selinux-policy/refpolicy/policy/modules/apps/uml.if

## <summary>Policy for UML</summary>
	
#######################################
## <summary>
##	The per user domain template for the uml module.
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	This template creates a derived domains which are used
##	for uml program.
##	</p>
##	<p>
##	This template is invoked automatically for each user, and
##	generally does not need to be invoked directly
##	by policy writers.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
##	<summary>
##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
##	is the prefix for user_t).
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_domain">
##	<summary>
##	The type of the user domain.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <param name="user_role">
##	<summary>
##	The role associated with the user domain.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
template(`uml_per_userdomain_template',`
	
	########################################
	#
	# Declarations
	#
	type $1_uml_t;
	domain_type($1_uml_t)
	role $3 types $1_uml_t;

	type $1_uml_exec_t;
	domain_entry_file($1_uml_t,$1_uml_exec_t)

	type $1_uml_ro_t;
	files_type($1_uml_ro_t)

	type $1_uml_rw_t;
	files_type($1_uml_rw_t)

	type $1_uml_tmp_t;
	files_tmp_file($1_uml_tmp_t)

	type $1_uml_tmpfs_t;
	files_tmpfs_file($1_uml_tmpfs_t)

	type $1_uml_devpts_t;
	term_pty($1_uml_devpts_t)

	########################################
	#
	# Local policy
	#
	allow $1_uml_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t self:process { fork signal_perms ptrace };
	allow $1_uml_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
	# Use the network.
	allow $1_uml_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;

	allow $1_uml_t $2:process sigchld;
	allow $1_uml_t $2:fifo_file { ioctl read write getattr lock append };

	# allow the UML thing to happen
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr };
	term_create_pty($1_uml_t,$1_uml_devpts_t)

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
	files_tmp_filetrans($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t, { file dir })
	can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t)

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write };
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename };
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename };
	fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_uml_t,$1_uml_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })
	can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmpfs_t)

	# access config files
	allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:file r_file_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:lnk_file { getattr read };

	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir create_dir_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:file create_file_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:sock_file create_file_perms;
	allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:fifo_file create_file_perms;
	userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1,$1_uml_t,$1_uml_rw_t,{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

	allow $2 uml_ro_t:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow $2 uml_ro_t:file r_file_perms;
	allow $2 uml_ro_t:lnk_file { getattr read };

	allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:{ file sock_file fifo_file } { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms };
	allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:lnk_file { relabelfrom relabelto create_lnk_perms };
	allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t $1_uml_exec_t }:dir { relabelfrom relabelto create_dir_perms };
	allow $2 $1_uml_exec_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms };

	allow $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace;
	allow $2 $1_uml_t:process signal_perms;

	# allow ps, ptrace, signal
	allow $2 $1_uml_t:dir { search getattr read };
	allow $2 $1_uml_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
	allow $2 $1_uml_t:process getattr;
	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
	# running in a privileged domain.
	dontaudit $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
	allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms;

	# Transition from the user domain to this domain.
	domain_auto_trans($2, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t }, $1_uml_t)
	can_exec($1_uml_t, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t })

	# for mconsole
	allow { $2 $1_uml_t } $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
	allow $1_uml_t $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
	
	kernel_read_system_state($1_uml_t)
	# for SKAS - need something better
	kernel_write_proc_files($1_uml_t)

	# for xterm
	corecmd_exec_bin($1_uml_t)
	corecmd_exec_sbin($1_uml_t)

	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t)
	corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_uml_t)
	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t)
	corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_uml_t)
	corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev($1_uml_t)
	
	domain_use_interactive_fds($1_uml_t)

	# for xterm
	files_read_etc_files($1_uml_t)
	files_dontaudit_read_etc_runtime_files($1_uml_t)
	# putting uml data under /var is usual...
	files_search_var($1_uml_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_uml_t)

	init_read_utmp($1_uml_t)
	init_dontaudit_write_utmp($1_uml_t)

	# for xterm
	libs_use_ld_so($1_uml_t)
	libs_use_shared_libs($1_uml_t)
	libs_exec_lib_files($1_uml_t)

	# Inherit and use descriptors from newrole.
	seutil_use_newrole_fds($1_uml_t)

	# Use the network.
	sysnet_read_config($1_uml_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_uml_t)

	optional_policy(`
		mount_send_nfs_client_request($1_uml_t)
	')

	optional_policy(`
		nis_use_ypbind($1_uml_t)
	')

	optional_policy(`
		ssh_tcp_connect($1_uml_t)
	')
	
	ifdef(`TODO',`
		# for X
		optional_policy(`
			ifelse($1, sysadm,`
			',`
				optional_policy(`
					allow $1_uml_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search;
				')
				allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file write;
				allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
			')
		')

		optional_policy(`
			# for uml_net
			domain_auto_trans($1_uml_t, uml_net_exec_t, uml_net_t)
			allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_stream_socket { read write };
			allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };
			dontaudit uml_net_t privfd:fd use;
			can_access_pty(uml_net_t, $1_uml)
			dontaudit uml_net_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir { getattr search };
		')
		#TODO
		optional_policy(`
			allow $1_uml_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };
		')
	')
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Set attributes on uml utility socket files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain allowed access.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`uml_setattr_util_sockets',`
	gen_require(`
		type uml_switch_var_run_t;
	')

	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:sock_file setattr;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Manage uml utility files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain allowed access.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`uml_manage_util_files',`
	gen_require(`
		type uml_switch_var_run_t;
	')

	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:file create_file_perms;
	allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
')