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Remove more old patches left-overs

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This commit is contained in:
Christophe Fergeau 2014-05-19 14:59:37 +02:00
parent 8713af5567
commit 9f9a59c2ce
1 changed files with 0 additions and 105 deletions
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105
0010-Fix-buffer-overflow-when-decrypting-client-SPICE-tic.patch
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@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
From 8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 11:29:44 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when decrypting client SPICE ticket
reds_handle_ticket uses a fixed size 'password' buffer for the decrypted
password whose size is SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH. However,
RSA_private_decrypt which we call for the decryption expects the
destination buffer to be at least RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa)
bytes long. On my spice-server build, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH
is 60 while RSA_size() is 128, so we end up overflowing 'password'
when using long passwords (this was reproduced using the string:
'fullscreen=1proxy=#enter proxy here; e.g spice_proxy = http://[proxy]:[port]'
as a password).
When the overflow occurs, QEMU dies with:
*** stack smashing detected ***: qemu-system-x86_64 terminated
This commit ensures we use a corectly sized 'password' buffer,
and that it's correctly nul-terminated so that we can use strcmp
instead of strncmp. To keep using strncmp, we'd need to figure out
which one of 'password' and 'taTicket.password' is the smaller buffer,
and use that size.
This fixes rhbz#999839
---
server/reds.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
index 892d247..2a0002b 100644
--- a/server/reds.c
+++ b/server/reds.c
@@ -1926,39 +1926,59 @@ static void reds_handle_link(RedLinkInfo *link)
static void reds_handle_ticket(void *opaque)
{
RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
- char password[SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
+ char *password;
time_t ltime;
+ int password_size;
//todo: use monotonic time
time(&ltime);
- RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
- link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
- (unsigned char *)password, link->tiTicketing.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa) < SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
+ spice_warning("RSA modulus size is smaller than SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH (%d < %d), "
+ "SPICE ticket sent from client may be truncated",
+ RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa), SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
+ }
+
+ password = g_malloc0(RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa) + 1);
+ password_size = RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
+ link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
+ (unsigned char *)password,
+ link->tiTicketing.rsa,
+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
+ if (password_size == -1) {
+ spice_warning("failed to decrypt RSA encrypted password: %s",
+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ password[password_size] = '\0';
if (ticketing_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
int expired = taTicket.expiration_time < ltime;
if (strlen(taTicket.password) == 0) {
- reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
spice_warning("Ticketing is enabled, but no password is set. "
- "please set a ticket first");
- reds_link_free(link);
- return;
+ "please set a ticket first");
+ goto error;
}
- if (expired || strncmp(password, taTicket.password, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) != 0) {
+ if (expired || strcmp(password, taTicket.password) != 0) {
if (expired) {
spice_warning("Ticket has expired");
} else {
spice_warning("Invalid password");
}
- reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
- reds_link_free(link);
- return;
+ goto error;
}
}
reds_handle_link(link);
+ goto end;
+
+error:
+ reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
+ reds_link_free(link);
+
+end:
+ g_free(password);
}
static inline void async_read_clear_handlers(AsyncRead *obj)