selinux-policy/strict/domains/user.te

#DESC User - Domains for ordinary users.
#
#################################

# Booleans for user domains.

# Allow users to read system messages.
bool user_dmesg false;

# Support NFS home directories
bool use_nfs_home_dirs false;

# Allow execution of anonymous mappings, e.g. executable stack.
bool allow_execmem false;

# Support Share libraries with Text Relocation
bool allow_execmod false;

# Support SAMBA home directories
bool use_samba_home_dirs false;

# Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from
# the same domain and outside users)  disabling this forces FTP passive mode
# and may change other protocols 
bool user_tcp_server false;

# Allow system to run with NIS
bool allow_ypbind false;

# Allow system to run with kerberos
bool allow_kerberos false;

# Allow users to rw usb devices
bool user_rw_usb false;

# Allow users to control network interfaces (also needs USERCTL=true)
bool user_net_control false;

# Allow regular users direct mouse access 
bool user_direct_mouse false;

# Allow user to r/w noextattrfile (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY)
bool user_rw_noexattrfile false;

# Allow reading of default_t files.
bool read_default_t false;

# Allow staff_r users to search the sysadm home dir and read
# files (such as ~/.bashrc)
bool staff_read_sysadm_file false;

# change from role $1_r to $2_r and relabel tty appropriately
define(`role_tty_type_change', `
allow $1_r $2_r;
type_change $2_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file $2_devpts_t;
type_change $2_t $1_tty_device_t:chr_file $2_tty_device_t;
# avoid annoying messages on terminal hangup
dontaudit $1_t { $2_devpts_t $2_tty_device_t }:chr_file ioctl;
')

# Reach sysadm_t via programs like userhelper/sudo/su
undefine(`reach_sysadm')
define(`reach_sysadm', `
ifdef(`userhelper.te', `userhelper_domain($1)')
ifdef(`sudo.te', `sudo_domain($1)')
ifdef(`su.te', `
su_domain($1)
# When an ordinary user domain runs su, su may try to
# update the /root/.Xauthority file, and the user shell may
# try to update the shell history. This is not allowed, but 
# we dont need to audit it.
dontaudit $1_su_t { sysadm_home_dir_t staff_home_dir_t }:dir search;
dontaudit $1_su_t { sysadm_home_t staff_home_t }:dir rw_dir_perms;
dontaudit $1_su_t { sysadm_home_t staff_home_t }:file create_file_perms;
') dnl ifdef su.te
')

# Privileged user domain
undefine(`priv_user')
define(`priv_user', `
# Reach sysadm_t
reach_sysadm($1)

# Read file_contexts for rpm and get security decisions. 
r_dir_file($1_t, file_context_t)
can_getsecurity($1_t)

# Signal and see information about unprivileged user domains.
allow $1_t unpriv_userdomain:process signal_perms;
can_ps($1_t, unpriv_userdomain)
allow $1_t { ttyfile ptyfile tty_device_t }:chr_file getattr;

# Read /root files if boolean is enabled.
if (staff_read_sysadm_file) {
allow $1_t sysadm_home_dir_t:dir { getattr search };
allow $1_t sysadm_home_t:file { getattr read };
}

') dnl priv_user

full_user_role(user)

ifdef(`user_canbe_sysadm', `
reach_sysadm(user)
role_tty_type_change(user, sysadm)
')

#  Do not add any rules referring to user_t to this file!  That will break
#  support for multiple user roles.

# a role for staff that allows seeing all domains and control over the user_t
# domain
full_user_role(staff)

priv_user(staff)
# if adding new user roles make sure you edit the in_user_role macro in
# macros/user_macros.te to match

# lots of user programs accidentally search /root, and also the admin often
# logs in as UID=0 domain=user_t...
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain { sysadm_home_dir_t staff_home_dir_t }:dir { getattr search };

#
# Allow the user roles to transition
# into each other.
role_tty_type_change(sysadm, user)
role_tty_type_change(staff, sysadm)
role_tty_type_change(sysadm, staff)

# "ps aux" and "ls -l /dev/pts" make too much noise without this
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain ptyfile:chr_file getattr;