add xdm
This commit is contained in:
parent
3509484c6f
commit
23a4442bf1
@ -6,6 +6,7 @@
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cyrus
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dovecot
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distcc
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xdm
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* Wed Oct 19 2005 Chris PeBenito <selinux@tresys.com> - 20051019
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- Many fixes to make loadable modules build.
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@ -54,22 +54,26 @@ attribute mlsrangetrans;
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type getty_t;
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type login_exec_t;
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type init_t;
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type init_exec_t;
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type initrc_t;
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type sshd_exec_t;
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type su_exec_t;
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type udev_exec_t;
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type unconfined_t;
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type xdm_exec_t;
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ifdef(`enable_mcs', `
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ifdef(`enable_mcs',`
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range_transition getty_t login_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition init_t xdm_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition initrc_t sshd_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition unconfined_t su_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition kernel_t udev_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition initrc_t udev_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition initrc_t xdm_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition kernel_t udev_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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range_transition unconfined_t su_exec_t s0 - s0:c0.c255;
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')
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ifdef(`enable_mls', `
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ifdef(`enable_mls',`
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# run init with maximum MLS range
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range_transition kernel_t init_exec_t s0 - s9:c0.c255;
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')
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38
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.fc
Normal file
38
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.fc
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
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/usr/(s)?bin/gdm-binary -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0)
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/usr/bin/[xgkw]dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0)
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/usr/bin/gpe-dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0)
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/usr/X11R6/bin/[xgkw]dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/kde3?/kdm/Xstartup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/kde3?/kdm/Xreset -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/kde3?/kdm/Xsession -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/kde3?/kdm/backgroundrc gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0)
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/etc/X11/[wx]dm/Xreset.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/X11/[wx]dm/Xsession -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/X11/wdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_rw_etc_t,s0)
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/etc/X11/wdm/Xsetup.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/X11/wdm/Xstartup.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/etc/X11/Xsession[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0)
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/opt/kde3/bin/kdm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0)
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/tmp/\.X0-lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_xserver_tmp_t,s0)
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/usr/lib(64)?/qt-.*/etc/settings(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0)
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/usr/var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0)
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/var/[xgk]dm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0)
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/var/lib/[xkw]dm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0)
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ifdef(`distro_suse',`
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/var/lib/pam_devperm/:0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0)
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')
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/var/log/[kw]dm\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0)
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/var/log/gdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0)
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/var/run/xdm\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0)
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/var/run/xdmctl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0)
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1
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.if
Normal file
1
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.if
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@ -0,0 +1 @@
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## <summary>X windows login display manager</summary>
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420
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.te
Normal file
420
refpolicy/policy/modules/services/xdm.te
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@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
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policy_module(xdm,1.0)
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########################################
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#
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# Declarations
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#
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# hack until all of strict is converted
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#type xdm_t;
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gen_require(`
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type unconfined_t;
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')
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typealias unconfined_t alias xdm_t;
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# real declaration moved to mls until
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# range_transition works in loadable modules
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gen_require(`
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type xdm_exec_t;
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')
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init_domain(xdm_t,xdm_exec_t)
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init_daemon_domain(xdm_t,xdm_exec_t)
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type xsession_exec_t;
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files_type(xsession_exec_t)
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type xserver_log_t;
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files_type(xserver_log_t)
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type xdm_xserver_tmp_t;
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files_type(xdm_xserver_tmp_t)
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type xdm_lock_t;
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files_lock_file(xdm_lock_t)
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type xdm_rw_etc_t;
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files_type(xdm_rw_etc_t)
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type xdm_var_run_t;
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files_type(xdm_var_run_t)
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type xdm_var_lib_t;
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files_type(xdm_var_lib_t)
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type xdm_tmp_t;
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files_tmp_file(xdm_tmp_t)
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type xdm_tmpfs_t;
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files_tmpfs_file(xdm_tmpfs_t)
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########################################
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#
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# Local policy
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#
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allow xdm_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_resource kill sys_tty_config mknod chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid ipc_owner sys_nice sys_rawio net_bind_service };
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allow xdm_t self:process { setexec setpgid setsched setrlimit };
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allow xdm_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
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allow xdm_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
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allow xdm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms };
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allow xdm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
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allow xdm_t xdm_lock_t:file create_file_perms;
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files_create_lock(xdm_t,xdm_lock_t)
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
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files_create_tmp_files(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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allow xdm_t xdm_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
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fs_create_tmpfs_data(xdm_t,xdm_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
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allow xdm_t xdm_var_lib_t:file create_file_perms;
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allow xdm_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir create_dir_perms;
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files_create_var_lib(xdm_t,xdm_var_lib_t)
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kernel_read_system_state(xdm_t)
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kernel_read_kernel_sysctl(xdm_t)
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dev_read_rand(xdm_t)
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dev_read_urand(xdm_t)
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selinux_get_fs_mount(xdm_t)
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selinux_validate_context(xdm_t)
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selinux_compute_access_vector(xdm_t)
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selinux_compute_create_context(xdm_t)
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selinux_compute_relabel_context(xdm_t)
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selinux_compute_user_contexts(xdm_t)
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files_read_etc_runtime_files(xdm_t)
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ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
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unconfined_domain_template(xdm_t)
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')
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ifdef(`TODO',`
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# cjp: TODO: integrate strict policy:
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daemon_domain(xdm, `, privuser, privrole, auth_chkpwd, privowner, privmem, nscd_client_domain')
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allow xdm_t xdm_var_run_t:dir setattr;
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# for xdmctl
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allow xdm_t xdm_var_run_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
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allow initrc_t xdm_var_run_t:fifo_file unlink;
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file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t, fifo_file)
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file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t, dir)
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# NB we do NOT allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir, only access to an open
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# handle of a file inside the dir!!!
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allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
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dontaudit xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir search;
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allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
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allow xdm_t default_context_t:dir search;
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allow xdm_t default_context_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
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can_network(xdm_t)
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allow xdm_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process signal;
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can_unix_connect(xdm_t, xdm_xserver_t)
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir { setattr r_dir_perms };
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allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_t:process signal;
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# for reboot
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allow xdm_t initctl_t:fifo_file write;
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# init script wants to check if it needs to update windowmanagerlist
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allow initrc_t xdm_rw_etc_t:file { getattr read };
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ifdef(`distro_suse', `
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# set permissions on /tmp/.X11-unix
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allow initrc_t xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr;
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')
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# Transition to user domains for user sessions.
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domain_trans(xdm_t, xsession_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
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allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
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allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
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allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
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allow xdm_xserver_t unpriv_userdomain:shm rw_shm_perms;
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allow xdm_xserver_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
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# Do not audit user access to the X log files due to file handle inheritance
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dontaudit unpriv_userdomain xserver_log_t:file { write append };
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# gnome-session creates socket under /tmp/.ICE-unix/
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allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow unpriv_userdomain xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create;
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# Allow xdm logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t
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bool xdm_sysadm_login false;
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if (xdm_sysadm_login) {
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domain_trans(xdm_t, xsession_exec_t, sysadm_t)
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allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:shm r_shm_perms;
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allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
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allow sysadm_t xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
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allow xdm_xserver_t sysadm_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
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allow xdm_xserver_t sysadm_t:fd use;
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}
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# Label pid and temporary files with derived types.
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rw_dir_create_file(xdm_xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t)
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allow xdm_xserver_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
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# Run helper programs.
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allow xdm_t etc_t:file { getattr read };
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allow xdm_t bin_t:dir { getattr search };
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# lib_t is for running cpp
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can_exec(xdm_t, { shell_exec_t etc_t bin_t sbin_t lib_t })
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allow xdm_t { bin_t sbin_t }:lnk_file read;
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ifdef(`hostname.te', `can_exec(xdm_t, hostname_exec_t)')
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ifdef(`loadkeys.te', `can_exec(xdm_t, loadkeys_exec_t)')
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process sigkill;
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:file unlink;
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# Access devices.
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allow xdm_t device_t:dir { read search };
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allow xdm_t console_device_t:chr_file setattr;
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allow xdm_t xconsole_device_t:fifo_file { getattr setattr };
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allow xdm_t framebuf_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
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allow xdm_t mouse_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
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allow xdm_t apm_bios_t:chr_file { setattr getattr read write };
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allow xdm_t dri_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow xdm_t device_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow xdm_t agp_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow xdm_t { xserver_misc_device_t misc_device_t }:chr_file { setattr getattr };
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allow xdm_t v4l_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
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allow xdm_t scanner_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
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allow xdm_t tty_device_t:chr_file { ioctl read write setattr getattr };
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allow xdm_t device_t:lnk_file read;
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can_resmgrd_connect(xdm_t)
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# Access xdm log files.
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file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, var_log_t, xserver_log_t, file)
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allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:dir setattr;
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# Access /var/gdm/.gdmfifo.
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allow xdm_t xserver_log_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
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allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;
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allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_t:fd use;
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allow { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain } xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t:file { getattr read };
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allow xdm_xserver_t { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain }:shm rw_shm_perms;
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allow xdm_xserver_t { xdm_t unpriv_userdomain }:fd use;
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# Remove /tmp/.X11-unix/X0.
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir { remove_name write };
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allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file unlink;
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ifdef(`gpm.te', `
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# Talk to the console mouse server.
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allow xdm_t gpmctl_t:sock_file { getattr setattr write };
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allow xdm_t gpm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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')
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allow xdm_t sysfs_t:dir search;
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# Update utmp and wtmp.
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allow xdm_t initrc_var_run_t: file { read write lock };
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allow xdm_t wtmp_t:file append;
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# Update lastlog.
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allow xdm_t lastlog_t:file rw_file_perms;
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# Need to further investigate these permissions and
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# perhaps define derived types.
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allow xdm_t var_lib_t:dir { write search add_name remove_name create unlink };
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allow xdm_t var_lib_t:file { create write unlink };
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# Connect to xfs.
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ifdef(`xfs.te', `
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allow xdm_t xfs_tmp_t:dir search;
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allow xdm_t xfs_tmp_t:sock_file write;
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can_unix_connect(xdm_t, xfs_t)
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')
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allow xdm_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
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# wdm has its own config dir /etc/X11/wdm
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# this is ugly, daemons should not create files under /etc!
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allow xdm_t xdm_rw_etc_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
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allow xdm_t xdm_rw_etc_t:file create_file_perms;
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# Signal any user domain.
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allow xdm_t userdomain:process signal_perms;
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# Search /proc for any user domain processes.
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allow xdm_t userdomain:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow xdm_t userdomain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
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# Allow xdm access to the user domains
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allow xdm_t home_root_t:dir search;
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allow xdm_xserver_t home_root_t:dir search;
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# Do not audit denied attempts to access devices.
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dontaudit xdm_t {removable_device_t fixed_disk_device_t}:{ chr_file blk_file } {setattr rw_file_perms};
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dontaudit xdm_t device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
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dontaudit xdm_t misc_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
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dontaudit xdm_t removable_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
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dontaudit xdm_t scsi_generic_device_t:file_class_set rw_file_perms;
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dontaudit xdm_t devpts_t:dir search;
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# Do not audit denied probes of /proc.
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dontaudit xdm_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;
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dontaudit xdm_t domain:{ file lnk_file } r_file_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Read /usr/share/terminfo/l/linux and /usr/share/icons/default/index.theme...
|
||||
allow xdm_t usr_t:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read fonts
|
||||
read_fonts(xdm_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit attempts to write to index files under /usr
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t usr_t:file write;
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit access to /root
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit user access to the X log files due to file handle inheritance
|
||||
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain xserver_log_t:file { write append };
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not audit attempts to check whether user root has email
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t { var_spool_t mail_spool_t }:dir search;
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t mail_spool_t:file getattr;
|
||||
|
||||
# Access sound device.
|
||||
allow xdm_t sound_device_t:chr_file { setattr getattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow setting of attributes on power management devices.
|
||||
allow xdm_t power_device_t:chr_file { getattr setattr };
|
||||
|
||||
# Run the X server in a derived domain.
|
||||
xserver_domain(xdm)
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`rhgb.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t ramfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t ramfs_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow rhgb_t xdm_xserver_t:process signal;
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Unrestricted inheritance.
|
||||
allow xdm_t xdm_xserver_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh };
|
||||
|
||||
# Run xkbcomp.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t var_lib_t:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file read;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Insert video drivers.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t self:capability mknod;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t sysctl_modprobe_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_xserver_t, insmod_exec_t, insmod_t)
|
||||
allow insmod_t xserver_log_t:file write;
|
||||
allow insmod_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
|
||||
|
||||
# Read /proc/dri/.*
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t proc_t:dir { search read };
|
||||
|
||||
# Search /var/run.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t var_run_t:dir search;
|
||||
|
||||
# FIXME: After per user fonts are properly working
|
||||
# xdm_xserver_t may no longer have any reason
|
||||
# to read ROLE_home_t - examine this in more detail
|
||||
# (xauth?)
|
||||
|
||||
# Search home directories.
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t user_home_type:dir search;
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_nfs_home_dirs) {
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } nfs_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } nfs_t:{file lnk_file} create_file_perms;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, nfs_t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (use_samba_home_dirs) {
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } cifs_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow { xdm_t xdm_xserver_t } cifs_t:{file lnk_file} create_file_perms;
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, cifs_t)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
# for .dmrc
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_dir_type:dir { getattr search };
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_type:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
ifdef(`support_polyinstatiation', `
|
||||
# xdm_t can polyinstantiate
|
||||
polyinstantiater(xdm_t)
|
||||
# xdm needs access for linking .X11-unix to poly /tmp
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:dir { add_name remove_name write };
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:lnk_file { create unlink };
|
||||
# xdm needs access for copying .Xauthority into new home
|
||||
allow xdm_t polymember:file { create getattr write };
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t mnt_t:dir { getattr read search };
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Wants to delete .xsession-errors file
|
||||
#
|
||||
allow xdm_t user_home_type:file unlink;
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Should fix exec of pam_timestamp_check is not closing xdm file descriptor
|
||||
#
|
||||
ifdef(`pam.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t pam_var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms;
|
||||
allow xdm_t pam_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
|
||||
allow pam_t xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr ioctl write };
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_t, pam_console_exec_t, pam_console_t)
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, pam_exec_t)
|
||||
# For pam_console
|
||||
rw_dir_create_file(xdm_t, pam_var_console_t)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
# Pamconsole/alsa
|
||||
ifdef(`alsa.te', `
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(xdm_t, alsa_exec_t, alsa_t)
|
||||
') dnl ifdef
|
||||
|
||||
allow xdm_t var_log_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
allow xdm_t wtmp_t:file { getattr read };
|
||||
|
||||
domain_auto_trans(initrc_t, xserver_exec_t, xdm_xserver_t)
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Poweroff wants to create the /poweroff file when run from xdm
|
||||
#
|
||||
file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, root_t, etc_runtime_t, file)
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# xdm tries to bind to biff_port_t
|
||||
#
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t port_type:tcp_socket name_bind;
|
||||
|
||||
# VNC v4 module in X server
|
||||
allow xdm_xserver_t vnc_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
|
||||
ifdef(`crack.te', `
|
||||
allow xdm_t crack_db_t:file r_file_perms;
|
||||
')
|
||||
r_dir_file(xdm_t, selinux_config_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Run telinit->init to shutdown.
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, init_exec_t)
|
||||
allow xdm_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
|
||||
|
||||
# Allow gdm to run gdm-binary
|
||||
can_exec(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t)
|
||||
|
||||
# Supress permission check on .ICE-unix
|
||||
dontaudit xdm_t ice_tmp_t:dir { getattr setattr };
|
||||
') dnl end TODO
|
@ -39,6 +39,11 @@ ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
|
||||
/etc/X11/prefdm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
/etc/X11/xdm/GiveConsole -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
|
||||
/etc/X11/xdm/TakeConsole -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
|
||||
/etc/X11/xdm/Xsetup_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
|
||||
/etc/X11/xinit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0)
|
||||
|
||||
#
|
||||
# /sbin
|
||||
#
|
||||
|
@ -19,7 +19,11 @@ attribute direct_init_entry;
|
||||
#
|
||||
# init_t is the domain of the init process.
|
||||
#
|
||||
type init_t;
|
||||
# real declaration moved to mls until
|
||||
# range_transition works in loadable modules
|
||||
gen_require(`
|
||||
type init_t;
|
||||
')
|
||||
domain_type(init_t)
|
||||
role system_r types init_t;
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -29,8 +29,7 @@ ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
|
||||
|
||||
# Define some type aliases to help with compatibility with
|
||||
# macros and domains from the "strict" policy.
|
||||
# cjp: remove xdm_t when we get to that module
|
||||
typealias unconfined_t alias { secadm_t sysadm_t xdm_t };
|
||||
typealias unconfined_t alias { secadm_t sysadm_t };
|
||||
|
||||
init_domtrans_script(unconfined_t)
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user