397 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
397 lines
11 KiB
Plaintext
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#
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# Macros for all user login domains.
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#
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#
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# base_user_domain(domain_prefix)
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#
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# Define derived types and rules for an ordinary user domain.
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#
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# The type declaration and role authorization for the domain must be
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# provided separately. Likewise, domain transitions into this domain
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# must be specified separately.
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#
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# base_user_domain() is also called by the admin_domain() macro
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undefine(`base_user_domain')
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define(`base_user_domain', `
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# Type for network-obtained content
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type $1_untrusted_content_t, file_type, $1_file_type, sysadmfile, customizable, polymember;
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type $1_untrusted_content_tmp_t, file_type, $1_file_type, sysadmfile, tmpfile, customizable, polymember;
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# Allow user to relabel untrusted content
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allow $1_t { $1_untrusted_content_t $1_untrusted_content_tmp_t }:dir { create_dir_perms relabelto relabelfrom };
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allow $1_t { $1_untrusted_content_t $1_untrusted_content_tmp_t }:file { getattr unlink relabelto relabelfrom rename };
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# Read content
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read_content($1_t, $1)
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# Write trusted content. This includes proper transition
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# for /home, and /tmp, so no other transition is necessary (or allowed)
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write_trusted($1_t, $1)
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# Maybe the home directory is networked
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network_home($1_t)
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# Transition for { lnk, fifo, sock }. The rest is covered by write_trusted.
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# Relabel files in the home directory
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file_type_auto_trans($1_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t, { fifo_file sock_file lnk_file });
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allow $1_t $1_home_t:{ notdevfile_class_set dir } { relabelfrom relabelto };
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can_setfscreate($1_t)
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ifdef(`ftpd.te' , `
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if (ftpd_is_daemon) {
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file_type_auto_trans(ftpd_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_home_t)
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}
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')
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allow $1_t self:capability { setgid chown fowner };
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dontaudit $1_t self:capability { sys_nice fsetid };
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# $1_r is authorized for $1_t for the initial login domain.
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role $1_r types $1_t;
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allow system_r $1_r;
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r_dir_file($1_t, usercanread)
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# Grant permissions within the domain.
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general_domain_access($1_t)
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if (allow_execmem) {
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# Allow making anonymous memory executable, e.g.
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# for runtime-code generation or executable stack.
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allow $1_t self:process execmem;
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}
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if (allow_execmem && allow_execstack) {
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# Allow making the stack executable via mprotect.
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allow $1_t self:process execstack;
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}
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# Allow text relocations on system shared libraries, e.g. libGL.
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allow $1_t texrel_shlib_t:file execmod;
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#
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# kdeinit wants this access
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#
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allow $1_t device_t:dir { getattr search };
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# Find CDROM devices
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r_dir_file($1_t, sysctl_dev_t)
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# for eject
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allow $1_t fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file getattr;
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allow $1_t fs_type:dir getattr;
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allow $1_t event_device_t:chr_file { getattr read ioctl };
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# open office is looking for the following
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allow $1_t dri_device_t:chr_file getattr;
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dontaudit $1_t dri_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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# Supress ls denials:
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# getattr() - ls -l
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# search_dir() - symlink path resolution
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# read_dir() - deep ls: ls parent/...
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dontaudit_getattr($1_t)
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dontaudit_search_dir($1_t)
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dontaudit_read_dir($1_t)
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# allow ptrace
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can_ptrace($1_t, $1_t)
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# Allow user to run restorecon and relabel files
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can_getsecurity($1_t)
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r_dir_file($1_t, default_context_t)
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r_dir_file($1_t, file_context_t)
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allow $1_t usbtty_device_t:chr_file read;
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# GNOME checks for usb and other devices
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rw_dir_file($1_t,usbfs_t)
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can_exec($1_t, noexattrfile)
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# Bind to a Unix domain socket in /tmp.
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allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:unix_stream_socket name_bind;
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# Use the type when relabeling terminal devices.
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type_change $1_t tty_device_t:chr_file $1_tty_device_t;
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# Debian login is from shadow utils and does not allow resetting the perms.
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# have to fix this!
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type_change $1_t ttyfile:chr_file $1_tty_device_t;
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# for running TeX programs
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r_dir_file($1_t, tetex_data_t)
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can_exec($1_t, tetex_data_t)
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# Use the type when relabeling pty devices.
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type_change $1_t server_pty:chr_file $1_devpts_t;
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tmpfs_domain($1)
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ifdef(`cardmgr.te', `
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# to allow monitoring of pcmcia status
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allow $1_t cardmgr_var_run_t:file { getattr read };
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')
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# Modify mail spool file.
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allow $1_t mail_spool_t:dir r_dir_perms;
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allow $1_t mail_spool_t:file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_t mail_spool_t:lnk_file read;
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#
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# Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan
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#
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ifdef(`apmd.te', `
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allow $1_t apmd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
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allow $1_t apmd_var_run_t:sock_file write;
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')
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#
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# Allow the query of filesystem quotas
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#
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allow $1_t fs_type:filesystem quotaget;
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# Run helper programs.
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can_exec_any($1_t)
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# Run programs developed by other users in the same domain.
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can_exec($1_t, $1_home_t)
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can_exec($1_t, $1_tmp_t)
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# Run user programs that require different permissions in their own domain.
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# These rules were moved into the individual program domains.
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# Instantiate derived domains for a number of programs.
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# These derived domains encode both information about the calling
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# user domain and the program, and allow us to maintain separation
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# between different instances of the program being run by different
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# user domains.
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ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `gph_domain($1, $1)')
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ifdef(`chkpwd.te', `chkpwd_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`fingerd.te', `fingerd_macro($1)')
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ifdef(`mta.te', `mail_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`crontab.te', `crontab_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`screen.te', `screen_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`tvtime.te', `tvtime_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`mozilla.te', `mozilla_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`thunderbird.te', `thunderbird_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`samba.te', `samba_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`gpg.te', `gpg_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`xauth.te', `xauth_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`iceauth.te', `iceauth_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`startx.te', `xserver_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`lpr.te', `lpr_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`ssh.te', `ssh_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`irc.te', `irc_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`using_spamassassin', `spamassassin_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`pyzor.te', `pyzor_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`razor.te', `razor_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`uml.te', `uml_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`cdrecord.te', `cdrecord_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`mplayer.te', `mplayer_domains($1)')
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fontconfig_domain($1)
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# GNOME
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ifdef(`gnome.te', `
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gnome_domain($1)
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ifdef(`games.te', `games_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`gift.te', `gift_domains($1)')
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ifdef(`evolution.te', `evolution_domains($1)')
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ifdef(`ethereal.te', `ethereal_domain($1)')
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')
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# ICE communication channel
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ice_domain($1, $1)
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# ORBit communication channel (independent of GNOME)
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orbit_domain($1, $1)
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# Instantiate a derived domain for user cron jobs.
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ifdef(`crond.te', `crond_domain($1)')
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ifdef(`vmware.te', `vmware_domain($1)')
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if (user_direct_mouse) {
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# Read the mouse.
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allow $1_t mouse_device_t:chr_file r_file_perms;
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}
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# Access other miscellaneous devices.
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allow $1_t misc_device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_t device_t:lnk_file { getattr read };
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can_resmgrd_connect($1_t)
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#
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# evolution and gnome-session try to create a netlink socket
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#
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dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;
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dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms;
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# Use the network.
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can_network($1_t)
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allow $1_t port_type:tcp_socket name_connect;
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can_ypbind($1_t)
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can_winbind($1_t)
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ifdef(`pamconsole.te', `
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allow $1_t pam_var_console_t:dir search;
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')
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allow $1_t var_lock_t:dir search;
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# Grant permissions to access the system DBus
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ifdef(`dbusd.te', `
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dbusd_client(system, $1)
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can_network_server_tcp($1_dbusd_t)
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allow $1_dbusd_t reserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind;
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allow $1_t system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
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dbusd_client($1, $1)
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allow $1_t $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc };
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dbusd_domain($1)
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ifdef(`hald.te', `
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allow $1_t hald_t:dbus send_msg;
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allow hald_t $1_t:dbus send_msg;
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') dnl end ifdef hald.te
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') dnl end ifdef dbus.te
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# allow port_t name binding for UDP because it is not very usable otherwise
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allow $1_t port_t:udp_socket name_bind;
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# Gnome pannel binds to the following
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ifdef(`cups.te', `
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allow $1_t { cupsd_etc_t cupsd_rw_etc_t }:file { read getattr };
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')
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# for perl
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dontaudit $1_t net_conf_t:file ioctl;
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# Communicate within the domain.
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can_udp_send($1_t, self)
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# Connect to inetd.
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ifdef(`inetd.te', `
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can_tcp_connect($1_t, inetd_t)
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can_udp_send($1_t, inetd_t)
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can_udp_send(inetd_t, $1_t)
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')
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# Connect to portmap.
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ifdef(`portmap.te', `can_tcp_connect($1_t, portmap_t)')
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# Inherit and use sockets from inetd
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ifdef(`inetd.te', `
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allow $1_t inetd_t:fd use;
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allow $1_t inetd_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms;')
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# Very permissive allowing every domain to see every type.
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allow $1_t kernel_t:system ipc_info;
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# When the user domain runs ps, there will be a number of access
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# denials when ps tries to search /proc. Do not audit these denials.
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dontaudit $1_t domain:dir r_dir_perms;
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dontaudit $1_t domain:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
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dontaudit $1_t domain:process { getattr getsession };
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#
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# Cups daemon running as user tries to write /etc/printcap
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#
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dontaudit $1_t usr_t:file setattr;
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# Use X
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x_client_domain($1, $1)
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ifdef(`xserver.te', `
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allow $1_t xserver_misc_device_t:{ chr_file blk_file } rw_file_perms;
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')
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ifdef(`xdm.te', `
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# Connect to the X server run by the X Display Manager.
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can_unix_connect($1_t, xdm_t)
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# certain apps want to read xdm.pid file
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r_dir_file($1_t, xdm_var_run_t)
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allow $1_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read };
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allow xdm_t $1_home_dir_t:dir getattr;
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ifdef(`xauth.te', `
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file_type_auto_trans(xdm_t, $1_home_dir_t, $1_xauth_home_t, file)
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')
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')dnl end ifdef xdm.te
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# Access the sound device.
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allow $1_t sound_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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# Access the power device.
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allow $1_t power_device_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl };
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allow $1_t var_log_t:dir { getattr search };
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dontaudit $1_t logfile:file getattr;
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# Check to see if cdrom is mounted
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allow $1_t mnt_t:dir { getattr search };
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# Get attributes of file systems.
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allow $1_t fs_type:filesystem getattr;
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# Read and write /dev/tty and /dev/null.
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allow $1_t devtty_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_t null_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms;
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allow $1_t zero_device_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms execute };
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allow $1_t { random_device_t urandom_device_t }:chr_file ra_file_perms;
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#
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# Added to allow reading of cdrom
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
allow $1_t rpc_pipefs_t:dir getattr;
|
||
|
|
allow $1_t nfsd_fs_t:dir getattr;
|
||
|
|
allow $1_t binfmt_misc_fs_t:dir getattr;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
# /initrd is left mounted, various programs try to look at it
|
||
|
|
dontaudit $1_t ramfs_t:dir getattr;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
# Emacs wants this access
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
allow $1_t wtmp_t:file r_file_perms;
|
||
|
|
dontaudit $1_t wtmp_t:file write;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
# Read the devpts root directory.
|
||
|
|
allow $1_t devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
r_dir_file($1_t, src_t)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
# Allow user to read default_t files
|
||
|
|
# This is different from reading default_t content,
|
||
|
|
# because it also includes sockets, fifos, and links
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
if (read_default_t) {
|
||
|
|
allow $1_t default_t:dir r_dir_perms;
|
||
|
|
allow $1_t default_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;
|
||
|
|
}
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
# Read fonts
|
||
|
|
read_fonts($1_t, $1)
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
read_sysctl($1_t);
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
# Caused by su - init scripts
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
dontaudit $1_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { ioctl read write };
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
# Running ifconfig as a user generates the following
|
||
|
|
#
|
||
|
|
dontaudit $1_t self:socket create;
|
||
|
|
dontaudit $1_t sysctl_net_t:dir search;
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
ifdef(`rpcd.te', `
|
||
|
|
create_dir_file($1_t, nfsd_rw_t)
|
||
|
|
')
|
||
|
|
|
||
|
|
')dnl end base_user_domain macro
|
||
|
|
|