selinux-policy/strict
2005-09-19 21:17:45 +00:00
..
appconfig more merging from nsa cvs 2005-09-16 13:36:26 +00:00
domains final updates from nsa cvs 2005-09-19 21:17:45 +00:00
file_contexts final updates from nsa cvs 2005-09-19 21:17:45 +00:00
flask update flask 2005-09-07 17:20:20 +00:00
macros final updates from nsa cvs 2005-09-19 21:17:45 +00:00
tunables more updates 2005-09-15 21:03:45 +00:00
types final updates from nsa cvs 2005-09-19 21:17:45 +00:00
assert.te more upstream merging 2005-09-16 19:36:10 +00:00
attrib.te more upstream merging 2005-09-16 19:36:10 +00:00
ChangeLog more merging from nsa cvs 2005-09-16 13:36:26 +00:00
constraints more updates 2005-09-15 21:03:45 +00:00
COPYING initial commit 2005-04-29 17:45:15 +00:00
fs_use more updates 2005-09-15 21:03:45 +00:00
genfs_contexts more updates 2005-09-15 21:03:45 +00:00
initial_sid_contexts initial commit 2005-04-29 17:45:15 +00:00
local.users initial commit 2005-04-29 17:45:15 +00:00
Makefile more merging from nsa cvs 2005-09-16 13:36:26 +00:00
mcs more upstream merging 2005-09-16 19:36:10 +00:00
mls more merging from nsa cvs 2005-09-16 13:36:26 +00:00
net_contexts more merging from nsa cvs 2005-09-16 13:36:26 +00:00
rbac initial commit 2005-04-29 17:45:15 +00:00
README initial commit 2005-04-29 17:45:15 +00:00
users more upstream merging 2005-09-16 19:36:10 +00:00
VERSION more merging from nsa cvs 2005-09-16 13:36:26 +00:00

The Makefile targets are:
policy - compile the policy configuration.
install - compile and install the policy configuration.
load    - compile, install, and load the policy configuration.
relabel - relabel the filesystem.
check-all - check individual additional policy files in domains/program/unused.
checkunused/FILE.te - check individual file FILE from domains/program/unused.

If you have configured MLS into your module, then set MLS=y in the
Makefile prior to building the policy.  Of course, you must have also
built checkpolicy with MLS enabled.  

Three of the configuration files are independent of the particular
security policy:
1) flask/security_classes -
   This file has a simple declaration for each security class.
   The corresponding symbol definitions are in the automatically
   generated header file <selinux/flask.h>. 

2) flask/initial_sids - 
   This file has a simple declaration for each initial SID.
   The corresponding symbol definitions are in the automatically
   generated header file <selinux/flask.h>.

3) access_vectors - 
   This file defines the access vectors.  Common prefixes for
   access vectors may be defined at the beginning of the file.
   After the common prefixes are defined, an access vector
   may be defined for each security class.
   The corresponding symbol definitions are in the automatically
   generated header file <selinux/av_permissions.h>.

In addition to being read by the security server, these configuration
files are used during the kernel build to automatically generate
symbol definitions used by the kernel for security classes, initial
SIDs and permissions.  Since the symbol definitions generated from
these files are used during the kernel build, the values of existing
security classes and permissions may not be modified by load_policy.
However, new classes may be appended to the list of classes and new
permissions may be appended to the list of permissions associated with
each access vector definition.

The policy-dependent configuration files are:
1) tmp/all.te -  
   This file defines the Type Enforcement (TE) configuration.
   This file is automatically generated from a collection of files.

   The macros subdirectory contains a collection of m4 macro definitions
   used by the TE configuration.  The global_macros.te file contains global 
   macros used throughout the configuration for common groupings of classes 
   and permissions and for common sets of rules.  The user_macros.te file
   contains macros used in defining user domains.  The admin_macros.te file
   contains macros used in defining admin domains.  The macros/program 
   subdirectory contains macros that are used to instantiate derived domains
   for certain programs that encode information about both the calling user
   domain and the program, permitting the policy to maintain separation 
   between different instances of the program.

   The types subdirectory contains several files with declarations for
   general types (types not associated with a particular domain) and 
   some rules defining relationships among those types.  Related types 
   are grouped together into each file in this directory, e.g. all
   device type declarations are in the device.te file.

   The domains subdirectory contains several files and directories
   with declarations and rules for each domain.  User domains are defined in 
   user.te.  Administrator domains are defined in admin.te.  Domains for 
   specific programs, including both system daemons and other programs, are 
   in the .te files within the domains/program subdirectory.  The domains/misc
   subdirectory is for miscellaneous domains such as the kernel domain and
   the kernel module loader domain.

   The assert.te file contains assertions that are checked after evaluating 
   the entire TE configuration.

2) rbac - 
   This file defines the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) configuration.

3) mls - 
   This file defines the Multi-Level Security (MLS) configuration.

4) users -
   This file defines the users recognized by the security policy.

5) constraints - 
   This file defines additional constraints on permissions
   in the form of boolean expressions that must be satisfied in order
   for specified permissions to be granted.  These constraints
   are used to further refine the type enforcement tables and
   the role allow rules.  Typically, these constraints are used
   to restrict changes in user identity or role to certain domains.

6) initial_sid_contexts -
   This file defines the security context for each initial SID.
   A security context consists of a user identity, a role, a type and
   optionally a MLS range if the MLS policy is enabled.  If left unspecified,
   the high MLS level defaults to the low MLS level.  The syntax of a valid 
   security context is:

     user:role:type[:sensitivity[:category,...][-sensitivity[:category,...]]]

7) fs_use -
   This file defines the labeling behavior for inodes in particular
   filesystem types.  

8) genfs_contexts -
   This file defines security contexts for files in filesystems that
   cannot support persistent label mappings or use one of the fixed
   labeling schemes specified in fs_use.

8) net_contexts -
   This file defines the security contexts of network objects
   such as ports, interfaces, and nodes.

9) file_contexts/{types.fc,program/*.fc}
   These files define the security contexts for persistent files.

It is possible to test the security server functions on a given policy
configuration by running the checkpolicy program with the -d option.
This program is built from the same sources as the security server
component of the kernel, so it may be used both to verify that a
policy configuration will load successfully and to determine how the
security server would respond if it were using that policy
configuration.  A menu-based interface is provided for calling any of
the security server functions after the policy is loaded.