move old strict, targeted, and mls policies to archive

docs/macro_conversion_guide

@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1)
 # daemon: complete
 #
 optional_policy(`nscd',`
-	nscd_use_socket($1)
+	nscd_socket_use($1)
 ')
 
 #
@@ -44,6 +44,11 @@ domain_type($1)
 #
 # handled by appropriate interfaces
 
+#
+# exec_type: complete
+#
+corecmd_executable_file($1)
+
 #
 # file_type: complete
 #
@@ -119,19 +124,19 @@ optional_policy(`arpwatch',`
 		dontaudit mta_user_agent arpwatch_t:packet_socket { read write };
 	')
 ')
-optional_policy(`cron',`
+optional_policy(`
 	cron_sigchld($1)
 	cron_read_system_job_tmp_files($1)
 ')
-optional_policy(`logrotate',`
+optional_policy(`
 	logrotate_read_tmp_files($1)
 ')
 
 #
 # nscd_client_domain: complete
 #
-optional_policy(`nscd',`
+optional_policy(`
-	nscd_use_socket($1)
+	nscd_socket_use($1)
 ')
 
 #
@@ -142,9 +147,7 @@ domain_interactive_fd($1)
 #
 # privlog: complete
 #
-optional_policy(`logging',`
+logging_send_syslog_msg($1)
-	logging_send_syslog_msg($1)
-')
 
 #
 # privmail: complete
@@ -367,9 +370,7 @@ term_create_pty($1_t,$1_devpts_t)
 #
 # can_exec_any(): complete
 #
-corecmd_exec_bin($1)
+corecmd_exec_all_executables($1)
-corecmd_exec_sbin($1)
-domain_exec_all_entry_files($1)
 files_exec_etc_files($1)
 libs_use_ld_so($1)
 libs_use_shared_libs($1)
@@ -643,11 +644,6 @@ sysnet_read_config($1)
 allow $1 $2:dir { search getattr read };
 allow $1 $2:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
 allow $1 $2:process getattr;
-# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
-# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
-# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
-# running in a privileged domain.
-dontaudit $1 $2:process ptrace;
 
 #
 # can_ptrace():
@@ -787,24 +783,24 @@ kernel_list_proc($1_t)
 kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
 kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
 dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
+domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t)
 fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
 term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
-domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t)
 init_use_fds($1_t)
-init_use_script_pty($1_t)
+init_use_script_ptys($1_t)
 libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
 libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
 logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
 userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds($1_t)
 ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
-	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
+	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys($1_t)
-	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
+	term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys($1_t)
 	files_dontaudit_read_root_files($1_t)
 ')
-optional_policy(`selinuxutil',`
+optional_policy(`
 	seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t)
 ')
-optional_policy(`udev',`
+optional_policy(`
 	udev_read_db($1_t)
 ')
 
@@ -820,32 +816,32 @@ dontaudit $1_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
 allow $1_t self:process signal_perms;
 allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
 allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-files_pid_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_run_t,file)
 kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t)
 kernel_list_proc($1_t)
 kernel_read_proc_symlinks($1_t)
 dev_read_sysfs($1_t)
+domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t)
 fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t)
 fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t)
 term_dontaudit_use_console($1_t)
-domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t)
 init_use_fds($1_t)
-init_use_script_pty($1_t)
+init_use_script_ptys($1_t)
 libs_use_ld_so($1_t)
 libs_use_shared_libs($1_t)
 logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t)
 miscfiles_read_localization($1_t)
 userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds($1_t)
 userdom_dontaudit_search_sysadm_home_dirs($1_t)
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
+ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
-	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_tty($1_t)
+	term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys($1_t)
-	term_dontaudit_use_generic_pty($1_t)
+	term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys($1_t)
 	files_dontaudit_read_root_files($1_t)
 ')
-optional_policy(`selinuxutil',`
+optional_policy(`
 	seutil_sigchld_newrole($1_t)
 ')
-optional_policy(`udev',`
+optional_policy(`
 	udev_read_db($1_t)
 ')
 
@@ -1044,7 +1040,7 @@ optional_policy(`nis',`
 	nis_use_ypbind($1_t)
 ')
 optional_policy(`nscd',`
-	nscd_use_socket($1_t)
+	nscd_socket_use($1_t)
 ')
 
 #
@@ -1060,7 +1056,7 @@ libs_legacy_use_ld_so($1_t)
 type $1_lock_t;
 files_lock_file($1_lock_t)
 allow $1_t $1_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
-files_lock_filetrans($1_t,$1_lock_t)
+files_lock_filetrans($1_t,$1_lock_t,file)
 
 #
 # log_domain(): complete
@@ -1068,7 +1064,7 @@ files_lock_filetrans($1_t,$1_lock_t)
 type $1_log_t;
 logging_log_file($1_log_t)
 allow $1_t $1_log_t:file create_file_perms;
-logging_log_filetrans($1_t,$1_log_t)
+logging_log_filetrans($1_t,$1_log_t,file)
 
 #
 # logdir_domain(): complete
@@ -1230,7 +1226,7 @@ type $1_var_lib_t;
 files_type($1_var_lib_t)
 allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
 allow $1_t $1_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-files_var_lib_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_lib_t)
+files_var_lib_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_lib_t,file)
 
 #
 # var_run_domain($1): complete
@@ -1239,7 +1235,7 @@ type $1_var_run_t;
 files_pid_file($1_var_run_t)
 allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
 allow $1_t $1_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-files_pid_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_run_t)
+files_pid_filetrans($1_t,$1_var_run_t,file)
 
 #
 # var_run_domain($1,$2): complete

mls/COPYING

@@ -1,340 +0,0 @@
-		    GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE
-		       Version 2, June 1991
-
- Copyright (C) 1989, 1991 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
-                       59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
- Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies
- of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
-
-			    Preamble
-
-  The licenses for most software are designed to take away your
-freedom to share and change it.  By contrast, the GNU General Public
-License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change free
-software--to make sure the software is free for all its users.  This
-General Public License applies to most of the Free Software
-Foundation's software and to any other program whose authors commit to
-using it.  (Some other Free Software Foundation software is covered by
-the GNU Library General Public License instead.)  You can apply it to
-your programs, too.
-
-  When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not
-price.  Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you
-have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for
-this service if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it
-if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it
-in new free programs; and that you know you can do these things.
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-These restrictions translate to certain responsibilities for you if you
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-
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-   TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR COPYING, DISTRIBUTION AND MODIFICATION
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-
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-
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mls/ChangeLog

@@ -1,434 +0,0 @@
-1.27.3 2005-11-17
-	* Removed the seuser policy as suggested by Kevin Carr.
-	* Removed unnecessary allow rule concerning tmpfs_t in the squid
-	policy as suggested by Russell Coker.
-	* Merged a patch from Jonathan Kim which modified the restorecon policy
-	to use the secadmin attribute.
-	* Merged a patch from Dan Walsh.  Added avahi, exim, and yppasswdd
-	policies.  Added the unconfinedtrans attribute for domains that
-	can transistion to unconfined_t.  Added httpd_enable_ftp_server,
-	allow_postgresql_use_pam, pppd_can_insmod, and allow_gssd_read_tmp
-	booleans.  Created a $1_disable_trans boolean used in the
-	init_service_domain macro to specify whether init should
-	transition to a new domain when executing.  Included Chad Hanson's
-	patch which adds the mls* attributes to more domains and makes
-	other changes to support MLS.  Included Russell Coker's patch
-	which makes many changes to the sendmail policy.  Added rules to
-	allow initscripts to execute scripts that they generate.  Added
-	dbus support to the named policy.  Made other fixes and cleanups
-	to various policies including amanda, apache, bluetooth, pegasus,
-	postfix, pppd, and slapd.  Removed sendmail policy from targeted.
-1.27.2 2005-10-20
-	* Merged patch from Chad Hanson.  Modified MLS constraints.
-	Provided comments for the MLS attributes.
-	* Merged two patches from Thomas Bleher which made some minor
-	fixes and cleanups.
-	* Merged patches from Russell Coker. Added comments to some of the
-	MLS attributes.  Added the secure_mode_insmod boolean to determine
-	whether the system permits loading policy, setting enforcing mode,
-	and changing boolean values. Made minor fixes for the cdrecord_domain
-	macro, application_domain, newrole_domain, and daemon_base_domain
-	macros.  Added rules to allow the mail server to access the user
-	home directories in the targeted policy and allows the postfix
-	showq program to do DNS lookups.  Minor fixes for the MCS
-	policy.  Made other minor fixes and cleanups.
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.  Added opencd, pegasus, readahead,
-	and roundup policies.  Created can_access_pty macro to handle pty
-	output.  Created nsswithch_domain macro for domains using
-	nsswitch.  Added mcs transition rules.  Removed mqueue and added
-	capifs genfscon entries.  Added dhcpd and pegasus ports.  Added
-	domain transitions from login domains to pam_console and alsa
-	domains.  Added rules to allow the httpd and squid domains to
-	relay more protocols.  For the targeted policy, removed sysadm_r
-	role from unconfined_t.  Made other fixes and cleanups.
-1.27.1 2005-09-15
-	* Merged small patches from Russell Coker for the apostrophe,
-	dhcpc, fsadm, and setfiles policy.
-	* Merged a patch from Russell Coker with some minor fixes to a
-	multitude of policy files.
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh from August 15th. Adds certwatch
-	policy.  Adds mcs support to Makefile.  Adds mcs file which
-	defines sensitivities and categories for the MSC policy.  Creates
-	an authentication_domain macro in global_macros.te for domains
-	that use pam_authentication.  Creates the anonymous_domain macro
-	so that the ftpd, rsync, httpd, and smbd domains can share the
-	ftpd_anon_t and ftpd_anon_rw_t types.  Removes netifcon rules to
-	start isolating individual ethernet devices.  Changes vpnc from a
-	daemon to an application_domain.  Adds audit_control capability to
-	crond_t.  Adds dac_override and dac_read_search capabilities to
-	fsadm_t to allow the manipulation of removable media.  Adds
-	read_sysctl macro to the base_passwd_domain macro.  Adds rules to
-	allow alsa_t to communicate with userspace.  Allows networkmanager
-	to communicate with isakmp_port and to use vpnc.  For targeted
-	policy, removes transitions of sysadm_t to apm_t, backup_t,
-	bootloader_t, cardmgr_t, clockspeed_t, hwclock_t, and kudzu_t.
-	Makes other minor cleanups and fixes.
-	
-1.26 2005-09-06
-	* Updated version for release.
-
-1.25.4 2005-08-10
-	* Merged small patches from Russell Coker for the restorecon,
-	kudzu, lvm, radvd, and spamassasin policies.
-	* Added fs_use_trans rule for mqueue from Mark Gebhart to support
-	the work he has done on providing SELinux support for mqueue.
-	* Merged a patch from Dan Walsh. Removes the user_can_mount
-	tunable.  Adds disable_evolution_trans and disable_thunderbird_trans
-	booleans.  Adds the nscd_client_domain attribute to insmod_t.
-	Removes the user_ping boolean from targeted policy.  Adds
-	hugetlbfs, inotifyfs, and mqueue filesystems to genfs_contexts.
-	Adds the isakmp_port for vpnc.  Creates the pptp daemon domain.
-	Allows getty to run sbin_t for pppd.  Allows initrc to write to
-	default_t for booting.  Allows Hotplug_t sys_rawio for prism54
-	card at boot.  Other minor fixes.
-
-1.25.3 2005-07-18
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.  Adds auth_bool attribute to allow
-	domains to have read access to shadow_t.  Creates pppd_can_insmod
-	boolean to control the loading of modem kernel modules.  Allows
-	nfs to export noexattrfile types.  Allows unix_chpwd to access
-	cert files and random devices for encryption purposes.  Other
-	minor cleanups and fixes.
-
-1.25.2 2005-07-11
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.  Added allow_ptrace boolean to
-	allow sysadm_t to ptrace and debug apps.  Gives auth_chkpwd the
-	audit_control and audit_write capabilities.  Stops targeted policy
-	from transitioning from unconfined_t to netutils.  Allows cupsd to
-	audit messages.  Gives prelink the execheap, execmem, and execstack
-	permissions by default.  Adds can_winbind boolean and functions to
-	better handle samba and winbind communications.  Eliminates
-	allow_execmod checks around texrel_shlib_t libraries.  Other minor
-	cleanups and fixes.
-	
-1.25.1 2005-07-05
-	* Moved role_tty_type_change, reach_sysadm, and priv_user macros
-	from user.te to user_macros.te as suggested by Steve.
-	* Modified admin_domain macro so autrace would work and removed
-	privuser attribute for dhcpc as suggested by Russell Coker.
-	* Merged rather large patch from Dan Walsh.  Moves
-	targeted/strict/mls policies closer together.  Adds local.te for
-	users to customize.  Includes minor fixes to auditd, cups,
-	cyrus_imapd, dhcpc, and dovecot.  Includes Russell Coker's patch
-	that defines all ports in network.te.  Ports are always defined
-	now, no ifdefs are used in network.te.  Also includes Ivan
-	Gyurdiev's user home directory policy patches.  These patches add
-	alsa, bonobo, ethereal, evolution, gconf, gnome, gnome_vfs,
-	iceauth, orbit, and thunderbird policy.  They create read_content,
-	write_trusted, and write_untrusted macros in content.te.  They
-	create network_home, write_network_home, read_network_home,
-	base_domain_ro_access, home_domain_access, home_domain, and
-	home_domain_ro macros in home_macros.te.  They also create
-	$3_read_content, $3_write_content, and write_untrusted booleans.
-	
-1.24 2005-06-20
-	* Updated version for release.
-
-1.23.18 2005-05-31
-	* Merged minor fixes to pppd.fc and courier.te by Russell Coker.
-	* Removed devfsd policy as suggested by Russell Coker.
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.  Includes beginnings of Ivan
-	Gyurdiev's Font Config policy.  Don't transition to fsadm_t from
-	unconfined_t (sysadm_t) in targeted policy.  Add support for
-	debugfs in modutil.  Allow automount to create and delete
-	directories in /root and /home dirs.  Move can_ypbind to
-	chkpwd_macro.te.  Allow useradd to create additional files and
-	types via the skell mechanism.  Other minor cleanups and fixes.
-
-1.23.17 2005-05-23
-	* Merged minor fixes by Petre Rodan to the daemontools, dante,
-	gpg, kerberos, and ucspi-tcp policies.
-	* Merged minor fixes by Russell Coker to the bluetooth, crond,
-	initrc, postfix, and udev  policies.  Modifies constraints so that
-	newaliases can be run.  Modifies types.fc so that objects in
-	lost+found directories will not be relabled.
-	* Modified fc rules for nvidia.
-	* Added Chad Sellers policy for polyinstantiation support, which
-	creates the polydir, polyparent, and polymember attributes.  Also
-	added the support_polyinstantiation tunable.
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.  Includes mount_point attribute,
-	read_font macros and some other policy fixes from Ivan Gyurdiev.
-	Adds privkmsg and secadmfile attributes and ddcprobe policy.
-	Removes the use_syslogng boolean.  Many other minor fixes.
-
-1.23.16 2005-05-13
-	* Added rdisc policy from Russell Coker.
-	* Merged minor fix to named policy by Petre Rodan.
-	* Merged minor fixes to policy from Russell Coker for kudzu,
-	named, screen, setfiles, telnet, and xdm.
-	* Merged minor fix to Makefile from Russell Coker.
-
-1.23.15 2005-05-06
-	* Added tripwire and yam policy from David Hampton.
-	* Merged minor fixes to amavid and a clarification to the
-	httpdcontent attribute comments from David Hampton.
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.  Includes fixes for restorecon,
-	games, and postfix from Russell Coker.  Adds support for debugfs.
-	Restores support for reiserfs.  Allows udev to work with tmpfs_t
-	before /dev is labled.  Removes transition from sysadm_t
-	(unconfined_t) to ifconfig_t for the targeted policy.  Other minor
-	cleanups and fixes.
-
-1.23.14 2005-04-29
-	* Added afs policy from Andrew Reisse.
-	* Merged patch from Lorenzo Hernández García-Hierro which defines
-	execstack and execheap permissions.  The patch excludes these
-	permissions from general_domain_access and updates the macros for
-	X, legacy binaries, users, and unconfined domains.
-	* Added nlmsg_relay permisison where netlink_audit_socket class is
-	used.  Added nlmsg_readpriv permission to auditd_t and auditctl_t.
-	* Merged some minor cleanups from Russell Coker and David Hampton.
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.  Many changes made to allow
-	targeted policy to run closer to strict and now almost all of
-	non-userspace is protected via SELinux.  Kernel is now in
-	unconfined_domain for targeted and runs as root:system_r:kernel_t.
-	Added transitionbool to daemon_sub_domain, mainly to turn off
-	httpd_suexec transitioning.  Implemented web_client_domain
-	name_connect rules.  Added yp support for cups.  Now the real
-	hotplug, udev, initial_sid_contexts are used for the targeted
-	policy.  Other minor cleanups and fixes.  Auditd fixes by Paul
-	Moore.
-
-1.23.13 2005-04-22
-	* Merged more changes from Dan Walsh to initrc_t for removal of
-	unconfined_domain.
-	* Merged Dan Walsh's split of auditd policy into auditd_t for the
-	audit daemon and auditctl_t for the autoctl program.
-	* Added use of name_connect to uncond_can_ypbind macro by Dan
-	Walsh.
-	* Merged other cleanup and fixes by Dan Walsh.
-
-1.23.12 2005-04-20
-	* Merged Dan Walsh's Netlink changes to handle new auditing pam
-	modules.
-	* Merged Dan Walsh's patch removing the sysadmfile attribute from
-	policy files to separate sysadm_t from secadm_t.
-	* Added CVS and uucpd policy from Dan Walsh.
-	* Cleanup by Dan Walsh to handle turning off unlimitedRC.
-	* Merged Russell Coker's fixes to ntpd, postgrey, and named
-	policy.
-	* Cleanup of chkpwd_domain and added permissions to su_domain
-	macro due to pam changes to support audit.
-	* Added nlmsg_relay and nlmsg_readpriv permissions to the
-	netlink_audit_socket class.
-
-1.23.11 2005-04-14
-	* Merged Dan Walsh's separation of the security manager and system
-	administrator.
-	* Removed screensaver.te as suggested by Thomas Bleher
-	* Cleanup of typealiases that are no longer used by Thomas Bleher.
-	* Cleanup of fc files and additional rules for SuSE by Thomas
-	Bleher.
-	* Merged changes to auditd and named policy by Russell Coker.
-	* Merged MLS change from Darrel Goeddel to support the policy
-	hierarchy patch.
-
-1.23.10 2005-04-08
-	* Removed pump.te, pump.fc, and targeted/domains/program/modutil.te
-
-1.23.9 2005-04-07
-	* Merged diffs from Dan Walsh.  Includes Ivan Gyurdiev's cleanup
-	of x_client apps.
-	* Added dmidecode policy from Ivan Gyurdiev.
-
-1.23.8 2005-04-05
-	* Added netlink_kobject_uevent_socket class.
-	* Removed empty files pump.te and pump.fc.
-	* Added NetworkManager policy from Dan Walsh.
-	* Merged Dan Walsh's major restructuring of Apache's policy.
-
-1.23.7 2005-04-04
-	* Merged David Hampton's amavis and clamav cleanups.
-	* Added David Hampton's dcc, pyzor, and razor policy.
-	
-1.23.6 2005-04-01
-	* Merged cleanup of the Makefile and other stuff from Dan Walsh.
-	Dan's patch includes some desktop changes from Ivan Gyurdiev.
-	* Merged Thomas Bleher's patches which increase the usage of
-	lock_domain() and etc_domain(), changes var_lib_DOMAIN_t usage to
-	DOMAIN_var_lib_t, and removes use of notdevfile_class_set where
-	possible. 
-	* Merged Greg Norris's cleanup of fetchmail.
-	
-1.23.5 2005-03-23
-	* Added name_connect support from Dan Walsh.
-	* Added httpd_unconfined_t from Dan Walsh.
-	* Merged cleanup of assert.te to allow unresticted full access
-	from Dan Walsh.
-	
-1.23.4 2005-03-21
-	* Merged diffs from Dan Walsh:  
-	* Cleanup of x_client_macro, tvtime, mozilla, and mplayer by Ivan 
-	Gyurdiev.  
-	* Added syslogng support to syslog.te.
-	
-1.23.3 2005-03-15
-	* Added policy for nx_server from Thomas Bleher.
-	* Added policies for clockspeed, daemontools, djbdns, ucspi-tcp, and
-	publicfile from Petre Rodan.
-	
-1.23.2 2005-03-14
-	* Merged diffs from Dan Walsh.  Dan's patch includes Ivan Gyurdiev's 
-	gift policy.
-	* Made sysadm_r the first role for root, so root's home will be labled 
-	as sysadm_home_dir_t instead of staff_home_dir_t.
-	* Modified fs_use and Makefile to reflect jfs now supporting security 
-	xattrs.
-
-1.23.1 2005-03-10
-	* Merged diffs from Dan Walsh.  Dan's patch includes Ivan
-	Gyurdiev's cleanup of homedir macros and more extensive use of
-	read_sysctl()
-
-1.22 2005-03-09
-	* Updated version for release.
-
-1.21 2005-02-24
-	* Added secure_file_type attribute from Dan Walsh
-	* Added access_terminal() macro from Ivan Gyurdiev
-	* Updated capability access vector for audit capabilities.
-	* Added mlsconvert Makefile target to help generate MLS policies
-	  (see selinux-doc/README.MLS for instructions).
-	* Changed policy Makefile to still generate policy.18 as well,
-	  and use it for make load if the kernel doesn't support 19.
-	* Merged enhanced MLS support from Darrel Goeddel (TCS).
-	* Merged diffs from Dan Walsh, Russell Coker, and Greg Norris.
-	* Merged man pages from Dan Walsh.
-	
-1.20 2005-01-04
-	* Merged diffs from Dan Walsh, Russell Coker, Thomas Bleher, and
-	Petre Rodan.
-	* Merged can_create() macro used for file_type_{,auto_}trans()
-	from Thomas Bleher.
-	* Merged dante and stunnel policy by Petre Rodan.
-	* Merged $1_file_type attribute from Thomas Bleher.
-	* Merged network_macros from Dan Walsh.
-
-1.18 2004-10-25
-	* Merged diffs from Russell Coker and Dan Walsh.
-	* Merged mkflask and mkaccess_vector patches from Ulrich Drepper.
-	* Added reserved_port_t type and portcon entries to map all other
-	  reserved ports to this type.
-	* Added distro_ prefix to distro tunables to avoid conflicts.
-	* Merged diffs from Russell Coker.
-
-1.16 2004-08-16
-	* Added nscd definitions.
-	* Converted many tunables to policy booleans.
-	* Added crontab permission.
-	* Merged diffs from Dan Walsh.
-	  This included diffs from Thomas Bleher, Russell Coker, and Colin Walters as well.
-	* Merged diffs from Russell Coker.
-	* Adjusted constraints for crond restart.
-	* Merged dbus/userspace object manager policy from Colin Walters.
-	* Merged dbus definitions from Matthew Rickard.
-	* Merged dnsmasq policy from Greg Norris.
-	* Merged gpg-agent policy from Thomas Bleher.
-
-1.14 2004-06-28
-	* Removed vmware-config.pl from vmware.fc.
-	* Added crond entry to root_default_contexts.
-	* Merged patch from Dan Walsh.
-	* Merged mdadm and postfix changes from Colin Walters.
-	* Merged reiserfs and rpm changes from Russell Coker.
-	* Merged runaway .* glob fix from Valdis Kletnieks.
-	* Merged diff from Dan Walsh.
-	* Merged fine-grained netlink classes and permissions.
-	* Merged changes for new /etc/selinux layout. 
-	* Changed mkaccess_vector.sh to provide stable order.
-	* Merged diff from Dan Walsh.
-	* Fix restorecon path in restorecon.fc.
-	* Merged pax class and access vector definition from Joshua Brindle.
-
-1.12 2004-05-12
-	* Added targeted policy.
-	* Merged atd/at into crond/crontab domains.
-	* Exclude bind mounts from relabeling to avoid aliasing.
-	* Removed some obsolete types and remapped their initial SIDs to unlabeled.
-	* Added SE-X related security classes and policy framework.
-	* Added devnull initial SID and context.
-	* Merged diffs from Fedora policy.
-
-1.10 2004-04-07
-	* Merged ipv6 support from James Morris of RedHat.
-	* Merged policy diffs from Dan Walsh.
-	* Updated call to genhomedircon to reflect new usage.
-	* Merged policy diffs from Dan Walsh and Russell Coker.
-	* Removed config-users and config-services per Dan's request.
-
-1.8 2004-03-09
-	* Merged genhomedircon patch from Karl MacMillan of Tresys.
-	* Added restorecon domain.
-	* Added unconfined_domain macro.
-	* Added default_t for /.* file_contexts entry and replaced some
-	  uses of file_t with default_t in the policy. 
-	* Added su_restricted_domain() macro and use it for initrc_t.
-	* Merged policy diffs from Dan Walsh and Russell Coker.
-	  These included a merge of an earlier patch by Chris PeBenito
-	  to rename the etc types to be consistent with other types.
-
-1.6 2004-02-18
-	* Merged xfs support from Chris PeBenito.
-	* Merged conditional rules for ping.te.
-	* Defined setbool permission, added can_setbool macro.
-	* Partial network policy cleanup.
-	* Merged with Russell Coker's policy.
-	* Renamed netscape macro and domain to mozilla  and renamed
-	  ipchains domain to iptables for consistency with Russell.
-	* Merged rhgb macro and domain from Russell Coker.
-	* Merged tunable.te from Russell Coker. 
-          Only define direct_sysadm_daemon by default in our copy.  
-	* Added rootok permission to passwd class.
-	* Merged Makefile change from Dan Walsh to generate /home 
-	  file_contexts entries for staff users.
-	* Added automatic role and domain transitions for init scripts and
-	  daemons.  Added an optional third argument (nosysadm) to 
-	  daemon_domain to omit the direct transition from sysadm_r when
-	  the same executable is also used as an application, in which
-	  case the daemon must be restarted via the init script to obtain
-	  the proper security context.  Added system_r to the authorized roles
-	  for admin users at least until support for automatic user identity
-	  transitions exist so that a transition to system_u can be provided
-	  transparently.
-	* Added support to su domain for using pam_selinux. 
-	  Added entries to default_contexts for the su domains to 
-	  provide reasonable defaults.  Removed user_su_t.
-	* Tighten restriction on user identity and role transitions in constraints.
-	* Merged macro for newrole-like domains from Russell Coker.
-	* Merged stub dbusd domain from Russell Coker.
-	* Merged stub prelink domain from Dan Walsh.
-	* Merged updated userhelper and config tool domains from Dan Walsh.
-	* Added send_msg/recv_msg permissions to can_network macro.
-	* Merged patch by Chris PeBenito for sshd subsystems.
-	* Merged patch by Chris PeBenito for passing class to var_run_domain.
-	* Merged patch by Yuichi Nakamura for append_log_domain macros.
-	* Merged patch by Chris PeBenito for rpc_pipefs labeling.
-	* Merged patch by Colin Walters to apply m4 once so that
-	  source file info is preserved for checkpolicy.
-
-1.4 2003-12-01
-        * Merged patches from Russell Coker.
-	* Revised networking permissions.
-	* Added new node_bind permission. 
-	* Added new siginh, rlimitinh, and setrlimit permissions.
-	* Added proc_t:file read permission for new is_selinux_enabled logic.
-	* Added failsafe_context configuration file to appconfig.
-	* Moved newrules.pl to policycoreutils, renamed to audit2allow.
-	* Merged newrules.pl patch from Yuichi Nakamura.
-
-1.2 2003-09-30
-	* More policy merging with Russell Coker.
-	* Transferred newrules.pl script from the old SELinux. 
-	* Merged MLS configuration patch from Karl MacMillan of Tresys.
-	* Limit staff_t to reading /proc entries for unpriv_userdomain.
-        * Updated Makefile and spec file to allow non-root builds,
-	  based on patch by Paul Nasrat.
-
-1.1 2003-08-13
-        * Merged Makefile check-all and te-includes patches from Colin Walters.
-        * Merged x-debian-packages.patch from Colin Walters.
-	* Folded read permission into domain_trans.
-
-1.0 2003-07-11
-	* Initial public release.
-

mls/Makefile

@@ -1,356 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Makefile for the security policy.
-#
-# Targets:
-# 
-# install - compile and install the policy configuration, and context files.
-# load    - compile, install, and load the policy configuration.
-# reload  - compile, install, and load/reload the policy configuration.
-# relabel - relabel filesystems based on the file contexts configuration.
-# policy  - compile the policy configuration locally for testing/development.
-#
-# The default target is 'install'.
-#
-
-# Set to y if MLS is enabled in the policy.
-MLS=y
-
-# Set to y if MCS is enabled in the policy
-MCS=n
-
-FLASKDIR = flask/
-PREFIX = /usr
-BINDIR = $(PREFIX)/bin
-SBINDIR = $(PREFIX)/sbin
-LOADPOLICY  = $(SBINDIR)/load_policy
-CHECKPOLICY = $(BINDIR)/checkpolicy
-GENHOMEDIRCON = $(SBINDIR)/genhomedircon
-SETFILES = $(SBINDIR)/setfiles
-VERS := $(shell $(CHECKPOLICY) $(POLICYCOMPAT) -V |cut -f 1 -d ' ')
-PREVERS := 20
-KERNVERS := $(shell cat /selinux/policyvers)
-MLSENABLED := $(shell cat /selinux/mls)
-POLICYVER := policy.$(VERS)
-TOPDIR = $(DESTDIR)/etc/selinux
-TYPE=mls
-
-INSTALLDIR = $(TOPDIR)/$(TYPE)
-POLICYPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/policy
-SRCPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/src
-USERPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/users
-CONTEXTPATH = $(INSTALLDIR)/contexts
-LOADPATH = $(POLICYPATH)/$(POLICYVER)
-FCPATH = $(CONTEXTPATH)/files/file_contexts
-HOMEDIRPATH = $(CONTEXTPATH)/files/homedir_template
-
-ALL_PROGRAM_MACROS := $(wildcard macros/program/*.te)
-ALL_MACROS := $(ALL_PROGRAM_MACROS) $(wildcard macros/*.te)
-ALL_TYPES := $(wildcard types/*.te)
-ALL_DOMAINS := $(wildcard domains/*.te domains/misc/*.te domains/program/*.te)
-ALLTEFILES := attrib.te tmp/program_used_flags.te $(ALL_MACROS) $(ALL_TYPES) $(ALL_DOMAINS) assert.te 
-TE_RBAC_FILES := $(ALLTEFILES) rbac
-ALL_TUNABLES := $(wildcard tunables/*.tun )
-USER_FILES := users 
-POLICYFILES = $(addprefix $(FLASKDIR),security_classes initial_sids access_vectors)
-ifeq ($(MLS),y)
-POLICYFILES += mls
-CHECKPOLMLS += -M
-endif
-ifeq ($(MCS), y)
-POLICYFILES += mcs
-CHECKPOLMLS += -M
-endif
-DEFCONTEXTFILES = initial_sid_contexts fs_use genfs_contexts net_contexts
-POLICYFILES += $(ALL_TUNABLES) $(TE_RBAC_FILES)
-POLICYFILES += $(USER_FILES)
-POLICYFILES += constraints
-POLICYFILES += $(DEFCONTEXTFILES)
-CONTEXTFILES = $(DEFCONTEXTFILES)
-POLICY_DIRS = domains domains/program domains/misc macros macros/program
-
-UNUSED_TE_FILES := $(wildcard domains/program/unused/*.te)
-
-FC = file_contexts/file_contexts
-HOMEDIR_TEMPLATE = file_contexts/homedir_template
-FCFILES=file_contexts/types.fc $(patsubst domains/program/%.te,file_contexts/program/%.fc, $(wildcard domains/program/*.te)) file_contexts/distros.fc $(wildcard file_contexts/misc/*.fc)
-CONTEXTFILES += $(FCFILES)
-
-APPDIR=$(CONTEXTPATH)
-APPFILES = $(addprefix $(APPDIR)/,default_contexts default_type initrc_context failsafe_context userhelper_context removable_context dbus_contexts customizable_types port_types) $(CONTEXTPATH)/files/media
-CONTEXTFILES += $(wildcard appconfig/*_context*) appconfig/media
-
-ROOTFILES = $(addprefix $(APPDIR)/users/,root)
-
-all:  policy
-
-tmp/valid_fc: $(LOADPATH) $(FC) 
-	@echo "Validating file contexts files ..."	
-	$(SETFILES) -q -c $(LOADPATH) $(FC)
-	@touch tmp/valid_fc
-
-install: $(FCPATH) $(APPFILES) $(ROOTFILES) $(USERPATH)/local.users
-
-$(USERPATH)/system.users: $(ALL_TUNABLES) $(USER_FILES) policy.conf
-	@mkdir -p $(USERPATH)
-	@echo "# " > tmp/system.users
-	@echo "# Do not edit this file. " >> tmp/system.users
-	@echo "# This file is replaced on reinstalls of this policy." >> tmp/system.users
-	@echo "# Please edit local.users to make local changes." >> tmp/system.users
-	@echo "#" >> tmp/system.users
-	@m4 $(ALL_TUNABLES) tmp/program_used_flags.te $(USER_FILES) | grep -v "^#" >> tmp/system.users
-	install -m 644 tmp/system.users $@
-
-$(USERPATH)/local.users: local.users
-	@mkdir -p $(USERPATH)
-	install -b -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(CONTEXTPATH)/files/media: appconfig/media
-	@mkdir -p $(CONTEXTPATH)/files/
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/default_contexts: appconfig/default_contexts
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/removable_context: appconfig/removable_context
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/customizable_types: policy.conf
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	@grep "^type .*customizable" $< | cut -d',' -f1 | cut -d' ' -f2 > tmp/customizable_types
-	install -m 644 tmp/customizable_types $@ 
-
-$(APPDIR)/port_types: policy.conf
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	@grep "^type .*port_type" $< | cut -d',' -f1 | cut -d' ' -f2 > tmp/port_types
-	install -m 644 tmp/port_types $@ 
-
-$(APPDIR)/default_type: appconfig/default_type
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/userhelper_context: appconfig/userhelper_context
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/initrc_context: appconfig/initrc_context
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/failsafe_context: appconfig/failsafe_context
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/dbus_contexts: appconfig/dbus_contexts
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(APPDIR)/users/root: appconfig/root_default_contexts
-	@mkdir -p $(APPDIR)/users
-	install -m 644 $< $@
-
-$(LOADPATH): policy.conf $(CHECKPOLICY) 
-	@echo "Compiling policy ..."
-	@mkdir -p $(POLICYPATH)
-	$(CHECKPOLICY) $(CHECKPOLMLS) -o $@ policy.conf
-ifneq ($(VERS),$(PREVERS))
-	$(CHECKPOLICY) $(CHECKPOLMLS) -c $(PREVERS) -o $(POLICYPATH)/policy.$(PREVERS) policy.conf
-endif
-
-# Note: Can't use install, so not sure how to deal with mode, user, and group
-#	other than by default.
-
-policy: $(POLICYVER)
-
-$(POLICYVER):  policy.conf $(FC) $(CHECKPOLICY)
-	$(CHECKPOLICY) $(CHECKPOLMLS) -o $@ policy.conf
-	@echo "Validating file contexts files ..."
-	$(SETFILES) -q -c $(POLICYVER) $(FC)
-
-reload tmp/load: $(LOADPATH) 
-	@echo "Loading Policy ..."
-	$(LOADPOLICY)
-	touch tmp/load
-
-load: tmp/load $(FCPATH) 
-
-enableaudit: policy.conf 
-	grep -v dontaudit policy.conf > policy.audit
-	mv policy.audit policy.conf
-
-policy.conf: $(POLICYFILES) $(POLICY_DIRS)
-	@echo "Building policy.conf ..."
-	@mkdir -p tmp
-	m4 $(M4PARAM) -Imacros -s $(POLICYFILES) > $@.tmp
-	@mv $@.tmp $@
-
-install-src: 
-	rm -rf $(SRCPATH)/policy.old
-	-mv $(SRCPATH)/policy $(SRCPATH)/policy.old
-	@mkdir -p $(SRCPATH)/policy
-	cp -R . $(SRCPATH)/policy
-
-tmp/program_used_flags.te: $(wildcard domains/program/*.te) domains/program
-	@mkdir -p tmp
-	( cd domains/program/ ; for n in *.te ; do echo "define(\`$$n')"; done ) > $@.tmp
-	( cd domains/misc/ ; for n in *.te ; do echo "define(\`$$n')"; done ) >> $@.tmp
-	mv $@.tmp $@
-
-FILESYSTEMS=`mount | grep -v "context=" | egrep -v '\((|.*,)bind(,.*|)\)' | awk '/(ext[23]| xfs| jfs | reiserfs ).*rw/{print $$3}';`
-
-checklabels: $(SETFILES)
-	$(SETFILES) -v -n $(FC) $(FILESYSTEMS)
-
-restorelabels: $(SETFILES)
-	$(SETFILES) -v $(FC) $(FILESYSTEMS)
-
-relabel:  $(FC) $(SETFILES)
-	$(SETFILES) $(FC) $(FILESYSTEMS)
-
-file_contexts/misc:
-	@mkdir -p file_contexts/misc
-
-$(FCPATH): tmp/valid_fc $(USERPATH)/system.users  $(APPDIR)/customizable_types $(APPDIR)/port_types
-	@echo "Installing file contexts files..."
-	@mkdir -p $(CONTEXTPATH)/files
-	install -m 644 $(HOMEDIR_TEMPLATE) $(HOMEDIRPATH)
-	install -m 644 $(FC) $(FCPATH)
-	@$(GENHOMEDIRCON) -d $(TOPDIR) -t $(TYPE) $(USEPWD)
-
-$(FC): $(ALL_TUNABLES) tmp/program_used_flags.te $(FCFILES) domains/program domains/misc file_contexts/program file_contexts/misc users /etc/passwd
-	@echo "Building file contexts files..."
-	@m4 $(M4PARAM) $(ALL_TUNABLES) tmp/program_used_flags.te $(FCFILES) > $@.tmp
-	@grep -v -e HOME -e ROLE -e USER $@.tmp > $@
-	@grep -e HOME -e ROLE -e USER $@.tmp  > $(HOMEDIR_TEMPLATE)
-	@-rm $@.tmp
-
-# Create a tags-file for the policy:
-# we need exuberant ctags; unfortunately it is named differently on different distros, sigh...
-pathsearch = $(firstword $(wildcard $(addsuffix /$(1),$(subst :, ,$(PATH))))) # taken from make-docs
-CTAGS := $(call pathsearch,ctags-exuberant) # debian naming scheme
-ifeq ($(strip $(CTAGS)),)
-CTAGS := $(call pathsearch,ctags) # suse naming scheme
-endif
-
-tags: $(wildcard *.te types/*.te domains/*.te domains/misc/*.te domains/program/*.te domains/program/unused/*.te macros/*.te macros/program/*.te)
-	@($(CTAGS) --version | grep -q Exuberant) || (echo ERROR: Need exuberant-ctags to function!; exit 1)
-	@LC_ALL=C $(CTAGS) --langdef=te --langmap=te:..te \
-	  --regex-te='/^[ \t]*type[ \t]+(\w+)(,|;)/\1/t,type/' \
-	  --regex-te='/^[ \t]*typealias[ \t]+\w+[ \t+]+alias[ \t]+(\w+);/\1/t,type/' \
-	  --regex-te='/^[ \t]*attribute[ \t]+(\w+);/\1/a,attribute/' \
-	  --regex-te='/^[ \t]*define\(`(\w+)/\1/d,define/' \
-	  --regex-te='/^[ \t]*bool[ \t]+(\w+)/\1/b,bool/' $^
- 
-clean:
-	rm -f policy.conf $(POLICYVER)
-	rm -f tags
-	rm -f tmp/*
-	rm -f $(FC)
-	rm -f flask/*.h
-# for the policy regression tester
-	find "domains/program/" -maxdepth 1 -type l -exec rm {} \; ; \
-
-# Policy regression tester.
-# Written by Colin Walters <walters@debian.org>
-cur_te = $(filter-out %/,$(subst /,/ ,$@))
-
-TESTED_TE_FILES := $(notdir $(UNUSED_TE_FILES))
-
-define compute_depends
-  export TE_DEPENDS_$(1) := $(shell egrep '^#[[:space:]]*Depends: ' domains/program/unused/$(1) | head -1 | sed -e 's/^.*Depends: //')
-endef
-
-
-ifeq ($(TE_DEPENDS_DEFINED),)
-ifeq ($(MAKECMDGOALS),check-all)
-  GENRULES := $(TESTED_TE_FILES)
-  export TE_DEPENDS_DEFINED := yes
-else
-  # Handle the case where checkunused/blah.te is run directly.
-  ifneq ($(findstring checkunused/,$(MAKECMDGOALS)),)
-    GENRULES := $(TESTED_TE_FILES)
-    export TE_DEPENDS_DEFINED := yes
-  endif
-endif
-endif
-
-# Test for a new enough version of GNU Make.
-$(eval have_eval := yes)
-ifneq ($(GENRULES),)
-  ifeq ($(have_eval),)
-$(error Need GNU Make 3.80 or better!)
-Need GNU Make 3.80 or better
-  endif
-endif
-$(foreach f,$(GENRULES),$(eval $(call compute_depends,$(f))))
-
-PHONIES :=
-
-define compute_presymlinks
-PHONIES += presymlink/$(1)
-presymlink/$(1):: $(patsubst %,presymlink/%,$(TE_DEPENDS_$(1)))
-	@if ! test -L domains/program/$(1); then \
-	  cd domains/program && ln -s unused/$(1) .; \
-	fi
-endef
-
-# Compute dependencies.
-$(foreach f,$(TESTED_TE_FILES),$(eval $(call compute_presymlinks,$(f))))
-
-PHONIES += $(patsubst %,checkunused/%,$(TESTED_TE_FILES))
-$(patsubst %,checkunused/%,$(TESTED_TE_FILES)) :: checkunused/% : 
-	@$(MAKE) -s clean
-
-$(patsubst %,checkunused/%,$(TESTED_TE_FILES)) :: checkunused/% : presymlink/%
-	@if test -n "$(TE_DEPENDS_$(cur_te))"; then \
-	  echo "Dependencies for $(cur_te): $(TE_DEPENDS_$(cur_te))"; \
-	fi
-	@echo "Testing $(cur_te)...";
-	@if ! make -s policy 1>/dev/null; then \
-	  echo "Testing $(cur_te)...FAILED"; \
-	  exit 1; \
-	fi;
-	@echo "Testing $(cur_te)...success."; \
-
-check-all:
-	@for goal in  $(patsubst %,checkunused/%,$(TESTED_TE_FILES)); do \
-	  $(MAKE) --no-print-directory $$goal; \
-	done
-
-.PHONY: clean $(PHONIES)
-
-mlsconvert: 
-	@for file in $(CONTEXTFILES); do \
-		echo "Converting $$file"; \
-		sed -e 's/_t\b/_t:s0/g' $$file > $$file.new && \
-		mv $$file.new $$file; \
-	done
-	@for file in $(USER_FILES); do \
-		echo "Converting $$file"; \
-		sed -e 's/;/ level s0 range s0 - s15:c0.c255;/' $$file > $$file.new && \
-		mv $$file.new $$file; \
-	done
-	@sed -e '/sid kernel/s/s0/s0 - s15:c0.c255/' initial_sid_contexts > initial_sid_contexts.new && mv initial_sid_contexts.new initial_sid_contexts
-	@echo "Enabling MLS in the Makefile"
-	@sed "s/MLS=y/MLS=y/" Makefile > Makefile.new
-	@mv Makefile.new Makefile
-	@echo "Done"
-
-mcsconvert: 
-	@for file in $(CONTEXTFILES); do \
-		echo "Converting $$file"; \
-		sed -e 's/_t\b/_t:s0/g' $$file > $$file.new && \
-		mv $$file.new $$file; \
-	done
-	@for file in $(USER_FILES); do \
-		echo "Converting $$file"; \
-		sed -r -e 's/\;/ level s0 range s0;/' $$file | \
-		sed -r -e 's/(user (user_u|root|system_u).*);/\1 - s0:c0.c255;/' > $$file.new; \
-		mv $$file.new $$file; \
-	done
-	@echo "Enabling MCS in the Makefile"
-	@sed "s/MCS=n/MCS=y/" Makefile > Makefile.new
-	@mv Makefile.new Makefile
-	@echo "Done"
-

mls/README

@@ -1,125 +0,0 @@
-The Makefile targets are:
-policy - compile the policy configuration.
-install - compile and install the policy configuration.
-load    - compile, install, and load the policy configuration.
-relabel - relabel the filesystem.
-check-all - check individual additional policy files in domains/program/unused.
-checkunused/FILE.te - check individual file FILE from domains/program/unused.
-
-If you have configured MLS into your module, then set MLS=y in the
-Makefile prior to building the policy.  Of course, you must have also
-built checkpolicy with MLS enabled.  
-
-Three of the configuration files are independent of the particular
-security policy:
-1) flask/security_classes -
-   This file has a simple declaration for each security class.
-   The corresponding symbol definitions are in the automatically
-   generated header file <selinux/flask.h>. 
-
-2) flask/initial_sids - 
-   This file has a simple declaration for each initial SID.
-   The corresponding symbol definitions are in the automatically
-   generated header file <selinux/flask.h>.
-
-3) access_vectors - 
-   This file defines the access vectors.  Common prefixes for
-   access vectors may be defined at the beginning of the file.
-   After the common prefixes are defined, an access vector
-   may be defined for each security class.
-   The corresponding symbol definitions are in the automatically
-   generated header file <selinux/av_permissions.h>.
-
-In addition to being read by the security server, these configuration
-files are used during the kernel build to automatically generate
-symbol definitions used by the kernel for security classes, initial
-SIDs and permissions.  Since the symbol definitions generated from
-these files are used during the kernel build, the values of existing
-security classes and permissions may not be modified by load_policy.
-However, new classes may be appended to the list of classes and new
-permissions may be appended to the list of permissions associated with
-each access vector definition.
-
-The policy-dependent configuration files are:
-1) tmp/all.te -  
-   This file defines the Type Enforcement (TE) configuration.
-   This file is automatically generated from a collection of files.
-
-   The macros subdirectory contains a collection of m4 macro definitions
-   used by the TE configuration.  The global_macros.te file contains global 
-   macros used throughout the configuration for common groupings of classes 
-   and permissions and for common sets of rules.  The user_macros.te file
-   contains macros used in defining user domains.  The admin_macros.te file
-   contains macros used in defining admin domains.  The macros/program 
-   subdirectory contains macros that are used to instantiate derived domains
-   for certain programs that encode information about both the calling user
-   domain and the program, permitting the policy to maintain separation 
-   between different instances of the program.
-
-   The types subdirectory contains several files with declarations for
-   general types (types not associated with a particular domain) and 
-   some rules defining relationships among those types.  Related types 
-   are grouped together into each file in this directory, e.g. all
-   device type declarations are in the device.te file.
-
-   The domains subdirectory contains several files and directories
-   with declarations and rules for each domain.  User domains are defined in 
-   user.te.  Administrator domains are defined in admin.te.  Domains for 
-   specific programs, including both system daemons and other programs, are 
-   in the .te files within the domains/program subdirectory.  The domains/misc
-   subdirectory is for miscellaneous domains such as the kernel domain and
-   the kernel module loader domain.
-
-   The assert.te file contains assertions that are checked after evaluating 
-   the entire TE configuration.
-
-2) rbac - 
-   This file defines the Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) configuration.
-
-3) mls - 
-   This file defines the Multi-Level Security (MLS) configuration.
-
-4) users -
-   This file defines the users recognized by the security policy.
-
-5) constraints - 
-   This file defines additional constraints on permissions
-   in the form of boolean expressions that must be satisfied in order
-   for specified permissions to be granted.  These constraints
-   are used to further refine the type enforcement tables and
-   the role allow rules.  Typically, these constraints are used
-   to restrict changes in user identity or role to certain domains.
-
-6) initial_sid_contexts -
-   This file defines the security context for each initial SID.
-   A security context consists of a user identity, a role, a type and
-   optionally a MLS range if the MLS policy is enabled.  If left unspecified,
-   the high MLS level defaults to the low MLS level.  The syntax of a valid 
-   security context is:
-
-     user:role:type[:sensitivity[:category,...][-sensitivity[:category,...]]]
-
-7) fs_use -
-   This file defines the labeling behavior for inodes in particular
-   filesystem types.  
-
-8) genfs_contexts -
-   This file defines security contexts for files in filesystems that
-   cannot support persistent label mappings or use one of the fixed
-   labeling schemes specified in fs_use.
-
-8) net_contexts -
-   This file defines the security contexts of network objects
-   such as ports, interfaces, and nodes.
-
-9) file_contexts/{types.fc,program/*.fc}
-   These files define the security contexts for persistent files.
-
-It is possible to test the security server functions on a given policy
-configuration by running the checkpolicy program with the -d option.
-This program is built from the same sources as the security server
-component of the kernel, so it may be used both to verify that a
-policy configuration will load successfully and to determine how the
-security server would respond if it were using that policy
-configuration.  A menu-based interface is provided for calling any of
-the security server functions after the policy is loaded.

mls/VERSION

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-1.27.3

mls/appconfig/dbus_contexts

@@ -1,6 +0,0 @@
-<!DOCTYPE busconfig PUBLIC "-//freedesktop//DTD D-BUS Bus Configuration 1.0//EN"
- "http://www.freedesktop.org/standards/dbus/1.0/busconfig.dtd">
-<busconfig>
-  <selinux>
-  </selinux>
-</busconfig>

mls/appconfig/default_contexts

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-system_r:sulogin_t:s0  sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 
-system_r:local_login_t:s0  staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 
-system_r:remote_login_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0
-system_r:sshd_t:s0		user_r:user_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0
-system_r:crond_t:s0	user_r:user_crond_t:s0 staff_r:staff_crond_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_crond_t:s0 system_r:system_crond_t:s0 mailman_r:user_crond_t:s0
-system_r:xdm_t:s0		staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 
-staff_r:staff_su_t:s0	staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 
-sysadm_r:sysadm_su_t:s0	staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 
-user_r:user_su_t:s0	staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 
-sysadm_r:sysadm_sudo_t:s0		sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0
-staff_r:staff_sudo_t:s0		sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0
-user_r:user_sudo_t:s0		sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0

mls/appconfig/default_type

@@ -1,4 +0,0 @@
-secadm_r:secadm_t
-sysadm_r:sysadm_t
-staff_r:staff_t
-user_r:user_t

mls/appconfig/failsafe_context

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0

mls/appconfig/initrc_context

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-system_u:system_r:initrc_t:s0

mls/appconfig/media

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-cdrom system_u:object_r:removable_device_t:s0
-floppy system_u:object_r:removable_device_t:s0
-disk system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t:s0

mls/appconfig/removable_context

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-system_u:object_r:removable_t:s0

mls/appconfig/root_default_contexts

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-system_r:local_login_t:s0  sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0
-system_r:crond_t:s0	sysadm_r:sysadm_crond_t:s0 staff_r:staff_crond_t:s0 user_r:user_crond_t:s0
-staff_r:staff_su_t:s0	sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0
-sysadm_r:sysadm_su_t:s0	sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0
-user_r:user_su_t:s0	sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0
-#
-# Uncomment if you want to automatically login as sysadm_r
-#
-#system_r:sshd_t:s0 sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0 staff_r:staff_t:s0 user_r:user_t:s0

mls/appconfig/userhelper_context

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-system_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:s0

mls/assert.te

@@ -1,156 +0,0 @@
-##############################
-#
-# Assertions for the type enforcement (TE) configuration.
-#
-
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-#
-
-##################################
-#
-# Access vector assertions.
-#
-# An access vector assertion specifies permissions that should not be in
-# an access vector based on a source type, a target type, and a class.
-# If any of the specified permissions are in the corresponding access
-# vector, then the policy compiler will reject the policy configuration.
-# Currently, there is only one kind of access vector assertion, neverallow, 
-# but support for the other kinds of vectors could be easily added.  Access 
-# vector assertions use the same syntax as access vector rules.
-#
-
-#
-# Verify that every type that can be entered by
-# a domain is also tagged as a domain.
-#
-neverallow domain ~domain:process { transition dyntransition };
-
-#
-# Verify that only the insmod_t and kernel_t domains 
-# have the sys_module capability.
-#
-neverallow {domain -privsysmod -unrestricted } self:capability sys_module;
-
-#
-# Verify that executable types, the system dynamic loaders, and the
-# system shared libraries can only be modified by administrators.
-#
-neverallow {domain  -kernel_t ifdef(`ldconfig.te', `-ldconfig_t') -admin -unrestricted } { exec_type ld_so_t shlib_t }:file { write append unlink rename };
-neverallow {domain  ifdef(`ldconfig.te', `-ldconfig_t') -change_context -admin -unrestricted } { exec_type ld_so_t shlib_t }:file relabelto;
-
-#
-# Verify that only appropriate domains can access /etc/shadow
-neverallow { domain -auth_bool -auth -auth_write -unrestricted } shadow_t:file ~getattr;
-neverallow { domain -auth_write -unrestricted } shadow_t:file ~r_file_perms;
-
-#
-# Verify that only appropriate domains can write to /etc (IE mess with
-# /etc/passwd)
-neverallow {domain -auth_write -etc_writer -unrestricted } etc_t:dir ~rw_dir_perms;
-neverallow {domain -auth_write -etc_writer -unrestricted } etc_t:lnk_file ~r_file_perms;
-neverallow {domain -auth_write -etc_writer -unrestricted } etc_t:file ~{ execute_no_trans rx_file_perms };
-
-#
-# Verify that other system software can only be modified by administrators.
-#
-neverallow {domain -kernel_t ifdef(`ldconfig.te', `-ldconfig_t') -admin -unrestricted } { lib_t bin_t sbin_t }:dir { add_name remove_name rename };
-neverallow { domain -kernel_t -admin -unrestricted } { lib_t bin_t sbin_t }:file { write append unlink rename };
-
-#
-# Verify that only certain domains have access to the raw disk devices.
-#
-neverallow { domain -fs_domain -unrestricted } fixed_disk_device_t:devfile_class_set { read write append };
-
-#
-# Verify that only the X server and klogd have access to memory devices.
-#
-neverallow { domain -privmem -unrestricted } memory_device_t:devfile_class_set { read write append };
-
-#
-# Verify that only domains with the privlog attribute can actually syslog
-#
-neverallow { domain -privlog -unrestricted } devlog_t:sock_file { read write append };
-
-#
-# Verify that /proc/kmsg is only accessible to klogd.
-#
-neverallow {domain -privkmsg -unrestricted } proc_kmsg_t:file ~stat_file_perms;
-
-#
-# Verify that /proc/kcore is inaccessible.
-#
-
-neverallow { domain -unrestricted } proc_kcore_t:file ~stat_file_perms;
-
-#
-# Verify that sysctl variables are only changeable
-# by initrc and administrators.
-#
-neverallow { domain -initrc_t -admin -kernel_t -insmod_t -unrestricted } sysctl_t:file { write append };
-neverallow { domain -initrc_t -admin -unrestricted } sysctl_fs_t:file { write append };
-neverallow { domain -admin -sysctl_kernel_writer -unrestricted } sysctl_kernel_t:file { write append };
-neverallow { domain -initrc_t -admin -sysctl_net_writer -unrestricted } sysctl_net_t:file { write append };
-neverallow { domain -initrc_t -admin -unrestricted } sysctl_net_unix_t:file { write append };
-neverallow { domain -initrc_t -admin -unrestricted } sysctl_vm_t:file { write append };
-neverallow { domain -initrc_t -admin -unrestricted } sysctl_dev_t:file { write append };
-neverallow { domain -initrc_t -admin -unrestricted } sysctl_modprobe_t:file { write append };
-
-#
-# Verify that certain domains are limited to only being
-# entered by their entrypoint types and to only executing
-# the dynamic loader without a transition to another domain.
-#
-
-define(`assert_execute', `
-    ifelse($#, 0, , 
-           $#, 1, 
-           ``neverallow $1_t ~$1_exec_t:file entrypoint; neverallow $1_t ~{ $1_exec_t ld_so_t }:file execute_no_trans;'',
-           `assert_execute($1) assert_execute(shift($@))')')
-
-ifdef(`getty.te', `assert_execute(getty)')
-ifdef(`klogd.te', `assert_execute(klogd)')
-ifdef(`tcpd.te', `assert_execute(tcpd)')
-ifdef(`portmap.te', `assert_execute(portmap)')
-ifdef(`syslogd.te', `assert_execute(syslogd)')
-ifdef(`rpcd.te', `assert_execute(rpcd)')
-ifdef(`rlogind.te', `assert_execute(rlogind)')
-ifdef(`ypbind.te', `assert_execute(ypbind)')
-ifdef(`xfs.te', `assert_execute(xfs)')
-ifdef(`gpm.te', `assert_execute(gpm)')
-ifdef(`ifconfig.te', `assert_execute(ifconfig)')
-ifdef(`iptables.te', `assert_execute(iptables)')
-
-ifdef(`login.te', `
-neverallow { local_login_t remote_login_t } ~{ login_exec_t ifdef(`pam.te', `pam_exec_t') }:file entrypoint;
-neverallow { local_login_t remote_login_t } ~{ ld_so_t ifdef(`pam.te', `pam_exec_t') }:file execute_no_trans;
-')
-
-#
-# Verify that the passwd domain can only be entered by its
-# entrypoint type and can only execute the dynamic loader
-# and the ordinary passwd program without a transition to another domain.
-#
-ifdef(`passwd.te', `
-neverallow passwd_t ~passwd_exec_t:file entrypoint;
-neverallow sysadm_passwd_t ~admin_passwd_exec_t:file entrypoint;
-neverallow { passwd_t sysadm_passwd_t } ~{ bin_t sbin_t shell_exec_t ld_so_t }:file execute_no_trans;
-')
-
-#
-# Verify that only the admin domains and initrc_t have setenforce.
-#
-neverallow { domain -secadmin -initrc_t -unrestricted } security_t:security setenforce;
-
-#
-# Verify that only the kernel and load_policy_t have load_policy.
-#
-
-neverallow { domain -kernel_t -load_policy_t -unrestricted } security_t:security load_policy;
-
-#
-# for gross mistakes in policy
-neverallow * domain:dir ~r_dir_perms;
-neverallow * domain:file_class_set ~rw_file_perms;
-neverallow { domain unlabeled_t } file_type:process *;
-neverallow ~{ domain unlabeled_t } *:process *;

mls/attrib.te

@@ -1,562 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Declarations for type attributes.
-# 
-
-# A type attribute can be used to identify a set of types with a similar
-# property.  Each type can have any number of attributes, and each
-# attribute can be associated with any number of types.  Attributes are
-# explicitly declared here, and can then be associated with particular
-# types in type declarations.  Attribute names can then be used throughout 
-# the configuration to express the set of types that are associated with 
-# the attribute.  Attributes have no implicit meaning to SELinux.  The
-# meaning of all attributes are completely defined through their
-# usage within the configuration, but should be documented here as
-# comments preceding the attribute declaration.  
-
-#####################
-# Attributes for MLS:
-#
-
-# Common Terminology
-# 	MLS Range: low-high
-#		low referred to as "Effective Sensitivity Label (SL)"
-#		high referred to as "Clearance SL"
-
-
-#
-# File System MLS attributes/privileges
-#
-# Grant MLS read access to files not dominated by the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsfileread;
-# Grant MLS read access to files dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsfilereadtoclr;
-# Grant MLS write access to files not equal to the Effective SL
-attribute mlsfilewrite;
-# Grant MLS write access to files which dominate the process Effective SL
-# and are dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsfilewritetoclr;
-# Grant MLS ability to change file label to a new label which dominates
-# the old label  
-attribute mlsfileupgrade;
-# Grant MLS ability to change file label to a new label which is
-# dominated by or incomparable to the old label
-attribute mlsfiledowngrade;
-
-#
-# Network MLS attributes/privileges
-#
-# Grant MLS read access to packets not dominated by the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsnetread;
-# Grant MLS read access to packets dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsnetreadtoclr;
-# Grant MLS write access to packets not equal to the Effective SL
-attribute mlsnetwrite;
-# Grant MLS write access to packets which dominate the Effective SL
-# and are dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsnetwritetoclr;
-# Grant MLS read access to packets from hosts or interfaces which dominate
-# or incomparable to the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsnetrecvall;
-# Grant MLS ability to change socket label to a new label which dominates
-# the old label  
-attribute mlsnetupgrade;
-# Grant MLS ability to change socket label to a new label which is
-# dominated by or incomparable to the old label
-attribute mlsnetdowngrade;
-
-#
-# IPC MLS attributes/privileges
-#
-# Grant MLS read access to IPC objects not dominated by the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsipcread;
-# Grant MLS read access to IPC objects dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsipcreadtoclr;
-# Grant MLS write access to IPC objects not equal to the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsipcwrite;
-# Grant MLS write access to IPC objects which dominate the process Effective SL
-# and are dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsipcwritetoclr;
-
-#
-# Process MLS attributes/privileges
-#
-# Grant MLS read access to processes not dominated by the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsprocread;
-# Grant MLS read access to processes dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsprocreadtoclr;
-# Grant MLS write access to processes not equal to the Effective SL
-attribute mlsprocwrite;
-# Grant MLS write access to processes which dominate the process Effective SL
-# and are dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsprocwritetoclr;
-# Grant MLS ability to change Effective SL or Clearance SL of process to a
-# label dominated by the Clearance SL
-attribute mlsprocsetsl;
-
-#
-# X Window MLS attributes/privileges
-#
-# Grant MLS read access to X objects not dominated by the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsxwinread;
-# Grant MLS read access to X objects dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsxwinreadtoclr;
-# Grant MLS write access to X objects not equal to the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsxwinwrite;
-# Grant MLS write access to X objects which dominate the process Effective SL
-# and are dominated by the process Clearance SL
-attribute mlsxwinwritetoclr;
-# Grant MLS read access to X properties not dominated by
-# the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsxwinreadproperty;
-# Grant MLS write access to X properties not equal to the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsxwinwriteproperty;
-# Grant MLS read access to X colormaps not dominated by
-# the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsxwinreadcolormap;
-# Grant MLS write access to X colormaps not equal to the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsxwinwritecolormap;
-# Grant MLS write access to X xinputs not equal to the process Effective SL
-attribute mlsxwinwritexinput;
-
-# Grant MLS read/write access to objects which internally arbitrate MLS
-attribute mlstrustedobject;
-
-#
-# Both of the following attributes are needed for a range transition to succeed
-#
-# Grant ability for the current domain to change SL upon process transition
-attribute privrangetrans;
-# Grant ability for the new process domain to change SL upon process transition
-attribute mlsrangetrans;
-
-#########################
-# Attributes for domains:
-#
-
-# The domain attribute identifies every type that can be 
-# assigned to a process.  This attribute is used in TE rules 
-# that should be applied to all domains, e.g. permitting 
-# init to kill all processes.
-attribute domain;
-
-# The daemon attribute identifies domains for system processes created via
-# the daemon_domain, daemon_base_domain, and init_service_domain macros.
-attribute daemon;
-
-# The privuser attribute identifies every domain that can 
-# change its SELinux user identity.  This attribute is used 
-# in the constraints configuration.  NOTE:  This attribute
-# is not required for domains that merely change the Linux
-# uid attributes, only for domains that must change the
-# SELinux user identity.  Also note that this attribute makes
-# no sense without the privrole attribute.
-attribute privuser;
-
-# The privrole attribute identifies every domain that can 
-# change its SELinux role.  This attribute is used in the 
-# constraints configuration.
-attribute privrole;
-
-# The userspace_objmgr attribute identifies every domain
-# which enforces its own policy.
-attribute userspace_objmgr;
-
-# The priv_system_role attribute identifies every domain that can
-# change role from a user role to system_r role, and identity from a user
-# identity to system_u.  It is used in the constraints configuration.
-attribute priv_system_role;
-
-# The privowner attribute identifies every domain that can 
-# assign a different SELinux user identity to a file, or that
-# can create a file with an identity that is not the same as the
-# process identity.  This attribute is used in the constraints
-# configuration.
-attribute privowner;
-
-# The privlog attribute identifies every domain that can 
-# communicate with syslogd through its Unix domain socket.
-# There is an assertion that other domains can not do it,
-# and an allow rule to permit it
-attribute privlog;
-
-# The privmodule attribute identifies every domain that can run
-# modprobe, there is an assertion that other domains can not do it,
-# and an allow rule to permit it
-attribute privmodule;
-
-# The privsysmod attribute identifies every domain that can have the
-# sys_module capability
-attribute privsysmod;
-
-# The privmem attribute identifies every domain that can 
-# access kernel memory devices.
-# This attribute is used in the TE assertions to verify
-# that such access is limited to domains that are explicitly
-# tagged with this attribute.
-attribute privmem;
-
-# The privkmsg attribute identifies every domain that can 
-# read kernel messages (/proc/kmsg)
-# This attribute is used in the TE assertions to verify
-# that such access is limited to domains that are explicitly
-# tagged with this attribute.
-attribute privkmsg;
-
-# The privfd attribute identifies every domain that should have
-# file handles inherited widely (IE sshd_t and getty_t).
-attribute privfd;
-
-# The privhome attribute identifies every domain that can create files under
-# regular user home directories in the regular context (IE act on behalf of
-# a user in writing regular files)
-attribute privhome;
-
-# The auth attribute identifies every domain that needs
-# to read /etc/shadow, and grants the permission.
-attribute auth;
-
-# The auth_bool attribute identifies every domain that can 
-# read /etc/shadow if its boolean is set;
-attribute auth_bool;
-
-# The auth_write attribute identifies every domain that can have write or
-# relabel access to /etc/shadow, but does not grant it.
-attribute auth_write;
-
-# The auth_chkpwd attribute identifies every system domain that can
-# authenticate users by running unix_chkpwd
-attribute auth_chkpwd;
-
-# The change_context attribute identifies setfiles_t, restorecon_t, and other
-# system domains that change the context of most/all files on the system
-attribute change_context;
-
-# The etc_writer attribute identifies every domain that can write to etc_t
-attribute etc_writer;
-
-# The sysctl_kernel_writer attribute identifies domains that can write to
-# sysctl_kernel_t, in addition the admin attribute is permitted write access
-attribute sysctl_kernel_writer;
-
-# the sysctl_net_writer attribute identifies domains that can write to
-# sysctl_net_t files.
-attribute sysctl_net_writer;
-
-# The sysctl_type attribute identifies every type that is assigned
-# to a sysctl entry.  This can be used in allow rules to grant
-# permissions to all sysctl entries without enumerating each individual
-# type, but should be used with care.
-attribute sysctl_type;
-
-# The admin attribute identifies every administrator domain.
-# It is used in TE assertions when verifying that only administrator 
-# domains have certain permissions.  
-# This attribute is presently associated with sysadm_t and 
-# certain administrator utility domains.  
-# XXX The use of this attribute should be reviewed for consistency.
-# XXX Might want to partition into several finer-grained attributes 
-# XXX used in different assertions within assert.te.
-attribute admin;
-
-# The secadmin attribute identifies every security administrator domain.
-# It is used in TE assertions when verifying that only administrator 
-# domains have certain permissions.  
-# This attribute is presently associated with sysadm_t and secadm_t
-attribute secadmin;
-
-# The userdomain attribute identifies every user domain, presently
-# user_t and sysadm_t.  It is used in TE rules that should be applied
-# to all user domains.
-attribute userdomain;
-
-# for a small domain that can only be used for newrole
-attribute user_mini_domain;
-
-# pty for the mini domain
-attribute mini_pty_type;
-
-# pty created by a server such as sshd
-attribute server_pty;
-
-# attribute for all non-administrative devpts types
-attribute userpty_type;
-
-# The user_tty_type identifies every type for a tty or pty owned by an
-# unpriviledged user
-attribute user_tty_type;
-
-# The admin_tty_type identifies every type for a tty or pty owned by a
-# priviledged user
-attribute admin_tty_type;
-
-# The user_crond_domain attribute identifies every user_crond domain, presently
-# user_crond_t and sysadm_crond_t.  It is used in TE rules that should be
-# applied to all user domains.
-attribute user_crond_domain;
-
-# The unpriv_userdomain identifies non-administrative users (default user_t)
-attribute unpriv_userdomain;
-
-# This attribute is for the main user home directory for unpriv users
-attribute user_home_dir_type;
-
-# The gphdomain attribute identifies every gnome-pty-helper derived
-# domain.  It is used in TE rules to permit inheritance and use of
-# descriptors created by these domains.
-attribute gphdomain;
-
-# The fs_domain identifies every domain that may directly access a fixed disk
-attribute fs_domain;
-
-# This attribute is for all domains for the userhelper program.
-attribute userhelperdomain;
-
-############################
-# Attributes for file types:
-#
-
-# The file_type attribute identifies all types assigned to files 
-# in persistent filesystems.  It is used in TE rules to permit
-# the association of all such file types with persistent filesystem
-# types, and to permit certain domains to access all such types as 
-# appropriate.
-attribute file_type;
-
-# The secure_file_type attribute identifies files 
-# which will be treated with a higer level of security.
-# Most domains will be prevented from manipulating files in this domain
-attribute secure_file_type;
-
-# The device_type attribute identifies all types assigned to device nodes
-attribute device_type;
-
-# The proc_fs attribute identifies all types that may be assigned to
-# files under /proc.
-attribute proc_fs;
-
-# The dev_fs attribute identifies all types that may be assigned to
-# files, sockets, or pipes under /dev.
-attribute dev_fs;
-
-# The sysadmfile attribute identifies all types assigned to files 
-# that should be completely accessible to administrators.  It is used
-# in TE rules to grant such access for administrator domains.
-attribute sysadmfile;
-
-# The secadmfile attribute identifies all types assigned to files 
-# that should be only accessible to security administrators.  It is used
-# in TE rules to grant such access for security administrator domains.
-attribute secadmfile;
-
-# The fs_type attribute identifies all types assigned to filesystems
-# (not limited to persistent filesystems).
-# It is used in TE rules to permit certain domains to mount
-# any filesystem and to permit most domains to obtain the
-# overall filesystem statistics.
-attribute fs_type;
-
-# The mount_point attribute identifies all types that can serve
-# as a mount point (for the mount binary). It is used in the mount 
-# policy to grant mounton permission, and in other domains to grant 
-# getattr permission over all the mount points.
-attribute mount_point;
-
-# The exec_type attribute identifies all types assigned
-# to entrypoint executables for domains.  This attribute is 
-# used in TE rules and assertions that should be applied to all 
-# such executables.
-attribute exec_type;
-
-# The tmpfile attribute identifies all types assigned to temporary 
-# files.  This attribute is used in TE rules to grant certain 
-# domains the ability to remove all such files (e.g. init, crond).
-attribute tmpfile;
-
-# The user_tmpfile attribute identifies all types associated with temporary
-# files for unpriv_userdomain domains.
-attribute user_tmpfile;
-
-# for the user_xserver_tmp_t etc
-attribute xserver_tmpfile;
-
-# The tmpfsfile attribute identifies all types defined for tmpfs 
-# type transitions. 
-# It is used in TE rules to grant certain domains the ability to
-# access all such files.
-attribute tmpfsfile;
-
-# The home_type attribute identifies all types assigned to home
-# directories.  This attribute is used in TE rules to grant certain
-# domains the ability to access all home directory types.
-attribute home_type;
-
-# This attribute is for the main user home directory /home/user, to
-# distinguish it from sub-dirs.  Often you want a process to be able to
-# read the user home directory but not read the regular directories under it.
-attribute home_dir_type;
-
-# The ttyfile attribute identifies all types assigned to ttys.
-# It is used in TE rules to grant certain domains the ability to
-# access all ttys.
-attribute ttyfile;
-
-# The ptyfile attribute identifies all types assigned to ptys.
-# It is used in TE rules to grant certain domains the ability to
-# access all ptys.
-attribute ptyfile;
-
-# The pidfile attribute identifies all types assigned to pid files.
-# It is used in TE rules to grant certain domains the ability to
-# access all such files.
-attribute pidfile;
-
-
-############################
-# Attributes for network types:
-#
-
-# The socket_type attribute identifies all types assigned to 
-# kernel-created sockets.  Ordinary sockets are assigned the 
-# domain of the creating process.
-# XXX This attribute is unused.  Remove?
-attribute socket_type;
-
-# Identifies all types assigned to port numbers to control binding.
-attribute port_type;
-
-# Identifies all types assigned to reserved port (<1024) numbers to control binding.
-attribute reserved_port_type;
-
-# Identifies all types assigned to network interfaces to control
-# operations on the interface (XXX obsolete, not supported via LSM) 
-# and to control traffic sent or received on the interface.
-attribute netif_type;
-
-# Identifies all default types assigned to packets received 
-# on network interfaces.  
-attribute netmsg_type;
-
-# Identifies all types assigned to network nodes/hosts to control
-# traffic sent to or received from the node.
-attribute node_type;
-
-# Identifier for log files or directories that only exist for log files.
-attribute logfile;
-
-# Identifier for lock files (/var/lock/*) or directories that only exist for
-# lock files.
-attribute lockfile;
-
-
-
-##############################
-# Attributes for security policy types:
-#
-
-# The login_contexts attribute idenitifies the files used
-# to define default contexts for login types (e.g., login, cron).
-attribute login_contexts;
-
-# Identifier for a domain used by "sendmail -t" (IE user_mail_t,
-# sysadm_mail_t, etc)
-attribute user_mail_domain;
-
-# Identifies domains that can transition to system_mail_t
-attribute privmail;
-
-# Type for non-sysadm home directory
-attribute user_home_type;
-
-# For domains that are part of a mail server and need to read user files and
-# fifos, and inherit file handles to enable user email to get to the mail
-# spool
-attribute mta_user_agent;
-
-# For domains that are part of a mail server for delivering messages to the
-# user
-attribute mta_delivery_agent;
-
-# For domains that make outbound TCP port 25 connections to send mail from the
-# mail server.
-attribute mail_server_sender;
-
-# For a mail server process that takes TCP connections on port 25
-attribute mail_server_domain;
-
-# For web clients such as netscape and squid
-attribute web_client_domain;
-
-# For X Window System server domains
-attribute xserver;
-
-# For X Window System client domains
-attribute xclient;
-
-# For X Window System protocol extensions
-attribute xextension;
-
-# For X Window System property types
-attribute xproperty;
-
-#
-# For file systems that do not have extended attributes but need to be
-# r/w by users
-#
-attribute noexattrfile;
-
-#
-# For filetypes that the usercan read
-#
-attribute usercanread;
-
-#
-# For serial devices
-#
-attribute serial_device;
-
-# Attribute to designate unrestricted access
-attribute unrestricted;
-
-# Attribute to designate can transition to unconfined_t
-attribute unconfinedtrans;
-
-# For clients of nscd.
-attribute nscd_client_domain;
-
-# For clients of nscd that can use shmem interface.
-attribute nscd_shmem_domain;
-
-# For labeling of content for httpd.  This attribute is only used by
-# the httpd_unified domain, which says treat all httpdcontent the
-# same.  If you want content to be served in a "non-unified" system
-# you must specifically add "r_dir_file(httpd_t, your_content_t)" to
-# your policy.
-attribute httpdcontent;
-
-# For labeling of domains whos transition can be disabled
-attribute transitionbool;
-
-# For labelling daemons that should not have a range transition to "s0"
-# included in the daemon_base_domain macro
-attribute no_daemon_range_trans;
-
-# For labeling of file_context domains which users can change files to rather
-# then the default file context.  These file_context can survive a relabeling
-# of the file system.
-attribute customizable;
-
-##############################
-# Attributes for polyinstatiation support:
-#
-
-# For labeling types that are to be polyinstantiated
-attribute polydir;
-
-# And for labeling the parent directories of those polyinstantiated directories
-# This is necessary for remounting the original in the parent to give
-# security aware apps access
-attribute polyparent;
-
-# And labeling for the member directories
-attribute polymember;
-

mls/constraints

@@ -1,83 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Define m4 macros for the constraints
-#
-
-#
-# Define the constraints
-#
-# constrain class_set perm_set expression ;
-#
-# validatetrans class_set expression ;
-#
-# expression : ( expression )
-#	     | not expression
-#	     | expression and expression
-#	     | expression or expression
-#	     | u1 op u2
-#	     | r1 role_mls_op r2
-#	     | t1 op t2
-#	     | l1 role_mls_op l2
-#	     | l1 role_mls_op h2
-#	     | h1 role_mls_op l2
-#	     | h1 role_mls_op h2
-#	     | l1 role_mls_op h1
-#	     | l2 role_mls_op h2
-#	     | u1 op names
-#	     | u2 op names
-#	     | r1 op names
-#	     | r2 op names
-#	     | t1 op names
-#	     | t2 op names
-#	     | u3 op names (NOTE: this is only available for validatetrans)
-#	     | r3 op names (NOTE: this is only available for validatetrans)
-#	     | t3 op names (NOTE: this is only available for validatetrans)
-#
-# op : == | !=
-# role_mls_op : == | != | eq | dom | domby | incomp
-#
-# names : name | { name_list }
-# name_list : name | name_list name#
-#
-
-#
-# Restrict the ability to transition to other users
-# or roles to a few privileged types.
-#
-
-constrain process transition
-	( u1 == u2 or ( t1 == privuser and t2 == userdomain )
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-         or (t1 == crond_t and (t2 == user_crond_domain or u2 == system_u))
-')
-ifdef(`userhelper.te', 
-	`or (t1 == userhelperdomain)')
-	 or (t1 == priv_system_role and u2 == system_u )
-        );
-
-constrain process transition 
-	( r1 == r2 or ( t1 == privrole and t2 == userdomain )
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-         or (t1 == crond_t and t2 == user_crond_domain)
-')
-ifdef(`userhelper.te', 
-	`or (t1 == userhelperdomain)')
-ifdef(`postfix.te', `
-ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',
-	`or (t1 == sysadm_mail_t and t2 == system_mail_t and r2 == system_r )')
-')
-	 or (t1 == priv_system_role and r2 == system_r )
-        );
-
-constrain process dyntransition
-	( u1 == u2 and r1 == r2);
-
-#
-# Restrict the ability to label objects with other
-# user identities to a few privileged types.
-#
-
-constrain dir_file_class_set { create relabelto relabelfrom } 
-	( u1 == u2 or t1 == privowner );
-
-constrain socket_class_set { create relabelto relabelfrom } 
-	( u1 == u2 or t1 == privowner );

mls/domains/admin.te

@@ -1,43 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Admin - Domains for administrators.
-#
-#################################
-
-# sysadm_t is the system administrator domain.
-type sysadm_t, domain, privlog, privowner, admin, userdomain, web_client_domain, privhome, etc_writer, privmodule, nscd_client_domain
-ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon', `, priv_system_role, privrangetrans')
-; dnl end of sysadm_t type declaration
-
-allow privhome home_root_t:dir { getattr search };
-
-# system_r is authorized for sysadm_t for single-user mode.
-role system_r types sysadm_t; 
-
-general_proc_read_access(sysadm_t)
-
-# sysadm_t is also granted permissions specific to administrator domains.
-admin_domain(sysadm)
-
-# for su
-allow sysadm_t userdomain:fd use;
-
-ifdef(`separate_secadm', `', `
-security_manager_domain(sysadm_t)
-')
-
-# Add/remove user home directories
-file_type_auto_trans(sysadm_t, home_root_t, user_home_dir_t, dir)
-
-limited_user_role(secadm)
-typeattribute secadm_t admin;
-role secadm_r types secadm_t; 
-security_manager_domain(secadm_t)
-r_dir_file(secadm_t, { var_t var_log_t })
-
-typeattribute secadm_tty_device_t admin_tty_type;
-typeattribute secadm_devpts_t admin_tty_type;
-
-bool allow_ptrace false;
-
-if (allow_ptrace) {
-can_ptrace(sysadm_t, domain)
-}

mls/domains/misc/auth-net.te

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Policy for using network servers for authenticating users (IE PAM-LDAP)
-
-can_network(auth)

mls/domains/misc/fcron.te

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#DESC fcron - additions to cron policy for a more powerful cron program
-#
-# Domain for fcron, a more powerful cron program.
-#
-# Needs cron.te installed.
-#
-# Author: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow crond_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };
-
-# differences between r_dir_perms and rw_dir_perms
-allow crond_t cron_spool_t:dir { add_name remove_name write };
-
-ifdef(`mta.te', `
-# not sure why we need write access, but Postfix does not work without it
-# I will have to change fcron to avoid the need for this
-allow { system_mail_t mta_user_agent } cron_spool_t:file { read write getattr };
-')
-
-ifdef(`distro_debian', `
-can_exec(dpkg_t, crontab_exec_t)
-file_type_auto_trans(dpkg_t, cron_spool_t, sysadm_cron_spool_t, file)
-')
-
-rw_dir_create_file(crond_t, cron_spool_t)
-can_setfscreate(crond_t)
-
-# for /var/run/fcron.fifo
-file_type_auto_trans(crond_t, var_run_t, crond_var_run_t, sock_file)

mls/domains/misc/kernel.te

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the kernel_t domain.
-#
-
-#
-# kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads.
-# It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class.
-# 
-type kernel_t, domain, privmodule, privlog, sysctl_kernel_writer, mlsprocread, mlsprocwrite, privsysmod, etc_writer, privrangetrans ;
-role system_r types kernel_t;
-general_domain_access(kernel_t)
-general_proc_read_access(kernel_t)
-base_file_read_access(kernel_t)
-uses_shlib(kernel_t)
-can_exec(kernel_t, shell_exec_t)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow kernel_t self:capability *;
-
-r_dir_file(kernel_t, sysfs_t)
-allow kernel_t { usbfs_t usbdevfs_t }:dir search;
-
-# Run init in the init_t domain.
-domain_auto_trans(kernel_t, init_exec_t, init_t)
-
-ifdef(`mls_policy', `
-# run init with maximum MLS range
-range_transition kernel_t init_exec_t s0 - s15:c0.c255;
-')
-
-# Share state with the init process.
-allow kernel_t init_t:process share;
-
-# Mount and unmount file systems.
-allow kernel_t fs_type:filesystem mount_fs_perms;
-
-# Send signal to any process.
-allow kernel_t domain:process signal;
-allow kernel_t domain:dir search;
-
-# Access the console.
-allow kernel_t device_t:dir search;
-allow kernel_t console_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Access the initrd filesystem.
-allow kernel_t file_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-can_exec(kernel_t, file_t)
-ifdef(`chroot.te', `
-can_exec(kernel_t, chroot_exec_t)
-')
-allow kernel_t self:capability sys_chroot;
-
-allow kernel_t { unlabeled_t root_t file_t }:dir mounton;
-allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow kernel_t file_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow kernel_t file_t:blk_file create_file_perms;
-allow kernel_t { sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_t }:file { setattr rw_file_perms };
-
-# Lookup the policy.
-allow kernel_t policy_config_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# Load the policy configuration.
-can_loadpol(kernel_t)
-
-# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe is set to /bin/true if not using modules.
-can_exec(kernel_t, bin_t)
-
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-unconfined_domain(kernel_t)
-')

mls/domains/misc/local.te

@@ -1,5 +0,0 @@
-# Local customization of existing policy should be done in this file.  
-# If you are creating brand new policy for a new "target" domain, you
-# need to create a type enforcement (.te) file in domains/program
-# and a file context (.fc) file in file_context/program.
-

mls/domains/misc/startx.te

@@ -1,7 +0,0 @@
-#DESC startx - policy for running an X server from a user domain
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-#
-
-# Everything is in the macro files
-

mls/domains/misc/userspace_objmgr.te

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Userspace Object Managers
-#
-#################################
-
-# Get our own security context.
-can_getcon(userspace_objmgr)
-# Get security decisions via selinuxfs.
-can_getsecurity(userspace_objmgr)
-# Read /etc/selinux
-r_dir_file(userspace_objmgr, { selinux_config_t default_context_t })
-# Receive notifications of policy reloads and enforcing status changes.
-allow userspace_objmgr self:netlink_selinux_socket { create bind read };
-

mls/domains/misc/xclient.te

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Authors:  Eamon Walsh <ewalsh@epoch.ncsc.mil>
-#
-
-#######################################
-#
-# Domains for the SELinux-enabled X Window System
-#
-
-#
-# Domain for all non-local X clients
-#
-type remote_xclient_t, domain;
-in_user_role(remote_xclient_t)

mls/domains/program/NetworkManager.te

@@ -1,122 +0,0 @@
-#DESC NetworkManager - 
-#
-# Authors: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the NetworkManager_t domain.
-#
-# NetworkManager_t is the domain for the NetworkManager daemon. 
-# NetworkManager_exec_t is the type of the NetworkManager executable.
-#
-daemon_domain(NetworkManager, `, nscd_client_domain, privsysmod, mlsfileread' )
-
-can_network(NetworkManager_t)
-allow NetworkManager_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-allow NetworkManager_t { isakmp_port_t dhcpc_port_t }:udp_socket name_bind;
-allow NetworkManager_t dhcpc_t:process signal;
-
-can_ypbind(NetworkManager_t)
-uses_shlib(NetworkManager_t)
-allow NetworkManager_t self:capability { kill setgid setuid sys_nice dac_override net_admin net_raw net_bind_service sys_module ipc_lock};
-
-allow NetworkManager_t { random_device_t urandom_device_t }:chr_file { getattr read };
-
-allow NetworkManager_t self:process { setcap getsched };
-allow NetworkManager_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow NetworkManager_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow NetworkManager_t self:file { getattr read };
-allow NetworkManager_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow NetworkManager_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-
-#
-# Communicate with Caching Name Server
-#
-ifdef(`named.te', `
-allow NetworkManager_t named_zone_t:dir search;
-rw_dir_create_file(NetworkManager_t, named_cache_t)
-domain_auto_trans(NetworkManager_t, named_exec_t, named_t)
-allow named_t NetworkManager_t:udp_socket { read write };
-allow named_t NetworkManager_t:netlink_route_socket { read write };
-allow NetworkManager_t named_t:process signal;
-allow named_t NetworkManager_t:packet_socket { read write };
-')
-
-allow NetworkManager_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-allow NetworkManager_t selinux_config_t:file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-dbusd_client(system, NetworkManager)
-allow NetworkManager_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg };
-allow NetworkManager_t self:dbus send_msg;
-ifdef(`hald.te', `
-allow NetworkManager_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow hald_t NetworkManager_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-allow NetworkManager_t initrc_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow initrc_t NetworkManager_t:dbus send_msg;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow NetworkManager_t unconfined_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow unconfined_t NetworkManager_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-allow NetworkManager_t userdomain:dbus send_msg;
-allow userdomain NetworkManager_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-
-allow NetworkManager_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`ifconfig.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(NetworkManager_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-')dnl end if def ifconfig
-
-allow NetworkManager_t { sbin_t bin_t }:dir search;
-allow NetworkManager_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(NetworkManager_t, { ls_exec_t sbin_t bin_t shell_exec_t })
-
-# in /etc created by NetworkManager will be labelled net_conf_t.
-file_type_auto_trans(NetworkManager_t, etc_t, net_conf_t, file)
-
-allow NetworkManager_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow NetworkManager_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-r_dir_file(NetworkManager_t, proc_net_t)
-
-allow NetworkManager_t { domain -unrestricted }:dir search;
-allow NetworkManager_t { domain -unrestricted }:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit NetworkManager_t unrestricted:dir search;
-dontaudit NetworkManager_t unrestricted:file { getattr read };
-
-allow NetworkManager_t howl_t:process signal;
-allow NetworkManager_t initrc_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`modutil.te', `
-if (!secure_mode_insmod) {
-domain_auto_trans(NetworkManager_t, insmod_exec_t, insmod_t)
-}
-')
-
-allow NetworkManager_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-# allow vpnc connections
-allow NetworkManager_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow NetworkManager_t tun_tap_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-domain_auto_trans(NetworkManager_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-domain_auto_trans(NetworkManager_t, dhcpc_exec_t, dhcpc_t)
-ifdef(`vpnc.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(NetworkManager_t, vpnc_exec_t, vpnc_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`dhcpc.te', `
-allow NetworkManager_t dhcp_state_t:dir search;
-allow NetworkManager_t dhcpc_var_run_t:file { getattr read unlink };
-')
-allow NetworkManager_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-dontaudit NetworkManager_t user_tty_type:chr_file { read write };
-dontaudit NetworkManager_t security_t:dir search;
-
-ifdef(`consoletype.te', `
-can_exec(NetworkManager_t, consoletype_exec_t)
-')
-

mls/domains/program/acct.te

@@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Acct - BSD process accounting
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: acct
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the acct_t domain.
-#
-# acct_exec_t is the type of the acct executable.
-#
-daemon_base_domain(acct)
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-system_crond_entry(acct_exec_t, acct_t)
-
-# for monthly cron job
-file_type_auto_trans(acct_t, var_log_t, wtmp_t, file)
-')
-
-# for SSP
-allow acct_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-type acct_data_t, file_type, logfile, sysadmfile;
-
-# not sure why we need this, the command "last" is reported as using it
-dontaudit acct_t self:capability kill;
-
-# gzip needs chown capability for some reason
-allow acct_t self:capability { chown fsetid sys_pacct };
-
-allow acct_t var_t:dir { getattr search };
-rw_dir_create_file(acct_t, acct_data_t)
-
-can_exec(acct_t, { shell_exec_t bin_t initrc_exec_t acct_exec_t })
-allow acct_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow acct_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-
-read_locale(acct_t)
-
-allow acct_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-allow acct_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-allow acct_t self:fifo_file { read write getattr };
-
-allow acct_t { self proc_t }:file { read getattr };
-
-read_sysctl(acct_t)
-
-dontaudit acct_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
-
-# for nscd
-dontaudit acct_t var_run_t:dir search;
-
-
-allow acct_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-allow acct_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { read getattr };
-
-ifdef(`logrotate.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(logrotate_t, acct_exec_t, acct_t)
-rw_dir_create_file(logrotate_t, acct_data_t)
-can_exec(logrotate_t, acct_data_t)
-')
-

mls/domains/program/alsa.te

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-#DESC       ainit - configuration tool for ALSA
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-#
-type alsa_t, domain, privlog, daemon;
-type alsa_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-uses_shlib(alsa_t)
-allow alsa_t { unpriv_userdomain self }:sem  create_sem_perms;
-allow alsa_t { unpriv_userdomain self }:shm  create_shm_perms;
-allow alsa_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow alsa_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow unpriv_userdomain alsa_t:sem { unix_read unix_write associate read write };
-allow unpriv_userdomain alsa_t:shm { unix_read unix_write create_shm_perms };
-
-type alsa_etc_rw_t, file_type, sysadmfile, usercanread;
-rw_dir_create_file(alsa_t,alsa_etc_rw_t)
-allow alsa_t self:capability { setgid setuid ipc_owner };
-dontaudit alsa_t self:capability sys_admin;
-allow alsa_t devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow alsa_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-domain_auto_trans(pam_console_t, alsa_exec_t, alsa_t)
-role system_r types alsa_t;
-read_locale(alsa_t) 

mls/domains/program/amanda.te

@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Amanda - Automated backup program
-#
-# This policy file sets the rigths for amanda client started by inetd_t
-# and amrecover 
-#
-# X-Debian-Packages: amanda-common amanda-server
-# Depends: inetd.te
-# Author     :  Carsten Grohmann <carstengrohmann@gmx.de>
-#
-# License    :  GPL
-#
-# last change:  27. August 2002
-#
-# state      :  complete and tested
-#
-# Hints      :
-#  - amanda.fc is the appendant file context file
-#  - If you use amrecover please extract the files and directories to the
-#    directory speficified in amanda.fc as type amanda_recover_dir_t.
-#  - The type amanda_user_exec_t is defined to label the files but not used.
-#    This configuration works only as an client and a amanda client does not need
-#    this programs.
-#
-# Enhancements/Corrections:
-#  - set tighter permissions to /bin/tar instead bin_t 
-
-##############################################################################
-# AMANDA CLIENT DECLARATIONS
-##############################################################################
-
-# General declarations
-######################
-
-type amanda_t, domain, privlog, auth, fs_domain, nscd_client_domain;
-role system_r types amanda_t;
-
-# type for the amanda executables
-type amanda_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# type for the amanda executables started by inetd
-type amanda_inetd_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# type for amanda configurations files
-type amanda_config_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for files in /usr/lib/amanda
-type amanda_usr_lib_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for all files in /var/lib/amanda
-type amanda_var_lib_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for all files in /var/lib/amanda/gnutar-lists/
-type amanda_gnutarlists_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for user startable files
-type amanda_user_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# type for same awk and other scripts
-type amanda_script_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# type for the shell configuration files 
-type amanda_shellconfig_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-tmp_domain(amanda)
- 
-# type for /etc/amandates
-type amanda_amandates_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for /etc/dumpdates
-type amanda_dumpdates_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for amanda data
-type amanda_data_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# Domain transitions
-####################
-
-domain_auto_trans(inetd_t, amanda_inetd_exec_t, amanda_t)
-
-
-##################
-# File permissions
-##################
-
-# configuration files -> read only
-allow amanda_t amanda_config_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# access to amanda_amandates_t
-allow amanda_t amanda_amandates_t:file { getattr lock read write };
-
-# access to amanda_dumpdates_t
-allow amanda_t amanda_dumpdates_t:file { getattr lock read write };
-
-# access to amandas data structure
-allow amanda_t amanda_data_t:dir { read search write };
-allow amanda_t amanda_data_t:file { read write };
-
-# access to proc_t
-allow amanda_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# access to etc_t and similar
-allow amanda_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow amanda_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# access to amanda_gnutarlists_t (/var/lib/amanda/gnutar-lists)
-rw_dir_create_file(amanda_t, amanda_gnutarlists_t)
-
-# access to device_t and similar
-allow amanda_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-# access to fs_t
-allow amanda_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-# access to sysctl_kernel_t ( proc/sys/kernel/* )
-read_sysctl(amanda_t)
-
-#####################
-# process permissions
-#####################
-
-# Allow to use shared libs
-uses_shlib(amanda_t)
-
-# Allow to execute a amanda executable file
-allow amanda_t amanda_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans getattr read };	
-
-# Allow to run a shell
-allow amanda_t shell_exec_t:file { execute execute_no_trans getattr read };
-
-# access to bin_t (tar)
-allow amanda_t bin_t:file { execute execute_no_trans };
-
-allow amanda_t self:capability { chown dac_override setuid };
-allow amanda_t self:process { fork sigchld setpgid signal };
-allow amanda_t self:dir search;
-allow amanda_t self:file { getattr read };
-
-
-###################################
-# Network and process communication
-###################################
-
-can_network_server(amanda_t);
-can_ypbind(amanda_t);
-can_exec(amanda_t, sbin_t);
-	
-allow amanda_t self:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl lock };
-allow amanda_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow amanda_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-
-##########################
-# Communication with inetd
-##########################
-
-allow amanda_t inetd_t:udp_socket { read write };
-
-
-###################
-# inetd permissions
-###################
-
-allow inetd_t amanda_usr_lib_t:dir search;
-
-
-########################
-# Access to to save data
-########################
-
-# access to user_home_t
-allow amanda_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
-
-##############################################################################
-# AMANDA RECOVER DECLARATIONS
-##############################################################################
-
-
-# General declarations
-######################
-
-# type for amrecover
-type amanda_recover_t, domain;
-role sysadm_r types amanda_recover_t;
-role system_r types amanda_recover_t;
-
-# exec types for amrecover 
-type amanda_recover_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# type for recover files ( restored data )
-type amanda_recover_dir_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-file_type_auto_trans(amanda_recover_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, amanda_recover_dir_t)
-
-# domain transsition
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, amanda_recover_exec_t, amanda_recover_t)
-
-# file type auto trans to write debug messages
-file_type_auto_trans(amanda_recover_t, tmp_t, amanda_tmp_t)
-
-
-# amanda recover process permissions
-####################################
-
-uses_shlib(amanda_recover_t)
-allow amanda_recover_t self:process { fork sigkill sigstop sigchld signal };
-allow amanda_recover_t self:capability { fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid chown dac_override net_bind_service };
-can_exec(amanda_recover_t, shell_exec_t)
-allow amanda_recover_t privfd:fd use;
-
-
-# amrecover network and process communication
-#############################################
-
-can_network(amanda_recover_t);
-allow amanda_recover_t amanda_port_t:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(amanda_recover_t);
-read_locale(amanda_recover_t);
-
-allow amanda_recover_t self:fifo_file { getattr ioctl read write };
-allow amanda_recover_t self:unix_stream_socket { connect create read write };
-allow amanda_recover_t var_log_t:dir search;
-rw_dir_create_file(amanda_recover_t, amanda_log_t)
-
-# amrecover file permissions
-############################
-
-# access to etc_t and similar
-allow amanda_recover_t etc_t:dir search;
-allow amanda_recover_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow amanda_recover_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# access to amanda_recover_dir_t
-allow amanda_recover_t amanda_recover_dir_t:dir { add_name remove_name search write };
-allow amanda_recover_t amanda_recover_dir_t:file { append create getattr setattr unlink };
-
-# access to var_t and var_run_t
-allow amanda_recover_t var_t:dir search;
-allow amanda_recover_t var_run_t:dir search;
-
-# access to proc_t
-allow amanda_recover_t proc_t:dir search;
-allow amanda_recover_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# access to sysctl_kernel_t
-read_sysctl(amanda_recover_t)
-
-# access to dev_t and similar
-allow amanda_recover_t device_t:dir search;
-allow amanda_recover_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow amanda_recover_t null_device_t:chr_file { getattr write };
-
-# access to bin_t
-allow amanda_recover_t bin_t:file { execute execute_no_trans };
-
-# access to sysadm_home_t and sysadm_home_dir_t to start amrecover 
-# in the sysadm home directory
-allow amanda_recover_t { sysadm_home_dir_t sysadm_home_t }:dir { search getattr };
-
-# access to use sysadm_tty_device_t (/dev/tty?)
-allow amanda_recover_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl read write };
-
-# access to amanda_tmp_t and tmp_t
-allow amanda_recover_t amanda_tmp_t:dir { add_name remove_name search write };
-allow amanda_recover_t amanda_tmp_t:file { append create getattr setattr unlink };
-allow amanda_recover_t tmp_t:dir search;
-
-#
-#  Rules to allow amanda to be run as a service in xinetd
-#
-allow inetd_t amanda_port_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } name_bind;
-
-#amanda needs to look at fs_type directories to decide whether it should backup
-allow amanda_t { fs_type file_type }:dir {getattr read search };
-allow amanda_t file_type:{ lnk_file file chr_file blk_file } {getattr read };
-allow amanda_t device_type:{ blk_file chr_file } getattr;
-allow amanda_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file read;
-domain_auto_trans(amanda_t, fsadm_exec_t, fsadm_t)
-
-allow amanda_t file_type:sock_file getattr;
-logdir_domain(amanda)
-
-dontaudit amanda_t proc_t:lnk_file read;
-dontaudit amanda_t unlabeled_t:file getattr;
-#amanda wants to check attributes on fifo_files
-allow amanda_t file_type:fifo_file getattr;

mls/domains/program/anaconda.te

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Anaconda - Red Hat Installation program
-#
-# Authors:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the anaconda_t domain.
-#
-# anaconda_t is the domain of the installation program
-#
-type anaconda_t, admin, etc_writer, fs_domain, privmem, auth_write, domain, privlog, privowner, privmodule, sysctl_kernel_writer;
-role system_r types anaconda_t;
-unconfined_domain(anaconda_t)
-
-role system_r types ldconfig_t;
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t, ldconfig_exec_t, ldconfig_t)
-
-# Run other rc scripts in the anaconda_t domain.
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-
-ifdef(`dmesg.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t, dmesg_exec_t, dmesg_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-file_type_auto_trans(anaconda_t, boot_t, boot_runtime_t, file)
-')
-
-ifdef(`rpm.te', `
-# Access /var/lib/rpm.
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t, rpm_exec_t, rpm_t)
-')
-
-file_type_auto_trans(anaconda_t, var_log_t, var_log_ksyms_t, file)
-
-ifdef(`udev.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t, udev_exec_t, udev_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`ssh-agent.te', `
-role system_r types sysadm_ssh_agent_t;
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t, ssh_agent_exec_t, sysadm_ssh_agent_t)
-')
-ifdef(`passwd.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t , admin_passwd_exec_t, sysadm_passwd_t)
-')

mls/domains/program/apache.te

@@ -1,415 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Apache - Web server
-#
-# X-Debian-Packages: apache2-common apache
-#
-###############################################################################
-#
-# Policy file for running the Apache web server
-#
-# NOTES: 
-#  This policy will work with SUEXEC enabled as part of the Apache
-#  configuration. However, the user CGI scripts will run under the
-#  system_u:system_r:httpd_$1_script_t domain where $1 is the domain of the
-#  of the creating user.
-#
-#  The user CGI scripts must be labeled with the httpd_$1_script_exec_t
-#  type, and the directory containing the scripts should also be labeled
-#  with these types. This policy allows user_r role to perform that 
-#  relabeling. If it is desired that only sysadm_r should be able to relabel
-#  the user CGI scripts, then relabel rule for user_r should be removed.
-#
-###############################################################################
-
-define(`httpd_home_dirs', `
-r_dir_file(httpd_t, $1)
-r_dir_file(httpd_suexec_t, $1)
-can_exec(httpd_suexec_t, $1)
-')
-
-bool httpd_unified false;
-
-# Allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php)
-bool httpd_builtin_scripting false;
-
-# Allow httpd cgi support
-bool httpd_enable_cgi false;
-
-# Allow httpd to read home directories
-bool httpd_enable_homedirs false;
-
-# Run SSI execs in system CGI script domain.
-bool httpd_ssi_exec false;
-
-# Allow http daemon to communicate with the TTY
-bool httpd_tty_comm false;
-
-# Allow http daemon to tcp connect 
-bool httpd_can_network_connect false;
-
-#########################################################
-# Apache types
-#########################################################
-# httpd_config_t is the type given to the configuration
-# files for apache /etc/httpd/conf
-#
-type httpd_config_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# httpd_modules_t is the type given to module files (libraries) 
-# that come with Apache /etc/httpd/modules and /usr/lib/apache
-#
-type httpd_modules_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# httpd_cache_t is the type given to the /var/cache/httpd
-# directory and the files under that directory
-#
-type httpd_cache_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# httpd_exec_t is the type give to the httpd executable.
-#
-daemon_domain(httpd, `, privmail, nscd_client_domain')
-
-append_logdir_domain(httpd)
-#can read /etc/httpd/logs
-allow httpd_t httpd_log_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# For /etc/init.d/apache2 reload
-can_tcp_connect(httpd_t, httpd_t)
-
-can_tcp_connect(web_client_domain, httpd_t)
-
-can_exec(httpd_t, httpd_exec_t)
-file_type_auto_trans(httpd_t, var_run_t, httpd_var_run_t, sock_file)
-
-general_domain_access(httpd_t)
-
-allow httpd_t { random_device_t urandom_device_t }:chr_file { getattr ioctl read };
-
-read_sysctl(httpd_t)
-
-allow httpd_t crypt_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# for modules that want to access /etc/mtab and /proc/meminfo
-allow httpd_t { proc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-
-uses_shlib(httpd_t)
-allow httpd_t { usr_t lib_t }:file { getattr read ioctl };
-allow httpd_t usr_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-
-# for apache2 memory mapped files
-var_lib_domain(httpd)
-
-# for tomcat
-r_dir_file(httpd_t, var_lib_t)
-
-# execute perl
-allow httpd_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
-can_exec(httpd_t, { bin_t sbin_t })
-allow httpd_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-
-########################################
-# Set up networking
-########################################
-
-can_network_server(httpd_t)
-can_kerberos(httpd_t)
-can_resolve(httpd_t)
-nsswitch_domain(httpd_t)
-allow httpd_t { http_port_t http_cache_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind;
-# allow httpd to connect to mysql/posgresql 
-allow httpd_t { postgresql_port_t mysqld_port_t }:tcp_socket name_connect;
-# allow httpd to work as a relay
-allow httpd_t { gopher_port_t ftp_port_t http_port_t http_cache_port_t }:tcp_socket name_connect;
-
-if (httpd_can_network_connect) {
-can_network_client(httpd_t)
-allow httpd_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-}
-
-##########################################
-# Legacy: remove when it's fixed         #
-# Allow libphp5.so with text relocations #
-##########################################
-allow httpd_t texrel_shlib_t:file execmod;
-
-#########################################
-# Allow httpd to search users directories
-#########################################
-allow httpd_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search };
-dontaudit httpd_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir getattr;
-
-############################################################################
-# Allow the httpd_t the capability to bind to a port and various other stuff
-############################################################################
-allow httpd_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_tty_config };
-dontaudit httpd_t self:capability net_admin;
-
-#################################################
-# Allow the httpd_t to read the web servers config files
-###################################################
-r_dir_file(httpd_t, httpd_config_t)
-# allow logrotate to read the config files for restart
-ifdef(`logrotate.te', `
-r_dir_file(logrotate_t, httpd_config_t)
-domain_auto_trans(logrotate_t, httpd_exec_t, httpd_t)
-allow logrotate_t httpd_t:process signull;
-')
-r_dir_file(initrc_t, httpd_config_t)
-##################################################
-
-###############################
-# Allow httpd_t to put files in /var/cache/httpd etc
-##############################
-create_dir_file(httpd_t, httpd_cache_t)
-
-###############################
-# Allow httpd_t to access the tmpfs file system
-##############################
-tmpfs_domain(httpd)
-
-#####################
-# Allow httpd_t to access
-# libraries for its modules
-###############################
-allow httpd_t httpd_modules_t:file rx_file_perms;
-allow httpd_t httpd_modules_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow httpd_t httpd_modules_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-
-######################################################################
-# Allow initrc_t to access the Apache modules directory.
-######################################################################
-allow initrc_t httpd_modules_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-##############################################
-# Allow httpd_t to have access to files
-# such as nisswitch.conf
-# need ioctl for php
-###############################################
-allow httpd_t etc_t:file { read getattr ioctl };
-allow httpd_t etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-
-# setup the system domain for system CGI scripts
-apache_domain(sys)
-dontaudit httpd_sys_script_t httpd_config_t:dir search;
-
-# Run SSI execs in system CGI script domain.
-if (httpd_ssi_exec) {
-domain_auto_trans(httpd_t, shell_exec_t, httpd_sys_script_t)
-}
-allow httpd_sys_script_t httpd_t:tcp_socket { read write };
-
-##################################################
-#
-# PHP Directives
-##################################################
-
-type httpd_php_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-type httpd_php_t, domain;
-
-# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
-domain_auto_trans(httpd_t, httpd_php_exec_t, httpd_php_t)
-
-# The system role is authorized for this domain.
-role system_r types httpd_php_t;
-
-general_domain_access(httpd_php_t)
-uses_shlib(httpd_php_t)
-can_exec(httpd_php_t, lib_t)
-
-# allow php to read and append to apache logfiles
-allow httpd_php_t httpd_log_t:file ra_file_perms;
-
-# access to /tmp
-tmp_domain(httpd)
-tmp_domain(httpd_php)
-
-# Creation of lock files for apache2
-lock_domain(httpd)
-
-# Allow apache to used public_content_t
-anonymous_domain(httpd)
-
-# connect to mysql
-ifdef(`mysqld.te', `
-can_unix_connect(httpd_php_t, mysqld_t)
-can_unix_connect(httpd_t, mysqld_t)
-can_unix_connect(httpd_sys_script_t, mysqld_t)
-allow httpd_php_t mysqld_var_run_t:dir search;
-allow httpd_php_t mysqld_var_run_t:sock_file write;
-allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t } mysqld_db_t:dir search;
-allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t } mysqld_db_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
-allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t } mysqld_var_run_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
-')
-allow httpd_t bin_t:dir search;
-allow httpd_t sbin_t:dir search;
-allow httpd_t httpd_log_t:dir remove_name;
-
-read_fonts(httpd_t)
-
-allow httpd_t self:netlink_route_socket { bind create getattr nlmsg_read read write };
-
-allow httpd_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
-
-if (use_nfs_home_dirs && httpd_enable_homedirs) {
-httpd_home_dirs(nfs_t)
-}
-if (use_samba_home_dirs && httpd_enable_homedirs) {
-httpd_home_dirs(cifs_t)
-}
-
-#
-# Allow users to mount additional directories as http_source
-#
-allow httpd_t mnt_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-domain_auto_trans(unconfined_t, httpd_exec_t, httpd_t)
-typealias httpd_sys_content_t alias httpd_user_content_t;
-typealias httpd_sys_script_exec_t alias httpd_user_script_exec_t;
-
-if (httpd_enable_homedirs) {
-allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t httpd_suexec_t } user_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
-}
-') dnl targeted policy
-
-# We no longer call httpd_domain(sysadm), but need httpd_sysadm_content_t for file context
-typealias httpd_sys_content_t alias httpd_sysadm_content_t;
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-#
-# mod_jk2 creates /var/log/httpd/jk2.shm to communicate with tomcat
-# This is a bug but it still exists in FC2
-#
-typealias httpd_log_t  alias httpd_runtime_t;
-allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t } httpd_runtime_t:file { getattr append };
-dontaudit httpd_t httpd_runtime_t:file ioctl;
-') dnl distro_redhat
-#
-# Customer reported the following
-#
-ifdef(`snmpd.te', `
-dontaudit httpd_t snmpd_var_lib_t:dir search;
-dontaudit httpd_t snmpd_var_lib_t:file { getattr write read };
-', `
-dontaudit httpd_t usr_t:dir write;
-')
-
-application_domain(httpd_helper)
-role system_r types httpd_helper_t;
-domain_auto_trans(httpd_t, httpd_helper_exec_t, httpd_helper_t)
-allow httpd_helper_t httpd_config_t:file { getattr read };
-allow httpd_helper_t httpd_log_t:file { append };
-
-########################################
-# When the admin starts the server, the server wants to access
-# the TTY or PTY associated with the session. The httpd appears
-# to run correctly without this permission, so the permission
-# are dontaudited here. 
-##################################################
-
-if (httpd_tty_comm) {
-allow { httpd_t httpd_helper_t } devpts_t:dir search;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow { httpd_helper_t httpd_t } { devtty_t devpts_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-')
-allow { httpd_t httpd_helper_t } admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-} else {
-dontaudit httpd_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-}
-
-read_sysctl(httpd_sys_script_t)
-allow httpd_sys_script_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-dontaudit httpd_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-r_dir_file(httpd_t, cert_t)
-
-#
-# unconfined domain for apache scripts.  Only to be used as a last resort
-#
-type httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, customizable;
-type httpd_unconfined_script_t, domain, nscd_client_domain;
-role system_r types httpd_unconfined_script_t;
-unconfined_domain(httpd_unconfined_script_t)
-
-# The following are types for SUEXEC,which runs user scripts as their
-# own user ID
-#
-daemon_sub_domain(httpd_t, httpd_suexec, `, transitionbool')
-allow httpd_t httpd_suexec_exec_t:file { getattr read };
-
-#########################################################
-# Permissions for running child processes and scripts
-##########################################################
-
-allow httpd_suexec_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
-
-dontaudit httpd_suexec_t var_run_t:dir search;
-allow httpd_suexec_t { var_t var_log_t }:dir search;
-allow httpd_suexec_t home_root_t:dir search;
-
-allow httpd_suexec_t httpd_log_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
-allow httpd_suexec_t httpd_log_t:file { create ra_file_perms };
-allow httpd_suexec_t httpd_t:fifo_file getattr;
-allow httpd_suexec_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-allow httpd_suexec_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-read_locale(httpd_suexec_t)
-read_sysctl(httpd_suexec_t)
-allow httpd_suexec_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-
-# for shell scripts
-allow httpd_suexec_t bin_t:dir search;
-allow httpd_suexec_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(httpd_suexec_t, { bin_t shell_exec_t })
-
-if (httpd_can_network_connect) {
-can_network(httpd_suexec_t)
-allow httpd_suexec_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-}
-
-can_ypbind(httpd_suexec_t)
-allow httpd_suexec_t { usr_t lib_t }:file { getattr read ioctl };
-
-allow httpd_suexec_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
-tmp_domain(httpd_suexec)
-
-if (httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified) {
-domain_auto_trans(httpd_suexec_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_script_t)
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_script_t)
-')
-}
-if (httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified && httpd_builtin_scripting) {
-domain_auto_trans(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_script_t)
-create_dir_file(httpd_t, httpdcontent)
-}
-if (httpd_enable_cgi) {
-domain_auto_trans(httpd_t, httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t, httpd_unconfined_script_t)
-domain_auto_trans(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t, httpd_unconfined_script_t)
-allow httpd_t httpd_unconfined_script_t:process { signal sigkill sigstop };
-allow httpd_t httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-}
-
-#
-# Types for squirrelmail
-#
-type httpd_squirrelmail_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-create_dir_file(httpd_t, httpd_squirrelmail_t)
-allow httpd_sys_script_t httpd_squirrelmail_t:file { append read };
-# File Type of squirrelmail attachments
-type squirrelmail_spool_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile;
-allow { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t } var_spool_t:dir { getattr search };
-create_dir_file(httpd_t, squirrelmail_spool_t)
-r_dir_file(httpd_sys_script_t, squirrelmail_spool_t)
-
-ifdef(`mta.te', `
-# apache should set close-on-exec
-dontaudit httpd_suexec_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-dontaudit { system_mail_t mta_user_agent } { httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t }:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-dontaudit system_mail_t httpd_log_t:file { append getattr };
-allow system_mail_t httpd_squirrelmail_t:file { append read };
-dontaudit system_mail_t httpd_t:tcp_socket { read write };
-')
-bool httpd_enable_ftp_server false;
-if (httpd_enable_ftp_server) {
-allow httpd_t ftp_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-}
-

mls/domains/program/apmd.te

@@ -1,157 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Apmd - Automatic Power Management daemon
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-#           Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: apmd
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the apmd_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(apmd, `, privmodule, privmail, nscd_client_domain')
-
-# for SSP
-allow apmd_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-type apm_t, domain, privlog;
-type apm_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, apm_exec_t, apm_t)
-')
-uses_shlib(apm_t)
-allow apm_t privfd:fd use;
-allow apm_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow apm_t device_t:dir search;
-allow apm_t self:capability { dac_override sys_admin };
-allow apm_t proc_t:dir search;
-allow apm_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow apm_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow apm_t apm_bios_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-role sysadm_r types apm_t;
-role system_r types apm_t;
-
-allow apmd_t device_t:lnk_file read;
-allow apmd_t proc_t:file { getattr read write };
-can_sysctl(apmd_t)
-allow apmd_t sysfs_t:file write;
-
-allow apmd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow apmd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow apmd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow apmd_t { etc_runtime_t modules_conf_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow apmd_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# acpid wants a socket
-file_type_auto_trans(apmd_t, var_run_t, apmd_var_run_t, sock_file)
-
-# acpid also has a logfile
-log_domain(apmd)
-tmp_domain(apmd)
-
-ifdef(`distro_suse', `
-var_lib_domain(apmd)
-')
-
-allow apmd_t self:file { getattr read ioctl };
-allow apmd_t self:process getsession;
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow apmd_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_nice sys_time kill };
-
-# controlling an orderly resume of PCMCIA requires creating device
-# nodes 254,{0,1,2} for some reason.
-allow apmd_t self:capability mknod;
-
-# Access /dev/apm_bios.
-allow apmd_t apm_bios_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Run helper programs.
-can_exec_any(apmd_t)
-
-# apmd calls hwclock.sh on suspend and resume
-allow apmd_t clock_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-ifdef(`hwclock.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, hwclock_exec_t, hwclock_t)
-allow apmd_t adjtime_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow hwclock_t apmd_log_t:file append;
-allow hwclock_t apmd_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
-')
-
-
-# to quiet fuser and ps
-# setuid for fuser, dac* for ps
-dontaudit apmd_t self:capability { setuid dac_override dac_read_search };
-dontaudit apmd_t domain:socket_class_set getattr;
-dontaudit apmd_t { file_type fs_type }:notdevfile_class_set getattr;
-dontaudit apmd_t device_type:devfile_class_set getattr;
-dontaudit apmd_t home_type:dir { search getattr };
-dontaudit apmd_t domain:key_socket getattr;
-dontaudit apmd_t domain:dir search;
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-can_exec(apmd_t, apmd_var_run_t)
-# for /var/lock/subsys/network
-lock_domain(apmd)
-
-# ifconfig_exec_t needs to be run in its own domain for Red Hat
-ifdef(`ifconfig.te', `domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)')
-ifdef(`iptables.te', `domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, iptables_exec_t, iptables_t)')
-ifdef(`netutils.te', `domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, netutils_exec_t, netutils_t)')
-', `
-# for ifconfig which is run all the time
-dontaudit apmd_t sysctl_t:dir search;
-')
-
-ifdef(`udev.te', `
-allow apmd_t udev_t:file { getattr read };
-allow apmd_t udev_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-')
-#
-# apmd tells the machine to shutdown requires the following
-#
-allow apmd_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
-allow apmd_t initrc_var_run_t:file { read write lock };
-
-#
-# Allow it to run killof5 and pidof
-#
-typeattribute apmd_t unrestricted;
-r_dir_file(apmd_t, domain)
-
-# Same for apm/acpid scripts
-domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-ifdef(`consoletype.te', `
-allow consoletype_t apmd_t:fd use;
-allow consoletype_t apmd_t:fifo_file write;
-')
-ifdef(`mount.te', `allow mount_t apmd_t:fd use;')
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, anacron_exec_t, system_crond_t)
-allow apmd_t crond_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl };
-')
-
-# for a find /dev operation that gets /dev/shm
-dontaudit apmd_t tmpfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-dontaudit apmd_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-allow apmd_t user_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-# Access /dev/apm_bios.
-allow initrc_t apm_bios_t:chr_file { setattr getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`logrotate.te', `
-allow apmd_t logrotate_t:fd use;
-')dnl end if logrotate.te
-allow apmd_t devpts_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow apmd_t security_t:dir search;
-allow apmd_t usr_t:dir search;
-r_dir_file(apmd_t, hwdata_t)
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-unconfined_domain(apmd_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`NetworkManager.te', `
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-allow apmd_t NetworkManager_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow NetworkManager_t apmd_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-')

mls/domains/program/arpwatch.te

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-#DESC arpwatch -  keep track of ethernet/ip address pairings
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the arpwatch_t domain.
-#
-# arpwatch_exec_t is the type of the arpwatch executable.
-#
-daemon_domain(arpwatch, `, privmail')
-
-# for files created by arpwatch
-type arpwatch_data_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-create_dir_file(arpwatch_t,arpwatch_data_t)
-tmp_domain(arpwatch)
-
-allow arpwatch_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw setgid setuid };
-
-can_network_server(arpwatch_t)
-allow arpwatch_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-allow arpwatch_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow arpwatch_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow arpwatch_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow arpwatch_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-allow arpwatch_t { sbin_t var_lib_t }:dir search;
-allow arpwatch_t sbin_t:lnk_file read;
-r_dir_file(arpwatch_t, etc_t)
-r_dir_file(arpwatch_t, usr_t)
-can_ypbind(arpwatch_t)
-
-ifdef(`qmail.te', `
-allow arpwatch_t bin_t:dir search;
-')
-
-ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
-allow initrc_t arpwatch_data_t:dir { add_name write };
-allow initrc_t arpwatch_data_t:file create;
-')dnl end distro_gentoo
-
-# why is mail delivered to a directory of type arpwatch_data_t?
-allow mta_delivery_agent arpwatch_data_t:dir search;
-allow { system_mail_t mta_user_agent } arpwatch_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
-dontaudit { system_mail_t mta_user_agent } arpwatch_t:packet_socket { read write };
-')

mls/domains/program/auditd.te

@@ -1,76 +0,0 @@
-#DESC auditd - System auditing daemon
-#
-# Authors: Colin Walters <walters@verbum.org>
-#
-# Some fixes by Paul Moore <paul.moore@hp.com>
-# 
-define(`audit_manager_domain', `
-allow $1 auditd_etc_t:file rw_file_perms;
-create_dir_file($1, auditd_log_t)
-domain_auto_trans($1, auditctl_exec_t, auditctl_t)
-')
-
-daemon_domain(auditd)
-
-ifdef(`mls_policy', `
-# run at the highest MLS level
-typeattribute auditd_t mlsrangetrans;
-range_transition initrc_t auditd_exec_t s15:c0.c255;
-')
-
-allow auditd_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay nlmsg_readpriv };
-allow auditd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow auditd_t self:capability { audit_write audit_control sys_nice sys_resource };
-allow auditd_t self:process setsched;
-allow auditd_t self:file { getattr read write };
-allow auditd_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# Do not use logdir_domain since this is a security file
-type auditd_log_t, file_type, secure_file_type;
-allow auditd_t var_log_t:dir search;
-rw_dir_create_file(auditd_t, auditd_log_t)
-
-can_exec(auditd_t, init_exec_t)
-allow auditd_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
-
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-dontaudit auditd_t unconfined_t:fifo_file read;
-')
-
-type auditctl_t, domain, privlog;
-type auditctl_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-uses_shlib(auditctl_t)
-allow auditctl_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay nlmsg_readpriv };
-allow auditctl_t self:capability { audit_write audit_control };
-allow auditctl_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow auditctl_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-type auditd_etc_t, file_type, secure_file_type;
-allow { auditd_t auditctl_t } auditd_etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t auditd_etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-role secadm_r types auditctl_t;
-role sysadm_r types auditctl_t;
-audit_manager_domain(secadm_t)
-
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-ifdef(`separate_secadm', `', `
-audit_manager_domain(sysadm_t)
-') 
-')
-
-role system_r types auditctl_t;
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, auditctl_exec_t, auditctl_t)
-
-dontaudit auditctl_t local_login_t:fd use;
-allow auditctl_t proc_t:dir search;
-allow auditctl_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir search;
-allow auditctl_t sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit auditctl_t init_t:fd use; 
-allow auditctl_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow auditctl_t privfd:fd use;
-
-
-allow auditd_t sbin_t:dir search;
-can_exec(auditd_t, sbin_t)
-allow auditd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

mls/domains/program/automount.te

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Automount - Automount daemon
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
-# Modified by Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: amd am-utils autofs
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the automount_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(automount)
-
-etc_domain(automount)
-
-# for SSP
-allow automount_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-# for if the mount point is not labelled
-allow automount_t file_t:dir getattr;
-allow automount_t default_t:dir getattr;
-
-allow automount_t autofs_t:dir { create_dir_perms ioctl };
-allow automount_t fs_type:dir getattr;
-
-allow automount_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow automount_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow automount_t self:process { getpgid setpgid setsched };
-allow automount_t self:capability { sys_nice dac_override };
-allow automount_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow automount_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# because config files can be shell scripts
-can_exec(automount_t, { etc_t automount_etc_t })
-
-can_network_server(automount_t)
-can_resolve(automount_t)
-can_ypbind(automount_t)
-can_ldap(automount_t)
-
-ifdef(`fsadm.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(automount_t, fsadm_exec_t, fsadm_t)
-')
-
-lock_domain(automount)
-
-tmp_domain(automount)
-allow automount_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Run mount in the mount_t domain.
-domain_auto_trans(automount_t, mount_exec_t, mount_t)
-allow mount_t autofs_t:dir { search mounton read };
-allow mount_t automount_tmp_t:dir mounton;
-
-ifdef(`apmd.te',
-`domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, automount_exec_t, automount_t)
-can_exec(automount_t, bin_t)')
-
-allow automount_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-can_exec(automount_t, mount_exec_t)
-can_exec(automount_t, shell_exec_t)
-
-allow mount_t autofs_t:dir getattr;
-dontaudit automount_t var_t:dir write;
-
-allow userdomain autofs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow kernel_t autofs_t:dir { getattr ioctl read search };
-
-allow automount_t { boot_t home_root_t }:dir getattr;
-allow automount_t mnt_t:dir { getattr search };
-
-can_exec(initrc_t, automount_etc_t)
-
-# Allow automount to create and delete directories in / and /home
-file_type_auto_trans(automount_t, { root_t home_root_t }, automount_tmp_t, dir)
-
-allow automount_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-allow automount_t var_lib_nfs_t:dir search;
-

mls/domains/program/avahi.te

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-#DESC avahi - mDNS/DNS-SD daemon implementing Apple’s ZeroConf architecture
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-
-daemon_domain(avahi, `, privsysmod')
-r_dir_file(avahi_t, proc_net_t)
-can_network_server(avahi_t)
-can_ypbind(avahi_t)
-allow avahi_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
-allow avahi_t self:unix_dgram_socket  create_socket_perms;
-allow avahi_t self:capability { dac_override setgid chown kill setuid };
-allow avahi_t urandom_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow avahi_t howl_port_t:{ udp_socket tcp_socket } name_bind;
-allow avahi_t self:fifo_file { read write };
-allow avahi_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-allow avahi_t self:process setrlimit;
-allow avahi_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow avahi_t initrc_t:process { signal signull };
-allow avahi_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg };
-allow avahi_t avahi_var_run_t:dir setattr;
-allow avahi_t avahi_var_run_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
-
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-dbusd_client(system, avahi)
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow avahi_t unconfined_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow unconfined_t avahi_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-')
-

mls/domains/program/bluetooth.te

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Bluetooth 
-#
-# Authors:  Dan Walsh
-# RH-Packages: Bluetooth
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the bluetooth_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(bluetooth)
-
-file_type_auto_trans(bluetooth_t, var_run_t, bluetooth_var_run_t, sock_file)
-file_type_auto_trans(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_conf_t, bluetooth_conf_rw_t)
-
-tmp_domain(bluetooth)
-var_lib_domain(bluetooth)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow bluetooth_t self:file read;
-allow bluetooth_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw sys_tty_config };
-allow bluetooth_t self:process getsched;
-allow bluetooth_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow bluetooth_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
-
-lock_domain(bluetooth)
-
-# Use the network.
-can_network(bluetooth_t)
-can_ypbind(bluetooth_t)
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-dbusd_client(system, bluetooth)
-allow bluetooth_t system_dbusd_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-allow bluetooth_t self:socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-allow bluetooth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow bluetooth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-dontaudit bluetooth_t sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-# bluetooth_conf_t is the type of the /etc/bluetooth dir.
-type bluetooth_conf_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-type bluetooth_conf_rw_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# Read /etc/bluetooth
-allow bluetooth_t bluetooth_conf_t:dir search;
-allow bluetooth_t bluetooth_conf_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-#/usr/sbin/hid2hci causes the following
-allow initrc_t usbfs_t:file { getattr read };
-allow bluetooth_t usbfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow bluetooth_t usbfs_t:file rw_file_perms; 
-allow bluetooth_t bin_t:dir search;
-can_exec(bluetooth_t, { bin_t shell_exec_t })
-allow bluetooth_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-
-#Handle bluetooth serial devices
-allow bluetooth_t tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow bluetooth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow bluetooth_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-r_dir_file(bluetooth_t, fonts_t)
-allow bluetooth_t urandom_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow bluetooth_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-
-application_domain(bluetooth_helper, `, nscd_client_domain')
-domain_auto_trans(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_helper_exec_t, bluetooth_helper_t)
-role system_r types bluetooth_helper_t;
-read_locale(bluetooth_helper_t) 
-typeattribute bluetooth_helper_t unrestricted;
-r_dir_file(bluetooth_helper_t, domain)
-allow bluetooth_helper_t bin_t:dir { getattr search };
-can_exec(bluetooth_helper_t, { bin_t shell_exec_t })
-allow bluetooth_helper_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t self:capability sys_nice;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t self:process { fork getsched sigchld };
-allow bluetooth_helper_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-r_dir_file(bluetooth_helper_t, fonts_t)
-r_dir_file(bluetooth_helper_t, proc_t)
-read_sysctl(bluetooth_helper_t)
-allow bluetooth_helper_t tmp_t:dir search;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-allow bluetooth_helper_t home_dir_type:dir search;
-ifdef(`xserver.te', `
-allow bluetooth_helper_t xserver_log_t:dir search;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t xserver_log_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow bluetooth_helper_t tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
-allow bluetooth_helper_t tmpfs_t:file { read write };
-allow bluetooth_helper_t unconfined_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow bluetooth_t unconfined_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow unconfined_t bluetooth_t:dbus send_msg;
-', `
-ifdef(`xdm.te', `
-allow bluetooth_helper_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file { read write };
-')
-allow bluetooth_t unpriv_userdomain:dbus send_msg;
-allow unpriv_userdomain bluetooth_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-allow bluetooth_helper_t bluetooth_t:socket { read write };
-allow bluetooth_helper_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-tmp_domain(bluetooth_helper)
-allow bluetooth_helper_t urandom_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-dontaudit bluetooth_helper_t default_t:dir { read search };
-dontaudit bluetooth_helper_t { devtty_t ttyfile }:chr_file { read write };
-dontaudit bluetooth_helper_t home_dir_type:dir r_dir_perms;
-ifdef(`xserver.te', `
-allow bluetooth_helper_t xserver_log_t:dir search;
-allow bluetooth_helper_t xserver_log_t:file { getattr read };
-')

mls/domains/program/bonobo.te

@@ -1,9 +0,0 @@
-# DESC - Bonobo Activation Server 
-#
-# Author: Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
-#
-
-# Type for executable
-type bonobo_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# Everything else is in macros/bonobo_macros.te

mls/domains/program/bootloader.te

@@ -1,167 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Bootloader - Lilo boot loader/manager
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: lilo
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the bootloader_t domain.
-#
-# bootloader_exec_t is the type of the bootloader executable.
-#
-type bootloader_t, domain, privlog, privmem, fs_domain, nscd_client_domain ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon', `, priv_system_role') ifdef(`distro_debian', `, privowner, admin');
-type bootloader_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-etc_domain(bootloader)
-
-role sysadm_r types bootloader_t;
-role system_r types bootloader_t;
-
-allow bootloader_t var_t:dir search;
-create_append_log_file(bootloader_t, var_log_t)
-allow bootloader_t var_log_t:file write;
-
-# for nscd
-dontaudit bootloader_t var_run_t:dir search;
-
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, bootloader_exec_t, bootloader_t)
-')
-allow bootloader_t { initrc_t privfd }:fd use;
-
-tmp_domain(bootloader, `, device_type', { dir file lnk_file chr_file blk_file })
-
-read_locale(bootloader_t)
-
-# for tune2fs
-file_type_auto_trans(bootloader_t, root_t, bootloader_tmp_t, file)
-
-# for /vmlinuz sym link
-allow bootloader_t root_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# lilo would need read access to get BIOS data
-allow bootloader_t proc_kcore_t:file getattr;
-
-allow bootloader_t { etc_t device_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow bootloader_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow bootloader_t initctl_t:fifo_file getattr;
-uses_shlib(bootloader_t)
-
-ifdef(`distro_debian', `
-allow bootloader_t bootloader_tmp_t:{ dir file } { relabelfrom relabelto };
-allow bootloader_t modules_object_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto unlink };
-allow bootloader_t boot_t:file relabelfrom;
-allow bootloader_t { usr_t lib_t fsadm_exec_t }:file relabelto;
-allow bootloader_t { usr_t lib_t fsadm_exec_t }:file create_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t usr_t:lnk_file read;
-allow bootloader_t tmpfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow bootloader_t initrc_var_run_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow bootloader_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-allow bootloader_t dpkg_var_lib_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow bootloader_t dpkg_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
-# for /usr/share/initrd-tools/scripts
-can_exec(bootloader_t, usr_t)
-')
-
-allow bootloader_t { fixed_disk_device_t removable_device_t }:blk_file rw_file_perms;
-dontaudit bootloader_t device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t device_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-
-# LVM2 / Device Mapper's /dev/mapper/control
-# maybe we should change the labeling for this
-ifdef(`lvm.te', `
-allow bootloader_t lvm_control_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-domain_auto_trans(bootloader_t, lvm_exec_t, lvm_t)
-allow lvm_t bootloader_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
-r_dir_file(bootloader_t, lvm_etc_t)
-')
-
-# uncomment the following line if you use "lilo -p"
-#file_type_auto_trans(bootloader_t, etc_t, bootloader_etc_t, file);
-
-can_exec_any(bootloader_t)
-allow bootloader_t shell_exec_t:lnk_file read;
-allow bootloader_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow bootloader_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
-
-allow bootloader_t { modules_dep_t modules_object_t modules_conf_t }:file r_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t modules_object_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-allow bootloader_t modules_object_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-')
-
-# for ldd
-ifdef(`fsadm.te', `
-allow bootloader_t fsadm_exec_t:file { rx_file_perms execute_no_trans };
-')
-ifdef(`modutil.te', `
-allow bootloader_t insmod_exec_t:file { rx_file_perms execute_no_trans };
-')
-
-dontaudit bootloader_t { staff_home_dir_t sysadm_home_dir_t }:dir search;
-
-allow bootloader_t boot_t:dir { create rw_dir_perms };
-allow bootloader_t boot_t:file create_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t boot_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
-
-allow bootloader_t load_policy_exec_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow bootloader_t random_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-# for mke2fs
-domain_auto_trans(bootloader_t, mount_exec_t, mount_t);
-allow mount_t bootloader_tmp_t:dir mounton;
-
-# new file system defaults to file_t, granting file_t access is still bad.
-allow bootloader_t file_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow bootloader_t file_t:{ file blk_file chr_file } create_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t file_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
-allow bootloader_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow bootloader_t boot_runtime_t:file { read getattr unlink };
-
-# for memlock
-allow bootloader_t zero_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow bootloader_t self:capability ipc_lock;
-')
-
-allow bootloader_t self:capability { dac_read_search fsetid sys_rawio sys_admin mknod chown };
-# allow bootloader to get attributes of any device node
-allow bootloader_t { device_type ttyfile }:chr_file getattr;
-allow bootloader_t device_type:blk_file getattr;
-dontaudit bootloader_t devpts_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-
-allow bootloader_t self:process { fork signal_perms };
-allow bootloader_t self:lnk_file read;
-allow bootloader_t self:dir search;
-allow bootloader_t self:file { getattr read };
-allow bootloader_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow bootloader_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-allow bootloader_t proc_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow bootloader_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t proc_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-allow bootloader_t proc_mdstat_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t self:dir { getattr search read };
-read_sysctl(bootloader_t)
-allow bootloader_t etc_runtime_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-allow bootloader_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t { initrc_devpts_t admin_tty_type }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow bootloader_t initrc_t:fifo_file { read write };
-
-# for reading BIOS data
-allow bootloader_t memory_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-allow bootloader_t policy_config_t:dir { search read };
-allow bootloader_t policy_config_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow bootloader_t lib_t:file { getattr read };
-allow bootloader_t sysfs_t:dir getattr;
-allow bootloader_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-allow bootloader_t { usr_t var_t }:file { getattr read };
-r_dir_file(bootloader_t, src_t)
-dontaudit bootloader_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-dontaudit bootloader_t sysctl_t:dir search;

mls/domains/program/canna.te

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-#DESC canna - A Japanese character set input system.
-#
-# Authors: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the canna_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(canna)
-
-file_type_auto_trans(canna_t, var_run_t, canna_var_run_t, sock_file)
-
-logdir_domain(canna)
-var_lib_domain(canna)
-
-allow canna_t self:capability { setgid setuid net_bind_service };
-allow canna_t tmp_t:dir { search };
-allow canna_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms};
-allow canna_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow canna_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow canna_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow canna_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow canna_t etc_runtime_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow canna_t canna_var_lib_t:dir create;
-
-rw_dir_create_file(canna_t, canna_var_lib_t)
-
-can_network_tcp(canna_t)
-allow canna_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(canna_t)
-
-allow userdomain canna_var_run_t:dir search;
-allow userdomain canna_var_run_t:sock_file write;
-can_unix_connect(userdomain, canna_t)
-
-ifdef(`i18n_input.te', `
-allow i18n_input_t canna_var_run_t:dir search;
-allow i18n_input_t canna_var_run_t:sock_file write;
-can_unix_connect(i18n_input_t, canna_t)
-')
-
-dontaudit canna_t kernel_t:fd use;
-dontaudit canna_t root_t:file read;

mls/domains/program/cardmgr.te

@@ -1,90 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Cardmgr - PCMCIA control programs
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-#           Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: pcmcia-cs
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the cardmgr_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(cardmgr, `, privmodule')
-
-# for SSP
-allow cardmgr_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-type cardctl_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, cardctl_exec_t, cardmgr_t)
-')
-role sysadm_r types cardmgr_t;
-allow cardmgr_t admin_tty_type:chr_file { read write };
-
-allow cardmgr_t sysfs_t:dir search;
-allow cardmgr_t home_root_t:dir search;
-
-# Use capabilities (net_admin for route), setuid for cardctl
-allow cardmgr_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override setuid net_admin sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod };
-
-# for /etc/resolv.conf
-file_type_auto_trans(cardmgr_t, etc_t, net_conf_t, file)
-
-allow cardmgr_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow cardmgr_t modules_object_t:dir search;
-allow cardmgr_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow cardmgr_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow cardmgr_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Create stab file
-var_lib_domain(cardmgr)
-
-# for /var/lib/misc/pcmcia-scheme
-# would be better to have it in a different type if I knew how it was created..
-allow cardmgr_t var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# Create device files in /tmp.
-type cardmgr_dev_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile, device_type, dev_fs;
-file_type_auto_trans(cardmgr_t, { var_run_t cardmgr_var_run_t device_t tmp_t }, cardmgr_dev_t, { blk_file chr_file })
-
-# Create symbolic links in /dev.
-type cardmgr_lnk_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-file_type_auto_trans(cardmgr_t, device_t, cardmgr_lnk_t, lnk_file)
-
-# Run a shell, normal commands, /etc/pcmcia scripts. 
-can_exec_any(cardmgr_t)
-allow cardmgr_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# Run ifconfig.
-domain_auto_trans(cardmgr_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-allow ifconfig_t cardmgr_t:fd use;
-
-allow cardmgr_t proc_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-
-# Read /proc/PID directories for all domains (for fuser).
-can_ps(cardmgr_t, domain -unrestricted)
-dontaudit cardmgr_t unrestricted:dir search;
-
-allow cardmgr_t device_type:{ chr_file blk_file } getattr;
-allow cardmgr_t ttyfile:chr_file getattr;
-dontaudit cardmgr_t ptyfile:chr_file getattr;
-dontaudit cardmgr_t file_type:{ dir notdevfile_class_set } getattr;
-dontaudit cardmgr_t domain:{ fifo_file socket_class_set } getattr;
-dontaudit cardmgr_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr;
-
-allow cardmgr_t tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-ifdef(`apmd.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(apmd_t, { cardctl_exec_t cardmgr_exec_t }, cardmgr_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
-dontaudit insmod_t cardmgr_dev_t:chr_file { read write };
-dontaudit ifconfig_t cardmgr_dev_t:chr_file { read write };
-')
-ifdef(`hald.te', `
-rw_dir_file(hald_t, cardmgr_var_run_t)
-allow hald_t cardmgr_var_run_t:chr_file create_file_perms;
-')
-allow cardmgr_t device_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

mls/domains/program/cdrecord.te

@@ -1,10 +0,0 @@
-# DESC cdrecord - record audio or data Compact Disks or Digital Versatile Disks from a master
-#
-# Author: Thomas Bleher <ThomasBleher@gmx.de>
-
-# Type for the cdrecord excutable.
-type cdrecord_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# everything else is in the cdrecord_domain macros in
-# macros/program/cdrecord_macros.te.
-

mls/domains/program/certwatch.te

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-#DESC certwatch - generate SSL certificate expiry warnings
-#
-# Domains for the certwatch process 
-# Authors:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>,
-#
-application_domain(certwatch)
-role system_r types certwatch_t;
-r_dir_file(certwatch_t, cert_t)
-can_exec(certwatch_t, httpd_modules_t)
-system_crond_entry(certwatch_exec_t, certwatch_t)
-read_locale(certwatch_t) 

mls/domains/program/checkpolicy.te

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Checkpolicy - SELinux policy compliler
-#
-# Authors:  Frank Mayer, mayerf@tresys.com
-# X-Debian-Packages: checkpolicy
-#
-
-###########################
-# 
-# checkpolicy_t is the domain type for checkpolicy
-# checkpolicy_exec_t if file type for the executable
-
-type checkpolicy_t, domain;
-role sysadm_r types checkpolicy_t;
-role system_r types checkpolicy_t;
-role secadm_r types checkpolicy_t;
-
-type checkpolicy_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-
-##########################
-# 
-# Rules
-
-domain_auto_trans(secadmin, checkpolicy_exec_t, checkpolicy_t)
-
-# able to create and modify binary policy files
-allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:file create_file_perms;
-
-###########################
-# constrain what checkpolicy can use as source files
-#
-
-# only allow read of policy source files
-allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
-
-# allow test policies to be created in src directories
-file_type_auto_trans(checkpolicy_t, policy_src_t, policy_config_t, file)
-
-# directory search permissions for path to source and binary policy files
-allow checkpolicy_t root_t:dir search;
-allow checkpolicy_t etc_t:dir search;
-
-# Read the devpts root directory.  
-allow checkpolicy_t devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-ifdef(`sshd.te',
-`allow checkpolicy_t sshd_devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;')
-
-# Other access
-allow checkpolicy_t { initrc_devpts_t admin_tty_type devtty_t }:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
-uses_shlib(checkpolicy_t)
-allow checkpolicy_t self:capability dac_override;
-
-##########################
-# Allow users to execute checkpolicy without a domain transition
-# so it can be used without privilege to write real binary policy file
-can_exec(unpriv_userdomain, checkpolicy_exec_t)
-
-allow checkpolicy_t { userdomain privfd }:fd use;
-
-allow checkpolicy_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow checkpolicy_t console_device_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow checkpolicy_t init_t:fd use;
-allow checkpolicy_t selinux_config_t:dir search;

mls/domains/program/chkpwd.te

@@ -1,18 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Chkpwd - PAM password checking programs
-# X-Debian-Packages: libpam-modules
-#
-# Domains for the /sbin/.*_chkpwd utilities.
-#
-
-#
-# chkpwd_exec_t is the type of the /sbin/.*_chkpwd executables.
-#
-type chkpwd_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-chkpwd_domain(system)
-dontaudit system_chkpwd_t privfd:fd use;
-role sysadm_r types system_chkpwd_t;
-in_user_role(system_chkpwd_t)
-
-# Everything else is in the chkpwd_domain macro in
-# macros/program/chkpwd_macros.te.

mls/domains/program/chroot.te

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Chroot - Establish chroot environments
-#
-# Author: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: 
-#
-type chroot_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# For a chroot environment named potato that can be entered from user_t (so
-# the user can run an old version of Debian in a chroot), with the possibility
-# of user_devpts_t or user_tty_device_t being the controlling tty type for
-# administration.  This also defines a mount_domain for the user (so they can
-# mount file systems).
-#chroot(user, potato)
-# For a chroot environment named apache that can be entered from initrc_t for
-# running a different version of apache.
-# initrc is a special case, uses the system_r role (usually appends "_r" to
-# the base name of the parent domain), and has sysadm_devpts_t and
-# sysadm_tty_device_t for the controlling terminal
-#chroot(initrc, apache)
-
-# the main code is in macros/program/chroot_macros.te

mls/domains/program/comsat.te

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-#DESC comsat - biff server
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-# Depends: inetd.te
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the comsat_t domain.
-#
-# comsat_exec_t is the type of the comsat executable.
-#
-
-inetd_child_domain(comsat, udp)
-allow comsat_t initrc_var_run_t:file r_file_perms;
-dontaudit comsat_t initrc_var_run_t:file write;
-allow comsat_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow comsat_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
-allow comsat_t var_spool_t:dir search;
-dontaudit comsat_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file getattr;

mls/domains/program/consoletype.te

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-#DESC consoletype - determine the type of a console device
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: 
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the consoletype_t domain.
-#
-# consoletype_t is the domain for the consoletype program.
-# consoletype_exec_t is the type of the corresponding program.
-#
-type consoletype_t, domain, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite;
-type consoletype_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-role system_r types consoletype_t;
-
-uses_shlib(consoletype_t)
-general_domain_access(consoletype_t)
-
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, consoletype_exec_t, consoletype_t)
-
-ifdef(`xdm.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(xdm_t, consoletype_exec_t, consoletype_t)
-allow consoletype_t xdm_tmp_t:file { read write };
-')
-
-ifdef(`hotplug.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, consoletype_exec_t, consoletype_t)
-')
-')
-
-allow consoletype_t {admin_tty_type tty_device_t devtty_t initrc_devpts_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow consoletype_t { kernel_t init_t initrc_t privfd sysadm_t }:fd use;
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow consoletype_t self:capability sys_admin;
-
-allow consoletype_t console_device_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl read write };
-allow consoletype_t initrc_t:fifo_file write;
-allow consoletype_t nfs_t:file write;
-allow consoletype_t sysadm_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-ifdef(`lpd.te', `
-allow consoletype_t printconf_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-
-ifdef(`pam.te', `
-allow consoletype_t pam_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-allow consoletype_t tmpfs_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-')
-ifdef(`firstboot.te', `
-allow consoletype_t firstboot_t:fifo_file write;
-')
-dontaudit consoletype_t proc_t:dir search;
-dontaudit consoletype_t proc_t:file read;
-dontaudit consoletype_t root_t:file read;
-allow consoletype_t crond_t:fifo_file { read getattr ioctl };
-allow consoletype_t system_crond_t:fd use;
-allow consoletype_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;

mls/domains/program/cpucontrol.te

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#DESC cpucontrol - domain for microcode_ctl and other programs to control CPU
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-#
-
-type cpucontrol_conf_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-daemon_base_domain(cpucontrol)
-
-# Access cpu devices.
-allow cpucontrol_t cpu_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow cpucontrol_t device_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-allow initrc_t cpu_device_t:chr_file getattr;
-
-allow cpucontrol_t self:capability sys_rawio;
-
-r_dir_file(cpucontrol_t, cpucontrol_conf_t)

mls/domains/program/cpuspeed.te

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-#DESC cpuspeed - domain for microcode_ctl, powernowd, etc
-#
-# Authors:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-#           Thomas Bleher <ThomasBleher@gmx.de>
-#
-
-daemon_base_domain(cpuspeed)
-read_locale(cpuspeed_t)
-
-allow cpuspeed_t sysfs_t:dir search;
-allow cpuspeed_t sysfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow cpuspeed_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow cpuspeed_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cpuspeed_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-
-allow cpuspeed_t self:process setsched;
-allow cpuspeed_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;

mls/domains/program/crack.te

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Crack - Password cracking application
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: crack
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the crack_t domain.
-#
-# crack_exec_t is the type of the crack executable.
-#
-system_domain(crack)
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-system_crond_entry(crack_exec_t, crack_t)
-')
-
-# for SSP
-allow crack_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-type crack_db_t, file_type, sysadmfile, usercanread;
-allow crack_t var_t:dir search;
-rw_dir_create_file(crack_t, crack_db_t)
-
-allow crack_t device_t:dir search;
-allow crack_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow crack_t self:fifo_file { read write getattr };
-
-tmp_domain(crack)
-
-# for dictionaries
-allow crack_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-
-can_exec(crack_t, bin_t)
-allow crack_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-
-allow crack_t self:process { fork signal_perms };
-
-allow crack_t proc_t:dir { read search };
-allow crack_t proc_t:file { read getattr };
-
-# read config files
-allow crack_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow crack_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-allow crack_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-dontaudit crack_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };

mls/domains/program/crond.te

@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Crond - Crond daemon
-#
-# Domains for the top-level crond daemon process and
-# for system cron jobs.  The domains for user cron jobs
-# are in macros/program/crond_macros.te.
-#
-# X-Debian-Packages: cron
-# Authors:  Jonathan Crowley (MITRE) <jonathan@mitre.org>,
-#	    Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser
-#
-
-# NB The constraints file has some entries for crond_t, this makes it
-# different from all other domains...
-
-# Domain for crond.  It needs auth_chkpwd to check for locked accounts.
-daemon_domain(crond, `, privmail, auth_chkpwd, privfd, nscd_client_domain')
-
-# This domain is granted permissions common to most domains (including can_net)
-general_domain_access(crond_t)
-
-# Type for the anacron executable.
-type anacron_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# Type for temporary files.
-tmp_domain(crond)
-
-crond_domain(system)
-
-allow system_crond_t proc_mdstat_t:file { getattr read };
-allow system_crond_t proc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow system_crond_t proc_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow system_crond_t usbdevfs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-ifdef(`mta.te', `
-allow mta_user_agent system_crond_t:fd use;
-')
-
-# read files in /etc
-allow system_crond_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow system_crond_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow system_crond_t { sysfs_t rpc_pipefs_t }:dir getattr;
-
-read_locale(crond_t)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow crond_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_nice audit_control };
-dontaudit crond_t self:capability sys_resource;
-
-# Get security policy decisions.
-can_getsecurity(crond_t)
-
-# for finding binaries and /bin/sh
-allow crond_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow crond_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
-
-# Read from /var/spool/cron.
-allow crond_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-allow crond_t var_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow crond_t cron_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow crond_t cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Read /etc/security/default_contexts.
-r_dir_file(crond_t, default_context_t)
-
-allow crond_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow crond_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-
-allow crond_t default_t:dir search;
-
-# crond tries to search /root.  Not sure why.
-allow crond_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# to search /home
-allow crond_t home_root_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow crond_t user_home_dir_type:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# Run a shell.
-can_exec(crond_t, shell_exec_t)
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-# Run the rpm program in the rpm_t domain. Allow creation of RPM log files
-# via redirection of standard out.
-ifdef(`rpm.te', `
-allow crond_t rpm_log_t: file create_file_perms;
-
-system_crond_entry(rpm_exec_t, rpm_t)
-allow system_crond_t rpm_log_t:file create_file_perms;
-#read ahead wants to read this
-allow initrc_t system_cron_spool_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-')
-
-allow system_crond_t var_log_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-
-# Set exec context.
-can_setexec(crond_t)
-
-# Transition to this domain for anacron as well.
-# Still need to study anacron.
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, anacron_exec_t, system_crond_t)
-
-# Inherit and use descriptors from init for anacron.
-allow system_crond_t init_t:fd use;
-
-# Inherit and use descriptors from initrc for anacron.
-allow system_crond_t initrc_t:fd use;
-can_access_pty(system_crond_t, initrc)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow system_crond_t self:capability { dac_read_search chown setgid setuid fowner net_bind_service fsetid };
-
-allow crond_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-
-# Read the system crontabs.
-allow system_crond_t system_cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-allow crond_t system_cron_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow crond_t system_cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Read from /var/spool/cron.
-allow system_crond_t cron_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow system_crond_t cron_spool_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /var/lib/slocate.db.
-allow system_crond_t var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow system_crond_t var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
-
-# Update whatis files.
-allow system_crond_t man_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow system_crond_t man_t:file create_file_perms;
-allow system_crond_t man_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# Write /var/lock/makewhatis.lock.
-lock_domain(system_crond)
-
-# for if /var/mail is a symlink
-allow { system_crond_t crond_t } mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
-allow crond_t mail_spool_t:dir search;
-
-ifdef(`mta.te', `
-r_dir_file(system_mail_t, crond_tmp_t)
-')
-
-# Stat any file and search any directory for find.
-allow system_crond_t { file_type fs_type }:notdevfile_class_set getattr;
-allow system_crond_t device_type:{ chr_file blk_file } getattr;
-allow system_crond_t file_type:dir { read search getattr };
-
-# Create temporary files.
-type system_crond_tmp_t, file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile;
-file_type_auto_trans(system_crond_t, { tmp_t crond_tmp_t }, system_crond_tmp_t)
-
-# /sbin/runlevel ask for w access to utmp, but will operate
-# correctly without it.  Do not audit write denials to utmp.
-# /sbin/runlevel needs lock access however
-dontaudit system_crond_t initrc_var_run_t:file write;
-allow system_crond_t initrc_var_run_t:file { getattr read lock };
-
-# Access other spool directories like
-# /var/spool/anacron and /var/spool/slrnpull.
-allow system_crond_t var_spool_t:file create_file_perms;
-allow system_crond_t var_spool_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-
-# Do not audit attempts to search unlabeled directories (e.g. slocate).
-dontaudit system_crond_t unlabeled_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-dontaudit system_crond_t unlabeled_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-#
-# reading /var/spool/cron/mailman
-#
-allow crond_t var_spool_t:file { getattr read };
-allow system_crond_t devpts_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow system_crond_t sysfs_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow system_crond_t tmpfs_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow system_crond_t rpc_pipefs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-#
-#  These rules are here to allow system cron jobs to su
-#
-ifdef(`su.te', `
-su_restricted_domain(system_crond,system)
-role system_r types system_crond_su_t;
-allow system_crond_su_t crond_t:fifo_file ioctl;
-')
-allow system_crond_t self:passwd rootok;
-#
-# prelink tells init to restart it self, we either need to allow or dontaudit
-#
-allow system_crond_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
-dontaudit userdomain system_crond_t:fd use;
-
-r_dir_file(crond_t, selinux_config_t)
-
-# Allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem for restoring file contexts.
-bool cron_can_relabel false;
-if (cron_can_relabel) {
-domain_auto_trans(system_crond_t, setfiles_exec_t, setfiles_t)
-} else {
-r_dir_file(system_crond_t, file_context_t)
-can_getsecurity(system_crond_t)
-}
-dontaudit system_crond_t removable_t:filesystem getattr;
-#
-# Required for webalizer
-#
-dontaudit crond_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-ifdef(`apache.te', `
-allow system_crond_t { httpd_log_t httpd_config_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow system_crond_t httpd_modules_t:lnk_file read;
-# Needed for certwatch
-can_exec(system_crond_t, httpd_modules_t)
-')

mls/domains/program/crontab.te

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Crontab - Crontab manipulation programs
-#
-# Domains for the crontab program.
-#
-# X-Debian-Packages: cron
-#
-
-# Type for the crontab executable.
-type crontab_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# Everything else is in the crontab_domain macro in
-# macros/program/crontab_macros.te.

mls/domains/program/cups.te

@@ -1,321 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Cups - Common Unix Printing System
-#
-# Created cups policy from lpd policy: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: cupsys cupsys-client cupsys-bsd
-# Depends: lpd.te lpr.te
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the cupsd_t domain.
-#
-# cupsd_t is the domain of cupsd.
-# cupsd_exec_t is the type of the cupsd executable.
-#
-daemon_domain(cupsd, `, auth_chkpwd, nscd_client_domain')
-etcdir_domain(cupsd)
-type cupsd_rw_etc_t, file_type, sysadmfile, usercanread;
-
-can_network(cupsd_t)
-allow cupsd_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-logdir_domain(cupsd)
-
-tmp_domain(cupsd, `', { file dir fifo_file })
-
-allow cupsd_t devpts_t:dir search;
-
-allow cupsd_t device_t:lnk_file read;
-allow cupsd_t printer_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow cupsd_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-dontaudit cupsd_t random_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
-
-# temporary solution, we need something better
-allow cupsd_t serial_device:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-r_dir_file(cupsd_t, usbdevfs_t)
-r_dir_file(cupsd_t, usbfs_t)
-
-ifdef(`logrotate.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(logrotate_t, cupsd_exec_t, cupsd_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`inetd.te', `
-allow inetd_t printer_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-domain_auto_trans(inetd_t, cupsd_exec_t, cupsd_t)
-')
-
-# write to spool
-allow cupsd_t var_spool_t:dir search;
-
-# this is not ideal, and allowing setattr access to cupsd_etc_t is wrong
-file_type_auto_trans(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file)
-file_type_auto_trans(cupsd_t, var_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, { dir file })
-allow cupsd_t cupsd_rw_etc_t:dir { setattr rw_dir_perms };
-allow cupsd_t cupsd_etc_t:file setattr;
-allow cupsd_t cupsd_etc_t:dir setattr;
-
-allow cupsd_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read ioctl };
-can_exec(cupsd_t, initrc_exec_t)
-allow cupsd_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow cupsd_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow cupsd_t self:file { getattr read };
-read_sysctl(cupsd_t)
-allow cupsd_t sysctl_dev_t:dir search;
-allow cupsd_t sysctl_dev_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# for /etc/printcap
-dontaudit cupsd_t etc_t:file write;
-
-# allow cups to execute its backend scripts
-can_exec(cupsd_t, cupsd_exec_t)
-allow cupsd_t cupsd_exec_t:dir search;
-allow cupsd_t cupsd_exec_t:lnk_file read;
-allow cupsd_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-dontaudit cupsd_t reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
-
-allow cupsd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow cupsd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow cupsd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow cupsd_t self:capability { dac_read_search kill setgid setuid fsetid net_bind_service fowner chown dac_override sys_tty_config audit_write };
-dontaudit cupsd_t self:capability net_admin;
-
-#
-# /usr/lib/cups/backend/serial needs sys_admin
-# Need new context to run under???
-allow cupsd_t self:capability sys_admin;
-
-allow cupsd_t self:process setsched;
-
-# for /var/lib/defoma
-allow cupsd_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-r_dir_file(cupsd_t, readable_t)
-
-# Bind to the cups/ipp port (631).
-allow cupsd_t ipp_port_t:{ udp_socket tcp_socket } name_bind;
-
-can_tcp_connect(web_client_domain, cupsd_t)
-can_tcp_connect(cupsd_t, cupsd_t)
-
-# Send to portmap.
-ifdef(`portmap.te', `
-can_udp_send(cupsd_t, portmap_t)
-can_udp_send(portmap_t, cupsd_t)
-')
-
-# Write to /var/spool/cups.
-allow cupsd_t print_spool_t:dir { setattr rw_dir_perms };
-allow cupsd_t print_spool_t:file create_file_perms;
-allow cupsd_t print_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Filter scripts may be shell scripts, and may invoke progs like /bin/mktemp
-allow cupsd_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir { search getattr };
-allow cupsd_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(cupsd_t, { shell_exec_t bin_t sbin_t })
-
-# They will also invoke ghostscript, which needs to read fonts
-read_fonts(cupsd_t)
-
-# Read /usr/lib/gconv/gconv-modules.* and /usr/lib/python2.2/.*
-allow cupsd_t lib_t:file { read getattr };
-
-# read python modules
-allow cupsd_t usr_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr ioctl };
-
-#
-# lots of errors generated requiring the following
-#
-allow cupsd_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
-allow cupsd_t self:netlink_route_socket { r_netlink_socket_perms };
-
-#
-# Satisfy readahead
-#
-allow initrc_t cupsd_log_t:file { getattr read };
-r_dir_file(cupsd_t, var_t)
-
-r_dir_file(cupsd_t, usercanread)
-ifdef(`samba.te', `
-rw_dir_file(cupsd_t, samba_var_t)
-allow smbd_t cupsd_etc_t:dir search;
-')
-
-ifdef(`pam.te', `
-dontaudit cupsd_t pam_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-dontaudit cupsd_t { sysadm_home_dir_t staff_home_dir_t }:dir { getattr search };
-# PTAL
-daemon_domain(ptal)
-etcdir_domain(ptal)
-
-file_type_auto_trans(ptal_t, var_run_t, ptal_var_run_t)
-allow ptal_t self:capability { chown sys_rawio };
-allow ptal_t self:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket } create_socket_perms;
-allow ptal_t self:unix_stream_socket { listen accept };
-can_network_server_tcp(ptal_t)
-allow ptal_t ptal_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-allow userdomain ptal_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow userdomain ptal_var_run_t:sock_file write;
-allow userdomain ptal_var_run_t:dir search;
-allow ptal_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow ptal_t device_t:dir read;
-allow ptal_t printer_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t printer_device_t:chr_file getattr;
-allow ptal_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-r_dir_file(ptal_t, usbdevfs_t)
-rw_dir_file(ptal_t, usbfs_t)
-allow cupsd_t ptal_var_run_t:sock_file { write setattr };
-allow cupsd_t ptal_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow cupsd_t ptal_var_run_t:dir search;
-dontaudit ptal_t { sysadm_home_dir_t staff_home_dir_t }:dir { getattr search };
-
-allow initrc_t ptal_var_run_t:dir rmdir;
-allow initrc_t ptal_var_run_t:fifo_file unlink;
-
-
-# HPLIP
-daemon_domain(hplip)
-etcdir_domain(hplip)
-allow hplip_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow hplip_t etc_runtime_t:file { read getattr };
-allow hplip_t printer_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow cupsd_t hplip_var_run_t:file { read getattr };
-allow hplip_t cupsd_etc_t:dir search;
-can_network(hplip_t)
-allow hplip_t { hplip_port_t ipp_port_t }:tcp_socket name_connect;
-allow hplip_t hplip_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-
-# Uses networking to talk to the daemons
-allow hplip_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow hplip_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow hplip_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# for python
-can_exec(hplip_t, bin_t)
-allow hplip_t { sbin_t bin_t }:dir search;
-allow hplip_t self:file { getattr read };
-allow hplip_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow hplip_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow hplip_t usr_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
-allow hplip_t devpts_t:dir search;
-allow hplip_t devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl };
-
-
-dontaudit cupsd_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-dontaudit cupsd_t selinux_config_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow cupsd_t printconf_t:file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-dbusd_client(system, cupsd)
-allow cupsd_t system_dbusd_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow cupsd_t userdomain:dbus send_msg;
-')
-
-# CUPS configuration daemon
-daemon_domain(cupsd_config, `, nscd_client_domain')
-
-allow cupsd_config_t devpts_t:dir search;
-allow cupsd_config_t devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl };
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-ifdef(`rpm.te', `
-allow cupsd_config_t rpm_var_lib_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow cupsd_config_t rpm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-allow cupsd_config_t initrc_exec_t:file getattr;
-')dnl end distro_redhat
-
-allow cupsd_config_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t net_conf_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow cupsd_config_t self:file { getattr read };
-
-allow cupsd_config_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cupsd_config_t cupsd_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cupsd_config_t cupsd_t:process { signal };
-allow cupsd_config_t cupsd_t:{ file lnk_file } { getattr read };
-can_ps(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_t)
-
-allow cupsd_config_t self:capability { chown sys_tty_config };
-
-rw_dir_create_file(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_etc_t)
-rw_dir_create_file(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t)
-file_type_auto_trans(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file)
-file_type_auto_trans(cupsd_config_t, var_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t, file)
-allow cupsd_config_t var_t:lnk_file read;
-
-can_network_tcp(cupsd_config_t)
-can_ypbind(cupsd_config_t)
-allow cupsd_config_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_tcp_connect(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_t)
-allow cupsd_config_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow cupsd_config_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow cupsd_config_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-dbusd_client(system, cupsd_config)
-allow cupsd_config_t userdomain:dbus send_msg;
-allow cupsd_config_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
-allow userdomain cupsd_config_t:dbus send_msg;
-')dnl end if dbusd.te
-
-ifdef(`hald.te', `
-
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-allow { cupsd_t cupsd_config_t } hald_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow hald_t { cupsd_t cupsd_config_t }:dbus send_msg;
-')dnl end if dbusd.te
-
-allow hald_t cupsd_config_t:process signal;
-domain_auto_trans(hald_t, cupsd_config_exec_t, cupsd_config_t)
-
-') dnl end if hald.te
-
-
-can_exec(cupsd_config_t, { bin_t sbin_t shell_exec_t })
-ifdef(`hostname.te', `
-can_exec(cupsd_t, hostname_exec_t)
-can_exec(cupsd_config_t, hostname_exec_t)
-')
-allow cupsd_config_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir { search getattr };
-allow cupsd_config_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
-# killall causes the following
-dontaudit cupsd_config_t domain:dir { getattr search };
-dontaudit cupsd_config_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-
-can_exec(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_config_exec_t) 
-
-allow cupsd_config_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cupsd_config_t var_lib_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow cupsd_config_t rpm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cupsd_config_t printconf_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow cupsd_config_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`logrotate.te', `
-allow cupsd_config_t logrotate_t:fd use;
-')dnl end if logrotate.te
-allow cupsd_config_t system_crond_t:fd use;
-allow cupsd_config_t crond_t:fifo_file r_file_perms;
-allow cupsd_t crond_t:fifo_file read;
-allow cupsd_t crond_t:fd use;
-
-# Alternatives asks for this
-allow cupsd_config_t initrc_exec_t:file getattr;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-can_unix_connect(cupsd_t, initrc_t)
-allow cupsd_t initrc_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow initrc_t cupsd_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow { cupsd_config_t cupsd_t } unconfined_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow unconfined_t cupsd_config_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow { cupsd_t cupsd_config_t } unconfined_t:fifo_file read;
-')
-typealias printer_port_t alias cupsd_lpd_port_t;
-inetd_child_domain(cupsd_lpd)
-allow inetd_t printer_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-r_dir_file(cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_etc_t)
-r_dir_file(cupsd_lpd_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t)
-allow cupsd_lpd_t ipp_port_t:tcp_socket name_connect;
-ifdef(`use_mcs', `
-range_transition initrc_t cupsd_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
-')
-

mls/domains/program/cvs.te

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-#DESC cvs - Concurrent Versions System
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-# Depends: inetd.te
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the cvs_t domain.
-#
-# cvs_exec_t is the type of the cvs executable.
-#
-
-inetd_child_domain(cvs, tcp)
-typeattribute cvs_t privmail;
-typeattribute cvs_t auth_chkpwd;
-
-type cvs_data_t, file_type, sysadmfile, customizable;
-create_dir_file(cvs_t, cvs_data_t)
-can_exec(cvs_t, { bin_t sbin_t shell_exec_t })
-allow cvs_t bin_t:dir search;
-allow cvs_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
-allow cvs_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-allow system_mail_t cvs_data_t:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit cvs_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-ifdef(`kerberos.te', `
-# Allow kerberos to work
-allow cvs_t { krb5_keytab_t krb5_conf_t }:file r_file_perms;
-dontaudit cvs_t krb5_conf_t:file write;
-')

mls/domains/program/cyrus.te

@@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
-#DESC cyrus-imapd
-#
-# Authors:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-
-# cyrusd_exec_t is the type of the cyrusd executable.
-# cyrusd_key_t is the type of the cyrus private key files
-daemon_domain(cyrus)
-
-general_domain_access(cyrus_t)
-file_type_auto_trans(cyrus_t, var_run_t, cyrus_var_run_t, sock_file)
-
-type cyrus_var_lib_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-allow cyrus_t self:capability { dac_override net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_resource };
-allow cyrus_t self:process setrlimit;
-
-can_network(cyrus_t)
-allow cyrus_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(cyrus_t)
-can_exec(cyrus_t, bin_t)
-allow cyrus_t cyrus_var_lib_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow cyrus_t cyrus_var_lib_t:{file sock_file lnk_file} create_file_perms;
-allow cyrus_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cyrus_t lib_t:file { execute execute_no_trans getattr read };
-read_locale(cyrus_t)
-read_sysctl(cyrus_t)
-tmp_domain(cyrus)
-allow cyrus_t { mail_port_t pop_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind;
-allow cyrus_t proc_t:dir search;
-allow cyrus_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cyrus_t sysadm_devpts_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-allow cyrus_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-
-allow cyrus_t etc_runtime_t:file { read getattr };
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-system_crond_entry(cyrus_exec_t, cyrus_t)
-allow system_crond_t cyrus_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow system_crond_t cyrus_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
-')
-create_dir_file(cyrus_t, mail_spool_t)
-allow cyrus_t var_spool_t:dir search;
-
-ifdef(`saslauthd.te', `
-allow cyrus_t saslauthd_var_run_t:dir search;
-allow cyrus_t saslauthd_var_run_t:sock_file { read write };
-allow cyrus_t saslauthd_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto };
-')
-
-r_dir_file(cyrus_t, cert_t)
-allow cyrus_t { urandom_device_t random_device_t }:chr_file { read getattr };
-
-ifdef(`postfix.te', `
-allow postfix_master_t cyrus_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow postfix_master_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-allow postfix_master_t cyrus_var_lib_t:dir search;
-allow postfix_master_t cyrus_var_lib_t:sock_file write;
-')
-

mls/domains/program/dbskkd.te

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-#DESC dbskkd - A dictionary server for the SKK Japanese input method system.
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the dbskkd_t domain.
-#
-# dbskkd_exec_t is the type of the dbskkd executable.
-#
-# Depends: inetd.te
-
-inetd_child_domain(dbskkd)

mls/domains/program/dbusd.te

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-#DESC dbus-daemon-1 server for dbus desktop bus protocol
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-
-dbusd_domain(system)
-
-allow system_dbusd_t system_dbusd_var_run_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
-
-ifdef(`pamconsole.te', `
-r_dir_file(system_dbusd_t, pam_var_console_t)
-')
-
-# dac_override: /var/run/dbus is owned by messagebus on Debian
-allow system_dbusd_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid };
-nsswitch_domain(system_dbusd_t)
-
-# I expect we need more than this
-
-allow initrc_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
-allow initrc_t system_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow initrc_t system_dbusd_var_run_t:sock_file write;
-
-can_exec(system_dbusd_t, sbin_t)
-allow system_dbusd_t self:fifo_file { read write };
-allow system_dbusd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow system_dbusd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow system_dbusd_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };

mls/domains/program/ddcprobe.te

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-#DESC ddcprobe - output ddcprobe results from kudzu
-#
-# Author: dan walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-
-type ddcprobe_t, domain, privmem;
-type ddcprobe_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# Allow execution by the sysadm
-role sysadm_r types ddcprobe_t;
-role system_r types ddcprobe_t;
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, ddcprobe_exec_t, ddcprobe_t)
-
-uses_shlib(ddcprobe_t)
-
-# Allow terminal access
-access_terminal(ddcprobe_t, sysadm)
-
-# Allow ddcprobe to read /dev/mem
-allow ddcprobe_t memory_device_t:chr_file read;
-allow ddcprobe_t memory_device_t:chr_file { execute write };
-allow ddcprobe_t self:process execmem;
-allow ddcprobe_t zero_device_t:chr_file { execute read };
-
-allow ddcprobe_t proc_t:dir search;
-allow ddcprobe_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-can_exec(ddcprobe_t, sbin_t)
-allow ddcprobe_t user_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow ddcprobe_t userdomain:fd use;
-read_sysctl(ddcprobe_t)
-allow ddcprobe_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow ddcprobe_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow ddcprobe_t self:capability { sys_rawio sys_admin };
-
-allow ddcprobe_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow ddcprobe_t kudzu_exec_t:file getattr;
-allow ddcprobe_t lib_t:file { getattr read };
-read_locale(ddcprobe_t)
-allow ddcprobe_t modules_object_t:dir search;
-allow ddcprobe_t modules_dep_t:file { getattr read };
-allow ddcprobe_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-allow ddcprobe_t kernel_t:system syslog_console;

mls/domains/program/dhcpc.te

@@ -1,169 +0,0 @@
-#DESC DHCPC - DHCP client
-#
-# Authors:  Wayne Salamon (NAI Labs) <wsalamon@tislabs.com>
-#           Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: pump dhcp-client udhcpc
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the dhcpc_t domain.
-#
-# dhcpc_t is the domain for the client side of DHCP. dhcpcd, the DHCP 
-# network configurator daemon started by /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts 
-# rc scripts, runs in this domain.
-# dhcpc_exec_t is the type of the dhcpcd executable.
-# The dhcpc_t can be used for other DHCPC related files as well.
-#
-daemon_domain(dhcpc)
-
-# for SSP
-allow dhcpc_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-can_network(dhcpc_t)
-allow dhcpc_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(dhcpc_t)
-allow dhcpc_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dhcpc_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dhcpc_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow dhcpc_t devpts_t:dir search;
-
-# for localization
-allow dhcpc_t lib_t:file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`consoletype.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, consoletype_exec_t, consoletype_t)
-')
-ifdef(`nscd.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, nscd_exec_t, nscd_t)
-allow dhcpc_t nscd_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-ifdef(`cardmgr.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(cardmgr_t, dhcpc_exec_t, dhcpc_t)
-allow cardmgr_t dhcpc_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-allow cardmgr_t dhcpc_t:process signal_perms;
-allow cardmgr_t dhcpc_var_run_t:file unlink;
-allow dhcpc_t cardmgr_dev_t:chr_file { read write };
-')
-ifdef(`hotplug.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, dhcpc_exec_t, dhcpc_t)
-allow hotplug_t dhcpc_t:process signal_perms;
-allow hotplug_t dhcpc_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-allow hotplug_t dhcp_etc_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow dhcpc_t hotplug_etc_t:dir { getattr search };
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, syslogd_exec_t, syslogd_t)
-')
-')dnl end hotplug.te
-
-# for the dhcp client to run ping to check IP addresses
-ifdef(`ping.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, ping_exec_t, ping_t)
-ifdef(`hotplug.te', `
-allow ping_t hotplug_t:fd use;
-') dnl end if hotplug
-ifdef(`cardmgr.te', `
-allow ping_t cardmgr_t:fd use;
-') dnl end if cardmgr
-', `
-allow dhcpc_t self:capability setuid;
-allow dhcpc_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
-') dnl end if ping
-
-ifdef(`dhcpd.te', `', `
-type dhcp_state_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-type dhcp_etc_t, file_type, sysadmfile, usercanread; 
-')
-type dhcpc_state_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-allow dhcpc_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow dhcpc_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow dhcpc_t proc_net_t:dir search;
-allow dhcpc_t { proc_t proc_net_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow dhcpc_t self:file { getattr read };
-read_sysctl(dhcpc_t)
-allow dhcpc_t userdomain:fd use;
-ifdef(`run_init.te', `
-allow dhcpc_t run_init_t:fd use;
-')
-
-# Use capabilities
-allow dhcpc_t self:capability { dac_override fsetid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service sys_resource sys_tty_config };
-
-# for access("/etc/bashrc", X_OK) on Red Hat
-dontaudit dhcpc_t self:capability { dac_read_search sys_module };
-
-# for udp port 68
-allow dhcpc_t dhcpc_port_t:udp_socket name_bind;
-
-# Allow read/write to /etc/resolv.conf and /etc/ntp.conf. Note that any files
-# in /etc created by dhcpcd will be labelled net_conf_t.
-file_type_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, etc_t, net_conf_t, file)
-
-# Allow access to the dhcpc file types
-r_dir_file(dhcpc_t, dhcp_etc_t)
-allow dhcpc_t sbin_t:dir search;
-can_exec(dhcpc_t, { dhcpc_exec_t dhcp_etc_t sbin_t })
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-can_exec(dhcpc_t, etc_t)
-allow initrc_t dhcp_etc_t:file rw_file_perms;
-')
-ifdef(`ifconfig.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-')dnl end if def ifconfig
-
-
-tmp_domain(dhcpc)
-
-# Allow dhcpc_t to use packet sockets
-allow dhcpc_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dhcpc_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-file_type_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, dhcp_state_t, dhcpc_state_t, file)
-rw_dir_create_file(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_state_t)
-allow dhcpc_t dhcp_state_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow dhcpc_t bin_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow dhcpc_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(dhcpc_t, { bin_t shell_exec_t })
-
-ifdef(`hostname.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, hostname_exec_t, hostname_t)
-')
-dontaudit dhcpc_t { devpts_t ttyfile ptyfile tty_device_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow dhcpc_t { userdomain kernel_t }:fd use;
-
-allow dhcpc_t home_root_t:dir search;
-allow initrc_t dhcpc_state_t:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit dhcpc_t var_lock_t:dir search;
-allow dhcpc_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-dontaudit dhcpc_t domain:dir getattr;
-allow dhcpc_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
-#
-# dhclient sometimes starts ypbind and ntdp
-#
-can_exec(dhcpc_t, initrc_exec_t)
-ifdef(`ypbind.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, ypbind_exec_t, ypbind_t)
-allow dhcpc_t ypbind_var_run_t:file { r_file_perms unlink };
-allow dhcpc_t ypbind_t:process signal;
-')
-ifdef(`ntpd.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, ntpd_exec_t, ntpd_t)
-')
-role sysadm_r types dhcpc_t;
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, dhcpc_exec_t, dhcpc_t)
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-dbusd_client(system, dhcpc)
-domain_auto_trans(system_dbusd_t, dhcpc_exec_t, dhcpc_t)
-allow dhcpc_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg };
-allow dhcpc_t self:dbus send_msg;
-allow { NetworkManager_t initrc_t } dhcpc_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow dhcpc_t { NetworkManager_t initrc_t }:dbus send_msg;
-ifdef(`unconfined.te', `
-allow unconfined_t dhcpc_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow dhcpc_t unconfined_t:dbus send_msg;
-')dnl end ifdef unconfined.te
-')
-ifdef(`netutils.te', `domain_auto_trans(dhcpc_t, netutils_exec_t, netutils_t)')
-allow dhcpc_t locale_t:file write;

mls/domains/program/dhcpd.te

@@ -1,79 +0,0 @@
-#DESC DHCPD - DHCP server
-#
-# Author: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au> 
-# based on the dhcpc_t policy from:
-#          Wayne Salamon (NAI Labs) <wsalamon@tislabs.com>
-# X-Debian-Packages: dhcp dhcp3-server 
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the dhcpd_t domain.
-#
-# dhcpd_t is the domain for the server side of DHCP. dhcpd, the DHCP 
-# server daemon rc scripts, runs in this domain.
-# dhcpd_exec_t is the type of the dhcpdd executable.
-# The dhcpd_t can be used for other DHCPC related files as well.
-#
-daemon_domain(dhcpd, `, nscd_client_domain')
-
-# for UDP port 4011
-allow dhcpd_t pxe_port_t:udp_socket name_bind;
-
-type dhcp_etc_t, file_type, sysadmfile, usercanread;
-
-# Use the network.
-can_network(dhcpd_t)
-allow dhcpd_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-allow dhcpd_t dhcpd_port_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } name_bind;
-can_ypbind(dhcpd_t)
-allow dhcpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dhcpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dhcpd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-
-allow dhcpd_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-
-allow dhcpd_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-# Use capabilities
-allow dhcpd_t self:capability { net_raw net_bind_service };
-dontaudit dhcpd_t self:capability  net_admin;
-
-# Allow access to the dhcpd file types
-type dhcp_state_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-type dhcpd_state_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-allow dhcpd_t dhcp_etc_t:file { read getattr };
-allow dhcpd_t dhcp_etc_t:dir search;
-file_type_auto_trans(dhcpd_t, dhcp_state_t, dhcpd_state_t, file)
-rw_dir_create_file(dhcpd_t, dhcpd_state_t)
-
-allow dhcpd_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow dhcpd_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Allow dhcpd_t programs to execute themselves and bin_t (uname etc)
-can_exec(dhcpd_t, { dhcpd_exec_t bin_t })
-
-# Allow dhcpd_t to use packet sockets
-allow dhcpd_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dhcpd_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# allow to run utilities and scripts
-allow dhcpd_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow dhcpd_t { bin_t sbin_t }:{ file lnk_file } rx_file_perms;
-allow dhcpd_t self:fifo_file { read write getattr };
-
-# allow reading /proc
-allow dhcpd_t proc_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
-tmp_domain(dhcpd)
-
-ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
-allow dhcpd_t self:capability { chown dac_override setgid setuid sys_chroot };
-allow initrc_t dhcpd_state_t:file setattr;
-')
-r_dir_file(dhcpd_t, usr_t)
-allow dhcpd_t { urandom_device_t random_device_t }:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-ifdef(`named.te', `
-allow dhcpd_t { named_conf_t named_zone_t }:dir search;
-allow dhcpd_t dnssec_t:file { getattr read };
-')

mls/domains/program/dictd.te

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Dictd - Dictionary daemon
-#
-# Authors:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: dictd
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the dictd_t domain.
-#
-# dictd_exec_t is the type of the dictd executable.
-#
-daemon_base_domain(dictd)
-type dictd_var_lib_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-typealias dictd_var_lib_t alias var_lib_dictd_t;
-etc_domain(dictd)
-
-# for checking for nscd
-dontaudit dictd_t var_run_t:dir search;
-
-# read config files
-allow dictd_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file r_file_perms;
-
-read_locale(dictd_t)
-
-allow dictd_t { var_t var_lib_t }:dir search;
-allow dictd_t dictd_var_lib_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow dictd_t dictd_var_lib_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-allow dictd_t self:capability { setuid setgid };
-
-allow dictd_t usr_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-allow dictd_t self:process { setpgid fork sigchld };
-
-allow dictd_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-allow dictd_t dict_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-
-allow dictd_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow dictd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-can_network_server(dictd_t)
-can_ypbind(dictd_t)
-can_tcp_connect(userdomain, dictd_t)
-
-allow dictd_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;

mls/domains/program/dmesg.te

@@ -1,29 +0,0 @@
-#DESC dmesg - control kernel ring buffer
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh dwalsh@redhat.com
-#
-# X-Debian-Packages: util-linux
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the dmesg_t domain.
-#
-# dmesg_exec_t is the type of the dmesg executable.
-#
-# while sysadm_t has the sys_admin capability there is no point in using
-# dmesg_t when run from sysadm_t, so we use nosysadm.
-#
-daemon_base_domain(dmesg, , `nosysadm')
-
-#
-# Rules used for dmesg
-#
-allow dmesg_t self:capability sys_admin;
-allow dmesg_t kernel_t:system { syslog_read syslog_console syslog_mod };
-allow dmesg_t admin_tty_type:chr_file { getattr read write };
-allow dmesg_t sysadm_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl;
-allow dmesg_t var_log_t:file { getattr write };
-read_locale(dmesg_t)
-
-# for when /usr is not mounted
-dontaudit dmesg_t file_t:dir search;

mls/domains/program/dmidecode.te

@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
-#DESC dmidecode - decodes DMI data for x86/ia64 bioses 
-#
-# Author: Ivan Gyurdiev <ivg2@cornell.edu>
-#
-
-type dmidecode_t, domain, privmem;
-type dmidecode_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# Allow execution by the sysadm
-role sysadm_r types dmidecode_t;
-role system_r types dmidecode_t;
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, dmidecode_exec_t, dmidecode_t)
-
-uses_shlib(dmidecode_t)
-
-# Allow terminal access
-access_terminal(dmidecode_t, sysadm)
-
-# Allow dmidecode to read /dev/mem
-allow dmidecode_t memory_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-allow dmidecode_t self:capability sys_rawio;

mls/domains/program/dovecot.te

@@ -1,75 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Dovecot POP and IMAP servers
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: dovecot-imapd, dovecot-pop3d
-
-#
-# Main dovecot daemon
-#
-daemon_domain(dovecot, `, privhome')
-etc_domain(dovecot);
-
-allow dovecot_t dovecot_var_run_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
-
-can_exec(dovecot_t, dovecot_exec_t)
-
-type dovecot_cert_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-type dovecot_passwd_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-type dovecot_spool_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-allow dovecot_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search chown net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_chroot };
-allow dovecot_t self:process setrlimit;
-can_network_tcp(dovecot_t)
-allow dovecot_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(dovecot_t)
-allow dovecot_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dovecot_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-can_unix_connect(dovecot_t, self)
-
-allow dovecot_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow dovecot_t initrc_var_run_t:file getattr;
-allow dovecot_t bin_t:dir { getattr search };
-can_exec(dovecot_t, bin_t)
-
-allow dovecot_t pop_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-allow dovecot_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow dovecot_t cert_t:dir search;
-r_dir_file(dovecot_t, dovecot_cert_t)
-r_dir_file(dovecot_t, cert_t)
-
-allow dovecot_t { self proc_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow dovecot_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-can_kerberos(dovecot_t)
-
-allow dovecot_t tmp_t:dir search;
-rw_dir_create_file(dovecot_t, mail_spool_t)
-
-
-create_dir_file(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t)
-create_dir_file(mta_delivery_agent, dovecot_spool_t)
-allow dovecot_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
-allow dovecot_t var_spool_t:dir { search };
-
-#
-# Dovecot auth daemon
-#
-daemon_sub_domain(dovecot_t, dovecot_auth, `, auth_chkpwd')
-can_ldap(dovecot_auth_t)
-can_ypbind(dovecot_auth_t)
-can_kerberos(dovecot_auth_t)
-can_resolve(dovecot_auth_t)
-allow dovecot_auth_t self:process { fork signal_perms };
-allow dovecot_auth_t self:capability { setgid setuid };
-allow dovecot_auth_t dovecot_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr accept read write ioctl };
-allow dovecot_auth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow dovecot_auth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow dovecot_auth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow dovecot_auth_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow dovecot_auth_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow dovecot_auth_t { self proc_t }:file { getattr read };
-read_locale(dovecot_auth_t)
-read_sysctl(dovecot_auth_t)
-allow dovecot_auth_t dovecot_passwd_t:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit dovecot_auth_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-allow dovecot_auth_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };

mls/domains/program/fetchmail.te

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-#DESC fetchmail - remote-mail retrieval utility
-#
-# Author: Greg Norris <haphazard@kc.rr.com>
-# X-Debian-Packages: fetchmail
-# Depends: mta.te
-#
-# Note: This policy is only required when running fetchmail in daemon mode.
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the fetchmail_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(fetchmail);
-type fetchmail_etc_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-type fetchmail_uidl_cache_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# misc. requirements
-allow fetchmail_t self:process setrlimit;
-
-# network-related goodies
-can_network_client_tcp(fetchmail_t, { dns_port_t pop_port_t smtp_port_t })
-can_network_udp(fetchmail_t, dns_port_t)
-allow fetchmail_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-
-allow fetchmail_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow fetchmail_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-# file access
-allow fetchmail_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow fetchmail_t fetchmail_etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow fetchmail_t mail_spool_t:dir search;
-file_type_auto_trans(fetchmail_t, mail_spool_t, fetchmail_uidl_cache_t, file)

mls/domains/program/fingerd.te

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Fingerd - Finger daemon
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: fingerd cfingerd efingerd ffingerd
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the fingerd_t domain.
-#
-# fingerd_exec_t is the type of the fingerd executable.
-#
-daemon_domain(fingerd)
-
-etcdir_domain(fingerd)
-
-allow fingerd_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow fingerd_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { read getattr };
-
-log_domain(fingerd)
-system_crond_entry(fingerd_exec_t, fingerd_t)
-ifdef(`logrotate.te', `can_exec(fingerd_t, logrotate_exec_t)')
-
-allow fingerd_t fingerd_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-ifdef(`inetd.te', `
-allow inetd_t fingerd_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-# can be run from inetd
-domain_auto_trans(inetd_t, fingerd_exec_t, fingerd_t)
-allow fingerd_t inetd_t:tcp_socket { read write getattr ioctl };
-')
-ifdef(`tcpd.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(tcpd_t, fingerd_exec_t, fingerd_t)
-')
-
-allow fingerd_t self:capability { setgid setuid };
-# for gzip from logrotate
-dontaudit fingerd_t self:capability fsetid;
-
-# cfingerd runs shell scripts
-allow fingerd_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow fingerd_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(fingerd_t, { shell_exec_t bin_t sbin_t })
-allow fingerd_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-allow fingerd_t { ttyfile ptyfile }:chr_file getattr;
-
-# Use the network.
-can_network_server(fingerd_t)
-can_ypbind(fingerd_t)
-
-allow fingerd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow fingerd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow fingerd_t self:fifo_file { read write getattr };
-
-# allow any user domain to connect to the finger server
-can_tcp_connect(userdomain, fingerd_t)
-
-# for .finger, .plan. etc
-allow fingerd_t { home_root_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search;
-# should really have a different type for .plan etc
-allow fingerd_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
-# stop it accessing sub-directories, prevents checking a Maildir for new mail,
-# have to change this when we create a type for Maildir
-dontaudit fingerd_t user_home_t:dir search;
-
-# for mail
-allow fingerd_t { var_spool_t mail_spool_t }:dir search;
-allow fingerd_t mail_spool_t:file getattr;
-allow fingerd_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# see who is logged in and when users last logged in
-allow fingerd_t { initrc_var_run_t lastlog_t }:file { read getattr };
-dontaudit fingerd_t initrc_var_run_t:file lock;
-allow fingerd_t devpts_t:dir search;
-allow fingerd_t ptyfile:chr_file getattr;
-
-allow fingerd_t proc_t:file { read getattr };
-
-# for date command
-read_sysctl(fingerd_t)

mls/domains/program/firstboot.te

@@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
-#DESC firstboot
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-# X-Debian-Packages: firstboot
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the firstboot_t domain.
-#
-# firstboot_exec_t is the type of the firstboot executable.
-#
-application_domain(firstboot,`, admin, etc_writer, fs_domain, privmem, auth_write, privowner, privmodule, privuser, sysctl_kernel_writer')
-type firstboot_rw_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-role system_r types firstboot_t;
-
-ifdef(`xserver.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(firstboot_t, xserver_exec_t, xdm_xserver_t)
-')
-
-etc_domain(firstboot)
-
-allow firstboot_t proc_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-allow firstboot_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow firstboot_t proc_t:file { getattr read write };
-
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, firstboot_exec_t, firstboot_t)
-file_type_auto_trans(firstboot_t, etc_t, firstboot_rw_t, file)
-
-can_exec_any(firstboot_t)
-ifdef(`useradd.te',`
-domain_auto_trans(firstboot_t, useradd_exec_t, useradd_t)
-domain_auto_trans(firstboot_t, groupadd_exec_t, groupadd_t)
-')
-allow firstboot_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-r_dir_file(firstboot_t, etc_t)
-
-allow firstboot_t firstboot_rw_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow firstboot_t firstboot_rw_t:file create_file_perms;
-allow firstboot_t self:fifo_file { getattr read write };
-allow firstboot_t self:process { fork sigchld };
-allow firstboot_t self:unix_stream_socket { connect create };
-allow firstboot_t initrc_exec_t:file { getattr read };
-allow firstboot_t initrc_var_run_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow firstboot_t lib_t:file { getattr read };
-allow firstboot_t local_login_t:fd use;
-read_locale(firstboot_t)
-
-allow firstboot_t proc_t:dir search;
-allow firstboot_t { devtty_t sysadm_tty_device_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow firstboot_t usr_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-allow firstboot_t etc_t:file write;
-
-# Allow write to utmp file
-allow firstboot_t initrc_var_run_t:file write;
-
-ifdef(`samba.te', `
-rw_dir_file(firstboot_t, samba_etc_t)
-')
-
-dontaudit firstboot_t shadow_t:file getattr;
-
-role system_r types initrc_t;
-#role_transition firstboot_r initrc_exec_t system_r;
-domain_auto_trans(firstboot_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-
-allow firstboot_t self:passwd rootok;
-
-ifdef(`userhelper.te', `
-role system_r types sysadm_userhelper_t;
-domain_auto_trans(firstboot_t, userhelper_exec_t, sysadm_userhelper_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`consoletype.te', `
-allow consoletype_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow consoletype_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow consoletype_t firstboot_t:fd use;
-')
-
-allow firstboot_t etc_t:{ file lnk_file } create_file_perms;
-
-allow firstboot_t self:capability { dac_override setgid };
-allow firstboot_t self:dir search;
-allow firstboot_t self:file { read write };
-allow firstboot_t self:lnk_file read;
-can_setfscreate(firstboot_t)
-allow firstboot_t krb5_conf_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow firstboot_t modules_conf_t:file { getattr read };
-allow firstboot_t modules_dep_t:file { getattr read };
-allow firstboot_t modules_object_t:dir search;
-allow firstboot_t port_t:tcp_socket { recv_msg send_msg };
-allow firstboot_t proc_t:lnk_file read;
-
-can_getsecurity(firstboot_t)
-
-dontaudit firstboot_t sysadm_t:process { noatsecure rlimitinh siginh transition };
-read_sysctl(firstboot_t)
-
-allow firstboot_t var_run_t:dir getattr;
-allow firstboot_t var_t:dir getattr;
-ifdef(`hostname.te', `
-allow hostname_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow hostname_t firstboot_t:fd use;
-')
-ifdef(`iptables.te', `
-allow iptables_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow iptables_t firstboot_t:fd use;
-allow iptables_t firstboot_t:fifo_file write;
-')
-can_network_server(firstboot_t)
-can_ypbind(firstboot_t)
-ifdef(`printconf.te', `
-can_exec(firstboot_t, printconf_t)
-')
-create_dir_file(firstboot_t, var_t)
-# Add/remove user home directories
-file_type_auto_trans(firstboot_t, home_root_t, user_home_dir_t, dir)
-file_type_auto_trans(firstboot_t, user_home_dir_t, user_home_t)
-
-#
-# The big hammer
-#
-unconfined_domain(firstboot_t) 
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow firstboot_t unconfined_t:process transition;
-')
-

mls/domains/program/fs_daemon.te

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-#DESC file system daemons
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: smartmontools
-
-daemon_domain(fsdaemon, `, fs_domain, privmail')
-allow fsdaemon_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow fsdaemon_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-# for config
-allow fsdaemon_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow fsdaemon_t device_t:dir read;
-allow fsdaemon_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file rw_file_perms;
-allow fsdaemon_t self:capability { setgid sys_rawio sys_admin };
-allow fsdaemon_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow fsdaemon_t proc_mdstat_t:file { getattr read };
-
-can_exec_any(fsdaemon_t)
-allow fsdaemon_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-can_network_udp(fsdaemon_t)
-tmp_domain(fsdaemon)
-allow system_mail_t fsdaemon_tmp_t:file { getattr ioctl read };
-
-dontaudit fsdaemon_t devpts_t:dir search;
-allow fsdaemon_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit system_mail_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file read;

mls/domains/program/fsadm.te

@@ -1,123 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Fsadm - Disk and file system administration
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# X-Debian-Packages: util-linux e2fsprogs xfsprogs reiserfsprogs parted raidtools2 mount
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the fsadm_t domain.
-#
-# fsadm_t is the domain for disk and file system
-# administration.
-# fsadm_exec_t is the type of the corresponding programs.
-#
-type fsadm_t, domain, privlog, fs_domain, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite;
-role system_r types fsadm_t;
-role sysadm_r types fsadm_t;
-
-general_domain_access(fsadm_t)
-
-# for swapon
-r_dir_file(fsadm_t, sysfs_t)
-
-# Read system information files in /proc.
-r_dir_file(fsadm_t, proc_t)
-
-# Read system variables in /proc/sys
-read_sysctl(fsadm_t)
-
-# for /dev/shm
-allow fsadm_t tmpfs_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow fsadm_t tmpfs_t:file { read write };
-
-base_file_read_access(fsadm_t)
-
-# Read /etc.
-r_dir_file(fsadm_t, etc_t)
-
-# Read module-related files.
-allow fsadm_t modules_conf_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
-
-# Read /dev directories and any symbolic links.
-allow fsadm_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow fsadm_t device_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-
-uses_shlib(fsadm_t)
-
-type fsadm_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, fsadm_exec_t, fsadm_t)
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, fsadm_exec_t, fsadm_t)
-')
-tmp_domain(fsadm)
-
-# remount file system to apply changes
-allow fsadm_t fs_t:filesystem remount;
-
-allow fsadm_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-# mkreiserfs needs this
-allow fsadm_t proc_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-# mkreiserfs and other programs need this for UUID
-allow fsadm_t { urandom_device_t random_device_t }:chr_file { getattr read };
-
-# Use capabilities.  ipc_lock is for losetup
-allow fsadm_t self:capability { ipc_lock sys_rawio sys_admin sys_tty_config dac_override dac_read_search };
-
-# Write to /etc/mtab.
-file_type_auto_trans(fsadm_t, etc_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
-
-# Inherit and use descriptors from init.
-allow fsadm_t init_t:fd use;
-
-# Run other fs admin programs in the fsadm_t domain.
-can_exec(fsadm_t, fsadm_exec_t)
-
-# Access disk devices.
-allow fsadm_t fixed_disk_device_t:devfile_class_set rw_file_perms;
-allow fsadm_t removable_device_t:devfile_class_set rw_file_perms;
-allow fsadm_t scsi_generic_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-# Access lost+found.
-allow fsadm_t lost_found_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow fsadm_t lost_found_t:{ file sock_file fifo_file } create_file_perms;
-allow fsadm_t lost_found_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
-
-allow fsadm_t file_t:dir { search read getattr rmdir create };
-
-# Recreate /mnt/cdrom. 
-allow fsadm_t mnt_t:dir { search read getattr rmdir create };
-
-# Recreate /dev/cdrom.
-allow fsadm_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow fsadm_t device_t:lnk_file { unlink create };
-
-# Enable swapping to devices and files
-allow fsadm_t swapfile_t:file { getattr swapon };
-allow fsadm_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file { getattr swapon };
-
-# Allow console log change (updfstab)
-allow fsadm_t kernel_t:system syslog_console;
-
-# Access terminals.
-can_access_pty(fsadm_t, initrc)
-allow fsadm_t { admin_tty_type devtty_t console_device_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow fsadm_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;')
-allow fsadm_t privfd:fd use;
-
-read_locale(fsadm_t)
-
-# for smartctl cron jobs
-system_crond_entry(fsadm_exec_t, fsadm_t)
-
-# Access to /initrd devices
-allow fsadm_t { file_t unlabeled_t }:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow fsadm_t { file_t unlabeled_t }:blk_file rw_file_perms;
-allow fsadm_t usbfs_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow fsadm_t ramfs_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow fsadm_t device_type:chr_file getattr;
-
-# for tune2fs
-allow fsadm_t file_type:dir { getattr search };

mls/domains/program/ftpd.te

@@ -1,116 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Ftpd - Ftp daemon
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-#           Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: proftpd-common bsd-ftpd ftpd vsftpd
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the ftpd_t domain 
-#
-daemon_domain(ftpd, `, auth_chkpwd, nscd_client_domain')
-etc_domain(ftpd)
-
-can_network(ftpd_t)
-allow ftpd_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-allow ftpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms };
-allow ftpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow ftpd_t self:process { getcap setcap setsched setrlimit };
-allow ftpd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow ftpd_t bin_t:dir search;
-can_exec(ftpd_t, bin_t)
-allow ftpd_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-read_sysctl(ftpd_t)
-
-allow ftpd_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-system_crond_entry(ftpd_exec_t, ftpd_t)
-allow system_crond_t xferlog_t:file r_file_perms;
-can_exec(ftpd_t, { sbin_t shell_exec_t })
-allow ftpd_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-ifdef(`logrotate.te', `
-can_exec(ftpd_t, logrotate_exec_t)
-')dnl end if logrotate.te
-')dnl end if crond.te
-
-allow ftpd_t ftp_data_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-allow ftpd_t port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-
-# ftpd_lock_t is only needed when ftpd_is_daemon is true, but we cannot define types conditionally
-type ftpd_lock_t, file_type, sysadmfile, lockfile;
-
-# Allow ftpd to run directly without inetd.
-bool ftpd_is_daemon false;
-if (ftpd_is_daemon) {
-file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, var_lock_t, ftpd_lock_t, file)
-allow ftpd_t ftp_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-can_tcp_connect(userdomain, ftpd_t)
-# Allows it to check exec privs on daemon
-allow inetd_t ftpd_exec_t:file x_file_perms;
-}
-ifdef(`inetd.te', `
-if (!ftpd_is_daemon) {
-ifdef(`tcpd.te', `domain_auto_trans(tcpd_t, ftpd_exec_t, ftpd_t)')
-domain_auto_trans(inetd_t, ftpd_exec_t, ftpd_t)
-
-# Use sockets inherited from inetd.
-allow ftpd_t inetd_t:fd use;
-allow ftpd_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;
-
-# Send SIGCHLD to inetd on death.
-allow ftpd_t inetd_t:process sigchld;
-}
-') dnl end inetd.te
-
-# Access shared memory tmpfs instance.
-tmpfs_domain(ftpd)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow ftpd_t self:capability { chown fowner fsetid setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_chroot sys_nice sys_resource };
-
-# Append to /var/log/wtmp.
-allow ftpd_t wtmp_t:file { getattr append };
-#kerberized ftp requires the following
-allow ftpd_t wtmp_t:file { write lock };
-
-# Create and modify /var/log/xferlog.
-type xferlog_t, file_type, sysadmfile, logfile;
-file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, var_log_t, xferlog_t, file)
-
-# Execute /bin/ls (can comment this out for proftpd)
-# also may need rules to allow tar etc...
-can_exec(ftpd_t, ls_exec_t)
-
-allow initrc_t ftpd_etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow ftpd_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow ftpd_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-dontaudit ftpd_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir getattr;
-dontaudit ftpd_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-allow ftpd_t autofs_t:dir search;
-allow ftpd_t self:file { getattr read };
-tmp_domain(ftpd)
-
-# Allow ftp to read/write files in the user home directories.
-bool ftp_home_dir false;
-
-if (ftp_home_dir) {
-# allow access to /home
-allow ftpd_t home_root_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-create_dir_file(ftpd_t, home_type)
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, user_home_dir_t, user_home_t)
-')
-}
-if (use_nfs_home_dirs && ftp_home_dir) {
-	r_dir_file(ftpd_t, nfs_t)
-}
-if (use_samba_home_dirs && ftp_home_dir) {
-	r_dir_file(ftpd_t, cifs_t)
-}
-dontaudit ftpd_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-anonymous_domain(ftpd)
-

mls/domains/program/getty.te

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Getty - Manage ttys
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# X-Debian-Packages: util-linux fbgetty mingetty mgetty rungetty
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the getty_t domain.
-#
-init_service_domain(getty, `, privfd, privmail, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite')
-
-etcdir_domain(getty)
-
-allow getty_t console_device_t:chr_file setattr;
-
-tmp_domain(getty)
-log_domain(getty)
-
-allow getty_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow getty_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow getty_t self:process { getpgid getsession };
-allow getty_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow getty_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow getty_t self:capability { dac_override chown sys_resource sys_tty_config };
-
-read_locale(getty_t)
-
-# Run login in local_login_t domain.
-allow getty_t { sbin_t bin_t }:dir search;
-domain_auto_trans(getty_t, login_exec_t, local_login_t)
-
-# Write to /var/run/utmp.
-allow getty_t { var_t var_run_t }:dir search;
-allow getty_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Write to /var/log/wtmp.
-allow getty_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Chown, chmod, read and write ttys.
-allow getty_t tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
-allow getty_t ttyfile:chr_file { setattr rw_file_perms };
-dontaudit getty_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; 
-
-# for error condition handling
-allow getty_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-lock_domain(getty)
-r_dir_file(getty_t, sysfs_t)
-# for mgetty
-var_run_domain(getty)
-allow getty_t self:capability { fowner fsetid };
-
-#
-# getty needs to be able to run pppd
-#
-ifdef(`pppd.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(getty_t, pppd_exec_t, pppd_t)
-')

mls/domains/program/gpg-agent.te

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-#DESC gpg-agent - agent to securely store gpg-keys
-#
-# Author: Thomas Bleher <ThomasBleher@gmx.de>
-#
-
-# Type for the gpg-agent executable.
-type gpg_agent_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for the pinentry executable
-type pinentry_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# Everything else is in the gpg_agent_domain macro in
-# macros/program/gpg_agent_macros.te.

mls/domains/program/gpg.te

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-#DESC GPG - Gnu Privacy Guard (PGP replacement)
-#
-# Authors:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: gnupg
-#
-
-# Type for gpg or pgp executables.
-type gpg_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-type gpg_helper_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-allow sysadm_gpg_t { home_root_t user_home_dir_type }:dir search;
-allow sysadm_gpg_t ptyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Everything else is in the gpg_domain macro in
-# macros/program/gpg_macros.te.

mls/domains/program/gpm.te

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Gpm - General Purpose Mouse driver
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# X-Debian-Packages: gpm
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the gpm_t domain.
-#
-# gpm_t is the domain of the console mouse server.
-# gpm_exec_t is the type of the console mouse server program.
-# gpmctl_t is the type of the Unix domain socket or pipe created
-# by the console mouse server.
-#
-daemon_domain(gpm)
-
-type gpmctl_t, file_type, sysadmfile, dev_fs;
-
-tmp_domain(gpm)
-
-# Allow to read the /etc/gpm/ conf files
-type gpm_conf_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-r_dir_file(gpm_t, gpm_conf_t)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow gpm_t self:capability { setuid dac_override sys_admin sys_tty_config };
-
-# Create and bind to /dev/gpmctl.
-file_type_auto_trans(gpm_t, device_t, gpmctl_t, { sock_file fifo_file })
-allow gpm_t gpmctl_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind;
-allow gpm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow gpm_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-
-# Read and write ttys.
-allow gpm_t tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Access the mouse.
-allow gpm_t { event_device_t mouse_device_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow gpm_t device_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-
-read_locale(gpm_t)
-
-allow initrc_t gpmctl_t:sock_file setattr;
-

mls/domains/program/hald.te

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-#DESC hald - server for device info
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <rcoker@redhat.com>
-# X-Debian-Packages: 
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the hald_t domain.
-#
-# hald_exec_t is the type of the hald executable.
-#
-daemon_domain(hald, `, fs_domain, nscd_client_domain')
-
-can_exec_any(hald_t)
-
-allow hald_t { etc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow hald_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
-allow hald_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-allow hald_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg };
-dbusd_client(system, hald)
-allow hald_t self:dbus send_msg;
-')
-
-allow hald_t self:file { getattr read };
-allow hald_t proc_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow hald_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow hald_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow hald_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-allow hald_t bin_t:file getattr;
-
-# For backwards compatibility with older kernels
-allow hald_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-allow hald_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow hald_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-allow hald_t self:capability { net_admin sys_admin dac_override dac_read_search mknod sys_rawio };
-can_network_server(hald_t)
-can_ypbind(hald_t)
-
-allow hald_t device_t:lnk_file read;
-allow hald_t { fixed_disk_device_t removable_device_t }:blk_file { getattr read ioctl };
-allow hald_t removable_device_t:blk_file write;
-allow hald_t event_device_t:chr_file { getattr read ioctl };
-allow hald_t printer_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow hald_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-allow hald_t mouse_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow hald_t device_type:chr_file getattr;
-
-can_getsecurity(hald_t)
-
-ifdef(`updfstab.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hald_t, updfstab_exec_t, updfstab_t)
-allow updfstab_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow hald_t updfstab_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-ifdef(`udev.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hald_t, udev_exec_t, udev_t)
-allow udev_t hald_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
-allow hald_t udev_tbl_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-
-ifdef(`hotplug.te', `
-r_dir_file(hald_t, hotplug_etc_t)
-')
-allow hald_t fs_type:dir { search getattr };
-allow hald_t usbfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow hald_t { usbdevfs_t usbfs_t }:file rw_file_perms;
-allow hald_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-r_dir_file(hald_t, { selinux_config_t default_context_t } )
-allow hald_t initrc_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow initrc_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow hald_t etc_runtime_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow hald_t var_lib_t:dir search;
-allow hald_t device_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow hald_t device_t:chr_file create_file_perms;
-tmp_domain(hald)
-allow hald_t mnt_t:dir search;
-r_dir_file(hald_t, proc_net_t)
-
-# For /usr/libexec/hald-addon-acpi - writes to /var/run/acpid.socket
-ifdef(`apmd.te', `
-allow hald_t apmd_var_run_t:sock_file write;
-allow hald_t apmd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-')
-
-# For /usr/libexec/hald-probe-smbios
-domain_auto_trans(hald_t, dmidecode_exec_t, dmidecode_t)
-
-# ??
-ifdef(`lvm.te', `
-allow hald_t lvm_control_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-')
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow unconfined_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;
-allow hald_t unconfined_t:dbus send_msg;
-')
-ifdef(`mount.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hald_t, mount_exec_t, mount_t)
-')
-r_dir_file(hald_t, hwdata_t)

mls/domains/program/hostname.te

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-#DESC hostname - show or set the system host name
-#
-# Author: Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: hostname
-
-# for setting the hostname
-daemon_core_rules(hostname, , nosysadm)
-allow hostname_t self:capability sys_admin;
-allow hostname_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow hostname_t { user_tty_type admin_tty_type }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-read_locale(hostname_t)
-can_resolve(hostname_t)
-allow hostname_t userdomain:fd use;
-dontaudit hostname_t kernel_t:fd use;
-allow hostname_t net_conf_t:file { getattr read };
-allow hostname_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-dontaudit hostname_t var_t:dir search;
-allow hostname_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-# for when /usr is not mounted
-dontaudit hostname_t file_t:dir search;
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-allow hostname_t tmpfs_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-')
-can_access_pty(hostname_t, initrc)
-allow hostname_t initrc_t:fd use;

mls/domains/program/hotplug.te

@@ -1,160 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Hotplug - Hardware event manager
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: hotplug
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the hotplug_t domain.
-#
-# hotplug_exec_t is the type of the hotplug executable.
-#
-ifdef(`unlimitedUtils', `
-daemon_domain(hotplug, `, admin, etc_writer, fs_domain, privmem, privmail, auth_write, privowner, privmodule, domain, privlog, sysctl_kernel_writer, nscd_client_domain')
-', `
-daemon_domain(hotplug, `, privmodule, privmail, nscd_client_domain')
-')
-
-etcdir_domain(hotplug)
-
-allow hotplug_t self:fifo_file { read write getattr ioctl };
-allow hotplug_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow hotplug_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow hotplug_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-read_sysctl(hotplug_t)
-allow hotplug_t sysctl_net_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow hotplug_t sysctl_net_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# get info from /proc
-r_dir_file(hotplug_t, proc_t)
-allow hotplug_t self:file { getattr read ioctl };
-
-allow hotplug_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow hotplug_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# for SSP
-allow hotplug_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-allow hotplug_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow hotplug_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(hotplug_t, { hotplug_exec_t bin_t sbin_t ls_exec_t shell_exec_t hotplug_etc_t etc_t })
-ifdef(`hostname.te', `
-can_exec(hotplug_t, hostname_exec_t)
-dontaudit hostname_t hotplug_t:fd use;
-')
-ifdef(`netutils.te', `
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-# for arping used for static IP addresses on PCMCIA ethernet
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, netutils_exec_t, netutils_t)
-
-allow hotplug_t tmpfs_t:dir search;
-allow hotplug_t tmpfs_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-')dnl end if distro_redhat
-')dnl end if netutils.te
-
-allow initrc_t usbdevfs_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-allow initrc_t modules_dep_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-r_dir_file(hotplug_t, usbdevfs_t)
-allow hotplug_t usbfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow hotplug_t usbfs_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# read config files
-allow hotplug_t etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow hotplug_t etc_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
-
-allow hotplug_t kernel_t:process { sigchld setpgid };
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-allow hotplug_t var_lock_t:dir search;
-allow hotplug_t var_lock_t:file getattr;
-')
-
-ifdef(`hald.te', `
-allow hotplug_t hald_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
-allow hald_t hotplug_etc_t:dir search;
-allow hald_t hotplug_etc_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-
-# for killall
-allow hotplug_t self:process { getsession getattr };
-allow hotplug_t self:file getattr;
-
-domain_auto_trans(kernel_t, hotplug_exec_t, hotplug_t)
-ifdef(`mount.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, mount_exec_t, mount_t)
-')
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-ifdef(`updfstab.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, updfstab_exec_t, updfstab_t)
-')
-
-# init scripts run /etc/hotplug/usb.rc
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, hotplug_etc_t, hotplug_t)
-allow initrc_t hotplug_etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-ifdef(`iptables.te', `domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, iptables_exec_t, iptables_t)')
-
-r_dir_file(hotplug_t, modules_object_t)
-allow hotplug_t modules_dep_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-
-# for lsmod
-dontaudit hotplug_t self:capability { sys_module sys_admin };
-
-# for access("/etc/bashrc", X_OK) on Red Hat
-dontaudit hotplug_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };
-
-ifdef(`fsadm.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, fsadm_exec_t, fsadm_t)
-')
-
-allow hotplug_t var_log_t:dir search;
-
-# for ps
-dontaudit hotplug_t domain:dir { getattr search };
-dontaudit hotplug_t { init_t kernel_t }:file read;
-ifdef(`initrc.te', `
-can_ps(hotplug_t, initrc_t)
-')
-
-# for when filesystems are not mounted early in the boot
-dontaudit hotplug_t file_t:dir { search getattr };
-
-# kernel threads inherit from shared descriptor table used by init
-dontaudit hotplug_t initctl_t:fifo_file { read write };
-
-# Read /usr/lib/gconv/.*
-allow hotplug_t lib_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow hotplug_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config mknod sys_rawio };
-allow hotplug_t sysfs_t:dir { getattr read search write };
-allow hotplug_t sysfs_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow hotplug_t sysfs_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-r_dir_file(hotplug_t, hwdata_t)
-allow hotplug_t udev_runtime_t:file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`lpd.te', `
-allow hotplug_t printer_device_t:chr_file setattr;
-')
-allow hotplug_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file setattr;
-allow hotplug_t removable_device_t:blk_file setattr;
-allow hotplug_t sound_device_t:chr_file setattr;
-
-ifdef(`udev.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, { udev_exec_t udev_helper_exec_t }, udev_t)
-')
-
-file_type_auto_trans(hotplug_t, etc_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
-
-can_network_server(hotplug_t)
-can_ypbind(hotplug_t)
-dbusd_client(system, hotplug)
-
-# Allow hotplug (including /sbin/ifup-local) to start/stop services
-domain_auto_trans(hotplug_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-
-allow { insmod_t kernel_t } hotplug_etc_t:dir { search getattr };
-allow hotplug_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-
-dontaudit hotplug_t selinux_config_t:dir search;

mls/domains/program/howl.te

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-#DESC howl - port of Apple Rendezvous multicast DNS
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <rcoker@redhat.com>
-#
-
-daemon_domain(howl, `, privsysmod')
-r_dir_file(howl_t, proc_net_t)
-can_network_server(howl_t)
-can_ypbind(howl_t)
-allow howl_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow howl_t self:capability { kill net_admin sys_module };
-
-allow howl_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-allow howl_t howl_port_t:{ udp_socket tcp_socket } name_bind;
-
-allow howl_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-allow howl_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow howl_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
-

mls/domains/program/hwclock.te

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Hwclock - Hardware clock manager
-#
-# Author:  David A. Wheeler <dwheeler@ida.org>
-#          Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: util-linux
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the hwclock_t domain.
-# This domain moves time information between the "hardware clock"
-# (which runs when the system is off) and the "system clock",
-# and it stores adjustment values in /etc/adjtime so that errors in the
-# hardware clock are corrected.
-# Note that any errors from this domain are NOT recorded by the system logger,
-# because the system logger isnt running when this domain is active.
-#
-daemon_base_domain(hwclock)
-role sysadm_r types hwclock_t;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, hwclock_exec_t, hwclock_t)
-')
-type adjtime_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-allow hwclock_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-read_locale(hwclock_t)
-
-# Give hwclock the capabilities it requires.  dac_override is a surprise,
-# but hwclock does require it.
-allow hwclock_t self:capability { dac_override sys_rawio sys_time sys_tty_config };
-
-# Allow hwclock to set the hardware clock.
-allow hwclock_t clock_device_t:devfile_class_set { setattr rw_file_perms };
-
-# Allow hwclock to store & retrieve correction factors.
-allow hwclock_t adjtime_t:file { setattr rw_file_perms };
-
-# Read and write console and ttys.
-allow hwclock_t tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow hwclock_t ttyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow hwclock_t ptyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow hwclock_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;')
-
-read_locale(hwclock_t)
-
-# for when /usr is not mounted
-dontaudit hwclock_t file_t:dir search;
-allow hwclock_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay };
-r_dir_file(hwclock_t, etc_t)

mls/domains/program/i18n_input.te

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-# i18n_input.te
-# Security Policy for IIIMF htt server
-# Date: 2004, 12th April (Monday)
-
-# Establish i18n_input as a daemon
-daemon_domain(i18n_input)
-
-can_exec(i18n_input_t, i18n_input_exec_t)
-can_network(i18n_input_t)
-allow i18n_input_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(i18n_input_t)
-
-can_tcp_connect(userdomain, i18n_input_t)
-can_unix_connect(i18n_input_t, initrc_t)
-
-allow i18n_input_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow i18n_input_t i18n_input_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-
-allow i18n_input_t self:capability { kill setgid setuid };
-allow i18n_input_t self:process { setsched setpgid };
-
-allow i18n_input_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-can_exec(i18n_input_t, bin_t)
-
-allow i18n_input_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow i18n_input_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow i18n_input_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow i18n_input_t i18n_input_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow i18n_input_t i18n_input_var_run_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
-allow i18n_input_t usr_t:file { getattr read };
-allow i18n_input_t home_root_t:dir search;
-allow i18n_input_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-allow i18n_input_t proc_t:file { getattr read };

mls/domains/program/ifconfig.te

@@ -1,74 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Ifconfig - Configure network interfaces
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# X-Debian-Packages: net-tools
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the ifconfig_t domain.
-#
-# ifconfig_t is the domain for the ifconfig program.
-# ifconfig_exec_t is the type of the corresponding program.
-#
-type ifconfig_t, domain, privlog, privmodule;
-type ifconfig_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-role system_r types ifconfig_t;
-role sysadm_r types ifconfig_t;
-
-uses_shlib(ifconfig_t)
-general_domain_access(ifconfig_t)
-
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-')
-
-# for /sbin/ip
-allow ifconfig_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow ifconfig_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms;
-allow ifconfig_t self:tcp_socket { create ioctl };
-allow ifconfig_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow ifconfig_t self:socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow ifconfig_t self:capability { net_raw net_admin };
-dontaudit ifconfig_t self:capability sys_module;
-allow ifconfig_t self:capability sys_tty_config;
-
-# Inherit and use descriptors from init.
-allow ifconfig_t { kernel_t init_t }:fd use;
-
-# Access /proc
-r_dir_file(ifconfig_t, proc_t)
-r_dir_file(ifconfig_t, proc_net_t)
-
-allow ifconfig_t privfd:fd use;
-allow ifconfig_t run_init_t:fd use;
-
-# Create UDP sockets, necessary when called from dhcpc
-allow ifconfig_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# Access terminals.
-can_access_pty(ifconfig_t, initrc)
-allow ifconfig_t { user_tty_type admin_tty_type }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow ifconfig_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;')
-
-allow ifconfig_t tun_tap_device_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-# ifconfig attempts to search some sysctl entries.
-# Do not audit those attempts; comment out these rules if it is desired to
-# see the denials.
-allow ifconfig_t { sysctl_t sysctl_net_t }:dir search;
-
-allow ifconfig_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-read_locale(ifconfig_t)
-allow ifconfig_t lib_t:file { getattr read };
-
-rhgb_domain(ifconfig_t)
-allow ifconfig_t userdomain:fd use;
-dontaudit ifconfig_t root_t:file read;
-r_dir_file(ifconfig_t, sysfs_t)

mls/domains/program/inetd.te

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Inetd - Internet services daemon
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# re-written with daemon_domain by Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: netkit-inetd openbsd-inetd xinetd
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the inetd_t domain and
-# the inetd_child_t domain.
-#
-
-daemon_domain(inetd, `ifdef(`unlimitedInetd', `,admin, etc_writer, fs_domain, auth_write, privmem')' )
-
-can_network(inetd_t)
-allow inetd_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-allow inetd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow inetd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow inetd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow inetd_t etc_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-allow inetd_t self:process setsched;
-
-log_domain(inetd)
-tmp_domain(inetd)
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow inetd_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service };
-
-# allow any domain to connect to inetd
-can_tcp_connect(userdomain, inetd_t)
-
-# Run each daemon with a defined domain in its own domain.
-# These rules have been moved to the individual target domain .te files.
-
-# Run other daemons in the inetd_child_t domain.
-allow inetd_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow inetd_t sbin_t:lnk_file read;
-
-# Bind to the telnet, ftp, rlogin and rsh ports.
-ifdef(`ftpd.te', `allow inetd_t ftp_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;')
-ifdef(`rshd.te', `allow inetd_t rsh_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;')
-ifdef(`talk.te', `
-allow inetd_t talk_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-allow inetd_t ntalk_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-')
-
-allow inetd_t auth_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-# Communicate with the portmapper.
-ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_udp_send(inetd_t, portmap_t)')
-
-
-inetd_child_domain(inetd_child)
-allow inetd_child_t proc_net_t:dir search;
-allow inetd_child_t proc_net_t:file { getattr read };
-
-ifdef(`unconfined.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(inetd_t, unconfined_exec_t, unconfined_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`unlimitedInetd', `
-unconfined_domain(inetd_t) 
-')
-

mls/domains/program/init.te

@@ -1,147 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Init - Process initialization
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# X-Debian-Packages: sysvinit
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the init_t domain.
-#
-# init_t is the domain of the init process.
-# init_exec_t is the type of the init program.
-# initctl_t is the type of the named pipe created 
-# by init during initialization.  This pipe is used
-# to communicate with init.
-#
-type init_t, domain, privlog, sysctl_kernel_writer, nscd_client_domain, mlsrangetrans, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite, mlsprocwrite;
-role system_r types init_t;
-uses_shlib(init_t);
-type init_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-type initctl_t, file_type, sysadmfile, dev_fs, mlstrustedobject;
-
-# for init to determine whether SE Linux is active so it can know whether to
-# activate it
-allow init_t security_t:dir search;
-allow init_t security_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# for mount points
-allow init_t file_t:dir search;
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow init_t self:capability ~sys_module;
-
-# Run /etc/rc.sysinit, /etc/rc, /etc/rc.local in the initrc_t domain.
-domain_auto_trans(init_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-
-# Run the shell in the sysadm_t domain for single-user mode.
-domain_auto_trans(init_t, shell_exec_t, sysadm_t)
-
-# Run /sbin/update in the init_t domain.
-can_exec(init_t, sbin_t)
-
-# Run init.
-can_exec(init_t, init_exec_t)
-
-# Run chroot from initrd scripts.
-ifdef(`chroot.te', `
-can_exec(init_t, chroot_exec_t)
-')
-
-# Create /dev/initctl.
-file_type_auto_trans(init_t, device_t, initctl_t, fifo_file)
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-file_type_auto_trans(init_t, tmpfs_t, initctl_t, fifo_file)
-')
-
-# Create ioctl.save.
-file_type_auto_trans(init_t, etc_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
-
-# Update /etc/ld.so.cache
-allow init_t ld_so_cache_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Allow access to log files
-allow init_t var_t:dir search;
-allow init_t var_log_t:dir search;
-allow init_t var_log_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-read_locale(init_t)
-
-# Create unix sockets
-allow init_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow init_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Permissions required for system startup
-allow init_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow init_t { bin_t sbin_t }:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr lock ioctl };
-
-# allow init to fork
-allow init_t self:process { fork sigchld };
-
-# Modify utmp.
-allow init_t var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow init_t initrc_var_run_t:file { setattr rw_file_perms };
-can_unix_connect(init_t, initrc_t)
-
-# For /var/run/shutdown.pid.
-var_run_domain(init)
-
-# Shutdown permissions
-r_dir_file(init_t, proc_t)
-r_dir_file(init_t, self)
-allow init_t devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# Modify wtmp.
-allow init_t wtmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Kill all processes.
-allow init_t domain:process signal_perms;
-
-# Allow all processes to send SIGCHLD to init.
-allow domain init_t:process { sigchld signull };
-
-# If you load a new policy that removes active domains, processes can
-# get stuck if you do not allow unlabeled processes to signal init
-# If you load an incompatible policy, you should probably reboot,
-# since you may have compromised system security.
-allow unlabeled_t init_t:process sigchld;
-
-# for loading policy
-allow init_t policy_config_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Set booleans.
-can_setbool(init_t)
-
-# Read and write the console and ttys.
-allow init_t { tty_device_t console_device_t } :chr_file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-allow init_t tmpfs_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-')
-allow init_t ttyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow init_t ptyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Run system executables.
-can_exec(init_t,bin_t)
-ifdef(`consoletype.te', `
-can_exec(init_t, consoletype_exec_t)
-')
-
-# Run /etc/X11/prefdm.
-can_exec(init_t,etc_t)
-
-allow init_t lib_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow init_t devtty_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow init_t ramfs_t:dir search;
-allow init_t ramfs_t:sock_file write;
-r_dir_file(init_t, sysfs_t)
-
-r_dir_file(init_t, selinux_config_t)
-
-# file descriptors inherited from the rootfs.
-dontaudit init_t root_t:{ file chr_file } { read write }; 
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-unconfined_domain(init_t)
-')
-

mls/domains/program/initrc.te

@@ -1,346 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Initrc - System initialization scripts
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# X-Debian-Packages: sysvinit policycoreutils
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the initrc_t domain.
-#
-# initrc_t is the domain of the init rc scripts.
-# initrc_exec_t is the type of the init program.
-#
-# do not use privmail for sendmail as it creates a type transition conflict
-type initrc_t, fs_domain, ifdef(`unlimitedRC', `admin, etc_writer, privmem, auth_write, ') domain, privlog, privowner, privmodule, ifdef(`sendmail.te', `', `privmail,') ifdef(`distro_debian', `etc_writer, ') sysctl_kernel_writer, nscd_client_domain, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite, mlsprocread, mlsprocwrite, privrangetrans;
-
-role system_r types initrc_t;
-uses_shlib(initrc_t);
-can_network(initrc_t)
-allow initrc_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(initrc_t)
-type initrc_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# for halt to down interfaces
-allow initrc_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# read files in /etc/init.d
-allow initrc_t etc_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-
-read_locale(initrc_t)
-
-r_dir_file(initrc_t, usr_t)
-
-# Read system information files in /proc.
-r_dir_file(initrc_t, { proc_t proc_net_t })
-allow initrc_t proc_mdstat_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# Allow IPC with self
-allow initrc_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow initrc_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
-allow initrc_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Read the root directory of a usbdevfs filesystem, and
-# the devices and drivers files.  Permit stating of the
-# device nodes, but nothing else.
-allow initrc_t usbdevfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t usbdevfs_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t usbdevfs_t:file getattr;
-allow initrc_t usbfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t usbfs_t:file getattr;
-
-# allow initrc to fork and renice itself
-allow initrc_t self:process { fork sigchld getpgid setsched setpgid setrlimit getsched };
-
-# Can create ptys for open_init_pty
-can_create_pty(initrc)
-
-tmp_domain(initrc)
-#
-# Some initscripts generate scripts that they need to execute (ldap)
-#
-can_exec(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t)
-
-var_run_domain(initrc)
-allow initrc_t var_run_t:{ file sock_file lnk_file } unlink;
-allow initrc_t var_run_t:dir { create rmdir };
-
-ifdef(`distro_debian', `
-allow initrc_t { etc_t device_t }:dir setattr;
-
-# for storing state under /dev/shm
-allow initrc_t tmpfs_t:dir setattr;
-file_type_auto_trans(initrc_t, tmpfs_t, initrc_var_run_t, dir)
-file_type_auto_trans(initrc_t, tmpfs_t, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file)
-allow { initrc_var_run_t fixed_disk_device_t } tmpfs_t:filesystem associate;
-')
-
-allow initrc_t framebuf_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow initrc_t self:capability ~{ sys_admin sys_module };
-
-# Use system operations.
-allow initrc_t kernel_t:system *;
-
-# Set values in /proc/sys.
-can_sysctl(initrc_t)
-
-# Run helper programs in the initrc_t domain.
-allow initrc_t {bin_t sbin_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t {bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(initrc_t, etc_t)
-can_exec(initrc_t, lib_t)
-can_exec(initrc_t, bin_t)
-can_exec(initrc_t, sbin_t)
-can_exec(initrc_t, exec_type)
-#
-#  These rules are here to allow init scripts to su
-#
-ifdef(`su.te', `
-su_restricted_domain(initrc,system)
-role system_r types initrc_su_t;
-')
-allow initrc_t self:passwd rootok;
-
-# read /lib/modules
-allow initrc_t modules_object_t:dir { search read };
-
-# Read conf.modules.
-allow initrc_t modules_conf_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Run other rc scripts in the initrc_t domain.
-can_exec(initrc_t, initrc_exec_t)
-
-# Run init (telinit) in the initrc_t domain.
-can_exec(initrc_t, init_exec_t)
-
-# Communicate with the init process.
-allow initrc_t initctl_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Read /proc/PID directories for all domains.
-r_dir_file(initrc_t, domain)
-allow initrc_t domain:process { getattr getsession };
-
-# Mount and unmount file systems.
-allow initrc_t fs_type:filesystem mount_fs_perms;
-allow initrc_t file_t:dir { read search getattr mounton };
-
-# during boot up initrc needs to do the following
-allow initrc_t default_t:dir { write read search getattr mounton };
-
-# rhgb-console writes to ramfs
-allow initrc_t ramfs_t:fifo_file write;
-
-# Create runtime files in /etc, e.g. /etc/mtab, /etc/HOSTNAME.
-file_type_auto_trans(initrc_t, etc_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
-
-# Update /etc/ld.so.cache.
-allow initrc_t ld_so_cache_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Update /var/log/wtmp and /var/log/dmesg.
-allow initrc_t wtmp_t:file { setattr rw_file_perms };
-allow initrc_t var_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t var_log_t:file create_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t lastlog_t:file { setattr rw_file_perms };
-allow initrc_t logfile:file { read append };
-
-# remove old locks
-allow initrc_t lockfile:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t lockfile:file { getattr unlink };
-
-# Access /var/lib/random-seed.
-allow initrc_t var_lib_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t var_lib_t:file unlink;
-
-# Create lock file.
-allow initrc_t var_lock_t:dir create_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t var_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
-
-# Set the clock.
-allow initrc_t clock_device_t:devfile_class_set rw_file_perms;
-
-# Kill all processes.
-allow initrc_t domain:process signal_perms;
-
-# Write to /dev/urandom.
-allow initrc_t { random_device_t urandom_device_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# for cryptsetup
-allow initrc_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file getattr;
-
-# Set device ownerships/modes.
-allow initrc_t framebuf_device_t:chr_file setattr;
-allow initrc_t misc_device_t:devfile_class_set setattr;
-allow initrc_t device_t:devfile_class_set setattr;
-allow initrc_t fixed_disk_device_t:devfile_class_set setattr;
-allow initrc_t removable_device_t:devfile_class_set setattr;
-allow initrc_t device_t:lnk_file read;
-allow initrc_t xconsole_device_t:fifo_file setattr;
-
-# Stat any file.
-allow initrc_t file_type:notdevfile_class_set getattr;
-allow initrc_t file_type:dir { search getattr };
-
-# Read and write console and ttys.
-allow initrc_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t console_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t ttyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t ptyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Reset tty labels.
-allow initrc_t ttyfile:chr_file relabelfrom;
-allow initrc_t tty_device_t:chr_file relabelto;
-
-ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
-# Create and read /boot/kernel.h and /boot/System.map.
-# Redhat systems typically create this file at boot time.
-allow initrc_t boot_t:lnk_file rw_file_perms;
-file_type_auto_trans(initrc_t, boot_t, boot_runtime_t, file)
-
-allow initrc_t tmpfs_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t tmpfs_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# Allow initrc domain to set the enforcing flag.
-can_setenforce(initrc_t)
-
-#
-# readahead asks for these
-#
-allow initrc_t etc_aliases_t:file { getattr read };
-allow initrc_t var_lib_nfs_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# for /halt /.autofsck and other flag files
-file_type_auto_trans({ initrc_t sysadm_t }, root_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
-
-file_type_auto_trans(initrc_t, device_t, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file)
-allow initrc_t file_type:{ dir_file_class_set socket_class_set } getattr;
-allow initrc_t self:capability sys_admin;
-allow initrc_t device_t:dir create;
-# wants to delete /poweroff and other files 
-allow initrc_t root_t:file unlink;
-# wants to read /.fonts directory
-allow initrc_t default_t:file { getattr read };
-ifdef(`xserver.te', `
-# wants to cleanup xserver log dir
-allow initrc_t xserver_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t xserver_log_t:file unlink;
-')
-')dnl end distro_redhat
-
-allow initrc_t system_map_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t var_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Allow access to the sysadm TTYs. Note that this will give access to the 
-# TTYs to any process in the initrc_t domain. Therefore, daemons and such
-# started from init should be placed in their own domain.
-allow initrc_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Access sound device and files.
-allow initrc_t sound_device_t:chr_file { setattr ioctl read write };
-
-# Read user home directories.
-allow initrc_t { home_root_t home_type }:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t home_type:file r_file_perms;
-
-# Read and unlink /var/run/*.pid files.
-allow initrc_t pidfile:file { getattr read unlink };
-
-# for system start scripts
-allow initrc_t pidfile:dir { rmdir rw_dir_perms };
-allow initrc_t pidfile:sock_file unlink;
-
-rw_dir_create_file(initrc_t, var_lib_t)
-
-# allow start scripts to clean /tmp
-allow initrc_t { unlabeled_t tmpfile }:dir { rw_dir_perms rmdir };
-allow initrc_t { unlabeled_t tmpfile }:notdevfile_class_set { getattr unlink };
-
-# for lsof which is used by alsa shutdown
-dontaudit initrc_t domain:{ udp_socket tcp_socket fifo_file unix_dgram_socket } getattr;
-dontaudit initrc_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr;
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the run_init_t domain.
-#
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-type run_init_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-type run_init_t, domain;
-domain_auto_trans(unconfined_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-allow unconfined_t initrc_t:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg };
-allow initrc_t unconfined_t:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg };
-typeattribute initrc_t privuser;
-domain_trans(initrc_t, shell_exec_t, unconfined_t)
-allow initrc_t unconfined_t:system syslog_mod;
-', `
-run_program(sysadm_t, sysadm_r, init, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-')
-allow initrc_t privfd:fd use;
-
-# Transition to system_r:initrc_t upon executing init scripts.
-ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon', `
-role_transition sysadm_r initrc_exec_t system_r;
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t)
-ifdef(`mls_policy', `
-typeattribute initrc_t mlsrangetrans;
-range_transition sysadm_t initrc_exec_t s0 - s15:c0.c255;
-')
-')
-
-#
-# Shutting down xinet causes these
-#
-# Fam
-dontaudit initrc_t device_t:dir { read write };
-# Rsync
-dontaudit initrc_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
-
-allow initrc_t sysfs_t:dir { getattr read search };
-allow initrc_t sysfs_t:file { getattr read write };
-allow initrc_t sysfs_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
-allow initrc_t udev_runtime_t:file rw_file_perms;
-allow initrc_t device_type:chr_file setattr;
-allow initrc_t binfmt_misc_fs_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow initrc_t binfmt_misc_fs_t:file { getattr ioctl write };
-
-# for lsof in shutdown scripts
-can_kerberos(initrc_t)
-
-#
-# Wants to remove udev.tbl
-#
-allow initrc_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow initrc_t device_t:lnk_file unlink;
-
-r_dir_file(initrc_t,selinux_config_t)
-
-ifdef(`unlimitedRC', `
-unconfined_domain(initrc_t) 
-')
-#
-# initrc script does a cat /selinux/enforce
-#
-allow initrc_t security_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow initrc_t security_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# init script state
-type initrc_state_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-create_dir_file(initrc_t,initrc_state_t)
-
-ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
-# Gentoo integrated run_init+open_init_pty-runscript:
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t,initrc_exec_t,run_init_t)
-')
-allow initrc_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-allow initrc_t device_t:lnk_file create_file_perms;
-ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
-allow initrc_t system_dbusd_var_run_t:sock_file write;
-')
-
-# Slapd needs to read cert files from its initscript
-r_dir_file(initrc_t, cert_t)
-ifdef(`use_mcs', `
-range_transition sysadm_t initrc_exec_t s0;
-')

mls/domains/program/innd.te

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-#DESC INN - InterNetNews server
-#
-# Author:  Faye Coker <faye@lurking-grue.org>
-# X-Debian-Packages: inn
-#
-################################
-
-# Types for the server port and news spool.
-#
-type news_spool_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-
-# need privmail attribute so innd can access system_mail_t
-daemon_domain(innd, `, privmail')
-
-# allow innd to create files and directories of type news_spool_t
-create_dir_file(innd_t, news_spool_t)
-
-# allow user domains to read files and directories these types
-r_dir_file(userdomain, { news_spool_t innd_var_lib_t innd_etc_t })
-
-can_exec(initrc_t, innd_etc_t)
-can_exec(innd_t, { innd_exec_t bin_t shell_exec_t })
-ifdef(`hostname.te', `
-can_exec(innd_t, hostname_exec_t)
-')
-
-allow innd_t var_spool_t:dir { getattr search };
-
-can_network(innd_t)
-allow innd_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
-can_ypbind(innd_t)
-
-can_unix_send( { innd_t sysadm_t }, { innd_t sysadm_t } )
-allow innd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow innd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-can_unix_connect(innd_t, self)
-
-allow innd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow innd_t innd_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-
-allow innd_t self:capability { dac_override kill setgid setuid net_bind_service };
-allow innd_t self:process setsched;
-
-allow innd_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;
-allow innd_t usr_t:lnk_file read;
-allow innd_t usr_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-allow innd_t lib_t:file ioctl;
-allow innd_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow innd_t { proc_t etc_runtime_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow innd_t urandom_device_t:chr_file read;
-
-allow innd_t innd_var_run_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
-
-# allow innd to read directories of type innd_etc_t (/etc/news/(/.*)? and symbolic links with that type
-etcdir_domain(innd)
-
-# allow innd to create files under /var/log of type innd_log_t and have a directory for its own files that
-# it can write to
-logdir_domain(innd)
-
-# allow innd read-write directory permissions to /var/lib/news.
-var_lib_domain(innd)
-
-ifdef(`crond.te', `
-system_crond_entry(innd_exec_t, innd_t)
-allow system_crond_t innd_etc_t:file { getattr read };
-rw_dir_create_file(system_crond_t, innd_log_t)
-rw_dir_create_file(system_crond_t, innd_var_run_t)
-')
-
-ifdef(`syslogd.te', `
-allow syslogd_t innd_log_t:dir search;
-allow syslogd_t innd_log_t:file create_file_perms;
-')
-
-allow innd_t self:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit innd_t selinux_config_t:dir { search };
-allow system_crond_t innd_etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow innd_t bin_t:lnk_file { read };
-allow innd_t sbin_t:lnk_file { read };

mls/domains/program/ipsec.te

@@ -1,229 +0,0 @@
-#DESC ipsec - TCP/IP encryption
-#
-# Authors: Mark Westerman mark.westerman@westcam.com
-# massively butchered by paul krumviede <pwk@acm.org>
-# further massaged by Chris Vance <cvance@tislabs.com>
-# X-Debian-Packages: freeswan
-#
-########################################
-#
-# Rules for the ipsec_t domain.
-#
-# a domain for things that need access to the PF_KEY socket
-daemon_base_domain(ipsec, `, privlog')
-
-# type for ipsec configuration file(s) - not for keys
-type ipsec_conf_file_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for file(s) containing ipsec keys - RSA or preshared
-type ipsec_key_file_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# type for runtime files, including pluto.ctl
-# lots of strange stuff for the ipsec_var_run_t - need to check it
-var_run_domain(ipsec)
-
-type ipsec_mgmt_t, domain, privlog, admin, privmodule, nscd_client_domain;
-type ipsec_mgmt_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-domain_auto_trans(ipsec_mgmt_t, ipsec_exec_t, ipsec_t)
-file_type_auto_trans(ipsec_mgmt_t, var_run_t, ipsec_var_run_t, sock_file)
-file_type_auto_trans(ipsec_t, var_run_t, ipsec_var_run_t, sock_file)
-file_type_auto_trans(ipsec_mgmt_t, etc_t, ipsec_key_file_t, file)
-
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t modules_object_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t modules_object_t:file getattr;
-
-allow ipsec_t self:capability { net_admin net_bind_service };
-allow ipsec_t self:process signal;
-allow ipsec_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-
-domain_auto_trans(ipsec_mgmt_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-
-# Inherit and use descriptors from init.
-# allow access (for, e.g., klipsdebug) to console
-allow { ipsec_t ipsec_mgmt_t } console_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow { ipsec_t ipsec_mgmt_t } { init_t initrc_t privfd }:fd use;
-
-# I do not know where this pesky pipe is...
-allow ipsec_t initrc_t:fifo_file write;
-
-r_dir_file(ipsec_t, ipsec_conf_file_t)
-r_dir_file(ipsec_t, ipsec_key_file_t)
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_conf_file_t:file { getattr read ioctl };
-rw_dir_create_file(ipsec_mgmt_t, ipsec_key_file_t)
-
-allow ipsec_t self:key_socket { create write read setopt };
-
-# for lsof
-allow sysadm_t ipsec_t:key_socket getattr;
-
-# the ipsec wrapper wants to run /usr/bin/logger (should we put
-# it in its own domain?)
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, bin_t)
-# logger, running in ipsec_mgmt_t needs to use sockets
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_t:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# also need to run things like whack and shell scripts
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, ipsec_exec_t)
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, ipsec_mgmt_exec_t)
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_mgmt_exec_t:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, shell_exec_t)
-can_exec(ipsec_t, shell_exec_t)
-can_exec(ipsec_t, bin_t)
-can_exec(ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_exec_t)
-# now for a icky part...
-# pluto runs an updown script (by calling popen()!); as this is by default
-# a shell script, we need to find a way to make things work without
-# letting all sorts of stuff possibly be run...
-# so try flipping back into the ipsec_mgmt_t domain
-domain_auto_trans(ipsec_t, shell_exec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t)
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_t:fd use;
-
-# the default updown script wants to run route
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, sbin_t)
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t sbin_t:lnk_file read;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:capability { net_admin dac_override };
-
-# need access to /proc/sys/net/ipsec/icmp
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t sysctl_t:file write;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t sysctl_net_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t sysctl_net_t:file { write setattr };
-
-# whack needs to be able to read/write pluto.ctl
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_var_run_t:sock_file { read write };
-# and it wants to connect to a socket...
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write };
-
-# allow system administrator to use the ipsec script to look
-# at things (e.g., ipsec auto --status)
-# probably should create an ipsec_admin role for this kind of thing
-can_exec(sysadm_t, ipsec_mgmt_exec_t)
-allow sysadm_t ipsec_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-
-# _realsetup needs to be able to cat /var/run/pluto.pid,
-# run ps on that pid, and delete the file
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_t:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
-
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t boot_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t system_map_t:file { read getattr };
-
-# denials when ps tries to search /proc. Do not audit these denials.
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;
-
-# suppress audit messages about unnecessary socket access
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t domain:key_socket { read write };
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t domain:udp_socket { read write };
-
-# from rbac
-role system_r types { ipsec_t ipsec_mgmt_t };
-
-# from initrc.te
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, ipsec_mgmt_exec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t)
-domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, ipsec_exec_t, ipsec_t)
-
-
-########## The following rules were added by cvance@tislabs.com ##########
-
-# allow pluto and startup scripts to access /dev/urandom
-allow { ipsec_t ipsec_mgmt_t } { urandom_device_t random_device_t }:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-# allow pluto to access /proc/net/ipsec_eroute;
-general_proc_read_access(ipsec_t)
-general_proc_read_access(ipsec_mgmt_t)
-
-# allow pluto to search the root directory (not sure why, but mostly harmless)
-# Are these all really necessary?
-allow ipsec_t var_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_t bin_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_t device_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t device_t:dir { getattr search read };
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t tty_device_t:chr_file getattr;
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t devpts_t:dir getattr;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t var_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t sbin_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t bin_t:dir search;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t ipsec_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# Startup scripts
-# use libraries
-uses_shlib({ ipsec_t ipsec_mgmt_t })
-# Read and write /dev/tty
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-# fork
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:process fork;
-# startup script runs /bin/gawk with a pipe
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-# read /etc/mtab Why?
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t etc_runtime_t:file { read getattr };
-# read link for /bin/sh 
-allow { ipsec_t ipsec_mgmt_t } bin_t:lnk_file read;
-
-#
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:process { sigchld signal setrlimit };
-
-# Allow read/write access to /var/run/pluto.ctl
-allow ipsec_t self:unix_stream_socket {create setopt bind listen accept read write };
-
-# Pluto needs network access
-can_network_server(ipsec_t)
-can_ypbind(ipsec_t)
-allow ipsec_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# for sleep
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-# for the start script
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, etc_t)
-
-# allow access to /etc/localtime
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t etc_t:file { read getattr };
-allow ipsec_t etc_t:file { read getattr };
-
-# allow access to /dev/null
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t null_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow ipsec_t null_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# Allow scripts to use /var/lock/subsys/ipsec
-lock_domain(ipsec_mgmt)
-
-# allow tncfg to create sockets
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
-
-#When running ipsec auto --up <conname>
-allow ipsec_t self:process { fork sigchld };
-allow ipsec_t self:fifo_file { read getattr };
-
-# ideally it would not need this.  It wants to write to /root/.rnd
-file_type_auto_trans(ipsec_mgmt_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, sysadm_home_t, file)
-
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t { initrc_devpts_t admin_tty_type }:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
-allow ipsec_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr read write };
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:lnk_file read;
-
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:capability { sys_tty_config dac_read_search };
-read_locale(ipsec_mgmt_t)
-var_run_domain(ipsec_mgmt)
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t default_t:dir getattr;
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t default_t:file getattr;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t tmpfs_t:dir { getattr read };
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:key_socket { create setopt };
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, initrc_exec_t)
-allow ipsec_t self:netlink_xfrm_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow ipsec_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-read_locale(ipsec_t)
-ifdef(`consoletype.te', `
-can_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t, consoletype_exec_t )
-')
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
-dontaudit ipsec_t ttyfile:chr_file { read write };
-allow ipsec_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };
-allow ipsec_t { isakmp_port_t reserved_port_t }:udp_socket name_bind;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t dev_fs:file_class_set getattr;
-dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t device_t:lnk_file read;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:{ tcp_socket udp_socket } create_socket_perms;
-allow ipsec_mgmt_t sysctl_net_t:file { getattr read };
-rw_dir_create_file(ipsec_mgmt_t, ipsec_var_run_t)
-rw_dir_create_file(initrc_t, ipsec_var_run_t)
-allow initrc_t ipsec_conf_file_t:file { getattr read ioctl };

mls/domains/program/iptables.te

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Ipchains - IP packet filter administration
-#
-# Authors:  Justin Smith <jsmith@mcs.drexel.edu>
-#           Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: ipchains iptables
-#
-
-#
-# Rules for the iptables_t domain.
-#
-daemon_base_domain(iptables, `, privmodule')
-role sysadm_r types iptables_t;
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, iptables_exec_t, iptables_t)
-
-ifdef(`modutil.te', `
-# for modprobe
-allow iptables_t sbin_t:dir search;
-allow iptables_t sbin_t:lnk_file read;
-')
-
-read_locale(iptables_t)
-
-# to allow rules to be saved on reboot
-allow iptables_t initrc_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-domain_auto_trans(iptables_t, ifconfig_exec_t, ifconfig_t)
-allow iptables_t var_t:dir search;
-var_run_domain(iptables)
-
-allow iptables_t self:process { fork signal_perms };
-
-allow iptables_t { sysctl_t sysctl_kernel_t }:dir search;
-allow iptables_t sysctl_modprobe_t:file { getattr read };
-
-tmp_domain(iptables)
-
-# for iptables -L
-allow iptables_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-can_resolve(iptables_t)
-can_ypbind(iptables_t)
-
-allow iptables_t iptables_exec_t:file execute_no_trans;
-allow iptables_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw };
-allow iptables_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-allow iptables_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-allow iptables_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow iptables_t { userdomain kernel_t }:fd use;
-
-# Access terminals.
-allow iptables_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow iptables_t sysadm_gph_t:fd use;')
-
-allow iptables_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow iptables_t proc_net_t:dir search;
-allow iptables_t proc_net_t:file { read getattr };
-
-# system-config-network appends to /var/log
-allow iptables_t var_log_t:file append;
-ifdef(`firstboot.te', `
-allow iptables_t firstboot_t:fifo_file write;
-')

mls/domains/program/irc.te

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Irc - IRC client
-#
-# Domains for the irc program.
-# X-Debian-Packages: tinyirc ircii
-
-#
-# irc_exec_t is the type of the irc executable.
-#
-type irc_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# Everything else is in the irc_domain macro in
-# macros/program/irc_macros.te.

mls/domains/program/irqbalance.te

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-#DESC IRQBALANCE - IRQ balance daemon
-#
-# Author:  Ulrich Drepper <drepper@redhat.com>
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the irqbalance_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(irqbalance)
-
-# irqbalance needs access to /proc.
-allow irqbalance_t proc_t:file { read getattr };
-allow irqbalance_t sysctl_irq_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow irqbalance_t sysctl_irq_t:file rw_file_perms;

mls/domains/program/java.te

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Java VM 
-#
-# Authors: Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 
-# X-Debian-Packages: java
-#
-
-# Type for the netscape, java or other browser executables.
-type java_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# Allow java executable stack
-bool allow_java_execstack false;
-
-# Everything else is in the java_domain macro in
-# macros/program/java_macros.te.

mls/domains/program/kerberos.te

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Kerberos5 - MIT Kerberos5
-# supports krb5kdc and kadmind daemons
-# kinit, kdestroy, klist clients
-# ksu support not complete
-#
-# includes rules for OpenSSH daemon compiled with both
-# kerberos5 and SELinux support
-#
-# Not supported : telnetd, ftpd, kprop/kpropd daemons
-#
-# Author:   Kerry Thompson <kerry@crypt.gen.nz>
-# Modified by Colin Walters <walters@redhat.com>
-# 
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the krb5kdc_t,kadmind_t domains.
-#
-daemon_domain(krb5kdc)
-daemon_domain(kadmind)
-
-can_exec(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_exec_t)
-can_exec(kadmind_t, kadmind_exec_t)
-
-# types for general configuration files in /etc
-type krb5_keytab_t, file_type, sysadmfile, secure_file_type;
-
-# types for KDC configs and principal file(s)
-type krb5kdc_conf_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-type krb5kdc_principal_t, file_type, sysadmfile;
-
-# Use capabilities. Surplus capabilities may be allowed.
-allow krb5kdc_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_admin net_bind_service chown fowner dac_override sys_nice };
-allow kadmind_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service chown fowner dac_override sys_nice };
-
-# krb5kdc and kadmind can use network
-can_network_server( { krb5kdc_t kadmind_t } )
-can_ypbind( { krb5kdc_t kadmind_t } )
-
-# allow UDP transfer to/from any program
-can_udp_send(kerberos_port_t, krb5kdc_t)
-can_udp_send(krb5kdc_t, kerberos_port_t)
-can_tcp_connect(kerberos_port_t, krb5kdc_t)
-can_tcp_connect(kerberos_admin_port_t, kadmind_t)
-
-# Bind to the kerberos, kerberos-adm ports.
-allow krb5kdc_t kerberos_port_t:{ udp_socket tcp_socket } name_bind;
-allow kadmind_t kerberos_admin_port_t:{ udp_socket tcp_socket } name_bind;
-allow kadmind_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
-dontaudit kadmind_t reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
-
-#
-# Rules for Kerberos5 KDC daemon
-allow krb5kdc_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow krb5kdc_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow kadmind_t  self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms;
-allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_conf_t:dir search;
-allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file r_file_perms;
-dontaudit krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file write;
-allow krb5kdc_t locale_t:file { getattr read };
-dontaudit krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file write;
-allow { kadmind_t krb5kdc_t } etc_t:dir { getattr search };
-allow { kadmind_t krb5kdc_t } etc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow { kadmind_t krb5kdc_t } krb5_conf_t:file r_file_perms;
-dontaudit { kadmind_t krb5kdc_t } krb5_conf_t:file write;
-tmp_domain(krb5kdc)
-log_domain(krb5kdc)
-allow { kadmind_t krb5kdc_t } urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow kadmind_t random_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };
-allow krb5kdc_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-allow kadmind_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms;
-allow krb5kdc_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow krb5kdc_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-#
-# Rules for Kerberos5 Kadmin daemon
-allow kadmind_t self:unix_dgram_socket { connect create write };
-allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_conf_t:dir search;
-allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file { getattr lock read write setattr };
-read_locale(kadmind_t)
-dontaudit kadmind_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file write;
-tmp_domain(kadmind)
-log_domain(kadmind)
-
-#
-# Allow user programs to talk to KDC
-allow krb5kdc_t userdomain:udp_socket recvfrom;
-allow userdomain krb5kdc_t:udp_socket recvfrom;
-allow initrc_t krb5_conf_t:file ioctl;

mls/domains/program/klogd.te

@@ -1,48 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Klogd - Kernel log daemon
-#
-# Authors:  Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil> and Timothy Fraser  
-# X-Debian-Packages: klogd
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the klogd_t domain.
-#
-daemon_domain(klogd, `, privmem, privkmsg, mlsfileread')
-
-tmp_domain(klogd)
-allow klogd_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow klogd_t proc_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-allow klogd_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow klogd_t self:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow klogd_t self:lnk_file r_file_perms;
-
-# read /etc/nsswitch.conf
-allow klogd_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-allow klogd_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;
-
-read_locale(klogd_t)
-
-allow klogd_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# Create unix sockets
-allow klogd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-# Use the sys_admin and sys_rawio capabilities.
-allow klogd_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_rawio };
-dontaudit klogd_t self:capability sys_resource;
-
-
-# Read /proc/kmsg and /dev/mem.
-allow klogd_t proc_kmsg_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow klogd_t memory_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-
-# Control syslog and console logging
-allow klogd_t kernel_t:system { syslog_mod syslog_console };
-
-# Read /boot/System.map*
-allow klogd_t system_map_t:file r_file_perms;
-allow klogd_t boot_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow klogd_t unconfined_t:system syslog_mod;
-')

mls/domains/program/ktalkd.te

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
-#DESC ktalkd -  KDE version of the talk server 
-#
-# Author:  Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-#
-# Depends: inetd.te
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the ktalkd_t domain.
-#
-# ktalkd_exec_t is the type of the ktalkd executable.
-#
-
-inetd_child_domain(ktalkd, udp)

mls/domains/program/kudzu.te

@@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
-#DESC kudzu - Red Hat utility to recognise new hardware
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-#
-
-daemon_base_domain(kudzu, `, etc_writer, privmodule, sysctl_kernel_writer, fs_domain, privmem')
-
-read_locale(kudzu_t)
-
-# for /etc/sysconfig/hwconf - probably need a new type
-allow kudzu_t etc_runtime_t:file rw_file_perms;
-
-# for kmodule
-if (allow_execmem) {
-allow kudzu_t self:process execmem;
-}
-allow kudzu_t zero_device_t:chr_file rx_file_perms;
-allow kudzu_t memory_device_t:chr_file { read write execute };
-
-allow kudzu_t ramfs_t:dir search;
-allow kudzu_t ramfs_t:sock_file write;
-allow kudzu_t self:capability { dac_override sys_admin sys_rawio net_admin sys_tty_config mknod };
-allow kudzu_t modules_conf_t:file { getattr read unlink rename };
-allow kudzu_t modules_object_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow kudzu_t { modules_object_t modules_dep_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow kudzu_t mouse_device_t:chr_file { read write };
-allow kudzu_t proc_net_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-allow kudzu_t { proc_net_t proc_t }:file { getattr read };
-allow kudzu_t { fixed_disk_device_t removable_device_t }:blk_file rw_file_perms;
-allow kudzu_t scsi_generic_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-allow kudzu_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir { getattr search };
-allow kudzu_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
-read_sysctl(kudzu_t)
-allow kudzu_t sysctl_dev_t:dir { getattr search read };
-allow kudzu_t sysctl_dev_t:file { getattr read };
-allow kudzu_t sysctl_kernel_t:file write;
-allow kudzu_t usbdevfs_t:dir search;
-allow kudzu_t usbdevfs_t:file { getattr read };
-allow kudzu_t usbfs_t:dir search;
-allow kudzu_t usbfs_t:file { getattr read };
-var_run_domain(kudzu)
-allow kudzu_t kernel_t:system syslog_console;
-allow kudzu_t self:udp_socket { create ioctl };
-allow kudzu_t var_lock_t:dir search;
-allow kudzu_t devpts_t:dir search;
-
-# so it can write messages to the console
-allow kudzu_t { tty_device_t devtty_t admin_tty_type }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-role sysadm_r types kudzu_t;
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `', `
-domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, kudzu_exec_t, kudzu_t)
-')
-ifdef(`anaconda.te', `
-domain_auto_trans(anaconda_t, kudzu_exec_t, kudzu_t)
-')
-
-allow kudzu_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search;
-rw_dir_create_file(kudzu_t, etc_t)
-
-rw_dir_create_file(kudzu_t, mnt_t)
-can_exec(kudzu_t, { bin_t sbin_t init_exec_t })
-# Read /usr/lib/gconv/gconv-modules.*
-allow kudzu_t lib_t:file { read getattr };
-# Read /usr/share/hwdata/.* and /usr/share/terminfo/l/linux
-allow kudzu_t usr_t:file { read getattr };
-r_dir_file(kudzu_t, hwdata_t)
-
-# Communicate with rhgb-client.
-allow kudzu_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
-allow kudzu_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
-
-ifdef(`rhgb.te', `
-allow kudzu_t rhgb_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-')
-
-allow kudzu_t self:file { getattr read };
-allow kudzu_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-ifdef(`gpm.te', `
-allow kudzu_t gpmctl_t:sock_file getattr;
-')
-
-can_exec(kudzu_t, shell_exec_t)
-
-# Write to /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug.  Why?
-allow kudzu_t sysctl_hotplug_t:file { read write };
-
-allow kudzu_t sysfs_t:dir { getattr read search };
-allow kudzu_t sysfs_t:file { getattr read };
-allow kudzu_t sysfs_t:lnk_file read;
-file_type_auto_trans(kudzu_t, etc_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
-allow kudzu_t tape_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
-tmp_domain(kudzu, `', `{ file dir chr_file }')
-
-# for file systems that are not yet mounted
-dontaudit kudzu_t file_t:dir search;
-ifdef(`lpd.te', `
-allow kudzu_t printconf_t:file { getattr read };
-')
-ifdef(`cups.te', `
-allow kudzu_t cupsd_rw_etc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
-')
-dontaudit kudzu_t src_t:dir search;
-ifdef(`xserver.te', `
-allow kudzu_t xserver_exec_t:file getattr;
-')
-
-ifdef(`userhelper.te', `
-role system_r types sysadm_userhelper_t;
-domain_auto_trans(kudzu_t, userhelper_exec_t, sysadm_userhelper_t)
-', `
-unconfined_domain(kudzu_t)
-')
-
-allow kudzu_t initrc_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
-allow kudzu_t net_conf_t:file { getattr read };
-

mls/domains/program/ldconfig.te

@@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Ldconfig - Configure dynamic linker bindings
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-# X-Debian-Packages: libc6
-#
-
-#################################
-#
-# Rules for the ldconfig_t domain.
-#
-type ldconfig_t, domain, privlog, etc_writer;
-type ldconfig_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-role sysadm_r types ldconfig_t;
-role system_r types ldconfig_t;
-
-domain_auto_trans({ sysadm_t initrc_t }, ldconfig_exec_t, ldconfig_t)
-dontaudit ldconfig_t device_t:dir search;
-can_access_pty(ldconfig_t, initrc)
-allow ldconfig_t admin_tty_type:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-allow ldconfig_t privfd:fd use;
-
-uses_shlib(ldconfig_t)
-
-file_type_auto_trans(ldconfig_t, etc_t, ld_so_cache_t, file)
-allow ldconfig_t lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
-allow ldconfig_t lib_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
-
-allow ldconfig_t userdomain:fd use;
-# unlink for when /etc/ld.so.cache is mislabeled
-allow ldconfig_t etc_t:file { getattr read unlink };
-allow ldconfig_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
-
-allow ldconfig_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-allow ldconfig_t tmp_t:dir search;
-
-ifdef(`apache.te', `
-# dontaudit access to /usr/lib/apache, normal programs cannot read these libs anyway
-dontaudit ldconfig_t httpd_modules_t:dir search;
-')
-
-allow ldconfig_t { var_t var_lib_t }:dir search;
-allow ldconfig_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', `
-ifdef(`unconfined.te',`
-dontaudit ldconfig_t unconfined_t:tcp_socket { read write };
-');
-')dnl end hide_broken_symptoms
-ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
-allow ldconfig_t lib_t:file r_file_perms;
-unconfined_domain(ldconfig_t) 
-')

mls/domains/program/load_policy.te

@@ -1,65 +0,0 @@
-#DESC LoadPolicy - SELinux policy loading utilities
-#
-# Authors:  Frank Mayer, mayerf@tresys.com
-# X-Debian-Packages: policycoreutils
-#
-
-###########################
-# load_policy_t is the domain type for load_policy 
-# load_policy_exec_t is the file type for the executable
-
-# boolean to determine whether the system permits loading policy, setting
-# enforcing mode, and changing boolean values.  Set this to true and you
-# have to reboot to set it back
-bool secure_mode_policyload false;
-
-type load_policy_t, domain;
-role sysadm_r types load_policy_t;
-role secadm_r types load_policy_t;
-role system_r types load_policy_t;
-
-type load_policy_exec_t, file_type, exec_type, sysadmfile;
-
-##########################
-# 
-# Rules
-
-domain_auto_trans(secadmin, load_policy_exec_t, load_policy_t)
-
-allow load_policy_t console_device_t:chr_file { read write };
-
-# Reload the policy configuration (sysadm_t no longer has this ability)
-can_loadpol(load_policy_t)
-
-# Reset policy boolean values.
-can_setbool(load_policy_t)
-
-
-###########################
-# constrain from where load_policy can load a policy, specifically 
-# policy_config_t files 
-#
-
-# only allow read of policy config files
-allow load_policy_t policy_src_t:dir search;
-r_dir_file(load_policy_t, policy_config_t)
-r_dir_file(load_policy_t, selinux_config_t)
-
-# directory search permissions for path to binary policy files
-allow load_policy_t root_t:dir search;
-allow load_policy_t etc_t:dir search;
-
-# for mcs.conf
-allow load_policy_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# Other access
-can_access_pty(load_policy_t, initrc)
-allow load_policy_t { admin_tty_type devtty_t }:chr_file { read write ioctl getattr };
-uses_shlib(load_policy_t)
-allow load_policy_t self:capability dac_override;
-
-allow load_policy_t { userdomain privfd initrc_t }:fd use;
-
-allow load_policy_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;
-
-read_locale(load_policy_t)

mls/domains/program/loadkeys.te

@@ -1,45 +0,0 @@
-#DESC loadkeys - for changing to unicode at login time
-#
-# Author:  Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>
-#
-# X-Debian-Packages: console-tools
-
-#
-# loadkeys_exec_t is the type of the wrapper
-#
-type loadkeys_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-can_exec(initrc_t, loadkeys_exec_t)
-
-# Derived domain based on the calling user domain and the program.
-type loadkeys_t, domain;
-
-# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
-domain_auto_trans(unpriv_userdomain, loadkeys_exec_t, loadkeys_t)
-
-uses_shlib(loadkeys_t)
-dontaudit loadkeys_t proc_t:dir search;
-allow loadkeys_t proc_t:file { getattr read };
-allow loadkeys_t self:process { fork sigchld };
-
-allow loadkeys_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
-allow loadkeys_t bin_t:dir search;
-allow loadkeys_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
-can_exec(loadkeys_t, { shell_exec_t bin_t })
-
-read_locale(loadkeys_t)
-
-dontaudit loadkeys_t etc_runtime_t:file { getattr read };
-
-# Use capabilities.
-allow loadkeys_t self:capability { setuid sys_tty_config };
-
-allow loadkeys_t local_login_t:fd use;
-allow loadkeys_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-
-# The user role is authorized for this domain.
-in_user_role(loadkeys_t)
-
-# Write to the user domain tty.
-allow loadkeys_t ttyfile:chr_file rw_file_perms;
-

mls/domains/program/lockdev.te

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-#DESC Lockdev - libblockdev helper application
-#
-# Authors:  Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com> 
-#
-
-
-# Type for the lockdev
-type lockdev_exec_t, file_type, sysadmfile, exec_type;
-
-# Everything else is in the lockdev_domain macro in
-# macros/program/lockdev_macros.te.