Commit Graph

18 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Chris PeBenito
b4ad699e57 trunk: add nlmsg_tty_audit permission. 2009-03-05 14:11:24 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
466e22a8ba trunk: Add db_procedure install permission from KaiGai Kohei. 2009-01-23 19:49:36 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
347a701119 trunk: Add kernel_service access vectors, from Stephen Smalley. 2009-01-05 21:44:33 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
d923d54c08 trunk: X application data class from Eamon Walsh and Ted Toth. 2008-05-06 14:37:05 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
2c12b471ad trunk: add core xselinux support. 2008-04-01 20:23:23 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
210607be61 trunk: Definitions for open permisson on file and similar objects from Eric Paris. 2008-03-04 20:19:29 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
f03433313a trunk: labeled networking permission update from paul moore. 2008-02-12 14:46:29 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
8b9ffed517 trunk: add capability2 class, from Stephen Smalley. 2008-02-07 17:51:59 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
d4623f3d24 trunk: add setfcap capabiltiy, from Serge Hallyn. 2008-01-11 14:08:02 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
f3da31d339 trunk: Labeled networking peer object class updates. 2008-01-03 16:20:01 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
9760cbec2d trunk: Database userspace object manager classes from KaiGai Kohei. 2007-08-09 13:15:07 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
924f3cc2cb trunk: add getserv and shmemserv nscd permissions. 2007-07-24 19:52:18 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
41337aa8b9 Memprotect support patch from Stephen Smalley. 2007-06-19 13:02:26 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
a715dc0995 add dccp_socket object class 2007-02-26 15:39:59 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
c6a60bb28d On Tue, 2006-11-07 at 16:51 -0500, James Antill wrote:
> Here is the policy changes needed for the context contains security
> checking in PAM and cron.
2006-11-14 13:38:52 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
a8671ae5b2 enhanced setransd support from darrel goeddel 2006-10-20 14:44:23 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
9b45c60308 This patch adds a polmatch avperm to arbitrate flow/state's access to
a xfrm policy. It also defines MLS policy for association { sendto,
recvfrom, polmatch }.

NOTE: When an inbound packet is not using an IPSec SA, a check is performed
between the socket label and the unlabeled sid (SYSTEM_HIGH MLS label). For
MLS purposes however, the target of the check should be the MLS label taken
from the node sid (or secmark in the new secmark world). This would present
a severe performance overhead (to make a new sid based on the unlabeled sid
with the MLS taken from the node sid or secmark and then using this sid as
the target). Pending reconciliation of the netlabel, ipsec and iptables contexts,
I have chosen to currently make an exception for unlabeled_t SAs if TE policy
allowed it. A similar problem exists for the outbound case and it has been similarly
handled in the policy below (by making an exception for unlabeled_t).

I am submitting the below limited patch pending a comprehensive patch from
Joy Latten at IBM (latten@austin.ibm.com).

I am not sure if I needed to manually do a "make tolib" in the flask subdir
and submit the results as well. Please let me know if I needed to.

Signed-off-by: Venkat Yekkirala <vyekkirala@TrustedCS.com>
2006-09-01 17:06:53 +00:00
Chris PeBenito
17de1b790b remove extra level of directory 2006-07-12 20:32:27 +00:00