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- CVE-2023-3961 CVE-2023-4091 CVE-2023-42669

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This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2023-11-07 16:09:40 +03:00
parent 8e9d4aaa65
commit e8f41cd48b
13 changed files with 326 additions and 803 deletions
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38
SOURCES/0001-netlogon.idl-add-support-for-netr_LogonGetCapabiliti.patch
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@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
From 5f87888ed53320538cf773d64868390d8641a40e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 17:20:32 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] netlogon.idl: add support for netr_LogonGetCapabilities
response level 2
We don't have any documentation about this yet, but tests against
a Windows Server 2022 patched with KB5028166 revealed that
the response for query_level=2 is exactly the same as
for querey_level=1.
Until we know the reason for query_level=2 we won't
use it as client nor support it in the server, but
we want ndrdump to work.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
---
librpc/idl/netlogon.idl | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl b/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl
index 48a8c8f9310..85dd73ee7e4 100644
--- a/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl
+++ b/librpc/idl/netlogon.idl
@@ -1236,6 +1236,7 @@ interface netlogon
/* Function 0x15 */
typedef [switch_type(uint32)] union {
[case(1)] netr_NegotiateFlags server_capabilities;
+ [case(2)] netr_NegotiateFlags server_capabilities;
} netr_Capabilities;
NTSTATUS netr_LogonGetCapabilities(
--
2.39.3

128
SOURCES/0002-s4-torture-rpc-let-rpc.schannel-also-check-netr_Logo.patch
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@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
From 404ce08e9088968311c714e756f5d58ce2cef715 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 17:25:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] s4:torture/rpc: let rpc.schannel also check
netr_LogonGetCapabilities with different levels
The important change it that we expect DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
for unsupported query_levels, we allow it to work with servers
with or without support for query_level=2.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
---
.../knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities | 3 +
source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..30aadf3bb9d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(nt4_dc
+^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc
+^samba4.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc
diff --git a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
index 1f068eb7826..a3d190f13dd 100644
--- a/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/torture/rpc/netlogon.c
@@ -2056,8 +2056,47 @@ bool test_netlogon_capabilities(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct torture_context *t
r.out.capabilities = &capabilities;
r.out.return_authenticator = &return_auth;
- torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities\n");
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=0\n");
+ r.in.query_level = 0;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth);
+
+ /*
+ * we need to operate on a temporary copy of creds
+ * because dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities with
+ * an unknown query level returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
+ * => NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE
+ * without looking a the authenticator.
+ */
+ tmp_creds = *creds;
+ netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(&tmp_creds, &auth);
+
+ status = dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities_r(b, tctx, &r);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, status, NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ "LogonGetCapabilities query_level=0 failed");
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=3\n");
+
+ r.in.query_level = 3;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth);
+
+ /*
+ * we need to operate on a temporary copy of creds
+ * because dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities with
+ * an unknown query level returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
+ * => NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE
+ * without looking a the authenticator.
+ */
+ tmp_creds = *creds;
+ netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(&tmp_creds, &auth);
+
+ status = dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities_r(b, tctx, &r);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal(tctx, status, NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE,
+ "LogonGetCapabilities query_level=0 failed");
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=1\n");
+
+ r.in.query_level = 1;
ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth);
/*
@@ -2077,6 +2116,42 @@ bool test_netlogon_capabilities(struct dcerpc_pipe *p, struct torture_context *t
*creds = tmp_creds;
+ torture_assert(tctx, netlogon_creds_client_check(creds,
+ &r.out.return_authenticator->cred),
+ "Credential chaining failed");
+
+ torture_assert_int_equal(tctx, creds->negotiate_flags,
+ capabilities.server_capabilities,
+ "negotiate flags");
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Testing LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2\n");
+
+ r.in.query_level = 2;
+ ZERO_STRUCT(return_auth);
+
+ /*
+ * we need to operate on a temporary copy of creds
+ * because dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities with
+ * an query level 2 may returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
+ * => NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE
+ * without looking a the authenticator.
+ */
+ tmp_creds = *creds;
+ netlogon_creds_client_authenticator(&tmp_creds, &auth);
+
+ status = dcerpc_netr_LogonGetCapabilities_r(b, tctx, &r);
+ if (NT_STATUS_EQUAL(status, NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE)) {
+ /*
+ * an server without KB5028166 returns
+ * DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG =>
+ * NT_STATUS_RPC_ENUM_VALUE_OUT_OF_RANGE
+ */
+ return true;
+ }
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok(tctx, status, "LogonGetCapabilities query_level=2 failed");
+
+ *creds = tmp_creds;
+
torture_assert(tctx, netlogon_creds_client_check(creds,
&r.out.return_authenticator->cred),
"Credential chaining failed");
--
2.39.3

89
SOURCES/0003-s4-rpc_server-netlogon-generate-FAULT_INVALID_TAG-fo.patch
View File

@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
From d5f1097b6220676d56ed5fc6707acf667b704518 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 16:11:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/4] s4:rpc_server:netlogon: generate FAULT_INVALID_TAG for
invalid netr_LogonGetCapabilities levels
This is important as Windows clients with KB5028166 seem to
call netr_LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2 after
a call with query_level=1.
An unpatched Windows Server returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
for query_level values other than 1.
While Samba tries to return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, but
later fails to marshall the response, which results
in DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA instead.
Because we don't have any documentation for level 2 yet,
we just try to behave like an unpatched server and
generate DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG instead of
DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA.
Which allows patched Windows clients to keep working
against a Samba DC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
---
.../knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities | 2 --
source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c | 28 ++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 24 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
index 30aadf3bb9d..99c7ac711ed 100644
--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
@@ -1,3 +1 @@
^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(nt4_dc
-^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc
-^samba4.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(ad_dc
diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
index 6ccba65d3bf..dc2167f08b2 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/netlogon/dcerpc_netlogon.c
@@ -2364,6 +2364,30 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_c
struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds;
NTSTATUS status;
+ switch (r->in.query_level) {
+ case 1:
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ /*
+ * Until we know the details behind KB5028166
+ * just return DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
+ * like an unpatched Windows Server.
+ */
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ default:
+ /*
+ * There would not be a way to marshall the
+ * the response. Which would mean our final
+ * ndr_push would fail an we would return
+ * an RPC-level fault with DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA.
+ *
+ * But it's important to match a Windows server
+ * especially before KB5028166, see also our bug #15418
+ * Otherwise Windows client would stop talking to us.
+ */
+ DCESRV_FAULT(DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG);
+ }
+
status = dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(dce_call,
mem_ctx,
r->in.computer_name,
@@ -2375,10 +2399,6 @@ static NTSTATUS dcesrv_netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct dcesrv_call_state *dce_c
}
NT_STATUS_NOT_OK_RETURN(status);
- if (r->in.query_level != 1) {
- return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- }
-
r->out.capabilities->server_capabilities = creds->negotiate_flags;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
--
2.39.3

93
SOURCES/0004-s3-rpc_server-netlogon-generate-FAULT_INVALID_TAG-fo.patch
View File

@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
From dfeabce44fbb78083fbbb2aa634fc4172cf83db9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2023 16:11:48 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/4] s3:rpc_server:netlogon: generate FAULT_INVALID_TAG for
invalid netr_LogonGetCapabilities levels
This is important as Windows clients with KB5028166 seem to
call netr_LogonGetCapabilities with query_level=2 after
a call with query_level=1.
An unpatched Windows Server returns DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
for query_level values other than 1.
While Samba tries to return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED, but
later fails to marshall the response, which results
in DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA instead.
Because we don't have any documentation for level 2 yet,
we just try to behave like an unpatched server and
generate DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG instead of
DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA.
Which allows patched Windows clients to keep working
against a Samba DC.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15418
Signed-off-by: Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Reviewed-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Stefan Metzmacher <metze@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Mon Jul 17 07:35:09 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
---
.../knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities | 1 -
source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++---
2 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities b/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
deleted file mode 100644
index 99c7ac711ed..00000000000
--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/netr_LogonGetCapabilities
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-^samba3.rpc.schannel.*\.schannel\(nt4_dc
diff --git a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
index 3ba58e61206..e8aa14167fc 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_server/netlogon/srv_netlog_nt.c
@@ -2284,6 +2284,31 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct pipes_struct *p,
struct netlogon_creds_CredentialState *creds;
NTSTATUS status;
+ switch (r->in.query_level) {
+ case 1:
+ break;
+ case 2:
+ /*
+ * Until we know the details behind KB5028166
+ * just return DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG
+ * like an unpatched Windows Server.
+ */
+ FALL_THROUGH;
+ default:
+ /*
+ * There would not be a way to marshall the
+ * the response. Which would mean our final
+ * ndr_push would fail an we would return
+ * an RPC-level fault with DCERPC_FAULT_BAD_STUB_DATA.
+ *
+ * But it's important to match a Windows server
+ * especially before KB5028166, see also our bug #15418
+ * Otherwise Windows client would stop talking to us.
+ */
+ p->fault_state = DCERPC_NCA_S_FAULT_INVALID_TAG;
+ return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
+ }
+
become_root();
status = dcesrv_netr_creds_server_step_check(p->dce_call,
p->mem_ctx,
@@ -2296,10 +2321,6 @@ NTSTATUS _netr_LogonGetCapabilities(struct pipes_struct *p,
return status;
}
- if (r->in.query_level != 1) {
- return NT_STATUS_NOT_SUPPORTED;
- }
-
r->out.capabilities->server_capabilities = creds->negotiate_flags;
return NT_STATUS_OK;
--
2.39.3

137
SOURCES/0005-CVE-2023-3347-CI-add-a-test-for-server-side-mandator.patch
View File

@ -1,137 +0,0 @@
From a9a2b182df738fd283f820e162d189d20010ad63 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 12:46:31 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/5] CVE-2023-3347: CI: add a test for server-side mandatory
signing
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
---
.../samba3.smb2.session-require-signing | 1 +
selftest/target/Samba3.pm | 1 +
source3/selftest/tests.py | 2 +
source4/torture/smb2/session.c | 64 +++++++++++++++++++
source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c | 1 +
5 files changed, 69 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..53b7a7022a8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+^samba3.smb2.session-require-signing.bug15397
diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
index d9e17473615..b4c3c130e9a 100755
--- a/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
+++ b/selftest/target/Samba3.pm
@@ -1294,6 +1294,7 @@ sub setup_ad_member_idmap_rid
# values required for tests to succeed
create krb5 conf = no
map to guest = bad user
+ server signing = required
";
my $ret = $self->provision(
diff --git a/source3/selftest/tests.py b/source3/selftest/tests.py
index b069630605a..d2b5409d0a9 100755
--- a/source3/selftest/tests.py
+++ b/source3/selftest/tests.py
@@ -1097,6 +1097,8 @@ for t in tests:
# Certain tests fail when run against ad_member with MIT kerberos because the private krb5.conf overrides the provisioned lib/krb5.conf,
# ad_member_idmap_rid sets "create krb5.conf = no"
plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "ad_member_idmap_rid", '//$SERVER/tmp -k yes -U$DC_USERNAME@$REALM%$DC_PASSWORD', 'krb5')
+ elif t == "smb2.session-require-signing":
+ plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "ad_member_idmap_rid", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$DC_USERNAME@$REALM%$DC_PASSWORD')
elif t == "rpc.lsa":
plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "nt4_dc", '//$SERVER_IP/tmp -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_np ')
plansmbtorture4testsuite(t, "nt4_dc", 'ncacn_ip_tcp:$SERVER_IP -U$USERNAME%$PASSWORD', 'over ncacn_ip_tcp ')
diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/session.c b/source4/torture/smb2/session.c
index 51df51542d4..823304f190f 100644
--- a/source4/torture/smb2/session.c
+++ b/source4/torture/smb2/session.c
@@ -5498,3 +5498,67 @@ struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_session_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
return suite;
}
+
+static bool test_session_require_sign_bug15397(struct torture_context *tctx,
+ struct smb2_tree *_tree)
+{
+ const char *host = torture_setting_string(tctx, "host", NULL);
+ const char *share = torture_setting_string(tctx, "share", NULL);
+ struct cli_credentials *_creds = samba_cmdline_get_creds();
+ struct cli_credentials *creds = NULL;
+ struct smbcli_options options;
+ struct smb2_tree *tree = NULL;
+ uint8_t security_mode;
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ bool ok = true;
+
+ /*
+ * Setup our own connection so we can control the signing flags
+ */
+
+ creds = cli_credentials_shallow_copy(tctx, _creds);
+ torture_assert(tctx, creds != NULL, "cli_credentials_shallow_copy");
+
+ options = _tree->session->transport->options;
+ options.client_guid = GUID_random();
+ options.signing = SMB_SIGNING_IF_REQUIRED;
+
+ status = smb2_connect(tctx,
+ host,
+ lpcfg_smb_ports(tctx->lp_ctx),
+ share,
+ lpcfg_resolve_context(tctx->lp_ctx),
+ creds,
+ &tree,
+ tctx->ev,
+ &options,
+ lpcfg_socket_options(tctx->lp_ctx),
+ lpcfg_gensec_settings(tctx, tctx->lp_ctx));
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ok, done,
+ "smb2_connect failed");
+
+ security_mode = smb2cli_session_security_mode(tree->session->smbXcli);
+
+ torture_assert_int_equal_goto(
+ tctx,
+ security_mode,
+ SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED | SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED,
+ ok,
+ done,
+ "Signing not required");
+
+done:
+ return ok;
+}
+
+struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_session_req_sign_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
+{
+ struct torture_suite *suite =
+ torture_suite_create(ctx, "session-require-signing");
+
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "bug15397",
+ test_session_require_sign_bug15397);
+
+ suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-SESSION require signing tests");
+ return suite;
+}
diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c b/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c
index c595b108ce8..5b6477e47bc 100644
--- a/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c
+++ b/source4/torture/smb2/smb2.c
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ NTSTATUS torture_smb2_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_sharemode_init(suite));
torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "hold-oplock", test_smb2_hold_oplock);
torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_session_init(suite));
+ torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_session_req_sign_init(suite));
torture_suite_add_suite(suite, torture_smb2_replay_init(suite));
torture_suite_add_simple_test(suite, "dosmode", torture_smb2_dosmode);
torture_suite_add_simple_test(suite, "async_dosmode", torture_smb2_async_dosmode);
--
2.39.3

131
SOURCES/0006-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-pass-lp_ctx-to-smb-1-2-_srv_init_.patch
View File

@ -1,131 +0,0 @@
From 1662eeeb7a6fc1b955fc0f7f52c7546ba3ac442a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 15:06:12 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: pass lp_ctx to
smb[1|2]_srv_init_signing()
No change in behaviour.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
---
source3/smbd/proto.h | 3 ++-
source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c | 10 ++--------
source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h | 3 ++-
source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c | 25 +++++++++++++++----------
4 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source3/smbd/proto.h b/source3/smbd/proto.h
index a39f0a2edfa..3884617e77b 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/proto.h
+++ b/source3/smbd/proto.h
@@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ struct dcesrv_context;
/* The following definitions come from smbd/smb2_signing.c */
-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
+bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
/* The following definitions come from smbd/aio.c */
diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c
index 6bcb0629c4f..aa3027d5318 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.c
@@ -170,18 +170,13 @@ static void smbd_shm_signing_free(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, void *ptr)
Called by server negprot when signing has been negotiated.
************************************************************/
-bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
+bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
{
bool allowed = true;
bool desired;
bool mandatory = false;
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers());
- if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
- DEBUG(10, ("loadparm_init_s3 failed\n"));
- return false;
- }
-
/*
* if the client and server allow signing,
* we desire to use it.
@@ -195,7 +190,6 @@ bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
*/
desired = lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &mandatory);
- talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx);
if (lp_async_smb_echo_handler()) {
struct smbd_shm_signing *s;
diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h
index 56c59c5bbc2..26f60420dfa 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h
+++ b/source3/smbd/smb1_signing.h
@@ -33,4 +33,5 @@ bool smb1_srv_is_signing_negotiated(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
void smb1_srv_set_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn,
const DATA_BLOB user_session_key,
const DATA_BLOB response);
-bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
+bool smb1_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
index 4691ef4d613..c1f876f9cd7 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
@@ -26,32 +26,37 @@
#include "lib/param/param.h"
#include "smb2_signing.h"
-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
+bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
+ struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
{
- struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers());
- if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
- DBG_DEBUG("loadparm_init_s3 failed\n");
- return false;
- }
-
/*
* For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory.
* It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says.
*/
(void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory);
- talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx);
return true;
}
bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
{
+ struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL;
+ bool ok;
+
+ lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers());
+ if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
+ DBG_DEBUG("loadparm_init_s3 failed\n");
+ return false;
+ }
+
#if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
#endif
- return smb2_srv_init_signing(conn);
+ ok = smb2_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn);
#if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
} else {
- return smb1_srv_init_signing(conn);
+ ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn);
}
#endif
+ talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx);
+ return ok;
}
--
2.39.3

73
SOURCES/0007-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-inline-smb2_srv_init_signing-code.patch
View File

@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
From 59131d6c345864dcf1ed3331c52ce35ddc5db2dc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2023 15:10:58 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: inline smb2_srv_init_signing() code
in srv_init_signing()
It's now a one-line function, imho the overall code is simpler if that code is
just inlined.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
---
source3/smbd/proto.h | 2 --
source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c | 19 ++++++-------------
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source3/smbd/proto.h b/source3/smbd/proto.h
index 3884617e77b..78e1b48be09 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/proto.h
+++ b/source3/smbd/proto.h
@@ -52,8 +52,6 @@ struct dcesrv_context;
/* The following definitions come from smbd/smb2_signing.c */
-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn);
/* The following definitions come from smbd/aio.c */
diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
index c1f876f9cd7..ef4a54d5710 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
@@ -26,21 +26,10 @@
#include "lib/param/param.h"
#include "smb2_signing.h"
-bool smb2_srv_init_signing(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx,
- struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
-{
- /*
- * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory.
- * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says.
- */
- (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory);
- return true;
-}
-
bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
{
struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx = NULL;
- bool ok;
+ bool ok = true;
lp_ctx = loadparm_init_s3(conn, loadparm_s3_helpers());
if (lp_ctx == NULL) {
@@ -51,7 +40,11 @@ bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
#if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
#endif
- ok = smb2_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn);
+ /*
+ * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory.
+ * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says.
+ */
+ (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory);
#if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
} else {
ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn);
--
2.39.3

36
SOURCES/0008-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-remove-comment-in-smbd_smb2_reque.patch
View File

@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
From 5a222ac37183ba5dd717d81c7e57f78e59695a67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 18:13:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: remove comment in
smbd_smb2_request_process_negprot()
This is just going to bitrot. Anyone who's interested can just grep for
"signing_mandatory" and look up what it does.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
---
source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c
index 9d4ce160e5c..885769be24d 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_negprot.c
@@ -368,12 +368,6 @@ NTSTATUS smbd_smb2_request_process_negprot(struct smbd_smb2_request *req)
}
security_mode = SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_ENABLED;
- /*
- * We use xconn->smb2.signing_mandatory set up via
- * srv_init_signing() -> smb2_srv_init_signing().
- * This calls lpcfg_server_signing_allowed() to get the correct
- * defaults, e.g. signing_required for an ad_dc.
- */
if (xconn->smb2.signing_mandatory) {
security_mode |= SMB2_NEGOTIATE_SIGNING_REQUIRED;
}
--
2.39.3

63
SOURCES/0009-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-fix-server-signing-mandatory.patch
View File

@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
From 9bab902fc50f88869b253c4089d83b3e33a1075a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2023 15:33:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] CVE-2023-3347: smbd: fix "server signing = mandatory"
This was broken by commit 1f3f6e20dc086a36de52bffd0bc36e15fb19e1c6 because when
calling srv_init_signing() very early after accepting the connection in
smbd_add_connection(), conn->protocol is still PROTOCOL_NONE.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15397
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Autobuild-User(master): Jule Anger <janger@samba.org>
Autobuild-Date(master): Fri Jul 21 13:03:09 UTC 2023 on atb-devel-224
---
.../samba3.smb2.session-require-signing | 1 -
source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c | 19 ++++++++-----------
2 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing
deleted file mode 100644
index 53b7a7022a8..00000000000
--- a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.session-require-signing
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-^samba3.smb2.session-require-signing.bug15397
diff --git a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
index ef4a54d5710..73d07380dfa 100644
--- a/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
+++ b/source3/smbd/smb2_signing.c
@@ -37,19 +37,16 @@ bool srv_init_signing(struct smbXsrv_connection *conn)
return false;
}
+ /*
+ * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory.
+ * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says.
+ */
+ (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory);
+
#if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
- if (conn->protocol >= PROTOCOL_SMB2_02) {
-#endif
- /*
- * For SMB2 all we need to know is if signing is mandatory.
- * It is always allowed and desired, whatever the smb.conf says.
- */
- (void)lpcfg_server_signing_allowed(lp_ctx, &conn->smb2.signing_mandatory);
-#if defined(WITH_SMB1SERVER)
- } else {
- ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn);
- }
+ ok = smb1_srv_init_signing(lp_ctx, conn);
#endif
+
talloc_unlink(conn, lp_ctx);
return ok;
}
--
2.39.3

45
SOURCES/CVE-2023-3961.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From ae476e1c28b797fe221172ed1066bf8efa476d8d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 25 Jul 2023 17:41:04 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-3961:s3:smbd: Catch any incoming pipe path that
could exit socket_dir.
For now, SMB_ASSERT() to exit the server. We will remove
this once the test code is in place.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15422
Signed-off-by: Jeremy Allison <jra@samba.org>
---
source3/rpc_client/local_np.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/source3/rpc_client/local_np.c b/source3/rpc_client/local_np.c
index 0e912d0e35a..dfed7e7beb6 100644
--- a/source3/rpc_client/local_np.c
+++ b/source3/rpc_client/local_np.c
@@ -542,6 +542,24 @@ struct tevent_req *local_np_connect_send(
return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
}
+ /*
+ * Ensure we cannot process a path that exits
+ * the socket_dir.
+ */
+ if (ISDOTDOT(lower_case_pipename) ||
+ (strchr(lower_case_pipename, '/')!=NULL))
+ {
+ DBG_DEBUG("attempt to connect to invalid pipe pathname %s\n",
+ lower_case_pipename);
+ /*
+ * For now, panic the server until we have
+ * the test code in place.
+ */
+ SMB_ASSERT(false);
+ tevent_req_error(req, ENOENT);
+ return tevent_req_post(req, ev);
+ }
+
state->socketpath = talloc_asprintf(
state, "%s/np/%s", socket_dir, lower_case_pipename);
if (tevent_req_nomem(state->socketpath, req)) {

183
SOURCES/CVE-2023-4091.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
From b1fd65694185c26f1e196d84ee8756300e631bd5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 1 Aug 2023 12:30:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-4091: smbtorture: test overwrite dispositions on
read-only file
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15439
Signed-off-by: Ralph Boehme <slow@samba.org>
---
selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls | 1 +
source4/torture/smb2/acls.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 144 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
diff --git a/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000..18df260c0e5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/selftest/knownfail.d/samba3.smb2.acls
@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+^samba3.smb2.acls.OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE
diff --git a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
index bbf201bcf4b..53f482c5541 100644
--- a/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
+++ b/source4/torture/smb2/acls.c
@@ -2989,6 +2989,148 @@ static bool test_mxac_not_granted(struct torture_context *tctx,
return ret;
}
+static bool test_overwrite_read_only_file(struct torture_context *tctx,
+ struct smb2_tree *tree)
+{
+ NTSTATUS status;
+ struct smb2_create c;
+ const char *fname = BASEDIR "\\test_overwrite_read_only_file.txt";
+ struct smb2_handle handle = {{0}};
+ union smb_fileinfo q;
+ union smb_setfileinfo set;
+ struct security_descriptor *sd = NULL, *sd_orig = NULL;
+ const char *owner_sid = NULL;
+ int i;
+ bool ret = true;
+
+ struct tcase {
+ int disposition;
+ const char *disposition_string;
+ NTSTATUS expected_status;
+ } tcases[] = {
+#define TCASE(d, s) { \
+ .disposition = d, \
+ .disposition_string = #d, \
+ .expected_status = s, \
+ }
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN, NT_STATUS_OK),
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_SUPERSEDE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
+ TCASE(NTCREATEX_DISP_OVERWRITE_IF, NT_STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED),
+ };
+#undef TCASE
+
+ ret = smb2_util_setup_dir(tctx, tree, BASEDIR);
+ torture_assert_goto(tctx, ret, ret, done, "smb2_util_setup_dir not ok");
+
+ c = (struct smb2_create) {
+ .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_READ_CONTROL |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC |
+ SEC_STD_WRITE_OWNER,
+ .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
+ .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_READ |
+ NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_WRITE,
+ .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
+ .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
+ .in.fname = fname,
+ };
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_create failed\n");
+ handle = c.out.file.handle;
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "get the original sd\n");
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(q);
+ q.query_secdesc.level = RAW_FILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ q.query_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL | SECINFO_OWNER;
+
+ status = smb2_getinfo_file(tree, tctx, &q);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_getinfo_file failed\n");
+ sd_orig = q.query_secdesc.out.sd;
+
+ owner_sid = dom_sid_string(tctx, sd_orig->owner_sid);
+
+ sd = security_descriptor_dacl_create(tctx,
+ 0, NULL, NULL,
+ owner_sid,
+ SEC_ACE_TYPE_ACCESS_ALLOWED,
+ SEC_FILE_READ_DATA,
+ 0,
+ NULL);
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(set);
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n");
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(handle);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tcases); i++) {
+ torture_comment(tctx, "Verify open with %s dispostion\n",
+ tcases[i].disposition_string);
+
+ c = (struct smb2_create) {
+ .in.create_disposition = tcases[i].disposition,
+ .in.desired_access = SEC_FILE_READ_DATA,
+ .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
+ .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
+ .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
+ .in.fname = fname,
+ };
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
+ smb2_util_close(tree, c.out.file.handle);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_equal_goto(
+ tctx, status, tcases[i].expected_status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_create failed\n");
+ };
+
+ torture_comment(tctx, "put back original sd\n");
+
+ c = (struct smb2_create) {
+ .in.desired_access = SEC_STD_WRITE_DAC,
+ .in.file_attributes = FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL,
+ .in.share_access = NTCREATEX_SHARE_ACCESS_MASK,
+ .in.create_disposition = NTCREATEX_DISP_OPEN_IF,
+ .in.impersonation_level = NTCREATEX_IMPERSONATION_ANONYMOUS,
+ .in.fname = fname,
+ };
+
+ status = smb2_create(tree, tctx, &c);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_create failed\n");
+ handle = c.out.file.handle;
+
+ ZERO_STRUCT(set);
+ set.set_secdesc.level = RAW_SFILEINFO_SEC_DESC;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.file.handle = handle;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.secinfo_flags = SECINFO_DACL;
+ set.set_secdesc.in.sd = sd_orig;
+
+ status = smb2_setinfo_file(tree, &set);
+ torture_assert_ntstatus_ok_goto(tctx, status, ret, done,
+ "smb2_setinfo_file failed\n");
+
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ ZERO_STRUCT(handle);
+
+done:
+ smb2_util_close(tree, handle);
+ smb2_util_unlink(tree, fname);
+ smb2_deltree(tree, BASEDIR);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
basic testing of SMB2 ACLs
*/
@@ -3017,6 +3159,7 @@ struct torture_suite *torture_smb2_acls_init(TALLOC_CTX *ctx)
test_deny1);
torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "MXAC-NOT-GRANTED",
test_mxac_not_granted);
+ torture_suite_add_1smb2_test(suite, "OVERWRITE_READ_ONLY_FILE", test_overwrite_read_only_file);
suite->description = talloc_strdup(suite, "SMB2-ACLS tests");

86
SOURCES/CVE-2023-42669.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
From 3cf1beed5df7d8b5d854517de7de322c6a5bc7fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
Date: Tue, 12 Sep 2023 18:59:44 +1200
Subject: [PATCH] CVE-2023-42669 s4-rpc_server: Disable rpcecho server by
default
The rpcecho server is useful in development and testing, but should never
have been allowed into production, as it includes the facility to
do a blocking sleep() in the single-threaded rpc worker.
BUG: https://bugzilla.samba.org/show_bug.cgi?id=15474
Signed-off-by: Andrew Bartlett <abartlet@samba.org>
---
docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/dcerpcendpointservers.xml | 2 +-
lib/param/loadparm.c | 2 +-
selftest/target/Samba4.pm | 2 +-
source3/param/loadparm.c | 2 +-
source4/rpc_server/wscript_build | 3 ++-
5 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/dcerpcendpointservers.xml b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/dcerpcendpointservers.xml
index 8a217cc7f118..c6642b795fd6 100644
--- a/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/dcerpcendpointservers.xml
+++ b/docs-xml/smbdotconf/protocol/dcerpcendpointservers.xml
@@ -6,6 +6,6 @@
<para>Specifies which DCE/RPC endpoint servers should be run.</para>
</description>
-<value type="default">epmapper, wkssvc, rpcecho, samr, netlogon, lsarpc, drsuapi, dssetup, unixinfo, browser, eventlog6, backupkey, dnsserver</value>
+<value type="default">epmapper, wkssvc, samr, netlogon, lsarpc, drsuapi, dssetup, unixinfo, browser, eventlog6, backupkey, dnsserver</value>
<value type="example">rpcecho</value>
</samba:parameter>
diff --git a/lib/param/loadparm.c b/lib/param/loadparm.c
index 9a7ae4f95fe8..673b913e6e5a 100644
--- a/lib/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/lib/param/loadparm.c
@@ -2730,7 +2730,7 @@ struct loadparm_context *loadparm_init(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx)
lpcfg_do_global_parameter(lp_ctx, "ntvfs handler", "unixuid default");
lpcfg_do_global_parameter(lp_ctx, "max connections", "0");
- lpcfg_do_global_parameter(lp_ctx, "dcerpc endpoint servers", "epmapper wkssvc rpcecho samr netlogon lsarpc drsuapi dssetup unixinfo browser eventlog6 backupkey dnsserver");
+ lpcfg_do_global_parameter(lp_ctx, "dcerpc endpoint servers", "epmapper wkssvc samr netlogon lsarpc drsuapi dssetup unixinfo browser eventlog6 backupkey dnsserver");
lpcfg_do_global_parameter(lp_ctx, "server services", "s3fs rpc nbt wrepl ldap cldap kdc drepl winbindd ntp_signd kcc dnsupdate dns");
lpcfg_do_global_parameter(lp_ctx, "kccsrv:samba_kcc", "true");
/* the winbind method for domain controllers is for both RODC
diff --git a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
index 49e3c174b07e..5f1f1bfffad6 100755
--- a/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
+++ b/selftest/target/Samba4.pm
@@ -783,7 +783,7 @@ sub provision_raw_step1($$)
wins support = yes
server role = $ctx->{server_role}
server services = +echo $services
- dcerpc endpoint servers = +winreg +srvsvc
+ dcerpc endpoint servers = +winreg +srvsvc +rpcecho
notify:inotify = false
ldb:nosync = true
ldap server require strong auth = yes
diff --git a/source3/param/loadparm.c b/source3/param/loadparm.c
index 1c3644589126..e7f4bbe3995e 100644
--- a/source3/param/loadparm.c
+++ b/source3/param/loadparm.c
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static void init_globals(struct loadparm_context *lp_ctx, bool reinit_globals)
Globals.server_services = str_list_make_v3_const(NULL, "s3fs rpc nbt wrepl ldap cldap kdc drepl winbindd ntp_signd kcc dnsupdate dns", NULL);
- Globals.dcerpc_endpoint_servers = str_list_make_v3_const(NULL, "epmapper wkssvc rpcecho samr netlogon lsarpc drsuapi dssetup unixinfo browser eventlog6 backupkey dnsserver", NULL);
+ Globals.dcerpc_endpoint_servers = str_list_make_v3_const(NULL, "epmapper wkssvc samr netlogon lsarpc drsuapi dssetup unixinfo browser eventlog6 backupkey dnsserver", NULL);
Globals.tls_enabled = true;
Globals.tls_verify_peer = TLS_VERIFY_PEER_AS_STRICT_AS_POSSIBLE;
diff --git a/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build b/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build
index 0e44a3c2baed..31ec4f60c9a6 100644
--- a/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build
+++ b/source4/rpc_server/wscript_build
@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@ bld.SAMBA_MODULE('dcerpc_rpcecho',
source='echo/rpc_echo.c',
subsystem='dcerpc_server',
init_function='dcerpc_server_rpcecho_init',
- deps='ndr-standard events'
+ deps='ndr-standard events',
+ enabled=bld.CONFIG_GET('ENABLE_SELFTEST')
)

27
SPECS/samba.spec
View File

@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
%define samba_requires_eq() %(LC_ALL="C" echo '%*' | xargs -r rpm -q --qf 'Requires: %%{name} = %%{epoch}:%%{version}\\n' | sed -e 's/ (none):/ /' -e 's/ 0:/ /' | grep -v "is not")
%global samba_version 4.18.6
%global baserelease 100
%global baserelease 101
# This should be rc1 or %%nil
%global pre_release %nil
@ -202,7 +202,7 @@
Name: samba
Version: %{samba_version}
Release: %{samba_release}%{?dist}.alma
Release: %{samba_release}%{?dist}.alma.1
%if 0%{?fedora}
Epoch: 2
@ -234,19 +234,13 @@ Source17: samba-usershares-systemd-sysusers.conf
Source201: README.downgrade
Source202: samba.abignore
# Patches were taken from upstream and backported
# https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/dfeabce44fbb78083fbbb2aa634fc4172cf83db9
Patch0001: 0001-netlogon.idl-add-support-for-netr_LogonGetCapabiliti.patch
Patch0002: 0002-s4-torture-rpc-let-rpc.schannel-also-check-netr_Logo.patch
Patch0003: 0003-s4-rpc_server-netlogon-generate-FAULT_INVALID_TAG-fo.patch
Patch0004: 0004-s3-rpc_server-netlogon-generate-FAULT_INVALID_TAG-fo.patch
# https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/9bab902fc50f88869b253c4089d83b3e33a1075a
Patch0005: 0005-CVE-2023-3347-CI-add-a-test-for-server-side-mandator.patch
Patch0006: 0006-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-pass-lp_ctx-to-smb-1-2-_srv_init_.patch
Patch0007: 0007-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-inline-smb2_srv_init_signing-code.patch
Patch0008: 0008-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-remove-comment-in-smbd_smb2_reque.patch
Patch0009: 0009-CVE-2023-3347-smbd-fix-server-signing-mandatory.patch
# Patches were taken from upstream:
# https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/ae476e1c28b797fe221172ed1066bf8efa476d8d
Patch0: CVE-2023-3961.patch
# https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/b1fd65694185c26f1e196d84ee8756300e631bd5
Patch1: CVE-2023-4091.patch
# https://github.com/samba-team/samba/commit/3cf1beed5df7d8b5d854517de7de322c6a5bc7fa
Patch2: CVE-2023-42669.patch
Requires(pre): /usr/sbin/groupadd
@ -4342,6 +4336,9 @@ fi
%endif
%changelog
* Tue Nov 07 2023 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 4.18.6-101.alma.1
- CVE-2023-3961 CVE-2023-4091 CVE-2023-42669
* Thu Aug 17 2023 Andreas Schneider <asn@redhat.com> - 4.18.6-100
- related: rhbz#2190415 - Update to version 4.18.6
- resolves: rhbz#2211617 - Fix the rpcclient dfsgetinfo command