openssh/openssh-6.0p1-audit4.patch

diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.306789054 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-bsm.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.314789022 +0200
@@ -485,4 +485,10 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
 {
 	/* not implemented */
 }
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+	/* not implemented */
+}
 #endif /* BSM */
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/audit.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/audit.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.307789050 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.315789018 +0200
@@ -143,6 +143,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
 	PRIVSEP(audit_kex_body(ctos, enc, mac, comp, getpid(), getuid()));
 }
 
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+	PRIVSEP(audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, getpid(), getuid()));
+}
+
 # ifndef CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 /*
  * Null implementations of audit functions.
@@ -274,5 +280,15 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
 		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, enc, mac, compress, (long)pid,
 	        (unsigned)uid);
 }
+
+/*
+ * This will be called on succesfull session key discard
+ */
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+	debug("audit session key discard euid %u direction %d from pid %ld uid %u",
+		(unsigned)geteuid(), ctos, (long)pid, (unsigned)uid);
+}
 # endif  /* !defined CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/audit.h
--- openssh-6.0p1/audit.h.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.308789046 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit.h	2012-08-06 20:35:56.315789018 +0200
@@ -62,5 +62,7 @@ void	audit_unsupported(int);
 void	audit_kex(int, char *, char *, char *);
 void	audit_unsupported_body(int);
 void	audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void	audit_session_key_free(int ctos);
+void	audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t, uid_t);
 
 #endif /* _SSH_AUDIT_H */
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.307789050 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/audit-linux.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.315789018 +0200
@@ -294,6 +294,8 @@ audit_unsupported_body(int what)
 #endif
 }
 
+const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
+
 void
 audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac, char *compress, pid_t pid,
 	       uid_t uid)
@@ -301,7 +303,6 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
 #ifdef AUDIT_CRYPTO_SESSION
 	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
 	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
-	const static char *direction[] = { "from-server", "from-client", "both" };
 	Cipher *cipher = cipher_by_name(enc);
 	char *s;
 
@@ -327,4 +328,32 @@ audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *enc, char
 #endif
 }
 
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+	char buf[AUDIT_LOG_SIZE];
+	int audit_fd, audit_ok;
+	char *s;
+
+	snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "op=destroy kind=session fp=? direction=%s spid=%jd suid=%jd rport=%d laddr=%s lport=%d ",
+		 direction[ctos], (intmax_t)pid, (intmax_t)uid,
+		 get_remote_port(),
+		 (s = get_local_ipaddr(packet_get_connection_in())),
+		 get_local_port());
+	xfree(s);
+	audit_fd = audit_open();
+	if (audit_fd < 0) {
+		if (errno != EINVAL && errno != EPROTONOSUPPORT &&
+					 errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
+			error("cannot open audit");
+		return;
+	}
+	audit_ok = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_CRYPTO_KEY_USER,
+			buf, NULL, get_remote_ipaddr(), NULL, 1);
+	audit_close(audit_fd);
+	/* do not abort if the error is EPERM and sshd is run as non root user */
+	if ((audit_ok < 0) && ((audit_ok != -1) || (getuid() == 0)))
+		error("cannot write into audit");
+}
+
 #endif /* USE_LINUX_AUDIT */
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/auditstub.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/auditstub.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/auditstub.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.308789046 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/auditstub.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.316789015 +0200
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
  * Red Hat author: Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
  */
 
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
 void
 audit_unsupported(int n)
 {
@@ -37,3 +39,12 @@ audit_kex(int ctos, char *enc, char *mac
 {
 }
 
+void
+audit_session_key_free(int ctos)
+{
+}
+
+void
+audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+}
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/kex.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/kex.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/kex.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.309789042 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/kex.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.317789011 +0200
@@ -624,3 +624,34 @@ dump_digest(char *msg, u_char *digest, i
 	fprintf(stderr, "\n");
 }
 #endif
+
+static void
+enc_destroy(Enc *enc)
+{
+	if (enc == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (enc->key) {
+		memset(enc->key, 0, enc->key_len);
+		xfree(enc->key);
+	}
+
+	if (enc->iv) {
+		memset(enc->iv,  0, enc->block_size);
+		xfree(enc->iv);
+	}
+
+	memset(enc, 0, sizeof(*enc));
+}
+
+void
+newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+	if (newkeys == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	enc_destroy(&newkeys->enc);
+	mac_destroy(&newkeys->mac);
+	memset(&newkeys->comp, 0, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
+}
+
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/kex.h.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/kex.h
--- openssh-6.0p1/kex.h.audit4	2010-09-24 14:11:14.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/kex.h	2012-08-06 20:35:56.317789011 +0200
@@ -156,6 +156,8 @@ void	 kexgex_server(Kex *);
 void	 kexecdh_client(Kex *);
 void	 kexecdh_server(Kex *);
 
+void	newkeys_destroy(Newkeys *newkeys);
+
 void
 kex_dh_hash(char *, char *, char *, int, char *, int, u_char *, int,
     BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, BIGNUM *, u_char **, u_int *);
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/mac.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/mac.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/mac.c.audit4	2012-01-17 04:03:38.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.0p1/mac.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.318789007 +0200
@@ -171,6 +171,20 @@ mac_clear(Mac *mac)
 	mac->umac_ctx = NULL;
 }
 
+void
+mac_destroy(Mac *mac)
+{
+	if (mac == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	if (mac->key) {
+		memset(mac->key, 0, mac->key_len);
+		xfree(mac->key);
+	}
+
+	memset(mac, 0, sizeof(*mac));
+}
+
 /* XXX copied from ciphers_valid */
 #define	MAC_SEP	","
 int
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/mac.h.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/mac.h
--- openssh-6.0p1/mac.h.audit4	2007-06-11 06:01:42.000000000 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/mac.h	2012-08-06 20:35:56.318789007 +0200
@@ -28,3 +28,4 @@ int	 mac_setup(Mac *, char *);
 int	 mac_init(Mac *);
 u_char	*mac_compute(Mac *, u_int32_t, u_char *, int);
 void	 mac_clear(Mac *);
+void	 mac_destroy(Mac *);
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.310789038 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.319789003 +0200
@@ -189,6 +189,7 @@ int mm_answer_audit_command(int, Buffer
 int mm_answer_audit_end_command(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body(int, Buffer *);
 int mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int, Buffer *);
+int mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int, Buffer *);
 #endif
 
 static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
@@ -242,6 +243,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
 #endif
 #ifdef BSD_AUTH
     {MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
@@ -281,6 +283,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -314,6 +317,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto15[]
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -328,6 +332,7 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth15
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_end_command},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_unsupported_body},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_kex_body},
+    {MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body},
 #endif
     {0, 0, NULL}
 };
@@ -449,10 +454,6 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
 			authenticated = 0;
 	}
 
-	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-		;
-
 	if (!authctxt->valid)
 		fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
 	if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
@@ -1953,11 +1954,13 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
 
 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
 	current_keys[MODE_OUT] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
 	xfree(blob);
 
 	debug3("%s: Waiting for second key", __func__);
 	blob = buffer_get_string(&m, &bloblen);
 	current_keys[MODE_IN] = mm_newkeys_from_blob(blob, bloblen);
+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
 	xfree(blob);
 
 	/* Now get sequence numbers for the packets */
@@ -2003,6 +2006,21 @@ mm_get_keystate(struct monitor *pmonitor
 	}
 
 	buffer_free(&m);
+
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+	if (compat20) {
+		buffer_init(&m);
+		mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
+					  MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+		mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(pmonitor->m_sendfd, &m);
+		buffer_free(&m);
+	}
+#endif
+
+	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+		;
+
 }
 
 
@@ -2449,4 +2467,22 @@ mm_answer_audit_kex_body(int sock, Buffe
 	return 0;
 }
 
+int
+mm_answer_audit_session_key_free_body(int sock, Buffer *m)
+{
+	int ctos;
+	pid_t pid;
+	uid_t uid;
+
+	ctos = buffer_get_int(m);
+	pid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+	uid = buffer_get_int64(m);
+
+	audit_session_key_free_body(ctos, pid, uid);
+
+	buffer_clear(m);
+
+	mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, m);
+	return 0;
+}
 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.310789038 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor.h	2012-08-06 20:35:56.319789003 +0200
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@ enum monitor_reqtype {
 	MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_COMMAND, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_END_COMMAND,
 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_UNSUPPORTED,
 	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_KEX, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_KEX,
+	MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
 	MONITOR_REQ_TERM,
 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_STEP1, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_STEP1,
 	MONITOR_REQ_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA, MONITOR_ANS_JPAKE_GET_PWDATA,
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.311789034 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.320788999 +0200
@@ -653,12 +653,14 @@ mm_send_keystate(struct monitor *monitor
 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
 
 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
 	xfree(blob);
 
 	if (!mm_newkeys_to_blob(MODE_IN, &blob, &bloblen))
 		fatal("%s: conversion of newkeys failed", __func__);
 
 	buffer_put_string(&m, blob, bloblen);
+	memset(blob, 0, bloblen);
 	xfree(blob);
 
 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, &seqnr, &blocks, &packets, &bytes);
@@ -1522,4 +1524,19 @@ mm_audit_kex_body(int ctos, char *cipher
 
 	buffer_free(&m);
 }
+
+void
+mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int ctos, pid_t pid, uid_t uid)
+{
+	Buffer m;
+
+	buffer_init(&m);
+	buffer_put_int(&m, ctos);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, pid);
+	buffer_put_int64(&m, uid);
+	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE, &m);
+	mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_AUDIT_SESSION_KEY_FREE,
+				  &m);
+	buffer_free(&m);
+}
 #endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h
--- openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.311789034 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/monitor_wrap.h	2012-08-06 20:35:56.320788999 +0200
@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ int mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
 void mm_audit_end_command(int, const char *);
 void mm_audit_unsupported_body(int);
 void mm_audit_kex_body(int, char *, char *, char *, pid_t, uid_t);
+void mm_audit_session_key_free_body(int, pid_t, uid_t);
 #endif
 
 struct Session;
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/packet.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/packet.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/packet.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.282789147 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/packet.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.321788995 +0200
@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
 #include <signal.h>
 
 #include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "audit.h"
 #include "buffer.h"
 #include "packet.h"
 #include "crc32.h"
@@ -470,6 +471,13 @@ packet_get_connection_out(void)
 	return active_state->connection_out;
 }
 
+static int
+packet_state_has_keys (const struct session_state *state)
+{
+	return state != NULL &&
+		(state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL || state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL);
+}
+
 /* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
 
 void
@@ -478,13 +486,6 @@ packet_close(void)
 	if (!active_state->initialized)
 		return;
 	active_state->initialized = 0;
-	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
-		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
-		close(active_state->connection_out);
-	} else {
-		close(active_state->connection_in);
-		close(active_state->connection_out);
-	}
 	buffer_free(&active_state->input);
 	buffer_free(&active_state->output);
 	buffer_free(&active_state->outgoing_packet);
@@ -493,8 +494,18 @@ packet_close(void)
 		buffer_free(&active_state->compression_buffer);
 		buffer_compress_uninit();
 	}
-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
-	cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+	if (packet_state_has_keys(active_state)) {
+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->send_context);
+		cipher_cleanup(&active_state->receive_context);
+		audit_session_key_free(2);
+	}
+	if (active_state->connection_in == active_state->connection_out) {
+		shutdown(active_state->connection_out, SHUT_RDWR);
+		close(active_state->connection_out);
+	} else {
+		close(active_state->connection_in);
+		close(active_state->connection_out);
+	}
 }
 
 /* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
@@ -729,6 +740,23 @@ packet_send1(void)
 	 */
 }
 
+static void
+newkeys_destroy_and_free(Newkeys *newkeys)
+{
+	if (newkeys == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	xfree(newkeys->enc.name);
+
+	mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
+	xfree(newkeys->mac.name);
+
+	xfree(newkeys->comp.name);
+
+	newkeys_destroy(newkeys);
+	xfree(newkeys);
+}
+
 void
 set_newkeys(int mode)
 {
@@ -754,18 +782,9 @@ set_newkeys(int mode)
 	}
 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
 		debug("set_newkeys: rekeying");
+		audit_session_key_free(mode);
 		cipher_cleanup(cc);
-		enc  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
-		mac  = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
-		comp = &active_state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
-		mac_clear(mac);
-		xfree(enc->name);
-		xfree(enc->iv);
-		xfree(enc->key);
-		xfree(mac->name);
-		xfree(mac->key);
-		xfree(comp->name);
-		xfree(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
+		newkeys_destroy_and_free(active_state->newkeys[mode]);
 	}
 	active_state->newkeys[mode] = kex_get_newkeys(mode);
 	if (active_state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
@@ -1921,6 +1940,47 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
 	return (void *)active_state->newkeys[mode];
 }
 
+static void
+packet_destroy_state(struct session_state *state)
+{
+	if (state == NULL)
+		return;
+
+	cipher_cleanup(&state->receive_context);
+	cipher_cleanup(&state->send_context);
+
+	buffer_free(&state->input);
+	buffer_free(&state->output);
+	buffer_free(&state->outgoing_packet);
+	buffer_free(&state->incoming_packet);
+	buffer_free(&state->compression_buffer);
+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_IN]);
+	state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = NULL;
+	newkeys_destroy_and_free(state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]);
+	state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
+	mac_destroy(state->packet_discard_mac);
+//	TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
+//	memset(state, 0, sizeof(state));
+}
+
+void
+packet_destroy_all(int audit_it, int privsep)
+{
+	if (audit_it)
+		audit_it = packet_state_has_keys (active_state) ||
+			packet_state_has_keys (backup_state);
+	packet_destroy_state(active_state);
+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+	if (audit_it) {
+#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
+		if (privsep)
+			audit_session_key_free(2);
+		else
+			audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+#endif
+	}
+}
+
 /*
  * Save the state for the real connection, and use a separate state when
  * resuming a suspended connection.
@@ -1928,18 +1988,12 @@ packet_get_newkeys(int mode)
 void
 packet_backup_state(void)
 {
-	struct session_state *tmp;
-
 	close(active_state->connection_in);
 	active_state->connection_in = -1;
 	close(active_state->connection_out);
 	active_state->connection_out = -1;
-	if (backup_state)
-		tmp = backup_state;
-	else
-		tmp = alloc_session_state();
 	backup_state = active_state;
-	active_state = tmp;
+	active_state = alloc_session_state();
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1956,9 +2010,7 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
 	backup_state = active_state;
 	active_state = tmp;
 	active_state->connection_in = backup_state->connection_in;
-	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
 	active_state->connection_out = backup_state->connection_out;
-	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
 	len = buffer_len(&backup_state->input);
 	if (len > 0) {
 		buf = buffer_ptr(&backup_state->input);
@@ -1966,4 +2018,10 @@ packet_restore_state(void)
 		buffer_clear(&backup_state->input);
 		add_recv_bytes(len);
 	}
+	backup_state->connection_in = -1;
+	backup_state->connection_out = -1;
+	packet_destroy_state(backup_state);
+	xfree(backup_state);
+	backup_state = NULL;
 }
+
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/packet.h.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/packet.h
--- openssh-6.0p1/packet.h.audit4	2012-02-10 22:19:21.000000000 +0100
+++ openssh-6.0p1/packet.h	2012-08-06 20:35:56.321788995 +0200
@@ -123,4 +123,5 @@ void	 packet_restore_state(void);
 void	*packet_get_input(void);
 void	*packet_get_output(void);
 
+void	 packet_destroy_all(int, int);
 #endif				/* PACKET_H */
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/session.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/session.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.296789093 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/session.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.322788991 +0200
@@ -1634,6 +1634,9 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
 
 	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
 	destroy_sensitive_data();
+	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
+	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
+	packet_destroy_all(0, 1);
 
 	/* Force a password change */
 	if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
diff -up openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit4 openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c.audit4	2012-08-06 20:35:56.312789030 +0200
+++ openssh-6.0p1/sshd.c	2012-08-06 20:35:56.323788987 +0200
@@ -690,6 +690,8 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 }
 
+extern Newkeys *current_keys[];
+
 static void
 privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
@@ -714,6 +716,10 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
 		verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
 		buffer_clear(&loginmsg);
+ 		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_OUT]);
+		newkeys_destroy(current_keys[MODE_IN]);
+		audit_session_key_free_body(2, getpid(), getuid());
+		packet_destroy_all(0, 0);
 		monitor_child_postauth(pmonitor);
 
 		/* NEVERREACHED */
@@ -2005,6 +2011,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	 */
 	if (use_privsep) {
 		mm_send_keystate(pmonitor);
+		packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
 		exit(0);
 	}
 
@@ -2057,6 +2064,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	do_authenticated(authctxt);
 
 	/* The connection has been terminated. */
+	packet_destroy_all(1, 1);
+
 	packet_get_state(MODE_IN, NULL, NULL, NULL, &ibytes);
 	packet_get_state(MODE_OUT, NULL, NULL, NULL, &obytes);
 	verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
@@ -2374,6 +2383,16 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 void
 cleanup_exit(int i)
 {
+	static int in_cleanup = 0;
+	int is_privsep_child;
+
+	/* cleanup_exit can be called at the very least from the privsep
+	   wrappers used for auditing.  Make sure we don't recurse
+	   indefinitely. */
+	if (in_cleanup)
+		_exit(i);
+	in_cleanup = 1;
+
 	if (the_authctxt) {
 		do_cleanup(the_authctxt);
 		if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
@@ -2384,6 +2403,8 @@ cleanup_exit(int i)
 				    pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
 		}
 	}
+	is_privsep_child = use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && !mm_is_monitor();
+	packet_destroy_all(1, is_privsep_child);
 #ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 	/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
 	if ((the_authctxt == NULL || !the_authctxt->authenticated) &&