794 lines
25 KiB
Plaintext
794 lines
25 KiB
Plaintext
# Copyright (C) 2005 Tresys Technology, LLC
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########################################
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#
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# Base user domain template
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#
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# This is common to user and admin domain
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define(`base_user_domain',`
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role $1_r types $1_t;
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allow system_r $1_r;
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allow $1_t self:capability { setgid chown fowner };
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dontaudit $1_t self:capability { sys_nice fsetid };
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allow $1_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
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allow $1_t self:process { ptrace setfscreate };
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allow $1_t self:fd use;
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allow $1_t self:fifo_file { read getattr lock ioctl write append };
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allow $1_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown };
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allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown listen accept };
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allow $1_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
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allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow $1_t self:shm { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write lock unix_read unix_write };
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allow $1_t self:sem { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write unix_read unix_write };
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allow $1_t self:msgq { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write enqueue unix_read unix_write };
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allow $1_t self:msg { send receive };
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dontaudit $1_t self:socket create;
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# Irrelevant until we have labeled networking.
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#allow $1_t self:udp_socket { sendto recvfrom };
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# evolution and gnome-session try to create a netlink socket
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dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown };
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dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read nlmsg_write };
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# execute files in the home directory
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allow $1_t $1_home_t:file { getattr read execute execute_no_trans };
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# full control of the home directory
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allow $1_t $1_home_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow $1_t $1_home_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow $1_t $1_home_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow $1_t $1_home_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow $1_t $1_home_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename relabelfrom relabelto };
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allow $1_t $1_home_dir_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir };
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type_transition $1_t $1_home_dir_t:{ file lnk_file dir sock_file fifo_file } $1_home_t;
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file { getattr read execute execute_no_trans };
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# Bind to a Unix domain socket in /tmp.
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# cjp: this is combination is not checked and should be removed
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind;
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allow $1_t $1_tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr read write append ioctl lock };
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allow $1_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
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# Instantiate derived domains for a number of programs.
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# These derived domains encode both information about the calling
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# user domain and the program, and allow us to maintain separation
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# between different instances of the program being run by different
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# user domains.
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per_userdomain_templates($1)
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kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_t)
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kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point($1_t)
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# Very permissive allowing every domain to see every type.
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kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_t)
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# Find CDROM devices
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kernel_read_device_sysctl($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_tcp_on_all_interfaces($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_raw_on_all_interfaces($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_udp_on_all_interfaces($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_tcp_on_all_nodes($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_raw_on_all_nodes($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_udp_on_all_nodes($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_tcp_on_all_ports($1_t)
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corenetwork_network_udp_on_all_ports($1_t)
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corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_all_nodes($1_t)
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corenetwork_bind_udp_on_all_nodes($1_t)
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# allow port_t name binding for UDP because it is not very usable otherwise
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corenetwork_bind_udp_on_general_port($1_t)
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devices_get_input_event($1_t)
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devices_read_misc($1_t)
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devices_write_misc($1_t)
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devices_play_sound($1_t)
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devices_record_sound_input($1_t)
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devices_read_sound_mixer_levels($1_t)
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devices_write_sound_mixer_levels($1_t)
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devices_get_random_data($1_t)
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devices_get_pseudorandom_data($1_t)
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# open office is looking for the following
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devices_get_direct_rendering_interface_attributes($1_t)
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devices_ignore_use_direct_rendering_interface($1_t)
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filesystem_get_all_filesystems_quotas($1_t)
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filesystem_get_all_filesystems_attributes($1_t)
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# for eject
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storage_get_fixed_disk_attributes($1_t)
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authlogin_read_login_records($1_t)
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authlogin_ignore_write_login_records($1_t)
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corecommands_execute_general_programs($1_t)
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corecommands_execute_system_programs($1_t)
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domain_execute_all_entrypoint_programs($1_t)
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domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors($1_t)
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files_execute_system_config_script($1_t)
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files_read_system_source_code($1_t)
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# Caused by su - init scripts
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init_script_ignore_use_pseudoterminal($1_t)
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libraries_use_dynamic_loader($1_t)
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libraries_use_shared_libraries($1_t)
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libraries_execute_dynamic_loader($1_t)
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libraries_execute_library_scripts($1_t)
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logging_ignore_get_all_logs_attributes($1_t)
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miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
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miscfiles_manage_man_page_cache($1_t)
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mta_modify_mail_spool($1_t)
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if (allow_execmem) {
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# Allow loading DSOs that require executable stack.
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allow $1_t self:process execmem;
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}
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if (use_nfs_home_dirs) {
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filesystem_manage_nfs_directories($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_nfs_files($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_nfs_symbolic_links($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_nfs_named_sockets($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_nfs_named_pipes($1_t)
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filesystem_execute_nfs_files($1_t)
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}
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if (use_samba_home_dirs) {
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filesystem_manage_windows_network_directories($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_windows_network_files($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_windows_network_symbolic_links($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_windows_network_named_sockets($1_t)
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filesystem_manage_windows_network_named_pipes($1_t)
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filesystem_execute_windows_network_files($1_t)
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}
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if (user_direct_mouse) {
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devices_get_mouse_input($1_t)
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}
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if (user_ttyfile_stat) {
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terminal_get_all_private_physical_terminal_attributes($1_t)
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}
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ifdef(`TODO',`
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# When the user domain runs ps, there will be a number of access
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# denials when ps tries to search /proc. Do not audit these denials.
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dontaudit $1_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;
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dontaudit $1_t domain:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
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dontaudit $1_t domain:process { getattr getsession };
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#
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# Cups daemon running as user tries to write /etc/printcap
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#
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dontaudit $1_t usr_t:file setattr;
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# Access the power device.
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allow $1_t power_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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# Check to see if cdrom is mounted
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allow $1_t mnt_t:dir { getattr search };
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#
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# Added to allow reading of cdrom
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#
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allow $1_t rpc_pipefs_t:dir getattr;
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allow $1_t nfsd_fs_t:dir getattr;
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allow $1_t binfmt_misc_fs_t:dir getattr;
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# /initrd is left mounted, various programs try to look at it
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dontaudit $1_t ramfs_t:dir getattr;
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if (read_default_t) {
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allow $1_t default_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1_t default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
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}
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#
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# Running ifconfig as a user generates the following
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#
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dontaudit $1_t sysctl_net_t:dir search;
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dontaudit $1_t default_context_t:dir search;
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r_dir_file($1_t, usercanread)
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can_ypbind($1_t)
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if (allow_execmod) {
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# Allow text relocations on system shared libraries, e.g. libGL.
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allow $1_t texrel_shlib_t:file execmod;
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}
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allow $1_t fs_type:dir getattr;
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# old "file_browse_domain":
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# Regular files/directories that are not security sensitive
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dontaudit $1_t file_type - secure_file_type:dir_file_class_set getattr;
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dontaudit $1_t file_type - secure_file_type:dir { read search };
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# /dev
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dontaudit $1_t dev_fs:dir_file_class_set getattr;
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dontaudit $1_t dev_fs:dir { read search };
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# /proc
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dontaudit $1_t sysctl_t:dir_file_class_set getattr;
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dontaudit $1_t proc_fs:dir { read search };
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allow $1_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
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can_exec($1_t, { removable_t noexattrfile } )
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if (user_rw_noexattrfile) {
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create_dir_file($1_t, noexattrfile)
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create_dir_file($1_t, removable_t)
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# Write floppies
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allow $1_t removable_device_t:blk_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file write;
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} else {
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r_dir_file($1_t, noexattrfile)
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r_dir_file($1_t, removable_t)
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allow $1_t removable_device_t:blk_file r_file_perms;
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}
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allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file read;
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# GNOME checks for usb and other devices
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rw_dir_file($1_t,usbfs_t)
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can_exec($1_t, noexattrfile)
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# for running TeX programs
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r_dir_file($1_t, tetex_data_t)
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can_exec($1_t, tetex_data_t)
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type $1_tmpfs_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfsfile;
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file_type_auto_trans($1_t, tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t)
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allow $1_tmpfs_t tmpfs_t:filesystem associate;
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# Run programs developed by other users in the same domain.
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can_resmgrd_connect($1_t)
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can_ypbind($1_t)
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allow $1_t var_lock_t:dir search;
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# Grant permissions to access the system DBus
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ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
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dbusd_client(system, $1)
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can_network_server_tcp($1_dbusd_t)
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allow $1_dbusd_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
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allow $1_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
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dbusd_client($1, $1)
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allow $1_t $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
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dbusd_domain($1)
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ifdef(`hald.te', `
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allow $1_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;
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allow hald_t $1_t:dbus send_msg;
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') dnl end ifdef hald.te
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') dnl end ifdef dbus.te
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# Gnome pannel binds to the following
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ifdef(`cups.te', `
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allow $1_t { cupsd_etc_t cupsd_rw_etc_t }:file { read getattr };
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')
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# Connect to inetd.
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ifdef(`inetd.te', `
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can_tcp_connect($1_t, inetd_t)
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can_udp_send($1_t, inetd_t)
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can_udp_send(inetd_t, $1_t)
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')
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# Connect to portmap.
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ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_tcp_connect($1_t, portmap_t)')
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# Inherit and use sockets from inetd
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ifdef(`inetd.te', `
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allow $1_t inetd_t:fd use;
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allow $1_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
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')
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ifdef(`xserver.te', `
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# for /tmp/.ICE-unix
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file_type_auto_trans($1_t, xdm_xserver_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t, sock_file)
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allow $1_t xserver_misc_device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;
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')
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ifdef(`xdm.te', `
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# Connect to the X server run by the X Display Manager.
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can_unix_connect($1_t, xdm_t)
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allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:file { getattr read };
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allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
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allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
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allow $1_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
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r_dir_file($1_t, xdm_var_run_t)
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allow $1_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
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allow xdm_t $1_home_dir_t:dir getattr;
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ifdef(`xauth.te', `
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file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_xauth_home_t, file)
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')
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# for shared memory
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allow xdm_xserver_t $1_tmpfs_t:file { read write };
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')dnl end ifdef xdm.te
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ifdef(`rpcd.te', `
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create_dir_file($1_t, nfsd_rw_t)
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')
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ifdef(`cardmgr.te', `
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# to allow monitoring of pcmcia status
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allow $1_t cardmgr_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
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')
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#
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# Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan
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#
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ifdef(`apmd.te', `
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allow $1_t apmd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow $1_t apmd_var_run_t:sock_file write;
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')
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ifdef(`automount.te', `
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allow $1_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
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')
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ifdef(`pamconsole.te', `
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allow $1_t pam_var_console_t:dir search;
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')
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') dnl endif TODO
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')dnl end base_user_domain macro
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########################################
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#
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# User domain template
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#
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define(`user_domain_template', `
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##############################
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#
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# Declarations
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#
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attribute $1_file_type;
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type $1_t, userdomain, unpriv_userdomain; #, web_client_domain, nscd_client_domain;
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domain_make_domain($1_t)
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domain_make_file_descriptors_widely_inheritable($1_t)
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type $1_devpts_t; # userpty_type, user_tty_type;
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terminal_make_user_pseudoterminal($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
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# Type for home directory.
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type $1_home_dir_t; #, home_dir_type, home_type, user_home_dir_type;
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files_make_file($1_home_dir_t)
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# Type for files and directories in the home directory
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type $1_home_t, $1_file_type; #, home_type, user_home_type;
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files_make_file($1_home_t)
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type $1_tmp_t, $1_file_type; #, user_tmpfile
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files_make_temporary_file($1_tmp_t)
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type $1_tty_device_t; #, sysadmfile, ttyfile, user_tty_type, dev_fs;
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terminal_make_physical_terminal($1_t,$1_tty_device_t)
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##############################
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#
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# Local policy
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#
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# Inherit rules for ordinary users.
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base_user_domain($1)
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allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append };
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terminal_create_private_pseudoterminal($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
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# Rules used to associate a homedir as a mountpoint
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allow $1_home_t self:filesystem associate;
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allow $1_file_type $1_home_t:filesystem associate;
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# user temporary files
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir };
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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files_create_private_tmp_data($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file lnk_file dir sock_file fifo_file })
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# privileged home directory writers
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allow privhome $1_home_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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allow privhome $1_home_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
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allow privhome $1_home_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir };
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allow privhome $1_home_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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allow privhome $1_home_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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type_transition privhome $1_home_dir_t:{ file lnk_file dir sock_file fifo_file } $1_home_t;
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kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
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kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
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kernel_read_hardware_state($1_t)
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# cjp: why?
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bootloader_read_kernel_symbol_table($1_t)
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# port access is audited even if dac would not have allowed it, so dontaudit it here
|
|
corenetwork_ignore_bind_tcp_on_all_reserved_ports($1_t)
|
|
|
|
files_read_general_system_config($1_t)
|
|
files_list_home_directories($1_t)
|
|
files_read_general_application_resources($1_t)
|
|
|
|
init_script_read_runtime_data($1_t)
|
|
# The library functions always try to open read-write first,
|
|
# then fall back to read-only if it fails.
|
|
init_script_ignore_write_runtime_data($1_t)
|
|
|
|
selinux_read_config($1_t)
|
|
|
|
if (user_dmesg) {
|
|
kernel_read_ring_buffer($1_t)
|
|
} else {
|
|
kernel_ignore_read_ring_buffer($1_t)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from
|
|
# the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode
|
|
# and may change other protocols
|
|
if (user_tcp_server) {
|
|
corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_general_port($1_t)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Need the following rule to allow users to run vpnc
|
|
optional_policy(`xserver.te', `
|
|
corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_xserver_port($1_t)
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`TODO',`
|
|
|
|
dontaudit $1_t boot_t:lnk_file read;
|
|
dontaudit $1_t boot_t:file read;
|
|
|
|
can_kerberos($1_t)
|
|
|
|
# do not audit read on disk devices
|
|
dontaudit $1_t { removable_device_t fixed_disk_device_t }:blk_file read;
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
|
|
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;
|
|
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search;
|
|
#
|
|
# Changing this to dontaudit should cause the .xsession-errors file to be written to /tmp
|
|
#
|
|
dontaudit xdm_t $1_home_t:file rw_file_perms;
|
|
')dnl end ifdef xdm.te
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`ftpd.te', `
|
|
if (ftp_home_dir) {
|
|
file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t)
|
|
}
|
|
')dnl end ifdef ftpd
|
|
|
|
if (read_default_t) {
|
|
allow $1 default_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1 default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
can_exec($1_t, usr_t)
|
|
|
|
# Read directories and files with the readable_t type.
|
|
# This type is a general type for "world"-readable files.
|
|
allow $1_t readable_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t readable_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Stat lost+found.
|
|
allow $1_t lost_found_t:dir getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Read /var, /var/spool, /var/run.
|
|
allow $1_t var_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t var_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t var_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t var_spool_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t var_run_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t var_run_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t var_lib_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
|
|
|
|
# for running depmod as part of the kernel packaging process
|
|
allow $1_t modules_conf_t:file { getattr read };
|
|
|
|
# Read man directories and files.
|
|
allow $1_t man_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t man_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Allow users to rw usb devices
|
|
if (user_rw_usb) {
|
|
rw_dir_create_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t)
|
|
} else {
|
|
r_dir_file($1_t,usbdevfs_t)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
# Read /dev directories and any symbolic links.
|
|
allow $1_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Do not audit write denials to /etc/ld.so.cache.
|
|
dontaudit $1_t ld_so_cache_t:file write;
|
|
|
|
dontaudit $1_t sysadm_home_t:file { read append };
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`syslogd.te', `
|
|
# Some programs that are left in $1_t will try to connect
|
|
# to syslogd, but we do not want to let them generate log messages.
|
|
# Do not audit.
|
|
dontaudit $1_t devlog_t:sock_file { read write };
|
|
dontaudit $1_t syslogd_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
# Stop warnings about access to /dev/console
|
|
dontaudit $1_t init_t:fd use;
|
|
dontaudit $1_t initrc_t:fd use;
|
|
allow $1_t initrc_t:fifo_file write;
|
|
ifdef(`user_can_mount', `
|
|
#
|
|
# Allow users to mount file systems like floppies and cdrom
|
|
#
|
|
mount_domain($1, $1_mount, `, fs_domain')
|
|
r_dir_file($1_t, mnt_t)
|
|
allow $1_mount_t device_t:lnk_file read;
|
|
allow $1_mount_t removable_device_t:blk_file read;
|
|
allow $1_mount_t iso9660_t:filesystem relabelfrom;
|
|
allow $1_mount_t removable_t:filesystem { mount relabelto };
|
|
allow $1_mount_t removable_t:dir mounton;
|
|
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
|
|
allow $1_mount_t xdm_t:fd use;
|
|
allow $1_mount_t xdm_t:fifo_file { read write };
|
|
')
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
') dnl end TODO
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
########################################
|
|
#
|
|
# Admin domain template
|
|
#
|
|
define(`admin_domain_template',`
|
|
|
|
##############################
|
|
#
|
|
# Declarations
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
attribute $1_file_type;
|
|
|
|
type $1_t, userdomain, privhome; #, admin, web_client_domain, nscd_client_domain;
|
|
kernel_make_object_identity_change_constraint_exception($1_t)
|
|
domain_make_domain($1_t)
|
|
role system_r types $1_t;
|
|
|
|
#ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon', `, priv_system_role')
|
|
#; dnl end of sysadm_t type declaration
|
|
|
|
# Type and access for pty devices.
|
|
type $1_devpts_t;
|
|
terminal_make_pseudoterminal($1_devpts_t)
|
|
|
|
type $1_home_t, $1_file_type; #, home_type;
|
|
files_make_file($1_home_t)
|
|
|
|
type $1_home_dir_t; #, home_dir_type, home_type;
|
|
files_make_file($1_home_t)
|
|
|
|
type $1_tmp_t, $1_file_type;
|
|
files_make_temporary_file($1_tmp_t)
|
|
|
|
type $1_tty_device_t;
|
|
terminal_make_physical_terminal($1_t,$1_tty_device_t)
|
|
|
|
##############################
|
|
#
|
|
# $1_t local policy
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# Inherit rules for ordinary users.
|
|
base_user_domain($1)
|
|
|
|
allow $1_t self:capability ~sys_module;
|
|
allow $1_t self:process { setexec setfscreate };
|
|
|
|
# Set password information for other users.
|
|
allow $1_t self:passwd { passwd chfn chsh };
|
|
|
|
# Skip authentication when pam_rootok is specified.
|
|
allow $1_t self:passwd rootok;
|
|
|
|
# Manipulate other users crontab.
|
|
allow $1_t self:passwd crontab;
|
|
|
|
# for the administrator to run TCP servers directly
|
|
allow $1_t self:tcp_socket { acceptfrom connectto recvfrom };
|
|
|
|
allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read getattr lock write append };
|
|
terminal_create_private_pseudoterminal($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
|
|
|
|
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:dir { create read getattr lock setattr ioctl link unlink rename search add_name remove_name reparent write rmdir };
|
|
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
|
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:lnk_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
|
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
|
allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
|
|
files_create_private_tmp_data($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
|
|
|
|
kernel_read_system_state($1_t)
|
|
kernel_read_network_state($1_t)
|
|
kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_t)
|
|
kernel_get_core_interface_attributes($1_t)
|
|
kernel_get_message_interface_attributes($1_t)
|
|
kernel_change_ring_buffer_level($1_t)
|
|
kernel_clear_ring_buffer($1_t)
|
|
kernel_read_ring_buffer($1_t)
|
|
kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_t)
|
|
kernel_modify_all_sysctl($1_t)
|
|
kernel_set_selinux_enforcement_mode($1_t)
|
|
kernel_set_selinux_boolean($1_t)
|
|
kernel_set_selinux_security_parameters($1_t)
|
|
# Get security policy decisions:
|
|
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point($1_t)
|
|
kernel_validate_selinux_context($1_t)
|
|
kernel_compute_selinux_access_vector($1_t)
|
|
kernel_compute_selinux_create_context($1_t)
|
|
kernel_compute_selinux_relabel_context($1_t)
|
|
kernel_compute_selinux_reachable_user_contexts($1_t)
|
|
|
|
corenetwork_bind_tcp_on_general_port($1_t)
|
|
|
|
devices_get_generic_block_device_attributes($1_t)
|
|
devices_get_generic_character_device_attributes($1_t)
|
|
devices_get_all_block_device_attributes($1_t)
|
|
devices_get_all_character_device_attributes($1_t)
|
|
|
|
filesystem_get_all_filesystems_attributes($1_t)
|
|
filesystem_set_all_filesystems_quotas($1_t)
|
|
|
|
storage_raw_read_removable_device($1_t)
|
|
storage_raw_write_removable_device($1_t)
|
|
|
|
terminal_use_console($1_t)
|
|
terminal_use_general_physical_terminal($1_t)
|
|
terminal_use_all_private_pseudoterminals($1_t)
|
|
terminal_use_all_private_physical_terminals($1_t)
|
|
|
|
domain_set_all_domains_priorities($1_t)
|
|
|
|
init_use_control_channel($1_t)
|
|
|
|
logging_send_system_log_message($1_t)
|
|
|
|
modutils_insmod_transition($1_t)
|
|
|
|
selinux_read_config($1_t)
|
|
# The following rule is temporary until such time that a complete
|
|
# policy management infrastructure is in place so that an administrator
|
|
# cannot directly manipulate policy files with arbitrary programs.
|
|
selinux_manage_source_policy($1_t)
|
|
# Violates the goal of limiting write access to checkpolicy.
|
|
# But presently necessary for installing the file_contexts file.
|
|
selinux_manage_binary_policy($1_t)
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`TODO',`
|
|
|
|
# Let admin stat the shadow file.
|
|
allow $1_t shadow_t:file getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Create and use all files that have the sysadmfile attribute.
|
|
allow $1_t sysadmfile:{ file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t sysadmfile:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t sysadmfile:dir create_dir_perms;
|
|
|
|
# Relabel all files.
|
|
# Actually this will not allow relabeling ALL files unless you change
|
|
# sysadmfile to file_type (and change the assertion in assert.te that
|
|
# only auth_write can relabel shadow_t)
|
|
allow $1_t sysadmfile:dir { getattr read search relabelfrom relabelto };
|
|
allow $1_t sysadmfile:notdevfile_class_set { getattr relabelfrom relabelto };
|
|
|
|
# for lsof
|
|
allow $1_t mtrr_device_t:file getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Examine all processes.
|
|
can_ps($1_t, domain)
|
|
|
|
# Send signals to all processes.
|
|
allow $1_t { domain unlabeled_t }:process signal_perms;
|
|
|
|
allow $1_t serial_device:chr_file setattr;
|
|
|
|
# allow setting up tunnels
|
|
allow $1_t tun_tap_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
|
|
allow $1_t ptyfile:chr_file getattr;
|
|
|
|
# Run programs from staff home directories.
|
|
# Not ideal, but typical if users want to login as both sysadm_t or staff_t.
|
|
can_exec($1_t, staff_home_t)
|
|
|
|
# Run programs from /usr/src.
|
|
can_exec($1_t, src_t)
|
|
|
|
# Run admin programs that require different permissions in their own domain.
|
|
# These rules were moved into the appropriate program domain file.
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`startx.te', `
|
|
ifdef(`xserver.te', `
|
|
# Create files in /tmp/.X11-unix with our X servers derived
|
|
# tmp type rather than user_xserver_tmp_t.
|
|
file_type_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xserver_tmpfile, $1_xserver_tmp_t, sock_file)
|
|
')dnl end xserver.te
|
|
')dnl end startx.te
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`xdm.te', `
|
|
ifdef(`xauth.te', `
|
|
if (xdm_sysadm_login) {
|
|
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:lnk_file read;
|
|
allow xdm_t $1_home_t:dir search;
|
|
}
|
|
allow $1_t xdm_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
|
|
')dnl end ifdef xauth.te
|
|
')dnl end ifdef xdm.te
|
|
|
|
#
|
|
# A user who is authorized for sysadm_t may nonetheless have
|
|
# a home directory labeled with user_home_t if the user is expected
|
|
# to login in either user_t or sysadm_t. Hence, the derived domains
|
|
# for programs need to be able to access user_home_t.
|
|
#
|
|
|
|
# Allow our gph domain to write to .xsession-errors.
|
|
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `
|
|
allow $1_gph_t user_home_dir_type:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_gph_t user_home_type:file create_file_perms;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
# Manipulate other users crontab.
|
|
can_getsecurity(sysadm_crontab_t)
|
|
|
|
ifdef(`crond.te', `
|
|
allow $1_crond_t var_log_t:file r_file_perms;
|
|
')
|
|
|
|
# Allow our crontab domain to unlink a user cron spool file.
|
|
ifdef(`crontab.te',`allow $1_crontab_t user_cron_spool_t:file unlink;')
|
|
|
|
# for the administrator to run TCP servers directly
|
|
allow $1_t kernel_t:tcp_socket recvfrom;
|
|
|
|
# Connect data port to ftpd.
|
|
ifdef(`ftpd.te', `can_tcp_connect(ftpd_t, $1_t)')
|
|
|
|
# Connect second port to rshd.
|
|
ifdef(`rshd.te', `can_tcp_connect(rshd_t, $1_t)')
|
|
|
|
# Allow MAKEDEV to work
|
|
allow $1_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
|
allow $1_t device_type:{ blk_file chr_file } { create unlink rename };
|
|
allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file { create read };
|
|
|
|
# for lsof
|
|
allow $1_t domain:socket_class_set getattr;
|
|
allow $1_t eventpollfs_t:file getattr;
|
|
') dnl endif TODO
|
|
')
|