selinux-policy/refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xserver.if

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## <summary>X Windows Server</summary>
template(`xserver_common_domain_template',`
##############################
#
# Declarations
#
type $1_xserver_t;
domain_type($1_xserver_t)
type $1_xserver_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file($1_xserver_tmp_t)
type $1_xserver_tmpfs_t;
files_tmpfs_file($1_xserver_tmpfs_t)
##############################
#
# $1_xserver_t local policy
#
# setuid/setgid for the wrapper program to change UID
# sys_rawio is for iopl access - should not be needed for frame-buffer
# sys_admin, locking shared mem? chowning IPC message queues or semaphores?
# admin of APM bios?
# sys_nice is so that the X server can set a negative nice value
# execheap needed until the X module loader is fixed.
allow $1_xserver_t self:capability { dac_override fsetid setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod net_bind_service };
dontaudit $1_xserver_t self:capability chown;
allow $1_xserver_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow $1_xserver_t self:process { execmem execheap setsched };
allow $1_xserver_t self:fd use;
allow $1_xserver_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t self:sock_file r_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t self:msg { send receive };
allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
allow $1_xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
files_filetrans_tmp($1_xserver_t, $1_xserver_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
allow $1_xserver_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
type_transition $1_xserver_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file $1_xserver_tmp_t;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
fs_filetrans_tmpfs($1_xserver_t,$1_xserver_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
files_search_var_lib($1_xserver_t)
# Create files in /var/log with the xserver_log_t type.
allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:dir r_dir_perms;
logging_filetrans_log($1_xserver_t,xserver_log_t,file)
kernel_read_system_state($1_xserver_t)
kernel_read_device_sysctls($1_xserver_t)
kernel_read_modprobe_sysctls($1_xserver_t)
# Xorg wants to check if kernel is tainted
kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_xserver_t)
# Run helper programs in $1_xserver_t.
corecmd_search_sbin($1_xserver_t)
corecmd_exec_bin($1_xserver_t)
corecmd_exec_shell($1_xserver_t)
corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_xserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
corenet_tcp_bind_xserver_port($1_xserver_t)
corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_xserver_t)
dev_read_sysfs($1_xserver_t)
dev_rw_mouse($1_xserver_t)
dev_rw_mtrr($1_xserver_t)
dev_rw_apm_bios($1_xserver_t)
dev_rw_agp($1_xserver_t)
dev_rw_framebuffer($1_xserver_t)
dev_manage_dri_dev($1_xserver_t)
dev_create_generic_dirs($1_xserver_t)
dev_setattr_generic_dirs($1_xserver_t)
# raw memory access is needed if not using the frame buffer
dev_read_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)
dev_write_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)
# for other device nodes such as the NVidia binary-only driver
dev_rw_xserver_misc($1_xserver_t)
# read events - the synaptics touchpad driver reads raw events
dev_rw_input_dev($1_xserver_t)
files_read_etc_files($1_xserver_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_xserver_t)
# brought on by rhgb
files_search_mnt($1_xserver_t)
# for nscd
files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_xserver_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xserver_t)
fs_search_nfs($1_xserver_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xserver_t)
term_setattr_unallocated_ttys($1_xserver_t)
term_use_unallocated_ttys($1_xserver_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_xserver_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_xserver_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_xserver_t)
miscfiles_read_localization($1_xserver_t)
miscfiles_read_fonts($1_xserver_t)
modutils_domtrans_insmod($1_xserver_t)
seutil_dontaudit_search_config($1_xserver_t)
sysnet_read_config($1_xserver_t)
optional_policy(`authlogin',`
auth_search_pam_console_data($1_xserver_t)
')
optional_policy(`nis',`
nis_use_ypbind($1_xserver_t)
')
optional_policy(`nscd',`
nscd_socket_use($1_xserver_t)
')
optional_policy(`xfs',`
xfs_stream_connect($1_xserver_t)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
ifdef(`rpm.te', `
allow $1_xserver_t rpm_t:shm { unix_read unix_write read write associate getattr };
allow $1_xserver_t rpm_tmpfs_t:file { read write };
rpm_use_fd($1_xserver_t)
')
')
') dnl end TODO
')
#######################################
## <summary>
## The per user domain template for the xserver module.
## </summary>
## <desc>
## <p>
## Define a derived domain for the X server when executed
## by a user domain (e.g. via startx). See the xdm module
## if using an X Display Manager.
## </p>
## <p>
## This is invoked automatically for each user and
## generally does not need to be invoked directly
## by policy writers.
## </p>
## </desc>
## <param name="prefix">
## <summary>
## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
## is the prefix for user_t).
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_domain">
## <summary>
## The type of the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_role">
## <summary>
## The role associated with the user domain.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
template(`xserver_per_userdomain_template',`
##############################
#
# Declarations
#
xserver_common_domain_template($1)
role $3 types $1_xserver_t;
type $1_iceauth_t;
domain_type($1_iceauth_t)
role $3 types $1_iceauth_t;
type $1_iceauth_home_t alias $1_iceauth_rw_t;
files_poly_member($1_iceauth_home_t)
userdom_home_file($1,$1_iceauth_home_t)
type $1_xauth_t;
domain_type($1_xauth_t)
role $3 types $1_xauth_t;
type $1_xauth_home_t alias $1_xauth_rw_t;
files_poly_member($1_xauth_home_t)
userdom_home_file($1,$1_xauth_home_t)
type $1_xauth_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file($1_xauth_tmp_t)
##############################
#
# $1_xserver_t Local policy
#
domain_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_t:fd use;
allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fd use;
allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:process sigchld;
allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };
domain_auto_trans($2, xserver_exec_t, $1_xserver_t)
allow $2 $1_xserver_t:fd use;
allow $1_xserver_t $2:fd use;
allow $1_xserver_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_xserver_t $2:process { signal sigchld };
allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;
allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
allow $2 $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $2 $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
# Communicate via System V shared memory.
allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;
allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
getty_use_fd($1_xserver_t)
locallogin_use_fd($1_xserver_t)
userdom_search_user_home($1,$1_xserver_t)
userdom_use_user_tty($1,$1_xserver_t)
userdom_setattr_user_tty($1,$1_xserver_t)
userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files($1,$1_xserver_t)
optional_policy(`userhelper',`
userhelper_search_config($1_xserver_t)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
# Read fonts
read_fonts($1_xserver_t, $1)
allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file unlink;
allow $1_xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:dir search;
')
') dnl end TODO
##############################
#
# $1_xauth_t Local policy
#
allow $1_xauth_t self:process signal;
allow $1_xauth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,$1_xauth_t,$1_xauth_home_t,file)
allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
files_filetrans_tmp($1_xauth_t, $1_xauth_tmp_t, { file dir })
domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;
allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;
allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;
allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process signal;
# allow ps to show xauth
allow $2 $1_xauth_t:dir { search getattr read };
allow $2 $1_xauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process getattr;
# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
# (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
# running in a privileged domain.
dontaudit $2 $1_xauth_t:process ptrace;
allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
allow xdm_t $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,xdm_t,$1_xauth_home_t,file)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_xauth_t)
files_read_etc_files($1_xauth_t)
files_search_pids($1_xauth_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xauth_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xauth_t)
# cjp: why?
term_use_ptmx($1_xauth_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_xauth_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_xauth_t)
sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_xauth_t)
userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_xauth_t)
userdom_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_xauth_t)
tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_nfs_files($1_xauth_t)
')
tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_cifs_files($1_xauth_t)
')
optional_policy(`nis',`
nis_use_ypbind($1_xauth_t)
')
optional_policy(`ssh',`
ssh_sigchld($1_xauth_t)
ssh_read_pipes($1_xauth_t)
ssh_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets($1_xauth_t)
')
##############################
#
# $1_iceauth_t Local policy
#
domain_auto_trans($2, iceauth_exec_t, $1_iceauth_t)
allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:fd use;
allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fd use;
allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_iceauth_t $2:process sigchld;
allow $1_iceauth_t $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,$1_iceauth_t,$1_iceauth_home_t,file)
# allow ps to show iceauth
allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:dir { search getattr read };
allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:process getattr;
# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
# (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
# running in a privileged domain.
dontaudit $2 $1_iceauth_t:process ptrace;
allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_iceauth_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_iceauth_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_iceauth_t)
userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_iceauth_t)
tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_nfs_files($1_iceauth_t)
')
tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
fs_manage_cifs_files($1_iceauth_t)
')
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Transition to a user Xauthority domain.
## </summary>
## <desc>
## <p>
## Transition to a user Xauthority domain.
## </p>
## <p>
## This is a templated interface, and should only
## be called from a per-userdomain template.
## </p>
## </desc>
## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
## <summary>
## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
## is the prefix for user_t).
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
template(`xserver_domtrans_user_xauth',`
gen_require(`
type $1_xauth_t, xauth_exec_t;
')
domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;
allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;
allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Connect to XDM over a unix domain
## stream socket.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_stream_connect_xdm',`
gen_require(`
type xdm_t;
')
allow $1 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Read xdm-writable configuration files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_read_xdm_rw_config',`
gen_require(`
type xdm_rw_etc_t;
')
files_search_etc($1)
allow $1 xdm_rw_etc_t:dir { getattr read };
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Set the attributes of XDM temporary directories.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_setattr_xdm_tmp_dirs',`
gen_require(`
type xdm_tmp_t;
')
allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr;
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Create a named socket in a XDM
## temporary directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets',`
gen_require(`
type xdm_tmp_t;
')
files_search_tmp($1)
allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create;
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Read XDM pid files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_read_xdm_pid',`
gen_require(`
type xdm_var_run_t;
')
files_search_pids($1)
allow $1 xdm_var_run_t:file r_file_perms;
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute the X server in the XDM X server domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_domtrans_xdm_xserver',`
gen_require(`
type xdm_xserver_t, xserver_exec_t;
')
domain_auto_trans($1,xserver_exec_t,xdm_xserver_t)
allow $1 xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
allow xdm_xserver_t $1:fd use;
allow xdm_xserver_t $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow xdm_xserver_t $1:process sigchld;
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Make an X session script an entrypoint for the specified domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## The domain for which the shell is an entrypoint.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_xsession_entry_type',`
gen_require(`
type xsession_exec_t;
')
domain_entry_file($1,xsession_exec_t)
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Execute an X session in the target domain. This
## is an explicit transition, requiring the
## caller to use setexeccon().
## </summary>
## <desc>
## <p>
## Execute an Xsession in the target domain. This
## is an explicit transition, requiring the
## caller to use setexeccon().
## </p>
## <p>
## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes,
## etc.) is provided by this interface since
## the domains are not owned by this module.
## </p>
## </desc>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain allowed access.
## </summary>
## </param>
## <param name="target_domain">
## <summary>
## The type of the shell process.
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_xsession_spec_domtrans',`
gen_require(`
type xsession_exec_t;
')
domain_trans($1,xsession_exec_t,$2)
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Do not audit attempts to write the X server
## log files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain to not audit
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_dontaudit_write_log',`
gen_require(`
type xserver_log_t;
')
dontaudit $1 xserver_log_t:file { append write };
')
########################################
## <summary>
## Do not audit attempts to write the X server
## log files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## <summary>
## Domain to not audit
## </summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_delete_log',`
gen_require(`
type xserver_log_t;
')
logging_search_logs($1)
allow $1 xserver_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow $1 xserver_log_t:file unlink;
')