selinux-policy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te
Chris PeBenito 60f04fcb7a Kernel patch from Dan Walsh.
Add ability to dontaudit requiests to load kernel modules.  If you
disable ipv6 every confined app that does ip, tries to get the kernel to
load the module.

Better handling of unlabeled files by the kernel interfaces
2010-06-07 11:08:35 -04:00

400 lines
12 KiB
Plaintext

policy_module(kernel, 1.12.1)
########################################
#
# Declarations
#
# assertion related attributes
attribute can_load_kernmodule;
attribute can_receive_kernel_messages;
attribute can_dump_kernel;
neverallow ~{ can_load_kernmodule kern_unconfined } self:capability sys_module;
# domains with unconfined access to kernel resources
attribute kern_unconfined;
# regular entries in proc
attribute proc_type;
# sysctls
attribute sysctl_type;
role system_r;
role sysadm_r;
role staff_r;
role user_r;
# here until order dependence is fixed:
role unconfined_r;
ifdef(`enable_mls',`
role secadm_r;
role auditadm_r;
')
#
# kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads.
# It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class.
#
type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule;
domain_base_type(kernel_t)
mls_rangetrans_source(kernel_t)
role system_r types kernel_t;
sid kernel gen_context(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,mls_systemhigh)
#
# cgroup fs
#
type cgroup_t;
fs_type(cgroup_t)
allow cgroup_t self:filesystem associate;
genfscon cgroup / gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgroup_t,s0)
#
# DebugFS
#
type debugfs_t;
fs_type(debugfs_t)
allow debugfs_t self:filesystem associate;
genfscon debugfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:debugfs_t,s0)
#
# kvmFS
#
type kvmfs_t;
fs_type(kvmfs_t)
genfscon kvmfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:kvmfs_t,s0)
#
# Procfs types
#
type proc_t, proc_type;
files_mountpoint(proc_t)
fs_type(proc_t)
genfscon proc / gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sysvipc gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)
type proc_afs_t, proc_type;
genfscon proc /fs/openafs gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_afs_t,s0)
# kernel message interface
type proc_kmsg_t, proc_type;
genfscon proc /kmsg gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_kmsg_t,mls_systemhigh)
neverallow ~{ can_receive_kernel_messages kern_unconfined } proc_kmsg_t:file ~getattr;
# /proc kcore: inaccessible
type proc_kcore_t, proc_type;
neverallow ~{ can_dump_kernel kern_unconfined } proc_kcore_t:file ~getattr;
genfscon proc /kcore gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_kcore_t,mls_systemhigh)
type proc_mdstat_t, proc_type;
genfscon proc /mdstat gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_mdstat_t,s0)
type proc_net_t, proc_type;
genfscon proc /net gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_net_t,s0)
type proc_xen_t, proc_type;
files_mountpoint(proc_xen_t)
genfscon proc /xen gen_context(system_u:object_r:proc_xen_t,s0)
#
# Sysctl types
#
# /proc/sys directory, base directory of sysctls
type sysctl_t, sysctl_type;
files_mountpoint(sysctl_t)
sid sysctl gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)
# /proc/irq directory and files
type sysctl_irq_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /irq gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_irq_t,s0)
# /proc/net/rpc directory and files
type sysctl_rpc_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /net/rpc gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_rpc_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/crypto directory and files
type sysctl_crypto_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/crypto gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_crypto_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/fs directory and files
type sysctl_fs_t, sysctl_type;
files_mountpoint(sysctl_fs_t)
genfscon proc /sys/fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/kernel directory and files
type sysctl_kernel_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file
type sysctl_modprobe_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug file
type sysctl_hotplug_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_hotplug_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/net directory and files
type sysctl_net_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/net gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/net/unix directory and files
type sysctl_net_unix_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/net/unix gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_unix_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/vm directory and files
type sysctl_vm_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/vm gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_t,s0)
# /proc/sys/dev directory and files
type sysctl_dev_t, sysctl_type;
genfscon proc /sys/dev gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)
#
# unlabeled_t is the type of unlabeled objects.
# Objects that have no known labeling information or that
# have labels that are no longer valid are treated as having this type.
#
type unlabeled_t;
sid unlabeled gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
# These initial sids are no longer used, and can be removed:
sid any_socket gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid file_labels gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid icmp_socket gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid igmp_packet gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid init gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid kmod gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid policy gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid scmp_packet gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
sid sysctl_modprobe gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_fs gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_kernel gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net_unix gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_vm gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_dev gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid tcp_socket gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh)
########################################
#
# kernel local policy
#
allow kernel_t self:capability *;
allow kernel_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
allow kernel_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow kernel_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow kernel_t self:msg { send receive };
allow kernel_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow kernel_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow kernel_t self:sock_file read_sock_file_perms;
allow kernel_t self:fd use;
allow kernel_t debugfs_t:dir search_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_t:file read_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_net_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_net_t:file read_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_mdstat_t:file read_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_kcore_t:file getattr;
allow kernel_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr;
allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir list_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file read_file_perms;
allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir list_dir_perms;
# Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files
allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets on
# connections with invalidated labels:
allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:packet send;
# Allow unlabeled network traffic
allow unlabeled_t unlabeled_t:packet { forward_in forward_out };
corenet_in_generic_if(unlabeled_t)
corenet_in_generic_node(unlabeled_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(kernel_t)
corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., ICMP replies:
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_send_generic_if(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets:
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_send_generic_node(kernel_t)
corenet_send_all_packets(kernel_t)
dev_read_sysfs(kernel_t)
dev_search_usbfs(kernel_t)
# devtmpfs handling:
dev_create_generic_dirs(kernel_t)
dev_delete_generic_dirs(kernel_t)
dev_create_generic_blk_files(kernel_t)
dev_delete_generic_blk_files(kernel_t)
dev_create_generic_chr_files(kernel_t)
dev_delete_generic_chr_files(kernel_t)
# work around until devtmpfs has device_t type
dev_tmpfs_filetrans_dev(kernel_t, { dir blk_file chr_file })
# Mount root file system. Used when loading a policy
# from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem
fs_mount_all_fs(kernel_t)
fs_unmount_all_fs(kernel_t)
selinux_load_policy(kernel_t)
term_use_console(kernel_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(kernel_t)
corecmd_list_bin(kernel_t)
# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe is set to /bin/true if not using modules.
corecmd_exec_bin(kernel_t)
domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t)
domain_search_all_domains_state(kernel_t)
files_list_root(kernel_t)
files_list_etc(kernel_t)
files_list_home(kernel_t)
files_read_usr_files(kernel_t)
mcs_process_set_categories(kernel_t)
mls_process_read_up(kernel_t)
mls_process_write_down(kernel_t)
mls_file_write_all_levels(kernel_t)
mls_file_read_all_levels(kernel_t)
ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
# Bugzilla 222337
fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
hotplug_search_config(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
init_sigchld(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
libs_use_ld_so(kernel_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
logging_send_syslog_msg(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
nis_use_ypbind(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
# nfs kernel server needs kernel UDP access. It is less risky and painful
# to just give it everything.
allow kernel_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
# nfs kernel server needs kernel UDP access. It is less risky and painful
# to just give it everything.
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(kernel_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(kernel_t)
corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(kernel_t)
corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(kernel_t)
corenet_sendrecv_portmap_client_packets(kernel_t)
corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(kernel_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs(kernel_t)
auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(kernel_t)
sysnet_read_config(kernel_t)
rpc_manage_nfs_ro_content(kernel_t)
rpc_manage_nfs_rw_content(kernel_t)
rpc_udp_rw_nfs_sockets(kernel_t)
tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',`
fs_getattr_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
fs_list_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t)
fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t)
auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(kernel_t)
auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(kernel_t)
auth_read_all_symlinks_except_shadow(kernel_t)
')
tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_rw',`
fs_getattr_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
fs_list_noxattr_fs(kernel_t)
fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t)
fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t)
auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(kernel_t)
')
')
optional_policy(`
seutil_read_config(kernel_t)
seutil_read_bin_policy(kernel_t)
')
optional_policy(`
unconfined_domain_noaudit(kernel_t)
')
########################################
#
# Unlabeled process local policy
#
optional_policy(`
# If you load a new policy that removes active domains, processes can
# get stuck if you do not allow unlabeled processes to signal init.
# If you load an incompatible policy, you should probably reboot,
# since you may have compromised system security.
init_sigchld(unlabeled_t)
')
########################################
#
# Rules for unconfined acccess to this module
#
allow kern_unconfined proc_type:{ dir file lnk_file } *;
allow kern_unconfined sysctl_type:{ dir file } *;
allow kern_unconfined kernel_t:system *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:dir_file_class_set *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:filesystem *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:association *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:packet *;
allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap };