< number of X-Forwarded-For header values processed so far
++#endif
+ };
+ 
+ #endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
+diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
+index 1c6ff62..b758f6f 100644
+--- a/src/client_side_request.cc
++++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
+@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@
+ static const char *const crlf = "\r\n";
+ 
+ #if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
++
++#if !defined(SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX)
++#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
++#endif
++
+ static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data);
+ #endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
+ 
+@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data)
+                 /* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
+                 Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
+             }
+-            calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
+-            return;
++            if (++calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber < SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX) {
++                calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
++                return;
++            }
++            const auto headerName = Http::HeaderLookupTable.lookup(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR).name;
++            debugs(28, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Ignoring trailing " << headerName << " addresses" <<
++                   Debug::Extra << "addresses allowed by follow_x_forwarded_for: " << calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber <<
++                   Debug::Extra << "last/accepted address: " << request->indirect_client_addr <<
++                   Debug::Extra << "ignored trailing addresses: " << request->x_forwarded_for_iterator);
++            // fall through to resume clientAccessCheck() processing
+         }
+     }
+ 

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
+index b006300..023e411 100644
+--- a/src/http.cc
++++ b/src/http.cc
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
+ #include "rfc1738.h"
+ #include "SquidConfig.h"
+ #include "SquidTime.h"
++#include "SquidMath.h"
+ #include "StatCounters.h"
+ #include "Store.h"
+ #include "StrList.h"
+@@ -1150,18 +1151,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
+      * Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
+      */
+ 
+-    Must(maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(true));
+-    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
+-    rd.conn = io.conn;
+-    rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
++    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
++    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission) || !moreDataPermission)) {
++        abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
++        return;
++    }
++
++    const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission);
++    // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
++    const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
+ 
+-    if (rd.size <= 0) {
++    if (readSizeWanted <= 0) {
+         assert(entry->mem_obj);
+         AsyncCall::Pointer nilCall;
+         entry->mem_obj->delayRead(DeferredRead(readDelayed, this, CommRead(io.conn, NULL, 0, nilCall)));
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
++    rd.conn = io.conn;
++    rd.size = readSizeWanted;
+     switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
+     case Comm::INPROGRESS:
+         if (inBuf.isEmpty())
+@@ -1520,8 +1529,11 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
+     if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
+         return;
+ 
+-    if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
++    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
++    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission)) || !moreDataPermission) {
++        abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
+         return;
++    }
+ 
+     // XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
+     // check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
+@@ -1539,40 +1551,79 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
+     Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
+ }
+ 
++/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
++/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
++/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
++/// * a bigger buffer may waste memory;
++/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
++size_t
++HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
++{
++    if (!flags.headers_parsed)
++        return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
++
++    // XXX: Our inBuf is not used to maintain the read-ahead gap, and using
++    // Config.readAheadGap like this creates huge read buffers for large
++    // read_ahead_gap values. TODO: Switch to using tcp_recv_bufsize as the
++    // primary read buffer capacity factor.
++    //
++    // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
++    // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
++    const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).second ? NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).first : SBuf::maxSize;
++
++    // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
++    // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
++
++    return std::min<size_t>(configurationPreferences, SBuf::maxSize);
++}
++
++/// The maximum number of virgin reply bytes we may buffer before we violate
++/// the currently configured response buffering limits.
++/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
++/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
++/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
+ bool
+-HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
++HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const
+ {
+-    // how much we are allowed to buffer
+-    const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
+-
+-    if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
+-        // when buffer is at or over limit already
+-        debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
+-        debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
+-        // Process next response from buffer
+-        processReply();
+-        return false;
++#if USE_ADAPTATION
++    // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
++    // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
++    if (responseBodyBuffer) {
++        debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
++        *maxReadSize = 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
++        return true;
++    }
++#endif
++
++    const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
++    if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
++        debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
++        return false; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
+     }
+ 
++    *maxReadSize = (maxCapacity - inBuf.length()); // positive
++    debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << *maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
++    return true; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
++}
++
++/// prepare read buffer for reading
++/// \return the maximum number of bytes the caller should attempt to read
++/// \retval 0 means that the caller should delay reading
++size_t
++HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(const size_t maxReadSize)
++{
+     // how much we want to read
+-    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), (limitBuffer - inBuf.length()));
++    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), maxReadSize);
+ 
+-    if (!read_size) {
++    if (read_size < 2) {
+         debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << read_size << " into buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
+-        return false;
++        return 0;
+     }
+ 
+-    // just report whether we could grow or not, do not actually do it
+-    if (doGrow)
+-        return (read_size >= 2);
+-
+     // we may need to grow the buffer
+     inBuf.reserveSpace(read_size);
+-    debugs(11, 8, (!flags.do_next_read ? "will not" : "may") <<
+-           " read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buf(" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() <<
+-           ") from " << serverConnection);
+-
+-    return (inBuf.spaceSize() >= 2); // only read if there is 1+ bytes of space available
++    debugs(11, 7, "may read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
++    return read_size;
+ }
+ 
+ /// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
+diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
+index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
+--- a/src/http.h
++++ b/src/http.h
+@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
+ #include "http/StateFlags.h"
+ #include "sbuf/SBuf.h"
+ 
++#include <optional>
++
+ class FwdState;
+ class HttpHeader;
+ 
+@@ -107,16 +109,9 @@ private:
+ 
+     void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
+ 
+-    /**
+-     * determine if read buffer can have space made available
+-     * for a read.
+-     *
+-     * \param grow  whether to actually expand the buffer
+-     *
+-     * \return whether the buffer can be grown to provide space
+-     *         regardless of whether the grow actually happened.
+-     */
+-    bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
++    size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
++    bool canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const;
++    size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
+ 
+     // consuming request body
+     virtual void handleMoreRequestBodyAvailable();

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
+index a791885..b9aef38 100644
+--- a/src/SquidString.h
++++ b/src/SquidString.h
+@@ -114,7 +114,16 @@ private:
+ 
+     size_type len_;  /* current length  */
+ 
+-    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
++    /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
++    /// (a) we do not know where those buffers are (or whether they still exist)
++    /// (b) too many String users unknowingly exceeded that limit and asserted.
++    /// We are now using a larger limit to reduce the number of (b) cases,
++    /// especially cases where "compact" lists of items grow 50% in size when we
++    /// convert them to canonical form. The new limit is selected to withstand
++    /// concatenation and ~50% expansion of two HTTP headers limited by default
++    /// request_header_max_size and reply_header_max_size settings.
++    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 3*64*1024 - 1;
++
+     /// returns true after increasing the first argument by extra if the sum does not exceed SizeMax_
+     static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
+index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
+--- a/src/cache_cf.cc
++++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
+@@ -935,6 +935,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
+                (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
+     }
+ 
++    // Warn about the dangers of exceeding String limits when manipulating HTTP
++    // headers. Technically, we do not concatenate _requests_, so we could relax
++    // their check, but we keep the two checks the same for simplicity sake.
++    const auto safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax = (String::SizeMaxXXX()+1)/3;
++    // TODO: static_assert(safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax >= 64*1024); // no WARNINGs for default settings
++    if (Config.maxRequestHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
++        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing request_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
++               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxRequestHeaderSize << " bytes");
++    if (Config.maxReplyHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
++        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing reply_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
++               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxReplyHeaderSize << " bytes");
++
+     /*
+      * Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
+      * Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
+diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
+index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
+--- a/src/cf.data.pre
++++ b/src/cf.data.pre
+@@ -6196,11 +6196,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
+ DEFAULT: 64 KB
+ LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
+ DOC_START
+-	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a request.
+-	Request headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
+-	Placing a limit on the request header size will catch certain
+-	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
+-	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
++	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP request
++	(including request-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
++	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
++	limit also applies to received FTP commands.
++
++	This limit has no direct affect on Squid memory consumption.
++
++	Squid does not check this limit when sending requests.
+ DOC_END
+ 
+ NAME: reply_header_max_size
+@@ -6209,11 +6212,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
+ DEFAULT: 64 KB
+ LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
+ DOC_START
+-	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a reply.
+-	Reply headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
+-	Placing a limit on the reply header size will catch certain
+-	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
+-	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
++	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP response
++	(including status-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
++	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
++	limit also applies to FTP command responses.
++
++	Squid also checks this limit when loading hit responses from disk cache.
++
++	Squid does not check this limit when sending responses.
+ DOC_END
+ 
+ NAME: request_body_max_size
+diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
+index 877172d..b006300 100644
+--- a/src/http.cc
++++ b/src/http.cc
+@@ -1820,8 +1820,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
+ 
+         String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);
+ 
+-        // if we cannot double strFwd size, then it grew past 50% of the limit
+-        if (!strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
++        // Detect unreasonably long header values. And paranoidly check String
++        // limits: a String ought to accommodate two reasonable-length values.
++        if (strFwd.size() > 32*1024 || !strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
+             // There is probably a forwarding loop with Via detection disabled.
+             // If we do nothing, String will assert on overflow soon.
+             // TODO: Terminate all transactions with huge XFF?

SOURCES/squid-4.15-halfclosed.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
+diff --git a/src/client_side.cc b/src/client_side.cc
+index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
+--- a/src/client_side.cc
++++ b/src/client_side.cc
+@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
+      * We are done with the response, and we are either still receiving request
+      * body (early response!) or have already stopped receiving anything.
+      *
+-     * If we are still receiving, then clientParseRequest() below will fail.
++     * If we are still receiving, then parseRequests() below will fail.
+      * (XXX: but then we will call readNextRequest() which may succeed and
+      * execute a smuggled request as we are not done with the current request).
+      *
+@@ -926,28 +926,12 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
+      * Attempt to parse a request from the request buffer.
+      * If we've been fed a pipelined request it may already
+      * be in our read buffer.
+-     *
+-     \par
+-     * This needs to fall through - if we're unlucky and parse the _last_ request
+-     * from our read buffer we may never re-register for another client read.
+      */
+ 
+-    if (clientParseRequests()) {
+-        debugs(33, 3, clientConnection << ": parsed next request from buffer");
+-    }
++    parseRequests();
+ 
+-    /** \par
+-     * Either we need to kick-start another read or, if we have
+-     * a half-closed connection, kill it after the last request.
+-     * This saves waiting for half-closed connections to finished being
+-     * half-closed _AND_ then, sometimes, spending "Timeout" time in
+-     * the keepalive "Waiting for next request" state.
+-     */
+-    if (commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd) && pipeline.empty()) {
+-        debugs(33, 3, "half-closed client with no pending requests, closing");
+-        clientConnection->close();
++    if (!isOpen())
+         return;
+-    }
+ 
+     /** \par
+      * At this point we either have a parsed request (which we've
+@@ -2058,16 +2042,11 @@ ConnStateData::receivedFirstByte()
+     commSetConnTimeout(clientConnection, Config.Timeout.request, timeoutCall);
+ }
+ 
+-/**
+- * Attempt to parse one or more requests from the input buffer.
+- * Returns true after completing parsing of at least one request [header]. That
+- * includes cases where parsing ended with an error (e.g., a huge request).
+- */
+-bool
+-ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
++/// Attempt to parse one or more requests from the input buffer.
++/// May close the connection.
++void
++ConnStateData::parseRequests()
+ {
+-    bool parsed_req = false;
+-
+     debugs(33, 5, HERE << clientConnection << ": attempting to parse");
+ 
+     // Loop while we have read bytes that are not needed for producing the body
+@@ -2116,8 +2095,6 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
+ 
+             processParsedRequest(context);
+ 
+-            parsed_req = true; // XXX: do we really need to parse everything right NOW ?
+-
+             if (context->mayUseConnection()) {
+                 debugs(33, 3, HERE << "Not parsing new requests, as this request may need the connection");
+                 break;
+@@ -2130,8 +2107,19 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
+         }
+     }
+ 
+-    /* XXX where to 'finish' the parsing pass? */
+-    return parsed_req;
++    debugs(33, 7, "buffered leftovers: " << inBuf.length());
++
++    if (isOpen() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
++        if (pipeline.empty()) {
++            // we processed what we could parse, and no more data is coming
++            debugs(33, 5, "closing half-closed without parsed requests: " << clientConnection);
++            clientConnection->close();
++        } else {
++            // we parsed what we could, and no more data is coming
++            debugs(33, 5, "monitoring half-closed while processing parsed requests: " << clientConnection);
++            flags.readMore = false; // may already be false
++        }
++    }
+ }
+ 
+ void
+@@ -2148,23 +2136,7 @@ ConnStateData::afterClientRead()
+     if (pipeline.empty())
+         fd_note(clientConnection->fd, "Reading next request");
+ 
+-    if (!clientParseRequests()) {
+-        if (!isOpen())
+-            return;
+-        /*
+-         * If the client here is half closed and we failed
+-         * to parse a request, close the connection.
+-         * The above check with connFinishedWithConn() only
+-         * succeeds _if_ the buffer is empty which it won't
+-         * be if we have an incomplete request.
+-         * XXX: This duplicates ConnStateData::kick
+-         */
+-        if (pipeline.empty() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
+-            debugs(33, 5, clientConnection << ": half-closed connection, no completed request parsed, connection closing.");
+-            clientConnection->close();
+-            return;
+-        }
+-    }
++    parseRequests();
+ 
+     if (!isOpen())
+         return;
+@@ -3945,7 +3917,7 @@ ConnStateData::notePinnedConnectionBecameIdle(PinnedIdleContext pic)
+     startPinnedConnectionMonitoring();
+ 
+     if (pipeline.empty())
+-        kick(); // in case clientParseRequests() was blocked by a busy pic.connection
++        kick(); // in case parseRequests() was blocked by a busy pic.connection
+ }
+ 
+ /// Forward future client requests using the given server connection.
+diff --git a/src/client_side.h b/src/client_side.h
+index 9fe8463..dfb4d8e 100644
+--- a/src/client_side.h
++++ b/src/client_side.h
+@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ public:
+     virtual void doneWithControlMsg();
+ 
+     /// Traffic parsing
+-    bool clientParseRequests();
+     void readNextRequest();
+ 
+     /// try to make progress on a transaction or read more I/O
+@@ -373,6 +372,7 @@ private:
+     virtual bool connFinishedWithConn(int size);
+     virtual void checkLogging();
+ 
++    void parseRequests();
+     void clientAfterReadingRequests();
+     bool concurrentRequestQueueFilled() const;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
+index d7efb0f..655ed83 100644
+--- a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
++++ b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
+@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
+ #include "tests/STUB.h"
+ 
+ #include "client_side.h"
+-bool ConnStateData::clientParseRequests() STUB_RETVAL(false)
++void ConnStateData::parseRequests() STUB
+ void ConnStateData::readNextRequest() STUB
+ bool ConnStateData::isOpen() const STUB_RETVAL(false)
+ void ConnStateData::kick() STUB

SOURCES/squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,367 @@
+From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
+
+Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
+with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
+
+It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
+common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
+nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
+
+This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
+which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
+---
+ src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
+     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
+     try {
++        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
+         parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
+         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
+         buf_ = tok.remaining();
+
+From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
+
+Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
+which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
+to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
+
+Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
+---
+ src/http/one/Parser.cc          |  4 ++--
+ src/http/one/Parser.h           |  3 ++-
+ src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
+ src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
+ 
+ // BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
+ void
+-Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
++Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
+ {
+-    const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
++    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
+ 
+     if (tok.atEnd())
+         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
+ };
+ 
+ /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
++/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
+ /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
+-void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
++void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
+ 
+ /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
+ int ErrorLevel();
+diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
+     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
+     try {
+-        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
+-        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
++        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
++        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
++        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
++            ParseBws(tok, true);
++
+         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
+         buf_ = tok.remaining();
+         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
+@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+ 
+ /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
+ /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
+-void
++bool
+ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
+ {
++    bool foundChunkExt = false;
+     do {
+         auto tok = callerTok;
+ 
+         ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
+ 
+         if (!tok.skip(';'))
+-            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
++            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
+ 
+         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
+         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
+         callerTok = tok;
++        foundChunkExt = true;
+     } while (true);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
+index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
++++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
+ private:
+     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
+     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
+-    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
++    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
+     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
+     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
+     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
+
+From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
+
+---
+ src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
+ };
+ 
+ /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
+-/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
++/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
+ /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
+ void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
+ 
+
+From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
+
+Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
+spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
+Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
+
+The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
+was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
+partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
+had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
+---
+ src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
+     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
+     try {
+-        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
+-        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
+-        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
+-            ParseBws(tok, true);
++        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
++        ParseBws(tok, true);
++
++        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
+ 
+         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
+         buf_ = tok.remaining();
+@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
+     do {
+         auto tok = callerTok;
+ 
+-        ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
++        ParseBws(tok);
+ 
+         if (!tok.skip(';'))
+             return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
+
+From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
+
+... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
+---
+ src/http/one/Parser.cc          | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
+ src/http/one/Parser.h           | 10 ++++++++--
+ src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
+ src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
+ 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
+     return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
+ }
+ 
+-// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
+-void
+-Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
++/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
++namespace Http::One {
++static void
++ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
+ {
+-    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
++    const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
+ 
+     if (tok.atEnd())
+         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
+@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
+ 
+     // success: no more BWS characters expected
+ }
++} // namespace Http::One
++
++void
++Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
++{
++    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
++}
++
++void
++Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
++{
++    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
++}
+ 
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
+ };
+ 
+ /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
+-/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
+ /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
+-void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
++/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
++/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
++void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
++
++/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
++/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
++/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
++void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
+ 
+ /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
+ int ErrorLevel();
+diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
+     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
+     try {
+-        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
+-        ParseBws(tok, true);
+-
+-        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
++        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
++        // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
++        ParseStrictBws(tok);
+ 
++        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
+         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
+         buf_ = tok.remaining();
+         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
+@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+ 
+ /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
+ /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
+-bool
++void
+ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
+ {
+-    bool foundChunkExt = false;
+     do {
+         auto tok = callerTok;
+ 
+         ParseBws(tok);
+ 
+         if (!tok.skip(';'))
+-            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
++            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
+ 
+         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
+         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
+         callerTok = tok;
+-        foundChunkExt = true;
+     } while (true);
+ }
+ 
+diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
+index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
++++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
+ private:
+     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
+     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
+-    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
++    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
+     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
+     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
+     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
+
+From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
+Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
+
+---
+ src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
+ void
+ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
+ {
+-    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
++    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
+ }
+ 
+ void
+ Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
+ {
+-    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
++    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
+ }
+ 
+

SPECS/squid.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:     squid
 Version:  4.15
-Release:  6%{?dist}
+Release:  10%{?dist}.1
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
@@ -38,6 +38,8 @@ Patch206: squid-4.11-active-ftp.patch
 Patch208: squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2006121
 Patch209: squid-4.15-ftp-filename-extraction.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2076717
+Patch210: squid-4.15-halfclosed.patch
 
 # Security fixes
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1941506
@@ -46,6 +48,31 @@ Patch300: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-28116.patch
 Patch301: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-46784.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2129771
 Patch302: squid-4.15-CVE-2022-41318.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245910
+# +backported: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/417da4006cf5c97d44e74431b816fc58fec9e270
+Patch303: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245916
+Patch304: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch
+# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14792
+Patch305: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-5824.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2248521
+Patch306: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46728.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2247567
+Patch307: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252926
+Patch308: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252923
+Patch309: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2254663
+Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264309
+Patch311: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268366
+Patch312: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch
+# Regression caused by squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
+# Upstream PR: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/1914
+Patch313: squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch
+
 
 Requires: bash >= 2.0
 Requires(pre): shadow-utils
@@ -107,11 +134,23 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch206 -p1 -b .active-ftp
 %patch208 -p1 -b .convert-ipv4
 %patch209 -p1 -b .ftp-fn-extraction
+%patch210 -p1 -b .halfclosed
 
 # Security patches
 %patch300 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-28116
 %patch301 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
 %patch302 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
+%patch303 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46846
+%patch304 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46847
+%patch305 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-5824
+%patch306 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46728
+%patch307 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
+%patch308 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
+%patch309 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
+%patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
+%patch311 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
+%patch312 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
+%patch313 -p1 -b .ignore-wsp-chunk-sz
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
 # Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
@@ -328,6 +367,40 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Oct 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.1
+- Resolves: RHEL-56024 - (Regression) Transfer-encoding:chunked data is not sent
+  to the client in its complementary
+
+* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10
+- Resolves: RHEL-28529 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
+  Decoding (CVE-2024-25111)
+- Resolves: RHEL-26088 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP header
+  parser (CVE-2024-25617)
+
+* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-9
+- Resolves: RHEL-19552 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request 
+  parsing (CVE-2023-50269)
+
+* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-8
+- Resolves: RHEL-18351 - squid:4/squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message
+  processing feature (CVE-2023-49285)
+- Resolves: RHEL-18342 - squid:4/squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return
+  Value In Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
+- Resolves: RHEL-18230 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate
+  validation (CVE-2023-46724)
+- Resolves: RHEL-15911 - squid:4/squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher
+  protocol code (CVE-2023-46728)
+- Resolves: RHEL-18251 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
+- Resolves: RHEL-14794 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
+  (CVE-2023-5824)
+- Resolves: RHEL-14803 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
+  Authentication (CVE-2023-46847)
+- Resolves: RHEL-14777 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
+  and ICAP (CVE-2023-46846)
+
+* Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7
+- Resolves: #2076717 - Crash with half_closed_client on
+
 * Thu Dec 08 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 4.15-6
 - Resolves: #2072988 - [RFE] Add the "IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT"
   flag to sockets created for outgoing connections in the squid source code.