215 lines
6.6 KiB
Plaintext
215 lines
6.6 KiB
Plaintext
#DESC Crond - Crond daemon
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#
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# Domains for the top-level crond daemon process and
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# for system cron jobs. The domains for user cron jobs
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# are in macros/program/crond_macros.te.
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#
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# X-Debian-Packages: cron
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# Authors: Jonathan Crowley (MITRE) <jonathan@mitre.org>,
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# Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser
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#
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# NB The constraints file has some entries for crond_t, this makes it
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# different from all other domains...
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# Domain for crond. It needs auth_chkpwd to check for locked accounts.
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daemon_domain(crond, `, privmail, auth_chkpwd, privfd, nscd_client_domain')
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# This domain is granted permissions common to most domains (including can_net)
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general_domain_access(crond_t)
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# Type for the anacron executable.
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type anacron_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
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# Type for temporary files.
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tmp_domain(crond)
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crond_domain(system)
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allow system_crond_t proc_mdstat_t:file { getattr read };
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allow system_crond_t proc_t:lnk_file read;
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allow system_crond_t proc_t:filesystem getattr;
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allow system_crond_t usbdevfs_t:filesystem getattr;
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ifdef(`mta.te', `
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allow mta_user_agent system_crond_t:fd use;
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')
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# read files in /etc
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allow system_crond_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;
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allow system_crond_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
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allow system_crond_t { sysfs_t rpc_pipefs_t }:dir getattr;
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read_locale(crond_t)
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# Use capabilities.
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allow crond_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_nice audit_control };
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dontaudit crond_t self:capability sys_resource;
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# Get security policy decisions.
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can_getsecurity(crond_t)
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# for finding binaries and /bin/sh
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allow crond_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
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allow crond_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
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# Read from /var/spool/cron.
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allow crond_t var_lib_t:dir search;
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allow crond_t var_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow crond_t cron_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow crond_t cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
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# Read /etc/security/default_contexts.
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r_dir_file(crond_t, default_context_t)
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allow crond_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
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allow crond_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
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allow crond_t default_t:dir search;
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# crond tries to search /root. Not sure why.
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allow crond_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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# to search /home
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allow crond_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search };
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allow crond_t user_home_dir_type:dir r_dir_perms;
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# Run a shell.
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can_exec(crond_t, shell_exec_t)
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ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
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# Run the rpm program in the rpm_t domain. Allow creation of RPM log files
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# via redirection of standard out.
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ifdef(`rpm.te', `
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allow crond_t rpm_log_t: file create_file_perms;
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system_crond_entry(rpm_exec_t, rpm_t)
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allow system_crond_t rpm_log_t:file create_file_perms;
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#read ahead wants to read this
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allow initrc_t system_cron_spool_t:file { getattr read };
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')
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')
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allow system_crond_t var_log_t:file r_file_perms;
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# Set exec context.
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can_setexec(crond_t)
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# Transition to this domain for anacron as well.
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# Still need to study anacron.
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domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, anacron_exec_t, system_crond_t)
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# Inherit and use descriptors from init for anacron.
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allow system_crond_t init_t:fd use;
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# Inherit and use descriptors from initrc for anacron.
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allow system_crond_t initrc_t:fd use;
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can_access_pty(system_crond_t, initrc)
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# Use capabilities.
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allow system_crond_t self:capability { dac_read_search chown setgid setuid fowner net_bind_service fsetid };
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allow crond_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
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# Read the system crontabs.
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allow system_crond_t system_cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
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allow crond_t system_cron_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow crond_t system_cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
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# Read from /var/spool/cron.
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allow system_crond_t cron_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow system_crond_t cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
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# Write to /var/lib/slocate.db.
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allow system_crond_t var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow system_crond_t var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
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# Update whatis files.
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allow system_crond_t man_t:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow system_crond_t man_t:file create_file_perms;
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allow system_crond_t man_t:lnk_file read;
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# Write /var/lock/makewhatis.lock.
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lock_domain(system_crond)
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# for if /var/mail is a symlink
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allow { system_crond_t crond_t } mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
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allow crond_t mail_spool_t:dir search;
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ifdef(`mta.te', `
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r_dir_file(system_mail_t, crond_tmp_t)
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')
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# Stat any file and search any directory for find.
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allow system_crond_t { file_type fs_type }:notdevfile_class_set getattr;
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allow system_crond_t device_type:{ chr_file blk_file } getattr;
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allow system_crond_t file_type:dir { read search getattr };
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# Create temporary files.
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type system_crond_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile;
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file_type_auto_trans(system_crond_t, { tmp_t crond_tmp_t }, system_crond_tmp_t)
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# /sbin/runlevel ask for w access to utmp, but will operate
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# correctly without it. Do not audit write denials to utmp.
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# /sbin/runlevel needs lock access however
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dontaudit system_crond_t initrc_var_run_t:file write;
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allow system_crond_t initrc_var_run_t:file { getattr read lock };
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# Access other spool directories like
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# /var/spool/anacron and /var/spool/slrnpull.
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allow system_crond_t var_spool_t:file create_file_perms;
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allow system_crond_t var_spool_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
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# Do not audit attempts to search unlabeled directories (e.g. slocate).
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dontaudit system_crond_t unlabeled_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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dontaudit system_crond_t unlabeled_t:file r_file_perms;
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#
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# reading /var/spool/cron/mailman
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#
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allow crond_t var_spool_t:file { getattr read };
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allow system_crond_t devpts_t:filesystem getattr;
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allow system_crond_t sysfs_t:filesystem getattr;
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allow system_crond_t tmpfs_t:filesystem getattr;
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allow system_crond_t rpc_pipefs_t:filesystem getattr;
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#
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# These rules are here to allow system cron jobs to su
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#
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ifdef(`su.te', `
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su_restricted_domain(system_crond,system)
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role system_r types system_crond_su_t;
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allow system_crond_su_t crond_t:fifo_file ioctl;
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')
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allow system_crond_t self:passwd rootok;
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#
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# prelink tells init to restart it self, we either need to allow or dontaudit
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#
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allow system_crond_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
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dontaudit userdomain system_crond_t:fd use;
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r_dir_file(crond_t, selinux_config_t)
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# Allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem for restoring file contexts.
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bool cron_can_relabel false;
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if (cron_can_relabel) {
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domain_auto_trans(system_crond_t, setfiles_exec_t, setfiles_t)
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} else {
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r_dir_file(system_crond_t, file_context_t)
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can_getsecurity(system_crond_t)
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}
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dontaudit system_crond_t removable_t:filesystem getattr;
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#
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# Required for webalizer
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#
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dontaudit crond_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
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ifdef(`apache.te', `
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allow system_crond_t { httpd_log_t httpd_config_t }:file { getattr read };
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allow system_crond_t httpd_modules_t:lnk_file read;
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# Needed for certwatch
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can_exec(system_crond_t, httpd_modules_t)
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')
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