import UBI openssh-8.0p1-19.el8_9.2

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+--- a/sftp-server.8	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
++++ b/sftp-server.8	2022-06-20 16:03:47.892540068 +0200
 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
  .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
  .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
@@ -9,21 +9,23 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
  .Ek
  .Nm
  .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,10 @@ Sets an explicit
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@
  .Xr umask 2
  to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
  user's default mask.
 +.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
 +Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
 +of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
-+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
++777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
++umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
++for newly created files.
  .El
  .Pp
  On some systems,
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+--- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:01:26.183793633 +0200
++++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:02:12.442690608 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
  /* Version of client */
  static u_int version;
  
@@ -34,7 +36,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
  static int init_done;
  
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@
  	Attrib a;
  	char *name;
  	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@
  	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
  	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
  	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
  	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
  	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@
  			}
  		}
  	}
@@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
  		send_status(id, status);
  	free(name);
-@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1555,7 +1566,7 @@
  	fprintf(stderr,
  	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
  	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
@@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
  	    __progname, __progname);
  	exit(1);
-@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1581,7 +1592,7 @@
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
  	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'Q':
  			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1643,6 +1654,15 @@
  				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
  			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
  			break;

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
  	struct dhgroup dhg;
  
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
++		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
 +		    " Falling back to known groups.");
 +		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 +	}

SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
  	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
  	    cfg, NULL);
  
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
 +
  	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
  	fill_default_server_options(&options);
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
  # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
 +# problems.
  UsePAM yes
  

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff --color -ru a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+--- a/sshd.8	2022-05-31 13:39:10.231843926 +0200
++++ b/sshd.8	2022-05-31 14:34:01.460815420 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
+ command-line options override values specified in the
+ configuration file.
++This mechanism is used by systemd to apply system-wide crypto-policies to ssh server.
+ .Nm
+ rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
+ .Dv SIGHUP ,
+@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@
+ rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
+ .Fl C
+ options.
++The configuration does not contain the system-wide crypto-policy configuration.
++To show the most accurate runtime configuration, use:
++.Bd -literal -offset 3n
++source /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
++source /etc/sysconfig/sshd
++sshd -T $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
++.Ed
+ .It Fl t
+ Test mode.
+ Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index 04881c83..03c7a5c7 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
++++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -2527,12 +2527,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 				port = tmp;
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
++			/* Try with user, host and path. */
+ 			if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
+-			    &file1) == -1) {
+-				/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
+-				host = xstrdup(*argv);
+-				host = cleanhostname(host);
+-			}
++			    &file1) == 0)
++				break;
++			/* Try with user and host. */
++			if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
++			    == 0)
++				break;
++			/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
++			host = xstrdup(*argv);
++			host = cleanhostname(host);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		file2 = *(argv + 1);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+diff --color -ruN a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+--- a/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:31:10.168186838 +0200
++++ b/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:32:19.146513347 +0200
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
+ 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+-	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
++	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
+ 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+ 	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
+ 	sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
+@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+-sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
++sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
++	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+diff --color -ruN a/sftp-realpath.c b/sftp-realpath.c
+--- a/sftp-realpath.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
++++ b/sftp-realpath.c	2022-06-23 11:35:33.193244873 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
++/*	$OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */
++/*
++ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
++ *
++ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
++ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
++ * are met:
++ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
++ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
++ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
++ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
++ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
++ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
++ *    permission.
++ *
++ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
++ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
++ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
++ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
++ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
++ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
++ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
++ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
++ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
++ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
++ * SUCH DAMAGE.
++ */
++
++#include "includes.h"
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++
++#include <errno.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stddef.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <limits.h>
++
++#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
++# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
++#endif
++
++/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
++
++char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
++
++/*
++ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
++ *
++ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
++ * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
++ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
++ */
++char *
++sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
++{
++	struct stat sb;
++	char *p, *q, *s;
++	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
++	unsigned symlinks;
++	int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
++	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
++
++	if (path[0] == '\0') {
++		errno = ENOENT;
++		return (NULL);
++	}
++
++	serrno = errno;
++
++	if (resolved == NULL) {
++		resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
++		if (resolved == NULL)
++			return (NULL);
++		mem_allocated = 1;
++	} else
++		mem_allocated = 0;
++
++	symlinks = 0;
++	if (path[0] == '/') {
++		resolved[0] = '/';
++		resolved[1] = '\0';
++		if (path[1] == '\0')
++			return (resolved);
++		resolved_len = 1;
++		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
++	} else {
++		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
++			if (mem_allocated)
++				free(resolved);
++			else
++				strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
++			return (NULL);
++		}
++		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
++		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
++	}
++	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
++		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++		goto err;
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
++	 */
++	while (left_len != 0) {
++		/*
++		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
++		 * and its length.
++		 */
++		p = strchr(left, '/');
++		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
++		if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
++			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++			goto err;
++		}
++		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
++		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
++		left_len -= s - left;
++		if (p != NULL)
++			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
++		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
++			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
++				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++				goto err;
++			}
++			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
++			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
++		}
++		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
++			continue;
++		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
++			continue;
++		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
++			/*
++			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
++			 * single "/"
++			 */
++			if (resolved_len > 1) {
++				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
++				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
++				*q = '\0';
++				resolved_len = q - resolved;
++			}
++			continue;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
++		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
++		 * there are no more path components left.
++		 */
++		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
++		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
++			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++			goto err;
++		}
++		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
++			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
++				errno = serrno;
++				return (resolved);
++			}
++			goto err;
++		}
++		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
++			if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
++				errno = ELOOP;
++				goto err;
++			}
++			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
++			if (slen < 0)
++				goto err;
++			symlink[slen] = '\0';
++			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
++				resolved[1] = 0;
++				resolved_len = 1;
++			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
++				/* Strip the last path component. */
++				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
++				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
++				*q = '\0';
++				resolved_len = q - resolved;
++			}
++
++			/*
++			 * If there are any path components left, then
++			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
++			 * in `left'.
++			 */
++			if (p != NULL) {
++				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
++					if (slen + 1 >=
++					    (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
++						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++						goto err;
++					}
++					symlink[slen] = '/';
++					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
++				}
++				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
++				if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
++					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
++					goto err;
++				}
++			}
++			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
++		}
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
++	 * is a single "/".
++	 */
++	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
++		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
++	return (resolved);
++
++err:
++	if (mem_allocated)
++		free(resolved);
++	return (NULL);
++}
+diff --color -ruN a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+--- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:31:10.147186434 +0200
++++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:32:19.147513366 +0200
+@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
+ 
++char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
++
+ /* Our verbosity */
+ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -1185,7 +1187,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
+ 	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
+-	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
++	if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+ 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ 	} else {
+ 		Stat s;

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch

@@ -779,7 +779,7 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
 -	    cfg, NULL);
 +	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
  
- 	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
+ 	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
  	if (! options.use_pam)
 @@ -1946,7 +1978,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		if (connection_info == NULL)
@@ -790,3 +790,16 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
  		dump_config(&options);
  	}
  
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb	2022-12-21 12:18:43.274799163 +0100
++++ openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c	2022-12-21 12:19:19.758081516 +0100
+@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, c
+ int
+ sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+ {
++	if (v == NULL)
++		return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
++
+ 	return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
+--- a/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.529922670 +0200
++++ b/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.911762100 +0200
+@@ -906,6 +906,18 @@
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
++static int
++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++{
++	char *cp;
++
++	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	free(cp);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ static int
+ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+@@ -941,6 +953,16 @@
+ 		free(ext);
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
++	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
++		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++		    "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
++			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
++		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++		    "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
++			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
++	}
++
+ 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
+ 	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
+diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
+--- a/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.511922322 +0200
++++ b/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.902761926 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
+ #define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
++#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 	0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
++#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 	0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
+ 
+ struct sshenc {
+ 	char	*name;
+diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+--- a/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.537922825 +0200
++++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.918762235 +0200
+@@ -736,16 +736,17 @@
+ 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
+-	int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
++	int r, ndx, success = 0;
+ 	const u_char *blob;
++	const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
+ 	u_char *sig = 0;
+ 	size_t blen, slen;
+ 
+ 	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+-
+-	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
+-	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
++	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
++	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
++		kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
+ 	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+ 		sshkey_free(key);
+ 		key = NULL;
+@@ -780,16 +781,24 @@
+ 		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
+ 		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
+ 		 */
+-		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
+-		    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
++		sigalg = NULL;
++		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
++			if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
++				sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
++			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
++				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
++				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
++		}
++		debug3("%s: sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", __func__,
++			sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+ 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
+ 		    ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
+-		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
+-		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
++		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
+ 			error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
+ 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+diff --color -ru a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+--- a/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.532922728 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.914762158 +0200
+@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@
+     struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+ static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
+     struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
+-static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep);
+ 
+ /* Supported key types */
+ struct keytype {
+@@ -2092,7 +2091,8 @@
+ 	if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
+ 	    sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
++	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
++	    &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	/* Success */
+@@ -2394,8 +2394,8 @@
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
++int
++sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+@@ -2477,7 +2477,7 @@
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
++	if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
+ 	free(sigtype);
+@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@
+ 	    sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
+-	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
++	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+diff --color -ru a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+--- a/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.521922515 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.907762022 +0200
+@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ int	 sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
+ const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
++int      sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
+ 
+ /* for debug */
+ void	sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);

SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
+index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
+--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
++++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
+@@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2.  The "SSH-"
++	 * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
++	 * large banner which we must read and ignore.  Loop while reading
++	 * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
++	 * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
++	 * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
++	 * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
++	 */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 		bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
+@@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
+ 		conrecycle(s);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
++	if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
++		error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
++		confree(s);
++		return;
++	}
+ 	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+ 		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
+ 		confree(s);

SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
++++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
+-		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+-		goto fail;
+-	}
++	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
++		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+ 
+ 	p->module->handle = handle;
+ 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */

SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
+diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
+index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
+--- a/PROTOCOL
++++ b/PROTOCOL
+@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
+ described at:
+ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+ 
++1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
++
++OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
++a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
++RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
++initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
++"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
++may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
++are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
++if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
++
++When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
++name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
++the the protocol:
++
++a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
++   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
++   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
++   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
++   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
++   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
++b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
++   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
++   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
++   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
++
+ 2. Connection protocol changes
+ 
+ 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
+--- a/kex.c
++++ b/kex.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* prototype */
+-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
++static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+ static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
++static int
++has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++{
++	char *cp;
++
++	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
++		return 0;
++	free(cp);
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+  * Caller must free returned string.
+@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
++	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			free(m);
++		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+-		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
++	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
++	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
++		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
++	}
++	error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
++ 	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
++ 		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
++ 		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
++		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
++ 	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (kex == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
++	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+ static int
+-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
++kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
+ {
+-	char *cp;
+-
+-	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+-		return 0;
+-	free(cp);
+-	return 1;
++	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
++kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ {
+ 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		sprop=peer;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+-	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+-		char *ext;
+-
+-		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+-		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+-		free(ext);
++	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
++	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++		if (kex->server) {
++			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
++		} else {
++			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
++			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
++		}
++		if (kex->kex_strict) {
++			debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
++			if (seq != 0)
++				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
++				    "strict KEX violation: "
++				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
++		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
+--- a/kex.h
++++ b/kex.h
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_int	kex_type;
+ 	char	*server_sig_algs;
+ 	int	ext_info_c;
++	int	kex_strict;
+ 	struct sshbuf *my;
+ 	struct sshbuf *peer;
+ 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
+--- a/packet.c
++++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+ #endif
+ 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+-	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ 
++	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
++		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
++	}
++
+ 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+-		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+-		if (r != 0)
++		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
++
+ 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+-	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
++	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
++		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
++			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
++			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
++		}
+ 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
++	}
+ 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ #endif
+ 	/* reset for next packet */
+ 	state->packlen = 0;
++	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
++		debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
++		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
++	}
+ 
+ 	/* do we need to rekey? */
+ 	if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
+@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ 		if (r != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-		if (*typep) {
+-			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++		if (*typep == 0) {
++			/* no message ready */
++			return 0;
+ 		}
++		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
++		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
++
++		/* Always process disconnect messages */
++		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
++			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
++			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
++				return r;
++			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
++			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
++			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
++			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
++			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
++			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
++			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
++			free(msg);
++			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
++		}
++
++		/*
++		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
++		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
++		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
++		 * protocol errors.
++		 */
++		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
++		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
++			return 0;
++		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
+ 		switch (*typep) {
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+-		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+-			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+-				return r;
+-			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+-			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+-			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+-			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+-			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+-			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+-			free(msg);
+-			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
++	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+ 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
++	debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	xxx_host = host;
+ 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 
+-	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
++	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
++	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
+ };
+ 
+ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+ 
+ 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
+ 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ }
+ 
+ /* ARGSUSED */
+-static int
+-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+ {
+@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
++	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict	2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
+@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
+ 	struct kex *kex;
++	char *cp;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+-	    options.kex_algorithms);
++	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, 
++	   "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
++		fatal("kex_names_cat");
++
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(cp);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ 	    options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+ 	else if (gss)
+-		newstr = gss;
++		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+ 	else if (orig)
+ 		newstr = orig;
+ 
+@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	packet_send();
+ 	packet_write_wait();
+ #endif
++	free(cp);
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
++static int
++valid_hostname(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
++		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
++static int
++valid_ruser(const char *s)
++{
++	size_t i;
++
++	if (*s == '-')
++		return 0;
++	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
++		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
++		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
++			return 0;
++		/* Disallow \ in last position */
++		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
++			return 0;
++	}
++	return 1;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * Main program for the ssh client.
+  */
+@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	if (!valid_hostname(host))
++		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
++	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
++		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */

SPECS/openssh.spec

@@ -66,14 +66,14 @@
 
 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
 %global openssh_ver 8.0p1
-%global openssh_rel 13
+%global openssh_rel 19
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.3
 %global pam_ssh_agent_rel 7
 
 Summary: An open source implementation of SSH protocol version 2
 Name: openssh
 Version: %{openssh_ver}
-Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
+Release: %{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}.2
 URL: http://www.openssh.com/portable.html
 #URL1: http://pamsshagentauth.sourceforge.net
 Source0: ftp://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
@@ -252,11 +252,38 @@ Patch980: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
 # c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf~1..677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7
 # 8bdc3bb7cf4c82c3344cfcb82495a43406e87e83
 # 47adfdc07f4f8ea0064a1495500244de08d311ed~1..7af1e92cd289b7eaa9a683e9a6f2fddd98f37a01
+# supplementary commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423
 Patch981: openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch
 # Port upstream ClientAliveCountMax behaviour
 # upstream commit:
 # 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e
 Patch982: openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch
+# add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for sftp-server
+# use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX
+# upstream commits:
+# 569b650f93b561c09c655f83f128e1dfffe74101
+# 53a6ebf1445a857f5e487b18ee5e5830a9575149
+# 5428b0d239f6b516c81d1dd15aa9fe9e60af75d4
+Patch983: openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch
+# include caveat for crypto-policy in sshd manpage (#2044354)
+Patch984: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch
+# minimize the use of SHA1 as a proof of possession for RSA key (#2093897)
+# upstream commits:
+# 291721bc7c840d113a49518f3fca70e86248b8e8
+# 0fa33683223c76289470a954404047bc762be84c
+# f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a
+Patch985: openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
+# Upstream ff89b1bed80721295555bd083b173247a9c0484e
+Patch986: openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
+# Upstream 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6
+Patch987: openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
+# upsream commit
+# b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280
+Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
+Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
+#upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a
+Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
 
 License: BSD
 Group: Applications/Internet
@@ -349,7 +376,7 @@ Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
 Summary: PAM module for authentication with ssh-agent
 Group: System Environment/Base
 Version: %{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
-Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}
+Release: %{pam_ssh_agent_rel}.%{openssh_rel}%{?dist}%{?rescue_rel}.2
 License: BSD
 
 %description
@@ -485,6 +512,11 @@ popd
 %patch980 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
 %patch981 -p1 -b .sshdinclude
 %patch982 -p1 -b .client_alive_count_max
+%patch983 -p1 -b .sftp-realpath
+%patch984 -p1 -b .crypto-policy-doc
+%patch985 -p1 -b .minimize-sha1-use
+%patch986 -p1 -b .banner
+%patch987 -p1 -b .sftp_ipv6
 
 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@@ -492,6 +524,10 @@ popd
 
 %patch100 -p1 -b .coverity
 
+%patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
+%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795
+%patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385
+
 autoreconf
 pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
 autoreconf
@@ -776,6 +812,43 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %endif
 
 %changelog
+* Mon Jan 08 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19.2
+- Fix Terrapin attack
+  Resolves: RHEL-19762
+
+* Thu Dec 21 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19.1
+- Fix Terrapin attack
+  Resolves: RHEL-19762
+- Forbid shell metasymbols in username/hostname
+  Resolves: RHEL-19820
+
+* Thu Aug 24 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19
+- rebuilt
+  Related: CVE-2023-38408
+
+* Thu Jul 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-18
+- Avoid remote code execution in ssh-agent PKCS#11 support
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-38408
+
+* Tue Dec 20 2022 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.0p1-17
+- Fix parsing of IPv6 IPs in sftp client (#2151334)
+- Avoid ssh banner one-byte overflow (#2138344)
+- Avoid crash of sshd when Include folder does not exist (#2133087)
+
+* Wed Jun 29 2022 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-16
+- Omit client side from minimize-sha1-use.patch to prevent regression (#2093897)
+
+* Thu Jun 23 2022 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-15
+- Fix new issues found by static analyzers
+
+* Wed Jun 01 2022 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-14
+- Upstream: add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for sftp-server (#2064249)
+- Change product name from Fedora to RHEL in openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch (#1953807)
+- Include caveat for crypto-policy in sshd manpage (#2044354)
+- Change log level of FIPS specific log message to verbose (#2050511)
+- Clarify force_file_perms (-m) documentation in sftp-server manpage (#1862504)
+- Minimize the use of SHA1 as a proof of possession for RSA key (#2093897)
+
 * Tue Oct 26 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-13
 - Upstream: ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the connection killing behaviour (#2015828)