import UBI openssh-8.0p1-24.el8

import UBI openssh-8.0p1-19.el8_9.2
import UBI openssh-8.0p1-19.el8_8
2024-05-22 14:26:20 +00:00 · 2024-01-30 19:53:52 +00:00 · 2023-08-02 07:42:27 +00:00 · 2023-02-21 09:54:50 +00:00 · 2022-11-08 14:04:01 +00:00 · 2022-05-10 11:06:34 +00:00
21 changed files with 2279 additions and 61 deletions
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -136,18 +136,6 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
 			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (sshpid > 1) {
- 		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
-		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
+diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+--- a/sftp-server.8	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+++ b/sftp-server.8	2022-06-20 16:03:47.892540068 +0200
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
 .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
@ -9,21 +9,23 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
 .Ek
 .Nm
 .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,10 @@ Sets an explicit
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@
 .Xr umask 2
 to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
 user's default mask.
 +.It Fl m Ar force_file_perms
 +Sets explicit file permissions to be applied to newly-created files instead
 +of the default or client requested mode.  Numeric values include:
-+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Option -u is ineffective if -m is set.
+777, 755, 750, 666, 644, 640, etc.  Using both -m and -u switches makes the
+umask (-u) effective only for newly created directories and explicit mode (-m)
+for newly created files.
 .El
 .Pp
 On some systems,
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
+diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+--- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:01:26.183793633 +0200
+++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:02:12.442690608 +0200
+@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
 /* Version of client */
 static u_int version;
 
@ -34,7 +36,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
 /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
 static int init_done;
 
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@
 	Attrib a;
 	char *name;
 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
 
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@
 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
 	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@
 			}
 		}
 	}
@ -62,7 +64,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
 		send_status(id, status);
 	free(name);
-@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1555,7 +1566,7 @@
 	fprintf(stderr,
 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
@ -71,7 +73,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
 	    __progname, __progname);
 	exit(1);
-@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1581,7 +1592,7 @@
 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
 
 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@ -80,7 +82,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'Q':
 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1643,6 +1654,15 @@
 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
 			break;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
 	struct dhgroup dhg;
 
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		logit("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
+		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
 +		    " Falling back to known groups.");
 +		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 +	}
@ -471,12 +471,53 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c
 
 #include "xmss_fast.h"
 
+@@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
+ {
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *sig = NULL;
+-	int ret, slen, len;
+	int ret, slen;
+	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -411,9 +414,10 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto error;
+ 	}
+-	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+-	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
+-	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
+	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto error;
+ 	}
+@@ -440,12 +444,13 @@ sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
+ 	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 	}
+-	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+-	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
+	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
+	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
+	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
+	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
+ 	switch (ret) {
+ 	case 1:
+ 		ret = 0;
@@ -1514,6 +1516,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
 	}
 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
+		if (FIPS_mode())
+			logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
@ -515,3 +556,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c
 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
 			error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx	2023-10-30 13:01:59.150952364 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config	2023-10-30 13:02:56.662231354 +0100
+@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+ 
+ HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+#In FIPS mode Ed25519 keys are not supported, please comment out the next line
+ HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ 
+ # Ciphers and keying
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
 	    cfg, NULL);
 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora */
+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several problems.");
+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
 +
 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
 # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in Fedora and may cause several
+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
 +# problems.
 UsePAM yes
 
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch
@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index b66037f1..54538ff9 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
+ static void
+ killchild(int signo)
+ {
+-	if (sshpid > 1) {
+-		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+	pid_t pid;
+
+	pid = sshpid;
+	if (pid > 1) {
+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+		(void)waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
+index 99c25cd2..574a566e 100644
+--- a/msg.c
+++ b/msg.c
+@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
+ 	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
+-	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
+	if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
+ 		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
+ 		return (-1);
+ 	}
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch
@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+index e16eabe2..a8c99e2e 100644
+--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
+@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	int r, channel_id;
+ 
+ 	/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
+-	if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
+	if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
+	    ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
+ 	    options.client_alive_count_max) {
+ 		sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
+ 		logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index d47cb0d2..2cddbd59 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -519,6 +519,9 @@ is set to 15, and
+ .Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+ is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
+ will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+Setting a zero
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+disables connection termination.
+ .It Cm ClientAliveInterval
+ Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
+ from the client,
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff --color -ru a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+--- a/sshd.8	2022-05-31 13:39:10.231843926 +0200
+++ b/sshd.8	2022-05-31 14:34:01.460815420 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
+ command-line options override values specified in the
+ configuration file.
+This mechanism is used by systemd to apply system-wide crypto-policies to ssh server.
+ .Nm
+ rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
+ .Dv SIGHUP ,
+@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@
+ rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
+ .Fl C
+ options.
+The configuration does not contain the system-wide crypto-policy configuration.
+To show the most accurate runtime configuration, use:
+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+source /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
+source /etc/sysconfig/sshd
+sshd -T $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
+.Ed
+ .It Fl t
+ Test mode.
+ Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
@ -1509,7 +1509,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgssc.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,595 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,618 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@ -1571,7 +1571,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +	struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
 +	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
 +	struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
 +	u_char *msg;
 +	int type = 0;
 +	int first = 1;
@ -1610,8 +1610,10 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +	default:
 +		fatal("%s: Unexpected KEX type %d", __func__, kex->kex_type);
 +	}
-+	if (r != 0)
+	if (r != 0) {
+		ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&ctxt);
 +		return r;
+	}
 +
 +	token_ptr = GSS_C_NO_BUFFER;
 +
@ -1674,11 +1676,16 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +			do {
 +				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+					char *tmp = NULL;
+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
 +					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
 +					if (server_host_key_blob)
 +						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
 +						fatal("Failed to read server host key: %s", ssh_err(r));
+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
 +				}
 +			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
 +
@ -1779,6 +1786,11 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +	if (r != 0)
 +		goto out;
 +
+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
+
 +	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
 +	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
 +	    kex->hash_alg,
@ -1848,7 +1860,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +	size_t hashlen;
 +	const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
 +	int nbits = 0, min = DH_GRP_MIN, max = DH_GRP_MAX;
-+	struct sshbuf *empty = sshbuf_new();
+	struct sshbuf *empty = NULL;
 +	u_char c;
 +	int r;
 +
@ -1960,11 +1972,16 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +			do {
 +				type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +				if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY) {
+					char *tmp = NULL;
+					size_t tmp_len = 0;
+
 +					debug("Received KEXGSS_HOSTKEY");
 +					if (server_host_key_blob)
 +						fatal("Server host key received more than once");
-+					if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
+					if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &tmp, &tmp_len)) != 0)
 +						fatal("sshpkt failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+					if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_from(tmp, tmp_len)) == NULL)
+						fatal("sshbuf_from failed");
 +				}
 +			} while (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY);
 +
@ -2040,6 +2057,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dh_server_pub)) != 0)
 +		goto out;
 +	sshbuf_free(buf);
+	buf = NULL;
 +
 +	if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@ -2048,6 +2066,10 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +
 +	if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
 +		goto out;
+	if ((empty = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+		goto out;
+	}
 +
 +	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
 +	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
@ -2094,6 +2116,7 @@ index 00000000..0b2f6a56
 +	if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
 +		r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
 +out:
+	sshbuf_free(buf);
 +	sshbuf_free(server_blob);
 +	sshbuf_free(empty);
 +	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
@ -2110,7 +2133,7 @@ new file mode 100644
 index 00000000..60bc02de
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/kexgsss.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,474 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,482 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2001-2009 Simon Wilkinson. All rights reserved.
 + *
@ -2177,7 +2200,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	 */
 +
 +	OM_uint32 ret_flags = 0;
-+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, recv_tok, msg_tok;
+	gss_buffer_desc gssbuf = {0, NULL}, recv_tok, msg_tok;
 +	gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
 +	Gssctxt *ctxt = NULL;
 +	struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
@ -2217,7 +2240,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		type = ssh_packet_read(ssh);
 +		switch(type) {
 +		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_INIT:
-+			if (client_pubkey != NULL)
+			if (gssbuf.value != NULL)
 +				fatal("Received KEXGSS_INIT after initialising");
 +			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
 +			        &recv_tok)) != 0 ||
@ -2248,6 +2271,31 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +				goto out;
 +
 +			/* Send SSH_MSG_KEXGSS_HOSTKEY here, if we want */
+
+			/* Calculate the hash early so we can free the
+			* client_pubkey, which has reference to the parent
+			* buffer state->incoming_packet
+			*/
+			hashlen = sizeof(hash);
+			if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
+			    kex->hash_alg,
+			    kex->client_version,
+			    kex->server_version,
+			    kex->peer,
+			    kex->my,
+			    empty,
+			    client_pubkey,
+			    server_pubkey,
+			    shared_secret,
+			    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
+				goto out;
+
+			gssbuf.value = hash;
+			gssbuf.length = hashlen;
+
+			sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
+			client_pubkey = NULL;
+
 +			break;
 +		case SSH2_MSG_KEXGSS_CONTINUE:
 +			if ((r = ssh_gssapi_sshpkt_get_buffer_desc(ssh,
@ -2269,7 +2317,7 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +		if (maj_status != GSS_S_COMPLETE && send_tok.length == 0)
 +			fatal("Zero length token output when incomplete");
 +
-+		if (client_pubkey == NULL)
+		if (gssbuf.value == NULL)
 +			fatal("No client public key");
 +
 +		if (maj_status & GSS_S_CONTINUE_NEEDED) {
@ -2298,23 +2346,6 @@ index 00000000..60bc02de
 +	if (!(ret_flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG))
 +		fatal("Integrity flag wasn't set");
 +
-+	hashlen = sizeof(hash);
-+	if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
-+	    kex->hash_alg,
-+	    kex->client_version,
-+	    kex->server_version,
-+	    kex->peer,
-+	    kex->my,
-+	    empty,
-+	    client_pubkey,
-+	    server_pubkey,
-+	    shared_secret,
-+	    hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
-+		goto out;
-+
-+	gssbuf.value = hash;
-+	gssbuf.length = hashlen;
-+
 +	if (GSS_ERROR(PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_sign(ctxt, &gssbuf, &msg_tok))))
 +		fatal("Couldn't get MIC");
 +
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+index 04881c83..03c7a5c7 100644
+--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
+@@ -2527,12 +2527,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 				port = tmp;
+ 			break;
+ 		default:
+			/* Try with user, host and path. */
+ 			if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
+-			    &file1) == -1) {
+-				/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
+-				host = xstrdup(*argv);
+-				host = cleanhostname(host);
+-			}
+			    &file1) == 0)
+				break;
+			/* Try with user and host. */
+			if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
+			    == 0)
+				break;
+			/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
+			host = xstrdup(*argv);
+			host = cleanhostname(host);
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+ 		file2 = *(argv + 1);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch
@ -0,0 +1,273 @@
+diff --color -ruN a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
+--- a/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:31:10.168186838 +0200
+++ b/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:32:19.146513347 +0200
+@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
+ 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
+ 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
+ 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
+-	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
+	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
+ 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
+ 	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
+ 	sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
+@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 
+-sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+-	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ 
+ sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+diff --color -ruN a/sftp-realpath.c b/sftp-realpath.c
+--- a/sftp-realpath.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
+++ b/sftp-realpath.c	2022-06-23 11:35:33.193244873 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
+ *    permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
+# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
+#endif
+
+/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
+
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
+
+/*
+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
+ *
+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
+ * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
+ */
+char *
+sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
+{
+	struct stat sb;
+	char *p, *q, *s;
+	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
+	unsigned symlinks;
+	int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
+	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
+
+	if (path[0] == '\0') {
+		errno = ENOENT;
+		return (NULL);
+	}
+
+	serrno = errno;
+
+	if (resolved == NULL) {
+		resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
+		if (resolved == NULL)
+			return (NULL);
+		mem_allocated = 1;
+	} else
+		mem_allocated = 0;
+
+	symlinks = 0;
+	if (path[0] == '/') {
+		resolved[0] = '/';
+		resolved[1] = '\0';
+		if (path[1] == '\0')
+			return (resolved);
+		resolved_len = 1;
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
+	} else {
+		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
+			if (mem_allocated)
+				free(resolved);
+			else
+				strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
+			return (NULL);
+		}
+		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
+	}
+	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+		goto err;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
+	 */
+	while (left_len != 0) {
+		/*
+		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
+		 * and its length.
+		 */
+		p = strchr(left, '/');
+		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
+		if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
+		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
+		left_len -= s - left;
+		if (p != NULL)
+			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
+		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
+			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
+			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
+		}
+		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
+			continue;
+		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
+			/*
+			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
+			 * single "/"
+			 */
+			if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+			continue;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
+		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
+		 * there are no more path components left.
+		 */
+		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
+		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
+			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
+				errno = serrno;
+				return (resolved);
+			}
+			goto err;
+		}
+		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
+			if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
+				errno = ELOOP;
+				goto err;
+			}
+			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
+			if (slen < 0)
+				goto err;
+			symlink[slen] = '\0';
+			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
+				resolved[1] = 0;
+				resolved_len = 1;
+			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
+				/* Strip the last path component. */
+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
+				*q = '\0';
+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
+			}
+
+			/*
+			 * If there are any path components left, then
+			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
+			 * in `left'.
+			 */
+			if (p != NULL) {
+				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
+					if (slen + 1 >=
+					    (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
+						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+						goto err;
+					}
+					symlink[slen] = '/';
+					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
+				}
+				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
+				if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
+					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
+					goto err;
+				}
+			}
+			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
+		}
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
+	 * is a single "/".
+	 */
+	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
+		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
+	return (resolved);
+
+err:
+	if (mem_allocated)
+		free(resolved);
+	return (NULL);
+}
+diff --color -ruN a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+--- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:31:10.147186434 +0200
+++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:32:19.147513366 +0200
+@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
+ #include "sftp.h"
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
+ 
+char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
+
+ /* Our verbosity */
+ static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -1185,7 +1187,7 @@
+ 	}
+ 	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
+ 	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
+-	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+	if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
+ 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
+ 	} else {
+ 		Stat s;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch
@ -0,0 +1,805 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/auth.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.740331098 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct include_list includes;
+ extern int use_privsep;
+ extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
+@@ -573,7 +574,7 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 
+ 	ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
+ 	ci->user = user;
+-	parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
+	parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
+ 	log_change_level(options.log_level);
+ 	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:21:43.541848103 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.302046768 +0200
+@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
+ static void
+ rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
+ {
+-	int i, j;
+	int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
+ 	char *cp;
+ 
+ 	/* Remove an environment variable */
+@@ -734,6 +734,11 @@ rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg
+ 		options->num_send_env--;
+ 		/* NB. don't increment i */
+ 	}
+	if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
+		options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
+		    onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
+		    sizeof(*options->send_env));
+	}
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile
+--- openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.742331115 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
+@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
+ 		principals-command \
+ 		cert-file \
+ 		cfginclude \
+		servcfginclude \
+ 		allow-deny-users \
+ 		authinfo
+ 
+@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
+ 		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
+ 		ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
+ 		ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
+-		sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
+		sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
+ 		sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
+ 		t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
+ 		t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh
+--- openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.744331132 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
+@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="server config include"
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Match host a
+	Banner /aa
+
+Match host b
+	Banner /bb
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match host c
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+	Banner /cc
+
+Match host m
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host d
+	Banner /dd
+
+Match Host e
+	Banner /ee
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host f
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+	Banner /ff
+
+Match Host n
+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Banner /aaa
+
+Match host b
+	Banner /bbb
+
+Match host c
+	Banner /ccc
+
+Match Host d
+	Banner /ddd
+
+Match Host e
+	Banner /eee
+
+Match Host f
+	Banner /fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Banner /aaaa
+
+Match host b
+	Banner /bbbb
+
+Match host c
+	Banner /cccc
+
+Match Host d
+	Banner /dddd
+
+Match Host e
+	Banner /eeee
+
+Match Host f
+	Banner /ffff
+
+Match all
+	Banner /xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+	_host="$1"
+	_exp="$2"
+	_desc="$3"
+	test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
+	trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+	${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+	    -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
+		fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+	_got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+	if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+		fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+	fi
+}
+
+trial a /aa
+trial b /bb
+trial c /ccc
+trial d /dd
+trial e /ee
+trial f /fff
+trial m /xxxx
+trial n /xxxx
+trial x none
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Banner xxxx
+	Junk
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+    -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
+
+# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Include
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+	fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
+
+# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Banner /xx
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Match host a
+	Banner /aaaa
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+	Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trace "Include before match blocks"
+trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
+
+# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
+Port 7722
+_EOF
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+_EOF
+
+trace "Port after included files"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
+	fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
+_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
+	fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
+fi
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh
+--- openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.746331150 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
+@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
+ 
+ chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
+ REAL_SSH="$SSH"
+REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
+ SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
+ 
+ # Some test data.  We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.748331167 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ #include <util.h>
+ #endif
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -70,6 +75,9 @@ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOption
+     const char *, int);
+ static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
+     const char *, int);
+static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
+    const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
+ 
+ /* Use of privilege separation or not */
+ extern int use_privsep;
+@@ -528,7 +536,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
+ 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
+ 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
+-	sHostCertificate,
+	sHostCertificate, sInclude,
+ 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
+ 	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
+ 	sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
+@@ -540,9 +548,11 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+-#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
+-#define SSHCFG_MATCH	0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
+-#define SSHCFG_ALL	(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL		0x01	/* allowed in main section of config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH		0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL		(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH	0x04  /* Match never matches; internal only */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY	0x08  /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
+ 
+ /* Textual representation of the tokens. */
+ static struct {
+@@ -687,6 +697,7 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
+@@ -1259,13 +1270,14 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
+ 	{ NULL, -1 }
+ };
+ 
+-int
+-process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+static int
+process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+     const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+-    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
+    struct include_list *includes)
+ {
+ 	char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
+-	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
+	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
+ 	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
+ 	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
+ 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
+@@ -1274,6 +1286,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 	long long val64;
+ 	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
+ 	const char *errstr;
+	struct include_item *item;
+	glob_t gbuf;
+ 
+ 	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
+ 	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
+@@ -1300,7 +1314,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		cmdline = 1;
+ 		activep = &cmdline;
+ 	}
+-	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
+	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
+ 		debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
+ 	if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
+ 		if (connectinfo == NULL) {
+@@ -1980,15 +1994,112 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 			*intptr = value;
+ 		break;
+ 
+	case sInclude:
+		if (cmdline) {
+			fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
+			    "command-line option");
+		}
+		value = 0;
+		while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') {
+			value++;
+			found = 0;
+			if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
+				xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
+			} else
+				arg = xstrdup(arg2);
+
+			/*
+			 * Don't let included files clobber the containing
+			 * file's Match state.
+			 */
+			oactive = *activep;
+
+			/* consult cache of include files */
+			TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
+				if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
+					continue;
+				if (item->filename != NULL) {
+					parse_server_config_depth(options,
+					    item->filename, item->contents,
+					    includes, connectinfo,
+					    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+					        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+					            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+					    activep, depth + 1);
+				}
+				found = 1;
+				*activep = oactive;
+			}
+			if (found != 0) {
+				free(arg);
+				continue;
+			}
+
+			/* requested glob was not in cache */
+			debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
+			    filename, linenum, arg);
+			if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
+				if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+					fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" "
+					    "glob failed", filename,
+					    linenum, arg);
+				}
+				/*
+				 * If no entry matched then record a
+				 * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
+				 */
+				debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
+				    filename, linenum, arg);
+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
+				    item, entry);
+			}
+			if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
+				fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__);
+			for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
+				debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
+				    filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
+				item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+				if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
+					    __func__);
+				}
+				load_server_config(item->filename,
+				    item->contents);
+				parse_server_config_depth(options,
+				    item->filename, item->contents,
+				    includes, connectinfo,
+				    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
+				        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
+				            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
+				    activep, depth + 1);
+				*activep = oactive;
+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
+			}
+			globfree(&gbuf);
+			free(arg);
+		}
+		if (value == 0) {
+			fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument",
+			    filename, linenum);
+		}
+		break;
+
+ 	case sMatch:
+ 		if (cmdline)
+ 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
+ 			   "option");
+-		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
+		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum,
+		    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
+ 		if (value < 0)
+ 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
+ 			    linenum);
+-		*activep = value;
+		*activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
+		/* The MATCH_ONLY is applicable only until the first match block */
+		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
+ 		break;
+ 
+ 	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
+@@ -2275,6 +2386,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+int
+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
+{
+	int inc_flags = 0;
+
+	return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
+	    linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
+}
+
+
+ /* Reads the server configuration file. */
+ 
+ void
+@@ -2313,12 +2436,13 @@ load_server_config(const char *filename,
+ 
+ void
+ parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
+-   struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+   struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+ {
+ 	ServerOptions mo;
+ 
+ 	initialize_server_options(&mo);
+-	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo);
+	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
+	    connectinfo);
+ 	copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -2464,28 +2588,44 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
+ #undef M_CP_STROPT
+ #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+ 
+-void
+-parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+-    struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH	16
+static void
+parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
+ {
+-	int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
+	int linenum, bad_options = 0;
+ 	char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
+ 
+-	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
+	if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
+		fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
+
+	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu%s", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
+	    (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
+ 
+ 	if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
+-	active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+ 	linenum = 1;
+ 	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
+-		if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
+-		    linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
+		if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
+		    filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
+		    depth, includes) != 0)
+ 			bad_options++;
+ 	}
+ 	free(obuf);
+ 	if (bad_options > 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
+ 		    filename, bad_options);
+}
+
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+	int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+	parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
+	    connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
+ 	process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.750331185 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
+@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
+ #ifndef SERVCONF_H
+ #define SERVCONF_H
+ 
+#include <sys/queue.h>
+
+ #define MAX_PORTS		256	/* Max # ports. */
+ 
+ #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS		256	/* Max # subsystems. */
+@@ -234,6 +236,15 @@ struct connection_info {
+ 				 * unspecified */
+ };
+ 
+/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
+struct include_item {
+	char *selector;
+	char *filename;
+	struct sshbuf *contents;
+	TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+
+ 
+ /*
+  * These are string config options that must be copied between the
+@@ -273,12 +284,13 @@ struct connection_info *get_connection_i
+ void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+ void	 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
+ int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
+-	     int *, struct connection_info *);
+	     int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
+ void	 process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
+ void	 load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
+ void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
+-	     struct connection_info *);
+-void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
+	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
+void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
+	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
+ int	 parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
+ int	 server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
+ void	 copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.754331220 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
+@@ -825,7 +825,20 @@ during
+ and use only the system-wide known hosts file
+ .Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
+ The default is
+-.Cm no .
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Include
+Include the specified configuration file(s).
+Multiple path names may be specified and each pathname may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+wildcards.
+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+.Pa /etc/ssh .
+A
+.Cm Include
+directive may appear inside a
+.Cm Match
+block
+to perform conditional inclusion.
+ .It Cm IPQoS
+ Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
+ Accepted values are
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.752331202 +0200
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
+@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
+ /* sshd_config buffer */
+ struct sshbuf *cfg;
+ 
+/* Included files from the configuration file */
+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+
+ /* message to be displayed after login */
+ struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -927,30 +930,45 @@ usage(void)
+ static void
+ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
+ {
+-	struct sshbuf *m;
+	struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
+	struct include_item *item = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
+ 	    sshbuf_len(conf));
+ 
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+	/* pack includes into a string */
+	TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+	}
+
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
+ 	 *	string	configuration
+-	 *	string rngseed		(only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
+	 *	string	included_files[] {
+	 *		string	selector
+	 *		string	filename
+	 *		string	contents
+	 *	}
+	 *	string	rng_seed (if required)
+ 	 */
+-	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+-		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-
+ #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
+ 	rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
+ #endif
+-
+ 	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
+ 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+	sshbuf_free(inc);
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ }
+@@ -958,14 +976,15 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
+ static void
+ recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
+ {
+-	struct sshbuf *m;
+	struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
+ 	u_char *cp, ver;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	int r;
+	struct include_item *item;
+ 
+ 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
+ 
+-	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 	if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
+ 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
+@@ -973,14 +992,28 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 	if (ver != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
+-		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+-	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
+ 	rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
+ #endif
+ 
+	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+	while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
+		item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+		if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
+	}
+
+ 	free(cp);
+ 	sshbuf_free(m);
+ 
+@@ -1661,7 +1694,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		case 'o':
+ 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
+ 			if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
+-			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
+ 				exit(1);
+ 			free(line);
+ 			break;
+@@ -1692,7 +1725,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
+ 	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
+ 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
+-	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
+	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
+@@ -1725,12 +1758,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			 */
+ 			(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
+ 		}
+-	}
+-	else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+	} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+ 		load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
+ 
+ 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
+-	    cfg, NULL);
+	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
+ 
+ 	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
+ 	if (! options.use_pam)
+@@ -1946,7 +1978,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		if (connection_info == NULL)
+ 			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
+ 		connection_info->test = 1;
+-		parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
+		parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
+ 		dump_config(&options);
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
+--- openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb	2022-12-21 12:18:43.274799163 +0100
+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c	2022-12-21 12:19:19.758081516 +0100
+@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, c
+ int
+ sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
+ {
+	if (v == NULL)
+		return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
+
+ 	return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
+ }
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
+--- a/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.529922670 +0200
+++ b/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.911762100 +0200
+@@ -906,6 +906,18 @@
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	free(cp);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+ static int
+ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+@@ -941,6 +953,16 @@
+ 		free(ext);
+ 	}
+ 
+	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+		    "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+		    "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
+	}
+
+ 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
+ 	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+ 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
+diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
+--- a/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.511922322 +0200
+++ b/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.902761926 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
+ #define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 	0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 	0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
+ 
+ struct sshenc {
+ 	char	*name;
+diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
+--- a/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.537922825 +0200
+++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.918762235 +0200
+@@ -736,16 +736,17 @@
+ 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
+-	int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
+	int r, ndx, success = 0;
+ 	const u_char *blob;
+	const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
+ 	u_char *sig = 0;
+ 	size_t blen, slen;
+ 
+ 	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+-
+-	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
+-	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
+	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
+	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
+		kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
+ 	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
+ 		sshkey_free(key);
+ 		key = NULL;
+@@ -780,16 +781,24 @@
+ 		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
+ 		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
+ 		 */
+-		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
+-		    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
+		sigalg = NULL;
+		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
+			if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
+				sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+		}
+		debug3("%s: sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", __func__,
+			sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+ 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
+ 		    ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
+-		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
+-		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
+		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
+ 			error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
+ 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
+diff --color -ru a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+--- a/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.532922728 +0200
+++ b/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.914762158 +0200
+@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@
+     struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
+ static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
+     struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
+-static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep);
+ 
+ /* Supported key types */
+ struct keytype {
+@@ -2092,7 +2091,8 @@
+ 	if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
+ 	    sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
+	    &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	/* Success */
+@@ -2394,8 +2394,8 @@
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+-static int
+-get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
+int
+sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+@@ -2477,7 +2477,7 @@
+ 		return 0;
+ 	if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+-	if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
+	if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
+ 	free(sigtype);
+@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@
+ 	    sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
+-	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
+diff --color -ru a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+--- a/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.521922515 +0200
+++ b/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.907762022 +0200
+@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ int	 sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
+ const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
+int      sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
+ 
+ /* for debug */
+ void	sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:37:57.240171687 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/pathnames.h	2021-09-16 11:42:29.183427917 +0200
+@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
+ #define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE	SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
+ #define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE		SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
+ #define _PATH_DH_MODULI			SSHDIR "/moduli"
+#define _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH		SSHDIR "/disable_scp"
+ 
+ #ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
+ #define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM		"/usr/bin/ssh"
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.1
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.1.kill-scp	2021-09-16 12:09:02.646714578 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.1	2021-09-16 12:26:49.978628226 +0200
+@@ -278,6 +278,13 @@ to print debugging messages about their
+ This is helpful in
+ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+ .El
+.Pp
+Usage of SCP protocol can be blocked by creating a world-readable
+.Ar /etc/ssh/disable_scp
+file. If this file exists, when SCP protocol is in use (either remotely or 
+via the
+.Fl O
+option), the program will exit.
+ .Sh EXIT STATUS
+ .Ex -std scp
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
+++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
+@@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	argc -= optind;
+ 	argv += optind;
+ 
+	{
+		FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r");
+		if (f != NULL) {
+			fclose(f);
+			fatal("SCP protocol is forbidden via %s", _PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH);
+		}
+	}
+
+ 	if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
+--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
+@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ # include <paths.h>
+ #endif
+ #include <pwd.h>
+#include <grp.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
+ #include <login.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+ 		}
+ 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ 
+		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
+		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
+			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
+			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
+			_exit(1);
+		}
+		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+ 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
+ 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
+index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
+--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
+@@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 
+	/*
+	 * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2.  The "SSH-"
+	 * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
+	 * large banner which we must read and ignore.  Loop while reading
+	 * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
+	 * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
+	 * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
+	 * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
+	 */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
+ 		bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
+@@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
+ 		conrecycle(s);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+	if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
+		error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
+		confree(s);
+		return;
+	}
+ 	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
+ 		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
+ 		confree(s);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
+--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
+@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
+ 		goto fail;
+ 	}
+-	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
+-		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+-		goto fail;
+-	}
+	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
+		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
+ 
+ 	p->module->handle = handle;
+ 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
+--- a/auth2.c	8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000	1.166
+++ b/auth2.c	28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
+@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
+ }
+ 
+ #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
+#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
+ static double
+ user_specific_delay(const char *user)
+ {
+@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, 
+ 	struct timespec ts;
+ 	double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
+ 
+	if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
+		debug3("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
+		    "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
+		return;
+	}
+
+ 	/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
+ 	while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
+ 		seconds *= 2;
+@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
+ 		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh);
+ 	}
+-	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
+	if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
+ 		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
+ 		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
+ 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
+diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
+index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
+--- a/PROTOCOL
+++ b/PROTOCOL
+@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
+ described at:
+ http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
+ 
+1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
+
+OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
+a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
+RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
+initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
+"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
+may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
+are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
+if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
+
+When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
+name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
+the the protocol:
+
+a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
+   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
+   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
+   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
+   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
+   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
+b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
+   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
+   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
+   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
+
+ 2. Connection protocol changes
+ 
+ 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
+diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
+index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
+--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
+@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /* prototype */
+-static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
+ static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ 
+ static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
+@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+static int
+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+{
+	char *cp;
+
+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+		return 0;
+	free(cp);
+	return 1;
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
+  * Caller must free returned string.
+@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ char *
+ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ {
+-	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
+ 	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
+@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
+ 	}
+ 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+-		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
+-			free(m);
+		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
+ 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
+-		}
+ 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
+ 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
+ 			free(tmp);
+@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
+	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
+	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
+		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
+	}
+	error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
+@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
+ 		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
+ 		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
+		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
+ 	}
+ 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
+ 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (kex == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
+ 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
+ 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
+	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
+ 		return r;
+ 
+ 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
+@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
+ 	return (1);
+ }
+ 
+-/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
+ static int
+-has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
+kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
+ {
+-	char *cp;
+-
+-	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
+-		return 0;
+-	free(cp);
+-	return 1;
+	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
+ }
+ 
+ static int
+-kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
+ {
+ 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
+ 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
+@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		sprop=peer;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
+-	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
+-		char *ext;
+-
+-		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
+-		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
+-		free(ext);
+	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
+	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+		if (kex->server) {
+			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
+		} else {
+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
+			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+		}
+		if (kex->kex_strict) {
+			debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
+			if (seq != 0)
+				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+				    "strict KEX violation: "
+				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
+		}
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
+diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
+index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
+--- a/kex.h
+++ b/kex.h
+@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
+ 	u_int	kex_type;
+ 	char	*server_sig_algs;
+ 	int	ext_info_c;
+	int	kex_strict;
+ 	struct sshbuf *my;
+ 	struct sshbuf *peer;
+ 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
+diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
+index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
+--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
+@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
+ #endif
+ 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
+-	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
+	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+		}
+ 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
+	}
+ 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
+ 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
+ 
+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+		debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
+		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
+	}
+
+ 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
+ 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
+ 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
+@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
+ 	for (;;) {
+ 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
+-		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+-		if (r != 0)
+		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
+ 			break;
+ 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
+ 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
+@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	}
+
+ 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
+ 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
+-	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
+	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
+		}
+ 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
+	}
+ 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
+ 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
+ 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
+@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ #endif
+ 	/* reset for next packet */
+ 	state->packlen = 0;
+	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
+		debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
+		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
+	}
+ 
+ 	/* do we need to rekey? */
+ 	if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
+@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
+ 		if (r != 0)
+ 			return r;
+-		if (*typep) {
+-			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+-			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+		if (*typep == 0) {
+			/* no message ready */
+			return 0;
+ 		}
+		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
+		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
+
+		/* Always process disconnect messages */
+		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+				return r;
+			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+			free(msg);
+			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+		}
+
+		/*
+		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
+		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
+		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
+		 * protocol errors.
+		 */
+		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
+		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
+			return 0;
+		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
+ 		switch (*typep) {
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
+ 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
+@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
+ 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
+ 			free(msg);
+ 			break;
+-		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
+-			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
+-			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
+-				return r;
+-			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
+-			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
+-			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
+-			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+-			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
+-			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+-			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
+-			free(msg);
+-			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
+ 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
+ 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
+ 				return r;
+@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
+@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
+ 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
+ 	va_end(args);
+ 
+	debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
+ 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	xxx_host = host;
+ 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 
+-	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
+	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
+ };
+ 
+ static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+-static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+ static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
+@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
+ 
+ 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
+ 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
+-	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
+ 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
+ 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
+@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ }
+ 
+ /* ARGSUSED */
+-static int
+-input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
+-{
+-	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
+-}
+-
+ void
+ userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
+ {
+@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
+ 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
+ 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict	2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
+@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
+ 	struct kex *kex;
+	char *cp;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+-	    options.kex_algorithms);
+	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, 
+	   "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
+		fatal("kex_names_cat");
+
+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(cp);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ 	    options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+ 	else if (gss)
+-		newstr = gss;
+		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
+ 	else if (orig)
+ 		newstr = orig;
+ 
+@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	packet_send();
+ 	packet_write_wait();
+ #endif
+	free(cp);
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+static int
+valid_hostname(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (*s == '-')
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
+		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+valid_ruser(const char *s)
+{
+	size_t i;
+
+	if (*s == '-')
+		return 0;
+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
+		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
+			return 0;
+		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
+		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
+			return 0;
+		/* Disallow \ in last position */
+		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
+			return 0;
+	}
+	return 1;
+}
+
+ /*
+  * Main program for the ssh client.
+  */
+@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if (!host)
+ 		usage();
+ 
+	if (!valid_hostname(host))
+		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
+	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
+		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
+ 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
+ 
+ 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
--- a/SPECS/openssh.spec
+++ b/SPECS/openssh.spec
@ -66,7 +66,7 @@

 # Do not forget to bump pam_ssh_agent_auth release if you rewind the main package release to 1
 %global openssh_ver 8.0p1
-%global openssh_rel 10
+%global openssh_rel 24
 %global pam_ssh_agent_ver 0.10.3
 %global pam_ssh_agent_rel 7

@ -245,6 +245,53 @@ Patch976: openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch
 Patch977: openssh-8.0p1-cve-2020-14145.patch
 # sshd -T requires -C when "Match" is used in sshd_config (#1836277)
 Patch978: openssh-8.0p1-sshd_config.patch
+# CVE-2021-41617
+Patch980: openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
+# support sshd Include directive
+# upstream commits:
+# c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf~1..677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7
+# 8bdc3bb7cf4c82c3344cfcb82495a43406e87e83
+# 47adfdc07f4f8ea0064a1495500244de08d311ed~1..7af1e92cd289b7eaa9a683e9a6f2fddd98f37a01
+# supplementary commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423
+Patch981: openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch
+# Port upstream ClientAliveCountMax behaviour
+# upstream commit:
+# 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e
+Patch982: openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch
+# add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for sftp-server
+# use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX
+# upstream commits:
+# 569b650f93b561c09c655f83f128e1dfffe74101
+# 53a6ebf1445a857f5e487b18ee5e5830a9575149
+# 5428b0d239f6b516c81d1dd15aa9fe9e60af75d4
+Patch983: openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch
+# include caveat for crypto-policy in sshd manpage (#2044354)
+Patch984: openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch
+# minimize the use of SHA1 as a proof of possession for RSA key (#2093897)
+# upstream commits:
+# 291721bc7c840d113a49518f3fca70e86248b8e8
+# 0fa33683223c76289470a954404047bc762be84c
+# f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a
+Patch985: openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
+# Upstream ff89b1bed80721295555bd083b173247a9c0484e
+Patch986: openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
+# Upstream 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6
+Patch987: openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
+# Upstream 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4
+Patch988: openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch
+# Upstream 89b54900ac61986760452f132bbe3fb7249cfdac
+Patch989: openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch
+# upsream commit
+# b23fe83f06ee7e721033769cfa03ae840476d280
+Patch1015: openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+#upstream commit 01dbf3d46651b7d6ddf5e45d233839bbfffaeaec
+Patch1017: openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
+#upstream commit 1edb00c58f8a6875fad6a497aa2bacf37f9e6cd5
+Patch1018: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
+#upstream commit 7ef3787c84b6b524501211b11a26c742f829af1a
+Patch1019: openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
+# SCP kill switch
+Patch1020: openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch

 License: BSD
 Group: Applications/Internet
@ -470,6 +517,16 @@ popd
 %patch976 -p1 -b .restore-nonblock
 %patch977 -p1 -b .cve-2020-14145
 %patch978 -p1 -b .sshd_config
+%patch980 -p1 -b .cve-2021-41617
+%patch981 -p1 -b .sshdinclude
+%patch982 -p1 -b .client_alive_count_max
+%patch983 -p1 -b .sftp-realpath
+%patch984 -p1 -b .crypto-policy-doc
+%patch985 -p1 -b .minimize-sha1-use
+%patch986 -p1 -b .banner
+%patch987 -p1 -b .sftp_ipv6
+%patch988 -p1 -b .killall
+%patch989 -p1 -b .bigsshdconfig

 %patch200 -p1 -b .audit
 %patch201 -p1 -b .audit-race
@ -477,6 +534,12 @@ popd

 %patch100 -p1 -b .coverity

+%patch1015 -p1 -b .cve-2023-38408
+%patch1017 -p1 -b .limitdelay
+%patch1018 -p1 -b .cve-2023-48795
+%patch1019 -p1 -b .cve-2023-51385
+%patch1020 -p1 -b .scp-kill-switch
+
 autoreconf
 pushd pam_ssh_agent_auth-%{pam_ssh_agent_ver}
 autoreconf
@ -761,6 +824,74 @@ getent passwd sshd >/dev/null || \
 %endif

 %changelog
+* Tue Feb 06 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-24
+- Providing a kill switch for scp to deal with CVE-2020-15778
+  Resolves: RHEL-22870
+
+* Fri Jan 05 2024 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-23
+- Fix Terrapin attack
+  Resolves: RHEL-19308
+
+* Thu Dec 21 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-22
+- Fix Terrapin attack
+  Resolves: RHEL-19308
+- Forbid shell metasymbols in username/hostname
+  Resolves: RHEL-19788
+
+* Tue Nov 07 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-21
+- Using DigestSign/DigestVerify functions for better FIPS compatibility
+  Resolves: RHEL-5217
+
+* Mon Oct 30 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-20
+- Limit artificial delays in sshd while login using AD user
+  Resolves: RHEL-1684
+- Add comment to OpenSSH server config about FIPS-incompatible key
+  Resolves: RHEL-5221
+- Avoid killing all processes on system in case of race condition
+  Resolves: RHEL-11548
+- Avoid sshd_config 256K limit
+  Resolves: RHEL-5279
+- Using DigestSign/DigestVerify functions for better FIPS compatibility
+  Resolves: RHEL-5217
+- Fix GSS KEX causing ssh failures when connecting to WinSSHD
+  Resolves: RHEL-5321
+
+* Thu Aug 24 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-19
+- rebuilt
+  Related: CVE-2023-38408
+
+* Thu Jul 20 2023 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-18
+- Avoid remote code execution in ssh-agent PKCS#11 support
+  Resolves: CVE-2023-38408
+
+* Tue Dec 20 2022 Dmitry Belyavskiy - 8.0p1-17
+- Fix parsing of IPv6 IPs in sftp client (#2151334)
+- Avoid ssh banner one-byte overflow (#2138344)
+- Avoid crash of sshd when Include folder does not exist (#2133087)
+
+* Wed Jun 29 2022 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-16
+- Omit client side from minimize-sha1-use.patch to prevent regression (#2093897)
+
+* Thu Jun 23 2022 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-15
+- Fix new issues found by static analyzers
+
+* Wed Jun 01 2022 Zoltan Fridrich <zfridric@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-14
+- Upstream: add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for sftp-server (#2064249)
+- Change product name from Fedora to RHEL in openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch (#1953807)
+- Include caveat for crypto-policy in sshd manpage (#2044354)
+- Change log level of FIPS specific log message to verbose (#2050511)
+- Clarify force_file_perms (-m) documentation in sftp-server manpage (#1862504)
+- Minimize the use of SHA1 as a proof of possession for RSA key (#2093897)
+
+* Tue Oct 26 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-13
+- Upstream: ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the connection killing behaviour (#2015828)
+
+* Wed Oct 20 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-12
+- Add support for "Include" directive in sshd_config file (#1926103)
+
+* Fri Oct 01 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-11
+- CVE-2021-41617 upstream fix (#2008885)
+
 * Mon Jun 21 2021 Dmitry Belyavskiy <dbelyavs@redhat.com> - 8.0p1-10
 - sshd -T requires -C when "Match" is used in sshd_config (#1836277)
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
eabdullin	6d16bfdb3c	import UBI openssh-8.0p1-24.el8	2024-05-22 14:26:20 +00:00
eabdullin	b6a876a1a7	import UBI openssh-8.0p1-19.el8_9.2	2024-01-30 19:53:52 +00:00
Andrew Lukoshko	f47dcec1ba	import UBI openssh-8.0p1-19.el8_8	2023-08-02 07:42:27 +00:00
CentOS Sources	8098341697	import openssh-8.0p1-17.el8_7	2023-02-21 09:54:50 +00:00
CentOS Sources	d538637397	import openssh-8.0p1-16.el8	2022-11-08 14:04:01 +00:00
CentOS Sources	d7c51ce412	import openssh-8.0p1-13.el8	2022-05-10 11:06:34 +00:00