This commit is contained in:
Chris PeBenito 2005-08-09 19:30:43 +00:00
parent b9d7d70b33
commit e784300a62
6 changed files with 239 additions and 4 deletions

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@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
acct acct
mysql mysql
su su
sudo
tmpreaper tmpreaper
updfstab updfstab

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@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
/usr/bin/sudo -- context_template(system_u:object_r:sudo_exec_t,s0)

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@ -0,0 +1,163 @@
## <summary>Execute a command with a substitute user</summary>
#######################################
## <summary>
## The per user domain template for the sudo module.
## </summary>
## <desc>
## <p>
## This template creates a derived domain which is allowed
## to change the linux user id, to run commands as a different
## user.
## </p>
## <p>
## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and
## generally does not need to be invoked directly
## by policy writers.
## </p>
## </desc>
## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
## is the prefix for user_t).
## </param>
#
template(`sudo_per_userdomain_template',`
##############################
#
# Declarations
#
type $1_sudo_t; #, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite, mlsfileupgrade, mlsfiledowngrade, mlsprocsetsl;
domain_type($1_sudo_t)
domain_entry_file($1_sudo_t,sudo_exec_t)
domain_wide_inherit_fd($1_sudo_t)
domain_subj_id_change_exempt($1_sudo_t)
domain_role_change_exempt($1_sudo_t)
domain_obj_id_change_exempt($1_sudo_t)
role $1_r types $1_sudo_t;
##############################
#
# Local Policy
#
# Use capabilities.
allow $1_sudo_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override sys_resource };
allow $1_sudo_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow $1_sudo_t self:process { setexec setrlimit };
allow $1_sudo_t self:fd use;
allow $1_sudo_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow $1_sudo_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t self:msg { send receive };
# Enter this derived domain from the user domain
domain_auto_trans($1_t, sudo_exec_t, $1_sudo_t)
allow $1_sudo_t $1_t:fd use;
allow $1_t $1_sudo_t:fd use;
allow $1_t $1_sudo_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_t $1_sudo_t:process sigchld;
# By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed.
corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_sudo_t,$1_t)
allow $1_t $1_sudo_t:fd use;
allow $1_sudo_t $1_t:fd use;
allow $1_sudo_t $1_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t $1_t:process sigchld;
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl($1_sudo_t)
kernel_read_system_state($1_sudo_t)
dev_read_urand($1_sudo_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_sudo_t)
fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_sudo_t)
selinux_get_fs_mount($1_sudo_t)
selinux_validate_context($1_sudo_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector($1_sudo_t)
selinux_compute_create_context($1_sudo_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_sudo_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_sudo_t)
term_use_all_user_ttys($1_sudo_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys($1_sudo_t)
term_relabel_all_user_ttys($1_sudo_t)
term_relabel_all_user_ptys($1_sudo_t)
auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_sudo_t)
corecmd_getattr_bin_file($1_sudo_t)
corecmd_read_sbin_symlink($1_sudo_t)
corecmd_getattr_sbin_file($1_sudo_t)
domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_sudo_t)
domain_sigchld_wide_inherit_fd($1_sudo_t)
domain_getattr_all_entry_files($1_sudo_t)
files_read_etc_files($1_sudo_t)
files_read_var_files($1_sudo_t)
files_read_usr_symlinks($1_sudo_t)
files_getattr_usr_files($1_sudo_t)
# for some PAM modules and for cwd
files_dontaudit_search_home($1_sudo_t)
init_rw_script_pid($1_sudo_t)
libs_use_ld_so($1_sudo_t)
libs_use_shared_libs($1_sudo_t)
logging_send_syslog_msg($1_sudo_t)
miscfiles_read_localization($1_sudo_t)
seutil_read_config($1_sudo_t)
seutil_read_default_contexts($1_sudo_t)
userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd($1_sudo_t)
# for some PAM modules and for cwd
userdom_dontaudit_search_all_users_home($1_sudo_t)
# if secure mode is enabled, then sudo
# can only transition to unprivileged users
if(secure_mode) {
userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_sudo_t)
} else {
userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users($1_sudo_t)
}
optional_policy(`nis.te',`
nis_use_ypbind($1_sudo_t)
')
optional_policy(`nscd.te',`
nscd_use_socket($1_sudo_t)
')
ifdef(`TODO',`
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_sudo_t gphdomain:fd use;')
# for when the network connection is killed
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain $1_sudo_t:process signal;
ifdef(`mta.te', `
domain_auto_trans($1_sudo_t, sendmail_exec_t, $1_mail_t)
allow $1_mail_t $1_sudo_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
')
ifdef(`pam.te', `
allow $1_sudo_t pam_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow $1_sudo_t pam_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
')
rw_dir_create_file($1_sudo_t, $1_tmp_t)
rw_dir_create_file($1_sudo_t, $1_home_t)
') dnl end TODO
')

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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
policy_module(sudo,1.0)
########################################
#
# Declarations
type sudo_exec_t;
files_type(sudo_exec_t)
# Remaining policy in per user domain template.

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@ -577,15 +577,23 @@ interface(`domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_unnamed_pipes',`
') ')
######################################## ########################################
## <summary>
## Get the attributes of entry point
## files for all domains.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## Domain allowed access.
## </param>
# #
# domain_exec_all_entry_files(domain) interface(`domain_getattr_all_entry_files',`
#
interface(`domain_exec_all_entry_files',`
gen_require(` gen_require(`
attribute entry_type; attribute entry_type;
class file getattr;
class lnk_file r_file_perms;
') ')
can_exec($1,entry_type) allow $1 entry_type:lnk_file getattr;
allow $1 entry_type:file r_file_perms;
') ')
######################################## ########################################
@ -603,6 +611,18 @@ interface(`domain_read_all_entry_files',`
allow $1 entry_type:file r_file_perms; allow $1 entry_type:file r_file_perms;
') ')
########################################
#
# domain_exec_all_entry_files(domain)
#
interface(`domain_exec_all_entry_files',`
gen_require(`
attribute entry_type;
')
can_exec($1,entry_type)
')
######################################## ########################################
## <summary> ## <summary>
## Unconfined access to domains. ## Unconfined access to domains.

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@ -1463,6 +1463,25 @@ interface(`files_search_usr',`
allow $1 usr_t:dir search; allow $1 usr_t:dir search;
') ')
########################################
## <summary>
## Get the attributes of files in /usr.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## Domain allowed access.
## </param>
#
interface(`files_getattr_usr_files',`
gen_require(`
type usr_t;
class dir search;
class file getattr;
')
allow $1 usr_t:dir search;
allow $1 usr_t:file getattr;
')
######################################## ########################################
# #
# files_read_usr_files(domain) # files_read_usr_files(domain)
@ -1479,6 +1498,25 @@ interface(`files_read_usr_files',`
allow $1 usr_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms; allow $1 usr_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
') ')
########################################
## <summary>
## Read symbolic links in /usr.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
## Domain allowed access.
## </param>
#
interface(`files_read_usr_symlinks',`
gen_require(`
type usr_t;
class dir search;
class file r_file_perms;
')
allow $1 usr_t:dir search;
allow $1 usr_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
')
######################################## ########################################
## <summary> ## <summary>
## Execute programs in /usr/src in the caller domain. ## Execute programs in /usr/src in the caller domain.