fb52482a1f
Allow all domains to search through default_t directories, in order to find differnet labels. For example people serring up /foo/bar to be share via samba. Add label for /var/log/slim.log
278 lines
7.0 KiB
Plaintext
278 lines
7.0 KiB
Plaintext
policy_module(domain, 1.8.1)
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########################################
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#
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# Declarations
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#
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## <desc>
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## <p>
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## Allow all domains to use other domains file descriptors
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## </p>
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## </desc>
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#
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gen_tunable(allow_domain_fd_use, true)
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## <desc>
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## <p>
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## Allow all domains to have the kernel load modules
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## </p>
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## </desc>
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#
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gen_tunable(domain_kernel_load_modules, false)
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## <desc>
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## <p>
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## Control the ability to mmap a low area of the address space,
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## as configured by /proc/sys/kernel/mmap_min_addr.
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## </p>
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## </desc>
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gen_tunable(mmap_low_allowed, false)
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# Mark process types as domains
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attribute domain;
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# Transitions only allowed from domains to other domains
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neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };
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# Domains that are unconfined
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attribute unconfined_domain_type;
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# Domains that can mmap low memory.
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attribute mmap_low_domain_type;
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neverallow { domain -mmap_low_domain_type } self:memprotect mmap_zero;
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# Domains that can set their current context
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# (perform dynamic transitions)
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attribute set_curr_context;
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# enabling setcurrent breaks process tranquility. If you do not
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# know what this means or do not understand the implications of a
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# dynamic transition, you should not be using it!!!
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neverallow { domain -set_curr_context } self:process setcurrent;
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# entrypoint executables
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attribute entry_type;
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# widely-inheritable file descriptors
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attribute privfd;
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#
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# constraint related attributes
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#
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# [1] types that can change SELinux identity on transition
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attribute can_change_process_identity;
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# [2] types that can change SELinux role on transition
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attribute can_change_process_role;
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# [3] types that can change the SELinux identity on a filesystem
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# object or a socket object on a create or relabel
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attribute can_change_object_identity;
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# [3] types that can change to system_u:system_r
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attribute can_system_change;
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# [4] types that have attribute 1 can change the SELinux
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# identity only if the target domain has this attribute.
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# Types that have attribute 2 can change the SELinux role
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# only if the target domain has this attribute.
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attribute process_user_target;
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# For cron jobs
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# [5] types used for cron daemons
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attribute cron_source_domain;
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# [6] types used for cron jobs
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attribute cron_job_domain;
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# [7] types that are unconditionally exempt from
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# SELinux identity and role change constraints
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attribute process_uncond_exempt; # add userhelperdomain to this one
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neverallow { domain unlabeled_t } ~{ domain unlabeled_t }:process *;
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neverallow ~{ domain unlabeled_t } *:process *;
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########################################
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#
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# Rules applied to all domains
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#
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# read /proc/(pid|self) entries
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allow domain self:dir list_dir_perms;
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allow domain self:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms lock ioctl };
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allow domain self:file rw_file_perms;
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kernel_read_proc_symlinks(domain)
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kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(domain)
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# Every domain gets the key ring, so we should default
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# to no one allowed to look at it; afs kernel support creates
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# a keyring
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kernel_dontaudit_search_key(domain)
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kernel_dontaudit_link_key(domain)
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kernel_dontaudit_search_debugfs(domain)
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# create child processes in the domain
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allow domain self:process { fork getsched sigchld };
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# Use trusted objects in /dev
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dev_rw_null(domain)
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dev_rw_zero(domain)
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term_use_controlling_term(domain)
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# list the root directory
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files_list_root(domain)
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# allow all domains to search through default_t directory, since users sometimes
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# place labels within these directories. (samba_share_t) for example.
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files_search_default(domain)
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# All executables should be able to search the directory they are in
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corecmd_search_bin(domain)
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tunable_policy(`domain_kernel_load_modules',`
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kernel_request_load_module(domain)
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')
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tunable_policy(`global_ssp',`
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# enable reading of urandom for all domains:
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# this should be enabled when all programs
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# are compiled with ProPolice/SSP
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# stack smashing protection.
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dev_read_urand(domain)
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')
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optional_policy(`
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afs_rw_cache(domain)
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')
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optional_policy(`
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libs_use_ld_so(domain)
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libs_use_shared_libs(domain)
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libs_read_lib_files(domain)
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')
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optional_policy(`
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setrans_translate_context(domain)
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')
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# xdm passes an open file descriptor to xsession-errors.log which is then audited by all confined domains.
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optional_policy(`
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xserver_dontaudit_use_xdm_fds(domain)
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xserver_dontaudit_rw_xdm_pipes(domain)
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xserver_dontaudit_append_xdm_home_files(domain)
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xserver_dontaudit_write_log(domain)
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')
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########################################
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#
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# Unconfined access to this module
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#
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# unconfined access also allows constraints, but this
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# is handled in the interface as typeattribute cannot
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# be used on an attribute.
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# Use/sendto/connectto sockets created by any domain.
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *;
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# Use descriptors and pipes created by any domain.
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fd use;
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow unconfined_domain_type unconfined_domain_type:dbus send_msg;
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# Act upon any other process.
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap };
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# Create/access any System V IPC objects.
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ sem msgq shm } *;
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:msg { send receive };
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# For /proc/pid
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:dir list_dir_perms;
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:file rw_file_perms;
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms ioctl lock };
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# act on all domains keys
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allow unconfined_domain_type domain:key *;
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# receive from all domains over labeled networking
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domain_all_recvfrom_all_domains(unconfined_domain_type)
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selinux_getattr_fs(domain)
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selinux_search_fs(domain)
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selinux_dontaudit_read_fs(domain)
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seutil_dontaudit_read_config(domain)
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init_sigchld(domain)
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init_signull(domain)
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ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
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files_search_mnt(domain)
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optional_policy(`
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unconfined_use_fds(domain)
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')
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')
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# these seem questionable:
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optional_policy(`
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abrt_domtrans_helper(domain)
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abrt_read_pid_files(domain)
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abrt_read_state(domain)
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abrt_signull(domain)
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abrt_stream_connect(domain)
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')
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optional_policy(`
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rpm_use_fds(domain)
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rpm_read_pipes(domain)
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rpm_search_log(domain)
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rpm_append_tmp_files(domain)
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rpm_dontaudit_leaks(domain)
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rpm_read_script_tmp_files(domain)
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rpm_inherited_fifo(domain)
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')
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optional_policy(`
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sosreport_append_tmp_files(domain)
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')
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tunable_policy(`allow_domain_fd_use',`
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# Allow all domains to use fds past to them
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allow domain domain:fd use;
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')
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optional_policy(`
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cron_dontaudit_write_system_job_tmp_files(domain)
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cron_rw_pipes(domain)
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cron_rw_system_job_pipes(domain)
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')
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ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
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dontaudit domain self:udp_socket listen;
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allow domain domain:key { link search };
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')
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optional_policy(`
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hal_dontaudit_read_pid_files(domain)
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')
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optional_policy(`
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ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
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afs_rw_udp_sockets(domain)
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')
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')
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optional_policy(`
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ssh_rw_pipes(domain)
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')
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optional_policy(`
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unconfined_dontaudit_rw_pipes(domain)
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unconfined_sigchld(domain)
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')
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# broken kernel
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dontaudit can_change_object_identity can_change_object_identity:key link;
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