2550 lines
65 KiB
Diff
2550 lines
65 KiB
Diff
--- /dev/null 2007-07-08 21:11:04.052436262 +0200
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+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/passupdate.c 2007-07-23 13:40:56.000000000 +0200
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@@ -0,0 +1,560 @@
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+/*
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+ * Main coding by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
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+ * Copyright (C) 1996.
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+ * Copyright (c) Jan Rêkorajski, 1999.
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+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007
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+ *
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+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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+ * are met:
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+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
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+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
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+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
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+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
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+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
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+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
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+ * written permission.
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+ *
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+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
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+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
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+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
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+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
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+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
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+ *
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+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
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+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
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+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
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+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
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+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
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+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
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+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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+ */
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+
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+/* this will be included from module and update helper */
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+
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+#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
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+# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
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+#endif
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+
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+/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
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+
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+#define ascii_to_bin(c) ((c)>='a'?(c-59):(c)>='A'?((c)-53):(c)-'.')
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+#define bin_to_ascii(c) ((c)>=38?((c)-38+'a'):(c)>=12?((c)-12+'A'):(c)+'.')
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+
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+#define PW_TMPFILE "/etc/npasswd"
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+#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
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+#define OPW_TMPFILE "/etc/security/nopasswd"
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+#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
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+
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+/*
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+ * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
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+ */
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+static int i64c(int i)
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+{
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+ if (i < 0)
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+ return ('.');
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+ else if (i > 63)
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+ return ('z');
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+ if (i == 0)
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+ return ('.');
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+ if (i == 1)
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+ return ('/');
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+ if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
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+ return ('0' - 2 + i);
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+ if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
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+ return ('A' - 12 + i);
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+ if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
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+ return ('a' - 38 + i);
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+ return ('\0');
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+}
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+
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+static char *crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
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+{
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+ /*
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+ * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
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+ * removed use of static variables (AGM)
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+ */
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+
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+ struct timeval tv;
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+ MD5_CTX ctx;
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+ unsigned char result[16];
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+ char *cp = (char *) result;
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+ unsigned char tmp[16];
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+ int i;
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+ char *x = NULL;
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+
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+ GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
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+ gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
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+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
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+ i = getpid();
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+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
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+ i = clock();
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+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
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+ GoodMD5Update(&ctx, result, sizeof result);
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+ GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
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+ strcpy(cp, "$1$"); /* magic for the MD5 */
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+ cp += strlen(cp);
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+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
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+ *cp++ = i64c(tmp[i] & 077);
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+ *cp = '\0';
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+
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+ /* no longer need cleartext */
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+ x = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
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+
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+ return x;
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+}
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+
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+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
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+static int lock_pwdf(void)
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+{
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+ int i;
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+ int retval;
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+
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+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
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+ if (selinux_confined()) {
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+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
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+ are, of course, completely arbitrary.
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+ My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
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+ called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
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+ reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
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+ for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
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+ i=0;
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+ while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
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+ usleep(1000);
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+ i++;
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+ }
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+ if(retval != 0) {
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
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+ }
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+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
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+}
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+
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+static void unlock_pwdf(void)
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+{
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+#ifndef HELPER_COMPILE
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+ if (selinux_confined()) {
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+ return;
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ ulckpwdf();
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+}
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+#endif
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+
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+static int
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+save_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
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+ int howmany)
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+{
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+ static char buf[16384];
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+ static char nbuf[16384];
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+ char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
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+ int npas;
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+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
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+ int err = 0;
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+ int oldmask;
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+ int found = 0;
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+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
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+ struct stat st;
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+
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+ if (howmany < 0) {
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+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (oldpass == NULL) {
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+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
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+ }
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+
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+ oldmask = umask(077);
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+
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+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
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+ security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
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+ if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
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+ };
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+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
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+ freecon(passwd_context);
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
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+ }
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+ if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
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+ freecon(passwd_context);
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+ freecon(prev_context);
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
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+ }
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+ freecon(passwd_context);
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
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+ umask(oldmask);
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+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+
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+ opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
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+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
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+ fclose(pwfile);
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
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+ fclose(opwfile);
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+ fclose(pwfile);
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
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+ fclose(opwfile);
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+ fclose(pwfile);
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
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+ fclose(opwfile);
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+ fclose(pwfile);
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+
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+ while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
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+ if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
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+ char *sptr = NULL;
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+ found = 1;
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+ if (howmany == 0)
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+ continue;
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+ buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
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+ s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
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+ s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
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+ s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
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+ s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
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+ npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
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+ while (npas > howmany) {
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+ s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
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+ if (s_pas != NULL)
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+ s_pas++;
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+ npas--;
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+ }
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+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
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+ if (s_pas == NULL)
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+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
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+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
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+ else
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+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
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+ s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
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+ _pam_delete(pass);
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+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ } else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ break;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ fclose(opwfile);
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+
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+ if (!found) {
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+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
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+ if (pwd == NULL) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ } else {
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+ pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
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+ snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
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+ forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
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+ _pam_delete(pass);
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+ if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ }
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+ }
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
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+ D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
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+ err = 1;
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+ }
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+
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+done:
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+ if (!err) {
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+ if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
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+ err = 1;
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+ }
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+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
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+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ }
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+ if (prev_context)
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+ freecon(prev_context);
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+ prev_context=NULL;
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ if (!err) {
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+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
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+ } else {
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+ unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
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+ }
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+}
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+
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+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
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+static int
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+_update_passwd(const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
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+#else
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+static int
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+_update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
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+#endif
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+{
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+ struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
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+ struct stat st;
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+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
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+ int err = 1;
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+ int oldmask;
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+
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+ oldmask = umask(077);
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+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
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+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
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+ security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
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+ if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
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+ };
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+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
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+ freecon(passwd_context);
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
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+ }
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+ if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
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+ freecon(passwd_context);
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+ freecon(prev_context);
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+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
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+ }
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+ freecon(passwd_context);
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+ }
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+#endif
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+ pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
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+ umask(oldmask);
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+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+
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+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
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+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
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+ fclose(pwfile);
|
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
|
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+ }
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+
|
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+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
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+ fclose(opwfile);
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+ fclose(pwfile);
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+
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+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
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+ fclose(opwfile);
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+ fclose(pwfile);
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
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+ fclose(opwfile);
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+ fclose(pwfile);
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+ err = 1;
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+ goto done;
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+ }
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+
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+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
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+ while (tmpent) {
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+ if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
|
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+ /* To shut gcc up */
|
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+ union {
|
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+ const char *const_charp;
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+ char *charp;
|
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+ } assigned_passwd;
|
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+ assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
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+
|
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+ tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
|
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+ err = 0;
|
|
+ }
|
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+ if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
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+ D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
|
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+ err = 1;
|
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+ break;
|
|
+ }
|
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+ tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
|
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+ }
|
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+ fclose(opwfile);
|
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+
|
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+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
|
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+ D(("error writing entries to password file: %m"));
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
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+done:
|
|
+ if (!err) {
|
|
+ if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
|
|
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
|
|
+ _log_err(
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
|
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+ else
|
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+ err = 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
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+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
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+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (prev_context)
|
|
+ freecon(prev_context);
|
|
+ prev_context=NULL;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ if (!err) {
|
|
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
|
|
+static int
|
|
+_update_shadow(const char *forwho, char *towhat)
|
|
+#else
|
|
+static int
|
|
+_update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat)
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
|
|
+ struct stat st;
|
|
+ FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
|
|
+ int err = 1;
|
|
+ int oldmask;
|
|
+
|
|
+ spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
|
|
+ if (spwdent == NULL) {
|
|
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ oldmask = umask(077);
|
|
+
|
|
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
+ security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
|
|
+ if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ };
|
|
+ if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
|
|
+ freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
|
|
+ freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
+ freecon(prev_context);
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
|
|
+ umask(oldmask);
|
|
+ if (pwfile == NULL) {
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
|
|
+ if (opwfile == NULL) {
|
|
+ fclose(pwfile);
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
|
|
+ fclose(opwfile);
|
|
+ fclose(pwfile);
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
|
|
+ fclose(opwfile);
|
|
+ fclose(pwfile);
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
|
|
+ fclose(opwfile);
|
|
+ fclose(pwfile);
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
|
|
+ while (stmpent) {
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
|
|
+ stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
|
|
+ stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
|
|
+ err = 0;
|
|
+ D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
|
|
+ D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ fclose(opwfile);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (fclose(pwfile)) {
|
|
+ D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ done:
|
|
+ if (!err) {
|
|
+ if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
|
|
+#ifdef HELPER_COMPILE
|
|
+ _log_err(
|
|
+#else
|
|
+ pam_syslog(pamh,
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
+ if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
+ if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
|
|
+ err = 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (prev_context)
|
|
+ freecon(prev_context);
|
|
+ prev_context=NULL;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!err) {
|
|
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+}
|
|
--- Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c.update-helper 2006-06-27 10:38:14.000000000 +0200
|
|
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_acct.c 2007-07-23 13:40:56.000000000 +0200
|
|
@@ -124,11 +124,11 @@
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* exec binary helper */
|
|
- args[0] = x_strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
|
|
+ args[0] = x_strdup(UPDATE_HELPER);
|
|
args[1] = x_strdup(user);
|
|
args[2] = x_strdup("verify");
|
|
|
|
- execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, args, envp);
|
|
+ execve(UPDATE_HELPER, args, envp);
|
|
|
|
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "helper binary execve failed: %m");
|
|
/* should not get here: exit with error */
|
|
@@ -142,11 +142,11 @@
|
|
int rc=0;
|
|
rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0); /* wait for helper to complete */
|
|
if (rc<0) {
|
|
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc);
|
|
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_update waitpid failed: %m");
|
|
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
} else {
|
|
retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
|
|
- if (retval != PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL) {
|
|
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
rc = pam_modutil_read(fds[0], buf, sizeof(buf) - 1);
|
|
if(rc > 0) {
|
|
buf[rc] = '\0';
|
|
@@ -157,15 +157,15 @@
|
|
&spwd.sp_warn, /* days warning for expiration */
|
|
&spwd.sp_inact, /* days before account inactive */
|
|
&spwd.sp_expire) /* date when account expires */ != 6 ) retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- else {
|
|
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, " ERROR %d: %m", rc); retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "read failed: %m"); retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_update returned error %d", retval);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "Fork failed: %m");
|
|
- D(("fork failed"));
|
|
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "fork failed: %m");
|
|
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
close(fds[0]);
|
|
@@ -247,6 +247,8 @@
|
|
setreuid( -1, save_euid );
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+ } else if (geteuid() != 0) { /* cannot read shadow when non root */
|
|
+ return PAM_IGNORE;
|
|
} else if (_unix_shadowed (pwent))
|
|
spent = pam_modutil_getspnam (pamh, uname);
|
|
else
|
|
--- Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c.update-helper 2007-04-30 12:47:30.000000000 +0200
|
|
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/pam_unix_passwd.c 2007-07-23 13:54:55.000000000 +0200
|
|
@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
|
|
* Main coding by Elliot Lee <sopwith@redhat.com>, Red Hat Software.
|
|
* Copyright (C) 1996.
|
|
* Copyright (c) Jan Rêkorajski, 1999.
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007.
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
@@ -92,15 +93,6 @@
|
|
#endif /* GNU libc 2.1 */
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
- * PAM framework looks for these entry-points to pass control to the
|
|
- * password changing module.
|
|
- */
|
|
-
|
|
-#if defined(USE_LCKPWDF) && !defined(HAVE_LCKPWDF)
|
|
-# include "./lckpwdf.-c"
|
|
-#endif
|
|
-
|
|
-/*
|
|
How it works:
|
|
Gets in username (has to be done) from the calling program
|
|
Does authentication of user (only if we are not running as root)
|
|
@@ -108,82 +100,15 @@
|
|
Sets it.
|
|
*/
|
|
|
|
-/* passwd/salt conversion macros */
|
|
-
|
|
-#define ascii_to_bin(c) ((c)>='a'?(c-59):(c)>='A'?((c)-53):(c)-'.')
|
|
-#define bin_to_ascii(c) ((c)>=38?((c)-38+'a'):(c)>=12?((c)-12+'A'):(c)+'.')
|
|
-
|
|
/* data tokens */
|
|
|
|
#define _UNIX_OLD_AUTHTOK "-UN*X-OLD-PASS"
|
|
#define _UNIX_NEW_AUTHTOK "-UN*X-NEW-PASS"
|
|
|
|
#define MAX_PASSWD_TRIES 3
|
|
-#define PW_TMPFILE "/etc/npasswd"
|
|
-#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
|
|
#ifndef CRACKLIB_DICTS
|
|
#define CRACKLIB_DICTS NULL
|
|
#endif
|
|
-#define OPW_TMPFILE "/etc/security/nopasswd"
|
|
-#define OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE "/etc/security/opasswd"
|
|
-
|
|
-/*
|
|
- * i64c - convert an integer to a radix 64 character
|
|
- */
|
|
-static int i64c(int i)
|
|
-{
|
|
- if (i < 0)
|
|
- return ('.');
|
|
- else if (i > 63)
|
|
- return ('z');
|
|
- if (i == 0)
|
|
- return ('.');
|
|
- if (i == 1)
|
|
- return ('/');
|
|
- if (i >= 2 && i <= 11)
|
|
- return ('0' - 2 + i);
|
|
- if (i >= 12 && i <= 37)
|
|
- return ('A' - 12 + i);
|
|
- if (i >= 38 && i <= 63)
|
|
- return ('a' - 38 + i);
|
|
- return ('\0');
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static char *crypt_md5_wrapper(const char *pass_new)
|
|
-{
|
|
- /*
|
|
- * Code lifted from Marek Michalkiewicz's shadow suite. (CG)
|
|
- * removed use of static variables (AGM)
|
|
- */
|
|
-
|
|
- struct timeval tv;
|
|
- MD5_CTX ctx;
|
|
- unsigned char result[16];
|
|
- char *cp = (char *) result;
|
|
- unsigned char tmp[16];
|
|
- int i;
|
|
- char *x = NULL;
|
|
-
|
|
- GoodMD5Init(&ctx);
|
|
- gettimeofday(&tv, (struct timezone *) 0);
|
|
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &tv, sizeof tv);
|
|
- i = getpid();
|
|
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
|
|
- i = clock();
|
|
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, (void *) &i, sizeof i);
|
|
- GoodMD5Update(&ctx, result, sizeof result);
|
|
- GoodMD5Final(tmp, &ctx);
|
|
- strcpy(cp, "$1$"); /* magic for the MD5 */
|
|
- cp += strlen(cp);
|
|
- for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
|
|
- *cp++ = i64c(tmp[i] & 077);
|
|
- *cp = '\0';
|
|
-
|
|
- /* no longer need cleartext */
|
|
- x = Goodcrypt_md5(pass_new, (const char *) result);
|
|
-
|
|
- return x;
|
|
-}
|
|
|
|
static char *getNISserver(pam_handle_t *pamh)
|
|
{
|
|
@@ -217,7 +142,8 @@
|
|
|
|
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
|
|
-static int _unix_run_shadow_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user, const char *fromwhat, const char *towhat)
|
|
+static int _unix_run_update_binary(pam_handle_t *pamh, unsigned int ctrl, const char *user,
|
|
+ const char *fromwhat, const char *towhat, int remember)
|
|
{
|
|
int retval, child, fds[2];
|
|
void (*sighandler)(int) = NULL;
|
|
@@ -247,7 +173,8 @@
|
|
size_t i=0;
|
|
struct rlimit rlim;
|
|
static char *envp[] = { NULL };
|
|
- char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
|
|
+ char *args[] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL };
|
|
+ char buffer[16];
|
|
|
|
/* XXX - should really tidy up PAM here too */
|
|
|
|
@@ -270,11 +197,18 @@
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/* exec binary helper */
|
|
- args[0] = x_strdup(CHKPWD_HELPER);
|
|
+ args[0] = x_strdup(UPDATE_HELPER);
|
|
args[1] = x_strdup(user);
|
|
- args[2] = x_strdup("shadow");
|
|
+ args[2] = x_strdup("update");
|
|
+ if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl))
|
|
+ args[3] = x_strdup("1");
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ args[3] = x_strdup("0");
|
|
|
|
- execve(CHKPWD_HELPER, args, envp);
|
|
+ snprintf(buffer, sizeof(buffer), "%d", remember);
|
|
+ args[4] = x_strdup(buffer);
|
|
+
|
|
+ execve(UPDATE_HELPER, args, envp);
|
|
|
|
/* should not get here: exit with error */
|
|
D(("helper binary is not available"));
|
|
@@ -297,7 +231,7 @@
|
|
close(fds[1]);
|
|
rc=waitpid(child, &retval, 0); /* wait for helper to complete */
|
|
if (rc<0) {
|
|
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_chkpwd waitpid returned %d: %m", rc);
|
|
+ pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_ERR, "unix_update waitpid failed: %m");
|
|
retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
} else {
|
|
retval = WEXITSTATUS(retval);
|
|
@@ -315,8 +249,56 @@
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int selinux_confined(void)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ static int confined = -1;
|
|
+ int fd;
|
|
+ char tempfile[]="/etc/.pwdXXXXXX";
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (confined != -1)
|
|
+ return confined;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* cannot be confined without SELinux enabled */
|
|
+ if (!SELINUX_ENABLED){
|
|
+ confined = 0;
|
|
+ return confined;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* let's try opening shadow read only */
|
|
+ if ((fd=open("/etc/shadow", O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
|
|
+ close(fd);
|
|
+ confined = 0;
|
|
+ return confined;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (errno == EACCES) {
|
|
+ confined = 1;
|
|
+ return confined;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* shadow opening failed because of other reasons let's try
|
|
+ creating a file in /etc */
|
|
+ if ((fd=mkstemp(tempfile)) != -1) {
|
|
+ unlink(tempfile);
|
|
+ close(fd);
|
|
+ confined = 0;
|
|
+ return confined;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ confined = 1;
|
|
+ return confined;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+#else
|
|
+static int selinux_confined(void)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
+#include "passupdate.c"
|
|
+
|
|
static int check_old_password(const char *forwho, const char *newpass)
|
|
{
|
|
static char buf[16384];
|
|
@@ -354,393 +336,6 @@
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
-static int save_old_password(pam_handle_t *pamh,
|
|
- const char *forwho, const char *oldpass,
|
|
- int howmany)
|
|
-{
|
|
- static char buf[16384];
|
|
- static char nbuf[16384];
|
|
- char *s_luser, *s_uid, *s_npas, *s_pas, *pass;
|
|
- int npas;
|
|
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
|
|
- int err = 0;
|
|
- int oldmask;
|
|
- int found = 0;
|
|
- struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
|
|
- struct stat st;
|
|
-
|
|
- if (howmany < 0) {
|
|
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (oldpass == NULL) {
|
|
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- oldmask = umask(077);
|
|
-
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
|
|
- if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- };
|
|
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
|
|
- freecon(passwd_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
|
|
- freecon(passwd_context);
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- freecon(passwd_context);
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- pwfile = fopen(OPW_TMPFILE, "w");
|
|
- umask(oldmask);
|
|
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- opwfile = fopen(OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE, "r");
|
|
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- while (fgets(buf, 16380, opwfile)) {
|
|
- if (!strncmp(buf, forwho, strlen(forwho))) {
|
|
- char *sptr;
|
|
- buf[strlen(buf) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
- s_luser = strtok_r(buf, ":", &sptr);
|
|
- s_uid = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
|
|
- s_npas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
|
|
- s_pas = strtok_r(NULL, ":", &sptr);
|
|
- npas = strtol(s_npas, NULL, 10) + 1;
|
|
- while (npas > howmany) {
|
|
- s_pas = strpbrk(s_pas, ",");
|
|
- if (s_pas != NULL)
|
|
- s_pas++;
|
|
- npas--;
|
|
- }
|
|
- pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
|
|
- if (s_pas == NULL)
|
|
- snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%s:%d:%s\n",
|
|
- s_luser, s_uid, npas, pass);
|
|
- else
|
|
- snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf),"%s:%s:%d:%s,%s\n",
|
|
- s_luser, s_uid, npas, s_pas, pass);
|
|
- _pam_delete(pass);
|
|
- if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- break;
|
|
- }
|
|
- found = 1;
|
|
- } else if (fputs(buf, pwfile) < 0) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- break;
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
-
|
|
- if (!found) {
|
|
- pwd = pam_modutil_getpwnam(pamh, forwho);
|
|
- if (pwd == NULL) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- pass = crypt_md5_wrapper(oldpass);
|
|
- snprintf(nbuf, sizeof(nbuf), "%s:%lu:1:%s\n",
|
|
- forwho, (unsigned long)pwd->pw_uid, pass);
|
|
- _pam_delete(pass);
|
|
- if (fputs(nbuf, pwfile) < 0) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
|
|
- D(("error writing entries to old passwords file: %m"));
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
-done:
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- if (rename(OPW_TMPFILE, OLD_PASSWORDS_FILE))
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (prev_context)
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- prev_context=NULL;
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- unlink(OPW_TMPFILE);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static int _update_passwd(pam_handle_t *pamh,
|
|
- const char *forwho, const char *towhat)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct passwd *tmpent = NULL;
|
|
- struct stat st;
|
|
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
|
|
- int err = 1;
|
|
- int oldmask;
|
|
-
|
|
- oldmask = umask(077);
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- security_context_t passwd_context=NULL;
|
|
- if (getfilecon("/etc/passwd",&passwd_context)<0) {
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- };
|
|
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
|
|
- freecon(passwd_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(passwd_context)) {
|
|
- freecon(passwd_context);
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- freecon(passwd_context);
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- pwfile = fopen(PW_TMPFILE, "w");
|
|
- umask(oldmask);
|
|
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- opwfile = fopen("/etc/passwd", "r");
|
|
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
|
|
- while (tmpent) {
|
|
- if (!strcmp(tmpent->pw_name, forwho)) {
|
|
- /* To shut gcc up */
|
|
- union {
|
|
- const char *const_charp;
|
|
- char *charp;
|
|
- } assigned_passwd;
|
|
- assigned_passwd.const_charp = towhat;
|
|
-
|
|
- tmpent->pw_passwd = assigned_passwd.charp;
|
|
- err = 0;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (putpwent(tmpent, pwfile)) {
|
|
- D(("error writing entry to password file: %m"));
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- break;
|
|
- }
|
|
- tmpent = fgetpwent(opwfile);
|
|
- }
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
|
|
- D(("error writing entries to password file: %m"));
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
-done:
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- if (!rename(PW_TMPFILE, "/etc/passwd"))
|
|
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
|
|
- else
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (prev_context)
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- prev_context=NULL;
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- unlink(PW_TMPFILE);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static int _update_shadow(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *forwho, char *towhat)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
|
|
- struct stat st;
|
|
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
|
|
- int err = 1;
|
|
- int oldmask;
|
|
-
|
|
- spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
|
|
- if (spwdent == NULL) {
|
|
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
- }
|
|
- oldmask = umask(077);
|
|
-
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
|
|
- if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- };
|
|
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
|
|
- freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
|
|
- freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
|
|
- umask(oldmask);
|
|
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
|
|
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
|
|
- while (stmpent) {
|
|
-
|
|
- if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
|
|
- stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
|
|
- stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
|
|
- err = 0;
|
|
- D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
|
|
- D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- break;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
|
|
- }
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
|
|
- D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- done:
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- if (!rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
|
|
- pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "password changed for %s", forwho);
|
|
- else
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (prev_context)
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- prev_context=NULL;
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
-
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
static int _do_setpass(pam_handle_t* pamh, const char *forwho,
|
|
const char *fromwhat,
|
|
char *towhat, unsigned int ctrl, int remember)
|
|
@@ -769,7 +364,7 @@
|
|
|
|
/* Unlock passwd file to avoid deadlock */
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
- ulckpwdf();
|
|
+ unlock_pwdf();
|
|
#endif
|
|
unlocked = 1;
|
|
|
|
@@ -832,33 +427,22 @@
|
|
if (_unix_comesfromsource(pamh, forwho, 1, 0)) {
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
if(unlocked) {
|
|
- int i = 0;
|
|
- /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
|
|
- are, of course, completely arbitrary.
|
|
- My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
|
|
- called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
|
|
- reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
|
|
- for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
|
|
- while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
|
|
- usleep(1000);
|
|
- i++;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if(retval != 0) {
|
|
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
+ if (selinux_confined())
|
|
+ return _unix_run_update_binary(pamh, ctrl, forwho, fromwhat, towhat, remember);
|
|
+#endif
|
|
/* first, save old password */
|
|
- if (save_old_password(pamh, forwho, fromwhat, remember)) {
|
|
+ if (save_old_password(forwho, fromwhat, remember)) {
|
|
retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
goto done;
|
|
}
|
|
if (on(UNIX_SHADOW, ctrl) || _unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
|
|
retval = _update_shadow(pamh, forwho, towhat);
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS && SELINUX_ENABLED)
|
|
- retval = _unix_run_shadow_binary(pamh, ctrl, forwho, fromwhat, towhat);
|
|
-#endif
|
|
if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
if (!_unix_shadowed(pwd))
|
|
retval = _update_passwd(pamh, forwho, "x");
|
|
@@ -870,7 +454,7 @@
|
|
|
|
done:
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
- ulckpwdf();
|
|
+ unlock_pwdf();
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
return retval;
|
|
@@ -891,13 +475,17 @@
|
|
if (_unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
|
|
/* ...and shadow password file entry for this user, if shadowing
|
|
is enabled */
|
|
- setspent();
|
|
- spwdent = getspnam(user);
|
|
- endspent();
|
|
-
|
|
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (spwdent == NULL && SELINUX_ENABLED )
|
|
- spwdent = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, user);
|
|
+ if (selinux_confined())
|
|
+ spwdent = _unix_run_verify_binary(pamh, ctrl, user);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ {
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ setspent();
|
|
+ spwdent = getspnam(user);
|
|
+ endspent();
|
|
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
+ }
|
|
#endif
|
|
if (spwdent == NULL)
|
|
return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
|
|
@@ -1020,7 +608,7 @@
|
|
int argc, const char **argv)
|
|
{
|
|
unsigned int ctrl, lctrl;
|
|
- int retval, i;
|
|
+ int retval;
|
|
int remember = -1;
|
|
|
|
/* <DO NOT free() THESE> */
|
|
@@ -1240,49 +828,40 @@
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
- /* These values for the number of attempts and the sleep time
|
|
- are, of course, completely arbitrary.
|
|
- My reading of the PAM docs is that, once pam_chauthtok() has been
|
|
- called with PAM_UPDATE_AUTHTOK, we are obliged to take any
|
|
- reasonable steps to make sure the token is updated; so retrying
|
|
- for 1/10 sec. isn't overdoing it. */
|
|
- i=0;
|
|
- while((retval = lckpwdf()) != 0 && i < 100) {
|
|
- usleep(1000);
|
|
- i++;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if(retval != 0) {
|
|
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif
|
|
|
|
- if (pass_old) {
|
|
+ if (!selinux_confined() && pass_old) {
|
|
retval = _unix_verify_password(pamh, user, pass_old, ctrl);
|
|
if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user password changed by another process");
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
- ulckpwdf();
|
|
+ unlock_pwdf();
|
|
#endif
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
- retval = _unix_verify_shadow(pamh, user, ctrl);
|
|
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!selinux_confined() &&
|
|
+ (retval=_unix_verify_shadow(pamh, user, ctrl)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE, "user not authenticated 2");
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
- ulckpwdf();
|
|
+ unlock_pwdf();
|
|
#endif
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
- retval = _pam_unix_approve_pass(pamh, ctrl, pass_old, pass_new);
|
|
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (!selinux_confined() &&
|
|
+ (retval=_pam_unix_approve_pass(pamh, ctrl, pass_old, pass_new)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
pam_syslog(pamh, LOG_NOTICE,
|
|
"new password not acceptable 2");
|
|
pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
- ulckpwdf();
|
|
+ unlock_pwdf();
|
|
#endif
|
|
return retval;
|
|
}
|
|
@@ -1326,7 +905,7 @@
|
|
"out of memory for password");
|
|
pass_new = pass_old = NULL; /* tidy up */
|
|
#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
- ulckpwdf();
|
|
+ unlock_pwdf();
|
|
#endif
|
|
return PAM_BUF_ERR;
|
|
}
|
|
@@ -1349,7 +928,7 @@
|
|
|
|
retval = _do_setpass(pamh, user, pass_old, tpass, ctrl,
|
|
remember);
|
|
- /* _do_setpass has called ulckpwdf for us */
|
|
+ /* _do_setpass has called unlock_pwdf for us */
|
|
|
|
_pam_delete(tpass);
|
|
pass_old = pass_new = NULL;
|
|
--- /dev/null 2007-07-08 21:11:04.052436262 +0200
|
|
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/passverify.h 2007-07-23 13:40:56.000000000 +0200
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * This program is designed to run setuid(root) or with sufficient
|
|
+ * privilege to read all of the unix password databases. It is designed
|
|
+ * to provide a mechanism for the current user (defined by this
|
|
+ * process' uid) to verify their own password.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
|
|
+ * this program indicates whether the user is authenticated or not.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+#define MAXPASS 200 /* the maximum length of a password */
|
|
+
|
|
+void _log_err(int err, const char *format,...);
|
|
+
|
|
+void setup_signals(void);
|
|
+
|
|
+int read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords);
|
|
+
|
|
+int _unix_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok);
|
|
+
|
|
+char *getuidname(uid_t uid);
|
|
+
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007. All rights reserved
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
+ * are met:
|
|
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
|
|
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
|
|
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
|
|
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
|
|
+ * written permission.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
|
|
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
|
|
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
|
|
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
|
|
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
|
|
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
|
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
|
|
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
|
|
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
|
|
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
|
|
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
+ */
|
|
--- Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c.update-helper 2007-03-12 15:35:14.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/unix_chkpwd.c 2007-07-23 13:40:56.000000000 +0200
|
|
@@ -41,386 +41,7 @@
|
|
|
|
#include "md5.h"
|
|
#include "bigcrypt.h"
|
|
-
|
|
-/* syslogging function for errors and other information */
|
|
-
|
|
-static void _log_err(int err, const char *format,...)
|
|
-{
|
|
- va_list args;
|
|
-
|
|
- va_start(args, format);
|
|
- openlog("unix_chkpwd", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
|
|
- vsyslog(err, format, args);
|
|
- va_end(args);
|
|
- closelog();
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static int _unix_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
|
|
-{
|
|
- char hashpass[1024];
|
|
- if (pwd != NULL) {
|
|
- if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (strlen(pwd->pw_name) < sizeof(hashpass) - 2) {
|
|
- strcpy(hashpass, "##");
|
|
- strcpy(hashpass + 2, pwd->pw_name);
|
|
- if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, hashpass) == 0) {
|
|
- return 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
- return 0;
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static void su_sighandler(int sig)
|
|
-{
|
|
-#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
|
|
- /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
|
|
- if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV )
|
|
- signal(sig, SIG_DFL);
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- if (sig > 0) {
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_NOTICE, "caught signal %d.", sig);
|
|
- exit(sig);
|
|
- }
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static void setup_signals(void)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct sigaction action; /* posix signal structure */
|
|
-
|
|
- /*
|
|
- * Setup signal handlers
|
|
- */
|
|
- (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
|
|
- action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
|
|
-#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
|
|
- action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
|
|
- action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
|
|
- action.sa_flags = 0;
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
|
|
- (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static int _verify_account(const char * const uname)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct spwd *spent;
|
|
- struct passwd *pwent;
|
|
-
|
|
- pwent = getpwnam(uname);
|
|
- if (!pwent) {
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))", uname);
|
|
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- spent = getspnam( uname );
|
|
- if (!spent) {
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not get username from shadow (%s))", uname);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* Couldn't get username from shadow */
|
|
- }
|
|
- printf("%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld",
|
|
- spent->sp_lstchg, /* last password change */
|
|
- spent->sp_min, /* days until change allowed. */
|
|
- spent->sp_max, /* days before change required */
|
|
- spent->sp_warn, /* days warning for expiration */
|
|
- spent->sp_inact, /* days before account inactive */
|
|
- spent->sp_expire); /* date when account expires */
|
|
-
|
|
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static int _unix_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
|
|
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
|
|
- char *salt = NULL;
|
|
- char *pp = NULL;
|
|
- int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
- size_t salt_len;
|
|
-
|
|
- /* UNIX passwords area */
|
|
- setpwent();
|
|
- pwd = getpwnam(name); /* Get password file entry... */
|
|
- endpwent();
|
|
- if (pwd != NULL) {
|
|
- if (_unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
|
|
- /*
|
|
- * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
|
|
- * if shadowing is enabled
|
|
- */
|
|
- setspent();
|
|
- spwdent = getspnam(name);
|
|
- endspent();
|
|
- if (spwdent != NULL)
|
|
- salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
|
|
- else
|
|
- pwd = NULL;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "*NP*") == 0) { /* NIS+ */
|
|
- uid_t save_uid;
|
|
-
|
|
- save_uid = geteuid();
|
|
- seteuid(pwd->pw_uid);
|
|
- spwdent = getspnam(name);
|
|
- seteuid(save_uid);
|
|
-
|
|
- salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- salt = x_strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL) {
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "check pass; user unknown");
|
|
- p = NULL;
|
|
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- salt_len = strlen(salt);
|
|
- if (salt_len == 0) {
|
|
- return (nullok == 0) ? PAM_AUTH_ERR : PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (p == NULL || strlen(p) == 0) {
|
|
- _pam_overwrite(salt);
|
|
- _pam_drop(salt);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- /* the moment of truth -- do we agree with the password? */
|
|
- retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
- if (!strncmp(salt, "$1$", 3)) {
|
|
- pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, salt);
|
|
- if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
|
|
- retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- _pam_overwrite(pp);
|
|
- _pam_drop(pp);
|
|
- pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, salt);
|
|
- if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0)
|
|
- retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- }
|
|
- } else if (*salt == '$') {
|
|
- /*
|
|
- * Ok, we don't know the crypt algorithm, but maybe
|
|
- * libcrypt nows about it? We should try it.
|
|
- */
|
|
- pp = x_strdup (crypt(p, salt));
|
|
- if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
|
|
- retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- }
|
|
- } else if (*salt == '*' || *salt == '!' || salt_len < 13) {
|
|
- retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- pp = bigcrypt(p, salt);
|
|
- /*
|
|
- * Note, we are comparing the bigcrypt of the password with
|
|
- * the contents of the password field. If the latter was
|
|
- * encrypted with regular crypt (and not bigcrypt) it will
|
|
- * have been truncated for storage relative to the output
|
|
- * of bigcrypt here. As such we need to compare only the
|
|
- * stored string with the subset of bigcrypt's result.
|
|
- * Bug 521314.
|
|
- */
|
|
- if (pp && salt_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > salt_len) {
|
|
- _pam_overwrite(pp+salt_len);
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
|
|
- retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
- p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */
|
|
-
|
|
- /* clean up */
|
|
- _pam_overwrite(pp);
|
|
- _pam_drop(pp);
|
|
-
|
|
- return retval;
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-static char *getuidname(uid_t uid)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct passwd *pw;
|
|
- static char username[32];
|
|
-
|
|
- pw = getpwuid(uid);
|
|
- if (pw == NULL)
|
|
- return NULL;
|
|
-
|
|
- strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
|
|
- username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
-
|
|
- return username;
|
|
-}
|
|
-
|
|
-#define SH_TMPFILE "/etc/nshadow"
|
|
-static int _update_shadow(const char *forwho)
|
|
-{
|
|
- struct spwd *spwdent = NULL, *stmpent = NULL;
|
|
- FILE *pwfile, *opwfile;
|
|
- int err = 1;
|
|
- int oldmask;
|
|
- struct stat st;
|
|
- char pass[MAXPASS + 1];
|
|
- char towhat[MAXPASS + 1];
|
|
- int npass=0;
|
|
-
|
|
- /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
|
|
-
|
|
- npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, pass, MAXPASS);
|
|
-
|
|
- if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */
|
|
-
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied");
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
-
|
|
- } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) {
|
|
-
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "password too long");
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
-
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- /* does pass agree with the official one? */
|
|
- int retval=0;
|
|
- pass[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */
|
|
- retval = _unix_verify_password(forwho, pass, 0);
|
|
- if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
- return retval;
|
|
- }
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
|
|
-
|
|
- npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, towhat, MAXPASS);
|
|
-
|
|
- if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */
|
|
-
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no new password supplied");
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
-
|
|
- } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) {
|
|
-
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "new password too long");
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
-
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- towhat[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */
|
|
- spwdent = getspnam(forwho);
|
|
- if (spwdent == NULL) {
|
|
- return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
- }
|
|
- oldmask = umask(077);
|
|
-
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- security_context_t shadow_context=NULL;
|
|
- if (getfilecon("/etc/shadow",&shadow_context)<0) {
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- };
|
|
- if (getfscreatecon(&prev_context)<0) {
|
|
- freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(shadow_context)) {
|
|
- freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
- freecon(shadow_context);
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
- pwfile = fopen(SH_TMPFILE, "w");
|
|
- umask(oldmask);
|
|
- if (pwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- opwfile = fopen("/etc/shadow", "r");
|
|
- if (opwfile == NULL) {
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fstat(fileno(opwfile), &st) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fchown(fileno(pwfile), st.st_uid, st.st_gid) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (fchmod(fileno(pwfile), st.st_mode) == -1) {
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
- fclose(pwfile);
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- goto done;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
|
|
- while (stmpent) {
|
|
-
|
|
- if (!strcmp(stmpent->sp_namp, forwho)) {
|
|
- stmpent->sp_pwdp = towhat;
|
|
- stmpent->sp_lstchg = time(NULL) / (60 * 60 * 24);
|
|
- err = 0;
|
|
- D(("Set password %s for %s", stmpent->sp_pwdp, forwho));
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (putspent(stmpent, pwfile)) {
|
|
- D(("error writing entry to shadow file: %m"));
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- break;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- stmpent = fgetspent(opwfile);
|
|
- }
|
|
- fclose(opwfile);
|
|
-
|
|
- if (fclose(pwfile)) {
|
|
- D(("error writing entries to shadow file: %m"));
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- done:
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- if (rename(SH_TMPFILE, "/etc/shadow"))
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
-#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
- if (SELINUX_ENABLED) {
|
|
- if (setfscreatecon(prev_context)) {
|
|
- err = 1;
|
|
- }
|
|
- if (prev_context)
|
|
- freecon(prev_context);
|
|
- prev_context=NULL;
|
|
- }
|
|
-#endif
|
|
-
|
|
- if (!err) {
|
|
- return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- unlink(SH_TMPFILE);
|
|
- return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
- }
|
|
-}
|
|
+#include "passverify.h"
|
|
|
|
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
|
{
|
|
@@ -430,6 +51,7 @@
|
|
int force_failure = 0;
|
|
int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
char *user;
|
|
+ char *passwords[] = { pass };
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
|
|
@@ -476,49 +98,24 @@
|
|
|
|
option=argv[2];
|
|
|
|
- if (strncmp(argv[2], "verify", 8) == 0) {
|
|
- /* Get the account information from the shadow file */
|
|
- return _verify_account(argv[1]);
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
- if (strncmp(option, "shadow", 8) == 0) {
|
|
- /* Attempting to change the password */
|
|
- return _update_shadow(argv[1]);
|
|
- }
|
|
-
|
|
/* read the nullok/nonull option */
|
|
if (strncmp(option, "nullok", 8) == 0)
|
|
nullok = 1;
|
|
- else
|
|
+ else if (strncmp(option, "nonull", 8) == 0)
|
|
nullok = 0;
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
|
|
|
|
/* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
|
|
|
|
- npass = read(STDIN_FILENO, pass, MAXPASS);
|
|
-
|
|
- if (npass < 0) { /* is it a valid password? */
|
|
-
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no password supplied");
|
|
+ npass = read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 1, passwords);
|
|
|
|
- } else if (npass >= MAXPASS) {
|
|
-
|
|
- _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "password too long");
|
|
-
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- if (npass == 0) {
|
|
- /* the password is NULL */
|
|
-
|
|
- retval = _unix_verify_password(user, NULL, nullok);
|
|
-
|
|
- } else {
|
|
- /* does pass agree with the official one? */
|
|
-
|
|
- pass[npass] = '\0'; /* NUL terminate */
|
|
- retval = _unix_verify_password(user, pass, nullok);
|
|
-
|
|
- }
|
|
+ if (npass != 1) { /* is it a valid password? */
|
|
+ _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no valid password supplied");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
+ retval = _unix_verify_password(user, pass, nullok);
|
|
+
|
|
memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS); /* clear memory of the password */
|
|
|
|
/* return pass or fail */
|
|
@@ -533,6 +130,7 @@
|
|
|
|
/*
|
|
* Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007. All rights reserved
|
|
*
|
|
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
--- /dev/null 2007-07-08 21:11:04.052436262 +0200
|
|
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/unix_update.c 2007-07-23 13:40:56.000000000 +0200
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,262 @@
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * This program is designed to run setuid(root) or with sufficient
|
|
+ * privilege to read all of the unix password databases. It is designed
|
|
+ * to provide a mechanism for the current user (defined by this
|
|
+ * process' uid) to verify their own password.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
|
|
+ * this program indicates whether the user is authenticated or not.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "config.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+#include <stdarg.h>
|
|
+#include <stdio.h>
|
|
+#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
+#include <string.h>
|
|
+#include <syslog.h>
|
|
+#include <unistd.h>
|
|
+#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
+#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
+#include <pwd.h>
|
|
+#include <shadow.h>
|
|
+#include <signal.h>
|
|
+#include <time.h>
|
|
+#include <sys/time.h>
|
|
+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
|
|
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
|
|
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED (selinux_enabled!=-1 ? selinux_enabled : (selinux_enabled=is_selinux_enabled()>0))
|
|
+static security_context_t prev_context=NULL;
|
|
+static int selinux_enabled=-1;
|
|
+#else
|
|
+#define SELINUX_ENABLED 0
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
+#define MAXPASS 200 /* the maximum length of a password */
|
|
+
|
|
+#include <security/_pam_types.h>
|
|
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "md5.h"
|
|
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
|
|
+#include "passverify.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+#define _pam_delete(xx) \
|
|
+{ \
|
|
+ _pam_overwrite(xx); \
|
|
+ _pam_drop(xx); \
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int
|
|
+_unix_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ if (pwd != NULL) {
|
|
+ if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if ((pwd->pw_passwd[0] == '#') &&
|
|
+ (pwd->pw_passwd[1] == '#') &&
|
|
+ (strcmp(pwd->pw_name, pwd->pw_passwd + 2) == 0)) {
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+#define HELPER_COMPILE
|
|
+#include "passupdate.c"
|
|
+
|
|
+static int
|
|
+verify_account(const char * const uname)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct spwd *spent;
|
|
+ struct passwd *pwent;
|
|
+
|
|
+ pwent = getpwnam(uname);
|
|
+ if (!pwent) {
|
|
+ _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not identify user (from getpwnam(%s))", uname);
|
|
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ spent = getspnam( uname );
|
|
+ if (!spent) {
|
|
+ _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "could not get username from shadow (%s))", uname);
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL; /* Couldn't get username from shadow */
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ printf("%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld:%ld",
|
|
+ spent->sp_lstchg, /* last password change */
|
|
+ spent->sp_min, /* days until change allowed. */
|
|
+ spent->sp_max, /* days before change required */
|
|
+ spent->sp_warn, /* days warning for expiration */
|
|
+ spent->sp_inact, /* days before account inactive */
|
|
+ spent->sp_expire); /* date when account expires */
|
|
+
|
|
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int
|
|
+set_password(const char *forwho, const char *shadow, const char *remember)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
|
|
+ int retval;
|
|
+ char pass[MAXPASS + 1];
|
|
+ char towhat[MAXPASS + 1];
|
|
+ int npass = 0;
|
|
+ /* we don't care about number format errors because the helper
|
|
+ should be called internally only */
|
|
+ int doshadow = atoi(shadow);
|
|
+ int nremember = atoi(remember);
|
|
+ char *passwords[] = { pass, towhat };
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* read the password from stdin (a pipe from the pam_unix module) */
|
|
+
|
|
+ npass = read_passwords(STDIN_FILENO, 2, passwords);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (npass != 2) { /* is it a valid password? */
|
|
+ if (npass == 1) {
|
|
+ _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no new password supplied");
|
|
+ memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS);
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ _log_err(LOG_DEBUG, "no valid passwords supplied");
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
+ if (lock_pwdf() != PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_LOCK_BUSY;
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
+ pwd = getpwnam(forwho);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (pwd == NULL) {
|
|
+ retval = PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* does pass agree with the official one?
|
|
+ we always allow change from null pass */
|
|
+ retval = _unix_verify_password(forwho, pass, 1);
|
|
+ if (retval != PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* first, save old password */
|
|
+ if (save_old_password(forwho, pass, nremember)) {
|
|
+ retval = PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ goto done;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (doshadow || _unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
|
|
+ retval = _update_shadow(forwho, towhat);
|
|
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS)
|
|
+ if (!_unix_shadowed(pwd))
|
|
+ retval = _update_passwd(forwho, "x");
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ retval = _update_passwd(forwho, towhat);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+done:
|
|
+ memset(pass, '\0', MAXPASS);
|
|
+ memset(towhat, '\0', MAXPASS);
|
|
+
|
|
+#ifdef USE_LCKPWDF
|
|
+ unlock_pwdf();
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (retval == PAM_SUCCESS) {
|
|
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
|
+{
|
|
+ char *option;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Catch or ignore as many signal as possible.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ setup_signals();
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * we establish that this program is running with non-tty stdin.
|
|
+ * this is to discourage casual use. It does *NOT* prevent an
|
|
+ * intruder from repeatadly running this program to determine the
|
|
+ * password of the current user (brute force attack, but one for
|
|
+ * which the attacker must already have gained access to the user's
|
|
+ * account).
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (isatty(STDIN_FILENO) || argc < 3 ) {
|
|
+ _log_err(LOG_NOTICE
|
|
+ ,"inappropriate use of Unix helper binary [UID=%d]"
|
|
+ ,getuid());
|
|
+ fprintf(stderr
|
|
+ ,"This binary is not designed for running in this way\n"
|
|
+ "-- the system administrator has been informed\n");
|
|
+ sleep(10); /* this should discourage/annoy the user */
|
|
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* We must be root to read/update shadow.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ if (geteuid() != 0) {
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ option = argv[2];
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (strncmp(option, "verify", 8) == 0) {
|
|
+ /* Get the account information from the shadow file */
|
|
+ return verify_account(argv[1]);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (strncmp(option, "update", 8) == 0) {
|
|
+ if (argc == 5)
|
|
+ /* Attempting to change the password */
|
|
+ return set_password(argv[1], argv[3], argv[4]);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ return PAM_SYSTEM_ERR;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc., 2007. All rights reserved
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
+ * are met:
|
|
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
|
|
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
|
|
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
|
|
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
|
|
+ * written permission.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
|
|
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
|
|
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
|
|
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
|
|
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
|
|
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
|
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
|
|
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
|
|
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
|
|
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
|
|
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
+ */
|
|
--- /dev/null 2007-07-08 21:11:04.052436262 +0200
|
|
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/passverify.c 2007-07-23 13:40:56.000000000 +0200
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,308 @@
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * This program is designed to run setuid(root) or with sufficient
|
|
+ * privilege to read all of the unix password databases. It is designed
|
|
+ * to provide a mechanism for the current user (defined by this
|
|
+ * process' uid) to verify their own password.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * The password is read from the standard input. The exit status of
|
|
+ * this program indicates whether the user is authenticated or not.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * Copyright information is located at the end of the file.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ */
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "config.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+#include <stdarg.h>
|
|
+#include <stdio.h>
|
|
+#include <stdlib.h>
|
|
+#include <string.h>
|
|
+#include <syslog.h>
|
|
+#include <unistd.h>
|
|
+#include <sys/types.h>
|
|
+#include <sys/stat.h>
|
|
+#include <pwd.h>
|
|
+#include <shadow.h>
|
|
+#include <signal.h>
|
|
+#include <time.h>
|
|
+#include <errno.h>
|
|
+
|
|
+#include <security/_pam_types.h>
|
|
+#include <security/_pam_macros.h>
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "md5.h"
|
|
+#include "bigcrypt.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+#include "passverify.h"
|
|
+
|
|
+/* syslogging function for errors and other information */
|
|
+
|
|
+void
|
|
+_log_err(int err, const char *format,...)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ va_list args;
|
|
+
|
|
+ va_start(args, format);
|
|
+ openlog("unix_chkpwd", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID, LOG_AUTHPRIV);
|
|
+ vsyslog(err, format, args);
|
|
+ va_end(args);
|
|
+ closelog();
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static int
|
|
+_unix_shadowed(const struct passwd *pwd)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ char hashpass[1024];
|
|
+ if (pwd != NULL) {
|
|
+ if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "x") == 0) {
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (strlen(pwd->pw_name) < sizeof(hashpass) - 2) {
|
|
+ strcpy(hashpass, "##");
|
|
+ strcpy(hashpass + 2, pwd->pw_name);
|
|
+ if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, hashpass) == 0) {
|
|
+ return 1;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ return 0;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+static void
|
|
+su_sighandler(int sig)
|
|
+{
|
|
+#ifndef SA_RESETHAND
|
|
+ /* emulate the behaviour of the SA_RESETHAND flag */
|
|
+ if ( sig == SIGILL || sig == SIGTRAP || sig == SIGBUS || sig = SIGSERV )
|
|
+ signal(sig, SIG_DFL);
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ if (sig > 0) {
|
|
+ _exit(sig);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+void
|
|
+setup_signals(void)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct sigaction action; /* posix signal structure */
|
|
+
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Setup signal handlers
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ (void) memset((void *) &action, 0, sizeof(action));
|
|
+ action.sa_handler = su_sighandler;
|
|
+#ifdef SA_RESETHAND
|
|
+ action.sa_flags = SA_RESETHAND;
|
|
+#endif
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGILL, &action, NULL);
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTRAP, &action, NULL);
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGBUS, &action, NULL);
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGSEGV, &action, NULL);
|
|
+ action.sa_handler = SIG_IGN;
|
|
+ action.sa_flags = 0;
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGTERM, &action, NULL);
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGHUP, &action, NULL);
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGINT, &action, NULL);
|
|
+ (void) sigaction(SIGQUIT, &action, NULL);
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+read_passwords(int fd, int npass, char **passwords)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ int rbytes = 0;
|
|
+ int offset = 0;
|
|
+ int i = 0;
|
|
+ char *pptr;
|
|
+ while (npass > 0) {
|
|
+ rbytes = read(fd, passwords[i]+offset, MAXPASS-offset);
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (rbytes < 0) {
|
|
+ if (errno == EINTR) continue;
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (rbytes == 0)
|
|
+ break;
|
|
+
|
|
+ while (npass > 0 && (pptr=memchr(passwords[i]+offset, '\0', rbytes))
|
|
+ != NULL) {
|
|
+ rbytes -= pptr - (passwords[i]+offset) + 1;
|
|
+ i++;
|
|
+ offset = 0;
|
|
+ npass--;
|
|
+ if (rbytes > 0) {
|
|
+ if (npass > 0)
|
|
+ memcpy(passwords[i], pptr+1, rbytes);
|
|
+ memset(pptr+1, '\0', rbytes);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ offset += rbytes;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* clear up */
|
|
+ if (offset > 0 && npass > 0) {
|
|
+ memset(passwords[i], '\0', offset);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ return i;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+int
|
|
+_unix_verify_password(const char *name, const char *p, int nullok)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct passwd *pwd = NULL;
|
|
+ struct spwd *spwdent = NULL;
|
|
+ char *salt = NULL;
|
|
+ char *pp = NULL;
|
|
+ int retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
+ size_t salt_len;
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* UNIX passwords area */
|
|
+ setpwent();
|
|
+ pwd = getpwnam(name); /* Get password file entry... */
|
|
+ endpwent();
|
|
+ if (pwd != NULL) {
|
|
+ if (_unix_shadowed(pwd)) {
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * ...and shadow password file entry for this user,
|
|
+ * if shadowing is enabled
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ setspent();
|
|
+ spwdent = getspnam(name);
|
|
+ endspent();
|
|
+ if (spwdent != NULL)
|
|
+ salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
|
|
+ else
|
|
+ pwd = NULL;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ if (strcmp(pwd->pw_passwd, "*NP*") == 0) { /* NIS+ */
|
|
+ uid_t save_uid;
|
|
+
|
|
+ save_uid = geteuid();
|
|
+ seteuid(pwd->pw_uid);
|
|
+ spwdent = getspnam(name);
|
|
+ seteuid(save_uid);
|
|
+
|
|
+ salt = x_strdup(spwdent->sp_pwdp);
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ salt = x_strdup(pwd->pw_passwd);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (pwd == NULL || salt == NULL) {
|
|
+ _log_err(LOG_ALERT, "check pass; user unknown");
|
|
+ p = NULL;
|
|
+ return PAM_USER_UNKNOWN;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ salt_len = strlen(salt);
|
|
+ if (salt_len == 0) {
|
|
+ return (nullok == 0) ? PAM_AUTH_ERR : PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ if (p == NULL || strlen(p) == 0) {
|
|
+ _pam_overwrite(salt);
|
|
+ _pam_drop(salt);
|
|
+ return PAM_AUTHTOK_ERR;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* the moment of truth -- do we agree with the password? */
|
|
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
+ if (!strncmp(salt, "$1$", 3)) {
|
|
+ pp = Goodcrypt_md5(p, salt);
|
|
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
|
|
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ _pam_overwrite(pp);
|
|
+ _pam_drop(pp);
|
|
+ pp = Brokencrypt_md5(p, salt);
|
|
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0)
|
|
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ } else if (*salt == '$') {
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Ok, we don't know the crypt algorithm, but maybe
|
|
+ * libcrypt nows about it? We should try it.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ pp = x_strdup (crypt(p, salt));
|
|
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
|
|
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ } else if (*salt == '*' || *salt == '!' || salt_len < 13) {
|
|
+ retval = PAM_AUTH_ERR;
|
|
+ } else {
|
|
+ pp = bigcrypt(p, salt);
|
|
+ /*
|
|
+ * Note, we are comparing the bigcrypt of the password with
|
|
+ * the contents of the password field. If the latter was
|
|
+ * encrypted with regular crypt (and not bigcrypt) it will
|
|
+ * have been truncated for storage relative to the output
|
|
+ * of bigcrypt here. As such we need to compare only the
|
|
+ * stored string with the subset of bigcrypt's result.
|
|
+ * Bug 521314.
|
|
+ */
|
|
+ if (pp && salt_len == 13 && strlen(pp) > salt_len) {
|
|
+ _pam_overwrite(pp+salt_len);
|
|
+ }
|
|
+
|
|
+ if (pp && strcmp(pp, salt) == 0) {
|
|
+ retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ }
|
|
+ p = NULL; /* no longer needed here */
|
|
+
|
|
+ /* clean up */
|
|
+ _pam_overwrite(pp);
|
|
+ _pam_drop(pp);
|
|
+
|
|
+ return retval;
|
|
+}
|
|
+
|
|
+char *
|
|
+getuidname(uid_t uid)
|
|
+{
|
|
+ struct passwd *pw;
|
|
+ static char username[256];
|
|
+
|
|
+ pw = getpwuid(uid);
|
|
+ if (pw == NULL)
|
|
+ return NULL;
|
|
+
|
|
+ strncpy(username, pw->pw_name, sizeof(username));
|
|
+ username[sizeof(username) - 1] = '\0';
|
|
+
|
|
+ return username;
|
|
+}
|
|
+/*
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Andrew G. Morgan, 1996. All rights reserved
|
|
+ * Copyright (c) Red Hat, Inc. 2007. All rights reserved
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
|
|
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
|
|
+ * are met:
|
|
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
|
|
+ * including the disclaimer of warranties.
|
|
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
|
|
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
|
|
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
|
|
+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
|
|
+ * products derived from this software without specific prior
|
|
+ * written permission.
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
|
|
+ * the GNU Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL are
|
|
+ * required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions. (This clause is
|
|
+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
|
|
+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
|
|
+ *
|
|
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
|
|
+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
|
|
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE
|
|
+ * DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT,
|
|
+ * INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
|
|
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR
|
|
+ * SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
|
|
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
|
|
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
|
|
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
|
|
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
|
|
+ */
|
|
--- Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am.update-helper 2006-12-18 19:50:50.000000000 +0100
|
|
+++ Linux-PAM-0.99.8.1/modules/pam_unix/Makefile.am 2007-07-23 13:40:56.000000000 +0200
|
|
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
|
|
secureconfdir = $(SCONFIGDIR)
|
|
|
|
AM_CFLAGS = -I$(top_srcdir)/libpam/include -I$(top_srcdir)/libpamc/include \
|
|
- -DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\"
|
|
+ -DCHKPWD_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_chkpwd\" \
|
|
+ -DUPDATE_HELPER=\"$(sbindir)/unix_update\"
|
|
|
|
if HAVE_LIBSELINUX
|
|
AM_CFLAGS += -D"WITH_SELINUX"
|
|
@@ -34,9 +35,9 @@
|
|
|
|
securelib_LTLIBRARIES = pam_unix.la
|
|
|
|
-noinst_HEADERS = md5.h support.h yppasswd.h bigcrypt.h
|
|
+noinst_HEADERS = md5.h support.h yppasswd.h bigcrypt.h passverify.h
|
|
|
|
-sbin_PROGRAMS = unix_chkpwd
|
|
+sbin_PROGRAMS = unix_chkpwd unix_update
|
|
|
|
noinst_PROGRAMS = bigcrypt
|
|
|
|
@@ -48,11 +49,16 @@
|
|
bigcrypt_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS)
|
|
bigcrypt_LDFLAGS = @LIBCRYPT@
|
|
|
|
-unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c
|
|
+unix_chkpwd_SOURCES = unix_chkpwd.c passverify.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c
|
|
unix_chkpwd_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@
|
|
unix_chkpwd_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@ -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam \
|
|
@LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
|
|
|
|
+unix_update_SOURCES = unix_update.c passverify.c md5_good.c md5_broken.c bigcrypt.c
|
|
+unix_update_CFLAGS = $(AM_CFLAGS) @PIE_CFLAGS@
|
|
+unix_update_LDFLAGS = @PIE_LDFLAGS@ -L$(top_builddir)/libpam -lpam \
|
|
+ @LIBCRYPT@ @LIBSELINUX@
|
|
+
|
|
if ENABLE_REGENERATE_MAN
|
|
noinst_DATA = README
|
|
README: pam_unix.8.xml
|