selinux-policy/refpolicy/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te

policy_module(usermanage,1.0)

########################################
#
# Declarations
#

type admin_passwd_exec_t;
files_file_type(admin_passwd_exec_t)

type chfn_t;
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(chfn_t)
domain_type(chfn_t)
role system_r types chfn_t;

type chfn_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(chfn_t,chfn_exec_t)

type crack_t;
role system_r types crack_t;

type crack_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(crack_t,crack_exec_t)

type crack_db_t; #, usercanread;
files_file_type(crack_db_t)

type crack_tmp_t;
files_tmp_file(crack_tmp_t)

type groupadd_t; #, nscd_client_domain;
type groupadd_exec_t;
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(groupadd_t)
init_system_domain(groupadd_t,groupadd_exec_t)
role system_r types groupadd_t;

type passwd_t;
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(passwd_t)
domain_type(passwd_t)
role system_r types passwd_t;

type passwd_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(passwd_t,passwd_exec_t)

type sysadm_passwd_t;
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(sysadm_passwd_t)
domain_type(sysadm_passwd_t)
domain_entry_file(sysadm_passwd_t,admin_passwd_exec_t)

type sysadm_passwd_tmp_t;
files_file_type(sysadm_passwd_tmp_t)

type useradd_t; # nscd_client_domain;
type useradd_exec_t;
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(useradd_t)
init_system_domain(useradd_t,useradd_exec_t)
role system_r types useradd_t;

########################################
#
# Chfn local policy
#

allow chfn_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid setuid setgid sys_resource };
allow chfn_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow chfn_t self:process { setrlimit setfscreate };
allow chfn_t self:fd use;
allow chfn_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow chfn_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow chfn_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow chfn_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow chfn_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow chfn_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow chfn_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow chfn_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow chfn_t self:msg { send receive };

kernel_read_system_state(chfn_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(chfn_t)
kernel_validate_context(chfn_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(chfn_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(chfn_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(chfn_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(chfn_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(chfn_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(chfn_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(chfn_t)

# for SSP
dev_read_urand(chfn_t)

# /usr/bin/passwd asks for w access to utmp, but it will operate
# correctly without it.  Do not audit write denials to utmp.
init_dontaudit_rw_script_pid(chfn_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(chfn_t)

files_manage_generic_etc_files(chfn_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(chfn_t)

libs_use_ld_so(chfn_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(chfn_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(chfn_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(chfn_t)

auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(chfn_t)
auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(chfn_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`
role sysadm_r types chfn_t;
in_user_role(chfn_t)

domain_auto_trans({ userdomain ifdef(`firstboot.te', `firstboot_t') }, chfn_exec_t, chfn_t)

dontaudit chfn_t var_t:dir search;

allow chfn_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
can_ypbind(chfn_t)
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow chfn_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
')

ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow chfn_t gphdomain:fd use;')

# allow checking if a shell is executable
allow chfn_t shell_exec_t:file execute;

# user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search
# on user home dir
dontaudit chfn_t { user_home_dir_type user_home_type }:dir search;

# can exec /sbin/unix_chkpwd
allow chfn_t { bin_t sbin_t }:dir search;

# uses unix_chkpwd for checking passwords
dontaudit chfn_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
') dnl endif TODO

########################################
#
# Crack local policy
#

allow crack_t self:process { sigkill sigstop signull signal };
allow crack_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

allow crack_t crack_db_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow crack_t crack_db_t:file create_file_perms;
allow crack_t crack_db_t:lnk_file create_file_perms;
files_search_var(crack_t)

allow crack_t crack_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow crack_t crack_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files(crack_t, crack_tmp_t, { file dir })

kernel_read_system_state(crack_t)

# for SSP
dev_read_urand(crack_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(crack_t)

files_read_generic_etc_files(crack_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(crack_t)
# for dictionaries
files_read_usr_files(crack_t)

corecmd_exec_bin(crack_t)

libs_use_ld_so(crack_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(crack_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(crack_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`
ifdef(`crond.te', `
domain_auto_trans(system_crond_t, crack_exec_t, crack_t)
allow crack_t crond_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
# a rule for privfd may make this obsolete
allow crack_t crond_t:fd use;
allow crack_t crond_t:process sigchld;
')

dontaudit crack_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
') dnl endif TODO

########################################
#
# Groupadd local policy
#

allow groupadd_t self:capability { dac_override chown kill setuid sys_resource };
dontaudit groupadd_t self:capability fsetid;
allow groupadd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow groupadd_t self:process { setrlimit setfscreate };
allow groupadd_t self:fd use;
allow groupadd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow groupadd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow groupadd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow groupadd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow groupadd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow groupadd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow groupadd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow groupadd_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow groupadd_t self:msg { send receive };

# Allow access to context for shadow file
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(groupadd_t)
kernel_validate_context(groupadd_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(groupadd_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(groupadd_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(groupadd_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(groupadd_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(groupadd_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(groupadd_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(groupadd_t)

init_use_fd(groupadd_t)
init_read_script_pid(groupadd_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(groupadd_t)

files_manage_generic_etc_files(groupadd_t)

libs_use_ld_so(groupadd_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(groupadd_t)

# Execute /usr/bin/{passwd,chfn,chsh} and /usr/sbin/{useradd,vipw}.
corecmd_exec_bin(groupadd_t)
corecmd_exec_sbin(groupadd_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(groupadd_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(groupadd_t)

auth_manage_shadow(groupadd_t)
auth_rw_lastlog(groupadd_t)

selinux_read_config(groupadd_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`
role sysadm_r types groupadd_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, groupadd_exec_t, groupadd_t)

allow groupadd_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
can_ypbind(groupadd_t)
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow groupadd_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
')

# Update /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd
allow groupadd_t { etc_t shadow_t }:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

# Access terminals.
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow groupadd_t gphdomain:fd use;')

# for when /root is the cwd
dontaudit groupadd_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search;
dontaudit groupadd_t initrc_var_run_t:file write;
') dnl end TODO

########################################
#
# Passwd local policy
#

allow passwd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid setuid setgid sys_resource };
allow passwd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow passwd_t self:process { setrlimit setfscreate };
allow passwd_t self:fd use;
allow passwd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow passwd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow passwd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow passwd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow passwd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow passwd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow passwd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow passwd_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow passwd_t self:msg { send receive };

kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(passwd_t)
kernel_validate_context(passwd_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(passwd_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(passwd_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(passwd_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(passwd_t)

# for SSP
dev_read_urand(passwd_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(passwd_t)

# /usr/bin/passwd asks for w access to utmp, but it will operate
# correctly without it.  Do not audit write denials to utmp.
init_dontaudit_rw_script_pid(passwd_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(passwd_t)

files_read_etc_runtime_files(passwd_t)
files_manage_generic_etc_files(passwd_t)

libs_use_ld_so(passwd_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(passwd_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(passwd_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(passwd_t)

auth_manage_shadow(passwd_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`

ifdef(`firstboot.te',`
domain_auto_trans(firstboot_t, passwd_exec_t, passwd_t)
')

# Update /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd
allow passwd_t { etc_t shadow_t }:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

allow passwd_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
can_ypbind(passwd_t)
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow passwd_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
')

# Inherit and use descriptors from login.
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow passwd_t gphdomain:fd use;')

# allow checking if a shell is executable
allow passwd_t shell_exec_t:file execute;

# user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search
# on user home dir
dontaudit passwd_t { user_home_dir_type user_home_type }:dir search;

# make sure that getcon succeeds
allow passwd_t userdomain:dir search;
allow passwd_t userdomain:file read;
allow passwd_t userdomain:process getattr;

dontaudit passwd_t selinux_config_t:dir search;

ifdef(`crack.te', `
allow passwd_t var_t:dir search;
dontaudit passwd_t var_run_t:dir search;
allow passwd_t crack_db_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow passwd_t crack_db_t:file r_file_perms;
', `
dontaudit passwd_t var_t:dir search;
')
') dnl endif TODO

########################################
#
# Password admin local policy
#

allow sysadm_passwd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid setuid setgid sys_resource };
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:process { setrlimit setfscreate };
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:fd use;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow sysadm_passwd_t self:msg { send receive };

# allow vipw to create temporary files under /var/tmp/vi.recover
allow sysadm_passwd_t sysadm_passwd_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
allow sysadm_passwd_t sysadm_passwd_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
files_create_tmp_files(sysadm_passwd_t, sysadm_passwd_tmp_t, { file dir })
files_search_var(sysadm_passwd_t)

kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(sysadm_passwd_t)
kernel_validate_context(sysadm_passwd_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(sysadm_passwd_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(sysadm_passwd_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(sysadm_passwd_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(sysadm_passwd_t)
# for /proc/meminfo
kernel_read_system_state(sysadm_passwd_t)

# for SSP
dev_read_urand(sysadm_passwd_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sysadm_passwd_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(sysadm_passwd_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(sysadm_passwd_t)

# /usr/bin/passwd asks for w access to utmp, but it will operate
# correctly without it.  Do not audit write denials to utmp.
init_dontaudit_rw_script_pid(sysadm_passwd_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(sysadm_passwd_t)

files_manage_generic_etc_files(sysadm_passwd_t)
files_read_etc_runtime_files(sysadm_passwd_t)

# allow vipw to exec the editor
corecmd_exec_bin(sysadm_passwd_t)
corecmd_exec_shell(sysadm_passwd_t)
files_read_usr_files(sysadm_passwd_t)

libs_use_ld_so(sysadm_passwd_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(sysadm_passwd_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(sysadm_passwd_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(sysadm_passwd_t)

auth_manage_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`
role sysadm_r types sysadm_passwd_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, admin_passwd_exec_t, sysadm_passwd_t)

allow sysadm_passwd_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
can_ypbind(sysadm_passwd_t)
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow sysadm_passwd_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
')

# Inherit and use descriptors from login.
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow sysadm_passwd_t gphdomain:fd use;')

# allow checking if a shell is executable
allow sysadm_passwd_t shell_exec_t:file execute;

# user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search
# on user home dir
dontaudit sysadm_passwd_t { user_home_dir_type user_home_type }:dir search;

# Update /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd
allow sysadm_passwd_t { etc_t shadow_t }:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

# for vipw - vi looks in the root home directory for config
dontaudit sysadm_passwd_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };

# for nscd lookups
dontaudit sysadm_passwd_t var_run_t:dir search;

dontaudit sysadm_passwd_t selinux_config_t:dir search;
') dnl endif TODO

########################################
#
# Useradd local policy
#

allow useradd_t self:capability { dac_override chown kill fowner fsetid setuid sys_resource };
allow useradd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow useradd_t self:process setfscreate;
allow useradd_t self:fd use;
allow useradd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow useradd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow useradd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow useradd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow useradd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow useradd_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow useradd_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow useradd_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow useradd_t self:msg { send receive };

# Allow access to context for shadow file
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(useradd_t)
kernel_validate_context(useradd_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(useradd_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(useradd_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(useradd_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(useradd_t)
# for getting the number of groups
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl(useradd_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(useradd_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(useradd_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(useradd_t)

init_use_fd(useradd_t)
init_rw_script_pid(useradd_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(useradd_t)

files_manage_generic_etc_files(useradd_t)

libs_use_ld_so(useradd_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(useradd_t)

corecmd_exec_shell(useradd_t)
# Execute /usr/bin/{passwd,chfn,chsh} and /usr/sbin/{useradd,vipw}.
corecmd_exec_bin(useradd_t)
corecmd_exec_sbin(useradd_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(useradd_t)

selinux_read_config(useradd_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(useradd_t)

auth_manage_shadow(useradd_t)
auth_rw_lastlog(useradd_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`

role sysadm_r types useradd_t;
domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t, useradd_exec_t, useradd_t)

allow useradd_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use;
can_ypbind(useradd_t)
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow useradd_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
')

# Update /etc/shadow and /etc/passwd
allow useradd_t { etc_t shadow_t }:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

# Access terminals.
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow useradd_t gphdomain:fd use;')

# for when /root is the cwd
dontaudit useradd_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir search;

# Add/remove user home directories
file_type_auto_trans(useradd_t, home_root_t, user_home_dir_t, dir)
file_type_auto_trans(useradd_t, user_home_dir_t, user_home_t)

# create/delete mail spool file in /var/mail
allow useradd_t var_spool_t:dir search;
allow useradd_t mail_spool_t:dir { search write add_name remove_name };
allow useradd_t mail_spool_t:file create_file_perms;
# /var/mail is a link to /var/spool/mail
allow useradd_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
') dnl end TODO