selinux-policy/refpolicy/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te

policy_module(selinuxutil,1.0)

gen_require(`
	bool secure_mode;
')

########################################
#
# Declarations
#

attribute can_write_binary_policy;
attribute can_relabelto_binary_policy;

type checkpolicy_t, can_write_binary_policy;
domain_type(checkpolicy_t)
role system_r types checkpolicy_t;

type checkpolicy_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(checkpolicy_t,checkpolicy_exec_t)

#
# default_context_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/*/contexts/*
#
type default_context_t;
files_type(default_context_t) 

#
# file_context_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/*/contexts/files
#
type file_context_t;
files_type(file_context_t)

type load_policy_t;
domain_type(load_policy_t)
role system_r types load_policy_t;

type load_policy_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(load_policy_t,load_policy_exec_t)

type newrole_t;
domain_role_change_exempt(newrole_t)
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(newrole_t)
domain_type(newrole_t)
domain_wide_inherit_fd(newrole_t)

type newrole_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(newrole_t,newrole_exec_t)

#
# policy_config_t is the type of /etc/security/selinux/*
# the security server policy configuration.
#
type policy_config_t;
files_type(policy_config_t)
kernel_list_from(policy_config_t)
kernel_read_file_from(policy_config_t)

neverallow ~can_relabelto_binary_policy policy_config_t:file relabelto;
#neverallow ~can_write_binary_policy policy_config_t:file { write append };

#
# policy_src_t is the type of the policy source
# files.
#
type policy_src_t;
files_type(policy_src_t)

type restorecon_t, can_relabelto_binary_policy;
type restorecon_exec_t;
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(restorecon_t)
init_system_domain(restorecon_t,restorecon_exec_t)
role system_r types restorecon_t;

type run_init_t;
domain_type(run_init_t)

type run_init_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(run_init_t,run_init_exec_t)

#
# selinux_config_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/config
#
type selinux_config_t;
files_type(selinux_config_t)
kernel_list_from(selinux_config_t)
kernel_read_file_from(selinux_config_t)

type setfiles_t, can_relabelto_binary_policy;
domain_obj_id_change_exempt(setfiles_t)
domain_type(setfiles_t)
role system_r types setfiles_t;

type setfiles_exec_t;
domain_entry_file(setfiles_t,setfiles_exec_t)

ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
	init_system_domain(setfiles_t,setfiles_exec_t)
')

########################################
#
# Checkpolicy local policy
#

allow checkpolicy_t self:capability dac_override;

# able to create and modify binary policy files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:file create_file_perms;

# allow test policies to be created in src directories
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
type_transition checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:file policy_config_t;

# only allow read of policy source files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:file r_file_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t selinux_config_t:dir search;

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(checkpolicy_t)

term_use_console(checkpolicy_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(checkpolicy_t)

files_list_usr(checkpolicy_t)
# directory search permissions for path to source and binary policy files
files_search_etc(checkpolicy_t)

init_use_fd(checkpolicy_t)
init_use_script_pty(checkpolicy_t)

libs_use_ld_so(checkpolicy_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(checkpolicy_t)

userdom_use_all_user_fd(checkpolicy_t)

ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
	term_use_generic_pty(checkpolicy_t)
	term_use_unallocated_tty(checkpolicy_t)
')

########################################
#
# Load_policy local policy
#

allow load_policy_t self:capability dac_override;

# only allow read of policy config files
allow load_policy_t policy_src_t:dir search;
allow load_policy_t policy_config_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow load_policy_t policy_config_t:file r_file_perms;
allow load_policy_t policy_config_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;

allow load_policy_t selinux_config_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow load_policy_t selinux_config_t:file r_file_perms;
allow load_policy_t selinux_config_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(load_policy_t)

selinux_get_fs_mount(load_policy_t)
selinux_load_policy(load_policy_t)
selinux_set_boolean(load_policy_t)

term_use_console(load_policy_t)
term_list_ptys(load_policy_t)

init_use_script_fd(load_policy_t)
init_use_script_pty(load_policy_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(load_policy_t)

# for mcs.conf
files_read_etc_files(load_policy_t)

libs_use_ld_so(load_policy_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(load_policy_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(load_policy_t)

userdom_use_all_user_fd(load_policy_t)

ifdef(`targeted_policy', `
	term_use_unallocated_tty(load_policy_t)
	term_use_generic_pty(load_policy_t)
')

# cjp: temporary hack to cover
# up stray file descriptors.
dontaudit load_policy_t selinux_config_t:file write;
dontaudit load_policy_t unconfined_t:fifo_file read;

########################################
#
# Newrole local policy
#

allow newrole_t self:capability { fowner setuid setgid dac_override };
allow newrole_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execheap execstack };
allow newrole_t self:process setexec;
allow newrole_t self:fd use;
allow newrole_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow newrole_t self:sock_file r_file_perms;
allow newrole_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow newrole_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow newrole_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow newrole_t self:msg { send receive };
allow newrole_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow newrole_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
allow newrole_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create bind write nlmsg_read read };

allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file r_file_perms;
allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file r_file_perms;

kernel_read_system_state(newrole_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl(newrole_t)

dev_read_urand(newrole_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(newrole_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(newrole_t)

mls_file_read_up(newrole_t)
mls_file_write_down(newrole_t)
mls_file_upgrade(newrole_t)
mls_file_downgrade(newrole_t)
mls_process_set_level(newrole_t)

selinux_get_fs_mount(newrole_t)
selinux_validate_context(newrole_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector(newrole_t)
selinux_compute_create_context(newrole_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(newrole_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(newrole_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(newrole_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(newrole_t)
term_relabel_all_user_ttys(newrole_t)
term_relabel_all_user_ptys(newrole_t)

auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(newrole_t)

corecmd_list_bin(newrole_t)
corecmd_read_bin_symlink(newrole_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(newrole_t)
# for when the user types "exec newrole" at the command line:
domain_sigchld_wide_inherit_fd(newrole_t)

# Write to utmp.
init_rw_script_pid(newrole_t)

files_read_etc_files(newrole_t)
files_read_var_files(newrole_t)
files_read_var_symlink(newrole_t)

libs_use_ld_so(newrole_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(newrole_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(newrole_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(newrole_t)

userdom_use_unpriv_users_fd(newrole_t)
# for some PAM modules and for cwd
userdom_dontaudit_search_all_users_home(newrole_t)

ifdef(`targeted_policy',`
	# newrole does not make any sense in
	# the targeted policy.  This is to
	# make sediff easier.
	if(!secure_mode) {
		unconfined_domtrans(newrole_t)
	}
',`
	# if secure mode is enabled, then newrole
	# can only transition to unprivileged users
	if(secure_mode) {
		userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users(newrole_t)
	} else {
		userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users(newrole_t)
	}
')

optional_policy(`nis.te',`
	nis_use_ypbind(newrole_t)
')

optional_policy(`nscd.te',`
	nscd_use_socket(newrole_t)
')

ifdef(`TODO',`
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow newrole_t gphdomain:fd use;')
') dnl ifdef TODO

########################################
#
# Restorecon local policy
#

allow restorecon_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };

allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file r_file_perms;
allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file r_file_perms;

kernel_use_fd(restorecon_t)
kernel_rw_pipe(restorecon_t)
kernel_read_system_state(restorecon_t)

# cjp: why is this needed?
dev_rw_generic_file(restorecon_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(restorecon_t)
fs_search_auto_mountpoints(restorecon_t)

mls_file_read_up(restorecon_t)
mls_file_write_down(restorecon_t)
mls_file_upgrade(restorecon_t)
mls_file_downgrade(restorecon_t)

selinux_get_fs_mount(restorecon_t)
selinux_validate_context(restorecon_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector(restorecon_t)
selinux_compute_create_context(restorecon_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(restorecon_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(restorecon_t)

term_use_unallocated_tty(restorecon_t)
term_use_all_user_ttys(restorecon_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(restorecon_t)

init_use_fd(restorecon_t)
init_use_script_pty(restorecon_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(restorecon_t)

files_read_etc_runtime_files(restorecon_t)
files_read_etc_files(restorecon_t)

libs_use_ld_so(restorecon_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(restorecon_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(restorecon_t)

userdom_use_all_user_fd(restorecon_t)

# relabeling rules
kernel_relabel_unlabeled(restorecon_t)
dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(restorecon_t)

files_relabel_all_files(restorecon_t)
files_list_all_dirs(restorecon_t)
# this is to satisfy the assertion:
auth_relabelto_shadow(restorecon_t)

ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
	fs_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(restorecon_t)
	fs_use_tmpfs_blk_dev(restorecon_t)
	fs_relabel_tmpfs_blk_dev(restorecon_t)
	fs_relabel_tmpfs_chr_dev(restorecon_t)
')

ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',`
	udev_dontaudit_rw_unix_dgram_socket(restorecon_t)
')

optional_policy(`hotplug.te',`
	hotplug_use_fd(restorecon_t)
')

ifdef(`TODO',`
# for upgrading glibc and other shared objects - without this the upgrade
# scripts will put things in a state such that restorecon can not be run!
allow restorecon_t lib_t:file { read execute };
ifdef(`dpkg.te', `
domain_auto_trans(dpkg_t, restorecon_exec_t, restorecon_t)
')
') dnl endif TODO

allow restorecon_t kernel_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write };

#################################
#
# Run_init local policy
#

selinux_get_fs_mount(run_init_t)
selinux_validate_context(run_init_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector(run_init_t)
selinux_compute_create_context(run_init_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(run_init_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(run_init_t)

ifdef(`targeted_policy',`',`
	allow run_init_t self:process setexec;
	allow run_init_t self:capability setuid;

	allow run_init_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	# often the administrator runs such programs from a directory that is owned
	# by a different user or has restrictive SE permissions, do not want to audit
	# the failed access to the current directory
	dontaudit run_init_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs(run_init_t)

	dev_dontaudit_list_all_dev_nodes(run_init_t)

	term_dontaudit_list_ptys(run_init_t)

	auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(run_init_t)

	corecmd_exec_bin(run_init_t)
	corecmd_exec_shell(run_init_t)

	domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(run_init_t)

	files_read_etc_files(run_init_t)
	files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(run_init_t)

	init_domtrans_script(run_init_t)
	# for utmp
	init_rw_script_pid(run_init_t)

	libs_use_ld_so(run_init_t)
	libs_use_shared_libs(run_init_t)

	seutil_read_config(run_init_t)
	seutil_read_default_contexts(run_init_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization(run_init_t)

	logging_send_syslog_msg(run_init_t)
') dnl end ifdef targeted policy

ifdef(`TODO',`
ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
	# Gentoo integrated run_init+open_init_pty-runscript:
	domain_entry_file(run_init_t,initrc_exec_t)
	domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t,initrc_exec_t,run_init_t)
')
') dnl end TODO

########################################
#
# Setfiles local policy
#

allow setfiles_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };

allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file r_file_perms;
allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file r_file_perms;

kernel_read_system_state(setfiles_t)
kernel_list_unlabeled(setfiles_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(setfiles_t)
fs_list_all(setfiles_t)

mls_file_read_up(setfiles_t)
mls_file_write_down(setfiles_t)
mls_file_upgrade(setfiles_t)
mls_file_downgrade(setfiles_t)

selinux_get_fs_mount(setfiles_t)
selinux_validate_context(setfiles_t)
selinux_compute_access_vector(setfiles_t)
selinux_compute_create_context(setfiles_t)
selinux_compute_relabel_context(setfiles_t)
selinux_compute_user_contexts(setfiles_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(setfiles_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(setfiles_t)
term_use_unallocated_tty(setfiles_t)

init_use_fd(setfiles_t)
init_use_script_fd(setfiles_t)
init_use_script_pty(setfiles_t)

domain_use_wide_inherit_fd(setfiles_t)

libs_use_ld_so(setfiles_t)
libs_use_shared_libs(setfiles_t)

files_read_etc_runtime_files(setfiles_t)
files_read_etc_files(setfiles_t)

logging_send_syslog_msg(setfiles_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(setfiles_t)

userdom_use_all_user_fd(setfiles_t)
# for config files in a home directory
userdom_read_all_user_files(setfiles_t)

# relabeling rules
kernel_relabel_unlabeled(setfiles_t)
dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(setfiles_t)
files_list_all_dirs(setfiles_t)
files_relabel_all_files(setfiles_t)
# this is to satisfy the assertion:
auth_relabelto_shadow(setfiles_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`
# for upgrading glibc and other shared objects - without this the upgrade
# scripts will put things in a state such that setfiles can not be run!
allow setfiles_t lib_t:file { read execute };
') dnl endif TODO