kernel.if renaming
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@ -188,21 +188,25 @@ allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file r_file_perms;
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allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file r_file_perms;
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# old base_file_read_access():
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files_list_home_directories(kernel_t)
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files_read_general_application_resources(kernel_t)
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selinux_read_config(kernel_t)
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selinux_read_binary_policy(kernel_t)
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allow kernel_t security_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow kernel_t security_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow kernel_t security_t:file rw_file_perms;
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allow kernel_t security_t:file rw_file_perms;
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allow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
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allow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
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auditallow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
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auditallow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
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corecommands_execute_shell(kernel_t)
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corecommands_read_system_programs_directory(kernel_t)
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files_read_root_dir(kernel_t)
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files_list_home_directories(kernel_t)
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files_read_general_application_resources(kernel_t)
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init_sigchld(kernel_t)
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libraries_use_dynamic_loader(kernel_t)
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libraries_use_dynamic_loader(kernel_t)
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libraries_use_shared_libraries(kernel_t)
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libraries_use_shared_libraries(kernel_t)
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corecommands_execute_shell(kernel_t)
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selinux_read_config(kernel_t)
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selinux_read_binary_policy(kernel_t)
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terminal_use_console(kernel_t)
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terminal_use_console(kernel_t)
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domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t)
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domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t)
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@ -234,3 +238,14 @@ neverallow ~can_setsecparam security_t:security setsecparam;
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neverallow * *:process { setcurrent dyntransition };
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neverallow * *:process { setcurrent dyntransition };
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neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule *:capability sys_module;
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neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule *:capability sys_module;
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########################################
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#
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# Unlabeled process local policy
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#
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# If you load a new policy that removes active domains, processes can
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# get stuck if you do not allow unlabeled processes to signal init.
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# If you load an incompatible policy, you should probably reboot,
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# since you may have compromised system security.
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init_sigchld(unlabeled_t)
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@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ files_make_file(bin_t)
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#
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#
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type sbin_t;
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type sbin_t;
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files_make_file(sbin_t)
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files_make_file(sbin_t)
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kernel_read_directory_from(sbin_t)
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#
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#
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# ls_exec_t is the type of the ls program.
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# ls_exec_t is the type of the ls program.
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@ -82,7 +82,6 @@ fs_noxattr_associate(readable_t)
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type root_t, file_type, mountpoint;
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type root_t, file_type, mountpoint;
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fs_associate(root_t)
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fs_associate(root_t)
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fs_noxattr_associate(root_t)
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fs_noxattr_associate(root_t)
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kernel_read_directory_from(root_t)
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kernel_make_root_fs_mountpoint(root_t)
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kernel_make_root_fs_mountpoint(root_t)
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genfscon rootfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:root_t,s0)
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genfscon rootfs / context_template(system_u:object_r:root_t,s0)
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@ -85,20 +85,8 @@ devices_create_dev_entry(init_t,initctl_t,fifo_file)
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# Modify utmp.
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# Modify utmp.
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allow init_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
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allow init_t initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms;
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# Run init scripts. this is ok since initrc
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# Run init scripts.
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# is also in this module
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domain_auto_trans(init_t,initrc_exec_t,initrc_t)
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allow init_t initrc_t:process transition;
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allow init_t initrc_exec_t:file rx_file_perms;
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type_transition init_t initrc_exec_t:process initrc_t;
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dontaudit init_t initrc_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
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kernel_sigchld_from(init_t)
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# If you load a new policy that removes active domains, processes can
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# get stuck if you do not allow unlabeled processes to signal init
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# If you load an incompatible policy, you should probably reboot,
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# since you may have compromised system security.
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kernel_unlabeled_sigchld_from(init_t)
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kernel_set_selinux_boolean(init_t)
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kernel_set_selinux_boolean(init_t)
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kernel_read_system_state(init_t)
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kernel_read_system_state(init_t)
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