Fix: CVE-2023-5869

Resolves: RHEL-16077
Backport patch based on: https://url.corp.redhat.com/66a866b
This commit is contained in:
Filip Janus 2024-01-11 15:52:30 +01:00
parent 33b2c2cbf2
commit f2eaee1528
2 changed files with 313 additions and 1 deletions

View File

@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
From c48008f599fd0e3bca2923ff5b40b559ae1e4e2e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tom Lane <tgl@sss.pgh.pa.us>
Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 10:56:43 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] Detect integer overflow while computing new array dimensions.
array_set_element() and related functions allow an array to be
enlarged by assigning to subscripts outside the current array bounds.
While these places were careful to check that the new bounds are
allowable, they neglected to consider the risk of integer overflow
in computing the new bounds. In edge cases, we could compute new
bounds that are invalid but get past the subsequent checks,
allowing bad things to happen. Memory stomps that are potentially
exploitable for arbitrary code execution are possible, and so is
disclosure of server memory.
To fix, perform the hazardous computations using overflow-detecting
arithmetic routines, which fortunately exist in all still-supported
branches.
The test cases added for this generate (after patching) errors that
mention the value of MaxArraySize, which is platform-dependent.
Rather than introduce multiple expected-files, use psql's VERBOSITY
parameter to suppress the printing of the message text. v11 psql
lacks that parameter, so omit the tests in that branch.
Our thanks to Pedro Gallegos for reporting this problem.
Security: CVE-2023-5869
---
src/backend/utils/adt/arrayfuncs.c | 85 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
src/backend/utils/adt/arrayutils.c | 6 ---
src/include/common/int.h | 69 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/include/utils/array.h | 6 +++
4 files changed, 142 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 src/include/common/int.h
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayfuncs.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayfuncs.c
index 553c517..7363893 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayfuncs.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayfuncs.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include "access/htup_details.h"
#include "catalog/pg_type.h"
+#include "common/int.h"
#include "funcapi.h"
#include "libpq/pqformat.h"
#include "utils/array.h"
@@ -2309,22 +2310,38 @@ array_set_element(Datum arraydatum,
addedbefore = addedafter = 0;
/*
- * Check subscripts
+ * Check subscripts. We assume the existing subscripts passed
+ * ArrayCheckBounds, so that dim[i] + lb[i] can be computed without
+ * overflow. But we must beware of other overflows in our calculations of
+ * new dim[] values.
*/
if (ndim == 1)
{
if (indx[0] < lb[0])
{
- addedbefore = lb[0] - indx[0];
- dim[0] += addedbefore;
+ /* addedbefore = lb[0] - indx[0]; */
+ /* dim[0] += addedbefore; */
+ if (pg_sub_s32_overflow(lb[0], indx[0], &addedbefore) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(dim[0], addedbefore, &dim[0]))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("array size exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ (int) MaxArraySize)));
lb[0] = indx[0];
if (addedbefore > 1)
newhasnulls = true; /* will insert nulls */
}
if (indx[0] >= (dim[0] + lb[0]))
{
- addedafter = indx[0] - (dim[0] + lb[0]) + 1;
- dim[0] += addedafter;
+ /* addedafter = indx[0] - (dim[0] + lb[0]) + 1; */
+ /* dim[0] += addedafter; */
+ if (pg_sub_s32_overflow(indx[0], dim[0] + lb[0], &addedafter) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(addedafter, 1, &addedafter) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(dim[0], addedafter, &dim[0]))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("array size exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ (int) MaxArraySize)));
if (addedafter > 1)
newhasnulls = true; /* will insert nulls */
}
@@ -2568,14 +2585,23 @@ array_set_element_expanded(Datum arraydatum,
addedbefore = addedafter = 0;
/*
- * Check subscripts (this logic matches original array_set_element)
+ * Check subscripts (this logic must match array_set_element). We assume
+ * the existing subscripts passed ArrayCheckBounds, so that dim[i] + lb[i]
+ * can be computed without overflow. But we must beware of other
+ * overflows in our calculations of new dim[] values.
*/
if (ndim == 1)
{
if (indx[0] < lb[0])
{
- addedbefore = lb[0] - indx[0];
- dim[0] += addedbefore;
+ /* addedbefore = lb[0] - indx[0]; */
+ /* dim[0] += addedbefore; */
+ if (pg_sub_s32_overflow(lb[0], indx[0], &addedbefore) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(dim[0], addedbefore, &dim[0]))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("array size exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ (int) MaxArraySize)));
lb[0] = indx[0];
dimschanged = true;
if (addedbefore > 1)
@@ -2583,8 +2609,15 @@ array_set_element_expanded(Datum arraydatum,
}
if (indx[0] >= (dim[0] + lb[0]))
{
- addedafter = indx[0] - (dim[0] + lb[0]) + 1;
- dim[0] += addedafter;
+ /* addedafter = indx[0] - (dim[0] + lb[0]) + 1; */
+ /* dim[0] += addedafter; */
+ if (pg_sub_s32_overflow(indx[0], dim[0] + lb[0], &addedafter) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(addedafter, 1, &addedafter) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(dim[0], addedafter, &dim[0]))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("array size exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ (int) MaxArraySize)));
dimschanged = true;
if (addedafter > 1)
newhasnulls = true; /* will insert nulls */
@@ -2866,7 +2899,10 @@ array_set_slice(Datum arraydatum,
addedbefore = addedafter = 0;
/*
- * Check subscripts
+ * Check subscripts. We assume the existing subscripts passed
+ * ArrayCheckBounds, so that dim[i] + lb[i] can be computed without
+ * overflow. But we must beware of other overflows in our calculations of
+ * new dim[] values.
*/
if (ndim == 1)
{
@@ -2881,18 +2917,31 @@ array_set_slice(Datum arraydatum,
errmsg("upper bound cannot be less than lower bound")));
if (lowerIndx[0] < lb[0])
{
- if (upperIndx[0] < lb[0] - 1)
- newhasnulls = true; /* will insert nulls */
- addedbefore = lb[0] - lowerIndx[0];
- dim[0] += addedbefore;
+ /* addedbefore = lb[0] - lowerIndx[0]; */
+ /* dim[0] += addedbefore; */
+ if (pg_sub_s32_overflow(lb[0], lowerIndx[0], &addedbefore) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(dim[0], addedbefore, &dim[0]))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("array size exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ (int) MaxArraySize)));
lb[0] = lowerIndx[0];
+ if (addedbefore > 1)
+ newhasnulls = true; /* will insert nulls */
}
if (upperIndx[0] >= (dim[0] + lb[0]))
{
- if (lowerIndx[0] > (dim[0] + lb[0]))
+ /* addedafter = upperIndx[0] - (dim[0] + lb[0]) + 1; */
+ /* dim[0] += addedafter; */
+ if (pg_sub_s32_overflow(upperIndx[0], dim[0] + lb[0], &addedafter) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(addedafter, 1, &addedafter) ||
+ pg_add_s32_overflow(dim[0], addedafter, &dim[0]))
+ ereport(ERROR,
+ (errcode(ERRCODE_PROGRAM_LIMIT_EXCEEDED),
+ errmsg("array size exceeds the maximum allowed (%d)",
+ (int) MaxArraySize)));
+ if (addedafter > 1)
newhasnulls = true; /* will insert nulls */
- addedafter = upperIndx[0] - (dim[0] + lb[0]) + 1;
- dim[0] += addedafter;
}
}
else
diff --git a/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayutils.c b/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayutils.c
index f7c6a51..eb5f2a0 100644
--- a/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayutils.c
+++ b/src/backend/utils/adt/arrayutils.c
@@ -63,10 +63,6 @@ ArrayGetOffset0(int n, const int *tup, const int *scale)
* This must do overflow checking, since it is used to validate that a user
* dimensionality request doesn't overflow what we can handle.
*
- * We limit array sizes to at most about a quarter billion elements,
- * so that it's not necessary to check for overflow in quite so many
- * places --- for instance when palloc'ing Datum arrays.
- *
* The multiplication overflow check only works on machines that have int64
* arithmetic, but that is nearly all platforms these days, and doing check
* divides for those that don't seems way too expensive.
@@ -77,8 +73,6 @@ ArrayGetNItems(int ndim, const int *dims)
int32 ret;
int i;
-#define MaxArraySize ((Size) (MaxAllocSize / sizeof(Datum)))
-
if (ndim <= 0)
return 0;
ret = 1;
diff --git a/src/include/common/int.h b/src/include/common/int.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..4235586
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/include/common/int.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/*-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ *
+ * int.h
+ * Routines to perform integer math, while checking for overflows.
+ *
+ * The routines in this file are intended to be well defined C, without
+ * relying on compiler flags like -fwrapv.
+ *
+ * To reduce the overhead of these routines try to use compiler intrinsics
+ * where available. That's not that important for the 16, 32 bit cases, but
+ * the 64 bit cases can be considerably faster with intrinsics. In case no
+ * intrinsics are available 128 bit math is used where available.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2017-2018, PostgreSQL Global Development Group
+ *
+ * src/include/common/int.h
+ *
+ *-------------------------------------------------------------------------
+ */
+#ifndef COMMON_INT_H
+#define COMMON_INT_H
+
+/*
+ * If a + b overflows, return true, otherwise store the result of a + b into
+ * *result. The content of *result is implementation defined in case of
+ * overflow.
+ */
+static inline bool
+pg_add_s32_overflow(int32 a, int32 b, int32 *result)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE__BUILTIN_OP_OVERFLOW)
+ return __builtin_add_overflow(a, b, result);
+#else
+ int64 res = (int64) a + (int64) b;
+
+ if (res > PG_INT32_MAX || res < PG_INT32_MIN)
+ {
+ *result = 0x5EED; /* to avoid spurious warnings */
+ return true;
+ }
+ *result = (int32) res;
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+/*
+ * If a - b overflows, return true, otherwise store the result of a - b into
+ * *result. The content of *result is implementation defined in case of
+ * overflow.
+ */
+static inline bool
+pg_sub_s32_overflow(int32 a, int32 b, int32 *result)
+{
+#if defined(HAVE__BUILTIN_OP_OVERFLOW)
+ return __builtin_sub_overflow(a, b, result);
+#else
+ int64 res = (int64) a - (int64) b;
+
+ if (res > PG_INT32_MAX || res < PG_INT32_MIN)
+ {
+ *result = 0x5EED; /* to avoid spurious warnings */
+ return true;
+ }
+ *result = (int32) res;
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+#endif /* COMMON_INT_H */
diff --git a/src/include/utils/array.h b/src/include/utils/array.h
index 905f6b0..2d96834 100644
--- a/src/include/utils/array.h
+++ b/src/include/utils/array.h
@@ -64,6 +64,12 @@
#include "fmgr.h"
#include "utils/expandeddatum.h"
+/*
+ * Maximum number of elements in an array. We limit this to at most about a
+ * quarter billion elements, so that it's not necessary to check for overflow
+ * in quite so many places --- for instance when palloc'ing Datum arrays.
+ */
+#define MaxArraySize ((Size) (MaxAllocSize / sizeof(Datum)))
/*
* Arrays are varlena objects, so must meet the varlena convention that
--
2.43.0

View File

@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ Summary: PostgreSQL client programs
Name: postgresql
%global majorversion 10
Version: %{majorversion}.23
Release: 2%{?dist}
Release: 3%{?dist}
# The PostgreSQL license is very similar to other MIT licenses, but the OSI
# recognizes it as an independent license, so we do as well.
@ -110,6 +110,8 @@ Patch9: postgresql-server-pg_config.patch
Patch10: postgresql-10.15-contrib-dblink-expected-out.patch
Patch11: postgresql-10.23-CVE-2023-2454.patch
Patch12: postgresql-10.23-CVE-2023-2455.patch
# Fixes CVE-2023-5869
Patch13: postgresql-array-overflow.patch
BuildRequires: gcc
BuildRequires: perl(ExtUtils::MakeMaker) glibc-devel bison flex gawk
@ -371,6 +373,7 @@ benchmarks.
%patch10 -p1
%patch11 -p1
%patch12 -p1
%patch13 -p1
# We used to run autoconf here, but there's no longer any real need to,
# since Postgres ships with a reasonably modern configure script.
@ -1175,6 +1178,9 @@ make -C postgresql-setup-%{setup_version} check
%changelog
* Thu Jan 11 2024 Filip Janus <fjanus@redhat.com> - 10.23-3
- Fix: CVE-2023-5869
* Wed Jul 19 2023 Dominik Rehák <drehak@redhat.com> - 10.23-2
- Backport fixes for CVE-2023-2454 and CVE-2023-2455
- Update postgresql-setup to 8.7 (https://github.com/devexp-db/postgresql-setup/pull/35)