selinux-policy/strict/macros/program/newrole_macros.te

# Authors:  Anthony Colatrella (NSA)    Stephen Smalley <sds@epoch.ncsc.mil>
#           Russell Coker <russell@coker.com.au>

# This macro defines the rules for a newrole like program, it is used by
# newrole.te and sudo.te, but may be used by other policy at some later time.

define(`newrole_domain', `
# Rules for the $1_t domain.
#
# $1_t is the domain for the program.
# $1_exec_t is the type of the executable.
#
type $1_t, domain, privrole, privowner, privlog, auth_chkpwd, nscd_client_domain, privfd, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite, mlsfileupgrade, mlsfiledowngrade, mlsprocsetsl $2;
in_user_role($1_t)
role sysadm_r types $1_t;

general_domain_access($1_t);

uses_shlib($1_t)
read_locale($1_t)
read_sysctl($1_t)

allow $1_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create bind write nlmsg_read read };

# for when the user types "exec newrole" at the command line
allow $1_t privfd:process sigchld;

# Inherit descriptors from the current session.
allow $1_t privfd:fd use;

# Execute /sbin/pwdb_chkpwd to check the password.
allow $1_t sbin_t:dir r_dir_perms;

# Execute shells
allow $1_t bin_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow $1_t bin_t:lnk_file read;
allow $1_t shell_exec_t:file r_file_perms;

allow $1_t urandom_device_t:chr_file { getattr read };

# Allow $1_t to transition to user domains.
domain_trans($1_t, shell_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
if(!secure_mode)
{
	# if we are not in secure mode then we can transition to sysadm_t
	domain_trans($1_t, shell_exec_t, sysadm_t)
}

can_setexec($1_t)

allow $1_t autofs_t:dir search;

# Use capabilities.
allow $1_t self:capability { fowner setuid setgid net_bind_service dac_override };

# Read the devpts root directory.
allow $1_t devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;

# Read the /etc/security/default_type file
r_dir_file($1_t, default_context_t)
r_dir_file($1_t, selinux_config_t)
allow $1_t etc_t:file r_file_perms;

# Read /var.
r_dir_file($1_t, var_t)

# Read /dev directories and any symbolic links.
allow $1_t device_t:dir r_dir_perms;

# Relabel terminals.
allow $1_t { ttyfile ptyfile }:chr_file { relabelfrom relabelto };

# Access terminals.
allow $1_t { ttyfile ptyfile devtty_t }:chr_file rw_file_perms;
ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow $1_t gphdomain:fd use;')

ifdef(`distro_debian', `
# for /etc/alternatives
allow $1_t etc_t:lnk_file read;
')

#
# Allow newrole to obtain contexts to relabel TTYs
#
can_getsecurity($1_t)

allow $1_t fs_t:filesystem getattr;

# for some PAM modules and for cwd
dontaudit $1_t { home_root_t home_type }:dir search;

allow $1_t proc_t:dir search;
allow $1_t proc_t:file { getattr read };

# for when the network connection is killed
dontaudit unpriv_userdomain $1_t:process signal;
')