333 lines
8.6 KiB
Plaintext
333 lines
8.6 KiB
Plaintext
## <summary>Run shells with substitute user and group</summary>
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template(`su_restricted_domain_template', `
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gen_require(`
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type su_exec_t;
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')
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type $1_su_t;
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domain_entry_file($1_su_t,su_exec_t)
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domain_type($1_su_t)
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domain_role_change_exempt($1_su_t)
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domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t)
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domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t)
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domain_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t)
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role $3 types $1_su_t;
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allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal;
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allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_override fowner sys_nice sys_resource };
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dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
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allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit };
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allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms };
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allow $1_su_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
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# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
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domain_auto_trans($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
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allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld;
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# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
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corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t,$2)
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allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld;
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kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t)
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kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_su_t)
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# for SSP
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dev_read_urand($1_su_t)
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files_read_etc_files($1_su_t)
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files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_su_t)
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files_search_var_lib($1_su_t)
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files_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dir($1_su_t)
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selinux_get_fs_mount($1_su_t)
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selinux_validate_context($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t)
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auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_su_t)
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auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t)
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auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t)
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domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t)
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init_dontaudit_use_fd($1_su_t)
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init_dontaudit_use_script_pty($1_su_t)
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# Write to utmp.
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init_rw_utmp($1_su_t)
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libs_use_ld_so($1_su_t)
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libs_use_shared_libs($1_su_t)
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logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t)
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miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t)
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seutil_read_config($1_su_t)
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seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t)
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# Only allow transitions to unprivileged user domains.
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userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t)
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optional_policy(`cron',`
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cron_read_pipe($1_su_t)
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')
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optional_policy(`kerberos',`
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kerberos_use($1_su_t)
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')
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optional_policy(`nscd',`
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nscd_use_socket($1_su_t)
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')
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ifdef(`TODO',`
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# Caused by su - init scripts
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dontaudit $1_su_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl };
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') dnl end TODO
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')
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#######################################
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## <summary>
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## The per user domain template for the su module.
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## </summary>
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## <desc>
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## <p>
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## This template creates a derived domain which is allowed
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## to change the linux user id, to run shells as a different
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## user.
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## </p>
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## <p>
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## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and
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## generally does not need to be invoked directly
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## by policy writers.
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## </p>
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## </desc>
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## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
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## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
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## is the prefix for user_t).
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## </param>
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## <param name="user_domain">
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## The type of the user domain.
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## </param>
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## <param name="user_role">
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## The role associated with the user domain.
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## </param>
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#
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template(`su_per_userdomain_template',`
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gen_require(`
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type su_exec_t;
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bool secure_mode;
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')
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type $1_su_t;
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domain_entry_file($1_su_t,su_exec_t)
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domain_type($1_su_t)
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domain_role_change_exempt($1_su_t)
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domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t)
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domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1_su_t)
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domain_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t)
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role $3 types $1_su_t;
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allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal;
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allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_override fowner sys_nice sys_resource };
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dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
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allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit };
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allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms };
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# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
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domain_auto_trans($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t)
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allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld;
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# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
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corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t,$2)
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allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fd use;
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allow $1_su_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_su_t $2:process sigchld;
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kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t)
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kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_su_t)
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# for SSP
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dev_read_urand($1_su_t)
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fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_su_t)
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selinux_get_fs_mount($1_su_t)
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selinux_validate_context($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t)
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selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t)
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# Relabel ttys and ptys.
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term_relabel_all_user_ttys($1_su_t)
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term_relabel_all_user_ptys($1_su_t)
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# Close and re-open ttys and ptys to get the fd into the correct domain.
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term_use_all_user_ttys($1_su_t)
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term_use_all_user_ptys($1_su_t)
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auth_domtrans_user_chk_passwd($1,$1_su_t)
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auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t)
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auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t)
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corecmd_search_bin($1_su_t)
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corecmd_search_sbin($1_su_t)
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domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_su_t)
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files_read_etc_files($1_su_t)
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files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_su_t)
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files_search_var_lib($1_su_t)
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files_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dir($1_su_t)
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init_dontaudit_use_fd($1_su_t)
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# Write to utmp.
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init_rw_utmp($1_su_t)
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libs_use_ld_so($1_su_t)
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libs_use_shared_libs($1_su_t)
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logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t)
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miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t)
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seutil_read_config($1_su_t)
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seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t)
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userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_su_t)
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userdom_search_user_home($1,$1_su_t)
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ifdef(`enable_polyinstantiation',`
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mls_file_read_up($1_su_t)
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mls_file_write_down($1_su_t)
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mls_file_upgrade($1_su_t)
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mls_file_downgrade($1_su_t)
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mls_process_set_level($1_su_t)
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# Su can polyinstantiate
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files_polyinstantiate_all($1_su_t)
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# Su needs additional permission to mount over a previous mount
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files_mounton_all_poly_members($1_su_t)
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# Su has to unmount polyinstantiated directories (like home)
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# that should not be polyinstantiated under the new user
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fs_unmount_xattr_fs($1_su_t)
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')
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ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
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# allow user to suspend terminal.
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# does not work in strict since the
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# parent may not be able to use
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# the terminal if we newrole,
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# which relabels the terminal.
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allow $1_su_t self:process sigstop;
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corecmd_exec_bin($1_su_t)
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userdom_manage_all_user_files($1_su_t)
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userdom_manage_all_user_symlinks($1_su_t)
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# newrole does not make any sense in
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# the targeted policy. This is to
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# make sediff easier.
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if(!secure_mode) {
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unconfined_domtrans($1_su_t)
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unconfined_signal($1_su_t)
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}
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',`
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if(secure_mode) {
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# Only allow transitions to unprivileged user domains.
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userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t)
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} else {
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# Allow transitions to all user domains
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userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users($1_su_t)
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}
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')
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tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
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fs_search_nfs($1_su_t)
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')
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tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
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fs_search_cifs($1_su_t)
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')
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optional_policy(`cron',`
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cron_read_pipe($1_su_t)
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')
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optional_policy(`kerberos',`
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kerberos_use($1_su_t)
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')
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optional_policy(`nscd',`
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nscd_use_socket($1_su_t)
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')
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ifdef(`TODO',`
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# Caused by su - init scripts
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dontaudit $1_su_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl };
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# Inherit and use descriptors from gnome-pty-helper.
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ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_su_t $1_gph_t:fd use;')
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allow $1_su_t $1_home_t:file create_file_perms;
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ifdef(`user_canbe_sysadm', `
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allow $1_su_t home_dir_type:dir { search write };
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', `
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dontaudit $1_su_t home_dir_type:dir { search write };
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')
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# Modify .Xauthority file (via xauth program).
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ifdef(`xauth.te', `
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file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, staff_home_dir_t, staff_xauth_home_t, file)
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file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, user_home_dir_t, user_xauth_home_t, file)
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file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, sysadm_xauth_home_t, file)
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domain_auto_trans($1_su_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
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')
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ifdef(`cyrus.te', `
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allow $1_su_t cyrus_var_lib_t:dir search;
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')
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ifdef(`ssh.te', `
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# Access sshd cookie files.
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allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
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file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sshd_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t)
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')
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') dnl end TODO
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')
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#######################################
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## <summary>
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## Execute su in the caller domain.
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## </summary>
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## <param name="domain">
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## Domain allowed access.
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## </param>
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#
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interface(`su_exec',`
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gen_require(`
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type su_exec_t;
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')
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can_exec($1,su_exec_t)
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')
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