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import python3-3.6.8-48.el8_7.1

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CentOS Sources 2023-02-21 08:47:03 +00:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 93994c4d72
commit d01f487196
4 changed files with 1684 additions and 1 deletions
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130
SOURCES/00386-cve-2021-28861.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,130 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 22 Jun 2022 15:05:00 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] 00386: CVE-2021-28861
Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
(cherry picked from commit 4abab6b603dd38bec1168e9a37c40a48ec89508e)
Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
---
Lib/http/server.py | 7 +++
Lib/test/test_httpservers.py | 53 ++++++++++++++++++-
...2-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst | 3 ++
3 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
diff --git a/Lib/http/server.py b/Lib/http/server.py
index 60a4dadf03..ce05be13d3 100644
--- a/Lib/http/server.py
+++ b/Lib/http/server.py
@@ -323,6 +323,13 @@ class BaseHTTPRequestHandler(socketserver.StreamRequestHandler):
return False
self.command, self.path, self.request_version = command, path, version
+ # gh-87389: The purpose of replacing '//' with '/' is to protect
+ # against open redirect attacks possibly triggered if the path starts
+ # with '//' because http clients treat //path as an absolute URI
+ # without scheme (similar to http://path) rather than a path.
+ if self.path.startswith('//'):
+ self.path = '/' + self.path.lstrip('/') # Reduce to a single /
+
# Examine the headers and look for a Connection directive.
try:
self.headers = http.client.parse_headers(self.rfile,
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
index 66e937e04b..5a0a7c3f74 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httpservers.py
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
pass
def setUp(self):
- BaseTestCase.setUp(self)
+ super().setUp()
self.cwd = os.getcwd()
basetempdir = tempfile.gettempdir()
os.chdir(basetempdir)
@@ -343,7 +343,7 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
except:
pass
finally:
- BaseTestCase.tearDown(self)
+ super().tearDown()
def check_status_and_reason(self, response, status, data=None):
def close_conn():
@@ -399,6 +399,55 @@ class SimpleHTTPServerTestCase(BaseTestCase):
self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.OK,
data=support.TESTFN_UNDECODABLE)
+ def test_get_dir_redirect_location_domain_injection_bug(self):
+ """Ensure //evil.co/..%2f../../X does not put //evil.co/ in Location.
+
+ //netloc/ in a Location header is a redirect to a new host.
+ https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/87389
+
+ This checks that a path resolving to a directory on our server cannot
+ resolve into a redirect to another server.
+ """
+ os.mkdir(os.path.join(self.tempdir, 'existing_directory'))
+ url = f'/python.org/..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f..%2f../%0a%0d/../{self.tempdir_name}/existing_directory'
+ expected_location = f'{url}/' # /python.org.../ single slash single prefix, trailing slash
+ # Canonicalizes to /tmp/tempdir_name/existing_directory which does
+ # exist and is a dir, triggering the 301 redirect logic.
+ response = self.request(url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location, msg='non-attack failed!')
+
+ # //python.org... multi-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack_url = f'/{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ self.assertFalse(location.startswith('//'), msg=location)
+ self.assertEqual(location, expected_location,
+ msg='Expected Location header to start with a single / and '
+ 'end with a / as this is a directory redirect.')
+
+ # ///python.org... triple-slash prefix, no trailing slash
+ attack3_url = f'//{url}'
+ response = self.request(attack3_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ self.assertEqual(response.getheader('Location'), expected_location)
+
+ # If the second word in the http request (Request-URI for the http
+ # method) is a full URI, we don't worry about it, as that'll be parsed
+ # and reassembled as a full URI within BaseHTTPRequestHandler.send_head
+ # so no errant scheme-less //netloc//evil.co/ domain mixup can happen.
+ attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url = f'https://pypi.org/{url}'
+ expected_scheme_netloc_location = f'{attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url}/'
+ response = self.request(attack_scheme_netloc_2slash_url)
+ self.check_status_and_reason(response, HTTPStatus.MOVED_PERMANENTLY)
+ location = response.getheader('Location')
+ # We're just ensuring that the scheme and domain make it through, if
+ # there are or aren't multiple slashes at the start of the path that
+ # follows that isn't important in this Location: header.
+ self.assertTrue(location.startswith('https://pypi.org/'), msg=location)
+
def test_get(self):
#constructs the path relative to the root directory of the HTTPServer
response = self.request(self.base_url + '/test')
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..029d437190
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-06-15-20-09-23.gh-issue-87389.QVaC3f.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,3 @@
+:mod:`http.server`: Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the HTTP server
+when an URI path starts with ``//``. Vulnerability discovered, and initial
+fix proposed, by Hamza Avvan.

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SOURCES/00387-cve-2020-10735-prevent-dos-by-very-large-int.patch Normal file
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SOURCES/00394-cve-2022-45061-cpu-denial-of-service-via-inefficient-idna-decoder.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Miss Islington (bot)"
<31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Nov 2022 19:22:14 -0800
Subject: [PATCH] 00394: CVE-2022-45061: CPU denial of service via inefficient
IDNA decoder
gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding.
There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
the behavior to linear.
(cherry picked from commit a6f6c3a3d6f2b580f2d87885c9b8a9350ad7bf15)
Co-authored-by: Miss Islington (bot) <31488909+miss-islington@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
---
Lib/encodings/idna.py | 32 +++++++++----------
Lib/test/test_codecs.py | 6 ++++
...2-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst | 6 ++++
3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
diff --git a/Lib/encodings/idna.py b/Lib/encodings/idna.py
index ea4058512f..bf98f51336 100644
--- a/Lib/encodings/idna.py
+++ b/Lib/encodings/idna.py
@@ -39,23 +39,21 @@ def nameprep(label):
# Check bidi
RandAL = [stringprep.in_table_d1(x) for x in label]
- for c in RandAL:
- if c:
- # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
- # tests:
- # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
- # This is table C.8, which was already checked
- # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
- # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
- if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
-
- # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
- # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
- # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
- # character of the string.
- if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
- raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
+ if any(RandAL):
+ # There is a RandAL char in the string. Must perform further
+ # tests:
+ # 1) The characters in section 5.8 MUST be prohibited.
+ # This is table C.8, which was already checked
+ # 2) If a string contains any RandALCat character, the string
+ # MUST NOT contain any LCat character.
+ if any(stringprep.in_table_d2(x) for x in label):
+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 2")
+ # 3) If a string contains any RandALCat character, a
+ # RandALCat character MUST be the first character of the
+ # string, and a RandALCat character MUST be the last
+ # character of the string.
+ if not RandAL[0] or not RandAL[-1]:
+ raise UnicodeError("Violation of BIDI requirement 3")
return label
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
index 56485de3f6..a798d1f287 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_codecs.py
@@ -1640,6 +1640,12 @@ class IDNACodecTest(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org")
self.assertEqual("pyth\xf6n.org.".encode("idna"), b"xn--pythn-mua.org.")
+ def test_builtin_decode_length_limit(self):
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*1100).decode("idna")
+ with self.assertRaisesRegex(UnicodeError, "too long"):
+ (b"xn--016c"+b"a"*70).decode("idna")
+
def test_stream(self):
r = codecs.getreader("idna")(io.BytesIO(b"abc"))
r.read(3)
diff --git a/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5185fac2e2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/Misc/NEWS.d/next/Security/2022-11-04-09-29-36.gh-issue-98433.l76c5G.rst
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+The IDNA codec decoder used on DNS hostnames by :mod:`socket` or :mod:`asyncio`
+related name resolution functions no longer involves a quadratic algorithm.
+This prevents a potential CPU denial of service if an out-of-spec excessive
+length hostname involving bidirectional characters were decoded. Some protocols
+such as :mod:`urllib` http ``3xx`` redirects potentially allow for an attacker
+to supply such a name.

79
SPECS/python3.spec
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@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ URL: https://www.python.org/
# WARNING When rebasing to a new Python version,
# remember to update the python3-docs package as well
Version: %{pybasever}.8
Release: 48%{?dist}
Release: 48%{?dist}.1
License: Python
@ -695,6 +695,76 @@ Patch378: 00378-support-expat-2-4-5.patch
# Tracker bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2075390
Patch382: 00382-cve-2015-20107.patch
# 00386 #
# CVE-2021-28861
#
# Fix an open redirection vulnerability in the `http.server` module when
# an URI path starts with `//` that could produce a 301 Location header
# with a misleading target. Vulnerability discovered, and logic fix
# proposed, by Hamza Avvan (@hamzaavvan).
#
# Test and comments authored by Gregory P. Smith [Google].
#
# Upstream: https://github.com/python/cpython/pull/93879
# Tracking bugzilla: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2120642
Patch386: 00386-cve-2021-28861.patch
# 00387 #
# CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int()
#
# gh-95778: CVE-2020-10735: Prevent DoS by very large int() (GH-96504)
#
# Converting between `int` and `str` in bases other than 2
# (binary), 4, 8 (octal), 16 (hexadecimal), or 32 such as base 10 (decimal) now
# raises a `ValueError` if the number of digits in string form is above a
# limit to avoid potential denial of service attacks due to the algorithmic
# complexity. This is a mitigation for CVE-2020-10735
# (https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2020-10735).
#
# This new limit can be configured or disabled by environment variable, command
# line flag, or :mod:`sys` APIs. See the `Integer String Conversion Length
# Limitation` documentation. The default limit is 4300
# digits in string form.
#
# Patch by Gregory P. Smith [Google] and Christian Heimes [Red Hat] with feedback
# from Victor Stinner, Thomas Wouters, Steve Dower, Ned Deily, and Mark Dickinson.
#
# Notes on the backport to Python 3.6 in RHEL:
#
# * Use "Python 3.6.8-48" version in the documentation, whereas this
# version will never be released
# * Only add _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits global variable:
# Python 3.6 doesn't have PyConfig API (PEP 597) nor _PyRuntime.
# * sys.flags.int_max_str_digits cannot be -1 on Python 3.6: it is
# set to the default limit. Adapt test_int_max_str_digits() for that.
# * Declare _PY_LONG_DEFAULT_MAX_STR_DIGITS and
# _PY_LONG_MAX_STR_DIGITS_THRESHOLD macros in longobject.h but only
# if the Py_BUILD_CORE macro is defined.
# * Declare _Py_global_config_int_max_str_digits in pydebug.h.
#
#
# gh-95778: Mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in error message (#96874)
#
# When ValueError is raised if an integer is larger than the limit,
# mention sys.set_int_max_str_digits() in the error message.
#
#
# gh-96848: Fix -X int_max_str_digits option parsing (#96988)
#
# Fix command line parsing: reject "-X int_max_str_digits" option with
# no value (invalid) when the PYTHONINTMAXSTRDIGITS environment
# variable is set to a valid limit.
Patch387: 00387-cve-2020-10735-prevent-dos-by-very-large-int.patch
# 00394 #
# CVE-2022-45061: CPU denial of service via inefficient IDNA decoder
#
# gh-98433: Fix quadratic time idna decoding.
#
# There was an unnecessary quadratic loop in idna decoding. This restores
# the behavior to linear.
Patch394: 00394-cve-2022-45061-cpu-denial-of-service-via-inefficient-idna-decoder.patch
# (New patches go here ^^^)
#
# When adding new patches to "python" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
@ -1037,6 +1107,9 @@ git apply %{PATCH351}
%patch377 -p1
%patch378 -p1
%patch382 -p1
%patch386 -p1
%patch387 -p1
%patch394 -p1
# Remove files that should be generated by the build
# (This is after patching, so that we can use patches directly from upstream)
@ -1962,6 +2035,10 @@ fi
# ======================================================
%changelog
* Wed Dec 21 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-48.1
- Security fixes for CVE-2020-10735, CVE-2021-28861 and CVE-2022-45061
Resolves: rhbz#1834423, rhbz#2120642, rhbz#2144072
* Thu Oct 20 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 3.6.8-48
- Release bump
Resolves: rhbz#2136436