106 lines
4.2 KiB
Diff
106 lines
4.2 KiB
Diff
From 8af619009660b24e0b41ad26b30289eea288fcc2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
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Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2013 11:29:44 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] Fix buffer overflow when decrypting client SPICE ticket
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reds_handle_ticket uses a fixed size 'password' buffer for the decrypted
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password whose size is SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH. However,
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RSA_private_decrypt which we call for the decryption expects the
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destination buffer to be at least RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa)
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bytes long. On my spice-server build, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH
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is 60 while RSA_size() is 128, so we end up overflowing 'password'
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when using long passwords (this was reproduced using the string:
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'fullscreen=1proxy=#enter proxy here; e.g spice_proxy = http://[proxy]:[port]'
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as a password).
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When the overflow occurs, QEMU dies with:
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*** stack smashing detected ***: qemu-system-x86_64 terminated
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This commit ensures we use a corectly sized 'password' buffer,
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and that it's correctly nul-terminated so that we can use strcmp
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instead of strncmp. To keep using strncmp, we'd need to figure out
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which one of 'password' and 'taTicket.password' is the smaller buffer,
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and use that size.
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This fixes rhbz#999839
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---
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server/reds.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
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1 file changed, 32 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/server/reds.c b/server/reds.c
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index 892d247..2a0002b 100644
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--- a/server/reds.c
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+++ b/server/reds.c
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@@ -1926,39 +1926,59 @@ static void reds_handle_link(RedLinkInfo *link)
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static void reds_handle_ticket(void *opaque)
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{
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RedLinkInfo *link = (RedLinkInfo *)opaque;
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- char password[SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH];
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+ char *password;
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time_t ltime;
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+ int password_size;
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//todo: use monotonic time
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time(<ime);
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- RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
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- link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
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- (unsigned char *)password, link->tiTicketing.rsa, RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
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+ if (RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa) < SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) {
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+ spice_warning("RSA modulus size is smaller than SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH (%d < %d), "
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+ "SPICE ticket sent from client may be truncated",
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+ RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa), SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH);
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+ }
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+
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+ password = g_malloc0(RSA_size(link->tiTicketing.rsa) + 1);
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+ password_size = RSA_private_decrypt(link->tiTicketing.rsa_size,
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+ link->tiTicketing.encrypted_ticket.encrypted_data,
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+ (unsigned char *)password,
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+ link->tiTicketing.rsa,
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+ RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING);
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+ if (password_size == -1) {
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+ spice_warning("failed to decrypt RSA encrypted password: %s",
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+ ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
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+ goto error;
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+ }
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+ password[password_size] = '\0';
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if (ticketing_enabled && !link->skip_auth) {
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int expired = taTicket.expiration_time < ltime;
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if (strlen(taTicket.password) == 0) {
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- reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
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spice_warning("Ticketing is enabled, but no password is set. "
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- "please set a ticket first");
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- reds_link_free(link);
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- return;
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+ "please set a ticket first");
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+ goto error;
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}
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- if (expired || strncmp(password, taTicket.password, SPICE_MAX_PASSWORD_LENGTH) != 0) {
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+ if (expired || strcmp(password, taTicket.password) != 0) {
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if (expired) {
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spice_warning("Ticket has expired");
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} else {
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spice_warning("Invalid password");
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}
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- reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
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- reds_link_free(link);
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- return;
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+ goto error;
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}
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}
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reds_handle_link(link);
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+ goto end;
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+
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+error:
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+ reds_send_link_result(link, SPICE_LINK_ERR_PERMISSION_DENIED);
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+ reds_link_free(link);
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+
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+end:
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+ g_free(password);
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}
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static inline void async_read_clear_handlers(AsyncRead *obj)
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