704 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
704 lines
16 KiB
Plaintext
## <summary>Core policy for domains.</summary>
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## <required val="true">
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## Contains the concept of a domain.
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## </required>
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########################################
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#
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# domain_base_domain_type(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_base_type',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class dir r_dir_perms;
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class lnk_file r_file_perms;
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class file rw_file_perms;
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class process { fork sigchld };
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')
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# mark as a domain
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typeattribute $1 domain;
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# allow the domain to read its /proc/pid entries
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allow $1 self:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 self:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow $1 self:file rw_file_perms;
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# allow $1 to create child processes in this domain
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allow $1 self:process { fork sigchld };
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# Files with domain types are currently only proc files
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# self is excepted since domains and files can have
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# the same type in SEFramework
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# cjp: perhaps this should be a conditional exception,
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# so it is excepted only on SEFramework policies
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neverallow $1 { domain -$1 }:dir ~r_dir_perms;
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neverallow $1 { domain -$1 }:file_class_set ~rw_file_perms;
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_type(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_type',`
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# start with basic domain
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domain_base_type($1)
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# Use trusted objects in /dev
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dev_rw_null_dev($1)
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dev_rw_zero_dev($1)
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term_use_controlling_term($1)
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# read the root directory
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files_list_root($1)
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# send init a sigchld and signull
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init_sigchld($1)
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init_signull($1)
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ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
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unconfined_use_fd($1)
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unconfined_sigchld($1)
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')
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# this seems highly questionable:
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optional_policy(`rpm.te',`
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rpm_use_fd($1)
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rpm_read_pipe($1)
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')
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_entry_file(domain,entrypointfile)
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#
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interface(`domain_entry_file',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute entry_type;
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class file entrypoint;
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')
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files_type($2)
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allow $1 $2:file entrypoint;
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typeattribute $2 entry_type;
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_wide_inherit_fd(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_wide_inherit_fd',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute privfd;
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')
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typeattribute $1 privfd;
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_dyntrans_type(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_dyntrans_type',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute set_curr_context;
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')
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typeattribute $1 set_curr_context;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Makes caller an exception to the constraint preventing
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## changing of user identity.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The process type to make an exception to the constraint.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_subj_id_change_exempt',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute can_change_process_identity;
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')
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typeattribute $1 can_change_process_identity;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Makes caller an exception to the constraint preventing
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## changing of role.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The process type to make an exception to the constraint.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_role_change_exempt',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute can_change_process_role;
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')
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typeattribute $1 can_change_process_role;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Makes caller an exception to the constraint preventing
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## changing the user identity in object contexts.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The process type to make an exception to the constraint.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_obj_id_change_exempt',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute can_change_object_identity;
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')
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typeattribute $1 can_change_object_identity;
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_use_wide_inherit_fd',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute privfd;
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class fd use;
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')
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allow $1 privfd:fd use;
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_dontaudit_use_wide_inherit_fd(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_use_wide_inherit_fd',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute privfd;
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class fd use;
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')
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dontaudit $1 privfd:fd use;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Send a SIGCHLD signal to domains whose file
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## discriptors are widely inheritable.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## Domain allowed access.
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## </param>
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#
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# cjp: this was added because of newrole
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interface(`domain_sigchld_wide_inherit_fd',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute privfd;
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class process signal;
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')
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dontaudit $1 privfd:fd use;
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_setpriority_all_domains(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_setpriority_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process setsched;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process setsched;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Send general signals to all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_signal_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process signal;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process signal;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Send a null signal to all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_signull_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process signull;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process signull;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Send a stop signal to all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_sigstop_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process sigstop;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process sigstop;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Send a child terminated signal to all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_sigchld_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process sigchld;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process sigchld;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Send a kill signal to all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_kill_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process sigkill;
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class capability kill;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process sigkill;
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allow $1 self:capability kill;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Read the process state (/proc/pid) of all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_read_all_domains_state',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class dir r_dir_perms;
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class lnk_file r_file_perms;
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class file r_file_perms;
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class process { getattr ptrace };
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')
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allow $1 domain:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1 domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow $1 domain:file r_file_perms;
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allow $1 domain:process getattr;
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# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
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# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
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# (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
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# running in a privileged domain.
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dontaudit $1 domain:process ptrace;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to read the process
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## state (/proc/pid) of all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class dir r_dir_perms;
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class lnk_file r_file_perms;
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class file r_file_perms;
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class process { getattr ptrace };
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:dir r_dir_perms;
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dontaudit $1 domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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dontaudit $1 domain:file r_file_perms;
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dontaudit $1 domain:process getattr;
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# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
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# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
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# (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
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# running in a privileged domain.
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dontaudit $1 domain:process ptrace;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to read the process state
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## directories of all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_list_all_domains_proc',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class dir r_dir_perms;
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:dir r_dir_perms;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Get the session ID of all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_getsession_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process getsession;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process getsession;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to get the
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## session ID of all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_getsession_all_domains',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class process getsession;
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')
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allow $1 domain:process getsession;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Get the attributes of all domains
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## sockets, for all socket types.
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## </summary>
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## <desc>
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## <p>
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## Get the attributes of all domains
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## sockets, for all socket types.
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## </p>
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## <p>
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## This is commonly used for domains
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## that can use lsof on all domains.
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## </p>
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## </desc>
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## <param name="domain">
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## Domain allowed access.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_getattr_all_sockets',`
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gen_require(`
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gen_require_set(getattr,socket_class_set)
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')
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allow $1 domain:socket_class_set getattr;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
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## of all domains sockets, for all socket types.
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## </summary>
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## <desc>
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## <p>
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## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
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## of all domains sockets, for all socket types.
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## </p>
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## <p>
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## This interface was added for PCMCIA cardmgr
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## and is probably excessive.
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## </p>
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## </desc>
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## <param name="domain">
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## Domain to not audit.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets',`
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gen_require(`
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gen_require_set(getattr,socket_class_set)
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:socket_class_set getattr;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
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## of all domains TCP sockets.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_tcp_sockets',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class tcp_socket getattr;
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:tcp_socket getattr;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
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## of all domains UDP sockets.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_udp_sockets',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class udp_socket getattr;
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:udp_socket getattr;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to read or write
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## all domains UDP sockets.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_rw_all_udp_sockets',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class udp_socket { read write };
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:udp_socket { read write };
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to read or write
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## all domains key sockets.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_rw_all_key_sockets',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class key_socket { read write };
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:key_socket { read write };
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
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## of all domains unix datagram sockets.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_unix_dgram_sockets',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class unix_dgram_socket getattr;
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:unix_dgram_socket getattr;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes
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## of all domains unnamed pipes.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## The type of the process performing this action.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_unnamed_pipes',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute domain;
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class fifo_file getattr;
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')
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dontaudit $1 domain:fifo_file getattr;
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')
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########################################
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## <summary>
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## Get the attributes of entry point
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## files for all domains.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## Domain allowed access.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`domain_getattr_all_entry_files',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute entry_type;
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class file getattr;
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class lnk_file r_file_perms;
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')
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allow $1 entry_type:lnk_file getattr;
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allow $1 entry_type:file r_file_perms;
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')
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########################################
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#
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# domain_read_all_entry_files(domain)
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#
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interface(`domain_read_all_entry_files',`
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gen_require(`
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attribute entry_type;
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class file r_file_perms;
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class lnk_file r_file_perms;
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')
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allow $1 entry_type:lnk_file r_file_perms;
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allow $1 entry_type:file r_file_perms;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
########################################
|
|
#
|
|
# domain_exec_all_entry_files(domain)
|
|
#
|
|
interface(`domain_exec_all_entry_files',`
|
|
gen_require(`
|
|
attribute entry_type;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
can_exec($1,entry_type)
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
########################################
|
|
## <summary>
|
|
## Unconfined access to domains.
|
|
## </summary>
|
|
## <param name="domain">
|
|
## The type of the process performing this action.
|
|
## </param>
|
|
#
|
|
interface(`domain_unconfined',`
|
|
gen_require(`
|
|
attribute domain, set_curr_context;
|
|
attribute can_change_process_identity;
|
|
attribute can_change_process_role;
|
|
attribute can_change_object_identity;
|
|
class fd use;
|
|
class fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
class process { transition dyntransition execmem };
|
|
class dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
class file r_file_perms;
|
|
class lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
# pass all constraints
|
|
typeattribute $1 can_change_process_identity;
|
|
typeattribute $1 can_change_process_role;
|
|
typeattribute $1 can_change_object_identity;
|
|
typeattribute $1 set_curr_context;
|
|
|
|
# Use/sendto/connectto sockets created by any domain.
|
|
allow $1 domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *;
|
|
|
|
# Use descriptors and pipes created by any domain.
|
|
allow $1 domain:fd use;
|
|
allow $1 domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Act upon any other process.
|
|
allow $1 domain:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem };
|
|
|
|
# Create/access any System V IPC objects.
|
|
allow $1 domain:{ sem msgq shm } *;
|
|
allow $1 domain:msg { send receive };
|
|
|
|
# For /proc/pid
|
|
allow $1 domain:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1 domain:file r_file_perms;
|
|
allow $1 domain:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# These next macros are not interfaces, but actually are
|
|
# support macros. Due to the domain_ prefix, they
|
|
# are placed in this module, to try to prevent confusion.
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
########################################
|
|
#
|
|
# domain_trans(source_domain,entrypoint_file,target_domain)
|
|
#
|
|
template(`domain_trans',`
|
|
gen_require(`
|
|
class file rx_file_perms;
|
|
class process { transition noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
allow $1 $2:file rx_file_perms;
|
|
allow $1 $3:process transition;
|
|
dontaudit $1 $3:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
########################################
|
|
#
|
|
# domain_auto_trans(source_domain,entrypoint_file,target_domain)
|
|
#
|
|
template(`domain_auto_trans',`
|
|
domain_trans($1,$2,$3)
|
|
type_transition $1 $2:process $3;
|
|
')
|