.fmf/version

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+1

.gitignore

@@ -1,3 +1,66 @@
-SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
-SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
-SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
+openssh-5.5p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
+/openssh-5.6p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2.tar.bz2
+/openssh-5.8p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+/openssh-5.8p2-noacss.tar.bz2
+/openssh-5.9p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3.tar.bz2
+/openssh-6.0p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+/openssh-6.1p1-noacss.tar.bz2
+/openssh-6.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.2p2.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.4p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.7p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-6.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.1p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.1p2.tar.gz
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2.tar.bz2
+/openssh-7.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.2p2.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.4p1.tar.gz
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
+/openssh-7.5p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.7p1.tar.gz.asc
+/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-7.9p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.1p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.2p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.3p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.4p1.tar.gz.asc
+/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.5p1.tar.gz.asc
+/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
+/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.6p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-8.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.0p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.3p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.6p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz.asc
+/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz
+/openssh-9.9p1.tar.gz.asc

.openssh.metadata

@@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
-bed7240bb17840b451b8f8457791c33456814d93 SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
-756dbb99193f9541c9206a667eaa27b0fa184a4f SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
-a4482a050fdad1d012427e45799564136708cf6b SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2

SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
- 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
- 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
--				     "Could not grab %s. "
--				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
--				     "on your session.", what);
-+				     "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
-+				     "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
-+				     "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
-+				     "on your session.\n"
-+				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
-+				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
- 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 
- 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));

SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <X11/Xlib.h>
-+#include <glib.h>
- #include <gtk/gtk.h>
- #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- 
-@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
- 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
-+{
-+	gdouble step;
-+	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
-+	
-+	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
-+	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
-+}
-+
- static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- {
- 	const char *failed;
- 	char *passphrase, *local;
- 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
--	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
-+	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
- 	GdkGrabStatus status;
- 
- 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
-@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 					"%s",
- 					message);
- 
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+	    FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
- 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
- 	gtk_box_pack_start(
--	    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
--	    FALSE, FALSE, 0);
-+	    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry,
-+	    TRUE, FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
- 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
- 
-+	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
-+	    FALSE, 8);
-+	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
-+
-+	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
-+	
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
-+	    TRUE, 5);
-+	gtk_widget_show(progress);
-+
- 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
- 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
-@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
- 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
-+	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
-+			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
- 
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
- 

SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch

@@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
-@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
- 
- struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
- {
--	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
- 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
- };
- 
-@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
- {
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 	size_t n = 0;
--	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
-+	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
-+	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
- 
- 	if (len == 0)
- 		return (1);
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
- 		return (0);
- 
--	while ((len--) > 0) {
-+	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
-+		u_int r,a,b;
-+
- 		if (n == 0) {
--			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
--			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			int outl, i, buflen;
-+
-+			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+
-+			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
-+				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
-+			}
-+
-+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
-+				ctrbuf, buflen);
- 		}
--		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
--		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
-+
-+		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
-+		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
-+		r = a ^ b;
-+		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
-+		src += sizeof(a);
-+		dest += sizeof(r);
-+
-+		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
- 	}
-+	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
-+	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
- 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
- 	}
--	if (key != NULL)
--		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
--		    &c->aes_ctx);
-+
-+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
-+
-+	if (key != NULL) {
-+		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
-+		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
-+			case 128:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 192:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			case 256:
-+				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
-+		}
-+		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
-+			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
-+	}
- 	if (iv != NULL)
- 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
- 	return (1);
-@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
- 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
- 
- 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
-+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
- 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
- 		free(c);
- 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void usage(void) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+        exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
-+{
-+        unsigned char *bin;
-+        char *p;
-+        size_t n = 0;
-+        int shift = 4;
-+        unsigned char out = 0;
-+        unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
-+        optr = bin;
-+
-+        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+                unsigned char c;
-+
-+                c = *p;
-+                if (isspace(c))
-+                        continue;
-+
-+                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+                        c = c - '0';
-+                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+                        break;
-+                }
-+
-+                out |= c << shift;
-+                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+                if (shift) {
-+                        *(optr++) = out;
-+                        out = 0;
-+                        ++n;
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        *len = n;
-+        return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+        char *buf;
-+        size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+        do {
-+                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
-+                        break;
-+
-+                total += n;
-+                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+        return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+        const struct sshcipher *c;
-+        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
-+        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+        char *hexkey = NULL;
-+        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+        char *hexdata = NULL;
-+        char *p;
-+        int i, r;
-+        int encrypt = 1;
-+        void *key;
-+        size_t keylen;
-+        void *iv;
-+        size_t ivlen;
-+        void *data;
-+        size_t datalen;
-+        void *outdata;
-+
-+        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+                        algo = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+                        hexkey = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+                        ++i;
-+                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 1;
-+                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 0;
-+                        } else {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+                        hexiv = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+                        hexdata = argv[++i];
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+                usage();
-+        }
-+
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+	if (c == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+                hexdata = read_stdin();
-+        } else {
-+                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+        }
-+
-+        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+        if (ivlen != 16) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+        }
-+
-+        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(key);
-+	free(iv);
-+
-+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+	if(outdata == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(data);
-+
-+	cipher_free(cc);
-+
-+        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
-+	}
-+
-+        free(outdata);
-+
-+        printf("\n");
-+        return 0;
-+}
-+

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
-index e93d867..4fc5b3d 100644
---- a/authfile.c
-+++ b/authfile.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
- 
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
- #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
- 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
- #endif
-+	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
-+		struct group *gr;
-+
-+		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
-+			st.st_mode &= ~040;
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
- 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
- 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity	2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-06-21 11:11:32.467290400 +0200
-@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
- 		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
- 		 * with other programs that follow.
- 		 */
--		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+		if (rfd >= 0 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
- 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
- 		}
--		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+		if (wfd >= 0 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
- 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
- 			set_nonblock(wfd);
- 		}
--		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+		if (efd >= 0 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
- 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
- 			set_nonblock(efd);
- 		}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity	2021-06-21 10:59:17.282473202 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c	2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
-@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
- 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
- 
- 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
--	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
-+	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
- 		;
- 
- 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
-@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
- 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
- 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
--		if (tmp1 > 0)
-+		if (tmp1 >= 0)
- 			close(tmp1);
--		if (tmp2 > 0)
--			close(tmp2);
-+		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
-+			close(tmp2);*/
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 	close(tmp1);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
- 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
- 	u_int16_t *portp;
- 	u_int16_t port;
--	socklen_t salen;
-+	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
- 	int i;
- 
- 	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
- {
- 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
- 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
-+		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (signo)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
--			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
-@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
- 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
- 			/* increase optional counter */
--			if (intptr != NULL)
--				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
-+			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
-+  			 if (intptr != NULL)
-+				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
- 		}
- 		break;
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
-@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
- static void
- notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
- }
- 
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
-+	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
- 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
- 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
- 			goto done;
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
-@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	sanitise_stdfd();
- 
- 	/* drop */
--	setegid(getgid());
--	setgid(getgid());
-+	(void) setegid(getgid());
-+	(void) setgid(getgid());
- 
- 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
-@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 
- 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
- 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
--		if (box != NULL)
-+		if (box != NULL) {
- 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
-+			free(box);
-+		}
- 
- 		return 0;
- 	}
-@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
- 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
- 		}
- 	}
-+
-+	if (fdset != NULL)
-+		free(fdset);
- }
- 
- /*

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch

@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
-+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
- ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
- 	fi
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
-+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
-+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
-+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
-+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
-+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
-+ * DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
-+{
-+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 48);
-+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 55);
-+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 87);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
-+ */
-+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
-+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
-+ * and convert hex into bin
-+ *
-+ * Caller must free bin
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
-+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
-+ *
-+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
-+ */
-+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
-+	size_t outlen = 0;
-+
-+	if (!hexlen)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
-+
-+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return -errno;
-+
-+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
-+	*bin = out;
-+	*binlen = outlen;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
-+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
-+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
-+{
-+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
-+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
-+	return 'X';
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
-+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of bin
-+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
-+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
-+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
-+ */
-+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
-+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
-+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+struct kdf_cavs {
-+	unsigned char *K;
-+	size_t Klen;
-+	unsigned char *H;
-+	size_t Hlen;
-+	unsigned char *session_id;
-+	size_t session_id_len;
-+
-+	unsigned int iv_len;
-+	unsigned int ek_len;
-+	unsigned int ik_len;
-+};
-+
-+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	struct kex kex;
-+	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
-+	int mode = 0;
-+	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
-+	struct newkeys *stockeys;
-+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
-+
-+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
-+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
-+
-+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
-+
-+	Kbn = BN_new();
-+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
-+	if (!Kbn) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	Kb = sshbuf_new();
-+	if (!Kb) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
-+
-+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
-+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
-+
-+	/* setup kex */
-+
-+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
-+	switch (test->ik_len) {
-+		case 20:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
-+			break;
-+		case 32:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
-+			break;
-+		case 48:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
-+			break;
-+		case 64:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement choose_enc */
-+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
-+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
-+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
-+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
-+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
-+
-+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
-+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
-+	kex.server = 1;
-+
-+	/* do it */
-+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
-+		printf("Allocation error\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ssh->kex = &kex;
-+	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
-+
-+	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
-+	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
-+
-+	/* get data */
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (Kbn)
-+		BN_free(Kbn);
-+	if (Kb)
-+		sshbuf_free(Kb);
-+	if (ssh)
-+		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Test command example:
-+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
-+ *
-+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
-+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
-+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
-+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
-+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
-+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
-+ */
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	struct kdf_cavs test;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	int opt = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
-+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
-+	{
-+		size_t len = 0;
-+		switch(opt)
-+		{
-+			/*
-+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
-+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
-+			 * following transformations already happened):
-+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
-+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
-+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
-+			 */
-+			case 'K':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'H':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 's':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.session_id,
-+						    &test.session_id_len);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'i':
-+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'e':
-+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'm':
-+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				usage();
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (test.session_id)
-+		free(test.session_id);
-+	if (test.K)
-+		free(test.K);
-+	if (test.H)
-+		free(test.H);
-+	return ret;
-+
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
-+#!/usr/bin/env perl
-+#
-+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
-+#
-+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+#
-+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-+#
-+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-+#
-+#                            NO WARRANTY
-+#
-+#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
-+#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
-+#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
-+#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
-+#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
-+#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
-+#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
-+#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
-+#
-+#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
-+#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
-+#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
-+#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
-+#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
-+#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
-+#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
-+#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
-+#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-+#
-+use strict;
-+use warnings;
-+use IPC::Open2;
-+
-+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
-+# STDOUT
-+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
-+# rest: program and args
-+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
-+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
-+	my $in = shift;
-+	my @args = @_;
-+
-+	my ($CO, $CI);
-+	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+	my $len = length($in);
-+	my $first = 1;
-+	while (1) {
-+		my $rin = "";
-+		my $win = "";
-+		# Output of prog is FD that we read
-+		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
-+		# Input of prog is FD that we write
-+		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
-+		# that is to be written to the app
-+		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
-+			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
-+			$first=0;
-+		}
-+		# Let us wait for 100ms
-+		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
-+		if ( $wout ) {
-+			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
-+			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
-+			$len -= $written;
-+			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
-+			if ($len <= 0) {
-+				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if ( $rout ) {
-+			my $tmp_out = "";
-+			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
-+			$out .= $tmp_out;
-+			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+	waitpid $pid, 0;
-+
-+	return $out;
-+}
-+
-+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
-+# $1: Test vector file
-+# $2: Output file for test results
-+# return: nothing
-+sub parse($$) {
-+	my $infile = shift;
-+	my $outfile = shift;
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+
-+	my $K = "";
-+	my $H = "";
-+	my $session_id = "";
-+	my $ivlen = 0;
-+	my $eklen = "";
-+	my $iklen = "";
-+
-+	open(IN, "<$infile");
-+	while(<IN>) {
-+
-+		my $line = $_;
-+		chomp($line);
-+		$line =~ s/\r//;
-+
-+		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 20;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 32;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 48;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 64;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$ivlen = $1;
-+			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$eklen = $1;
-+			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$K = $1;
-+			$K = substr($K, 8);
-+			$K = "00" . $K;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$H = $1;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$session_id = $1;
-+		}
-+		$out .= $line . "\n";
-+
-+		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
-+		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
-+			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
-+
-+			$K = "";
-+			$H = "";
-+			$session_id = "";
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close IN;
-+	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
-+	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
-+	print OUT $out;
-+	close OUT;
-+}
-+
-+############################################################
-+#
-+# let us pretend to be C :-)
-+sub main() {
-+
-+	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
-+	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
-+
-+	my $outfile = $infile;
-+	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
-+	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
-+	$outfile .= ".rsp";
-+	if (-f $outfile) {
-+		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
-+			unless unlink($outfile);
-+	}
-+	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
-+
-+	# Do the job
-+	parse($infile, $outfile);
-+}
-+
-+###########################################
-+# Call it
-+main();
-+1;

SOURCES/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login	2015-08-12 11:29:12.919269245 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config	2015-08-12 11:31:03.653096466 +0200
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
- # Authentication:
- 
- #LoginGraceTime 2m
--#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
-+PermitRootLogin yes
- #StrictModes yes
- #MaxAuthTries 6
- #MaxSessions 10

SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
-
-    systemd stuff
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
- AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
- AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
- 
-+# Check whether user wants systemd support
-+SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
-+AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
-+	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
-+	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
-+		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
-+		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
-+			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
-+			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
-+				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
-+				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
-+				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
-+				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
-+				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
-+				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
-+			else
-+				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
-+			fi
-+		fi
-+	fi ]
-+)
-+
-+
- # Looking for programs, paths and files
- 
- PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
-@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
- echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
- echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
- echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
-+echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
- echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
- echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
- echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
-diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..e0d4923
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/contrib/sshd.service
-@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
-+[Unit]
-+Description=OpenSSH server daemon
-+Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-+After=network.target
-+
-+[Service]
-+Type=notify
-+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
-+ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
-+KillMode=process
-+Restart=on-failure
-+RestartPreventExitStatus=255
-+
-+[Install]
-+WantedBy=multi-user.target
-+
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
- #include <prot.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
-+#endif
-+
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
-+		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
-+		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
-+#endif
-+
- 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
- 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
- 		    &newsock, config_s);

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,569 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.519877082 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.523877120 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
-@@ -2014,7 +2014,8 @@ key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct
- {
- 	const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
- 	const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
--	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
-+	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : (FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
- 		return 0;
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.c	2019-03-11 17:08:11.769763057 +0100
-@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
- 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
- 	struct dhgroup dhg;
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
-+		    " Falling back to known groups.");
-+		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
-+	}
-+
- 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
- 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
-@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
- 	return 8192;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
-+ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
-+ */
-+int
-+dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
-+{
-+	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
-+	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
-+	DH *known = NULL;
-+	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
-+	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
-+
-+	if (bits <= 3072) {
-+		known = dh_new_group14();
-+	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
-+		known = dh_new_group16();
-+	} else {
-+		known = dh_new_group18();
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
-+
-+	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
-+	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
-+		rv = 1;
-+	}
-+
-+	DH_free(known);
-+	return rv;
-+}
-+
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.h
---- openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.h	2019-03-11 17:08:18.718828381 +0100
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
- 
- int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
- int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
-+int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
- 
- u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
- 
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kex.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.614877975 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/kex.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
-@@ -175,7 +196,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
- 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
- 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
--			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
-+			if (FIPS_mode())
-+				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
-+			else
-+				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
- 			free(s);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include <sys/types.h>
- 
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -118,6 +119,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
- 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
- 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
- 
- 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
-@@ -116,6 +116,16 @@
- 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
- 	"ssh-rsa"
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
-+	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256," \
-+	"ssh-rsa"
-+
- /* the actual algorithms */
- 
- #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
-@@ -139,6 +147,38 @@
- 
- #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
- 
-+#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
-+	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
-+	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" \
-+	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-+# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
-+	KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
-+	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
-+# define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+	"hmac-sha1," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512," \
-+	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
-+	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+#else
-+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
-+#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
-+# else
-+#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
-+# endif
-+#define        KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+       "hmac-sha1"
-+#endif
-+
- /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
- #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.601877853 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
-@@ -2178,18 +2178,19 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
- 	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
--#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
-+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
- 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
--		    defaults, all)) != 0) \
-+		    (FIPS_mode() ? fips_defaults : defaults), \
-+		    all)) != 0) \
- 			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
- 	} while (0)
--	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
--	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
--	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-+	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
-+	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
-+	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
- #undef ASSEMBLE
- 	free(all_cipher);
- 	free(all_mac);
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.586877712 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- #ifdef __NR_open
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
- #endif
-+#ifdef __NR_socket
-+	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
-+#endif
- #ifdef __NR_openat
- 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.568877543 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
-@@ -209,18 +209,19 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
- 	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
- 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
--#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
-+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
- 	do { \
--		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-+		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, (FIPS_mode() \
-+		    ? fips_defaults : defaults), all)) != 0) \
- 			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
- 	} while (0)
--	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
--	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
--	ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-+	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
-+	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
-+	ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
- #undef ASSEMBLE
- 	free(all_cipher);
- 	free(all_mac);
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.602877862 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #endif
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
-@@ -1283,6 +1294,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
- 		exit(0);
- 	}
-+
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
- 
- 	if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
- 		fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.580877655 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
- #include <vis.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -148,7 +150,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
- 	 * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
- 	 * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
- 	 */
--	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
-+	oavail = avail = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
-+	    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
- 	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
- 	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
- 	last = xmalloc(maxlen);
-@@ -229,14 +232,16 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
- 		all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 		if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
--		    KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
-+		    (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
-+		    all_key) != 0)
- 			fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
- 		free(all_key);
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- 	} else {
- 		/* Enforce default */
--		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
-+		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
-+		    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
- 		/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(
-@@ -201,35 +201,40 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
- 
- #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
- 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
--		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
--		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
--		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
--
--		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
--		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
--			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
--			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
--			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
--			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
--
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
-+			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
-+			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
-+
-+			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
-+			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
-+				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
-+				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
-+				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
-+				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
-+					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+				}
-+			} else {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+			}
-+
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
-+			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
-+			if (gss) {
-+				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-+
-+				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
-+				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
-+				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
-+				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+				    "%s,null", orig);
-+			}
- 		}
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
-@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
- #include <grp.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <signal.h>
-+#include <syslog.h>
- #include <stdarg.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
- #include <openssl/dh.h>
- #include <openssl/bn.h>
- #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- #endif
- 
-@@ -1581,6 +1584,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- #endif
- 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
- 
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
- 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
- 	saved_argc = ac;
- 	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -2036,6 +2051,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
- 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
- 
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
-@@ -2412,10 +2431,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
- 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
- 		orig = NULL;
- 
--	if (options.gss_keyex)
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
--	else
--		gss = NULL;
-+	if (options.gss_keyex) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
-+			options.gss_keyex = 0;
-+		} else {
-+			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
-+		}
-+	}
- 
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
-@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include <openssl/err.h>
- #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
- #endif
- 
- #include "crypto_api.h"
-@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "sshkey-xmss.h"
- #include "match.h"
-+#include "log.h"
- 
- #include "xmss_fast.h"
- 
-@@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
- {
- 	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
- 	u_char *sig = NULL;
--	int ret, slen, len;
-+	int ret, slen;
-+	size_t len;
- 
- 	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -411,9 +414,10 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto error;
- 	}
--	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto error;
- 	}
-@@ -440,12 +444,13 @@ sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
- 	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 	}
--	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
- 	switch (ret) {
- 	case 1:
- 		ret = 0;
-@@ -1514,6 +1516,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	}
- 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
- 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
-+		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.590877750 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.625878079 +0100
-@@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
- 	    OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
- 	if (*bitsp > maxbits)
- 		fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
-+	if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+		if (type == KEY_DSA)
-+			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
-+			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+	}
- 	switch (type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 			first = 1;
- 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
- 		}
-+		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
-+
-+		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
-+		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
-+			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
-+			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
-+			goto next;
-+		}
-+
- 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
- 		fflush(stdout);
--		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
- 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx	2023-10-30 13:01:59.150952364 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config	2023-10-30 13:02:56.662231354 +0100
-@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
- 
- HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
- HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-+#In FIPS mode Ed25519 keys are not supported, please comment out the next line
- HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- 
- # Ciphers and keying

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config
---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
-@@ -44,3 +44,8 @@
- #   VisualHostKey no
- #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
- #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
-+#
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
-+# To modify the system-wide ssh configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
-+#  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
-+Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat
---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
-+# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
-+# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
-+Match final all
-+	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
-+	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
-+
-+	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+
-+# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
-+# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
-+# mode correctly we set this to yes.
-+	ForwardX11Trusted yes
-+
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
-+# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
-+# Host *.local
-+#   CheckHostIP no
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2018-04-02 07:39:27.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0	2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
-@@ -872,9 +872,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
- 
-      SyslogFacility
-              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
--             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
--             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
--             default is AUTH.
-+             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
-+             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
-+             The default is AUTH.
- 
-      TCPKeepAlive
-              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5	2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
-@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
- .It Cm SyslogFacility
- Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
- .Xr sshd 8 .
--The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
-+The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
- LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
- The default is AUTH.
- .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config	2018-07-03 10:45:16.950782466 +0200
-@@ -10,20 +10,31 @@
- # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
- # default value.
- 
-+# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
-+# SELinux about this change.
-+# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
-+#
- #Port 22
- #AddressFamily any
- #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
- #ListenAddress ::
- 
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- 
- # Ciphers and keying
- #RekeyLimit default none
- 
-+# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect here.
-+# They will be overridden by command-line options passed to the server
-+# on command line.
-+# Please, check manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
-+
- # Logging
- #SyslogFacility AUTH
-+SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
- #LogLevel INFO
- 
- # Authentication:
-@@ -56,9 +70,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
- #PasswordAuthentication yes
- #PermitEmptyPasswords no
-+PasswordAuthentication yes
- 
- # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
- #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
-+ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- 
- # Kerberos options
- #KerberosAuthentication no
-@@ -67,8 +83,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
- 
- # GSSAPI options
--#GSSAPIAuthentication no
--#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
-+GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-+GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
- 
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-@@ -79,16 +95,20 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
--#UsePAM no
-+UsePAM yes
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
--#X11Forwarding no
-+X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PermitTTY yes
--#PrintMotd yes
-+
-+# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
-+# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
-+PrintMotd no
-+
- #PrintLastLog yes
- #TCPKeepAlive yes
- #PermitUserEnvironment no
-@@ -106,6 +126,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # no default banner path
- #Banner none
- 
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 

SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, NULL);
- 
-+	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
-+	if (! options.use_pam)
-+		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
-+
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
- 
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
---- a/sshd_config
-+++ b/sshd_config
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
-+# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
-+# problems.
- UsePAM yes
- 
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes

SOURCES/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
---- openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2019-01-23 20:49:30.513393667 +0100
-@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ do
-         usage
-   }
- 
--  OPT= OPTARG=
-+  OPT=
-+  OPTARG=
-   # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
-   case "$1" in
-     -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
-@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@
-   usage
- fi
- 
--# drop trailing colon
--USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
-+# don't drop trailing colon because it can be a valid ipv6 address
-+USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1")
- # tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
- SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
- # and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
-@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   fi
-   if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
-     printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
--    printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2
-+    printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' >&2
-     exit 0
-   fi
-   printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
-@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
-     # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
-     #     'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh.
-     [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
--      ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
-+      ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
-       || exit 1
-     ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
-     ;;

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
-index b66037f1..54538ff9 100644
---- a/sftp.c
-+++ b/sftp.c
-@@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
- static void
- killchild(int signo)
- {
--	if (sshpid > 1) {
--		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
-+	pid_t pid;
-+
-+	pid = sshpid;
-+	if (pid > 1) {
-+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-+		(void)waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
-index 99c25cd2..574a566e 100644
---- a/msg.c
-+++ b/msg.c
-@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
--	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
-+	if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
- 		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-channel-limits.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits	2021-03-16 12:17:58.905576511 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-03-16 12:17:58.925576667 +0100
-@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
- 	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
- 	u_int i, found;
- 	Channel *c;
-+	int r;
- 
- 	/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
- 	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
-@@ -383,6 +384,8 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
- 	    (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
- 	    (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_set_max_size: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 	c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
- 	c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
- 	channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits	2021-03-16 12:17:58.868576223 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h	2021-03-16 12:17:58.907576527 +0100
-@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ struct Channel {
- /* Read buffer size */
- #define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
- 
-+/* Maximum channel input buffer size */
-+#define CHAN_INPUT_MAX	(16*1024*1024)
-+
- /* Hard limit on number of channels */
- #define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS	(16*1024)
- 

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
-index e16eabe2..a8c99e2e 100644
---- a/serverloop.c
-+++ b/serverloop.c
-@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	int r, channel_id;
- 
- 	/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
--	if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
-+	if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
-+	    ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
- 	    options.client_alive_count_max) {
- 		sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- 		logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index d47cb0d2..2cddbd59 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -519,6 +519,9 @@ is set to 15, and
- .Cm ClientAliveCountMax
- is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
- will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
-+Setting a zero
-+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-+disables connection termination.
- .It Cm ClientAliveInterval
- Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
- from the client,

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -1,424 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-24 17:32:54.821789205 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-24 17:59:58.174122920 +0100
-@@ -357,17 +357,17 @@ or
- .Qq *.c.example.com
- domains.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
--.Pp
- .Xr ssh 1
- will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
- specified.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm CertificateFile
- Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
- A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
-@@ -420,16 +420,21 @@ If the option is set to
- .Cm no ,
- the check will not be executed.
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
- instead of replacing them.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -445,13 +450,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .Ed
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -800,6 +798,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
- The default is
- .Dq no .
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -812,9 +815,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
- .Pp
--The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm HashKnownHosts
- Indicates that
- .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1114,26 +1115,21 @@ it may be zero or more of:
- and
- .Cm pam .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
- instead of replacing them.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
--diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
--.Ed
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- .Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1193,33 +1189,29 @@ The default is INFO.
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
- in order of preference.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
- instead of replacing them.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
- calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
- These are considered safer and their use recommended.
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
--umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1352,27 +1344,21 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
- The default is
- .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
- as a comma-separated list of patterns.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
-+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in default
- instead of replacing it.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
--The default for this option is:
--.Bd -literal -offset 3n
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q key .
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-24 17:32:54.802788908 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-24 17:54:13.347740176 +0100
-@@ -383,16 +383,16 @@ If the argument is
- then no banner is displayed.
- By default, no banner is displayed.
- .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
- by certificate authorities (CAs).
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
--.Pp
- Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
- public key or host-based authentication.
-+.Pp
- .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
- PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-@@ -454,16 +454,21 @@ The default is
- indicating not to
- .Xr chroot 2 .
- .It Cm Ciphers
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the ciphers allowed.
- Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
- instead of replacing them.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- .Pp
- The supported ciphers are:
- .Pp
-@@ -490,13 +495,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
--aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
--aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
- .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -688,6 +686,11 @@ For this to work
- .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
- needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
- .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
- key exchange. Possible values are
- .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -700,8 +703,6 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
- gss-curve25519-sha256-
- .Ed
- .Pp
--The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
- This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
-@@ -791,19 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
- .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
- environment variable.
- .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the host key algorithms
- that the server offers.
--The default for this option is:
--.Bd -literal -offset 3n
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q key .
-@@ -922,16 +916,21 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm KexAlgorithms
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
- instead of replacing them.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- The supported algorithms are:
- .Pp
- .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -961,15 +960,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp384
- ecdh-sha2-nistp521
- .El
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
--ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
--diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
--diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
- .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1038,17 +1028,22 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
- Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
- .It Cm MACs
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
- The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
- instead of replacing them.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- .Pp
- The algorithms that contain
- .Qq -etm
-@@ -1091,15 +1086,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
- umac-128-etm@openssh.com
- .El
- .Pp
--The default is:
--.Bd -literal -offset indent
--umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
--umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
--hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
--.Ed
--.Pp
- The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q mac .
- .It Cm Match
-@@ -1446,27 +1432,21 @@ or equivalent.)
- The default is
- .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
-+The default is handled system-wide by
-+.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
-+.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
-+.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
- .Sq +
--character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in default set
- instead of replacing them.
- If the specified value begins with a
- .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
--from the default set instead of replacing them.
--The default for this option is:
--.Bd -literal -offset 3n
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
--.Ed
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
- .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q key .

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
---- a/sshd.8	2022-05-31 13:39:10.231843926 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.8	2022-05-31 14:34:01.460815420 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
- .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
- command-line options override values specified in the
- configuration file.
-+This mechanism is used by systemd to apply system-wide crypto-policies to ssh server.
- .Nm
- rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
- .Dv SIGHUP ,
-@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@
- rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
- .Fl C
- options.
-+The configuration does not contain the system-wide crypto-policy configuration.
-+To show the most accurate runtime configuration, use:
-+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-+source /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+source /etc/sysconfig/sshd
-+sshd -T $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
-+.Ed
- .It Fl t
- Test mode.
- Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-cve-2020-14145.patch

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c	2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
-@@ -409,6 +409,18 @@ lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct ho
- 	    found) == HOST_FOUND);
- }
- 
-+int
-+lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker)
-+{
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
-+		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker)
-+			return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int
- write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
-     const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h	2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct
-     const struct hostkey_entry **);
- int	 lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
-     const struct hostkey_entry **);
-+int	 lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, int);
- 
- int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
- int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145	2021-05-17 16:53:38.610576561 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-17 16:54:58.169230103 +0200
-@@ -98,12 +98,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
-+static char *
-+first_alg(const char *algs)
-+{
-+	char *ret, *cp;
-+
-+	ret = xstrdup(algs);
-+	if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
-+		*cp = '\0';
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- static char *
- order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- {
--	char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
-+	char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
-+	char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
- 	size_t maxlen;
--	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
-+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
- 	int ktype;
- 	u_int i;
- 
-@@ -115,6 +128,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- 		load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
-+	 * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
-+	 * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
-+	 * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
-+	 * plain keys if necessary.
-+	 */
-+	best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+	if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
-+	    sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) {
-+		debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, "
-+		    "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best);
-+		ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
-+	 * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
-+	 */
- 	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- 	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
- 	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
-@@ -131,11 +164,23 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
- 	while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
- 		if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
- 			fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then
-+		 * prefer all certificate algorithms.
-+		 */
-+		if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) &&
-+		    lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) {
-+			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		/* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */
- 		if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
--		    sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
-+		    sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) {
- 			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
--		else
--			ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		/* Otherwise, put it last */
-+		ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
- 	}
- #undef ALG_APPEND
- 	xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
-@@ -143,6 +188,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
- 	if (*first != '\0')
- 		debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
- 
-+ out:
-+	free(best);
- 	free(first);
- 	free(last);
- 	free(hostname);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-entropy.patch

@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
-index 2d483b3..b361a04 100644
---- a/entropy.c
-+++ b/entropy.c
-@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	}
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
- 
-+#ifdef __linux__
-+	linux_seed();
-+#endif /* __linux__ */
- 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
- 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-index b912dbe..9206337 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
- 	port-solaris.o \
- 	port-net.o \
- 	port-uw.o \
-+	port-linux-prng.o \
- 	port-linux-sshd.o
- 
- .c.o:
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy	2016-12-23 18:34:27.747753563 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:34:27.769753570 +0100
-@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ void oom_adjust_restore(void);
- void oom_adjust_setup(void);
- #endif
- 
-+void linux_seed(void);
-+
- #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..92a617c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 - 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
-+ *
-+ * Authors:
-+ *  Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ *  Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <sys/random.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+
-+void
-+linux_seed(void)
-+{
-+	char *env = NULL;
-+	size_t randlen = 14, left;
-+	unsigned int flags = 0;
-+	unsigned char buf[256], *p;
-+
-+	env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
-+	if (env && strcmp(env, "0") != 0) {
-+		size_t ienv = atoi(env);
-+
-+		/* Max on buffer length */
-+		if (ienv > sizeof(buf))
-+			ienv = sizeof(buf);
-+		/* Minimum is always 14 B */
-+		if (ienv > randlen)
-+			randlen = ienv;
-+		flags = GRND_RANDOM;
-+	}
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	left = randlen;
-+	p = buf;
-+	do {
-+		ssize_t len = getrandom(p, left, flags);
-+		if (len == -1) {
-+			if (errno != EINTR) {
-+				if (flags) {
-+					/* With the variable present, this is fatal error */
-+					fatal("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
-+				} else {
-+					/* Otherwise we log the issue drop out from here */
-+					debug("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
-+					return;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		} else if (len > 0) {
-+			left -= len;
-+			p += len;
-+		}
-+	} while (left > 0);
-+
-+	RAND_seed(buf, randlen);
-+}
-diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
-index 4812448..16305bf 100644
---- a/ssh-add.1
-+++ b/ssh-add.1
-@@ -161,6 +161,22 @@ to make this work.)
- Identifies the path of a
- .Ux Ns -domain
- socket used to communicate with the agent.
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
-index 281ecbd..1a9a635 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.1
-+++ b/ssh-agent.1
-@@ -201,6 +201,26 @@ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
- These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
- The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
-index 12e00d4..1b51a4a 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -832,6 +832,26 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
-index 69d0829..02d79f8 100644
---- a/ssh-keysign.8
-+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
-@@ -80,6 +80,26 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
- information corresponding with the private keys above.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 929904b..f65e42f 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -1309,6 +1309,25 @@ For more information, see the
- .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
- option in
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
-+.Pp
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.rhosts
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index c2c237f..058d37a 100644
---- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -951,6 +951,26 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh IPV6
- IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
-index 04881c83..03c7a5c7 100644
---- a/sftp.c
-+++ b/sftp.c
-@@ -2527,12 +2527,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 				port = tmp;
- 			break;
- 		default:
-+			/* Try with user, host and path. */
- 			if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
--			    &file1) == -1) {
--				/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
--				host = xstrdup(*argv);
--				host = cleanhostname(host);
--			}
-+			    &file1) == 0)
-+				break;
-+			/* Try with user and host. */
-+			if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
-+			    == 0)
-+				break;
-+			/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
-+			host = xstrdup(*argv);
-+			host = cleanhostname(host);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		file2 = *(argv + 1);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-sha2.patch

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-From 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 00:27:04 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default
- to
-
-a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
-the user; ok markus@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
----
- ssh-keygen.c | 14 +++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 564c3c481..f2192edb9 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -1788,10 +1788,14 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
- 	}
- 	free(tmp);
- 
--	if (key_type_name != NULL &&
--	    sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type)  {
--		fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
--		    sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
-+	if (key_type_name != NULL) {
-+		if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
-+			fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
-+			    sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
-+		}
-+	} else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
-+		/* Default to a good signature algorithm */
-+		key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
- 	}
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-
-From 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 00:20:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default
- to
-
-using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
-will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
-overridden.
-
-Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
-signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
-
-ok deraadt@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
----
- ssh-keygen.1 | 13 +++++++++++--
- sshkey.c     |  9 ++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
-index f29774249..673bf6e2f 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
- .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- .\"
--.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2019 $
-+.Dd $Mdocdate: May 20 2019 $
- .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
- .Os
- .Sh NAME
-@@ -577,6 +577,15 @@ The possible values are
- .Dq ed25519 ,
- or
- .Dq rsa .
-+.Pp
-+This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
-+signing certificates using a RSA CA key.
-+The available RSA signature variants are
-+.Dq ssh-rsa
-+(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
-+.Dq rsa-sha2-256
-+.Dq rsa-sha2-512
-+(the default).
- .It Fl U
- When used in combination with
- .Fl s ,
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 9849cb237..379a579cf 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -2528,6 +2528,13 @@ sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
- 	    strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
-+	 * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
-+	 */
-+	if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
-+		alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+
- 	if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
- 
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keyscan-rsa-sha2.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 04:08:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX
- proposal;
-
-allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
-ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
----
- ssh-keyscan.c | 9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
-index d95ba1b37..d383b57b9 100644
---- a/ssh-keyscan.c
-+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
-@@ -233,7 +233,12 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
- 		break;
- 	case KT_RSA:
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
--		    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa";
-+		    "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-+		    "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-+		    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
-+		    "rsa-sha2-512,"
-+		    "rsa-sha2-256,"
-+		    "ssh-rsa";
- 		break;
- 	case KT_ED25519:
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch

@@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
-From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
-
----
- digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
- digest.h         |   6 ++
- ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
- ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
- ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
- sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
- sshkey.h         |   4 +
- 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
-index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
---- a/digest-openssl.c
-+++ b/digest-openssl.c
-@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
- 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
- };
- 
-+const EVP_MD *
-+ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
-+{
-+	switch (digest_type) {
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
-+	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
-+	}
-+	return NULL;
-+}
-+
- static const struct ssh_digest *
- ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
- {
-diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
-index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
---- a/digest.h
-+++ b/digest.h
-@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
- struct sshbuf;
- struct ssh_digest_ctx;
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+#include <openssl/evp.h>
-+/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
-+const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
-+#endif
-+
- /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
- int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
- 
-diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
-index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
---- a/ssh-dss.c
-+++ b/ssh-dss.c
-@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
- ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
--	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
-+	size_t rlen, slen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const u_char *psig = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
-+	    data, datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	free(sigb);
-+	sigb = NULL;
- 
- 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
- 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
-@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
--	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
-+	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
-+	size_t len, slen;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if (dlen == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
-@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	/* sha1 the data */
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
--
--	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
-+	}
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
-+	    sigb, slen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
- 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
-diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
---- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
-@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
- ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
-+	const unsigned char *psig;
- 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
- 	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t len, dlen;
-+	int len;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--
- 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	sshbuf_free(bb);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
- {
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
- 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
--	int hash_alg;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
--	size_t dlen;
-+	int hash_alg, len;
- 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	char *ktype = NULL;
-+	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
- 
- 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
- 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
--	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
-+	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
- 	/* fetch signature */
-@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	}
- 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
- 
--	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
-+	/* Figure out the length */
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
-+	psig = sigb;
-+	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-+	}
- 
--	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
--	case 1:
--		ret = 0;
--		break;
--	case 0:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
- 		goto out;
--	default:
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
-+		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
-+	free(sigb);
- 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
-diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
-index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
---- a/ssh-rsa.c
-+++ b/ssh-rsa.c
-@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
- 
--static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
-+static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
- 
- static const char *
- rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
-@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
- 	return -1;
- }
- 
--static int
--rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
--{
--	switch (type) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		return NID_sha1;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		return NID_sha256;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		return NID_sha512;
--	default:
--		return -1;
--	}
--}
--
- int
- ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
- {
-@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
- ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
-     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
--	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
--	size_t slen = 0;
--	u_int dlen, len;
--	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int len, slen = 0;
-+	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 
- 	if (lenp != NULL)
-@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
- 	else
- 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
-+
- 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
--		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
--	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--
--	/* hash the data */
--	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
--		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
--	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
-+	    datalen);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
-+	if (ret < 0) {
- 		goto out;
- 	}
- 
--	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto out;
--	}
- 	if (len < slen) {
- 		size_t diff = slen - len;
- 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
-@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	/* encode signature */
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- 		*lenp = len;
- 	ret = 0;
-  out:
--	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
- 	freezero(sig, slen);
- 	sshbuf_free(b);
- 	return ret;
-@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
-     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-     const char *alg)
- {
--	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 	char *sigtype = NULL;
- 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
-+	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
- 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
- 
-@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
- 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
--	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
-+	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
- 
- 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
-@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
- 		len = modlen;
- 	}
--	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
-+
-+	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
-+	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
--	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
--	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
--		goto out;
-+	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 
--	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
--	    key->rsa);
-  out:
- 	freezero(sigblob, len);
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * See:
-- * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
-- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
-- */
--
--/*
-- * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
-- *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
--	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
--	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
--	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
--	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(1) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
--	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
--};
--
--/*
-- * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
-- * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
-- *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
-- *      id-sha256(3) }
-- */
--static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
--	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
--	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
--	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
--	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
--	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
--	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
--};
--
- static int
--rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
-+openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
-+    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
- {
--	switch (hash_alg) {
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
--		*oidp = id_sha1;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
--		*oidp = id_sha256;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
--		break;
--	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
--		*oidp = id_sha512;
--		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
--		break;
--	default:
--		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	}
--	return 0;
--}
-+	size_t rsasize = 0;
-+	const RSA *rsa;
-+	int ret;
- 
--static int
--openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
--    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
--{
--	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
--	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
--	const u_char *oid = NULL;
--	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
--
--	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
--		return ret;
--	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
--	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
--	if (hashlen != hlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--		goto done;
--	}
-+	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
- 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
- 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
- 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
--	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
--	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
--	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
--		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
--		goto done;
--	}
--	ret = 0;
-+
-+	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
-+	    sigbuf, siglen);
-+
- done:
--	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
- 	return ret;
- }
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
- }
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+int
-+sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
-+    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	u_char *sig = NULL;
-+	int ret, slen, len;
-+
-+	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+
-+	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
-+	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+
-+	len = slen;
-+	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto error;
-+	}
-+
-+	*sigp = sig;
-+	*lenp = len;
-+	/* Now owned by the caller */
-+	sig = NULL;
-+	ret = 0;
-+
-+error:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	free(sig);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+int
-+sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
-+    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
-+{
-+	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
-+	int ret;
-+
-+	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
-+		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+	}
-+	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
-+	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto done;
-+	}
-+	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	switch (ret) {
-+	case 1:
-+		ret = 0;
-+		break;
-+	case 0:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		break;
-+	}
-+
-+done:
-+	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
- int
- sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
- const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
- int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
- char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
-+int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
-+    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
-+int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
-+    size_t, u_char *, int);
- 
- int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
- int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-pem.patch

@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
-From eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:16:29 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
-
-private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
-private keys to disk.
-
-The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
-superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
-is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
-round of MD5 as a KDF).
-
-adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
----
- authfile.c   |  6 ++--
- ssh-keygen.1 |  9 +++---
- ssh-keygen.c | 25 +++++++++--------
- sshkey.c     | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- sshkey.h     | 11 ++++++--
- 5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
-index 2166c1689..851c1a8a1 100644
---- a/authfile.c
-+++ b/authfile.c
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
- int
- sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
-     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
--    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
-+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
- 	int r;
-@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
- 	if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 	if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
--	    force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
-+	    format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
-index f42127c60..8184a1797 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -419,11 +419,12 @@ The supported key formats are:
- .Dq RFC4716
- (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
- .Dq PKCS8
--(PEM PKCS8 public key)
-+(PKCS8 public or private key)
- or
- .Dq PEM
- (PEM public key).
--The default conversion format is
-+By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
-+format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
- .Dq RFC4716 .
- Setting a format of
- .Dq PEM
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index b019a02ff..5dcad1f61 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ static char *key_type_name = NULL;
- /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
- static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
- 
--/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */
--static int use_new_format = 1;
-+/* Format for writing private keys */
-+static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
- 
- /* Cipher for new-format private keys */
--static char *new_format_cipher = NULL;
-+static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
- 
- /*
-  * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
-@@ -1048,7 +1048,8 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 		snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
- 		    hostname);
- 		if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
--		    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+		    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
-+		    rounds)) != 0) {
- 			error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, ssh_err(r));
- 			goto failnext;
-@@ -1391,7 +1392,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
--	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
- 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
-@@ -1480,7 +1481,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
--	    !use_new_format) {
-+	    private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
- 		error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
- 		    "the new format (-o).");
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
-@@ -1514,7 +1515,8 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
- 
- 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
--	    new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+	    new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
-+	    rounds)) != 0) {
- 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
-@@ -2525,11 +2527,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 			}
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
- 				convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
-+				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
- 				convert_format = FMT_PEM;
--				use_new_format = 0;
-+				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
-@@ -2567,7 +2570,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 			add_cert_option(optarg);
- 			break;
- 		case 'Z':
--			new_format_cipher = optarg;
-+			openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
- 			break;
- 		case 'C':
- 			identity_comment = optarg;
-@@ -2912,7 +2915,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
--	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 6b5ff0485..a0cea9257 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -3975,10 +3975,10 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
- 
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
--/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
-+/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
- static int
--sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
--    const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
-+sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
-+    int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
- {
- 	int success, r;
- 	int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
-@@ -3988,26 +3988,46 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
- 	char *bptr;
- 	BIO *bio = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 
- 	if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
- 		return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
--	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
--		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+ 	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+ 	}
-+
-+	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+ 	}
- 
- 	switch (key->type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
--		success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
--		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
-+			success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
-+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		} else {
-+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
-+		}
- 		break;
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	case KEY_ECDSA:
--		success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
--		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
-+			success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
-+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		} else {
-+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
-+		}
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEY_RSA:
--		success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
--		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
-+			success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
-+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		} else {
-+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		success = 0;
-@@ -4023,6 +4040,13 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
-+		if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
-+		    passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
-+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
- 	if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -4035,6 +4059,7 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- 		goto out;
- 	r = 0;
-  out:
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 	BIO_free(bio);
- 	return r;
- }
-@@ -4046,29 +4071,38 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- int
- sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
-     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
--    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
-+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
- {
- 	switch (key->type) {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 	case KEY_ECDSA:
- 	case KEY_RSA:
--		if (force_new_format) {
--			return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
--			    comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
--		}
--		return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob,
--		    passphrase, comment);
-+		break; /* see below */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	case KEY_ED25519:
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
- 	case KEY_XMSS:
- #endif /* WITH_XMSS */
- 		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
--		    comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
-+		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
- 	default:
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
- 	}
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	switch (format) {
-+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
-+		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
-+		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
-+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
-+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
-+		return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
-+		    format, passphrase, comment);
-+	default:
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- }
- 
- 
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 41d159a1b..d30a69cc9 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
- 	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254,
- };
- 
-+/* Private key disk formats */
-+enum sshkey_private_format {
-+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
-+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
-+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
-+};
-+
- /* key is stored in external hardware */
- #define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT		0x0001
- 
-@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ int	sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf,  struct sshkey **keyp);
- /* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
- int	sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
-     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
--    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds);
-+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
- int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
-     const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
- int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-proxyjump-loops.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 08:49:49 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when
- using
-
-ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037
----
- ssh.c | 10 +++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 15aee569e..a983a108b 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1208,6 +1208,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
- 		char port_s[8];
- 		const char *sshbin = argv0;
-+		int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
-+
-+		if (port <= 0)
-+			port = default_ssh_port();
-+		if (jumpport <= 0)
-+			jumpport = default_ssh_port();
-+		if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport)
-+			fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-rdomain.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-commit 5481d0b4036b33b92c372ee36258ed11bff57d5d
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Thu Feb 27 10:07:33 2020 +0100
-
-    Mark the RDomain configuration option unsupported on non-openbsd builds
-
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index db80e943..153d2525 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -698,7 +698,11 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
- 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#else
-+	{ "rdomain", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#endif
- 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
-@@ -2841,7 +2845,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	    o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
- 	    o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
-+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
- 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 5dca8981..766e9b90 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1542,6 +1542,7 @@ will be bound to this
- If the routing domain is set to
- .Cm \&%D ,
- then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
-+This feature is available on OpenBSD only.
- .It Cm SetEnv
- Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
- by

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch

@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-06-21 10:48:47.754579151 +0200
-@@ -333,7 +333,27 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
- #endif
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
--	if (nonblock) {
-+	c->restore_block = 0;
-+	if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set
-+		 * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to
-+		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
-+		 * with other programs that follow.
-+		 */
-+		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
-+			set_nonblock(rfd);
-+		}
-+		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
-+			set_nonblock(wfd);
-+		}
-+		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
-+			set_nonblock(efd);
-+		}
-+	} else if (nonblock) {
- 		if (rfd != -1)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
- 		if (wfd != -1)
-@@ -422,17 +442,23 @@ channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *
- }
- 
- int
--channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
-+channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp)
- {
- 	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
--	int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
-+	int ret, fd = *fdp;
- 
--	if (fd != -1) {
--		ret = close(fd);
--		*fdp = -1;
--		if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
--			channel_find_maxfd(sc);
--	}
-+	if (fd == -1)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) ||
-+	   (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) ||
-+	   (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0))
-+		(void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0);	/* restore blocking */
-+
-+	ret = close(fd);
-+	*fdp = -1;
-+	if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
-+		channel_find_maxfd(sc);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -442,13 +468,13 @@ channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Chann
- {
- 	int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
- 
--	channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+	channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 	if (rfd != sock)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd);
- 	if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd);
- 	if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -681,7 +707,7 @@ channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
--				channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+				channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 				channel_free(ssh, c);
- 				break;
- 			}
-@@ -1487,7 +1513,8 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct
- 
- Channel *
- channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
--    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
-+    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
-+    int in, int out, int nonblock)
- {
- 	Channel *c;
- 
-@@ -1495,7 +1522,7 @@ channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ss
- 
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
- 	    -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
--	    0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    0, "stdio-forward", nonblock);
- 
- 	c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
- 	c->host_port = port_to_connect;
-@@ -1650,7 +1677,7 @@ channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ss
- 	if (c->single_connection) {
- 		oerrno = errno;
- 		debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
- 		errno = oerrno;
- 	}
-@@ -2087,7 +2114,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh
- 		return 1;
- 	if (len <= 0) {
- 		debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- 	} else {
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) {
- 			fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
-@@ -2119,7 +2146,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh,
- 	if (len <= 0) {
- 		debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
- 		    c->self, c->efd);
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- 	} else {
- 		if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
- 			debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h	2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
-@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@
- 
- #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC	-1
- 
-+/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE	0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET	1 /* set non-blocking state */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO	2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */
-+
-+/* c->restore_block mask flags */
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD	0x01
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD	0x02
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD	0x04
-+
- /* TCP forwarding */
- #define FORWARD_DENY		0
- #define FORWARD_REMOTE		(1)
-@@ -131,6 +141,7 @@ struct Channel {
- 				 * to a matching pre-select handler.
- 				 * this way post-select handlers are not
- 				 * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
-+	int	restore_block;	/* fd mask to restore blocking status */
- 	struct sshbuf *input;	/* data read from socket, to be sent over
- 				 * encrypted connection */
- 	struct sshbuf *output;	/* data received over encrypted connection for
-@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ void	 channel_register_filter(struct ssh
- void	 channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
- 	    channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
- void	 channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
--int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
-+int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *);
- void	 channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
- 
- /* mux proxy support */
-@@ -305,7 +316,7 @@ Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(struct
- 	    char *, char *, int *, const char **);
- Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
- Channel	*channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
--	    u_short, int, int);
-+	    u_short, int, int, int);
- Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
- 	    u_short, char *, char *);
- Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.290558923 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c	2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
-@@ -1436,14 +1436,6 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt
- 	if (have_pty)
- 		leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- 
--	/* restore blocking io */
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
--
- 	/*
- 	 * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
- 	 * exit status to be returned.  In that case, clear error code if the
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/mux.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/mux.c	2021-06-21 10:50:51.007537336 +0200
-@@ -454,14 +454,6 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
- 	if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
- 		error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
--
- 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (cctx->want_tty) {
-@@ -471,7 +463,7 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
- 
- 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
- 	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
--	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
- 	c->remote_id = nc->self; 	/* link control -> session channel */
-@@ -1033,13 +1025,8 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
--
--	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
-+	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1],
-+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 	free(chost);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.388559673 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c	2021-06-21 10:52:42.685405537 +0200
-@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Cha
- 			    strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) {
-+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) {
- 			logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- 			    c->self, __func__, c->wfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
-@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Chan
-  			    strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) {
-+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) {
- 			logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- 			    c->self, __func__, c->rfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
-@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *
- 	debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
- 	    c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
- 	    channel_format_extended_usage(c));
--	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) {
-+	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) {
- 		logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- 		    "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- 		    c->self, __func__, c->efd, c->istate, c->ostate,
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.389559681 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2021-06-21 10:54:47.651377045 +0200
-@@ -1709,7 +1709,8 @@ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ss
- 	    (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0)
- 		fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
- 	if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
--	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
-+	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
-+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
- 	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
- 	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
-@@ -1862,14 +1863,6 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
- 		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(in))
--		set_nonblock(in);
--	if (!isatty(out))
--		set_nonblock(out);
--	if (!isatty(err))
--		set_nonblock(err);
--
- 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (tty_flag) {
-@@ -1879,7 +1872,7 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	c = channel_new(ssh,
- 	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
- 	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
--	    "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);
- 

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-scp-tests.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-index 59f1ff63..dd48a482 100644
---- a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-+++ b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ badserver_4)
- 	echo "C755 2 file"
- 	echo "X"
- 	;;
-+badserver_5)
-+	echo "D0555 0 "
-+	echo "X"
-+	;;
-+badserver_6)
-+	echo "D0555 0 ."
-+	echo "X"
-+	;;
-+badserver_7)
-+	echo "C0755 2 extrafile"
-+	echo "X"
-+	;;
- *)
- 	set -- $arg
- 	shift
-diff --git a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
-index 57cc7706..104c89e1 100644
---- a/regress/scp.sh
-+++ b/regress/scp.sh
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
- scpclean() {
- 	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
- 	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
-+	chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
- }
- 
- verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file"
-@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
- 	$SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
- fi
- 
--for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
-+for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
- 	verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i"
- 	SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
- 	export DIR SCPTESTMODE
-@@ -113,6 +114,15 @@ for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
- 	scpclean
- 	$SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
- 	[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
-+
-+	scpclean
-+	$SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-+	[ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change"
-+
-+	scpclean
-+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-+	[ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows extranous object creation"
-+	rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile
- done
- 
- verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target"
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch

@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ruN a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
---- a/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:31:10.168186838 +0200
-+++ b/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:32:19.146513347 +0200
-@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
- 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
--	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
-+	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
- 	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
- 	sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
-@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
--sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
-diff --color -ruN a/sftp-realpath.c b/sftp-realpath.c
---- a/sftp-realpath.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/sftp-realpath.c	2022-06-23 11:35:33.193244873 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
-+/*	$OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
-+ *    permission.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
-+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
-+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
-+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <stddef.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+
-+#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
-+# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
-+#endif
-+
-+/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
-+
-+char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
-+
-+/*
-+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
-+ *
-+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
-+ * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
-+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
-+ */
-+char *
-+sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
-+{
-+	struct stat sb;
-+	char *p, *q, *s;
-+	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
-+	unsigned symlinks;
-+	int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
-+	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
-+
-+	if (path[0] == '\0') {
-+		errno = ENOENT;
-+		return (NULL);
-+	}
-+
-+	serrno = errno;
-+
-+	if (resolved == NULL) {
-+		resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
-+		if (resolved == NULL)
-+			return (NULL);
-+		mem_allocated = 1;
-+	} else
-+		mem_allocated = 0;
-+
-+	symlinks = 0;
-+	if (path[0] == '/') {
-+		resolved[0] = '/';
-+		resolved[1] = '\0';
-+		if (path[1] == '\0')
-+			return (resolved);
-+		resolved_len = 1;
-+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
-+	} else {
-+		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
-+			if (mem_allocated)
-+				free(resolved);
-+			else
-+				strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
-+			return (NULL);
-+		}
-+		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
-+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
-+	}
-+	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
-+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+		goto err;
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
-+	 */
-+	while (left_len != 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
-+		 * and its length.
-+		 */
-+		p = strchr(left, '/');
-+		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
-+		if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
-+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+			goto err;
-+		}
-+		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
-+		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
-+		left_len -= s - left;
-+		if (p != NULL)
-+			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
-+		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
-+			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
-+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+				goto err;
-+			}
-+			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
-+			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
-+		}
-+		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
-+			continue;
-+		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
-+			continue;
-+		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
-+			/*
-+			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
-+			 * single "/"
-+			 */
-+			if (resolved_len > 1) {
-+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
-+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
-+				*q = '\0';
-+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
-+			}
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
-+		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
-+		 * there are no more path components left.
-+		 */
-+		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
-+		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
-+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+			goto err;
-+		}
-+		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
-+			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
-+				errno = serrno;
-+				return (resolved);
-+			}
-+			goto err;
-+		}
-+		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
-+			if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
-+				errno = ELOOP;
-+				goto err;
-+			}
-+			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
-+			if (slen < 0)
-+				goto err;
-+			symlink[slen] = '\0';
-+			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
-+				resolved[1] = 0;
-+				resolved_len = 1;
-+			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
-+				/* Strip the last path component. */
-+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
-+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
-+				*q = '\0';
-+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
-+			}
-+
-+			/*
-+			 * If there are any path components left, then
-+			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
-+			 * in `left'.
-+			 */
-+			if (p != NULL) {
-+				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
-+					if (slen + 1 >=
-+					    (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
-+						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+						goto err;
-+					}
-+					symlink[slen] = '/';
-+					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
-+				}
-+				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
-+				if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
-+					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+					goto err;
-+				}
-+			}
-+			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
-+	 * is a single "/".
-+	 */
-+	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
-+		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
-+	return (resolved);
-+
-+err:
-+	if (mem_allocated)
-+		free(resolved);
-+	return (NULL);
-+}
-diff --color -ruN a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
---- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:31:10.147186434 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:32:19.147513366 +0200
-@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
- #include "sftp.h"
- #include "sftp-common.h"
- 
-+char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
-+
- /* Our verbosity */
- static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -1185,7 +1187,7 @@
- 	}
- 	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
- 	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
--	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
-+	if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
- 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
- 	} else {
- 		Stat s;

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-timespeccmp.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original	2020-12-22 17:05:02.105698989 +0900
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c	2020-12-22 17:05:42.922035780 +0900
-@@ -937,7 +937,11 @@ sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *b
- 		return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
- 	else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
- #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
--		return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <));
-+		if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <)){
-+			return rmul;
-+		} else {
-+			return -rmul;
-+		}
- #elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
- 		return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
- #else

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_config.patch

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index ffac5d2c..340045b2 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
- 				    "line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				result = 0;
- 			}
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
- 				    "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				return -1;
- 			}
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				    arg);
- 				return -1;
- 			}
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1138,10 +1138,12 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 			else
- 				result = 0;
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL || ci->rdomain == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-+			if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
-+				match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
- 			if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
- 				result = 0;
- 			else
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 54e0a8d8..5483da05 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ struct connection_info {
- 	const char *laddress;	/* local address */
- 	int lport;		/* local port */
- 	const char *rdomain;	/* routing domain if available */
-+	int test;		/* test mode, allow some attributes to be
-+				 * unspecified */
- };
- 
- 
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index cbd3bce9..1fcde502 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1843,6 +1843,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		 */
- 		if (connection_info == NULL)
- 			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
-+		connection_info->test = 1;
- 		parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
- 		dump_config(&options);
- 	}

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch

@@ -1,805 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.740331098 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
- 
- /* import */
- extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern struct include_list includes;
- extern int use_privsep;
- extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
-@@ -573,7 +574,7 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 
- 	ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
- 	ci->user = user;
--	parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
-+	parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
- 	log_change_level(options.log_level);
- 	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:21:43.541848103 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.302046768 +0200
-@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
- static void
- rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
- {
--	int i, j;
-+	int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
- 	char *cp;
- 
- 	/* Remove an environment variable */
-@@ -734,6 +734,11 @@ rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg
- 		options->num_send_env--;
- 		/* NB. don't increment i */
- 	}
-+	if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
-+		options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
-+		    onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
-+		    sizeof(*options->send_env));
-+	}
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.742331115 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
- 		principals-command \
- 		cert-file \
- 		cfginclude \
-+		servcfginclude \
- 		allow-deny-users \
- 		authinfo
- 
-@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
- 		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
- 		ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
- 		ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
--		sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
-+		sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
- 		sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
- 		t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
- 		t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh
---- openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.744331132 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
-+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
-+
-+tid="server config include"
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aa
-+
-+Match host b
-+	Banner /bb
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+Match host c
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+	Banner /cc
-+
-+Match host m
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+Match Host d
-+	Banner /dd
-+
-+Match Host e
-+	Banner /ee
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+Match Host f
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+	Banner /ff
-+
-+Match Host n
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+_EOF
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
-+Match host xxxxxx
-+_EOF
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aaa
-+
-+Match host b
-+	Banner /bbb
-+
-+Match host c
-+	Banner /ccc
-+
-+Match Host d
-+	Banner /ddd
-+
-+Match Host e
-+	Banner /eee
-+
-+Match Host f
-+	Banner /fff
-+_EOF
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aaaa
-+
-+Match host b
-+	Banner /bbbb
-+
-+Match host c
-+	Banner /cccc
-+
-+Match Host d
-+	Banner /dddd
-+
-+Match Host e
-+	Banner /eeee
-+
-+Match Host f
-+	Banner /ffff
-+
-+Match all
-+	Banner /xxxx
-+_EOF
-+
-+trial() {
-+	_host="$1"
-+	_exp="$2"
-+	_desc="$3"
-+	test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
-+	trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
-+	${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
-+	    -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
-+		fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
-+	_got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
-+	if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
-+		fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
-+	fi
-+}
-+
-+trial a /aa
-+trial b /bb
-+trial c /ccc
-+trial d /dd
-+trial e /ee
-+trial f /fff
-+trial m /xxxx
-+trial n /xxxx
-+trial x none
-+
-+# Prepare an included config with an error.
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
-+Banner xxxx
-+	Junk
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
-+    -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
-+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
-+
-+trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
-+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
-+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
-+
-+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+Banner /aa
-+_EOF
-+
-+trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
-+
-+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
-+Match host x
-+_EOF
-+
-+trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
-+
-+# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
-+Include
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
-+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
-+	fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
-+
-+# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+Banner /xx
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aaaa
-+_EOF
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aa
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "Include before match blocks"
-+trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
-+
-+# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
-+Port 7722
-+_EOF
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "Port after included files"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
-+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
-+	fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
-+_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
-+if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
-+	fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
-+fi
-+
-+# cleanup
-+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh
---- openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.746331150 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
-@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
- 
- chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
- REAL_SSH="$SSH"
-+REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
- SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
- 
- # Some test data.  We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.748331167 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
- #include <util.h>
- #endif
-+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
-+# include <glob.h>
-+#else
-+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
-+#endif
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -70,6 +75,9 @@ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOption
-     const char *, int);
- static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-     const char *, int);
-+static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
-+    const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
- 
- /* Use of privilege separation or not */
- extern int use_privsep;
-@@ -528,7 +536,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
--	sHostCertificate,
-+	sHostCertificate, sInclude,
- 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- 	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
- 	sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
-@@ -540,9 +548,11 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
- 
--#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
--#define SSHCFG_MATCH	0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
--#define SSHCFG_ALL	(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
-+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL		0x01	/* allowed in main section of config */
-+#define SSHCFG_MATCH		0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
-+#define SSHCFG_ALL		(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
-+#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH	0x04  /* Match never matches; internal only */
-+#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY	0x08  /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
- 
- /* Textual representation of the tokens. */
- static struct {
-@@ -687,6 +697,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -1259,13 +1270,14 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
- 	{ NULL, -1 }
- };
- 
--int
--process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-+static int
-+process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-     const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
--    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
-+    struct include_list *includes)
- {
- 	char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
--	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
-+	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
- 	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
- 	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
- 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
-@@ -1274,6 +1286,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 	long long val64;
- 	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
- 	const char *errstr;
-+	struct include_item *item;
-+	glob_t gbuf;
- 
- 	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
- 	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
-@@ -1300,7 +1314,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		cmdline = 1;
- 		activep = &cmdline;
- 	}
--	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
-+	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
- 		debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
- 	if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
- 		if (connectinfo == NULL) {
-@@ -1980,15 +1994,112 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			*intptr = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sInclude:
-+		if (cmdline) {
-+			fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
-+			    "command-line option");
-+		}
-+		value = 0;
-+		while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') {
-+			value++;
-+			found = 0;
-+			if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
-+				xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
-+			} else
-+				arg = xstrdup(arg2);
-+
-+			/*
-+			 * Don't let included files clobber the containing
-+			 * file's Match state.
-+			 */
-+			oactive = *activep;
-+
-+			/* consult cache of include files */
-+			TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
-+				if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
-+					continue;
-+				if (item->filename != NULL) {
-+					parse_server_config_depth(options,
-+					    item->filename, item->contents,
-+					    includes, connectinfo,
-+					    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
-+					        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
-+					            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
-+					    activep, depth + 1);
-+				}
-+				found = 1;
-+				*activep = oactive;
-+			}
-+			if (found != 0) {
-+				free(arg);
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+
-+			/* requested glob was not in cache */
-+			debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
-+			    filename, linenum, arg);
-+			if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
-+				if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
-+					fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" "
-+					    "glob failed", filename,
-+					    linenum, arg);
-+				}
-+				/*
-+				 * If no entry matched then record a
-+				 * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
-+				 */
-+				debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
-+				    filename, linenum, arg);
-+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
-+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
-+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
-+				    item, entry);
-+			}
-+			if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
-+				fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__);
-+			for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
-+				debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
-+				    filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
-+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
-+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
-+				item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
-+				if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
-+					    __func__);
-+				}
-+				load_server_config(item->filename,
-+				    item->contents);
-+				parse_server_config_depth(options,
-+				    item->filename, item->contents,
-+				    includes, connectinfo,
-+				    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
-+				        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
-+				            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
-+				    activep, depth + 1);
-+				*activep = oactive;
-+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
-+			}
-+			globfree(&gbuf);
-+			free(arg);
-+		}
-+		if (value == 0) {
-+			fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument",
-+			    filename, linenum);
-+		}
-+		break;
-+
- 	case sMatch:
- 		if (cmdline)
- 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
- 			   "option");
--		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
-+		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum,
-+		    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
- 		if (value < 0)
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
- 			    linenum);
--		*activep = value;
-+		*activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
-+		/* The MATCH_ONLY is applicable only until the first match block */
-+		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
- 		break;
- 
- 	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-@@ -2275,6 +2386,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+int
-+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
-+{
-+	int inc_flags = 0;
-+
-+	return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
-+	    linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
-+}
-+
-+
- /* Reads the server configuration file. */
- 
- void
-@@ -2313,12 +2436,13 @@ load_server_config(const char *filename,
- 
- void
- parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
--   struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+   struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
- {
- 	ServerOptions mo;
- 
- 	initialize_server_options(&mo);
--	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo);
-+	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
-+	    connectinfo);
- 	copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
- }
- 
-@@ -2464,28 +2588,44 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- #undef M_CP_STROPT
- #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
- 
--void
--parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
--    struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH	16
-+static void
-+parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
-+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
- {
--	int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
-+	int linenum, bad_options = 0;
- 	char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
- 
--	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
-+	if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
-+		fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
-+
-+	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu%s", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
-+	    (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
- 
- 	if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
--	active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
- 	linenum = 1;
- 	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
--		if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
--		    linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
-+		if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
-+		    filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
-+		    depth, includes) != 0)
- 			bad_options++;
- 	}
- 	free(obuf);
- 	if (bad_options > 0)
- 		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
- 		    filename, bad_options);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
-+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+{
-+	int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
-+	parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
-+	    connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
- 	process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.750331185 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
-@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
- #ifndef SERVCONF_H
- #define SERVCONF_H
- 
-+#include <sys/queue.h>
-+
- #define MAX_PORTS		256	/* Max # ports. */
- 
- #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS		256	/* Max # subsystems. */
-@@ -234,6 +236,15 @@ struct connection_info {
- 				 * unspecified */
- };
- 
-+/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
-+struct include_item {
-+	char *selector;
-+	char *filename;
-+	struct sshbuf *contents;
-+	TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
-+};
-+TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
-+
- 
- /*
-  * These are string config options that must be copied between the
-@@ -273,12 +284,13 @@ struct connection_info *get_connection_i
- void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
- void	 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
- int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
--	     int *, struct connection_info *);
-+	     int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
- void	 process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
- void	 load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
- void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
--	     struct connection_info *);
--void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
-+	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
-+void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
-+	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
- int	 parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
- int	 server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
- void	 copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.754331220 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
-@@ -825,7 +825,20 @@ during
- and use only the system-wide known hosts file
- .Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
- The default is
--.Cm no .
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm Include
-+Include the specified configuration file(s).
-+Multiple path names may be specified and each pathname may contain
-+.Xr glob 7
-+wildcards.
-+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
-+.Pa /etc/ssh .
-+A
-+.Cm Include
-+directive may appear inside a
-+.Cm Match
-+block
-+to perform conditional inclusion.
- .It Cm IPQoS
- Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
- Accepted values are
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.752331202 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
-@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
- /* sshd_config buffer */
- struct sshbuf *cfg;
- 
-+/* Included files from the configuration file */
-+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
-+
- /* message to be displayed after login */
- struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -927,30 +930,45 @@ usage(void)
- static void
- send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
- {
--	struct sshbuf *m;
-+	struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
-+	struct include_item *item = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
- 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
- 	    sshbuf_len(conf));
- 
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+
-+	/* pack includes into a string */
-+	TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
- 	 *	string	configuration
--	 *	string rngseed		(only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
-+	 *	string	included_files[] {
-+	 *		string	selector
-+	 *		string	filename
-+	 *		string	contents
-+	 *	}
-+	 *	string	rng_seed (if required)
- 	 */
--	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
--		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
--	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
--
- #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
- 	rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
- #endif
--
- 	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
- 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
-+	sshbuf_free(inc);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
- }
-@@ -958,14 +976,15 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
- static void
- recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
- {
--	struct sshbuf *m;
-+	struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
- 	u_char *cp, ver;
- 	size_t len;
- 	int r;
-+	struct include_item *item;
- 
- 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
- 
--	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
- 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
-@@ -973,14 +992,28 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 	if (ver != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
--	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
--		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
--	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+
- #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
- 	rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
- #endif
- 
-+	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
-+		item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
-+		if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
-+	}
-+
- 	free(cp);
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- 
-@@ -1661,7 +1694,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		case 'o':
- 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
- 			if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
--			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
-+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
- 				exit(1);
- 			free(line);
- 			break;
-@@ -1692,7 +1725,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
- 	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
- 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
--	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
-+	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
-@@ -1725,12 +1758,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			 */
- 			(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
- 		}
--	}
--	else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
-+	} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
- 		load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
- 
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
--	    cfg, NULL);
-+	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
- 
- 	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
- 	if (! options.use_pam)
-@@ -1946,7 +1978,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		if (connection_info == NULL)
- 			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
- 		connection_info->test = 1;
--		parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
-+		parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
- 		dump_config(&options);
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb	2022-12-21 12:18:43.274799163 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c	2022-12-21 12:19:19.758081516 +0100
-@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, c
- int
- sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
- {
-+	if (v == NULL)
-+		return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
-+
- 	return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
- }
- 

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-upstream-ignore-SIGPIPE.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From d33ff14309e33aa79fdf95e1bc4facafa80b90a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stepan Broz <sbroz@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 17:38:22 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ignore SIGPIPE earlier in main(), specifically
- before
-
-muxclient() which performs operations that could cause one; Reported by Noam
-Lewis via bz3454, ok dtucker@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 63d8e13276869eebac6d7a05d5a96307f9026e47
----
- ssh.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 786e26d..e037c66 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
- 	 * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
-@@ -1545,7 +1547,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    options.num_system_hostfiles);
- 	tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
- 
--	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
- 	signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- 
- 	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
--- 
-2.45.2
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
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SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
---- a/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.529922670 +0200
-+++ b/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.911762100 +0200
-@@ -906,6 +906,18 @@
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
-+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
-+static int
-+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
-+{
-+	char *cp;
-+
-+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+	free(cp);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- static int
- kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
-@@ -941,6 +953,16 @@
- 		free(ext);
- 	}
- 
-+	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
-+	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
-+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+		    "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
-+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
-+		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
-+		    "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
-+			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
- 	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
- 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
-diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
---- a/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.511922322 +0200
-+++ b/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.902761926 +0200
-@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@
- 
- #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
- #define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
-+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 	0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
-+#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 	0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
- 
- struct sshenc {
- 	char	*name;
-diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
---- a/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.537922825 +0200
-+++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.918762235 +0200
-@@ -736,16 +736,17 @@
- 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
- 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
- 	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
--	int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
-+	int r, ndx, success = 0;
- 	const u_char *blob;
-+	const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
- 	u_char *sig = 0;
- 	size_t blen, slen;
- 
- 	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
--
--	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
--	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
-+	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
-+	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
-+		kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
- 	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
- 		sshkey_free(key);
- 		key = NULL;
-@@ -780,16 +781,24 @@
- 		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
- 		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
- 		 */
--		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
--		    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
-+		sigalg = NULL;
-+		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
-+			if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
-+				sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
-+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
-+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
-+				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
-+		}
-+		debug3("%s: sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", __func__,
-+			sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
- 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
- 		    ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
--		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
--		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
-+		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
- 			error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
- 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
-diff --color -ru a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
---- a/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.532922728 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.914762158 +0200
-@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@
-     struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
- static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
-     struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
--static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep);
- 
- /* Supported key types */
- struct keytype {
-@@ -2092,7 +2091,8 @@
- 	if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
--	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
-+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
-+	    &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	/* Success */
-@@ -2394,8 +2394,8 @@
- 	return r;
- }
- 
--static int
--get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
-+int
-+sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
- {
- 	int r;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-@@ -2477,7 +2477,7 @@
- 		return 0;
- 	if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 	r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@
- 	    sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
--	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
-+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
-diff --color -ru a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
---- a/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.521922515 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.907762022 +0200
-@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
- int	 sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
- const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
-+int      sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
- 
- /* for debug */
- void	sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
-index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
---- a/auth.c
-+++ b/auth.c
-@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
- # include <paths.h>
- #endif
- #include <pwd.h>
-+#include <grp.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
- #include <login.h>
- #endif
-@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
- 		}
- 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
- 
-+		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
-+		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
-+			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
-+			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
-+			_exit(1);
-+		}
-		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
- 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,

SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
-index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
---- a/ssh-keyscan.c
-+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
-@@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
- 		return;
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2.  The "SSH-"
-+	 * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
-+	 * large banner which we must read and ignore.  Loop while reading
-+	 * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
-+	 * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
-+	 * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
-+	 * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
-+	 */
- 	for (;;) {
- 		memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
- 		bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
-@@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
- 		conrecycle(s);
- 		return;
- 	}
-+	if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
-+		error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
-+		confree(s);
-+		return;
-+	}
- 	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
- 		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
- 		confree(s);

SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch

@@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
---- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
-+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
-@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
- 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
- 		goto fail;
- 	}
--	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
--		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
--		goto fail;
--	}
-+	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
-+		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
- 
- 	p->module->handle = handle;
- 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */

SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
---- a/auth2.c	8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000	1.166
-+++ b/auth2.c	28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
-@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
- }
- 
- #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
-+#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
- static double
- user_specific_delay(const char *user)
- {
-@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, 
- 	struct timespec ts;
- 	double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
- 
-+	if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
-+		debug3("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
-+		    "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
-+		return;
-+	}
-+
- 	/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
- 	while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
- 		seconds *= 2;
-@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
- 		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh);
- 	}
--	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
-+	if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
- 		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
- 		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
- 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);

SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch

@@ -1,447 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
-index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
---- a/PROTOCOL
-+++ b/PROTOCOL
-@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
- described at:
- http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
- 
-+1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
-+
-+OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
-+a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
-+RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
-+initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
-+"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
-+may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
-+are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
-+if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
-+
-+When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
-+name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
-+the the protocol:
-+
-+a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
-+   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
-+   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
-+   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
-+   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
-+   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
-+b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
-+   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
-+   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
-+   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
-+
- 2. Connection protocol changes
- 
- 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
-diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
-index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
---- a/kex.c
-+++ b/kex.c
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
- #endif
- 
- /* prototype */
--static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
-+static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
- static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- 
- static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
-@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-+/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
-+static int
-+has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
-+{
-+	char *cp;
-+
-+	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
-+		return 0;
-+	free(cp);
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
-  * Caller must free returned string.
-@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
- char *
- kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
- {
--	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
-+	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
- 	size_t len;
- 
- 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
-@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
- 	}
- 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
- 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
--		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
--			free(m);
-+		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
- 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
--		}
- 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
- 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
- 			free(tmp);
-@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	int r;
- 
--	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
-+	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
-+	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
-+		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
-+	}
-+	error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
-@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
- 		return r;
-+ 	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
-+ 		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
-+ 		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
-+		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
-+ 	}
- 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
- 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
- 			return r;
-@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (kex == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
--	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
-+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
- 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
- 		return r;
-@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
- 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
- 			return r;
--	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 
- 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
-@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
- 	return (1);
- }
- 
--/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
- static int
--has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
-+kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
- {
--	char *cp;
--
--	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
--		return 0;
--	free(cp);
--	return 1;
-+	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
- }
- 
- static int
--kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
-+kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
- {
- 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
- 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
-@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
- 		sprop=peer;
- 	}
- 
--	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
--	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
--		char *ext;
--
--		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
--		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
--		free(ext);
-+	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
-+	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
-+		if (kex->server) {
-+			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
-+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
-+			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
-+		} else {
-+			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
-+			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
-+		}
-+		if (kex->kex_strict) {
-+			debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
-+			if (seq != 0)
-+				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
-+				    "strict KEX violation: "
-+				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
-diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
-index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
---- a/kex.h
-+++ b/kex.h
-@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
- 	u_int	kex_type;
- 	char	*server_sig_algs;
- 	int	ext_info_c;
-+	int	kex_strict;
- 	struct sshbuf *my;
- 	struct sshbuf *peer;
- 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
-diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
-index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
---- a/packet.c
-+++ b/packet.c
-@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
- #endif
- 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
--	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
-+	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
-+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
-+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
-+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
-+		}
- 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
-+	}
- 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
- 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
- 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
-@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
- 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
- 
-+	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
-+		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
-+	}
-+
- 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
- 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
- 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
-@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
- 	for (;;) {
- 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
--		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
--		if (r != 0)
-+		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
- 			break;
- 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
- 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
-@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
- 			goto out;
- 	}
-+
- 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
- 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
--	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
-+	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
-+		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
-+			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
-+			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
-+		}
- 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
-+	}
- 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
- 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
- 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
-@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- #endif
- 	/* reset for next packet */
- 	state->packlen = 0;
-+	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
-+		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
-+	}
- 
- 	/* do we need to rekey? */
- 	if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
-@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
- 		if (r != 0)
- 			return r;
--		if (*typep) {
--			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
--			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
-+		if (*typep == 0) {
-+			/* no message ready */
-+			return 0;
- 		}
-+		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
-+		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
-+
-+		/* Always process disconnect messages */
-+		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
-+			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
-+			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
-+				return r;
-+			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
-+			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
-+			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
-+			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
-+			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
-+			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
-+			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
-+			free(msg);
-+			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
-+		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
-+		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
-+		 * protocol errors.
-+		 */
-+		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
-+		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
- 		switch (*typep) {
- 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
- 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
-@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
- 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
- 			free(msg);
- 			break;
--		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
--			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
--			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
--				return r;
--			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
--			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
--			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
--			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
--			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
--			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
--			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
--			free(msg);
--			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
- 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
- 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
- 				return r;
-@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
-@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
-@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
- 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
- 	va_end(args);
- 
-+	debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
- 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
-diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
-index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
---- a/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	xxx_host = host;
- 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
- 
--	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
-+	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
-+	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
-@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
- };
- 
- static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
--static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
- static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
-@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
- 
- 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
- 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
--	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
-+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
- 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
- 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
- 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
-@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- }
- 
- /* ARGSUSED */
--static int
--input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
--{
--	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
--}
--
- void
- userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
- {
-@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
- 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
- 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
-+	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict	2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
-@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
- 	struct kex *kex;
-+	char *cp;
- 	int r;
- 
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
--	    options.kex_algorithms);
-+	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, 
-+	   "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
-+		fatal("kex_names_cat");
-+
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(cp);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
- 	    options.ciphers);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
-@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (gss && orig)
- 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
- 	else if (gss)
--		newstr = gss;
-+		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
- 	else if (orig)
- 		newstr = orig;
- 
-@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	packet_send();
- 	packet_write_wait();
- #endif
-+	free(cp);
- 	debug("KEX done");
- }
- 

SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 	}
- }
- 
-+static int
-+valid_hostname(const char *s)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	if (*s == '-')
-+		return 0;
-+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
-+		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
-+		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
-+static int
-+valid_ruser(const char *s)
-+{
-+	size_t i;
-+
-+	if (*s == '-')
-+		return 0;
-+	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
-+		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
-+		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
-+			return 0;
-+		/* Disallow \ in last position */
-+		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
-+			return 0;
-+	}
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Main program for the ssh client.
-  */
-@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (!host)
- 		usage();
- 
-+	if (!valid_hostname(host))
-+		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
-+	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
-+		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
- 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
- 
- 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-authfd.c
-authfd.h
-atomicio.c
-atomicio.h
-bufaux.c
-bufbn.c
-buffer.h
-buffer.c
-cleanup.c
-cipher.h
-compat.h
-defines.h
-entropy.c
-entropy.h
-fatal.c
-includes.h
-kex.h
-key.c
-key.h
-log.c
-log.h
-match.h
-misc.c
-misc.h
-pathnames.h
-platform.h
-rsa.h
-ssh-dss.c
-ssh-rsa.c
-ssh.h
-ssh2.h
-uidswap.c
-uidswap.h
-uuencode.c
-uuencode.h
-xmalloc.c
-xmalloc.h

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch

@@ -1,939 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c	2018-08-24 10:22:56.281930322 +0200
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
-  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
-  */
- 
-+#include <stdlib.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <errno.h>
- #include <string.h>
-@@ -65,8 +66,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
-                 case EOF:
-                 case '\0':
-                     if (len > 0) { 
--                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
--                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-+                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
-+                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
-                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
-                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
-                         len = 0;
-@@ -105,9 +106,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
- {
-     size_t i;
-     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
-+        free(argv[i]);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
-+    free(argv);
-     return;
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
-@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- 
-@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
--    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
-+    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
-     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
-     int tried;
-     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2018-08-24 10:18:05.007393297 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2018-08-24 10:18:32.937612513 +0200
-@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
-@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
- 
-+#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
-+
- /* 
-  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
-  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
-@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
-     if (count == 0)
-         return NULL;
-    
--    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-+    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
-         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
-@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- }
- 
- void
--agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
-+agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-     size_t i;
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
-+    int r;
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
-+    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     }
- }
- 
- 
--void
--pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-+static void
-+pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-     u_char *cookie = NULL;
-@@ -114,22 +116,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
-     size_t count = 0;
-     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
--    Buffer action_agentbuf;
-+    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
-     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
-     char * retc;
-     int32_t reti;
-+    int r;
- 
--    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+    rnd = arc4random();
-     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
-     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
-         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
-     }
- 
--    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
-+    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
--            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-+            rnd = arc4random();
-         }
-         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-@@ -139,12 +141,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     if (count > 0) { 
-         free_logbuf = 1;
-         action_logbuf = log_action(reported_argv, count);
--        agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
-+        agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
-         pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(reported_argv, count);
-     }
-     else {
-         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
-+            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-     }
-     
-     /*
-@@ -161,35 +163,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
-     time(&ts);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
-+    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
--    if(retc)
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
--    else
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    if (retc) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    }
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-     if (free_logbuf) { 
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
-+        free(action_logbuf);
-+        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
-     }
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
--    if(reti >= 0)
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
--    else
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
--    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
-+    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
-+    if (reti >= 0) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    }
-+    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
-     free(cookie);
-     return;
-@@ -278,7 +280,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- 
- 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
- 	auth->fd = sock;
--	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	auth->howmany = 0;
- 
- 	return auth;
-@@ -287,43 +289,42 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
- int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
--    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
--    Key *key;
-+    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
-     char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
- 
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
--    pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
-+    pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-+        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-         {
-             if(key != NULL) {
--                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-+                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
-                 id->key = key;
-                 id->filename = comment;
-                 id->ac = ac;
--                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
-+                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
--                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
--                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
--                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
-+                free(id->filename);
-+                key_free(id->key);
-+                free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
-             }
-         }
--        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
-+        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-     }
-     else {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-+        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-     }
--    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
-     EVP_cleanup();
-     return retval;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2018-08-24 10:18:05.008393305 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
-@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-  * a patch 8-)
-  */
- #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
--    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
-+    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
- #endif
- 
-     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
-@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #endif
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-+    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
-     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
-+    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
- 
-     if(ruser_ptr) {
-         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
-         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
-             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-+            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
-         } else
- #endif
-         {
-             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-+                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
-                 goto cleanexit;
-             }
-             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
- 
-     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
-     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
-     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-+        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
-         goto cleanexit;
-     }
- 
-@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-          */
-         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
-     } else {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
--        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-+        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
-     }
- 
-     /*
-@@ -187,19 +187,19 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
-      */
- 
-     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
- 
-         /*
-          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
-          */
-         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
-         } else {
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-         }
-     } else {
--        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-+        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
-     }
- 
- cleanexit:
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
-@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- 
--#include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
- 
- extern char *authorized_keys_file;
-@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-         } else {
-             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
-             if(!slash_ptr)
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal
-+                fatal
-                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
- 
-             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
-             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
--                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
-+                fatal("Username too long");
- 
-             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
-             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
-@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
-         }
-         authorized_keys_file =
--            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-+            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
-                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
-         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
-                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-+        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
-                                                               percent_expand
-                                                               later, we'd step
-                                                               on this, so free
-@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
-     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
- #endif
-     authorized_keys_file =
--        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-+        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
-                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
-                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
- }
- 
- int
--pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
-+pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     return
-         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
--int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
-+int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
- void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
-@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
- #include "uidswap.h"
--
--#include "identity.h"
-+#include <unistd.h>
- 
- /* return 1 if user allows given key */
- /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
- static int
--pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
-+pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
- {
--    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char *line = NULL;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     u_long linenum = 0;
--    Key *found;
-+    struct sshkey *found;
-     char *fp;
-+    size_t linesize = 0;
- 
-     found_key = 0;
--    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
-+    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
- 
--    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
-+    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
-         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
- 
-+        linenum++;
-         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
-         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
-         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
-             continue;
- 
--        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
-+        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
-             int quoted = 0;
- 
--            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-+            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
-             /* key_options = cp; */
-             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
-                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
-@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-             }
-             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
-             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
--            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
--                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-+            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
-+                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
-                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
-                 continue;
-             }
-         }
--        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
-+        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
-             found_key = 1;
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-+            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
-                                   linenum);
--            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
--                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
--            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
-+            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
-+            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
-+                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
-+            free(fp);
-             break;
-         }
-     }
--    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
-+    free(line);
-+    sshkey_free(found);
-     if(!found_key)
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
-+        verbose("key not found");
-     return found_key;
- }
- 
-@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
-  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
-  */
- int
--pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
-+pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int found_key = 0;
-     struct stat st;
--    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
-+    char buf[256];
- 
-     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
-+    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
- 
-     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
-     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-+        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- 
-     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
-         fclose(f);
--        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-+        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
-         return 0;
-     }
- 
-@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
- int
- pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
-                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
--                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
-+                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-     FILE *f;
-     int ok, found_key = 0;
-@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
-     else {
-         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
-         if(pw == NULL) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-+            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
-                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
-             return 0;
-         }
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror
-+        error
-             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
-              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
-        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-+        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
-     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
-     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         goto out;
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-+    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
-                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
- 
-     /* 
-      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
-      * run cleanup_exit() code.
-      */
--    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
- 
-     switch ((pid = fork())) {
-     case -1:                                              /* error */
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         close(p[1]);
-         return 0;
-@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
-         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-+            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
-            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
- #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
-@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
- #endif
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-+            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- #else
-         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
- #endif
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-+            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             _exit(1);
-         }
-@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
-            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
-         _exit(127);
-     default:                                              /* parent */
-         break;
-     }
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
-+    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
- 
-     close(p[1]);
-     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-+        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
-         close(p[0]);
-         /* Don't leave zombie child */
-         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
-@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
- 
-     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
-         if(errno != EINTR) {
--            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-+            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
-                                      strerror(errno));
-             goto out;
-         }
-     }
-     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
-         goto out;
-     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
--        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-+        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
-                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
-         goto out;
-     }
-     found_key = ok;
-   out:
--    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
-+    restore_uid();
-     return found_key;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
-@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
- #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
- 
- #include "identity.h"
--int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
--int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
-+int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
-@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "match.h"
- #include "log.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- 
- 
-@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 	int comparehome = 0;
- 	struct stat st;
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
-+    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
- 
- 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
- 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
-@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
- 			return -1;
- 		}
--		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
-+		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
- 
--		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
-+		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
- 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
- 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
- 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
- 
- 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
- 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
--			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
-+			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
- 			    buf);
- 			break;
- 		}
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2018-08-24 10:22:13.202657025 +0200
-@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
- #include "xmalloc.h"
- #include "ssh.h"
- #include "ssh2.h"
--#include "buffer.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "log.h"
- #include "compat.h"
--#include "key.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include "pathnames.h"
- #include "misc.h"
- #include "secure_filename.h"
-@@ -48,54 +48,59 @@
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
- 
-+#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
-+
- /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
- extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
-  */
- 
- int
--userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
-+userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
- {
--    Buffer          b = { 0 };
-+    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
-     char           *pkalg = NULL;
-     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
--    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
-+    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
--    int             authenticated = 0;
-+    int             r, authenticated = 0;
- 
--    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
-+    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
- 
-     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
-     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
--        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
--    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
--        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
-+    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
-+        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
- 
-     /* construct packet to sign and test */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
-+    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
-+    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
-+        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-+        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
--    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */
--    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
-+    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) == 0)
-         authenticated = 1;
- 
-   user_auth_clean_exit:
-     /* if(&b != NULL) */
--    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
-+    sshbuf_free(b);
-+  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
-     if(sig != NULL)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
-+        free(sig);
-     if(pkblob != NULL)
--        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
-+        free(pkblob);
-     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
-     return authenticated;
- }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
-@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
- #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
- 
--#include <identity.h>
--int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
-+#include "identity.h"
-+int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
- 
- #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
-@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
- 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
- 	*p = '\0';
- 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
--	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
-+	xfree(encoded);
- 	return len;
- }
- 
-@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
- 		return;
- 	}
--	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
-+	buf = malloc(2*len);
- 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
- 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
- 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
-@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
- 	}
- 	if (i % 70 != 69)
- 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
--	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
-+	free(buf);
- }

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-+++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
-@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
- int
- pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
- {
-+    struct passwd *pw;
-     return
--        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
--                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
--        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
--                                             authorized_keys_file)
-+        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-+        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
-+            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
-         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
-                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
-                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
-@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
- 	}
- 
- 	errno = 0; 
--	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
--	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
--	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
- 		close(sock);
--        if(errno == EACCES)
--		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
-+		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		sock = -1;
-+		if(errno == EACCES)
-+			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+	}
- 
--	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
--
-+	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
-+		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
-+		return -1;
-+	}
- 	return sock;
- }
- 

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
-@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
- extern char    *__progname;
- #endif
- 
--PAM_EXTERN int
-+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
- pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- {
-     char          **argv_ptr;
-@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
- }
- 
- 
--PAM_EXTERN int
-+PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
- pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
- {
-     UNUSED(pamh);

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch

@@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
- typedef struct identity Identity;
- typedef struct idlist Idlist;
- 
-+typedef struct {
-+       int     fd;
-+       struct sshbuf *identities;
-+       int     howmany;
-+}      AuthenticationConnection;
-+
- struct identity {
-     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include "sshbuf.h"
- #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "authfd.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
-@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
- {
-     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
-     Identity *id;
--    struct sshkey *key;
-     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
--    char *comment;
-     uint8_t retval = 0;
-     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
-+    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
-+    int r;
-+    unsigned int i;
- 
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
-     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
--        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
--        {
--            if(key != NULL) {
-+        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
-+            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
-+               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
-+                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
-+        } else {
-+            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
-+            {
-+              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
-                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
--                id->key = key;
--                id->filename = comment;
-+                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
-+                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
-                 id->ac = ac;
-                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
-                     retval = 1;
-                 }
--                free(id->filename);
--                key_free(id->key);
-                 free(id);
-                 if(retval == 1)
-                     break;
--            }
--        }
-+              }
-+            }
--        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
--        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
-+            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
-+            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
-+        }
-+        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
-+        free(ac);
-     }
-     else {
-         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
-@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
-         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
-         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 
--    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
-+    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
-         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
- 
-     /* test for correct signature */

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

@@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
-@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
- #include <openssl/evp.h>
- #include "ssh2.h"
- #include "misc.h"
-+#include "ssh.h"
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+#include <sys/socket.h>
-+#include <sys/un.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
- 
- #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
- #include "identity.h"
- #include "get_command_line.h"
- extern char **environ;
- 
-+/* 
-+ * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
-+ * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
-+ * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. 
-+ *
-+ * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that 
-+ * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a 
-+ * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
-+ */
-+
- static char *
- log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
- {
-@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
- pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
-                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
--    char *cookie = NULL;
-+    u_char *cookie = NULL;
-     uint8_t i = 0;
-     uint32_t rnd = 0;
-     uint8_t cookie_len;
-@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-         if (i % 4 == 0) {
-             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
-         }
--        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
-+        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
-         rnd >>= 8;
-     }
- 
-@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
- }
- 
- int
-+ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	const char *authsocket;
-+	int sock;
-+	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
-+	struct stat sock_st;
-+
-+	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
-+	if (!authsocket)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	/* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
-+	if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
-+		if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
-+			fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
-+			return -1;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/* 
-+	 * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody 
-+	 * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
-+	 */
-+	if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
-+		error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
-+	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
-+
-+	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
-+	if (sock < 0)
-+		return -1;
-+
-+	/* close on exec */
-+	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
-+		close(sock);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	errno = 0; 
-+	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
-+	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
-+	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
-+		close(sock);
-+        if(errno == EACCES)
-+		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
-+
-+	return sock;
-+}
-+
-+AuthenticationConnection *
-+ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
-+{
-+	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
-+	int sock;
-+
-+	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
-+	 * exited due to a timeout.
-+	 */
-+	if (sock < 0)
-+		return NULL;
-+
-+	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
-+	auth->fd = sock;
-+	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
-+	auth->howmany = 0;
-+
-+	return auth;
-+}
-+
-+int
- pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
- {
-     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
-@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
-     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
- 
--    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
-+    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
-         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
-         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
-         {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
---- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
-@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
- CC=@CC@
- LD=@LD@
- CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
--CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
-+CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
- LIBS=@LIBS@
- AR=@AR@
- AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
- PERL=@PERL@
- SED=@SED@
- ENT=@ENT@
--LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
-+LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
- LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
- EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- 
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
- 
- ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
- 
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o secure_filename.o
- 
- 
- MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
-@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
- .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
- 
--LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
-+LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
- $(LIBCOMPAT): always
- 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
- always:
- 
--pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
--	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o
-+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
- 
- $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
- 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8

SOURCES/sshd.tmpfiles

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-d /var/empty/sshd 711 root root -

SOURCES/sshd@.service

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-[Unit]
-Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
-Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
-Wants=sshd-keygen.target
-After=sshd-keygen.target
-
-[Service]
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
-StandardInput=socket

ci.fmf

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+resultsdb-testcase: separate

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-10
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-enabled.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-enabled.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-disabled-buildroot-disabled.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build./plans/ci/fips-enabled-buildroot-disabled.functional}

openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 
+ 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
+ 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
+-	    "on your session.", what);
++	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
++	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
++	    "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
++	    "on your session.\n"
++	    "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
++	    "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
+ 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
+ 
+ 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));

openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
+@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include <X11/Xlib.h>
++#include <glib.h>
+ #include <gtk/gtk.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
+ #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
+@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++static void
++move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
++{
++	gdouble step;
++	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
++	
++	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
++	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
++	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
++}
++
+ static int
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
+ {
+ 	const char *failed;
+ 	char *passphrase, *local;
+ 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ 	int buttons, default_response;
+-	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
++	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
+ 	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 	GdkColor fg, bg;
+ 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+ 
+ 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++		    FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
+		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		if (fg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+		if (bg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
+		gtk_box_pack_start(
+-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
++		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
+ 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ 			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ 		}
++
++		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
++		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
++		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
++
++		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
++
++		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
++		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
++		    TRUE, 5);
++		gtk_widget_show(progress);
++		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
++				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
++
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Grab focus */

openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
 --- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
 +++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
  		fdlim_set(maxfd);
  	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- 
++ 
 +	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
 +
- 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
+	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
+		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
  

openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
- void
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
+@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
+     int on_stderr)
  {
 +	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
 +}
 +
 +void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
++log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
-@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
  		exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -26,21 +26,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
  
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
++void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
-@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
+@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
  
@@ -49,25 +49,25 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
  	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
  	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
  	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
  	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
  
 +	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
 +
  	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	/* Log it */
  	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
- 		    __func__, level);
--	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-+	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
+-	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
  
  	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
  	free(msg);
-@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
  	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
  	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
  
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 +		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
 +
 +		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
 +			do_logfds = 1;
 +		}
 +		free(dev_log_path);
@@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
  	int			 m_log_sendfd;
  	struct kex		**m_pkex;
  	pid_t			 m_pid;
@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
  
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
  /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
  static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  	int ret;
  	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
  	char session_type[1024];
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
  	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
  		original_command = command;
-@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  			tty += 5;
  	}
  
@@ -144,10 +144,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    session_type,
  	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 	 * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed later.
- 	 */
- 	endpwent();
+@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
 -
 -	/*
 -	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
  			exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
  
  	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
  		argv[i] = NULL;
  		optind = optreset = 1;
  		__progname = argv[0];
@@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	fflush(NULL);
  
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
 @@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
  struct passwd;
@@ -197,28 +197,28 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
 -int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
 +int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
  void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
  int
 -sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
  {
- 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
- 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+	ssize_t len, olen;
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	extern char *__progname;
  
- 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 -	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
 +	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
  
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -227,21 +227,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	/*
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
-@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  		return 1;
  	}
  
 -	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
 +	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
  }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
-@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ #endif
  
  	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  
  	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
  	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  
  	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;

openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -10,5 +10,5 @@
 +		}
  		omode = mode;
  		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
 -- 

openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +
 +	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
 +	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
++		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
++		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
 +	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
++		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		    " and not writable by anyone else");
 +		fclose(contexts_file);
 +		return;
 +	}
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
 +			arg = strdelim(&cp);
 +			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
++				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
 +				fclose(contexts_file);
 +				return;
 +			}
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +	fclose(contexts_file);
 +
 +	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
++		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		    " SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
@@ -93,18 +93,17 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
  #endif
  
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
--	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
- 	    oldctx, newctx);
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(date 1703108053912)
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
+ 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
+ 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
+
+-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
  	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+ 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@@ -117,10 +116,10 @@ index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
  #endif
  
  #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
 index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c
++++ b/sshd-session.c
 @@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
  	demote_sensitive_data();
  

openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 @@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  #endif
  	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
@@ -38,16 +38,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
  	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
  	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
  	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+@@ -600,14 +600,16 @@ static struct {
  	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
 @@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
@@ -122,10 +122,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
 @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
  #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
  #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
 +#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
  
  # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
  # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
+diff -up openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx	2024-07-11 13:51:19.969960781 +0200
++++ openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c	2024-07-11 13:51:30.938231250 +0200

openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
  
  	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
  	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@@ -21,11 +21,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +				case 130:
 +				case 133:
 +				case 134:
-+					i += opts[i + 1];
-+					break;
++					if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
++						i += opts[i + 1];
++						break;
++					}
++					/* FALLTHROUGH */
 +				default:
 +				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
++			 	 * or incorrect source routing options. */
 +					text[0] = '\0';
 +					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
 +						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
@@ -35,5 +38,5 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +			}
 +		} while (i < option_size);
  	}
- 	return;
  #endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
+ }

openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
  			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
-+
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
- 		_exit(127);
+ 		if (env != NULL)
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
+ 		else
 diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 --- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 +++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
@@ -36,44 +35,44 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
 --- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
 +++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
+ SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
  SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
  LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
  AR=@AR@
- AWK=@AWK@
 @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  
  XMSS_OBJS=\
  	ssh-xmss.o \
 @@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LDAPLIBS)
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
  
 @@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -96,8 +95,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
 @@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  extern int inetd_flag;
- extern int rexeced_flag;
  
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@@ -132,7 +131,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
  		use_current = "";
@@ -466,16 +465,16 @@ index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
  				esac
  			fi
 @@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
  )
- AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
  AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
 +AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
  
  # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
  KRB5_MSG="no"
 @@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
- echo "          +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
  fi
 +if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
 +echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"

openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
  	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
++	if (k5login_exists &&
++	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
  		retval = 1;
  		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
  		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 @@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
  		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
@@ -193,14 +193,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
- 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 @@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -217,16 +217,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 @@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*activep = value;
- 		break;
- 
+		}
+		break;
+
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+	case sMatch:
+		if (cmdline)
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
 @@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
@@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
 @@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
  .Cm IPQoS ,
  .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
@@ -286,4 +286,4 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
 +#KerberosUseKuserok yes
  
  # GSSAPI options
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no

openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
 @@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("done");
  }
  
 +void
@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 +		return;
 +
 +	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		return;
 +	}
 +	if (ctx != NULL) {
 +		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
 +		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		freecon(ctx);
 +	}
 +}
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	platform_setusercontext(pw);
  
 -	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
++	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
  #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
  		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
  		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
@@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	}
  
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
 @@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
  	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
  	demote_sensitive_data();
@@ -109,13 +109,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  	/* Demote the child */
  	if (privsep_chroot) {
  		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
- {
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
- 	if (1) {
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+	if (0) {
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
- #else
- 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
+@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
+ 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
+ 	 * special privileges to begin with.
+ 	 */
+-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
++#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+ 	skip_privdrop = 1;
  #endif
+ 

openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,248 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
+@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
+@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
+ 	 */
+ 
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
+@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
+ 	}
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(nullfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
+ 	}
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
+ 		close(devnull);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+ 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
+ 
+ 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
+-	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
++	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
+ 		;
+ 
+ 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
+ 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
+ 	u_int16_t *portp;
+ 	u_int16_t port;
+-	socklen_t salen;
++	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
+ 	int i;
+ 
+ 	if (sa == NULL) {
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
+@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
+@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
+@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
+ 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
+ 			/* increase optional counter */
+-			if (intptr != NULL)
+-				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
++			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
++  			 if (intptr != NULL)
++				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
+ 		}
+ 		break;
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
++	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
+ 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
+ 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
+ 			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
+@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+ 
+ 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
+ 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
+-		if (box != NULL)
++		if (box != NULL) {
+ 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
++			free(box);
++		}
+ 
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (newstr)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+-	else
++	else {
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++		free(gss);
++	     }
++	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
++			freezero(blob, blen);
++			blob = NULL;
++			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;

openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
---- a/sftp-server.8	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-server.8	2022-06-20 16:03:47.892540068 +0200
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
  .Op Fl u Ar umask
 +.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
  .Ek
  .Nm
  .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
  .Xr umask 2
  to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
  user's default mask.
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
  .El
  .Pp
  On some systems,
-diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
---- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:01:26.183793633 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:02:12.442690608 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
+@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
  /* Version of client */
  static u_int version;
  
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
  static int init_done;
  
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	Attrib a;
  	char *name;
  	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
  	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
  	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
  	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
  	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  			}
  		}
  	}
@@ -64,16 +64,16 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
  		send_status(id, status);
  	free(name);
-@@ -1555,7 +1566,7 @@
+@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  	fprintf(stderr,
  	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
--	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
+-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
++	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
  	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
  	    __progname, __progname);
  	exit(1);
-@@ -1581,7 +1592,7 @@
+@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
  	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'Q':
  			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1643,6 +1654,15 @@
+@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
  			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
  			break;

openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
 +++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
 @@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
 -	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
 +	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
  	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);

openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -13,33 +13,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	int r, ret = 0;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	do {
 +		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
 +			break;
 +		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +
 +		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 +		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
 +		sshbuf_reset(m);
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
 +		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 @@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
  	}
  	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
  #endif
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
++	if (ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	return ret;
  }
  
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 	endpwent();
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
  }
  
 +void
@@ -147,12 +147,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
-+		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
++	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
++	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@@ -176,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
  
 -	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
--	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */

openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -28,14 +28,15 @@ diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
 index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,5 +222,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+ 
  #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
- #include <krb5.h>
  krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
 +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
 +	char **k5login_directory);
  #endif
- #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
++	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
 +	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
 +		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
 +		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
 +			pw->pw_name);
 +	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
++	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
  
 -	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
  	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;

openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
 +#endif
  	}
  	(void) closedir(dirp);
-     } else
+ 	return;
 

openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch

@@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
---- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
+--- a/channels.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/channels.c	(date 1703026069921)
+@@ -5075,11 +5075,13 @@
  }
- 
+
  static int
 -connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
 +connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
  {
  	int sock;
  	struct sockaddr_un addr;
- 
+
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
  	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock < 0)
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
+@@ -5087,11 +5089,12 @@
+ 	}
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@@ -29,8 +31,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 -	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
  	return -1;
  }
- 
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+
+@@ -5099,8 +5102,18 @@
  connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
  {
  	char buf[1024];

openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
 @@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ #define	NUM_SOCKS	10
  
  /* -- X11 forwarding */
 -/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
@@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 +/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
 +#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
  
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
 @@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
   */
  int
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
  		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
 @@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
  		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
  			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
 -			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
 +			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
 @@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
  
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
  int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
 -int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
@@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
  	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
 @@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 -	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 +	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
  	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
@@ -191,13 +191,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
 @@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
- .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
  .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
+ .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
  .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
 +.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
  .Cm X11Forwarding
  and
- .Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+ .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
 @@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
  X11 forwarding.
  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.

openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
 +	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
 +#endif
  #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
  #endif
 @@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
  #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
@@ -69,29 +69,6 @@ index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
  	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
  #endif
 -- 1.9.1
-
-The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
-specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e86aa2c..98062f1 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
-+	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
- #endif
- #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
- 	/*
--- 
 1.9.1
 diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 --- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
@@ -107,40 +84,3 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-se
  	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
  #endif
 
-
-From ef34ea4521b042dd8a9c4c7455f5d1a8f8ee5bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
-Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:11:15 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
-
-Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware acceleration
-to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
-
-Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography support with the
-help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt
-device driver and so there is a need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
-
-Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
-
-Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in that area.
-I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the patches to the openssl
-community.
-
-Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 5edbc6946..56eb9317f 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
- 	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
- #endif
- #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
- 	/*

openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -1,70 +1,69 @@
 diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
+ extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
  
  static char *
- format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
 @@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
 @@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
++	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
---- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
-  */
  pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
--    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
-+    void *the_authctxt)
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
++    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
++    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
 @@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
---- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
--    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
- 
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
++    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
  
+ typedef struct arglist arglist;
+ struct arglist {
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -82,14 +81,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #endif
  
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
--extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
  /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
  int
@@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  
  	if (r == 0) {
  		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
--		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
  			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
  
@@ -145,14 +143,14 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  	char *role;
 @@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
  
  	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
  
--	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
  		use_current = "1";
  	} else {
@@ -203,10 +201,10 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
@@ -216,56 +214,58 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
 --- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
 +++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
  
- extern int use_privsep;
  extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
  
- void
- platform_pre_listen(void)
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
+ int
 @@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
  	}
  #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+diff -up openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor openssh/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
 @@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
  
  /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
 -static int inetd_flag = 0;
 +int inetd_flag = 0;
  
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
-@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
- static int saved_argc;
- 
- /* re-exec */
--static int rexeced_flag = 0;
-+int rexeced_flag = 0;
- static int rexec_flag = 1;
- static int rexec_argc = 0;
- static char **rexec_argv;
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
 @@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
++	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
  #endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
+diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
++++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);

openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,766 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-05-06 12:12:10.107634472 +0200
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+ 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
+ 	struct dhgroup dhg;
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
++		    " Falling back to known groups.");
++		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
++	}
++
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
+ 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
+@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+ 	return 8192;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
++ * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
++ */
++int
++dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
++{
++	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
++	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
++	DH *known = NULL;
++	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
++	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
++
++	if (bits <= 3072) {
++		known = dh_new_group14();
++	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
++		known = dh_new_group16();
++	} else {
++		known = dh_new_group18();
++	}
++
++	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
++
++	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
++	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
++		rv = 1;
++	}
++
++	DH_free(known);
++	return rv;
++}
++
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-05-06 12:11:28.393298005 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+ 
+ int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
+ int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
++int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
+ 
+ u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
+-			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
++			if (FIPS_mode())
++				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
++			else
++				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
+ 			free(s);
+ 			return 0;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
++	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
+ 
+ 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
+ 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
+ 	"rsa-sha2-256"
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"rsa-sha2-512," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256"
++
+ #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
+ 
+ #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
+ 
++#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
++	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
++	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
++	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
++#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
++#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
++	"hmac-sha1," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512," \
++	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
++	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
++
+ /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
+ #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.428926336 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+ # include <glob.h>
+ #else
+@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.463926606 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
+ #ifdef __NR_open
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
+ #endif
++#ifdef __NR_socket
++	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
++#endif
+ #ifdef __NR_openat
+ 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.455926545 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ #include <util.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	do { \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #endif
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		exit(0);
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
+ #include <vis.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
++
+ #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
+ 
+ #include "xmalloc.h"
+@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+-		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
+-		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
+-		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+-
+-		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
+-		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
+-			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
+-			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
+-			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
+-			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
+-				free(gss_host);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
++			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
++			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++
++			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
++				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
++			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
++				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
++				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
++				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
++				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
++					free(gss_host);
++					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
++				}
++			} else {
+ 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ 			}
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
+ 
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
++			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
++			if (gss) {
++				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
++				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
++
++				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
++				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
++				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
++				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
++				    "%s,null", orig);
++			}
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
+@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
+ #endif
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <syslog.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
++		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
++				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
++		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++		    sshkey_free(key);
++		    key = NULL;
++		    continue;
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
+ 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
+ 
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
++	}
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ b/sshd-session.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
+@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/rand.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+ 
+@@ -2506,10 +2513,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
+ 		orig = NULL;
+ 
+-	if (options.gss_keyex)
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
+-	else
+-		gss = NULL;
++	if (options.gss_keyex) {
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
++			options.gss_keyex = 0;
++		} else {
++			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
++		}
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (gss && orig)
+ 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "match.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
+ 		impl = keyimpls[i];
+ 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 			continue;
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			switch (impl->type) {
++			case KEY_ED25519:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++			     continue;
++			     break;
++			default:
++			     break;
++			}
++		}
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
+@@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
+ 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ 	}
+ 
++	switch (type) {
++	case KEY_ED25519:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    sshkey_free(k);
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		break;
++	}
+ 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+ 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
+ 	*ret = *k;
+@@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*lenp = 0;
+ 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
++	/* Fallthrough */
+ 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
+@@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		*detailsp = NULL;
+ 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
+		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
+ #include "cipher.h"
+ 
+ #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
++#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
+ 
+ /*
+  * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
+@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		if (type == KEY_DSA)
++			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
++			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	}
+ 	switch (type) {
+ 	case KEY_DSA:
+ 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
+@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const ch
+ 	char *name = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
++		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
+ 	else {
+ 		switch (sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name)) {
+ #ifdef WITH_DSA
+@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+ 			first = 1;
+ 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
+ 		}
++		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
++
++		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
++		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
++			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
++			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
++			goto next;
++		}
++
+ 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
+ 		fflush(stdout);
+-		type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_types[i].key_type);
+ 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
+ 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
+@@ -3830,7 +3831,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
+-		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
++		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
+ 
+ 	type = sshkey_type_from_shortname(key_type_name);
+ 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
+		goto out;
+ 	}
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0 || res == NULL) {
++		if (FIPS_mode())
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c.xxx	2024-10-09 10:35:56.285946080 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/kexgen.c	2024-10-09 10:41:52.792597194 +0200
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -115,13 +116,28 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -189,15 +205,30 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -312,16 +343,31 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_MLKEM768X25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type mlkem768x25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_mlkem768x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:53:41.428343304 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c	2022-07-11 16:56:09.284663661 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *ke
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
+ 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+diff -up openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx openssh-9.9p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-9.9p1/kex.c.xxx	2024-10-11 12:44:08.087426597 +0200
++++ openssh-9.9p1/kex.c	2024-10-11 14:00:10.404714521 +0200
+@@ -40,6 +40,7 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+ # include <openssl/param_build.h>
+@@ -109,7 +110,7 @@ kex_proposal_populate_entries(struct ssh
+ 
+ 	/* Append EXT_INFO signalling to KexAlgorithms */
+ 	if (kexalgos == NULL)
+-		kexalgos = defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
++	    kexalgos = FIPS_mode() ? KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : defprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
+ 	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(kexalgos, ssh->kex->server ?
+ 	    "ext-info-s,kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com" :
+ 	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)

openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
-index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
---- a/auth-krb5.c
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -10,7 +29,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  #endif
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -19,24 +38,18 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  	char *client, *platform_client;
  	const char *errmsg;
  
-@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  		goto out;
  	}
  
--	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
 +	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
 +	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
-@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-+	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- 				 &creds);
- 	if (problem)
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  		goto out;
  #endif
  
@@ -57,7 +70,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
  
-@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  void
  krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
@@ -113,7 +126,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
  		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
  		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	}
  }
  
@@ -151,7 +164,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
 +	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
++	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
 +	if (template == NULL)
 +		return -1;
 +
@@ -179,7 +192,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		} else {
 +			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
 +			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
++			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
@@ -198,16 +211,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	return -1;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
++krb5_error_code
 +ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
 +	profile_t p;
 +	int ret = 0;
 +	char *value = NULL;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
 +	if (ret)
 +		return ret;
@@ -218,11 +228,14 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
++	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
-+krb5_error_code
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
@@ -242,7 +255,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 -		return oerrno;
 -	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
@@ -283,7 +296,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -	close(tmpfd);
  
 -	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
++	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
 +	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
 +	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
 +	if (ret)
@@ -304,13 +317,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
 +	 */
 +	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
 +		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
 +		free(type);
 +		if (ret)
 +			return ret;
 +
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
 +		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
 +	} else {
 +		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
@@ -318,35 +331,47 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		 * collections
 +		 */
 +		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
 +		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
 +	}
  }
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
-index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
---- a/auth.h
-+++ b/auth.h
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
+@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
+ }
  
-@@ -243,6 +244,6 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
  
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
- #include <krb5.h>
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
+@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
+ 	char *envstr;
  #endif
- #endif
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+ 
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
 @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
@@ -449,7 +474,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
  #endif
  
-@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  
  	client->store.data = krb_context;
  
@@ -458,43 +483,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  }
  
  int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
-index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
---- a/gss-serv.c
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
-@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
-@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -502,7 +494,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
  	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@@ -511,17 +503,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
--	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
-+	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
+@@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ typedef enum {
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
++	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
+@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -535,7 +526,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -546,7 +537,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # ifdef USE_AFS
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
@@ -554,11 +545,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@@ -567,13 +557,12 @@ index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
-index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
---- a/session.c
-+++ b/session.c
-@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- 	 * the childs environment as they see fit
+ 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
  	 */
 -	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
 +	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
@@ -581,7 +570,7 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
  #endif
  
  	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -590,33 +579,10 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
-index 6593e422..245178af 100644
---- a/ssh-gss.h
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
-@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
  		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@@ -625,11 +591,10 @@ index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
+@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
  file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -642,5 +607,26 @@ index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);

openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
+--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
+ #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
+ #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+ #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
++#
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
++# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
++#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
++# included below. For more information, see manual page for
++#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
++Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
+--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
++# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
++Match final all
++	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
++	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
++
++	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++
++# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
++# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
++# mode correctly we set this to yes.
++	ForwardX11Trusted yes
++
++# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
++# Host *.local
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
+ 
+      SyslogFacility
+              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+-             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
+-             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
+-             default is AUTH.
++             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
++             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
++             The default is AUTH.
+ 
+      TCPKeepAlive
+              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
+@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+ .It Cm SyslogFacility
+ Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
+ .Xr sshd 8 .
+-The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
++The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
+ LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
+ The default is AUTH.
+ .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
+--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
+ # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
+ # default value.
+
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
++# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
++# SELinux about this change.
++# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
++#
+ #Port 22
+ #AddressFamily any
+ #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
++SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
++
++ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
++
++GSSAPIAuthentication yes
++GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
++
++UsePAM yes
++
++X11Forwarding yes
++
++# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
++# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
++PrintMotd no
++
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
+@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
++# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
++

openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
+@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 			    "enabled authentication methods");
+ 	}
+ 
++	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
++	if (! options.use_pam)
++		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
++
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
+ # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
+ # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
++# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
++# problems.
+ #UsePAM no
+ 
+ #AllowAgentForwarding yes

openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -23,23 +23,20 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
  	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
  		*style++ = 0;
  
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+@@ -314,7 +314,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
  		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
  		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
--		if (use_privsep)
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
 +#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
- 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
++         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
 +#endif
-+		}
  		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
 diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 --- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
@@ -50,9 +47,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +	char *micuser;
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
+ 	u_char *p;
 @@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
 -	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
@@ -63,7 +60,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +#endif
 +		micuser = authctxt->user;
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
 @@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
@@ -74,13 +71,13 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
  	free(mic.value);
  
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
 diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 --- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
 @@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	    (authctxt->role
@@ -93,7 +90,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
 +#endif
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
 diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -141,33 +138,19 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
 +do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
  {
  	int ret = 1;
- #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+ 	char *compound;
 diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
 --- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
 @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
  void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
  void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
 -int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
 +int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
  char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
  char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
  void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/configure.ac.role-mls openssh/configure.ac
---- openssh/configure.ac.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/configure.ac	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -4241,10 +4241,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 			  LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
- 			],
- 			AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
--		SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
--		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
--		LIBS="$save_LIBS"
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
 diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
 --- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -193,10 +176,10 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
---- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
+@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -206,7 +189,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -216,7 +199,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
+@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -226,7 +209,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
+@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -238,8 +221,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 +	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
++	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
 +
 +	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
 +		free(authctxt->role);
@@ -253,25 +236,25 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
- {
+@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  	struct sshbuf *b;
+	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
  	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+ 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
+@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -280,10 +263,10 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@@ -319,12 +302,12 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	int r;
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -338,8 +321,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
 --- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
 +++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
 @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
- int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int compat);
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
+     const char *, u_int compat);
  void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
@@ -351,7 +334,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
- 	port-linux.o \
+ 	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
 -	port-uw.o
@@ -359,7 +342,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
 +	port-linux-sshd.o
  
  .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -371,7 +354,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 -void
 -ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 -{
--	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
 -
 -	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
 -		return;
@@ -407,7 +390,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
  
 -	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
 +	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
@@ -432,7 +415,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -486,7 +469,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
-+extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@@ -544,7 +526,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	access_vector_t bit;
 +	security_class_t class;
 +
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
 +	class = string_to_security_class("context");
 +	if (!class) {
 +		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
@@ -692,7 +674,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++		if (inetd_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@@ -706,7 +688,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +			    /* we actually don't change level */
 +			    reqlvl = "";
 +
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
 +
 +		}
 +
@@ -734,8 +716,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		    "context for %s", pwname);
 +	}
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
@@ -760,13 +742,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	char *use_current;
 +	int rv;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
++	if (inetd_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@@ -797,32 +779,30 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
 +			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+				    __func__);
++				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +			break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
-+				    __func__);
++				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
 +			}
 +		}
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	if (r >= 0) {
 +		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
 +		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
 +		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +	}
@@ -837,14 +817,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (r < 0) {
 +		switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
-+			    __func__);
++			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +			break;
 +		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
-+			    __func__);
++			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
@@ -852,7 +830,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (default_ctx != NULL)
 +		freecon(default_ctx);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++	debug3_f("done");
 +}
 +
 +#endif
@@ -871,8 +849,8 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
  }
  
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
---- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
 @@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  		restore_uid();
  	}
@@ -882,4 +860,4 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 		do_pam_setcred();

openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,642 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.284590156 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.623052194 +0200
+@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@
+ causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
+ This is the default behaviour.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
+ (the default),
+ the check will not be executed.
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Bd -literal -offset indent
+@@ -479,13 +480,6 @@
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
+@@ -885,6 +879,11 @@
+ The default is
+ .Dq no .
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+@@ -897,10 +896,8 @@
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+ .Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
++.Pp
+ .It Cm HashKnownHosts
+ Indicates that
+ .Xr ssh 1
+@@ -919,36 +916,25 @@
+ but may be manually hashed using
+ .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
+-to the default set instead of replacing them.
++to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
+-at the head of the default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The
+ .Fl Q
+@@ -1001,6 +987,17 @@
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++The proposed
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
++.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
++would break the order given by the
++.Pa known_hosts
++file.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+ real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+@@ -1330,6 +1330,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+ and
+ .Cm pam .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
+ their preference order.
+ The selected algorithm will be the first algorithm in this list that
+@@ -1338,29 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-.Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
+ .Pp
++built-in openssh default set.
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+ .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
+@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
+ in order of preference.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+ calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
+ These are considered safer and their use recommended.
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -1567,39 +1555,31 @@
+ The default is
+ .Cm no .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
+-instead of replacing it.
++character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default instead of replacing it.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++This option affects also
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be
+@@ -2265,7 +2245,9 @@
+ This file must be world-readable.
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+-.Xr ssh 1
++.Xr ssh 1 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.277590077 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.592051845 +0200
+@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@
+ then no banner is displayed.
+ By default, no banner is displayed.
+ .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
+ by certificate authorities (CAs).
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+@@ -525,20 +521,25 @@
+ indicating not to
+ .Xr chroot 2 .
+ .It Cm Ciphers
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the ciphers allowed.
+ Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported ciphers are:
+ .Pp
+@@ -565,13 +566,6 @@
+ chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
+-aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
+-aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
+ .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+@@ -766,53 +760,43 @@
+ .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
+ needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
+ .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
+ key exchange. Possible values are
+ .Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-gss-gex-sha1-,
+-gss-group1-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha256-,
+-gss-group16-sha512-,
+-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
++gss-gex-sha1-
++gss-group1-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha256-
++gss-group16-sha512-
++gss-nistp256-sha256-
+ gss-curve25519-sha256-
+ .Ed
+-.Pp
+-The default is
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+ This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
+-the default set instead of replacing them.
++the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
+-will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
++will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
+-the head of the default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++the head of the built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -879,25 +863,14 @@
+ .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ environment variable.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
+ that the server offers.
+ The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+@@ -1025,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm KexAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
+ offer to clients.
+ The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
+@@ -1033,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
+ .Pp
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The supported algorithms are:
+ .Pp
+@@ -1075,17 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-sntrup761x25519-sha512,sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
+-mlkem768x25519-sha256,
+-curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
+-ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
+-diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
+ .It Cm ListenAddress
+@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
+ file.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
+ .It Cm MACs
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
+ The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
+ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The algorithms that contain
+ .Qq -etm
+@@ -1241,15 +1214,6 @@
+ umac-128-etm@openssh.com
+ .El
+ .Pp
+-The default is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset indent
+-umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
+-umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
+-hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
+-.Ed
+-.Pp
+ The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q mac .
+ .It Cm Match
+@@ -1633,36 +1597,25 @@
+ The default is
+ .Cm yes .
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++The default is handled system-wide by
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
++.Pp
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq +
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
+-instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq -
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
+-from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
+-The default for this option is:
+-.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
+-.Ed
++built-in openssh default set.
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
+@@ -2131,7 +2084,9 @@
+ .El
+ .Sh SEE ALSO
+ .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+-.Xr sshd 8
++.Xr sshd 8 ,
++.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
++.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An -nosplit
+ OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free

openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
  		HMAC_CTX_init \
  		RSA_generate_key_ex \
  		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
  	])
  
  	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
@@ -20,33 +20,35 @@ diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
 index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 --- a/kex.c
 +++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
+@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  #include <openssl/crypto.h>
  #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
++# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
 +# include <openssl/kdf.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
 +# endif
  #endif
  
  #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -942,6 +945,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
  	return r;
  }
  
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
-+static const EVP_MD *
++#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
++static const char *
 +digest_to_md(int digest_type)
 +{
 +	switch (digest_type) {
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
++		return SN_sha1;
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
++		return SN_sha256;
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
++		return SN_sha384;
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
++		return SN_sha512;
 +	}
 +	return NULL;
 +}
@@ -56,52 +58,62 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
-+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	u_char *key = NULL;
 +	int r, key_len;
 +
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
++	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
++       char keytype = (char)id;
++
++	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
++	if (!ctx) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (md == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (param_bld == NULL) {
++		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
++		return -1;
++	}
++	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
 +	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
 +	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
-+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
-+	if (!ctx) {
++	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
++		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
++				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
++				hash, hashlen) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
++				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
++				&keytype, 1);
++	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
-+	if (r != 1) {
++	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
++	if (params == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
-+	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
-+	if (r != 1) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
++	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
@@ -115,6 +127,8 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +	r = 0;
 +
 +out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +	free (key);
 +	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	if (r < 0) {
@@ -130,7 +144,7 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
  	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
  	return r;
  }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
++#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
  
  #define NKEYS	6
  int

openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch

@@ -27,16 +27,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
  	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
  		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
  	else
-@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
- 			plen++;
+@@ -856,9 +862,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
  			free(msg);
  			break;
-+		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
-+		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
  		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
 +			sshpam_account_status = 0;
 +			/* FALLTHROUGH */
  		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
++		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
++		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
 -			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -				sshpam_account_status = 0;
  			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)

openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
++++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-uint32_t
++uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_api_version(void)
+ {
+ 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+ {

openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
  				sock_set_v6only(sock);
  			if (x11_use_localhost)
  				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
+ 				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
 +
 +				/* do not remove successfully opened

openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c.orig	2022-04-12 15:47:03.815044607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c	2022-04-12 15:48:12.464963511 +0200
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
++#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>

openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+--- a/readconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/readconf.c	(date 1703169891147)
+@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
++	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
+ 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+--- a/servconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
++++ b/servconf.c	(date 1703169891148)
+@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@
+ 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },

openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+--- openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx	2023-05-29 18:15:56.311236887 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2023-05-29 18:16:07.598503551 +0200
+@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
+ 
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
+ 
++PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
++    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
++echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r == 0 ]; then
++echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
++r=$?
++if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
++fi
++fi
++
+ trace "load hostkeys"
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
+ 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
+@@ -32,12 +48,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private
+ 
+ unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "key type $k"
++	hka=$k
++	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
++	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
++	fi
+ 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
++	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+-	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
++	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
+ 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+@@ -50,15 +70,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
+ done
+ 
+ SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
+ 
+ # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ HOSTKEYALGS=""
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
+ 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
+ done
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
+@@ -70,7 +93,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >>
+ ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
+   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
+ 
+-for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
+ 	verbose "cert type $k"
+ 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
+ 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
+diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx	2023-04-26 17:37:35.100827792 +0200
++++ openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-04-26 17:50:31.860748877 +0200
+@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
+-	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
++	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -260,10 +260,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
+ 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
+ 
++	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
++		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
++				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
++		if (hkalgs)
++			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++		else
++			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
++			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++	}
++
+ 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
+ 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
+-	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++	    filtered_algs);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
+@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	free(hkalgs);
++	free(filtered_algs);
+ 
+ 	/* start key exchange */
+ 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)

openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,297 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.338710923 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.357711165 +0100
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -145,16 +146,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
++	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.279676981 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2023-01-20 15:01:07.007821379 +0100
+@@ -660,11 +660,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	struct sshkey *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
++	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
+ 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+ 	int r, is_proof = 0;
+ 	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
++	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -719,18 +720,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
++		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
++	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
+@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype,
+ 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ 	if (kex != NULL)
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
++	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
++		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
+@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:10:37.533168013 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c	2023-01-26 12:15:35.637631860 +0100
+@@ -333,13 +333,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -101,8 +104,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
++	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0)
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -119,16 +123,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
++	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
++		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0) {
++		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
++		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
++		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -514,7 +524,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
++	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
+@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
+ #include "auth-options.h"
+ #include "serverloop.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "compat.h"
+ 
+ extern ServerOptions options;
+ 
+@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
++			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
++		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-01-25 15:59:34.225364883 +0100
+@@ -1461,6 +1464,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_cha
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
++		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
++			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
++
++			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
++			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
++		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
+@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
++		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
++			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+diff -up openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c
+--- openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx	2024-07-23 15:08:14.794350818 +0200
++++ openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c	2024-07-23 15:40:21.658456636 +0200
+@@ -1305,6 +1305,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	{
++		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
++		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
++		if (rsakey == NULL)
++			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
++
++		if (rsakey != NULL) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++		    }
++		}
++	}
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);