rpms/python2
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

import python2-2.7.18-10.module+el8.6.0+14191+7fdd52cd

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2022-03-29 12:26:11 -04:00 committed by Stepan Oksanichenko
parent 59097c0a60
commit 155e533f82
5 changed files with 393 additions and 1 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

35
SOURCES/00366-CVE-2021-3733.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 14 Sep 2021 11:34:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] 00366-CVE-2021-3733.patch
00366 #
CVE-2021-3733: Fix ReDoS in urllib AbstractBasicAuthHandler
Fix Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in
urllib2.AbstractBasicAuthHandler. The ReDoS-vulnerable regex
has quadratic worst-case complexity and it allows cause a denial of
service when identifying crafted invalid RFCs. This ReDoS issue is on
the client side and needs remote attackers to control the HTTP server.
Backported from Python 3 together with another backward-compatible
improvement of the regex from fix for CVE-2020-8492.
Co-authored-by: Yeting Li <liyt@ios.ac.cn>
---
Lib/urllib2.py | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Lib/urllib2.py b/Lib/urllib2.py
index fd19e1ae943..e286583ecba 100644
--- a/Lib/urllib2.py
+++ b/Lib/urllib2.py
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ class AbstractBasicAuthHandler:
# allow for double- and single-quoted realm values
# (single quotes are a violation of the RFC, but appear in the wild)
- rx = re.compile('(?:.*,)*[ \t]*([^ \t]+)[ \t]+'
+ rx = re.compile('(?:[^,]*,)*[ \t]*([^ \t,]+)[ \t]+'
'realm=(["\']?)([^"\']*)\\2', re.I)
# XXX could pre-emptively send auth info already accepted (RFC 2617,

89
SOURCES/00368-CVE-2021-3737.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lumir Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 07:56:50 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] 00368-CVE-2021-3737.patch
00368 #
CVE-2021-3737: http client infinite line reading (DoS) after a HTTP 100 Continue
Fixes http.client potential denial of service where it could get stuck reading
lines from a malicious server after a 100 Continue response.
Backported from Python 3.
Co-authored-by: Gregory P. Smith <greg@krypto.org>
Co-authored-by: Gen Xu <xgbarry@gmail.com>
---
Lib/httplib.py | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
Lib/test/test_httplib.py | 8 ++++++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Lib/httplib.py b/Lib/httplib.py
index a63677477d5..f9a27619e62 100644
--- a/Lib/httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/httplib.py
@@ -365,6 +365,25 @@ class HTTPMessage(mimetools.Message):
# It's not a header line; skip it and try the next line.
self.status = 'Non-header line where header expected'
+
+def _read_headers(fp):
+ """Reads potential header lines into a list from a file pointer.
+ Length of line is limited by _MAXLINE, and number of
+ headers is limited by _MAXHEADERS.
+ """
+ headers = []
+ while True:
+ line = fp.readline(_MAXLINE + 1)
+ if len(line) > _MAXLINE:
+ raise LineTooLong("header line")
+ headers.append(line)
+ if len(headers) > _MAXHEADERS:
+ raise HTTPException("got more than %d headers" % _MAXHEADERS)
+ if line in (b'\r\n', b'\n', b''):
+ break
+ return headers
+
+
class HTTPResponse:
# strict: If true, raise BadStatusLine if the status line can't be
@@ -453,15 +472,10 @@ class HTTPResponse:
if status != CONTINUE:
break
# skip the header from the 100 response
- while True:
- skip = self.fp.readline(_MAXLINE + 1)
- if len(skip) > _MAXLINE:
- raise LineTooLong("header line")
- skip = skip.strip()
- if not skip:
- break
- if self.debuglevel > 0:
- print "header:", skip
+ skipped_headers = _read_headers(self.fp)
+ if self.debuglevel > 0:
+ print("headers:", skipped_headers)
+ del skipped_headers
self.status = status
self.reason = reason.strip()
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
index b5fec9aa1ec..d05c0fc28d2 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_httplib.py
@@ -700,6 +700,14 @@ class BasicTest(TestCase):
resp = httplib.HTTPResponse(FakeSocket(body))
self.assertRaises(httplib.LineTooLong, resp.begin)
+ def test_overflowing_header_limit_after_100(self):
+ body = (
+ 'HTTP/1.1 100 OK\r\n'
+ 'r\n' * 32768
+ )
+ resp = httplib.HTTPResponse(FakeSocket(body))
+ self.assertRaises(httplib.HTTPException, resp.begin)
+
def test_overflowing_chunked_line(self):
body = (
'HTTP/1.1 200 OK\r\n'

80
SOURCES/00372-CVE-2021-4189.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
diff --git a/Lib/ftplib.py b/Lib/ftplib.py
index 6644554..0550f0a 100644
--- a/Lib/ftplib.py
+++ b/Lib/ftplib.py
@@ -108,6 +108,8 @@ class FTP:
file = None
welcome = None
passiveserver = 1
+ # Disables https://bugs.python.org/issue43285 security if set to True.
+ trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address = False
# Initialization method (called by class instantiation).
# Initialize host to localhost, port to standard ftp port
@@ -310,8 +312,13 @@ class FTP:
return sock
def makepasv(self):
+ """Internal: Does the PASV or EPSV handshake -> (address, port)"""
if self.af == socket.AF_INET:
- host, port = parse227(self.sendcmd('PASV'))
+ untrusted_host, port = parse227(self.sendcmd('PASV'))
+ if self.trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address:
+ host = untrusted_host
+ else:
+ host = self.sock.getpeername()[0]
else:
host, port = parse229(self.sendcmd('EPSV'), self.sock.getpeername())
return host, port
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py b/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py
index 8a3eb06..62a3f5e 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_ftplib.py
@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ class DummyFTPHandler(asynchat.async_chat):
self.rest = None
self.next_retr_data = RETR_DATA
self.push('220 welcome')
+ # We use this as the string IPv4 address to direct the client
+ # to in response to a PASV command. To test security behavior.
+ # https://bugs.python.org/issue43285/.
+ self.fake_pasv_server_ip = '252.253.254.255'
def collect_incoming_data(self, data):
self.in_buffer.append(data)
@@ -109,7 +113,8 @@ class DummyFTPHandler(asynchat.async_chat):
sock.bind((self.socket.getsockname()[0], 0))
sock.listen(5)
sock.settimeout(10)
- ip, port = sock.getsockname()[:2]
+ port = sock.getsockname()[1]
+ ip = self.fake_pasv_server_ip
ip = ip.replace('.', ',')
p1, p2 = divmod(port, 256)
self.push('227 entering passive mode (%s,%d,%d)' %(ip, p1, p2))
@@ -577,6 +582,26 @@ class TestFTPClass(TestCase):
# IPv4 is in use, just make sure send_epsv has not been used
self.assertEqual(self.server.handler_instance.last_received_cmd, 'pasv')
+ def test_makepasv_issue43285_security_disabled(self):
+ """Test the opt-in to the old vulnerable behavior."""
+ self.client.trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address = True
+ bad_host, port = self.client.makepasv()
+ self.assertEqual(
+ bad_host, self.server.handler_instance.fake_pasv_server_ip)
+ # Opening and closing a connection keeps the dummy server happy
+ # instead of timing out on accept.
+ socket.create_connection((self.client.sock.getpeername()[0], port),
+ timeout=TIMEOUT).close()
+
+ def test_makepasv_issue43285_security_enabled_default(self):
+ self.assertFalse(self.client.trust_server_pasv_ipv4_address)
+ trusted_host, port = self.client.makepasv()
+ self.assertNotEqual(
+ trusted_host, self.server.handler_instance.fake_pasv_server_ip)
+ # Opening and closing a connection keeps the dummy server happy
+ # instead of timing out on accept.
+ socket.create_connection((trusted_host, port), timeout=TIMEOUT).close()
+
def test_line_too_long(self):
self.assertRaises(ftplib.Error, self.client.sendcmd,
'x' * self.client.maxline * 2)

127
SOURCES/00377-CVE-2022-0391.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
diff --git a/Doc/library/urlparse.rst b/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
index 97d1119257c..c08c3dc8e8f 100644
--- a/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
+++ b/Doc/library/urlparse.rst
@@ -125,6 +125,9 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the following functions:
decomposed before parsing, or is not a Unicode string, no error will be
raised.
+ Following the `WHATWG spec`_ that updates RFC 3986, ASCII newline
+ ``\n``, ``\r`` and tab ``\t`` characters are stripped from the URL.
+
.. versionchanged:: 2.5
Added attributes to return value.
@@ -321,6 +324,10 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the following functions:
.. seealso::
+ `WHATWG`_ - URL Living standard
+ Working Group for the URL Standard that defines URLs, domains, IP addresses, the
+ application/x-www-form-urlencoded format, and their API.
+
:rfc:`3986` - Uniform Resource Identifiers
This is the current standard (STD66). Any changes to urlparse module
should conform to this. Certain deviations could be observed, which are
@@ -345,6 +352,7 @@ The :mod:`urlparse` module defines the following functions:
:rfc:`1738` - Uniform Resource Locators (URL)
This specifies the formal syntax and semantics of absolute URLs.
+.. _WHATWG: https://url.spec.whatwg.org/
.. _urlparse-result-object:
diff --git a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
index 21875bb2991..16eefed56f6 100644
--- a/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/test/test_urlparse.py
@@ -618,6 +618,55 @@ class UrlParseTestCase(unittest.TestCase):
self.assertEqual(p1.path, '863-1234')
self.assertEqual(p1.params, 'phone-context=+1-914-555')
+ def test_urlsplit_remove_unsafe_bytes(self):
+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input, for http common case scenario.
+ url = "h\nttp://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "http")
+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, "www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.path, "/javascript:alert('msg')/")
+ self.assertEqual(p.query, "query=something")
+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, "fragment")
+ self.assertEqual(p.username, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.password, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, "www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.port, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "http://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input as bytes, for http common case scenario.
+ url = b"h\nttp://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, b"http")
+ self.assertEqual(p.netloc, b"www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.path, b"/javascript:alert('msg')/")
+ self.assertEqual(p.query, b"query=something")
+ self.assertEqual(p.fragment, b"fragment")
+ self.assertEqual(p.username, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.password, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.hostname, b"www.python.org")
+ self.assertEqual(p.port, None)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), b"http://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # any scheme
+ url = "x-new-scheme\t://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "x-new-scheme://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # Remove ASCII tabs and newlines from input as bytes, any scheme.
+ url = b"x-new-scheme\t://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ p = urlparse.urlsplit(url)
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), b"x-new-scheme://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+ # Unsafe bytes is not returned from urlparse cache.
+ # scheme is stored after parsing, sending an scheme with unsafe bytes *will not* return an unsafe scheme
+ url = "https://www.python\n.org\t/java\nscript:\talert('msg\r\n')/?query\n=\tsomething#frag\nment"
+ scheme = "htt\nps"
+ for _ in range(2):
+ p = urlparse.urlsplit(url, scheme=scheme)
+ self.assertEqual(p.scheme, "https")
+ self.assertEqual(p.geturl(), "https://www.python.org/javascript:alert('msg')/?query=something#fragment")
+
+
def test_attributes_bad_port(self):
"""Check handling of non-integer ports."""
diff --git a/Lib/urlparse.py b/Lib/urlparse.py
index 69504d8fd93..6cc40a8d2fb 100644
--- a/Lib/urlparse.py
+++ b/Lib/urlparse.py
@@ -63,6 +63,9 @@ scheme_chars = ('abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
'0123456789'
'+-.')
+# Unsafe bytes to be removed per WHATWG spec
+_UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE = ['\t', '\r', '\n']
+
MAX_CACHE_SIZE = 20
_parse_cache = {}
@@ -185,12 +188,19 @@ def _checknetloc(netloc):
"under NFKC normalization"
% netloc)
+def _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url):
+ for b in _UNSAFE_URL_BYTES_TO_REMOVE:
+ url = url.replace(b, "")
+ return url
+
def urlsplit(url, scheme='', allow_fragments=True):
"""Parse a URL into 5 components:
<scheme>://<netloc>/<path>?<query>#<fragment>
Return a 5-tuple: (scheme, netloc, path, query, fragment).
Note that we don't break the components up in smaller bits
(e.g. netloc is a single string) and we don't expand % escapes."""
+ url = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(url)
+ scheme = _remove_unsafe_bytes_from_url(scheme)
allow_fragments = bool(allow_fragments)
key = url, scheme, allow_fragments, type(url), type(scheme)
cached = _parse_cache.get(key, None)

63
SPECS/python2.spec
View File

@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ Summary: An interpreted, interactive, object-oriented programming language
Name: %{python}
# Remember to also rebase python2-docs when changing this:
Version: 2.7.18
Release: 7%{?dist}
Release: 10%{?dist}
License: Python
Group: Development/Languages
Requires: %{python}-libs%{?_isa} = %{version}-%{release}
@ -729,6 +729,51 @@ Patch357: 00357-CVE-2021-3177.patch
# Main BZ: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1928904
Patch359: 00359-CVE-2021-23336.patch
# 00366 # e76b05ea3313854adf80e290c07d5b38fef606bb
# CVE-2021-3733: Fix ReDoS in urllib AbstractBasicAuthHandler
#
# Fix Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) vulnerability in
# urllib2.AbstractBasicAuthHandler. The ReDoS-vulnerable regex
# has quadratic worst-case complexity and it allows cause a denial of
# service when identifying crafted invalid RFCs. This ReDoS issue is on
# the client side and needs remote attackers to control the HTTP server.
#
# Backported from Python 3 together with another backward-compatible
# improvement of the regex from fix for CVE-2020-8492.
#
# Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue43075
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1995234
Patch366: 00366-CVE-2021-3733.patch
# 00368 # 10dcf6732fb101ce89ad506a89365c6b1ff8c4e4
# CVE-2021-3737: http client infinite line reading (DoS) after a HTTP 100 Continue
#
# Fixes http.client potential denial of service where it could get stuck reading
# lines from a malicious server after a 100 Continue response.
#
# Backported from Python 3.
#
# Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue44022
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1995162
Patch368: 00368-CVE-2021-3737.patch
# 00372 #
# CVE-2021-4189: ftplib should not use the host from the PASV response
# Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue43285
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2036020
Patch372: 00372-CVE-2021-4189.patch
# 00377 #
# CVE-2022-0391: urlparse does not sanitize URLs containing ASCII newline and tabs
#
# ASCII newline and tab characters are stripped from the URL.
#
# Backported from Python 3.
#
# Upstream: https://bugs.python.org/issue43882
# Tracking bug: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2047376
Patch377: 00377-CVE-2022-0391.patch
# (New patches go here ^^^)
#
# When adding new patches to "python2" and "python3" in Fedora, EL, etc.,
@ -1056,6 +1101,10 @@ git apply %{PATCH351}
%patch355 -p1
%patch357 -p1
%patch359 -p1
%patch366 -p1
%patch368 -p1
%patch372 -p1
%patch377 -p1
# This shouldn't be necesarry, but is right now (2.2a3)
find -name "*~" |xargs rm -f
@ -1994,6 +2043,18 @@ fi
# ======================================================
%changelog
* Tue Feb 08 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 2.7.18-10
- Security fix for CVE-2022-0391: urlparse does not sanitize URLs containing ASCII newline and tabs
Resolves: rhbz#2047376
* Wed Jan 12 2022 Charalampos Stratakis <cstratak@redhat.com> - 2.7.18-9
- Security fix for CVE-2021-4189: ftplib should not use the host from the PASV response
Resolves: rhbz#2036020
* Tue Sep 21 2021 Lumír Balhar <lbalhar@redhat.com> - 2.7.18-8
- Security fixes for CVE-2021-3737 and CVE-2021-3733
Resolves: rhbz#1995162 and rhbz#1995234
* Thu Aug 05 2021 Tomas Orsava <torsava@redhat.com> - 2.7.18-7
- Adjusted the postun scriptlets to enable upgrading to RHEL 9
- Resolves: rhbz#1933055