selinux-policy/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te
2005-05-02 19:22:58 +00:00

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# Copyright (C) 2005 Tresys Technology, LLC
policy_module(selinux,1.0)
########################################
#
# Declarations
#
attribute can_write_binary_policy;
attribute can_relabelto_binary_policy;
type checkpolicy_t, can_write_binary_policy;
domain_make_domain(checkpolicy_t)
role system_r types checkpolicy_t;
type checkpolicy_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(checkpolicy_t,checkpolicy_exec_t)
#
# default_context_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/*/contexts/*
#
type default_context_t;
files_make_file(default_context_t)
#
# file_context_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/*/contexts/files
#
type file_context_t;
files_make_file(file_context_t)
type load_policy_t;
domain_make_domain(load_policy_t)
role system_r types load_policy_t;
type load_policy_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(load_policy_t,load_policy_exec_t)
type newrole_t; #, privrole, privowner, privlog, auth_chkpwd, nscd_client_domain, privfd, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite, mlsfileupgrade, mlsfiledowngrade, mlsprocsetsl $2;
domain_make_domain(newrole_t)
type newrole_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(newrole_t,newrole_exec_t)
#
# policy_config_t is the type of /etc/security/selinux/*
# the security server policy configuration.
#
type policy_config_t;
files_make_file(policy_config_t)
neverallow ~can_relabelto_binary_policy policy_config_t:file relabelto;
neverallow ~can_write_binary_policy policy_config_t:file { write append };
#
# policy_src_t is the type of the policy source
# files.
#
type policy_src_t;
files_make_file(policy_src_t)
type restorecon_t, can_relabelto_binary_policy; #, privowner, auth_write, change_context;
domain_make_domain(restorecon_t)
role system_r types restorecon_t;
type restorecon_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(restorecon_t,restorecon_exec_t)
#
# selinux_config_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/config
#
type selinux_config_t;
files_make_file(selinux_config_t)
type setfiles_t, can_relabelto_binary_policy; # privlog, privowner, auth_write, change_context;
domain_make_domain(setfiles_t)
role system_r types setfiles_t;
type setfiles_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(setfiles_t,setfiles_exec_t)
########################################
#
# Checkpolicy local policy
#
allow checkpolicy_t self:capability dac_override;
# able to create and modify binary policy files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
# only allow read of policy source files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:dir { getattr search read };
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:{ file lnk_file } { getattr read };
allow checkpolicy_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
filesystem_get_persistent_filesystem_attributes(checkpolicy_t)
terminal_use_console(checkpolicy_t)
terminal_use_controlling_terminal(checkpolicy_t)
init_use_file_descriptors(checkpolicy_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(checkpolicy_t)
libraries_use_dynamic_loader(checkpolicy_t)
libraries_read_shared_libraries(checkpolicy_t)
ifdef(`TODO',`
role sysadm_r types checkpolicy_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, checkpolicy_exec_t, checkpolicy_t)
# allow test policies to be created in src directories
file_type_auto_trans(checkpolicy_t, policy_src_t, policy_config_t, file)
# directory search permissions for path to source and binary policy files
allow checkpolicy_t root_t:dir search;
allow checkpolicy_t etc_t:dir search;
# Read the devpts root directory.
allow checkpolicy_t devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;
ifdef(`sshd.te',`allow checkpolicy_t sshd_devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;')
# Other access
allow checkpolicy_t admin_tty_type:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
allow checkpolicy_t sysadm_tmp_t:file { getattr write } ;
# Allow users to execute checkpolicy without a domain transition
# so it can be used without privilege to write real binary policy file
can_exec(unpriv_userdomain, checkpolicy_exec_t)
allow checkpolicy_t { userdomain privfd }:fd use;
') dnl endif TODO
########################################
#
# Load_policy local policy
#
allow load_policy_t self:capability dac_override;
# only allow read of policy config files
allow load_policy_t policy_src_t:dir search;
allow load_policy_t policy_config_t:dir { getattr search read };
allow load_policy_t policy_config_t:{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } { getattr read };
allow newrole_t selinux_config_t:dir { getattr read search };
allow newrole_t selinux_config_t:file { read getattr };
allow newrole_t selinux_config_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(load_policy_t)
kernel_load_selinux_policy(load_policy_t)
kernel_set_selinux_boolean(load_policy_t)
filesystem_get_persistent_filesystem_attributes(load_policy_t)
terminal_use_console(load_policy_t)
terminal_use_controlling_terminal(load_policy_t)
terminal_list_pseudoterminals(load_policy_t)
init_script_use_file_descriptors(load_policy_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(load_policy_t)
libraries_use_dynamic_loader(load_policy_t)
libraries_read_shared_libraries(load_policy_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(load_policy_t)
ifdef(`TODO',`
role sysadm_r types load_policy_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, load_policy_exec_t, load_policy_t)
# directory search permissions for path to binary policy files
allow load_policy_t etc_t:dir search;
# Other access
allow load_policy_t { admin_tty_type }:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
allow load_policy_t { userdomain privfd }:fd use;
allow load_policy_t sysadm_tmp_t:file { getattr write } ;
') dnl endif TODO
########################################
#
# Newrole local policy
#
allow newrole_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service dac_override };
allow newrole_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow newrole_t self:process setexec;
allow newrole_t self:fd use;
allow newrole_t self:fifo_file { read getattr lock ioctl write append };
allow newrole_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow newrole_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow newrole_t self:shm { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write lock unix_read unix_write };
allow newrole_t self:sem { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write unix_read unix_write };
allow newrole_t self:msgq { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write enqueue unix_read unix_write };
allow newrole_t self:msg { send receive };
allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir { getattr read search };
allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file { read getattr };
allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file { getattr read };
kernel_read_system_state(newrole_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl(newrole_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(newrole_t)
kernel_validate_selinux_context(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_selinux_av(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_create(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_relabel(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(newrole_t)
devices_get_pseudorandom_data(newrole_t)
filesystem_get_persistent_filesystem_attributes(newrole_t)
terminal_list_pseudoterminals(newrole_t)
terminal_use_controlling_terminal(newrole_t)
files_read_general_system_config(newrole_t)
libraries_use_dynamic_loader(newrole_t)
libraries_read_shared_libraries(newrole_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(newrole_t)
ifdef(`TODO',`
in_user_role(newrole_t)
role sysadm_r types newrole_t;
allow newrole_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
can_ypbind(newrole)
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow newrole_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
')
# for when the user types "exec newrole" at the command line
allow newrole_t privfd:process sigchld;
# Inherit descriptors from the current session.
allow newrole_t privfd:fd use;
# Execute /sbin/pwdb_chkpwd to check the password.
allow newrole_t sbin_t:dir r_dir_perms;
# Execute shells
allow newrole_t bin_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow newrole_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
allow newrole_t shell_exec_t:file r_file_perms;
# Allow newrole_t to transition to user domains.
bool secure_mode false;
domain_trans(newrole_t, shell_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
if(!secure_mode)
{
# if we are not in secure mode then we can transition to sysadm_t
domain_trans(newrole_t, shell_exec_t, sysadm_t)
}
# Read /var.
allow newrole_t var_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow newrole_t var_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
# Read /dev directories and any symbolic links.
allow newrole_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;
# Relabel terminals.
allow newrole_t { ttyfile ptyfile }:chr_file { relabelfrom relabelto };
# Access terminals.
allow newrole_t { ttyfile ptyfile }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow newrole_t gphdomain:fd use;')
# for some PAM modules and for cwd
dontaudit newrole_t { home_root_t home_type }:dir search;
# for when the network connection is killed
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain newrole_t:process signal;
# Write to utmp.
allow newrole_t var_run_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow newrole_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
') dnl ifdef TODO
########################################
#
# Restorecon local policy
#
allow restorecon_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir { getattr read search };
allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file { read getattr };
allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file { getattr read };
kernel_use_file_descriptors(restorecon_t)
kernel_read_system_state(restorecon_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(restorecon_t)
kernel_validate_selinux_context(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_selinux_av(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_create(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_relabel(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(restorecon_t)
filesystem_get_persistent_filesystem_attributes(restorecon_t)
init_use_file_descriptors(restorecon_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(restorecon_t)
files_read_runtime_system_config(restorecon_t)
files_read_general_system_config(restorecon_t)
libraries_use_dynamic_loader(restorecon_t)
libraries_read_shared_libraries(restorecon_t)
logging_send_system_log_message(restorecon_t)
optional_policy(`hotplug.te',`
hotplug_use_file_descriptors(restorecon_t)
')
# relabeling rules
files_read_all_directories(restorecon_t)
kernel_relabel_unlabeled_object(restorecon_t)
devices_manage_all_devices_labels(restorecon_t)
files_manage_all_files_labels(restorecon_t)
ifdef(`TODO',`
allow restorecon_t { tty_device_t admin_tty_type }:chr_file { read write ioctl };
domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, restorecon_exec_t, restorecon_t)
domain_audo_trans(sysadm_t, restorecon_exec_t, restorecon_t)
role sysadm_r types restorecon_t;
allow restorecon_t { userdomain privfd }:fd use;
# for upgrading glibc and other shared objects - without this the upgrade
# scripts will put things in a state such that restorecon can not be run!
allow restorecon_t lib_t:file { read execute };
tunable_policy(`distro_redhat', `
allow restorecon_t tmpfs_t:{ chr_file blk_file } { rw_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto };
')
allow restorecon_t fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
allow restorecon_t device_t:file { read write };
allow restorecon_t kernel_t:fifo_file { read write };
') dnl endif TODO
########################################
#
# Setfiles local policy
#
allow setfiles_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };
allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir { getattr read search };
allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file { read getattr };
allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file { getattr read };
kernel_read_system_state(setfiles_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(setfiles_t)
kernel_validate_selinux_context(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_selinux_av(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_create(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_relabel(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(setfiles_t)
filesystem_get_persistent_filesystem_attributes(setfiles_t)
terminal_use_controlling_terminal(setfiles_t)
init_use_file_descriptors(setfiles_t)
init_script_use_file_descriptors(setfiles_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(setfiles_t)
libraries_use_dynamic_loader(setfiles_t)
libraries_read_shared_libraries(setfiles_t)
files_read_runtime_system_config(setfiles_t)
files_read_general_system_config(setfiles_t)
logging_send_system_log_message(setfiles_t)
miscfiles_read_localization(setfiles_t)
# relabeling rules
files_read_all_directories(setfiles_t)
kernel_relabel_unlabeled_object(setfiles_t)
devices_manage_all_devices_labels(setfiles_t)
files_manage_all_files_labels(setfiles_t)
ifdef(`TODO',`
allow setfiles_t { ttyfile ptyfile tty_device_t }:chr_file { read write ioctl };
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, setfiles_exec_t, setfiles_t)
role sysadm_r types setfiles_t;
allow setfiles_t { userdomain privfd }:fd use;
# for upgrading glibc and other shared objects - without this the upgrade
# scripts will put things in a state such that setfiles can not be run!
allow setfiles_t lib_t:file { read execute };
allow setfiles_t unlabeled_t:dir read;
allow setfiles_t fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;
# for config files in a home directory
allow setfiles_t home_type:file r_file_perms;
') dnl endif TODO