import python3-3.6.8-48.el8_7.1

SOURCES/00386-cve-2021-28861.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 15:05:00 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH] 00386: CVE-2021-28861
+
+Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
+an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
+with a misleading target.  Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
+proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
+
+Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
+(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e)
+
+Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
+Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
+
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
+---
+ Lib/http/server.py                            |  7 +++
+ Lib/test/test_httpservers.py                  | 53 ++++++++++++++++++-
+ ...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst |  3 ++
+ 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py
+index 60a4dadf03..ce05be13d3 100644
+--- a/Lib/http/server.py
++++ b/Lib/http/server.py
+@@ -323,6 +323,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
+             return False
+         self.command, self.path, self.request_version = command, path, version
+ 
++        # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
++        # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
++        # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
++        # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
++        if self.path.startswith('//'):
++            self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/')  # Reduce to a single /
++
+         # Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
+         try:
+             self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+index 66e937e04b..5a0a7c3f74 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
+         pass
+ 
+     def setUp(self):
+-        BaseTestCase.setUp(self)
++        super().setUp()
+         self.cwd = os.getcwd()
+         basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
+         os.chdir(basetempdir)
+@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
+             except:
+                 pass
+         finally:
+-            BaseTestCase.tearDown(self)
++            super().tearDown()
+ 
+     def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None):
+         def close_conn():
+@@ -399,6 +399,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
+         self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
+                                      data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
+ 
++    def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
++        """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
++
++        //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
++        https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
++
++        This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
++        resolve into a redirect to another server.
++        """
++        os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
++        url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
++        expected_location = f'{url}/'  # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash
++        # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
++        # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
++        response = self.request(url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        location = response.getheader('Location')
++        self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
++
++        # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
++        attack_url = f'/{url}'
++        response = self.request(attack_url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        location = response.getheader('Location')
++        self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
++        self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
++                msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
++                'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
++
++        # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
++        attack3_url = f'//{url}'
++        response = self.request(attack3_url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
++
++        # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
++        # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
++        # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
++        # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
++        attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
++        expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
++        response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
++        self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
++        location = response.getheader('Location')
++        # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
++        # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
++        # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
++        self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
++
+     def test_get(self):
+         #constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
+         response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..029d437190
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
++:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
++when an URI path starts with ``//``.  Vulnerability discovered, and initial
++fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.

SOURCES/00394-cve-2022-45061-cpu-denial-of-service-via-inefficient-idna-decoder.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
+ <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 19:22:14 -0800
+Subject: [PATCH] 00394: CVE-2022-45061: CPU denial of service via inefficient
+ IDNA decoder
+
+gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding.
+
+There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
+the behavior to linear.
+
+(cherry picked from commit a6f6c3a3d6f2b580f2d87885c9b8a9350ad7bf15)
+
+Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
+Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
+---
+ Lib/encodings/idna.py                         | 32 +++++++++----------
+ Lib/test/test_codecs.py                       |  6 ++++
+ ...2-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst |  6 ++++
+ 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+ create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
+
+diff --git a/Lib/encodings/idna.py b/Lib/encodings/idna.py
+index ea4058512f..bf98f51336 100644
+--- a/Lib/encodings/idna.py
++++ b/Lib/encodings/idna.py
+@@ -39,23 +39,21 @@ def nameprep(label):
+ 
+     # Check bidi
+     RandAL = [stringprep.in_table_d1(x) for x in label]
+-    for c in RandAL:
+-        if c:
+-            # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
+-            # tests:
+-            # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
+-            # This is table C.8, which was already checked
+-            # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
+-            # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
+-            if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
+-                raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
+-
+-            # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
+-            # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
+-            # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
+-            # character of the string.
+-            if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
+-                raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
++    if any(RandAL):
++        # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
++        # tests:
++        # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
++        # This is table C.8, which was already checked
++        # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
++        # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
++        if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
++            raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
++        # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
++        # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
++        # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
++        # character of the string.
++        if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
++            raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
+ 
+     return label
+ 
+diff --git a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
+index 56485de3f6..a798d1f287 100644
+--- a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
++++ b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
+@@ -1640,6 +1640,12 @@ class IDNACodecTest(unittest.TestCase):
+         self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org")
+         self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org.".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org.")
+ 
++    def test_builtin_decode_length_limit(self):
++        with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
++            (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*1100).decode("idna")
++        with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
++            (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*70).decode("idna")
++
+     def test_stream(self):
+         r = codecs.getreader("idna")(io.BytesIO(b"abc"))
+         r.read(3)
+diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..5185fac2e2
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
+@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
++The IDNA codec decoder used on DNS hostnames by :mod:`socket` or :mod:`asyncio`
++related name resolution functions no longer involves a quadratic algorithm.
++This prevents a potential CPU denial of service if an out-of-spec excessive
++length hostname involving bidirectional characters were decoded. Some protocols
++such as :mod:`urllib` http ``3xx`` redirects potentially allow for an attacker
++to supply such a name.

SPECS/python3.spec

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
 #  WARNING  When rebasing to a new Python version,
 #           remember to update the python3-docs package as well
 Version: %{pybasever}.8
-Release: 48%{?dist}
+Release: 48%{?dist}.1
 License: Python
 
 
@@ -695,6 +695,76 @@ Patch378: 00378-support-expat-2-4-5.patch
 # Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
 Patch382: 00382-cve-2015-20107.patch
 
+# 00386 #
+# CVE-2021-28861
+#
+# Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
+# an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
+# with a misleading target.  Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
+# proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
+#
+# Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
+#
+# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
+# Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
+Patch386: 00386-cve-2021-28861.patch
+
+# 00387 #
+# CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int()
+#
+# gh-95778: CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int() (GH-96504)
+#
+# Converting between `int` and `str` in bases other than 2
+# (binary), 4, 8 (octal), 16 (hexadecimal), or 32 such as base 10 (decimal) now
+# raises a `ValueError` if the number of digits in string form is above a
+# limit to avoid potential denial of service attacks due to the algorithmic
+# complexity. This is a mitigation for CVE-2020-10735
+# (https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10735).
+#
+# This new limit can be configured or disabled by environment variable, command
+# line flag, or :mod:`sys` APIs. See the `Integer String Conversion Length
+# Limitation` documentation.  The default limit is 4300
+# digits in string form.
+#
+# Patch by Gregory P. Smith [Google] and Christian Heimes [Red Hat] with feedback
+# from Victor Stinner, Thomas Wouters, Steve Dower, Ned Deily, and Mark Dickinson.
+#
+# Notes on the backport to Python 3.6 in RHEL:
+#
+# * Use "Python 3.6.8-48" version in the documentation, whereas this
+#   version will never be released
+# * Only add _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits global variable:
+#   Python 3.6 doesn't have PyConfig API (PEP 597) nor _PyRuntime.
+# * sys.flags.int_max_str_digits cannot be -1 on Python 3.6: it is
+#   set to the default limit. Adapt test_int_max_str_digits() for that.
+# * Declare _PY_LONG_DEFAULT_MAX_STR_DIGITS and
+#   _PY_LONG_MAX_STR_DIGITS_THRESHOLD macros in longobject.h but only
+#   if the Py_BUILD_CORE macro is defined.
+# * Declare _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits in pydebug.h.
+#
+#
+# gh-95778: Mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in error message (#96874)
+#
+# When ValueError is raised if an integer is larger than the limit,
+# mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in the error message.
+#
+#
+# gh-96848: Fix -X int_max_str_digits option parsing (#96988)
+#
+# Fix command line parsing: reject "-X int_max_str_digits" option with
+# no value (invalid) when the PYTHONINTMAXSTRDIGITS environment
+# variable is set to a valid limit.
+Patch387: 00387-cve-2020-10735-prevent-dos-by-very-large-int.patch
+
+# 00394 #
+# CVE-2022-45061: CPU denial of service via inefficient IDNA decoder
+#
+# gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding.
+#
+# There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
+# the behavior to linear.
+Patch394: 00394-cve-2022-45061-cpu-denial-of-service-via-inefficient-idna-decoder.patch
+
 # (New patches go here ^^^)
 #
 # When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
@@ -1037,6 +1107,9 @@ git apply %{PATCH351}
 %patch377 -p1
 %patch378 -p1
 %patch382 -p1
+%patch386 -p1
+%patch387 -p1
+%patch394 -p1
 
 # Remove files that should be generated by the build
 # (This is after patching, so that we can use patches directly from upstream)
@@ -1962,6 +2035,10 @@ fi
 # ======================================================
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Dec 21 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-48.1
+- Security fixes for CVE-2020-10735, CVE-2021-28861 and CVE-2022-45061
+Resolves: rhbz#1834423, rhbz#2120642, rhbz#2144072
+
 * Thu Oct 20 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-48
 - Release bump
 Resolves: rhbz#2136436