.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz
+SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
-index 20b9bf1..81ebb18 100644
---- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
-+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
-@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ urlInitialize(void)
-     assert(0 == matchDomainName("*.foo.com", ".foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
-     assert(0 != matchDomainName("*.foo.com", "foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
- 
-+    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", ""));
-+    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnHonorWildcards));
-+    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnRejectSubsubDomains));
-+
-     /* more cases? */
- }
- 
-@@ -756,6 +760,8 @@ matchDomainName(const char *h, const char *d, MatchDomainNameFlags flags)
-         return -1;
- 
-     dl = strlen(d);
-+    if (dl == 0)
-+        return 1;
- 
-     /*
-      * Start at the ends of the two strings and work towards the

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-index 6a9736f..0a883fa 100644
---- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-@@ -847,11 +847,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const char *aRequestRealm)
-             break;
- 
-         case DIGEST_NC:
--            if (value.size() != 8) {
-+            if (value.size() == 8) {
-+                // for historical reasons, the nc value MUST be exactly 8 bytes
-+                static_assert(sizeof(digest_request->nc) == 8 + 1, "bad nc buffer size");
-+                xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
-+                debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
-+            } else {
-                 debugs(29, 9, "Invalid nc '" << value << "' in '" << temp << "'");
-+                digest_request->nc[0] = 0;
-             }
--            xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
--            debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
-             break;
- 
-         case DIGEST_CNONCE:

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-commit 77b3fb4df0f126784d5fd4967c28ed40eb8d521b
-Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date:   Wed Oct 25 19:41:45 2023 +0000
-
-    RFC 1123: Fix date parsing (#1538)
-    
-    The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
-    https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/datetime-overflow.html
-    where it was filed as "1-Byte Buffer OverRead in RFC 1123 date/time
-    Handling".
-
-diff --git a/lib/rfc1123.c b/lib/rfc1123.c
-index e5bf9a4d7..cb484cc00 100644
---- a/lib/rfc1123.c
-+++ b/lib/rfc1123.c
-@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ make_month(const char *s)
-     char month[3];
- 
-     month[0] = xtoupper(*s);
-+    if (!month[0])
-+        return -1; // protects *(s + 1) below
-+
-     month[1] = xtolower(*(s + 1));
-+    if (!month[1])
-+        return -1; // protects *(s + 2) below
-+
-     month[2] = xtolower(*(s + 2));
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
-

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
-index 42e11e6..a68e623 100644
---- a/src/ipc.cc
-+++ b/src/ipc.cc
-@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
- #include "SquidConfig.h"
- #include "SquidIpc.h"
- #include "tools.h"
-+#include <cstdlib>
-+
-+#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
- 
- static const char *hello_string = "hi there\n";
- #ifndef HELLO_BUF_SZ
-@@ -365,6 +370,22 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
-     }
- 
-     PutEnvironment();
-+
-+    // A dup(2) wrapper that reports and exits the process on errors. The
-+    // exiting logic is only suitable for this child process context.
-+    const auto dupOrExit = [prog,name](const int oldFd) {
-+        const auto newFd = dup(oldFd);
-+        if (newFd < 0) {
-+            const auto savedErrno = errno;
-+            debugs(54, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Helper process initialization failure: " << name <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "helper (CHILD) PID: " << getpid() <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "helper program name: " << prog <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "dup(2) system call error for FD " << oldFd << ": " << xstrerr(savedErrno));
-+            _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+        }
-+        return newFd;
-+    };
-+
-     /*
-      * This double-dup stuff avoids problems when one of
-      *  crfd, cwfd, or debug_log are in the rage 0-2.
-@@ -372,17 +393,16 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
- 
-     do {
-         /* First make sure 0-2 is occupied by something. Gets cleaned up later */
--        x = dup(crfd);
--        assert(x > -1);
--    } while (x < 3 && x > -1);
-+        x = dupOrExit(crfd);
-+    } while (x < 3);
- 
-     close(x);
- 
--    t1 = dup(crfd);
-+    t1 = dupOrExit(crfd);
- 
--    t2 = dup(cwfd);
-+    t2 = dupOrExit(cwfd);
- 
--    t3 = dup(fileno(debug_log));
-+    t3 = dupOrExit(fileno(debug_log));
- 
-     assert(t1 > 2 && t2 > 2 && t3 > 2);
- 

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-index fe2edf6..47aa935 100644
---- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-+++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ public:
- #endif
-     ErrorState *error; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
-     bool readNextRequest; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
-+
-+#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
-+    size_t currentXffHopNumber = 0; ///< number of X-Forwarded-For header values processed so far
-+#endif
- };
- 
- #endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
-diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
-index 1c6ff62..b758f6f 100644
---- a/src/client_side_request.cc
-+++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
-@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@
- static const char *const crlf = "\r\n";
- 
- #if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
-+
-+#if !defined(SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX)
-+#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
-+#endif
-+
- static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data);
- #endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
- 
-@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data)
-                 /* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
-                 Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
-             }
--            calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
--            return;
-+            if (++calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber < SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX) {
-+                calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
-+                return;
-+            }
-+            const auto headerName = Http::HeaderLookupTable.lookup(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR).name;
-+            debugs(28, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Ignoring trailing " << headerName << " addresses" <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "addresses allowed by follow_x_forwarded_for: " << calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "last/accepted address: " << request->indirect_client_addr <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "ignored trailing addresses: " << request->x_forwarded_for_iterator);
-+            // fall through to resume clientAccessCheck() processing
-         }
-     }
- 

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index b006300..023e411 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
- #include "rfc1738.h"
- #include "SquidConfig.h"
- #include "SquidTime.h"
-+#include "SquidMath.h"
- #include "StatCounters.h"
- #include "Store.h"
- #include "StrList.h"
-@@ -1150,18 +1151,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
-      * Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
-      */
- 
--    Must(maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(true));
--    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
--    rd.conn = io.conn;
--    rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission) || !moreDataPermission)) {
-+        abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-+    const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission);
-+    // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
-+    const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
- 
--    if (rd.size <= 0) {
-+    if (readSizeWanted <= 0) {
-         assert(entry->mem_obj);
-         AsyncCall::Pointer nilCall;
-         entry->mem_obj->delayRead(DeferredRead(readDelayed, this, CommRead(io.conn, NULL, 0, nilCall)));
-         return;
-     }
- 
-+    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
-+    rd.conn = io.conn;
-+    rd.size = readSizeWanted;
-     switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
-     case Comm::INPROGRESS:
-         if (inBuf.isEmpty())
-@@ -1520,8 +1529,11 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
-         return;
- 
--    if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission)) || !moreDataPermission) {
-+        abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     // XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
-     // check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
-@@ -1539,40 +1551,79 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
- }
- 
-+/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
-+/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
-+/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may waste memory;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
-+{
-+    if (!flags.headers_parsed)
-+        return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
-+
-+    // XXX: Our inBuf is not used to maintain the read-ahead gap, and using
-+    // Config.readAheadGap like this creates huge read buffers for large
-+    // read_ahead_gap values. TODO: Switch to using tcp_recv_bufsize as the
-+    // primary read buffer capacity factor.
-+    //
-+    // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
-+    // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
-+    const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).second ? NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).first : SBuf::maxSize;
-+
-+    // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
-+    // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
-+
-+    return std::min<size_t>(configurationPreferences, SBuf::maxSize);
-+}
-+
-+/// The maximum number of virgin reply bytes we may buffer before we violate
-+/// the currently configured response buffering limits.
-+/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
-+/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
-+/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
- bool
--HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
-+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const
- {
--    // how much we are allowed to buffer
--    const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
--
--    if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
--        // when buffer is at or over limit already
--        debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
--        // Process next response from buffer
--        processReply();
--        return false;
-+#if USE_ADAPTATION
-+    // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
-+    // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
-+    if (responseBodyBuffer) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
-+        *maxReadSize = 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
-+        return true;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+    const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
-+    if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
-+        return false; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
-     }
- 
-+    *maxReadSize = (maxCapacity - inBuf.length()); // positive
-+    debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << *maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
-+    return true; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
-+}
-+
-+/// prepare read buffer for reading
-+/// \return the maximum number of bytes the caller should attempt to read
-+/// \retval 0 means that the caller should delay reading
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(const size_t maxReadSize)
-+{
-     // how much we want to read
--    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), (limitBuffer - inBuf.length()));
-+    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), maxReadSize);
- 
--    if (!read_size) {
-+    if (read_size < 2) {
-         debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << read_size << " into buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        return false;
-+        return 0;
-     }
- 
--    // just report whether we could grow or not, do not actually do it
--    if (doGrow)
--        return (read_size >= 2);
--
-     // we may need to grow the buffer
-     inBuf.reserveSpace(read_size);
--    debugs(11, 8, (!flags.do_next_read ? "will not" : "may") <<
--           " read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buf(" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() <<
--           ") from " << serverConnection);
--
--    return (inBuf.spaceSize() >= 2); // only read if there is 1+ bytes of space available
-+    debugs(11, 7, "may read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
-+    return read_size;
- }
- 
- /// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
-diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
-index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
---- a/src/http.h
-+++ b/src/http.h
-@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
- #include "http/StateFlags.h"
- #include "sbuf/SBuf.h"
- 
-+#include <optional>
-+
- class FwdState;
- class HttpHeader;
- 
-@@ -107,16 +109,9 @@ private:
- 
-     void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
- 
--    /**
--     * determine if read buffer can have space made available
--     * for a read.
--     *
--     * \param grow  whether to actually expand the buffer
--     *
--     * \return whether the buffer can be grown to provide space
--     *         regardless of whether the grow actually happened.
--     */
--    bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
-+    size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
-+    bool canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const;
-+    size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
- 
-     // consuming request body
-     virtual void handleMoreRequestBodyAvailable();

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
-index a791885..b9aef38 100644
---- a/src/SquidString.h
-+++ b/src/SquidString.h
-@@ -114,7 +114,16 @@ private:
- 
-     size_type len_;  /* current length  */
- 
--    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
-+    /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
-+    /// (a) we do not know where those buffers are (or whether they still exist)
-+    /// (b) too many String users unknowingly exceeded that limit and asserted.
-+    /// We are now using a larger limit to reduce the number of (b) cases,
-+    /// especially cases where "compact" lists of items grow 50% in size when we
-+    /// convert them to canonical form. The new limit is selected to withstand
-+    /// concatenation and ~50% expansion of two HTTP headers limited by default
-+    /// request_header_max_size and reply_header_max_size settings.
-+    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 3*64*1024 - 1;
-+
-     /// returns true after increasing the first argument by extra if the sum does not exceed SizeMax_
-     static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
- 
-diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
-index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
---- a/src/cache_cf.cc
-+++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
-@@ -935,6 +935,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
-                (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
-     }
- 
-+    // Warn about the dangers of exceeding String limits when manipulating HTTP
-+    // headers. Technically, we do not concatenate _requests_, so we could relax
-+    // their check, but we keep the two checks the same for simplicity sake.
-+    const auto safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax = (String::SizeMaxXXX()+1)/3;
-+    // TODO: static_assert(safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax >= 64*1024); // no WARNINGs for default settings
-+    if (Config.maxRequestHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing request_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxRequestHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+    if (Config.maxReplyHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing reply_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxReplyHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+
-     /*
-      * Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
-      * Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
-diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
-index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
---- a/src/cf.data.pre
-+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
-@@ -6196,11 +6196,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a request.
--	Request headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the request header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP request
-+	(including request-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to received FTP commands.
-+
-+	This limit has no direct affect on Squid memory consumption.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending requests.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: reply_header_max_size
-@@ -6209,11 +6212,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a reply.
--	Reply headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the reply header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP response
-+	(including status-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to FTP command responses.
-+
-+	Squid also checks this limit when loading hit responses from disk cache.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending responses.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: request_body_max_size
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index 877172d..b006300 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -1820,8 +1820,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
- 
-         String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);
- 
--        // if we cannot double strFwd size, then it grew past 50% of the limit
--        if (!strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-+        // Detect unreasonably long header values. And paranoidly check String
-+        // limits: a String ought to accommodate two reasonable-length values.
-+        if (strFwd.size() > 32*1024 || !strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-             // There is probably a forwarding loop with Via detection disabled.
-             // If we do nothing, String will assert on overflow soon.
-             // TODO: Terminate all transactions with huge XFF?

SOURCES/squid-4.15-halfclosed.patch

@@ -1,163 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/client_side.cc b/src/client_side.cc
-index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
---- a/src/client_side.cc
-+++ b/src/client_side.cc
-@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
-      * We are done with the response, and we are either still receiving request
-      * body (early response!) or have already stopped receiving anything.
-      *
--     * If we are still receiving, then clientParseRequest() below will fail.
-+     * If we are still receiving, then parseRequests() below will fail.
-      * (XXX: but then we will call readNextRequest() which may succeed and
-      * execute a smuggled request as we are not done with the current request).
-      *
-@@ -926,28 +926,12 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
-      * Attempt to parse a request from the request buffer.
-      * If we've been fed a pipelined request it may already
-      * be in our read buffer.
--     *
--     \par
--     * This needs to fall through - if we're unlucky and parse the _last_ request
--     * from our read buffer we may never re-register for another client read.
-      */
- 
--    if (clientParseRequests()) {
--        debugs(33, 3, clientConnection << ": parsed next request from buffer");
--    }
-+    parseRequests();
- 
--    /** \par
--     * Either we need to kick-start another read or, if we have
--     * a half-closed connection, kill it after the last request.
--     * This saves waiting for half-closed connections to finished being
--     * half-closed _AND_ then, sometimes, spending "Timeout" time in
--     * the keepalive "Waiting for next request" state.
--     */
--    if (commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd) && pipeline.empty()) {
--        debugs(33, 3, "half-closed client with no pending requests, closing");
--        clientConnection->close();
-+    if (!isOpen())
-         return;
--    }
- 
-     /** \par
-      * At this point we either have a parsed request (which we've
-@@ -2058,16 +2042,11 @@ ConnStateData::receivedFirstByte()
-     commSetConnTimeout(clientConnection, Config.Timeout.request, timeoutCall);
- }
- 
--/**
-- * Attempt to parse one or more requests from the input buffer.
-- * Returns true after completing parsing of at least one request [header]. That
-- * includes cases where parsing ended with an error (e.g., a huge request).
-- */
--bool
--ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
-+/// Attempt to parse one or more requests from the input buffer.
-+/// May close the connection.
-+void
-+ConnStateData::parseRequests()
- {
--    bool parsed_req = false;
--
-     debugs(33, 5, HERE << clientConnection << ": attempting to parse");
- 
-     // Loop while we have read bytes that are not needed for producing the body
-@@ -2116,8 +2095,6 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
- 
-             processParsedRequest(context);
- 
--            parsed_req = true; // XXX: do we really need to parse everything right NOW ?
--
-             if (context->mayUseConnection()) {
-                 debugs(33, 3, HERE << "Not parsing new requests, as this request may need the connection");
-                 break;
-@@ -2130,8 +2107,19 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
-         }
-     }
- 
--    /* XXX where to 'finish' the parsing pass? */
--    return parsed_req;
-+    debugs(33, 7, "buffered leftovers: " << inBuf.length());
-+
-+    if (isOpen() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
-+        if (pipeline.empty()) {
-+            // we processed what we could parse, and no more data is coming
-+            debugs(33, 5, "closing half-closed without parsed requests: " << clientConnection);
-+            clientConnection->close();
-+        } else {
-+            // we parsed what we could, and no more data is coming
-+            debugs(33, 5, "monitoring half-closed while processing parsed requests: " << clientConnection);
-+            flags.readMore = false; // may already be false
-+        }
-+    }
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -2148,23 +2136,7 @@ ConnStateData::afterClientRead()
-     if (pipeline.empty())
-         fd_note(clientConnection->fd, "Reading next request");
- 
--    if (!clientParseRequests()) {
--        if (!isOpen())
--            return;
--        /*
--         * If the client here is half closed and we failed
--         * to parse a request, close the connection.
--         * The above check with connFinishedWithConn() only
--         * succeeds _if_ the buffer is empty which it won't
--         * be if we have an incomplete request.
--         * XXX: This duplicates ConnStateData::kick
--         */
--        if (pipeline.empty() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
--            debugs(33, 5, clientConnection << ": half-closed connection, no completed request parsed, connection closing.");
--            clientConnection->close();
--            return;
--        }
--    }
-+    parseRequests();
- 
-     if (!isOpen())
-         return;
-@@ -3945,7 +3917,7 @@ ConnStateData::notePinnedConnectionBecameIdle(PinnedIdleContext pic)
-     startPinnedConnectionMonitoring();
- 
-     if (pipeline.empty())
--        kick(); // in case clientParseRequests() was blocked by a busy pic.connection
-+        kick(); // in case parseRequests() was blocked by a busy pic.connection
- }
- 
- /// Forward future client requests using the given server connection.
-diff --git a/src/client_side.h b/src/client_side.h
-index 9fe8463..dfb4d8e 100644
---- a/src/client_side.h
-+++ b/src/client_side.h
-@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ public:
-     virtual void doneWithControlMsg();
- 
-     /// Traffic parsing
--    bool clientParseRequests();
-     void readNextRequest();
- 
-     /// try to make progress on a transaction or read more I/O
-@@ -373,6 +372,7 @@ private:
-     virtual bool connFinishedWithConn(int size);
-     virtual void checkLogging();
- 
-+    void parseRequests();
-     void clientAfterReadingRequests();
-     bool concurrentRequestQueueFilled() const;
- 
-diff --git a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
-index d7efb0f..655ed83 100644
---- a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
-+++ b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
-@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
- #include "tests/STUB.h"
- 
- #include "client_side.h"
--bool ConnStateData::clientParseRequests() STUB_RETVAL(false)
-+void ConnStateData::parseRequests() STUB
- void ConnStateData::readNextRequest() STUB
- bool ConnStateData::isOpen() const STUB_RETVAL(false)
- void ConnStateData::kick() STUB

SOURCES/squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch

@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
-From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
-
-Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
-with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
-
-It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
-common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
-nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
-
-This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
-which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
-+        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
-         parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-
-From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
-
-Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
-which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
-to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
-
-Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          |  4 ++--
- src/http/one/Parser.h           |  3 ++-
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
- 
- // BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
- void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-+        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
-+        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
-+        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
-+            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--void
-+bool
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
-+    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
-+        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
- void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
-
-From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
-
-Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
-spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
-Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
-
-The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
-was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
-partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
-had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
--        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
--        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
--            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
- 
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
--        ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
-             return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-
-From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
-
-... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
- src/http/one/Parser.h           | 10 ++++++++--
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
-     return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
- }
- 
--// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
--void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
-+/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
-+namespace Http::One {
-+static void
-+ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- 
-     // success: no more BWS characters expected
- }
-+} // namespace Http::One
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+}
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
-+/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
-+/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+
-+/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
-+/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
-+/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
-+void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
--        ParseBws(tok, true);
--
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
-+        // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
-+        ParseStrictBws(tok);
- 
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--bool
-+void
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
--    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
--        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- void
- Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- }
- 
- void
- Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
- }
- 
-

SPECS/squid.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:     squid
 Version:  4.15
-Release:  10%{?dist}.1
+Release:  6%{?dist}
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
@@ -38,8 +38,6 @@ Patch206: squid-4.11-active-ftp.patch
 Patch208: squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2006121
 Patch209: squid-4.15-ftp-filename-extraction.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2076717
-Patch210: squid-4.15-halfclosed.patch
 
 # Security fixes
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1941506
@@ -48,31 +46,6 @@ Patch300: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-28116.patch
 Patch301: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-46784.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2129771
 Patch302: squid-4.15-CVE-2022-41318.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245910
-# +backported: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/417da4006cf5c97d44e74431b816fc58fec9e270
-Patch303: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245916
-Patch304: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch
-# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14792
-Patch305: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-5824.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2248521
-Patch306: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46728.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2247567
-Patch307: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252926
-Patch308: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252923
-Patch309: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2254663
-Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264309
-Patch311: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268366
-Patch312: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch
-# Regression caused by squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
-# Upstream PR: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/1914
-Patch313: squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch
-
 
 Requires: bash >= 2.0
 Requires(pre): shadow-utils
@@ -134,23 +107,11 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch206 -p1 -b .active-ftp
 %patch208 -p1 -b .convert-ipv4
 %patch209 -p1 -b .ftp-fn-extraction
-%patch210 -p1 -b .halfclosed
 
 # Security patches
 %patch300 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-28116
 %patch301 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
 %patch302 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
-%patch303 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46846
-%patch304 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46847
-%patch305 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-5824
-%patch306 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46728
-%patch307 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
-%patch308 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
-%patch309 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
-%patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
-%patch311 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
-%patch312 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
-%patch313 -p1 -b .ignore-wsp-chunk-sz
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
 # Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
@@ -367,40 +328,6 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
-* Mon Oct 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.1
-- Resolves: RHEL-56024 - (Regression) Transfer-encoding:chunked data is not sent
-  to the client in its complementary
-
-* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10
-- Resolves: RHEL-28529 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
-  Decoding (CVE-2024-25111)
-- Resolves: RHEL-26088 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP header
-  parser (CVE-2024-25617)
-
-* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-9
-- Resolves: RHEL-19552 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request 
-  parsing (CVE-2023-50269)
-
-* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-8
-- Resolves: RHEL-18351 - squid:4/squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message
-  processing feature (CVE-2023-49285)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18342 - squid:4/squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return
-  Value In Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18230 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate
-  validation (CVE-2023-46724)
-- Resolves: RHEL-15911 - squid:4/squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher
-  protocol code (CVE-2023-46728)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18251 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
-- Resolves: RHEL-14794 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
-  (CVE-2023-5824)
-- Resolves: RHEL-14803 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
-  Authentication (CVE-2023-46847)
-- Resolves: RHEL-14777 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
-  and ICAP (CVE-2023-46846)
-
-* Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7
-- Resolves: #2076717 - Crash with half_closed_client on
-
 * Thu Dec 08 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 4.15-6
 - Resolves: #2072988 - [RFE] Add the "IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT"
   flag to sockets created for outgoing connections in the squid source code.