selinux-policy/policy/flask/access_vectors
Chris PeBenito 9b45c60308 This patch adds a polmatch avperm to arbitrate flow/state's access to
a xfrm policy. It also defines MLS policy for association { sendto,
recvfrom, polmatch }.

NOTE: When an inbound packet is not using an IPSec SA, a check is performed
between the socket label and the unlabeled sid (SYSTEM_HIGH MLS label). For
MLS purposes however, the target of the check should be the MLS label taken
from the node sid (or secmark in the new secmark world). This would present
a severe performance overhead (to make a new sid based on the unlabeled sid
with the MLS taken from the node sid or secmark and then using this sid as
the target). Pending reconciliation of the netlabel, ipsec and iptables contexts,
I have chosen to currently make an exception for unlabeled_t SAs if TE policy
allowed it. A similar problem exists for the outbound case and it has been similarly
handled in the policy below (by making an exception for unlabeled_t).

I am submitting the below limited patch pending a comprehensive patch from
Joy Latten at IBM (latten@austin.ibm.com).

I am not sure if I needed to manually do a "make tolib" in the flask subdir
and submit the results as well. Please let me know if I needed to.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
2006-09-01 17:06:53 +00:00

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#
# Define common prefixes for access vectors
#
# common common_name { permission_name ... }
#
# Define a common prefix for file access vectors.
#
common file
{
ioctl
read
write
create
getattr
setattr
lock
relabelfrom
relabelto
append
unlink
link
rename
execute
swapon
quotaon
mounton
}
#
# Define a common prefix for socket access vectors.
#
common socket
{
# inherited from file
ioctl
read
write
create
getattr
setattr
lock
relabelfrom
relabelto
append
# socket-specific
bind
connect
listen
accept
getopt
setopt
shutdown
recvfrom
sendto
recv_msg
send_msg
name_bind
}
#
# Define a common prefix for ipc access vectors.
#
common ipc
{
create
destroy
getattr
setattr
read
write
associate
unix_read
unix_write
}
#
# Define the access vectors.
#
# class class_name [ inherits common_name ] { permission_name ... }
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for file-related objects.
#
class filesystem
{
mount
remount
unmount
getattr
relabelfrom
relabelto
transition
associate
quotamod
quotaget
}
class dir
inherits file
{
add_name
remove_name
reparent
search
rmdir
}
class file
inherits file
{
execute_no_trans
entrypoint
execmod
}
class lnk_file
inherits file
class chr_file
inherits file
{
execute_no_trans
entrypoint
execmod
}
class blk_file
inherits file
class sock_file
inherits file
class fifo_file
inherits file
class fd
{
use
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for network-related objects.
#
class socket
inherits socket
class tcp_socket
inherits socket
{
connectto
newconn
acceptfrom
node_bind
name_connect
}
class udp_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
}
class rawip_socket
inherits socket
{
node_bind
}
class node
{
tcp_recv
tcp_send
udp_recv
udp_send
rawip_recv
rawip_send
enforce_dest
}
class netif
{
tcp_recv
tcp_send
udp_recv
udp_send
rawip_recv
rawip_send
}
class netlink_socket
inherits socket
class packet_socket
inherits socket
class key_socket
inherits socket
class unix_stream_socket
inherits socket
{
connectto
newconn
acceptfrom
}
class unix_dgram_socket
inherits socket
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for process-related objects
#
class process
{
fork
transition
sigchld # commonly granted from child to parent
sigkill # cannot be caught or ignored
sigstop # cannot be caught or ignored
signull # for kill(pid, 0)
signal # all other signals
ptrace
getsched
setsched
getsession
getpgid
setpgid
getcap
setcap
share
getattr
setexec
setfscreate
noatsecure
siginh
setrlimit
rlimitinh
dyntransition
setcurrent
execmem
execstack
execheap
setkeycreate
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for ipc-related objects
#
class ipc
inherits ipc
class sem
inherits ipc
class msgq
inherits ipc
{
enqueue
}
class msg
{
send
receive
}
class shm
inherits ipc
{
lock
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for the security server.
#
class security
{
compute_av
compute_create
compute_member
check_context
load_policy
compute_relabel
compute_user
setenforce # was avc_toggle in system class
setbool
setsecparam
setcheckreqprot
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for system operations.
#
class system
{
ipc_info
syslog_read
syslog_mod
syslog_console
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for controling capabilies
#
class capability
{
# The capabilities are defined in include/linux/capability.h
# Care should be taken to ensure that these are consistent with
# those definitions. (Order matters)
chown
dac_override
dac_read_search
fowner
fsetid
kill
setgid
setuid
setpcap
linux_immutable
net_bind_service
net_broadcast
net_admin
net_raw
ipc_lock
ipc_owner
sys_module
sys_rawio
sys_chroot
sys_ptrace
sys_pacct
sys_admin
sys_boot
sys_nice
sys_resource
sys_time
sys_tty_config
mknod
lease
audit_write
audit_control
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
# changes to passwd information.
#
class passwd
{
passwd # change another user passwd
chfn # change another user finger info
chsh # change another user shell
rootok # pam_rootok check (skip auth)
crontab # crontab on another user
}
#
# SE-X Windows stuff
#
class drawable
{
create
destroy
draw
copy
getattr
}
class gc
{
create
free
getattr
setattr
}
class window
{
addchild
create
destroy
map
unmap
chstack
chproplist
chprop
listprop
getattr
setattr
setfocus
move
chselection
chparent
ctrllife
enumerate
transparent
mousemotion
clientcomevent
inputevent
drawevent
windowchangeevent
windowchangerequest
serverchangeevent
extensionevent
}
class font
{
load
free
getattr
use
}
class colormap
{
create
free
install
uninstall
list
read
store
getattr
setattr
}
class property
{
create
free
read
write
}
class cursor
{
create
createglyph
free
assign
setattr
}
class xclient
{
kill
}
class xinput
{
lookup
getattr
setattr
setfocus
warppointer
activegrab
passivegrab
ungrab
bell
mousemotion
relabelinput
}
class xserver
{
screensaver
gethostlist
sethostlist
getfontpath
setfontpath
getattr
grab
ungrab
}
class xextension
{
query
use
}
#
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
# PaX flags
#
class pax
{
pageexec # Paging based non-executable pages
emutramp # Emulate trampolines
mprotect # Restrict mprotect()
randmmap # Randomize mmap() base
randexec # Randomize ET_EXEC base
segmexec # Segmentation based non-executable pages
}
#
# Extended Netlink classes
#
class netlink_route_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
}
class netlink_firewall_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
}
class netlink_tcpdiag_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
}
class netlink_nflog_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_xfrm_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
}
class netlink_selinux_socket
inherits socket
class netlink_audit_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
nlmsg_relay
nlmsg_readpriv
}
class netlink_ip6fw_socket
inherits socket
{
nlmsg_read
nlmsg_write
}
class netlink_dnrt_socket
inherits socket
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
# access and communication through the D-BUS messaging
# system.
#
class dbus
{
acquire_svc
send_msg
}
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
# access through the name service cache daemon (nscd).
#
class nscd
{
getpwd
getgrp
gethost
getstat
admin
shmempwd
shmemgrp
shmemhost
}
# Define the access vector interpretation for controlling
# access to IPSec network data by association
#
class association
{
sendto
recvfrom
setcontext
polmatch
}
# Updated Netlink class for KOBJECT_UEVENT family.
class netlink_kobject_uevent_socket
inherits socket
class appletalk_socket
inherits socket
class packet
{
send
recv
relabelto
}
class key
{
view
read
write
search
link
setattr
create
}