selinux-policy/refpolicy/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te

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policy_module(kernel,1.0)
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########################################
#
# Declarations
#
# assertion related attributes
attribute can_load_kernmodule;
attribute can_receive_kernel_messages;
#
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# kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads.
# It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class.
#
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type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule;
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role system_r types kernel_t;
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domain_type(kernel_t)
sid kernel context_template(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,s0 - s9:c0.c127)
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#
# unlabeled_t is the type of unlabeled objects.
# Objects that have no known labeling information or that
# have labels that are no longer valid are treated as having this type.
#
type unlabeled_t;
sid unlabeled context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
# These initial sids are no longer used, and can be removed:
sid any_socket context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid file_labels context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid icmp_socket context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid igmp_packet context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid init context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid kmod context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid netmsg context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid policy context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid scmp_packet context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_modprobe context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_fs context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_kernel context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_net_unix context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_vm context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid sysctl_dev context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
sid tcp_socket context_template(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,s0)
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#
# Procfs types
#
type proc_t;
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files_mountpoint(proc_t)
fs_type(proc_t)
genfscon proc / context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sysvipc context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_t,s0)
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# kernel message interface
type proc_kmsg_t;
genfscon proc /kmsg context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_kmsg_t,s0)
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neverallow ~can_receive_kernel_messages proc_kmsg_t:file ~getattr;
# /proc kcore: inaccessible
type proc_kcore_t;
neverallow * proc_kcore_t:file ~getattr;
genfscon proc /kcore context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_kcore_t,s0)
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type proc_mdstat_t;
genfscon proc /mdstat context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_mdstat_t,s0)
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type proc_net_t;
genfscon proc /net context_template(system_u:object_r:proc_net_t,s0)
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#
# Sysctl types
#
# /proc/irq directory and files
type sysctl_irq_t;
genfscon proc /irq context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_irq_t,s0)
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# /proc/net/rpc directory and files
type sysctl_rpc_t;
genfscon proc /net/rpc context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_rpc_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys directory, base directory of sysctls
type sysctl_t;
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files_mountpoint(sysctl_t)
sid sysctl context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)
genfscon proc /sys context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/fs directory and files
type sysctl_fs_t;
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files_mountpoint(sysctl_fs_t)
genfscon proc /sys/fs context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/kernel directory and files
type sysctl_kernel_t;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file
type sysctl_modprobe_t;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug file
type sysctl_hotplug_t;
genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_hotplug_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/net directory and files
type sysctl_net_t;
genfscon proc /sys/net context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/net/unix directory and files
type sysctl_net_unix_t;
genfscon proc /sys/net/unix context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_unix_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/vm directory and files
type sysctl_vm_t;
genfscon proc /sys/vm context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_t,s0)
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# /proc/sys/dev directory and files
type sysctl_dev_t;
genfscon proc /sys/dev context_template(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0)
########################################
#
# kernel local policy
#
# Use capabilities. need to investigate which capabilities are actually used
allow kernel_t self:capability *;
# Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files
allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton;
# old general_domain_access()
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allow kernel_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow kernel_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow kernel_t self:msg { send receive };
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allow kernel_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow kernel_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow kernel_t self:fd use;
# old general_proc_read_access():
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allow kernel_t proc_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_t:{ lnk_file file } r_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_net_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_net_t:file r_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_mdstat_t:file r_file_perms;
allow kernel_t proc_kcore_t:file getattr;
allow kernel_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr;
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allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file r_file_perms;
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allow kernel_t security_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow kernel_t security_t:file rw_file_perms;
allow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
auditallow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy;
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# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., ICMP replies:
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
# Kernel-generated traffic e.g., TCP resets:
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corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t)
corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t)
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selinux_load_policy(kernel_t)
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term_use_console(kernel_t)
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# Mount root file system. Used when loading a policy
# from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem
fs_mount_all_fs(kernel_t)
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corecmd_exec_shell(kernel_t)
corecmd_list_sbin(kernel_t)
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# /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe is set to /bin/true if not using modules.
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corecmd_exec_bin(kernel_t)
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domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t)
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files_list_root(kernel_t)
files_list_home(kernel_t)
files_read_usr_files(kernel_t)
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init_sigchld(kernel_t)
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libs_use_ld_so(kernel_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(kernel_t)
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logging_send_syslog_msg(kernel_t)
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seutil_read_config(kernel_t)
seutil_read_binary_pol(kernel_t)
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neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_module;
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########################################
#
# Unlabeled process local policy
#
# If you load a new policy that removes active domains, processes can
# get stuck if you do not allow unlabeled processes to signal init.
# If you load an incompatible policy, you should probably reboot,
# since you may have compromised system security.
init_sigchld(unlabeled_t)