import RHEL 10 Beta openssh-9.8p1-6.el10

2024-11-20 13:45:43 +00:00
127 changed files with 11463 additions and 15641 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1,3 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
-SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
+openssh-9.8p1.tar.gz
 SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
--- a/.openssh.metadata
+++ b/.openssh.metadata
@ -1,3 +0,0 @@
 bed7240bb17840b451b8f8457791c33456814d93 SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
 756dbb99193f9541c9206a667eaa27b0fa184a4f SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
 a4482a050fdad1d012427e45799564136708cf6b SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
 -				     "Could not grab %s. "
 -				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
 -				     "on your session.", what);
 +				     "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
 +				     "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
 +				     "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
 +				     "on your session.\n"
 +				     "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
 +				     "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <X11/Xlib.h>
 +#include <glib.h>
 #include <gtk/gtk.h>
 #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
 }
 +static void
 +move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
 +{
 +	gdouble step;
 +	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
 +	
 +	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
 +	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
 +	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
 +}
 +
 static int
 passphrase_dialog(char *message)
 {
 	const char *failed;
 	char *passphrase, *local;
 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
 -	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
 +	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
 	GdkGrabStatus status;
 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
 					"%s",
 					message);
 +	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
 +	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
 +	    FALSE, 0);
 +	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
 	entry = gtk_entry_new();
 	gtk_box_pack_start(
 -	    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
 -	    FALSE, FALSE, 0);
 +	    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry,
 +	    TRUE, FALSE, 0);
 +	gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
 	gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
 	gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
 +	hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
 +	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
 +	    FALSE, 8);
 +	gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
 +	progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
 +	
 +	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
 +	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
 +	    TRUE, 5);
 +	gtk_widget_show(progress);
 +
 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
 +	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
 +			 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.3p1-ctr-evp-fast.patch
@ -1,101 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
 --- openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.ctr-evp	2012-01-11 09:24:06.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-5.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2012-01-11 15:54:04.675956600 +0100
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, in
 struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx
 {
 -	AES_KEY		aes_ctx;
 +	EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ecbctx;
 	u_char		aes_counter[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 };
@@ -63,21 +63,42 @@ ssh_aes_ctr(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, u_char
 {
 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
 	size_t n = 0;
 -	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE];
 +	u_char ctrbuf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
 +	u_char buf[AES_BLOCK_SIZE*256];
 	if (len == 0)
 		return (1);
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) == NULL)
 		return (0);
 -	while ((len--) > 0) {
 +	for (; len > 0; len -= sizeof(u_int)) {
 +		u_int r,a,b;
 +
 		if (n == 0) {
 -			AES_encrypt(c->aes_counter, buf, &c->aes_ctx);
 -			ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 +			int outl, i, buflen;
 +
 +			buflen = MIN(len, sizeof(ctrbuf));
 +
 +			for(i = 0; i < buflen; i += AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
 +				memcpy(&ctrbuf[i], c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 +				ssh_ctr_inc(c->aes_counter, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 +			}
 +
 +			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&c->ecbctx, buf, &outl,
 +				ctrbuf, buflen);
 		}
 -		*(dest++) = *(src++) ^ buf[n];
 -		n = (n + 1) % AES_BLOCK_SIZE;
 +
 +		memcpy(&a, src, sizeof(a));
 +		memcpy(&b, &buf[n], sizeof(b));
 +		r = a ^ b;
 +		memcpy(dest, &r, sizeof(r));
 +		src += sizeof(a);
 +		dest += sizeof(r);
 +
 +		n = (n + sizeof(b)) % sizeof(buf);
 	}
 +	memset(ctrbuf, '\0', sizeof(ctrbuf));
 +	memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
 	return (1);
 }
@@ -91,9 +112,28 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, co
 		c = xmalloc(sizeof(*c));
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, c);
 	}
 -	if (key != NULL)
 -		AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 8,
 -		    &c->aes_ctx);
 +
 +	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&c->ecbctx);
 +
 +	if (key != NULL) {
 +		const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
 +		switch(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)*8) {
 +			case 128:
 +				cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
 +				break;
 +			case 192:
 +				cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
 +				break;
 +			case 256:
 +				cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
 +				break;
 +			default:
 +				fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: wrong aes key length");
 +		}
 +		if(!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&c->ecbctx, cipher, NULL, key, NULL))
 +			fatal("ssh_aes_ctr_init: cannot initialize aes encryption");
 +		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(&c->ecbctx, 0);
 +	}
 	if (iv != NULL)
 		memcpy(c->aes_counter, iv, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
 	return (1);
@@ -105,6 +145,7 @@ ssh_aes_ctr_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
 	struct ssh_aes_ctr_ctx *c;
 	if ((c = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(ctx)) != NULL) {
 +		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&c->ecbctx);
 		memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c));
 		free(c);
 		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(ctx, NULL);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch
@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
 --- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
 +++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
 SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
 +CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
 SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
 PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
 SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
 MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
 INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
 -TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 +TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
 XMSS_OBJS=\
 	ssh-xmss.o \
@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
 ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
 +
 ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
 	fi
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
 diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
 --- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
 +++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
 +/*
 + *
 + * invocation (all of the following are equal):
 + * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
 + * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
 + * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
 + */
 +
 +#include "includes.h"
 +
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <sys/param.h>
 +#include <stdarg.h>
 +#include <stdio.h>
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include <ctype.h>
 +
 +#include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "log.h"
 +#include "ssherr.h"
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +
 +/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
 +#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 +
 +void usage(void) {
 +        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
 +                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
 +                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
 +                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
 +                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
 +        exit(1);
 +}
 +
 +void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
 +{
 +        unsigned char *bin;
 +        char *p;
 +        size_t n = 0;
 +        int shift = 4;
 +        unsigned char out = 0;
 +        unsigned char *optr;
 +
 +        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
 +        optr = bin;
 +
 +        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
 +                unsigned char c;
 +
 +                c = *p;
 +                if (isspace(c))
 +                        continue;
 +
 +                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
 +                        c = c - '0';
 +                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
 +                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
 +                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
 +                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
 +                } else {
 +                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
 +                        break;
 +                }
 +
 +                out |= c << shift;
 +                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
 +
 +                if (shift) {
 +                        *(optr++) = out;
 +                        out = 0;
 +                        ++n;
 +                }
 +        }
 +
 +        *len = n;
 +        return bin;
 +}
 +
 +#define READ_CHUNK 4096
 +#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
 +char *read_stdin(void)
 +{
 +        char *buf;
 +        size_t n, total = 0;
 +
 +        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
 +
 +        do {
 +                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
 +                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
 +                        break;
 +
 +                total += n;
 +                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
 +        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
 +        return buf;
 +}
 +
 +int main (int argc, char *argv[])
 +{
 +
 +        const struct sshcipher *c;
 +        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
 +        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
 +        char *hexkey = NULL;
 +        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
 +        char *hexdata = NULL;
 +        char *p;
 +        int i, r;
 +        int encrypt = 1;
 +        void *key;
 +        size_t keylen;
 +        void *iv;
 +        size_t ivlen;
 +        void *data;
 +        size_t datalen;
 +        void *outdata;
 +
 +        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
 +                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
 +                        algo = argv[++i];
 +                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
 +                        hexkey = argv[++i];
 +                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
 +                        ++i;
 +                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
 +                                usage();
 +                        }
 +                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
 +                                encrypt = 1;
 +                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
 +                                encrypt = 0;
 +                        } else {
 +                                usage();
 +                        }
 +                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
 +                        hexiv = argv[++i];
 +                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
 +                        hexdata = argv[++i];
 +                }
 +        }
 +
 +        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
 +                usage();
 +        }
 +
 +	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 +
 +	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
 +	if (c == NULL) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
 +        if (hexdata == NULL) {
 +                hexdata = read_stdin();
 +        } else {
 +                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
 +        }
 +
 +        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
 +
 +	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
 +        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
 +
 +        if (ivlen != 16) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
 +		return 2;
 +        }
 +
 +        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
 +
 +	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
 +	free(key);
 +	free(iv);
 +
 +	outdata = malloc(datalen);
 +	if(outdata == NULL) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
 +		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
 +		return 2;
 +	}
 +
 +	free(data);
 +
 +	cipher_free(cc);
 +
 +        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
 +		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
 +	}
 +
 +        free(outdata);
 +
 +        printf("\n");
 +        return 0;
 +}
 +
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
 index e93d867..4fc5b3d 100644
 --- a/authfile.c
 +++ b/authfile.c
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <fcntl.h>
 +#include <grp.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
 #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
 	if (check_ntsec(filename))
 #endif
 +	if (st.st_mode & 040) {
 +		struct group *gr;
 +
 +		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
 +			st.st_mode &= ~040;
 +	}
 +
 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
 		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -1,177 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity	2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-06-21 11:11:32.467290400 +0200
@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
 		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
 		 * with other programs that follow.
 		 */
 -		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 +		if (rfd >= 0 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
 			set_nonblock(rfd);
 		}
 -		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 +		if (wfd >= 0 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
 			set_nonblock(wfd);
 		}
 -		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 +		if (efd >= 0 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
 			set_nonblock(efd);
 		}
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity	2021-06-21 10:59:17.282473202 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c	2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
 -	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
 +	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
 		;
 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
 	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
 	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
 -		if (tmp1 > 0)
 +		if (tmp1 >= 0)
 			close(tmp1);
 -		if (tmp2 > 0)
 -			close(tmp2);
 +		/*DEAD CODE if (tmp2 >= 0)
 +			close(tmp2);*/
 		return 0;
 	}
 	close(tmp1);
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
 	u_int16_t *portp;
 	u_int16_t port;
 -	socklen_t salen;
 +	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
 	int i;
 	if (sa == NULL) {
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
 {
 	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
 		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
 -		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
 +		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
 	}
 	if (signo)
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
 			    filename, linenum);
 		if (!*activep) {
 -			arg = strdelim(&cp);
 +			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
 			break;
 		}
 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
 			/* increase optional counter */
 -			if (intptr != NULL)
 -				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
 +			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
 +  			 if (intptr != NULL)
 +				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
 		}
 		break;
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
 static void
 notify_parent(void)
 {
 -	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
 }
 static void
 notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
 {
 -	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
 }
 static void
@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
 {
 	char c;
 -	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
 -		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
 +		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
 }
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
 		goto done;
 	}
 -	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
 +	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
 			goto done;
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	sanitise_stdfd();
 	/* drop */
 -	setegid(getgid());
 -	setgid(getgid());
 +	(void) setegid(getgid());
 +	(void) setgid(getgid());
 	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
 -		if (box != NULL)
 +		if (box != NULL) {
 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
 +			free(box);
 +		}
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -1386,6 +1388,9 @@ server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *so
 			explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
 		}
 	}
 +
 +	if (fdset != NULL)
 +		free(fdset);
 }
 /*
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch
@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
 --- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
 +++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
 SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
 CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
 +SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
 SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
 PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
 SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
 MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
 INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
 -TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
 +TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
 XMSS_OBJS=\
 	ssh-xmss.o \
@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
 ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
 +ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 +
 ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
 	fi
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
 diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
 --- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
 +++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
 + *
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 + * are met:
 + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 + *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
 + *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
 + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 + *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 + *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 + * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
 + *    products derived from this software without specific prior
 + *    written permission.
 + *
 + * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
 + * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
 + * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
 + * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
 + * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
 + *
 + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
 + * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
 + * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
 + * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
 + * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
 + * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
 + * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
 + * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
 + * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
 + * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
 + * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
 + * DAMAGE.
 + */
 +
 +#include "includes.h"
 +
 +#include <stdio.h>
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <string.h>
 +
 +#include <openssl/bn.h>
 +
 +#include "xmalloc.h"
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 +#include "cipher.h"
 +#include "kex.h"
 +#include "packet.h"
 +#include "digest.h"
 +
 +static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
 +{
 +	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
 +		return (hex - 48);
 +	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
 +		return (hex - 55);
 +	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
 +		return (hex - 87);
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * Convert hex representation into binary string
 + * @hex input buffer with hex representation
 + * @hexlen length of hex
 + * @bin output buffer with binary data
 + * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
 + *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
 + */
 +static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
 +		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
 +{
 +	size_t i = 0;
 +	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
 +		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
 +		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
 + * and convert hex into bin
 + *
 + * Caller must free bin
 + * @hex input buffer with hex representation
 + * @hexlen length of hex
 + * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
 + * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
 + *
 + * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
 + */
 +static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
 +			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
 +{
 +	unsigned char *out = NULL;
 +	size_t outlen = 0;
 +
 +	if (!hexlen)
 +		return -EINVAL;
 +
 +	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
 +
 +	out = calloc(1, outlen);
 +	if (!out)
 +		return -errno;
 +
 +	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
 +	*bin = out;
 +	*binlen = outlen;
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 +static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
 +				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
 +static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
 +				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
 +static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
 +{
 +	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
 +		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
 +	return 'X';
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * Convert binary string into hex representation
 + * @bin input buffer with binary data
 + * @binlen length of bin
 + * @hex output buffer to store hex data
 + * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
 + *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
 + * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
 + */
 +static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
 +		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
 +{
 +	size_t i = 0;
 +	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
 +		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
 +		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
 +	}
 +}
 +
 +struct kdf_cavs {
 +	unsigned char *K;
 +	size_t Klen;
 +	unsigned char *H;
 +	size_t Hlen;
 +	unsigned char *session_id;
 +	size_t session_id_len;
 +
 +	unsigned int iv_len;
 +	unsigned int ek_len;
 +	unsigned int ik_len;
 +};
 +
 +static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
 +{
 +	int ret = 0;
 +	struct kex kex;
 +	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
 +	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
 +	int mode = 0;
 +	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
 +	struct newkeys *stockeys;
 +	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
 +
 +#define HEXOUTLEN 500
 +	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
 +
 +	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
 +
 +	Kbn = BN_new();
 +	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
 +	if (!Kbn) {
 +		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
 +		ret = 1;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	Kb = sshbuf_new();
 +	if (!Kb) {
 +		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
 +		ret = 1;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
 +
 +	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
 +	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
 +
 +	/* setup kex */
 +
 +	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
 +	switch (test->ik_len) {
 +		case 20:
 +			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
 +			break;
 +		case 32:
 +			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
 +			break;
 +		case 48:
 +			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
 +			break;
 +		case 64:
 +			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
 +			break;
 +		default:
 +			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
 +			ret = 1;
 +			goto out;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* implement choose_enc */
 +	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
 +		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
 +		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
 +			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
 +			ret = 1;
 +			goto out;
 +		}
 +		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
 +		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
 +		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
 +		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
 +	}
 +
 +	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
 +	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
 +	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
 +		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
 +	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
 +		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
 +	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
 +		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
 +
 +	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
 +	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
 +	kex.server = 1;
 +
 +	/* do it */
 +	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
 +		printf("Allocation error\n");
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	ssh->kex = &kex;
 +	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
 +
 +	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
 +	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
 +
 +	/* get data */
 +	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
 +	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
 +		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
 +	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
 +	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
 +	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
 +		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
 +	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
 +
 +	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
 +	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
 +		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
 +	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
 +	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
 +	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
 +		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
 +	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
 +
 +	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
 +	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
 +		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
 +	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
 +	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
 +	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
 +		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
 +	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
 +
 +out:
 +	if (Kbn)
 +		BN_free(Kbn);
 +	if (Kb)
 +		sshbuf_free(Kb);
 +	if (ssh)
 +		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
 +static void usage(void)
 +{
 +	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
 +	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
 +	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
 +	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
 +	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
 +	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
 +	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
 +	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
 +}
 +
 +/*
 + * Test command example:
 + * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
 + *
 + * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
 + * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
 + * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
 + * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
 + * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
 + * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
 + */
 +int main(int argc, char *argv[])
 +{
 +	struct kdf_cavs test;
 +	int ret = 1;
 +	int opt = 0;
 +
 +	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
 +	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
 +	{
 +		size_t len = 0;
 +		switch(opt)
 +		{
 +			/*
 +			 * CAVS K is MPINT
 +			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
 +			 * following transformations already happened):
 +			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
 +			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
 +			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
 +			 */
 +			case 'K':
 +				len = strlen(optarg);
 +				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
 +						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
 +				if (ret)
 +					goto out;
 +				break;
 +			case 'H':
 +				len = strlen(optarg);
 +				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
 +						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
 +				if (ret)
 +					goto out;
 +				break;
 +			case 's':
 +				len = strlen(optarg);
 +				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
 +						    &test.session_id,
 +						    &test.session_id_len);
 +				if (ret)
 +					goto out;
 +				break;
 +			case 'i':
 +				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
 +				break;
 +			case 'e':
 +				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
 +				break;
 +			case 'm':
 +				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
 +				break;
 +			default:
 +				usage();
 +				goto out;
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
 +
 +out:
 +	if (test.session_id)
 +		free(test.session_id);
 +	if (test.K)
 +		free(test.K);
 +	if (test.H)
 +		free(test.H);
 +	return ret;
 +
 +}
 diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
 --- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
 +++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
 +#!/usr/bin/env perl
 +#
 +# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
 +#
 +# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
 +#
 +# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
 +# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
 +# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
 +# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
 +# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
 +# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
 +#
 +# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
 +# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
 +#
 +#                            NO WARRANTY
 +#
 +#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
 +#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
 +#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
 +#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
 +#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 +#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
 +#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
 +#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
 +#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
 +#
 +#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
 +#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
 +#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
 +#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
 +#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
 +#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
 +#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
 +#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
 +#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
 +#
 +use strict;
 +use warnings;
 +use IPC::Open2;
 +
 +# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
 +# STDOUT
 +# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
 +# rest: program and args
 +# returns: STDOUT of program as string
 +sub pipe_through_program($@) {
 +	my $in = shift;
 +	my @args = @_;
 +
 +	my ($CO, $CI);
 +	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
 +
 +	my $out = "";
 +	my $len = length($in);
 +	my $first = 1;
 +	while (1) {
 +		my $rin = "";
 +		my $win = "";
 +		# Output of prog is FD that we read
 +		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
 +		# Input of prog is FD that we write
 +		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
 +		# that is to be written to the app
 +		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
 +			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
 +			$first=0;
 +		}
 +		# Let us wait for 100ms
 +		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
 +		if ( $wout ) {
 +			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
 +			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
 +			$len -= $written;
 +			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
 +			if ($len <= 0) {
 +				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
 +			}
 +		}
 +		if ( $rout ) {
 +			my $tmp_out = "";
 +			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
 +			$out .= $tmp_out;
 +			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
 +		}
 +	}
 +	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
 +	waitpid $pid, 0;
 +
 +	return $out;
 +}
 +
 +# Parser of CAVS test vector file
 +# $1: Test vector file
 +# $2: Output file for test results
 +# return: nothing
 +sub parse($$) {
 +	my $infile = shift;
 +	my $outfile = shift;
 +
 +	my $out = "";
 +
 +	my $K = "";
 +	my $H = "";
 +	my $session_id = "";
 +	my $ivlen = 0;
 +	my $eklen = "";
 +	my $iklen = "";
 +
 +	open(IN, "<$infile");
 +	while(<IN>) {
 +
 +		my $line = $_;
 +		chomp($line);
 +		$line =~ s/\r//;
 +
 +		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
 +			$iklen = 20;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
 +			$iklen = 32;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
 +			$iklen = 48;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
 +			$iklen = 64;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
 +			$ivlen = $1;
 +			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
 +			$eklen = $1;
 +			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
 +			$K = $1;
 +			$K = substr($K, 8);
 +			$K = "00" . $K;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
 +			$H = $1;
 +		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
 +			$session_id = $1;
 +		}
 +		$out .= $line . "\n";
 +
 +		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
 +		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
 +			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
 +
 +			$K = "";
 +			$H = "";
 +			$session_id = "";
 +		}
 +	}
 +	close IN;
 +	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
 +	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
 +	print OUT $out;
 +	close OUT;
 +}
 +
 +############################################################
 +#
 +# let us pretend to be C :-)
 +sub main() {
 +
 +	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
 +	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
 +
 +	my $outfile = $infile;
 +	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
 +	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
 +	$outfile .= ".rsp";
 +	if (-f $outfile) {
 +		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
 +			unless unlink($outfile);
 +	}
 +	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
 +
 +	# Do the job
 +	parse($infile, $outfile);
 +}
 +
 +###########################################
 +# Call it
 +main();
 +1;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-ldap.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-ldap.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config
 --- openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login	2015-08-12 11:29:12.919269245 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config	2015-08-12 11:31:03.653096466 +0200
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 # Authentication:
 #LoginGraceTime 2m
 -#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
 +PermitRootLogin yes
 #StrictModes yes
 #MaxAuthTries 6
 #MaxSessions 10
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.4p1-systemd.patch
@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
 commit 0e22b79bfde45a7cf7a2e51a68ec11c4285f3b31
 Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date:   Mon Nov 21 15:04:06 2016 +0100
    systemd stuff
 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
 index 2ffc369..162ce92 100644
 --- a/configure.ac
 +++ b/configure.ac
@@ -4265,6 +4265,30 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
 AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
 AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
 +# Check whether user wants systemd support
 +SYSTEMD_MSG="no"
 +AC_ARG_WITH(systemd,
 +	[  --with-systemd          Enable systemd support],
 +	[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
 +		AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
 +		if test "$PKGCONFIG" != "no"; then
 +			AC_MSG_CHECKING([for libsystemd])
 +			if $PKGCONFIG --exists libsystemd; then
 +				SYSTEMD_CFLAGS=`$PKGCONFIG --cflags libsystemd`
 +				SYSTEMD_LIBS=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libsystemd`
 +				CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $SYSTEMD_CFLAGS"
 +				SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $SYSTEMD_LIBS"
 +				AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
 +				AC_DEFINE(HAVE_SYSTEMD, 1, [Define if you want systemd support.])
 +				SYSTEMD_MSG="yes"
 +			else
 +				AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
 +			fi
 +		fi
 +	fi ]
 +)
 +
 +
 # Looking for programs, paths and files
 PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
@@ -5097,6 +5121,7 @@ echo "                   libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
 echo "  Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
 echo "           Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
 echo "         Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
 +echo "                   systemd support: $SYSTEMD_MSG"
 echo "       IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
 echo "           Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
 echo "                  BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
 diff --git a/contrib/sshd.service b/contrib/sshd.service
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..e0d4923
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/contrib/sshd.service
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
 +[Unit]
 +Description=OpenSSH server daemon
 +Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
 +After=network.target
 +
 +[Service]
 +Type=notify
 +ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
 +ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 +KillMode=process
 +Restart=on-failure
 +RestartPreventExitStatus=255
 +
 +[Install]
 +WantedBy=multi-user.target
 +
 diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 index 816611c..b8b9d13 100644
 --- a/sshd.c
 +++ b/sshd.c
@@ -85,6 +85,10 @@
 #include <prot.h>
 #endif
 +#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
 +#include <systemd/sd-daemon.h>
 +#endif
 +
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -1888,6 +1892,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			}
 		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD
 +		/* Signal systemd that we are ready to accept connections */
 +		sd_notify(0, "READY=1");
 +#endif
 +
 		/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
 		server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
 		    &newsock, config_s);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -1,569 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.519877082 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
 #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
 -	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
 +	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
 +	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
 #endif
 	return (&aes_ctr);
 }
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.523877120 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
@@ -2014,7 +2014,8 @@ key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct
 {
 	const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
 	const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
 -	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
 +	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : (FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
 	if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
 		return 0;
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.c	2019-03-11 17:08:11.769763057 +0100
@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
 	struct dhgroup dhg;
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
 +		    " Falling back to known groups.");
 +		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 +	}
 +
 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
 	return 8192;
 }
 +/*
 + * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
 + * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
 + */
 +int
 +dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
 +{
 +	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
 +	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
 +	DH *known = NULL;
 +	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
 +
 +	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
 +	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
 +
 +	if (bits <= 3072) {
 +		known = dh_new_group14();
 +	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
 +		known = dh_new_group16();
 +	} else {
 +		known = dh_new_group18();
 +	}
 +
 +	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
 +
 +	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
 +	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
 +		rv = 1;
 +	}
 +
 +	DH_free(known);
 +	return rv;
 +}
 +
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.h
 --- openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.h	2019-03-11 17:08:18.718828381 +0100
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
 int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
 int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
 +int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
 u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kex.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.614877975 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/kex.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
@@ -175,7 +196,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
 -			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
 +			if (FIPS_mode())
 +				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
 +			else
 +				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
 			free(s);
 			return 0;
 		}
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -118,6 +119,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 +	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h
 --- openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
@@ -116,6 +116,16 @@
 	"rsa-sha2-256," \
 	"ssh-rsa"
 +#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
 +	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
 +	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
 +	"rsa-sha2-512," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-256," \
 +	"ssh-rsa"
 +
 /* the actual algorithms */
 #define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
@@ -139,6 +147,38 @@
 #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
 +#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
 +	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
 +	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
 +	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" \
 +	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
 +#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
 +# define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
 +	KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
 +	KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
 +	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
 +# define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
 +	"hmac-sha1," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-256," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-512," \
 +	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
 +#else
 +# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
 +#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
 +# else
 +#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
 +# endif
 +#define        KEX_FIPS_MAC \
 +       "hmac-sha1"
 +#endif
 +
 /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
 #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.601877853 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
@@ -2178,18 +2178,19 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
 -#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
 +#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
 	do { \
 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
 -		    defaults, all)) != 0) \
 +		    (FIPS_mode() ? fips_defaults : defaults), \
 +		    all)) != 0) \
 			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
 	} while (0)
 -	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
 -	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
 -	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
 -	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
 -	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
 -	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
 +	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
 +	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
 +	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
 +	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
 +	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
 +	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
 #undef ASSEMBLE
 	free(all_cipher);
 	free(all_mac);
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.586877712 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
 #ifdef __NR_open
 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
 #endif
 +#ifdef __NR_socket
 +	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
 +#endif
 #ifdef __NR_openat
 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
 #endif
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.568877543 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
@@ -209,18 +209,19 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
 	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
 -#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
 +#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
 	do { \
 -		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
 +		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, (FIPS_mode() \
 +		    ? fips_defaults : defaults), all)) != 0) \
 			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
 	} while (0)
 -	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
 -	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
 -	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
 -	ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
 -	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
 -	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
 -	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
 +	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
 +	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
 +	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
 +	ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
 +	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
 +	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
 +	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
 #undef ASSEMBLE
 	free(all_cipher);
 	free(all_mac);
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.602877862 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #endif
 +#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
@@ -1283,6 +1294,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
 		exit(0);
 	}
 +
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
 	if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
 		fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.580877655 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
 #include <vis.h>
 #endif
 +#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 +
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -148,7 +150,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
 	 * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
 	 * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
 	 */
 -	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
 +	oavail = avail = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
 +	    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
 	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
 	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
 	last = xmalloc(maxlen);
@@ -229,14 +232,16 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
 		all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
 		if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
 -		    KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
 +		    (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
 +		    all_key) != 0)
 			fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
 		free(all_key);
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 	} else {
 		/* Enforce default */
 -		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
 +		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
 +		    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
 		/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(
@@ -201,35 +201,40 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
 #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 -		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
 -		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
 -		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 -
 -		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
 -			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
 -		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
 -			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
 -			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
 -			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 -			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
 -				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 -			}
 -		} else {
 -			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 -		}
 -
 -		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 -		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 -		if (gss) {
 -			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
 -			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
 -			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 -
 -			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
 -			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
 -			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
 -			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
 -			    "%s,null", orig);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
 +			options.gss_keyex = 0;
 +		} else {
 +			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
 +			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
 +			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 +
 +			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
 +				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
 +			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
 +				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
 +				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
 +				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 +				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
 +					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 +				}
 +			} else {
 +				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 +			}
 +
 +			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 +			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 +			if (gss) {
 +				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
 +				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
 +				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 +
 +				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
 +				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
 +				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
 +				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
 +				    "%s,null", orig);
 +			}
 		}
 	}
 #endif
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <grp.h>
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 +#include <syslog.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #endif
@@ -1581,6 +1584,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #endif
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
 +	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
 	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
 	saved_argc = ac;
 	rexec_argc = ac;
@@ -2036,6 +2051,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
 +
 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
 	   unmounted if desired. */
 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
@@ -2412,10 +2431,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
 		orig = NULL;
 -	if (options.gss_keyex)
 -		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
 -	else
 -		gss = NULL;
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
 +			options.gss_keyex = 0;
 +		} else {
 +			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
 +		}
 +	}
 	if (gss && orig)
 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
@@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 +#include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #endif
 #include "crypto_api.h"
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "sshkey-xmss.h"
 #include "match.h"
 +#include "log.h"
 #include "xmss_fast.h"
@@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
 {
 	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 	u_char *sig = NULL;
 -	int ret, slen, len;
 +	int ret, slen;
 +	size_t len;
 	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -411,9 +414,10 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto error;
 	}
 -	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
 -	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
 -	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
 +	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
 +	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto error;
 	}
@@ -440,12 +444,13 @@ sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
 	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 	}
 -	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
 -	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
 +	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
 +	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
 +	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto done;
 	}
 -	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
 +	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
 	switch (ret) {
 	case 1:
 		ret = 0;
@@ -1514,6 +1516,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
 	}
 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
 +		if (FIPS_mode())
 +			logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.590877750 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.625878079 +0100
@@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
 	    OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
 	if (*bitsp > maxbits)
 		fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		if (type == KEY_DSA)
 +			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
 +			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	}
 	switch (type) {
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 			first = 1;
 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
 		}
 +		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
 +
 +		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
 +		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
 +			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
 +			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
 +			goto next;
 +		}
 +
 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
 		fflush(stdout);
 -		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
 			error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config
 --- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx	2023-10-30 13:01:59.150952364 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config	2023-10-30 13:02:56.662231354 +0100
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
 HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
 HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
 +#In FIPS mode Ed25519 keys are not supported, please comment out the next line
 HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
 # Ciphers and keying
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
@ -1,164 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config
 --- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
@@ -44,3 +44,8 @@
 #   VisualHostKey no
 #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
 #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
 +#
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
 +# To modify the system-wide ssh configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
 +#  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
 diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat
 --- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
 +Match final all
 +	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
 +	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
 +
 +	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +
 +# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
 +# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
 +# mode correctly we set this to yes.
 +	ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
 +# Send locale-related environment variables
 +	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
 +	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
 +	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
 +	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
 +
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
 +#   CheckHostIP no
 diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
 --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2018-04-02 07:39:27.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0	2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
@@ -872,9 +872,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
      SyslogFacility
              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
 -             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
 -             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
 -             default is AUTH.
 +             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
 +             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
 +             The default is AUTH.
      TCPKeepAlive
              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
 diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5	2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
 .It Cm SyslogFacility
 Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
 .Xr sshd 8 .
 -The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
 +The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
 LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
 The default is AUTH.
 .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
 diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
 --- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config	2018-07-03 10:45:16.950782466 +0200
@@ -10,20 +10,31 @@
 # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
 # default value.
 +# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
 +# SELinux about this change.
 +# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
 +#
 #Port 22
 #AddressFamily any
 #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
 #ListenAddress ::
 -#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
 -#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
 -#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
 +HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
 +HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
 +HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
 # Ciphers and keying
 #RekeyLimit default none
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
 +# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect here.
 +# They will be overridden by command-line options passed to the server
 +# on command line.
 +# Please, check manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
 +
 # Logging
 #SyslogFacility AUTH
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 #LogLevel INFO
 # Authentication:
@@ -56,9 +70,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
 #PasswordAuthentication yes
 #PermitEmptyPasswords no
 +PasswordAuthentication yes
 # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
 #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
 +ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
 # Kerberos options
 #KerberosAuthentication no
@@ -67,8 +83,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 #KerberosGetAFSToken no
 # GSSAPI options
 -#GSSAPIAuthentication no
 -#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
 +GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
@@ -79,16 +95,20 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
 # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
 -#UsePAM no
 +UsePAM yes
 #AllowAgentForwarding yes
 #AllowTcpForwarding yes
 #GatewayPorts no
 -#X11Forwarding no
 +X11Forwarding yes
 #X11DisplayOffset 10
 #X11UseLocalhost yes
 #PermitTTY yes
 -#PrintMotd yes
 +
 +# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
 #PrintLastLog yes
 #TCPKeepAlive yes
 #PermitUserEnvironment no
@@ -106,6 +126,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 # no default banner path
 #Banner none
 +# Accept locale-related environment variables
 +AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
 +AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
 +AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
 +AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
 +
 # override default of no subsystems
 Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 --- a/sshd.c
 +++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
 	    cfg, NULL);
 +	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
 +
 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
 diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
 --- a/sshd_config
 +++ b/sshd_config
@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
 # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
 +# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
 +# problems.
 UsePAM yes
 #AllowAgentForwarding yes
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch
@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
 --- openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2019-01-23 20:49:30.513393667 +0100
@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ do
         usage
   }
 -  OPT= OPTARG=
 +  OPT=
 +  OPTARG=
   # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
   case "$1" in
     -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@
   usage
 fi
 -# drop trailing colon
 -USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
 +# don't drop trailing colon because it can be a valid ipv6 address
 +USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1")
 # tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
 SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
 # and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
   fi
   if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
     printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
 -    printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2
 +    printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' >&2
     exit 0
   fi
   printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
     # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
     #     'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh.
     [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
 -      ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
 +      ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
       || exit 1
     ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
     ;;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
 index b66037f1..54538ff9 100644
 --- a/sftp.c
 +++ b/sftp.c
@@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
 static void
 killchild(int signo)
 {
 -	if (sshpid > 1) {
 -		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
 -		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
 +	pid_t pid;
 +
 +	pid = sshpid;
 +	if (pid > 1) {
 +		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
 +		(void)waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
 	}
 	_exit(1);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch
@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
 index 99c25cd2..574a566e 100644
 --- a/msg.c
 +++ b/msg.c
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
 		return (-1);
 	}
 	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 -	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
 +	if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
 		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
 		return (-1);
 	}
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-channel-limits.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-channel-limits.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits	2021-03-16 12:17:58.905576511 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-03-16 12:17:58.925576667 +0100
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
 	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
 	u_int i, found;
 	Channel *c;
 +	int r;
 	/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
 	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
@@ -383,6 +384,8 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
 	    (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
 	    (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
 +		fatal("%s: sshbuf_set_max_size: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 	c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
 	c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
 	channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
 --- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits	2021-03-16 12:17:58.868576223 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h	2021-03-16 12:17:58.907576527 +0100
@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ struct Channel {
 /* Read buffer size */
 #define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
 +/* Maximum channel input buffer size */
 +#define CHAN_INPUT_MAX	(16*1024*1024)
 +
 /* Hard limit on number of channels */
 #define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS	(16*1024)
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch
@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
 index e16eabe2..a8c99e2e 100644
 --- a/serverloop.c
 +++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
 	int r, channel_id;
 	/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
 -	if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
 +	if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
 +	    ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
 	    options.client_alive_count_max) {
 		sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
 		logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
 diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
 index d47cb0d2..2cddbd59 100644
 --- a/sshd_config.5
 +++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -519,6 +519,9 @@ is set to 15, and
 .Cm ClientAliveCountMax
 is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
 will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
 +Setting a zero
 +.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
 +disables connection termination.
 .It Cm ClientAliveInterval
 Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
 from the client,
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -1,424 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5
 --- openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-24 17:32:54.821789205 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-24 17:59:58.174122920 +0100
@@ -357,17 +357,17 @@ or
 .Qq *.c.example.com
 domains.
 .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
 by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 .Xr ssh 1
 will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
 specified.
 +.Pp
 .It Cm CertificateFile
 Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
 A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
@@ -420,16 +420,21 @@ If the option is set to
 .Cm no ,
 the check will not be executed.
 .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
 Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 +character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
 instead of replacing them.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
@@ -445,13 +450,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
 .Ed
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
 -aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
 -aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
 .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
@@ -800,6 +798,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
 key exchange. Possible values are
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
@@ -812,9 +815,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 gss-curve25519-sha256-
 .Ed
 .Pp
 -The default is
 -.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
 +.Pp
 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
 Indicates that
 .Xr ssh 1
@@ -1114,26 +1115,21 @@ it may be zero or more of:
 and
 .Cm pam .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
 instead of replacing them.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
 -diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
 -.Ed
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q kex .
@@ -1193,33 +1189,29 @@ The default is INFO.
 DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
 DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
 .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
 in order of preference.
 The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
 instead of replacing them.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
 calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
 These are considered safer and their use recommended.
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
 -umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q mac .
 .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
@@ -1352,27 +1344,21 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
 The default is
 .Cm no .
 .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
 as a comma-separated list of patterns.
 Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
 +character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in default
 instead of replacing it.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The list of available key types may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q key .
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-24 17:32:54.802788908 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-24 17:54:13.347740176 +0100
@@ -383,16 +383,16 @@ If the argument is
 then no banner is displayed.
 By default, no banner is displayed.
 .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
 by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
 public key or host-based authentication.
 +.Pp
 .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
 Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
 PAM or through authentication styles supported in
@@ -454,16 +454,21 @@ The default is
 indicating not to
 .Xr chroot 2 .
 .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the ciphers allowed.
 Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 +character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
 instead of replacing them.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Pp
@@ -490,13 +495,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
 -aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
 -aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
 .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
@@ -688,6 +686,11 @@ For this to work
 .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
 needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
 .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
 key exchange. Possible values are
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
@@ -700,8 +703,6 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 gss-curve25519-sha256-
 .Ed
 .Pp
 -The default is
 -.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
 Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
@@ -791,19 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
 .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
 environment variable.
 .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the host key algorithms
 that the server offers.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 .Pp
 The list of available key types may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q key .
@@ -922,16 +916,21 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
 instead of replacing them.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 The supported algorithms are:
 .Pp
 .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
@@ -961,15 +960,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp384
 ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
 -diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q kex .
 .It Cm ListenAddress
@@ -1038,17 +1028,22 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
 DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
 Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
 .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
 The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
 instead of replacing them.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
@@ -1091,15 +1086,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
 umac-128-etm@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
 -umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q mac .
 .It Cm Match
@@ -1446,27 +1432,21 @@ or equivalent.)
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
 .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
 as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 Alternately if the specified value begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
 +character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in default set
 instead of replacing them.
 If the specified value begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
 +from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
 .Pp
 The list of available key types may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q key .
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
 diff --color -ru a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
 --- a/sshd.8	2022-05-31 13:39:10.231843926 +0200
 +++ b/sshd.8	2022-05-31 14:34:01.460815420 +0200
@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
 .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
 command-line options override values specified in the
 configuration file.
 +This mechanism is used by systemd to apply system-wide crypto-policies to ssh server.
 .Nm
 rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
 .Dv SIGHUP ,
@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@
 rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
 .Fl C
 options.
 +The configuration does not contain the system-wide crypto-policy configuration.
 +To show the most accurate runtime configuration, use:
 +.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 +source /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +source /etc/sysconfig/sshd
 +sshd -T $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
 +.Ed
 .It Fl t
 Test mode.
 Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-cve-2020-14145.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-cve-2020-14145.patch
@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c	2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
@@ -409,6 +409,18 @@ lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct ho
 	    found) == HOST_FOUND);
 }
 +int
 +lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker)
 +{
 +	u_int i;
 +
 +	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
 +		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker)
 +			return 1;
 +	}
 +	return 0;
 +}
 +
 static int
 write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
     const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h
 --- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h	2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct
     const struct hostkey_entry **);
 int	 lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
     const struct hostkey_entry **);
 +int	 lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, int);
 int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
 int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145	2021-05-17 16:53:38.610576561 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-17 16:54:58.169230103 +0200
@@ -98,12 +98,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *
 	return 0;
 }
 +/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
 +static char *
 +first_alg(const char *algs)
 +{
 +	char *ret, *cp;
 +
 +	ret = xstrdup(algs);
 +	if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
 +		*cp = '\0';
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
 static char *
 order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
 {
 -	char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
 +	char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
 +	char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
 	size_t maxlen;
 -	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
 +	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
 	int ktype;
 	u_int i;
@@ -115,6 +128,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
 		load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
 +	/*
 +	 * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
 +	 * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
 +	 * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
 +	 * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
 +	 * plain keys if necessary.
 +	 */
 +	best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +	if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
 +	    sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) {
 +		debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, "
 +		    "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best);
 +		ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
 +	 * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
 +	 */
 	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
 	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
 	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
@@ -131,11 +164,23 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
 	while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
 		if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
 			fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
 +		/*
 +		 * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then
 +		 * prefer all certificate algorithms.
 +		 */
 +		if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) &&
 +		    lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) {
 +			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
 +			continue;
 +		}
 +		/* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */
 		if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
 -		    sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
 +		    sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) {
 			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
 -		else
 -			ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
 +			continue;
 +		}
 +		/* Otherwise, put it last */
 +		ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
 	}
 #undef ALG_APPEND
 	xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
@@ -143,6 +188,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
 	if (*first != '\0')
 		debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
 + out:
 +	free(best);
 	free(first);
 	free(last);
 	free(hostname);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-entropy.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-entropy.patch
@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
 index 2d483b3..b361a04 100644
 --- a/entropy.c
 +++ b/entropy.c
@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
 	}
 #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
 +#ifdef __linux__
 +	linux_seed();
 +#endif /* __linux__ */
 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
 index b912dbe..9206337 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
 	port-solaris.o \
 	port-net.o \
 	port-uw.o \
 +	port-linux-prng.o \
 	port-linux-sshd.o
 .c.o:
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy	2016-12-23 18:34:27.747753563 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:34:27.769753570 +0100
@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ void oom_adjust_restore(void);
 void oom_adjust_setup(void);
 #endif
 +void linux_seed(void);
 +
 #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
 new file mode 100644
 index 0000000..92a617c
 --- /dev/null
 +++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2011 - 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
 + *
 + * Authors:
 + *  Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
 + *  Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 + *
 + * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
 + * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
 + * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
 + *
 + * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
 + * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
 + * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
 + * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
 + * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
 + * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
 + * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
 + */
 +
 +/*
 + * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
 + */
 +
 +#include "includes.h"
 +
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <sys/random.h>
 +
 +#include "log.h"
 +
 +void
 +linux_seed(void)
 +{
 +	char *env = NULL;
 +	size_t randlen = 14, left;
 +	unsigned int flags = 0;
 +	unsigned char buf[256], *p;
 +
 +	env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
 +	if (env && strcmp(env, "0") != 0) {
 +		size_t ienv = atoi(env);
 +
 +		/* Max on buffer length */
 +		if (ienv > sizeof(buf))
 +			ienv = sizeof(buf);
 +		/* Minimum is always 14 B */
 +		if (ienv > randlen)
 +			randlen = ienv;
 +		flags = GRND_RANDOM;
 +	}
 +
 +	errno = 0;
 +	left = randlen;
 +	p = buf;
 +	do {
 +		ssize_t len = getrandom(p, left, flags);
 +		if (len == -1) {
 +			if (errno != EINTR) {
 +				if (flags) {
 +					/* With the variable present, this is fatal error */
 +					fatal("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
 +				} else {
 +					/* Otherwise we log the issue drop out from here */
 +					debug("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
 +					return;
 +				}
 +			}
 +		} else if (len > 0) {
 +			left -= len;
 +			p += len;
 +		}
 +	} while (left > 0);
 +
 +	RAND_seed(buf, randlen);
 +}
 diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
 index 4812448..16305bf 100644
 --- a/ssh-add.1
 +++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -161,6 +161,22 @@ to make this work.)
 Identifies the path of a
 .Ux Ns -domain
 socket used to communicate with the agent.
 +.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +without any specific flags.
 +If the
 +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +environment variable is set to value other than
 +.Cm 0
 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
 +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
 +Minimum is 14 bytes.
 +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
 +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
 +be blocked until enough entropy is available.
 .El
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds
 diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
 index 281ecbd..1a9a635 100644
 --- a/ssh-agent.1
 +++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -201,6 +201,26 @@ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
 These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
 The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
 .El
 +.Sh ENVIRONMENT
 +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
 +.Pp
 +.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +without any specific flags.
 +If the
 +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +environment variable is set to value other than
 +.Cm 0
 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
 +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
 +Minimum is 14 bytes.
 +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
 +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
 +be blocked until enough entropy is available.
 +.El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
 index 12e00d4..1b51a4a 100644
 --- a/ssh-keygen.1
 +++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -832,6 +832,26 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
 The file format is described in
 .Xr moduli 5 .
 .El
 +.Sh ENVIRONMENT
 +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
 +.Pp
 +.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +without any specific flags.
 +If the
 +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +environment variable is set to value other than
 +.Cm 0
 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
 +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
 +Minimum is 14 bytes.
 +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
 +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
 +be blocked until enough entropy is available.
 +.El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
 diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
 index 69d0829..02d79f8 100644
 --- a/ssh-keysign.8
 +++ b/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -80,6 +80,26 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
 If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
 information corresponding with the private keys above.
 .El
 +.Sh ENVIRONMENT
 +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
 +.Pp
 +.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +without any specific flags.
 +If the
 +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +environment variable is set to value other than
 +.Cm 0
 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
 +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
 +Minimum is 14 bytes.
 +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
 +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
 +be blocked until enough entropy is available.
 +.El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr ssh 1 ,
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
 diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
 index 929904b..f65e42f 100644
 --- a/ssh.1
 +++ b/ssh.1
@@ -1309,6 +1309,25 @@ For more information, see the
 .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
 option in
 .Xr sshd_config 5 .
 +.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
 +.Pp
 +.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +without any specific flags.
 +If the
 +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +environment variable is set to value other than
 +.Cm 0
 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
 +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
 +Minimum is 14 bytes.
 +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
 +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
 +be blocked until enough entropy is available.
 +.El
 .Sh FILES
 .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
 .It Pa ~/.rhosts
 diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
 index c2c237f..058d37a 100644
 --- a/sshd.8
 +++ b/sshd.8
@@ -951,6 +951,26 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
 started last).
 The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
 .El
 +.Sh ENVIRONMENT
 +.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
 +.Pp
 +.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +without any specific flags.
 +If the
 +.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
 +environment variable is set to value other than
 +.Cm 0
 +the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
 +.Cm getrandom(1)
 +with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
 +The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
 +Minimum is 14 bytes.
 +This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
 +random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
 +be blocked until enough entropy is available.
 +.El
 .Sh IPV6
 IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
 .Sh SEE ALSO
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
 index 04881c83..03c7a5c7 100644
 --- a/sftp.c
 +++ b/sftp.c
@@ -2527,12 +2527,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 				port = tmp;
 			break;
 		default:
 +			/* Try with user, host and path. */
 			if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
 -			    &file1) == -1) {
 -				/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
 -				host = xstrdup(*argv);
 -				host = cleanhostname(host);
 -			}
 +			    &file1) == 0)
 +				break;
 +			/* Try with user and host. */
 +			if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
 +			    == 0)
 +				break;
 +			/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
 +			host = xstrdup(*argv);
 +			host = cleanhostname(host);
 			break;
 		}
 		file2 = *(argv + 1);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-sha2.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-sha2.patch
@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
 From 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
 Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 00:27:04 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default
 to
 a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
 the user; ok markus@
 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
 ---
 ssh-keygen.c | 14 +++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
 index 564c3c481..f2192edb9 100644
 --- a/ssh-keygen.c
 +++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1788,10 +1788,14 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
 	}
 	free(tmp);
 -	if (key_type_name != NULL &&
 -	    sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type)  {
 -		fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
 -		    sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
 +	if (key_type_name != NULL) {
 +		if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
 +			fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
 +			    sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
 +		}
 +	} else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
 +		/* Default to a good signature algorithm */
 +		key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
 From 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
 Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 00:20:35 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default
 to
 using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
 will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
 overridden.
 Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
 signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
 ok deraadt@
 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
 ---
 ssh-keygen.1 | 13 +++++++++++--
 sshkey.c     |  9 ++++++++-
 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
 index f29774249..673bf6e2f 100644
 --- a/ssh-keygen.1
 +++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
 .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
 .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
 .\"
 -.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2019 $
 +.Dd $Mdocdate: May 20 2019 $
 .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
 .Os
 .Sh NAME
@@ -577,6 +577,15 @@ The possible values are
 .Dq ed25519 ,
 or
 .Dq rsa .
 +.Pp
 +This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
 +signing certificates using a RSA CA key.
 +The available RSA signature variants are
 +.Dq ssh-rsa
 +(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
 +.Dq rsa-sha2-256
 +.Dq rsa-sha2-512
 +(the default).
 .It Fl U
 When used in combination with
 .Fl s ,
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 index 9849cb237..379a579cf 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
 +++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -2528,6 +2528,13 @@ sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
 	    strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	/*
 +	 * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
 +	 * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
 +	 */
 +	if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
 +		alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
 +
 	if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keyscan-rsa-sha2.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keyscan-rsa-sha2.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
 From 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
 Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 04:08:39 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX
 proposal;
 allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
 ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
 ---
 ssh-keyscan.c | 9 +++++++--
 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
 index d95ba1b37..d383b57b9 100644
 --- a/ssh-keyscan.c
 +++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -233,7 +233,12 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
 		break;
 	case KT_RSA:
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
 -		    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa";
 +		    "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
 +		    "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
 +		    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
 +		    "rsa-sha2-512,"
 +		    "rsa-sha2-256,"
 +		    "ssh-rsa";
 		break;
 	case KT_ED25519:
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-evp.patch
@ -1,720 +0,0 @@
 From ed7ec0cdf577ffbb0b15145340cf51596ca3eb89 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 14 May 2019 10:45:45 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Use high-level OpenSSL API for signatures
 ---
 digest-openssl.c |  16 ++++
 digest.h         |   6 ++
 ssh-dss.c        |  65 ++++++++++------
 ssh-ecdsa.c      |  69 ++++++++++-------
 ssh-rsa.c        | 193 +++++++++--------------------------------------
 sshkey.c         |  77 +++++++++++++++++++
 sshkey.h         |   4 +
 7 files changed, 221 insertions(+), 209 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
 index da7ed72bc..6a21d8adb 100644
 --- a/digest-openssl.c
 +++ b/digest-openssl.c
@@ -63,6 +63,22 @@ const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
 	{ -1,			NULL,		0,	NULL },
 };
 +const EVP_MD *
 +ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type)
 +{
 +	switch (digest_type) {
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
 +		return EVP_sha1();
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
 +		return EVP_sha256();
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
 +		return EVP_sha384();
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
 +		return EVP_sha512();
 +	}
 +	return NULL;
 +}
 +
 static const struct ssh_digest *
 ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
 {
 diff --git a/digest.h b/digest.h
 index 274574d0e..c7ceeb36f 100644
 --- a/digest.h
 +++ b/digest.h
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@
 struct sshbuf;
 struct ssh_digest_ctx;
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +#include <openssl/evp.h>
 +/* Converts internal digest representation to the OpenSSL one */
 +const EVP_MD *ssh_digest_to_md(int digest_type);
 +#endif
 +
 /* Looks up a digest algorithm by name */
 int ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name);
 diff --git a/ssh-dss.c b/ssh-dss.c
 index a23c383dc..ea45e7275 100644
 --- a/ssh-dss.c
 +++ b/ssh-dss.c
@@ -52,11 +52,15 @@ int
 ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
 -	size_t rlen, slen, len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
 +	u_char sigblob[SIGBLOB_LEN];
 +	size_t rlen, slen;
 +	int len;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 +	u_char *sigb = NULL;
 +	const u_char *psig = NULL;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 	if (lenp != NULL)
@@ -67,17 +71,24 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	if (dlen == 0)
 -		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 +	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
 +		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
 +	    data, datalen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 		goto out;
 +	}
 -	if ((sig = DSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->dsa)) == NULL) {
 +	psig = sigb;
 +	if ((sig = d2i_DSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 +	free(sigb);
 +	sigb = NULL;
 	DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
 	rlen = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
@@ -110,7 +121,7 @@ ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		*lenp = len;
 	ret = 0;
  out:
 -	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 +	free(sigb);
 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
 	return ret;
@@ -121,20 +132,20 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	DSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sigblob = NULL;
 -	size_t len, dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
 +	u_char *sigblob = NULL;
 +	size_t len, slen;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	char *ktype = NULL;
 +	u_char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
 	if (key == NULL || key->dsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA ||
 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	if (dlen == 0)
 -		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	/* fetch signature */
 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
@@ -176,25 +187,31 @@ ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	}
 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
 -	/* sha1 the data */
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 +	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 -
 -	switch (DSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->dsa)) {
 -	case 1:
 -		ret = 0;
 -		break;
 -	case 0:
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
 +	}
 +	if ((sigb = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 -	default:
 +	}
 +	psig = sigb;
 +	if ((slen = i2d_DSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 +	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
 +	    sigb, slen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +
  out:
 -	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 +	free(sigb);
 	DSA_SIG_free(sig);
 	BN_clear_free(sig_r);
 	BN_clear_free(sig_s);
 diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa.c b/ssh-ecdsa.c
 index 599c7199d..b036796e8 100644
 --- a/ssh-ecdsa.c
 +++ b/ssh-ecdsa.c
@@ -50,11 +50,13 @@ int
 ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
 +	unsigned char *sigb = NULL;
 +	const unsigned char *psig;
 	const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
 	int hash_alg;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 -	size_t len, dlen;
 +	int len;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *bb = NULL;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
@@ -67,18 +69,24 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
 -	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
 +	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 +
 +	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
 +		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
 +	    datalen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 		goto out;
 +	}
 -	if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(digest, dlen, key->ecdsa)) == NULL) {
 +	psig = sigb;
 +	if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &psig, len)) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -
 	if ((bb = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
@@ -102,7 +110,7 @@ ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		*lenp = len;
 	ret = 0;
  out:
 -	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 +	free(sigb);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
 	sshbuf_free(bb);
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
@@ -115,22 +123,21 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
     const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat)
 {
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
 	BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
 -	int hash_alg;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
 -	size_t dlen;
 +	int hash_alg, len;
 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL;
 	char *ktype = NULL;
 +	unsigned char *sigb = NULL, *psig = NULL;
 	if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA ||
 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1 ||
 -	    (dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
 +	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	/* fetch signature */
@@ -166,28 +173,36 @@ ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	}
 	sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
 -	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
 +	/* Figure out the length */
 +	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, NULL)) == 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if ((sigb = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 +	psig = sigb;
 +	if ((len = i2d_ECDSA_SIG(sig, &psig)) == 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 +	}
 -	switch (ECDSA_do_verify(digest, dlen, sig, key->ecdsa)) {
 -	case 1:
 -		ret = 0;
 -		break;
 -	case 0:
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
 +	if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
 		goto out;
 -	default:
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
 +		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 +	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
  out:
 -	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 +	free(sigb);
 	sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
 	ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
 diff --git a/ssh-rsa.c b/ssh-rsa.c
 index 9b14f9a9a..8ef3a6aca 100644
 --- a/ssh-rsa.c
 +++ b/ssh-rsa.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 -static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, RSA *);
 +static int openssh_RSA_verify(int, const u_char *, size_t, u_char *, size_t, EVP_PKEY *);
 static const char *
 rsa_hash_alg_ident(int hash_alg)
@@ -90,21 +90,6 @@ rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(const char *alg)
 	return -1;
 }
 -static int
 -rsa_hash_alg_nid(int type)
 -{
 -	switch (type) {
 -	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
 -		return NID_sha1;
 -	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
 -		return NID_sha256;
 -	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
 -		return NID_sha512;
 -	default:
 -		return -1;
 -	}
 -}
 -
 int
 ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *key, const BIGNUM *iqmp)
 {
@@ -164,11 +149,10 @@ int
 ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
     const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg_ident)
 {
 -	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
 -	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *sig = NULL;
 -	size_t slen = 0;
 -	u_int dlen, len;
 -	int nid, hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 +	u_char *sig = NULL;
 +	int len, slen = 0;
 +	int hash_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	if (lenp != NULL)
@@ -180,33 +164,24 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
 	else
 		hash_alg = rsa_hash_id_from_keyname(alg_ident);
 +
 	if (key == NULL || key->rsa == NULL || hash_alg == -1 ||
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
 -	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
 -		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
 	slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
 -	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
 -		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -
 -	/* hash the data */
 -	nid = rsa_hash_alg_nid(hash_alg);
 -	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0)
 -		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 -		goto out;
 +	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
 +		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
 -	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
 +		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
 +	    datalen);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 +	if (ret < 0) {
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	if (RSA_sign(nid, digest, dlen, sig, &len, key->rsa) != 1) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 -		goto out;
 -	}
 	if (len < slen) {
 		size_t diff = slen - len;
 		memmove(sig + diff, sig, len);
@@ -215,6 +190,7 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 +
 	/* encode signature */
 	if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -235,7 +211,6 @@ ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
 		*lenp = len;
 	ret = 0;
  out:
 -	explicit_bzero(digest, sizeof(digest));
 	freezero(sig, slen);
 	sshbuf_free(b);
 	return ret;
@@ -246,10 +221,10 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
     const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
     const char *alg)
 {
 -	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	char *sigtype = NULL;
 	int hash_alg, want_alg, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 -	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen, dlen;
 +	size_t len = 0, diff, modlen;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
 	u_char digest[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH], *osigblob, *sigblob = NULL;
@@ -257,8 +232,7 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_RSA ||
 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
 -	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
 +	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
@@ -310,16 +284,15 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 		explicit_bzero(sigblob, diff);
 		len = modlen;
 	}
 -	if ((dlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg)) == 0) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 +
 +	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
 +	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 -	if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(hash_alg, data, datalen,
 -	    digest, sizeof(digest))) != 0)
 -		goto out;
 +	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 -	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, digest, dlen, sigblob, len,
 -	    key->rsa);
  out:
 	freezero(sigblob, len);
 	free(sigtype);
@@ -328,122 +301,26 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 	return ret;
 }
 -/*
 - * See:
 - * http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/pkcs/pkcs-1/
 - * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/pkcs/pkcs-1/pkcs-1v2-1.asn
 - */
 -
 -/*
 - * id-sha1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
 - *	oiw(14) secsig(3) algorithms(2) 26 }
 - */
 -static const u_char id_sha1[] = {
 -	0x30, 0x21, /* type Sequence, length 0x21 (33) */
 -	0x30, 0x09, /* type Sequence, length 0x09 */
 -	0x06, 0x05, /* type OID, length 0x05 */
 -	0x2b, 0x0e, 0x03, 0x02, 0x1a, /* id-sha1 OID */
 -	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
 -	0x04, 0x14  /* Octet string, length 0x14 (20), followed by sha1 hash */
 -};
 -
 -/*
 - * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
 - * id-sha256 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
 - *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
 - *      id-sha256(1) }
 - */
 -static const u_char id_sha256[] = {
 -	0x30, 0x31, /* type Sequence, length 0x31 (49) */
 -	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
 -	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
 -	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x01, /* id-sha256 */
 -	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
 -	0x04, 0x20  /* Octet string, length 0x20 (32), followed by sha256 hash */
 -};
 -
 -/*
 - * See http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/crypto_apps_infra/csor/algorithms.html
 - * id-sha512 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { joint-iso-itu-t(2) country(16) us(840)
 - *      organization(1) gov(101) csor(3) nistAlgorithm(4) hashAlgs(2)
 - *      id-sha256(3) }
 - */
 -static const u_char id_sha512[] = {
 -	0x30, 0x51, /* type Sequence, length 0x51 (81) */
 -	0x30, 0x0d, /* type Sequence, length 0x0d (13) */
 -	0x06, 0x09, /* type OID, length 0x09 */
 -	0x60, 0x86, 0x48, 0x01, 0x65, 0x03, 0x04, 0x02, 0x03, /* id-sha512 */
 -	0x05, 0x00, /* NULL */
 -	0x04, 0x40  /* Octet string, length 0x40 (64), followed by sha512 hash */
 -};
 -
 static int
 -rsa_hash_alg_oid(int hash_alg, const u_char **oidp, size_t *oidlenp)
 +openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
 +    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
 {
 -	switch (hash_alg) {
 -	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
 -		*oidp = id_sha1;
 -		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha1);
 -		break;
 -	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
 -		*oidp = id_sha256;
 -		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha256);
 -		break;
 -	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
 -		*oidp = id_sha512;
 -		*oidlenp = sizeof(id_sha512);
 -		break;
 -	default:
 -		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	}
 -	return 0;
 -}
 +	size_t rsasize = 0;
 +	const RSA *rsa;
 +	int ret;
 -static int
 -openssh_RSA_verify(int hash_alg, u_char *hash, size_t hashlen,
 -    u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, RSA *rsa)
 -{
 -	size_t rsasize = 0, oidlen = 0, hlen = 0;
 -	int ret, len, oidmatch, hashmatch;
 -	const u_char *oid = NULL;
 -	u_char *decrypted = NULL;
 -
 -	if ((ret = rsa_hash_alg_oid(hash_alg, &oid, &oidlen)) != 0)
 -		return ret;
 -	ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 -	hlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
 -	if (hashlen != hlen) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -		goto done;
 -	}
 +	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
 	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 		goto done;
 	}
 -	if ((decrypted = malloc(rsasize)) == NULL) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 -		goto done;
 -	}
 -	if ((len = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sigbuf, decrypted, rsa,
 -	    RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)) < 0) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 -		goto done;
 -	}
 -	if (len < 0 || (size_t)len != hlen + oidlen) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
 -		goto done;
 -	}
 -	oidmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted, oid, oidlen) == 0;
 -	hashmatch = timingsafe_bcmp(decrypted + oidlen, hash, hlen) == 0;
 -	if (!oidmatch || !hashmatch) {
 -		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
 -		goto done;
 -	}
 -	ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen,
 +	    sigbuf, siglen);
 +
 done:
 -	freezero(decrypted, rsasize);
 	return ret;
 }
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 index ad1957762..b95ed0b10 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
 +++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -358,6 +358,83 @@ sshkey_type_plain(int type)
 }
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +int
 +sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, u_char **sigp,
 +    int *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
 +{
 +	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	u_char *sig = NULL;
 +	int ret, slen, len;
 +
 +	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
 +		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
 +
 +	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
 +	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
 +		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +
 +	len = slen;
 +	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
 +		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto error;
 +	}
 +	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
 +	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
 +	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto error;
 +	}
 +
 +	*sigp = sig;
 +	*lenp = len;
 +	/* Now owned by the caller */
 +	sig = NULL;
 +	ret = 0;
 +
 +error:
 +	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	free(sig);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
 +int
 +sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int hash_alg, const u_char *data,
 +    size_t datalen, u_char *sigbuf, int siglen)
 +{
 +	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	int ret;
 +
 +	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
 +		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +	}
 +	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
 +	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto done;
 +	}
 +	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
 +	switch (ret) {
 +	case 1:
 +		ret = 0;
 +		break;
 +	case 0:
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
 +		break;
 +	default:
 +		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		break;
 +	}
 +
 +done:
 +	EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
 /* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
 int
 sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
 diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
 index a91e60436..270901a87 100644
 --- a/sshkey.h
 +++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -179,6 +179,10 @@ const char	*sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
 const char	*sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
 int		 sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
 char		*sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
 +int		 sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY*, int, u_char **,
 +    int *, const u_char *, size_t);
 +int		 sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *, int, const u_char *,
 +    size_t, u_char *, int);
 int	 sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
 int	 sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-pem.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-pem.patch
@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
 From eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
 Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:16:29 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
 private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
 private keys to disk.
 The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
 superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
 is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
 round of MD5 as a KDF).
 adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
 ---
 authfile.c   |  6 ++--
 ssh-keygen.1 |  9 +++---
 ssh-keygen.c | 25 +++++++++--------
 sshkey.c     | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
 sshkey.h     | 11 ++++++--
 5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
 index 2166c1689..851c1a8a1 100644
 --- a/authfile.c
 +++ b/authfile.c
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
 int
 sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
 -    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
 +    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
 {
 	struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
 	int r;
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
 	if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 	if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
 -	    force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
 +	    format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
 index f42127c60..8184a1797 100644
 --- a/ssh-keygen.1
 +++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -419,11 +419,12 @@ The supported key formats are:
 .Dq RFC4716
 (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
 .Dq PKCS8
 -(PEM PKCS8 public key)
 +(PKCS8 public or private key)
 or
 .Dq PEM
 (PEM public key).
 -The default conversion format is
 +By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
 +format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
 .Dq RFC4716 .
 Setting a format of
 .Dq PEM
 diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
 index b019a02ff..5dcad1f61 100644
 --- a/ssh-keygen.c
 +++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ static char *key_type_name = NULL;
 /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
 static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
 -/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */
 -static int use_new_format = 1;
 +/* Format for writing private keys */
 +static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
 /* Cipher for new-format private keys */
 -static char *new_format_cipher = NULL;
 +static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
 /*
  * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
@@ -1048,7 +1048,8 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 		snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
 		    hostname);
 		if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
 -		    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
 +		    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
 +		    rounds)) != 0) {
 			error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
 			    prv_tmp, ssh_err(r));
 			goto failnext;
@@ -1391,7 +1392,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
 -	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
 +	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
@@ -1480,7 +1481,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
 	}
 	if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
 -	    !use_new_format) {
 +	    private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
 		error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
 		    "the new format (-o).");
 		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
@@ -1514,7 +1515,8 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
 -	    new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
 +	    new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
 +	    rounds)) != 0) {
 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
@@ -2525,11 +2527,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			}
 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
 				convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
 +				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
 				break;
 			}
 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
 				convert_format = FMT_PEM;
 -				use_new_format = 0;
 +				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
 				break;
 			}
 			fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
@@ -2567,7 +2570,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 			add_cert_option(optarg);
 			break;
 		case 'Z':
 -			new_format_cipher = optarg;
 +			openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
 			break;
 		case 'C':
 			identity_comment = optarg;
@@ -2912,7 +2915,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
 -	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
 +	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
 diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 index 6b5ff0485..a0cea9257 100644
 --- a/sshkey.c
 +++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -3975,10 +3975,10 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 -/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
 +/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
 static int
 -sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
 -    const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
 +sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
 +    int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
 {
 	int success, r;
 	int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
@@ -3988,26 +3988,46 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
 	char *bptr;
 	BIO *bio = NULL;
 +	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
 	if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
 		return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
 -	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
 -		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 + 	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 + 	}
 +
 +	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 + 	}
 	switch (key->type) {
 	case KEY_DSA:
 -		success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
 -		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
 +		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
 +			success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
 +			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
 +		} else {
 +			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
 +		}
 		break;
 #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
 -		success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
 -		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
 +		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
 +			success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
 +			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
 +		} else {
 +			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
 +		}
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEY_RSA:
 -		success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
 -		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
 +		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
 +			success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
 +			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
 +		} else {
 +			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
 +		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		success = 0;
@@ -4023,6 +4040,13 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 +	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
 +		if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
 +		    passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
 +			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +			goto out;
 +		}
 +	}
 	if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
 		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
 		goto out;
@@ -4035,6 +4059,7 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
 		goto out;
 	r = 0;
  out:
 +	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
 	BIO_free(bio);
 	return r;
 }
@@ -4046,29 +4071,38 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
 int
 sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
 -    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
 +    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
 {
 	switch (key->type) {
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	case KEY_DSA:
 	case KEY_ECDSA:
 	case KEY_RSA:
 -		if (force_new_format) {
 -			return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
 -			    comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
 -		}
 -		return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob,
 -		    passphrase, comment);
 +		break; /* see below */
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 	case KEY_ED25519:
 #ifdef WITH_XMSS
 	case KEY_XMSS:
 #endif /* WITH_XMSS */
 		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
 -		    comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
 +		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
 	default:
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
 	}
 +
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +	switch (format) {
 +	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
 +		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
 +		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
 +	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
 +	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
 +		return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
 +		    format, passphrase, comment);
 +	default:
 +		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
 +#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 }
 diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
 index 41d159a1b..d30a69cc9 100644
 --- a/sshkey.h
 +++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
 	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254,
 };
 +/* Private key disk formats */
 +enum sshkey_private_format {
 +	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
 +	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
 +	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
 +};
 +
 /* key is stored in external hardware */
 #define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT		0x0001
@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ int	sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf,  struct sshkey **keyp);
 /* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
 int	sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
 -    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds);
 +    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
 int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
     const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
 int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-proxyjump-loops.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-proxyjump-loops.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
 From de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
 Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 08:49:49 +0000
 Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when
 using
 ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@
 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037
 ---
 ssh.c | 10 +++++++++-
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
 index 15aee569e..a983a108b 100644
 --- a/ssh.c
 +++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1208,6 +1208,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
 		char port_s[8];
 		const char *sshbin = argv0;
 +		int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
 +
 +		if (port <= 0)
 +			port = default_ssh_port();
 +		if (jumpport <= 0)
 +			jumpport = default_ssh_port();
 +		if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport)
 +			fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
 		/*
 		 * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-rdomain.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-rdomain.patch
@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
 commit 5481d0b4036b33b92c372ee36258ed11bff57d5d
 Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
 Date:   Thu Feb 27 10:07:33 2020 +0100
    Mark the RDomain configuration option unsupported on non-openbsd builds
 diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
 index db80e943..153d2525 100644
 --- a/servconf.c
 +++ b/servconf.c
@@ -698,7 +698,11 @@ static struct {
 	{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +#else
 +	{ "rdomain", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +#endif
 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
 };
@@ -2841,7 +2845,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	    o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
 	dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
 	    o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
 +#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
 	dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
 +#endif
 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
 diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
 index 5dca8981..766e9b90 100644
 --- a/sshd_config.5
 +++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -1542,6 +1542,7 @@ will be bound to this
 If the routing domain is set to
 .Cm \&%D ,
 then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
 +This feature is available on OpenBSD only.
 .It Cm SetEnv
 Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
 by
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch
@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-06-21 10:48:47.754579151 +0200
@@ -333,7 +333,27 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
 #endif
 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
 -	if (nonblock) {
 +	c->restore_block = 0;
 +	if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set
 +		 * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to
 +		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
 +		 * with other programs that follow.
 +		 */
 +		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 +			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
 +			set_nonblock(rfd);
 +		}
 +		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 +			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
 +			set_nonblock(wfd);
 +		}
 +		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
 +			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
 +			set_nonblock(efd);
 +		}
 +	} else if (nonblock) {
 		if (rfd != -1)
 			set_nonblock(rfd);
 		if (wfd != -1)
@@ -422,17 +442,23 @@ channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *
 }
 int
 -channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
 +channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp)
 {
 	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
 -	int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
 +	int ret, fd = *fdp;
 -	if (fd != -1) {
 -		ret = close(fd);
 -		*fdp = -1;
 -		if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
 -			channel_find_maxfd(sc);
 -	}
 +	if (fd == -1)
 +		return 0;
 +
 +	if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) ||
 +	   (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) ||
 +	   (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0))
 +		(void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0);	/* restore blocking */
 +
 +	ret = close(fd);
 +	*fdp = -1;
 +	if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
 +		channel_find_maxfd(sc);
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -442,13 +468,13 @@ channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Chann
 {
 	int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
 -	channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
 +	channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
 	if (rfd != sock)
 -		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
 +		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd);
 	if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
 -		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
 +		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd);
 	if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
 -		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
 +		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
 }
 static void
@@ -681,7 +707,7 @@ channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
 			case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
 			case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
 			case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
 -				channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
 +				channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
 				channel_free(ssh, c);
 				break;
 			}
@@ -1487,7 +1513,8 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct
 Channel *
 channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
 -    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
 +    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
 +    int in, int out, int nonblock)
 {
 	Channel *c;
@@ -1495,7 +1522,7 @@ channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ss
 	c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
 	    -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
 -	    0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
 +	    0, "stdio-forward", nonblock);
 	c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
 	c->host_port = port_to_connect;
@@ -1650,7 +1677,7 @@ channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ss
 	if (c->single_connection) {
 		oerrno = errno;
 		debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
 -		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
 +		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
 		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
 		errno = oerrno;
 	}
@@ -2087,7 +2114,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh
 		return 1;
 	if (len <= 0) {
 		debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
 -		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
 +		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
 	} else {
 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) {
 			fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
@@ -2119,7 +2146,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh,
 	if (len <= 0) {
 		debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
 		    c->self, c->efd);
 -		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
 +		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
 	} else {
 		if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
 			debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
 --- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h	2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@
 #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC	-1
 +/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */
 +#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE	0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */
 +#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET	1 /* set non-blocking state */
 +#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO	2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */
 +
 +/* c->restore_block mask flags */
 +#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD	0x01
 +#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD	0x02
 +#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD	0x04
 +
 /* TCP forwarding */
 #define FORWARD_DENY		0
 #define FORWARD_REMOTE		(1)
@@ -131,6 +141,7 @@ struct Channel {
 				 * to a matching pre-select handler.
 				 * this way post-select handlers are not
 				 * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
 +	int	restore_block;	/* fd mask to restore blocking status */
 	struct sshbuf *input;	/* data read from socket, to be sent over
 				 * encrypted connection */
 	struct sshbuf *output;	/* data received over encrypted connection for
@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ void	 channel_register_filter(struct ssh
 void	 channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
 	    channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
 void	 channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
 -int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
 +int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *);
 void	 channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
 /* mux proxy support */
@@ -305,7 +316,7 @@ Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(struct
 	    char *, char *, int *, const char **);
 Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
 Channel	*channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
 -	    u_short, int, int);
 +	    u_short, int, int, int);
 Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
 	    u_short, char *, char *);
 Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.290558923 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c	2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
@@ -1436,14 +1436,6 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt
 	if (have_pty)
 		leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
 -	/* restore blocking io */
 -	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
 -		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
 -	if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
 -		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
 -	if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
 -		unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
 -
 	/*
 	 * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
 	 * exit status to be returned.  In that case, clear error code if the
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/mux.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/mux.c	2021-06-21 10:50:51.007537336 +0200
@@ -454,14 +454,6 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
 	if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
 		error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 -	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
 -	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
 -		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
 -	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
 -		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
 -	if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
 -		set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
 -
 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
 	if (cctx->want_tty) {
@@ -471,7 +463,7 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
 	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
 -	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
 +	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
 	c->remote_id = nc->self; 	/* link control -> session channel */
@@ -1033,13 +1025,8 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh
 		}
 	}
 -	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
 -	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
 -		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
 -	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
 -		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
 -
 -	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
 +	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1],
 +	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
 	free(chost);
 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.388559673 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c	2021-06-21 10:52:42.685405537 +0200
@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Cha
 			    strerror(errno));
 		}
 	} else {
 -		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) {
 +		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) {
 			logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
 			    c->self, __func__, c->wfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Chan
  			    strerror(errno));
 		}
 	} else {
 -		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) {
 +		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) {
 			logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
 			    c->self, __func__, c->rfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *
 	debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
 	    c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
 	    channel_format_extended_usage(c));
 -	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) {
 +	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) {
 		logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
 		    "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
 		    c->self, __func__, c->efd, c->istate, c->ostate,
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.389559681 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2021-06-21 10:54:47.651377045 +0200
@@ -1709,7 +1709,8 @@ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ss
 	    (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0)
 		fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
 	if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
 -	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
 +	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
 +	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
 	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
 	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
@@ -1862,14 +1863,6 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
 		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
 -	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
 -	if (!isatty(in))
 -		set_nonblock(in);
 -	if (!isatty(out))
 -		set_nonblock(out);
 -	if (!isatty(err))
 -		set_nonblock(err);
 -
 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
 	if (tty_flag) {
@@ -1879,7 +1872,7 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
 	c = channel_new(ssh,
 	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
 	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
 -	    "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
 +	    "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
 	debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-scp-tests.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-scp-tests.patch
@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
 index 59f1ff63..dd48a482 100644
 --- a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
 +++ b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ badserver_4)
 	echo "C755 2 file"
 	echo "X"
 	;;
 +badserver_5)
 +	echo "D0555 0 "
 +	echo "X"
 +	;;
 +badserver_6)
 +	echo "D0555 0 ."
 +	echo "X"
 +	;;
 +badserver_7)
 +	echo "C0755 2 extrafile"
 +	echo "X"
 +	;;
 *)
 	set -- $arg
 	shift
 diff --git a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
 index 57cc7706..104c89e1 100644
 --- a/regress/scp.sh
 +++ b/regress/scp.sh
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
 scpclean() {
 	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
 	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
 +	chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
 }
 verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file"
@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
 	$SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
 fi
 -for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
 +for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
 	verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i"
 	SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
 	export DIR SCPTESTMODE
@@ -113,6 +114,15 @@ for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
 	scpclean
 	$SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
 	[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
 +
 +	scpclean
 +	$SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
 +	[ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change"
 +
 +	scpclean
 +	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
 +	[ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows extranous object creation"
 +	rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile
 done
 verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target"
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch
@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
 diff --color -ruN a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
 --- a/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:31:10.168186838 +0200
 +++ b/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:32:19.146513347 +0200
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
 -	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
 +	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
 	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
 	sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@
 ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
 -sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
 -	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 +sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
 sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
 diff --color -ruN a/sftp-realpath.c b/sftp-realpath.c
 --- a/sftp-realpath.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
 +++ b/sftp-realpath.c	2022-06-23 11:35:33.193244873 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
 +/*	$OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
 + *
 + * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
 + * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
 + * are met:
 + * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
 + *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
 + * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
 + *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
 + *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
 + * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
 + *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
 + *    permission.
 + *
 + * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
 + * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
 + * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
 + * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
 + * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
 + * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
 + * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
 + * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
 + * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
 + * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
 + * SUCH DAMAGE.
 + */
 +
 +#include "includes.h"
 +
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <sys/stat.h>
 +
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <stddef.h>
 +#include <string.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
 +#include <limits.h>
 +
 +#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
 +# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
 +#endif
 +
 +/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
 +
 +char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
 +
 +/*
 + * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
 + *
 + * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
 + * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
 + * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
 + */
 +char *
 +sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
 +{
 +	struct stat sb;
 +	char *p, *q, *s;
 +	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
 +	unsigned symlinks;
 +	int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
 +	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
 +
 +	if (path[0] == '\0') {
 +		errno = ENOENT;
 +		return (NULL);
 +	}
 +
 +	serrno = errno;
 +
 +	if (resolved == NULL) {
 +		resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
 +		if (resolved == NULL)
 +			return (NULL);
 +		mem_allocated = 1;
 +	} else
 +		mem_allocated = 0;
 +
 +	symlinks = 0;
 +	if (path[0] == '/') {
 +		resolved[0] = '/';
 +		resolved[1] = '\0';
 +		if (path[1] == '\0')
 +			return (resolved);
 +		resolved_len = 1;
 +		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
 +	} else {
 +		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
 +			if (mem_allocated)
 +				free(resolved);
 +			else
 +				strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
 +			return (NULL);
 +		}
 +		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
 +		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
 +	}
 +	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
 +		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
 +		goto err;
 +	}
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
 +	 */
 +	while (left_len != 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
 +		 * and its length.
 +		 */
 +		p = strchr(left, '/');
 +		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
 +		if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
 +			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
 +			goto err;
 +		}
 +		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
 +		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
 +		left_len -= s - left;
 +		if (p != NULL)
 +			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
 +		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
 +			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
 +				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
 +				goto err;
 +			}
 +			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
 +			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
 +		}
 +		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
 +			continue;
 +		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
 +			continue;
 +		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
 +			/*
 +			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
 +			 * single "/"
 +			 */
 +			if (resolved_len > 1) {
 +				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
 +				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
 +				*q = '\0';
 +				resolved_len = q - resolved;
 +			}
 +			continue;
 +		}
 +
 +		/*
 +		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
 +		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
 +		 * there are no more path components left.
 +		 */
 +		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
 +		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
 +			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
 +			goto err;
 +		}
 +		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
 +			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
 +				errno = serrno;
 +				return (resolved);
 +			}
 +			goto err;
 +		}
 +		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
 +			if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
 +				errno = ELOOP;
 +				goto err;
 +			}
 +			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
 +			if (slen < 0)
 +				goto err;
 +			symlink[slen] = '\0';
 +			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
 +				resolved[1] = 0;
 +				resolved_len = 1;
 +			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
 +				/* Strip the last path component. */
 +				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
 +				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
 +				*q = '\0';
 +				resolved_len = q - resolved;
 +			}
 +
 +			/*
 +			 * If there are any path components left, then
 +			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
 +			 * in `left'.
 +			 */
 +			if (p != NULL) {
 +				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
 +					if (slen + 1 >=
 +					    (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
 +						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
 +						goto err;
 +					}
 +					symlink[slen] = '/';
 +					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
 +				}
 +				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
 +				if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
 +					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
 +					goto err;
 +				}
 +			}
 +			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
 +	 * is a single "/".
 +	 */
 +	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
 +		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
 +	return (resolved);
 +
 +err:
 +	if (mem_allocated)
 +		free(resolved);
 +	return (NULL);
 +}
 diff --color -ruN a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
 --- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:31:10.147186434 +0200
 +++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:32:19.147513366 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
 #include "sftp.h"
 #include "sftp-common.h"
 +char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
 +
 /* Our verbosity */
 static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
@@ -1185,7 +1187,7 @@
 	}
 	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
 	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
 -	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
 +	if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
 	} else {
 		Stat s;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-timespeccmp.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-timespeccmp.patch
@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original	2020-12-22 17:05:02.105698989 +0900
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c	2020-12-22 17:05:42.922035780 +0900
@@ -937,7 +937,11 @@ sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *b
 		return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
 	else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
 #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
 -		return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <));
 +		if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <)){
 +			return rmul;
 +		} else {
 +			return -rmul;
 +		}
 #elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
 		return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
 #else
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_config.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_config.patch
@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
 index ffac5d2c..340045b2 100644
 --- a/servconf.c
 +++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 			return -1;
 		}
 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
 -			if (ci == NULL) {
 +			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 				debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
 				    "line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
 -			if (ci == NULL) {
 +			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 				result = 0;
 			}
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
 -			if (ci == NULL) {
 +			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
 				    "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
 -			if (ci == NULL) {
 +			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 				return -1;
 			}
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
 -			if (ci == NULL) {
 +			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 				    arg);
 				return -1;
 			}
 -			if (ci == NULL) {
 +			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
@@ -1138,10 +1138,12 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
 			else
 				result = 0;
 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
 -			if (ci == NULL || ci->rdomain == NULL) {
 +			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
 				result = 0;
 				continue;
 			}
 +			if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
 +				match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
 			if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
 				result = 0;
 			else
 diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
 index 54e0a8d8..5483da05 100644
 --- a/servconf.h
 +++ b/servconf.h
@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ struct connection_info {
 	const char *laddress;	/* local address */
 	int lport;		/* local port */
 	const char *rdomain;	/* routing domain if available */
 +	int test;		/* test mode, allow some attributes to be
 +				 * unspecified */
 };
 diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 index cbd3bce9..1fcde502 100644
 --- a/sshd.c
 +++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1843,6 +1843,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		 */
 		if (connection_info == NULL)
 			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
 +		connection_info->test = 1;
 		parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
 		dump_config(&options);
 	}
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch
@ -1,805 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/auth.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.740331098 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/auth.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern struct include_list includes;
 extern int use_privsep;
 extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
 extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
@@ -573,7 +574,7 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
 	ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
 	ci->user = user;
 -	parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
 +	parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
 	log_change_level(options.log_level);
 	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:21:43.541848103 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.302046768 +0200
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
 static void
 rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
 {
 -	int i, j;
 +	int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
 	char *cp;
 	/* Remove an environment variable */
@@ -734,6 +734,11 @@ rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg
 		options->num_send_env--;
 		/* NB. don't increment i */
 	}
 +	if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
 +		options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
 +		    onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
 +		    sizeof(*options->send_env));
 +	}
 }
 /*
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile
 --- openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.742331115 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
 		principals-command \
 		cert-file \
 		cfginclude \
 +		servcfginclude \
 		allow-deny-users \
 		authinfo
@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
 		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
 		ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
 		ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
 -		sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
 +		sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
 		sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
 		t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
 		t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh
 --- openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.744331132 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
 +#	Placed in the Public Domain.
 +
 +tid="server config include"
 +
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
 +HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
 +Match host a
 +	Banner /aa
 +
 +Match host b
 +	Banner /bb
 +	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +
 +Match host c
 +	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +	Banner /cc
 +
 +Match host m
 +	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +
 +Match Host d
 +	Banner /dd
 +
 +Match Host e
 +	Banner /ee
 +	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +
 +Match Host f
 +	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +	Banner /ff
 +
 +Match Host n
 +	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +_EOF
 +
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
 +Match host xxxxxx
 +_EOF
 +
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
 +Match host a
 +	Banner /aaa
 +
 +Match host b
 +	Banner /bbb
 +
 +Match host c
 +	Banner /ccc
 +
 +Match Host d
 +	Banner /ddd
 +
 +Match Host e
 +	Banner /eee
 +
 +Match Host f
 +	Banner /fff
 +_EOF
 +
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
 +Match host a
 +	Banner /aaaa
 +
 +Match host b
 +	Banner /bbbb
 +
 +Match host c
 +	Banner /cccc
 +
 +Match Host d
 +	Banner /dddd
 +
 +Match Host e
 +	Banner /eeee
 +
 +Match Host f
 +	Banner /ffff
 +
 +Match all
 +	Banner /xxxx
 +_EOF
 +
 +trial() {
 +	_host="$1"
 +	_exp="$2"
 +	_desc="$3"
 +	test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
 +	trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
 +	${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
 +	    -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
 +		fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
 +	_got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
 +	if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
 +		fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
 +	fi
 +}
 +
 +trial a /aa
 +trial b /bb
 +trial c /ccc
 +trial d /dd
 +trial e /ee
 +trial f /fff
 +trial m /xxxx
 +trial n /xxxx
 +trial x none
 +
 +# Prepare an included config with an error.
 +
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
 +Banner xxxx
 +	Junk
 +_EOF
 +
 +trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
 +${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
 +    -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
 +	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
 +
 +trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
 +${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
 +    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
 +	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
 +
 +rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +
 +# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
 +HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
 +Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
 +Banner /aa
 +_EOF
 +
 +trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
 +
 +# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
 +Match host x
 +_EOF
 +
 +trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
 +
 +# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
 +Include
 +_EOF
 +
 +trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
 +${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
 +    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
 +	fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
 +
 +# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
 +Banner /xx
 +HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
 +Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
 +Match host a
 +	Banner /aaaa
 +_EOF
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
 +Match host a
 +	Banner /aa
 +_EOF
 +
 +trace "Include before match blocks"
 +trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
 +
 +# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
 +Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
 +Port 7722
 +_EOF
 +cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
 +HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
 +_EOF
 +
 +trace "Port after included files"
 +${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
 +    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
 +	fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
 +_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
 +if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
 +	fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
 +fi
 +
 +# cleanup
 +rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh
 --- openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.746331150 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
 chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
 REAL_SSH="$SSH"
 +REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
 SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
 # Some test data.  We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.748331167 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 #include <util.h>
 #endif
 +#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
 +# include <glob.h>
 +#else
 +# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
 +#endif
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -70,6 +75,9 @@ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOption
     const char *, int);
 static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
     const char *, int);
 +static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
 +    const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
 +    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
 /* Use of privilege separation or not */
 extern int use_privsep;
@@ -528,7 +536,7 @@ typedef enum {
 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
 -	sHostCertificate,
 +	sHostCertificate, sInclude,
 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
 	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
 	sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
@@ -540,9 +548,11 @@ typedef enum {
 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
 } ServerOpCodes;
 -#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
 -#define SSHCFG_MATCH	0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
 -#define SSHCFG_ALL	(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
 +#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL		0x01	/* allowed in main section of config */
 +#define SSHCFG_MATCH		0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
 +#define SSHCFG_ALL		(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
 +#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH	0x04  /* Match never matches; internal only */
 +#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY	0x08  /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
 /* Textual representation of the tokens. */
 static struct {
@@ -687,6 +697,7 @@ static struct {
 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 +	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
@@ -1259,13 +1270,14 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
 	{ NULL, -1 }
 };
 -int
 -process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 +static int
 +process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
     const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
 -    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
 +    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
 +    struct include_list *includes)
 {
 	char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
 -	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
 +	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
 	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
 	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
@@ -1274,6 +1286,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
 	long long val64;
 	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
 	const char *errstr;
 +	struct include_item *item;
 +	glob_t gbuf;
 	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
 	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
@@ -1300,7 +1314,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
 		cmdline = 1;
 		activep = &cmdline;
 	}
 -	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
 +	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
 		debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
 	if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
 		if (connectinfo == NULL) {
@@ -1980,15 +1994,112 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
 			*intptr = value;
 		break;
 +	case sInclude:
 +		if (cmdline) {
 +			fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
 +			    "command-line option");
 +		}
 +		value = 0;
 +		while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') {
 +			value++;
 +			found = 0;
 +			if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
 +				xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
 +			} else
 +				arg = xstrdup(arg2);
 +
 +			/*
 +			 * Don't let included files clobber the containing
 +			 * file's Match state.
 +			 */
 +			oactive = *activep;
 +
 +			/* consult cache of include files */
 +			TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
 +				if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
 +					continue;
 +				if (item->filename != NULL) {
 +					parse_server_config_depth(options,
 +					    item->filename, item->contents,
 +					    includes, connectinfo,
 +					    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
 +					        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
 +					            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
 +					    activep, depth + 1);
 +				}
 +				found = 1;
 +				*activep = oactive;
 +			}
 +			if (found != 0) {
 +				free(arg);
 +				continue;
 +			}
 +
 +			/* requested glob was not in cache */
 +			debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
 +			    filename, linenum, arg);
 +			if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
 +				if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
 +					fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" "
 +					    "glob failed", filename,
 +					    linenum, arg);
 +				}
 +				/*
 +				 * If no entry matched then record a
 +				 * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
 +				 */
 +				debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
 +				    filename, linenum, arg);
 +				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
 +				item->selector = strdup(arg);
 +				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
 +				    item, entry);
 +			}
 +			if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
 +				fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__);
 +			for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
 +				debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
 +				    filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
 +				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
 +				item->selector = strdup(arg);
 +				item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
 +				if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
 +					fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
 +					    __func__);
 +				}
 +				load_server_config(item->filename,
 +				    item->contents);
 +				parse_server_config_depth(options,
 +				    item->filename, item->contents,
 +				    includes, connectinfo,
 +				    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
 +				        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
 +				            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
 +				    activep, depth + 1);
 +				*activep = oactive;
 +				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
 +			}
 +			globfree(&gbuf);
 +			free(arg);
 +		}
 +		if (value == 0) {
 +			fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument",
 +			    filename, linenum);
 +		}
 +		break;
 +
 	case sMatch:
 		if (cmdline)
 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
 			   "option");
 -		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
 +		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum,
 +		    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
 		if (value < 0)
 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
 			    linenum);
 -		*activep = value;
 +		*activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
 +		/* The MATCH_ONLY is applicable only until the first match block */
 +		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
 		break;
 	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
@@ -2275,6 +2386,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
 	return 0;
 }
 +int
 +process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
 +    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
 +    struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
 +{
 +	int inc_flags = 0;
 +
 +	return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
 +	    linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
 +}
 +
 +
 /* Reads the server configuration file. */
 void
@@ -2313,12 +2436,13 @@ load_server_config(const char *filename,
 void
 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
 -   struct connection_info *connectinfo)
 +   struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
 {
 	ServerOptions mo;
 	initialize_server_options(&mo);
 -	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo);
 +	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
 +	    connectinfo);
 	copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
 }
@@ -2464,28 +2588,44 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
 #undef M_CP_STROPT
 #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
 -void
 -parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
 -    struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
 +#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH	16
 +static void
 +parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
 +    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
 +    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
 {
 -	int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
 +	int linenum, bad_options = 0;
 	char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
 -	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
 +	if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
 +		fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
 +
 +	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu%s", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
 +	    (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
 	if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
 -	active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
 	linenum = 1;
 	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
 -		if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
 -		    linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
 +		if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
 +		    filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
 +		    depth, includes) != 0)
 			bad_options++;
 	}
 	free(obuf);
 	if (bad_options > 0)
 		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
 		    filename, bad_options);
 +}
 +
 +void
 +parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
 +    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
 +    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
 +{
 +	int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
 +	parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
 +	    connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
 	process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
 }
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h
 --- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.750331185 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
 #ifndef SERVCONF_H
 #define SERVCONF_H
 +#include <sys/queue.h>
 +
 #define MAX_PORTS		256	/* Max # ports. */
 #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS		256	/* Max # subsystems. */
@@ -234,6 +236,15 @@ struct connection_info {
 				 * unspecified */
 };
 +/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
 +struct include_item {
 +	char *selector;
 +	char *filename;
 +	struct sshbuf *contents;
 +	TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
 +};
 +TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
 +
 /*
  * These are string config options that must be copied between the
@@ -273,12 +284,13 @@ struct connection_info *get_connection_i
 void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
 void	 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
 int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
 -	     int *, struct connection_info *);
 +	     int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
 void	 process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
 void	 load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
 void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
 -	     struct connection_info *);
 -void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
 +	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
 +void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
 +	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
 int	 parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
 int	 server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
 void	 copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.754331220 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
@@ -825,7 +825,20 @@ during
 and use only the system-wide known hosts file
 .Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
 The default is
 -.Cm no .
 +.Dq no .
 +.It Cm Include
 +Include the specified configuration file(s).
 +Multiple path names may be specified and each pathname may contain
 +.Xr glob 7
 +wildcards.
 +Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
 +.Pa /etc/ssh .
 +A
 +.Cm Include
 +directive may appear inside a
 +.Cm Match
 +block
 +to perform conditional inclusion.
 .It Cm IPQoS
 Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
 Accepted values are
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.752331202 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
 /* sshd_config buffer */
 struct sshbuf *cfg;
 +/* Included files from the configuration file */
 +struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
 +
 /* message to be displayed after login */
 struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
@@ -927,30 +930,45 @@ usage(void)
 static void
 send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
 {
 -	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
 +	struct include_item *item = NULL;
 	int r;
 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
 	    sshbuf_len(conf));
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 +		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +
 +	/* pack includes into a string */
 +	TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
 +		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
 +		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
 +			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +	}
 +
 	/*
 	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
 	 *	string	configuration
 -	 *	string rngseed		(only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
 +	 *	string	included_files[] {
 +	 *		string	selector
 +	 *		string	filename
 +	 *		string	contents
 +	 *	}
 +	 *	string	rng_seed (if required)
 	 */
 -	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 -		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 -	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 -
 #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
 	rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
 #endif
 -
 	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
 	sshbuf_free(m);
 +	sshbuf_free(inc);
 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
 }
@@ -958,14 +976,15 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
 static void
 recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
 {
 -	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
 	u_char *cp, ver;
 	size_t len;
 	int r;
 +	struct include_item *item;
 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
 -	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 	if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
@@ -973,14 +992,28 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 	if (ver != 0)
 		fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
 -	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
 -		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 -	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
 	rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
 #endif
 +	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
 +		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +
 +	while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
 +		item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
 +		if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 +			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
 +		    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
 +			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
 +	}
 +
 	free(cp);
 	sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -1661,7 +1694,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		case 'o':
 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
 			if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
 -			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
 +			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
 				exit(1);
 			free(line);
 			break;
@@ -1692,7 +1725,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
 	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
 -	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
 +	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
 	/*
 	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
@@ -1725,12 +1758,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			 */
 			(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
 		}
 -	}
 -	else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
 +	} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
 		load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
 -	    cfg, NULL);
 +	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
 	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
 	if (! options.use_pam)
@@ -1946,7 +1978,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		if (connection_info == NULL)
 			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
 		connection_info->test = 1;
 -		parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
 +		parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
 		dump_config(&options);
 	}
 diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
 --- openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb	2022-12-21 12:18:43.274799163 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c	2022-12-21 12:19:19.758081516 +0100
@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, c
 int
 sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
 {
 +	if (v == NULL)
 +		return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
 +
 	return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
 }
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-upstream-ignore-SIGPIPE.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-upstream-ignore-SIGPIPE.patch
@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
 From d33ff14309e33aa79fdf95e1bc4facafa80b90a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Stepan Broz <sbroz@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 17:38:22 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ignore SIGPIPE earlier in main(), specifically
 before
 muxclient() which performs operations that could cause one; Reported by Noam
 Lewis via bz3454, ok dtucker@
 OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 63d8e13276869eebac6d7a05d5a96307f9026e47
 ---
 ssh.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
 index 786e26d..e037c66 100644
 --- a/ssh.c
 +++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		}
 	}
 +	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
 +
 	/*
 	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
 	 * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
@@ -1545,7 +1547,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	    options.num_system_hostfiles);
 	tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
 -	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
 	signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
 	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
 -- 
 2.45.2
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
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--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch
@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
 diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
 --- a/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.529922670 +0200
 +++ b/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.911762100 +0200
@@ -906,6 +906,18 @@
 	return (1);
 }
 +/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
 +static int
 +has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
 +{
 +	char *cp;
 +
 +	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
 +		return 0;
 +	free(cp);
 +	return 1;
 +}
 +
 static int
 kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
@@ -941,6 +953,16 @@
 		free(ext);
 	}
 +	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
 +	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
 +		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
 +		    "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
 +			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED;
 +		if (has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
 +		    "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com"))
 +			kex->flags |= KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED;
 +	}
 +
 	/* Algorithm Negotiation */
 	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
 	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
 diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
 --- a/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.511922322 +0200
 +++ b/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.902761926 +0200
@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@
 #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
 #define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
 +#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED 	0x0008 /* only set in server for now */
 +#define KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED 	0x0010 /* only set in server for now */
 struct sshenc {
 	char	*name;
 diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
 --- a/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.537922825 +0200
 +++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.918762235 +0200
@@ -736,16 +736,17 @@
 	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
 	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
 -	int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
 +	int r, ndx, success = 0;
 	const u_char *blob;
 +	const char *sigalg, *kex_rsa_sigalg = NULL;
 	u_char *sig = 0;
 	size_t blen, slen;
 	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
 -
 -	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
 -	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
 +	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
 +	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
 +		kex_rsa_sigalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
 	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
 		sshkey_free(key);
 		key = NULL;
@@ -780,16 +781,24 @@
 		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
 		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
 		 */
 -		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
 -		    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
 +		sigalg = NULL;
 +		if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
 +			if (kex_rsa_sigalg != NULL)
 +				sigalg = kex_rsa_sigalg;
 +			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_512_SUPPORTED)
 +				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
 +			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
 +				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
 +		}
 +		debug3("%s: sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", __func__,
 +			sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
 		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
 		    ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
 		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
 		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
 -		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
 -		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
 +		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
 			error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
 diff --color -ru a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
 --- a/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.532922728 +0200
 +++ b/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.914762158 +0200
@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@
     struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
 static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
     struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
 -static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep);
 /* Supported key types */
 struct keytype {
@@ -2092,7 +2091,8 @@
 	if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
 	    sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 -	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
 +	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
 +	    &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	/* Success */
@@ -2394,8 +2394,8 @@
 	return r;
 }
 -static int
 -get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
 +int
 +sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
 {
 	int r;
 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
@@ -2477,7 +2477,7 @@
 		return 0;
 	if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
 +	if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
 		return r;
 	r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
 	free(sigtype);
@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@
 	    sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
 -	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
 +	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
 		goto out;
 	if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
 		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
 diff --color -ru a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
 --- a/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.521922515 +0200
 +++ b/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.907762022 +0200
@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
 int	 sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
 const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
 +int      sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
 /* for debug */
 void	sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
 index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
 --- a/auth.c
 +++ b/auth.c
@@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
 # include <paths.h>
 #endif
 #include <pwd.h>
 +#include <grp.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
 #include <login.h>
 #endif
@@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
 		}
 		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
 +		if (geteuid() == 0 &&
 +		    initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
 +			error("%s: initgroups(%s, %u): %s", tag,
 +			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
 +			_exit(1);
 +		}
 		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
 			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
 index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
 --- a/ssh-keyscan.c
 +++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -490,6 +490,15 @@ congreet(int s)
 		return;
 	}
 +	/*
 +	 * Read the server banner as per RFC4253 section 4.2.  The "SSH-"
 +	 * protocol identification string may be preceeded by an arbitarily
 +	 * large banner which we must read and ignore.  Loop while reading
 +	 * newline-terminated lines until we have one starting with "SSH-".
 +	 * The ID string cannot be longer than 255 characters although the
 +	 * preceeding banner lines may (in which case they'll be discarded
 +	 * in multiple iterations of the outer loop).
 +	 */
 	for (;;) {
 		memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
 		bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
@@ -517,6 +526,11 @@ congreet(int s)
 		conrecycle(s);
 		return;
 	}
 +	if (cp >= buf + sizeof(buf)) {
 +		error("%s: greeting exceeds allowable length", c->c_name);
 +		confree(s);
 +		return;
 +	}
 	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
 		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
 		confree(s);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-upstream-cve-2023-38408.patch
@ -1,17 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
 index 6be647ec..ebddf6c3 100644
 --- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
 +++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -1537,10 +1537,8 @@ pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
 		error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_module, dlerror());
 		goto fail;
 	}
 -	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
 -		error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
 -		goto fail;
 -	}
 +	if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL)
 +		fatal("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
 	p->module->handle = handle;
 	/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch
@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
 diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
 --- a/auth2.c	8 Mar 2023 04:43:12 -0000	1.166
 +++ b/auth2.c	28 Aug 2023 08:32:44 -0000
@@ -208,6 +208,7 @@ input_service_request(int type, u_int32_
 }
 #define MIN_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 0.005
 +#define MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS 5.0
 static double
 user_specific_delay(const char *user)
 {
@@ -233,6 +234,12 @@ ensure_minimum_time_since(double start, 
 	struct timespec ts;
 	double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
 +	if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
 +		debug3("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
 +		    "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 	/* if we've already passed the requested time, scale up */
 	while ((remain = seconds - elapsed) < 0.0)
 		seconds *= 2;
@@ -317,7 +324,7 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
 		debug2("input_userauth_request: try method %s", method);
 		authenticated =	m->userauth(ssh);
 	}
 -	if (!authctxt->authenticated)
 +	if (!authctxt->authenticated && strcmp(method, "none") != 0)
 		ensure_minimum_time_since(tstart,
 		    user_specific_delay(authctxt->user));
 	userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, method, NULL);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch
@ -1,447 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/PROTOCOL b/PROTOCOL
 index d453c779..ded935eb 100644
 --- a/PROTOCOL
 +++ b/PROTOCOL
@@ -137,6 +137,32 @@ than as a named global or channel request to allow pings with very
 described at:
 http://git.libssh.org/users/aris/libssh.git/plain/doc/curve25519-sha256@libssh.org.txt?h=curve25519
 +1.9 transport: strict key exchange extension
 +
 +OpenSSH supports a number of transport-layer hardening measures under
 +a "strict KEX" feature. This feature is signalled similarly to the
 +RFC8308 ext-info feature: by including a additional algorithm in the
 +initiial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT kex_algorithms field. The client may append
 +"kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com" to its kex_algorithms and the server
 +may append "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com". These pseudo-algorithms
 +are only valid in the initial SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT and MUST be ignored
 +if they are present in subsequent SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT packets.
 +
 +When an endpoint that supports this extension observes this algorithm
 +name in a peer's KEXINIT packet, it MUST make the following changes to
 +the the protocol:
 +
 +a) During initial KEX, terminate the connection if any unexpected or
 +   out-of-sequence packet is received. This includes terminating the
 +   connection if the first packet received is not SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT.
 +   Unexpected packets for the purpose of strict KEX include messages
 +   that are otherwise valid at any time during the connection such as
 +   SSH2_MSG_DEBUG and SSH2_MSG_IGNORE.
 +b) After sending or receiving a SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS message, reset the
 +   packet sequence number to zero. This behaviour persists for the
 +   duration of the connection (i.e. not just the first
 +   SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS).
 +
 2. Connection protocol changes
 2.1. connection: Channel write close extension "eow@openssh.com"
 diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
 index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
 --- a/kex.c
 +++ b/kex.c
@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@
 #endif
 /* prototype */
 -static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
 +static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *, uint32_t seq);
 static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
@@ -177,6 +177,18 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 	return 1;
 }
 +/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
 +static int
 +has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
 +{
 +	char *cp;
 +
 +	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
 +		return 0;
 +	free(cp);
 +	return 1;
 +}
 +
 /*
  * Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
  * Caller must free returned string.
@@ -184,7 +196,7 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 char *
 kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 {
 -	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
 +	char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p;
 	size_t len;
 	if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
@@ -201,10 +213,8 @@ kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
 	}
 	strlcpy(ret, a, len);
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 -		if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
 -			free(m);
 +		if (has_any_alg(ret, p))
 			continue; /* Algorithm already present */
 -		}
 		if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
 		    strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
 			free(tmp);
@@ -466,7 +485,12 @@ kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 {
 	int r;
 -	error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
 +	/* If in strict mode, any unexpected message is an error */
 +	if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
 +		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
 +		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
 +	}
 +	error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -548,6 +572,11 @@ kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
 	if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
 		return r;
 + 	if (ninfo >= 1024) {
 + 		error("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO with too many entries, expected "
 + 		    "<=1024, received %u", ninfo);
 +		return dispatch_protocol_error(type, seq, ssh);
 + 	}
 	for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
 		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
 			return r;
@@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (kex == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 -	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
 +	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
 	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
 	if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
 		return r;
@@ -717,7 +741,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
 		if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
 			return r;
 -	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
 +	if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh, seq)) != 0)
 		return r;
 	if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
@@ -981,20 +1005,14 @@ proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
 	return (1);
 }
 -/* returns non-zero if proposal contains any algorithm from algs */
 static int
 -has_any_alg(const char *proposal, const char *algs)
 +kexalgs_contains(char **peer, const char *ext)
 {
 -	char *cp;
 -
 -	if ((cp = match_list(proposal, algs, NULL)) == NULL)
 -		return 0;
 -	free(cp);
 -	return 1;
 +	return has_any_alg(peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], ext);
 }
 static int
 -kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
 +kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh, uint32_t seq)
 {
 	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 	struct newkeys *newkeys;
@@ -1019,13 +1037,23 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
 		sprop=peer;
 	}
 -	/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
 -	if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
 -		char *ext;
 -
 -		ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
 -		kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
 -		free(ext);
 +	/* Check whether peer supports ext_info/kex_strict */
 +	if ((kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
 +		if (kex->server) {
 +			kex->ext_info_c = kexalgs_contains(peer, "ext-info-c");
 +			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
 +			    "kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com");
 +		} else {
 +			kex->kex_strict = kexalgs_contains(peer,
 +			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
 +		}
 +		if (kex->kex_strict) {
 +			debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
 +			if (seq != 0)
 +				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
 +				    "strict KEX violation: "
 +				    "KEXINIT was not the first packet");
 +		}
 	}
 	/* Check whether client supports rsa-sha2 algorithms */
 diff --git a/kex.h b/kex.h
 index 5f7ef784..272ebb43 100644
 --- a/kex.h
 +++ b/kex.h
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ struct kex {
 	u_int	kex_type;
 	char	*server_sig_algs;
 	int	ext_info_c;
 +	int	kex_strict;
 	struct sshbuf *my;
 	struct sshbuf *peer;
 	struct sshbuf *client_version;
 diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
 index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
 --- a/packet.c
 +++ b/packet.c
@@ -1207,8 +1207,13 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
 	sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
 #endif
 	/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
 -	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
 +	if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0) {
 +		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
 +			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "outgoing sequence number "
 +			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
 +		}
 		logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
 +	}
 	if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1216,6 +1221,11 @@ ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
 	state->p_send.bytes += len;
 	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
 +	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
 +		debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
 +		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
 +	}
 +
 	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
 		r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
 	else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
@@ -1344,8 +1354,7 @@ ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 	/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
 	for (;;) {
 		/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
 -		r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
 -		if (r != 0)
 +		if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p)) != 0)
 			break;
 		/* If we got a packet, return it. */
 		if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
@@ -1629,10 +1615,16 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
 			goto out;
 	}
 +
 	if (seqnr_p != NULL)
 		*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
 -	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
 +	if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0) {
 +		if ((ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0) {
 +			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "incoming sequence number "
 +			    "wrapped during initial key exchange");
 +		}
 		logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
 +	}
 	if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
 		if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
 			return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
@@ -1698,6 +1690,10 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 #endif
 	/* reset for next packet */
 	state->packlen = 0;
 +	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
 +		debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
 +		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
 +	}
 	/* do we need to rekey? */
 	if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
@@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
 		if (r != 0)
 			return r;
 -		if (*typep) {
 -			state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
 -			DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
 +		if (*typep == 0) {
 +			/* no message ready */
 +			return 0;
 		}
 +		state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
 +		DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
 +
 +		/* Always process disconnect messages */
 +		if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT) {
 +			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
 +				return r;
 +			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
 +			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
 +			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
 +			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
 +			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
 +			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 +			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
 +			free(msg);
 +			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
 +		}
 +
 +		/*
 +		 * Do not implicitly handle any messages here during initial
 +		 * KEX when in strict mode. They will be need to be allowed
 +		 * explicitly by the KEX dispatch table or they will generate
 +		 * protocol errors.
 +		 */
 +		if (ssh->kex != NULL &&
 +		    (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) && ssh->kex->kex_strict)
 +			return 0;
 +		/* Implicitly handle transport-level messages */
 		switch (*typep) {
 		case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
 			debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
@@ -1738,19 +1763,6 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
 			debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
 			free(msg);
 			break;
 -		case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
 -			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
 -			    (r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
 -				return r;
 -			/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
 -			do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
 -			    reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
 -			    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
 -			    "Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
 -			    "%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 -			    ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
 -			free(msg);
 -			return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
 		case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
 			if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
 				return r;
@@ -2242,6 +2254,7 @@ kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2404,6 +2417,7 @@ kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
 +	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_strict)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
@@ -2732,6 +2746,7 @@ sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
 	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
 	va_end(args);
 +	debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
 	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
 diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
 index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
 --- a/sshconnect2.c
 +++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
 	xxx_host = host;
 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
 -	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
 +	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
 +	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
 		fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
@@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
 };
 static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 -static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
 static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
@@ -472,7 +471,7 @@ ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
 	ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
 	ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
 -	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
 +	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, kex_input_ext_info);
 	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
 	ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success);	/* loop until success */
 	pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
@@ -531,12 +530,6 @@ input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 }
 /* ARGSUSED */
 -static int
 -input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
 -{
 -	return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
 -}
 -
 void
 userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
 {
@@ -615,6 +608,7 @@ input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
 	free(authctxt->methoddata);
 	authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
 	authctxt->success = 1;			/* break out */
 +	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, dispatch_protocol_error);
 	return 0;
 }
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict	2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
@@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 {
 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
 	struct kex *kex;
 +	char *cp;
 	int r;
 -	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
 -	    options.kex_algorithms);
 +	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, 
 +	   "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
 +		fatal("kex_names_cat");
 +
 +	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(cp);
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
 	    options.ciphers);
 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
@@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (gss && orig)
 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 	else if (gss)
 -		newstr = gss;
 +		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
 	else if (orig)
 		newstr = orig;
@@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 	packet_send();
 	packet_write_wait();
 #endif
 +	free(cp);
 	debug("KEX done");
 }
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch
@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
 index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
 --- a/ssh.c
 +++ b/ssh.c
@@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 	}
 }
 +static int
 +valid_hostname(const char *s)
 +{
 +	size_t i;
 +
 +	if (*s == '-')
 +		return 0;
 +	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
 +		if (strchr("'`\"$\\;&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL ||
 +		    isspace((u_char)s[i]) || iscntrl((u_char)s[i]))
 +			return 0;
 +	}
 +	return 1;
 +}
 +
 +static int
 +valid_ruser(const char *s)
 +{
 +	size_t i;
 +
 +	if (*s == '-')
 +		return 0;
 +	for (i = 0; s[i] != 0; i++) {
 +		if (strchr("'`\";&<>|(){}", s[i]) != NULL)
 +			return 0;
 +		/* Disallow '-' after whitespace */
 +		if (isspace((u_char)s[i]) && s[i + 1] == '-')
 +			return 0;
 +		/* Disallow \ in last position */
 +		if (s[i] == '\\' && s[i + 1] == '\0')
 +			return 0;
 +	}
 +	return 1;
 +}
 +
 /*
  * Main program for the ssh client.
  */
@@ -1118,6 +1153,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	if (!host)
 		usage();
 +	if (!valid_hostname(host))
 +		fatal("hostname contains invalid characters");
 +	if (options.user != NULL && !valid_ruser(options.user))
 +		fatal("remote username contains invalid characters");
 	host_arg = xstrdup(host);
 	/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
 authfd.c
 authfd.h
 atomicio.c
 atomicio.h
 bufaux.c
 bufbn.c
 buffer.h
 buffer.c
 cleanup.c
 cipher.h
 compat.h
 defines.h
 entropy.c
 entropy.h
 fatal.c
 includes.h
 kex.h
 key.c
 key.h
 log.c
 log.h
 match.h
 misc.c
 misc.h
 pathnames.h
 platform.h
 rsa.h
 ssh-dss.c
 ssh-rsa.c
 ssh.h
 ssh2.h
 uidswap.c
 uidswap.h
 uuencode.c
 uuencode.h
 xmalloc.c
 xmalloc.h
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch
@ -1,939 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c	2018-08-24 10:22:56.281930322 +0200
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
  * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
  */
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -65,8 +66,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
                 case EOF:
                 case '\0':
                     if (len > 0) { 
 -                        argv = pamsshagentauth_xrealloc(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
 -                        argv[count] = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
 +                        argv = xreallocarray(argv, count + 1, sizeof(*argv));
 +                        argv[count] = xcalloc(len + 1, sizeof(*argv[count]));
                         strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
                         memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
                         len = 0;
@@ -105,9 +106,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
 {
     size_t i;
     for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
 -        pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv[i]);
 +        free(argv[i]);
 -    pamsshagentauth_xfree(argv);
 +    free(argv);
     return;
 }
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
@@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 -#include "buffer.h"
 -#include "key.h"
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ typedef struct idlist Idlist;
 struct identity {
     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
 -    Key *key;           /* public/private key */
 +    struct sshkey *key;           /* public/private key */
     char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
     int tried;
     int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2018-08-24 10:18:05.007393297 +0200
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2018-08-24 10:18:32.937612513 +0200
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "log.h"
 -#include "buffer.h"
 -#include "key.h"
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
@@ -58,6 +58,8 @@
 #include "get_command_line.h"
 extern char **environ;
 +#define PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1 101
 +
 /* 
  * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
  * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
@@ -77,7 +79,7 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
     if (count == 0)
         return NULL;
 -    buf = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
 +    buf = xcalloc((count * MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG) + (count * 3), sizeof(*buf));
     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
         strcat(buf, (i > 0) ? " '" : "'");
         strncat(buf, action[i], MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG);
@@ -87,21 +89,25 @@ log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
 }
 void
 -agent_action(Buffer *buf, char ** action, size_t count)
 +agent_action(struct sshbuf **buf, char ** action, size_t count)
 {
     size_t i;
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(buf);
 +    int r;
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(buf, count);
 +    if ((*buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 +        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 +    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*buf, count)) != 0)
 +        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
     for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(buf, action[i]);
 +        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*buf, action[i])) != 0)
 +            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
     }
 }
 -void
 -pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
 +static void
 +pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(struct sshbuf ** session_id2, const char * user,
                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
 {
     u_char *cookie = NULL;
@@ -114,22 +116,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
     char ** reported_argv = NULL;
     size_t count = 0;
     char * action_logbuf = NULL;
 -    Buffer action_agentbuf;
 +    struct sshbuf *action_agentbuf = NULL;
     uint8_t free_logbuf = 0;
     char * retc;
     int32_t reti;
 +    int r;
 -    rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
 +    rnd = arc4random();
     cookie_len = ((uint8_t) rnd);
     while (cookie_len < 16) { 
         cookie_len += 16;                                          /* Add 16 bytes to the size to ensure that while the length is random, the length is always reasonable; ticket #18 */
     }
 -    cookie = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1,cookie_len);
 +    cookie = xcalloc(1, cookie_len);
     for (i = 0; i < cookie_len; i++) {
         if (i % 4 == 0) {
 -            rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
 +            rnd = arc4random();
         }
         cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
         rnd >>= 8;
@@ -139,12 +141,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
     if (count > 0) { 
         free_logbuf = 1;
         action_logbuf = log_action(reported_argv, count);
 -        agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
 +        agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
         pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(reported_argv, count);
     }
     else {
         action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&action_agentbuf); /* stays empty, means unavailable */
 +        if ((action_agentbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) /* stays empty, means unavailable */
 +            fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
     }
     /*
@@ -161,35 +163,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
     retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
     time(&ts);
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(session_id2);
 +    if ((*session_id2 = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 +        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int(session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1);
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("cookie: %s", pamsshagentauth_tohex(cookie, cookie_len)); */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, cookie, cookie_len);
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("user: %s", user); */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, user);
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ruser: %s", ruser); */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, ruser);
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("servicename: %s", servicename); */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, servicename);
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("pwd: %s", pwd); */
 -    if(retc)
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, pwd);
 -    else
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("action: %s", action_logbuf); */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(session_id2, action_agentbuf.buf + action_agentbuf.offset, action_agentbuf.end - action_agentbuf.offset);
 +    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(*session_id2, PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_REQUESTv1)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_string(*session_id2, cookie, cookie_len)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, user)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, ruser)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, servicename)) != 0)
 +        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +    if (retc) {
 +        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, pwd)) != 0)
 +            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +    } else {
 +        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
 +            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +    }
 +    if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(*session_id2, action_agentbuf)) != 0)
 +        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
     if (free_logbuf) { 
 -        pamsshagentauth_xfree(action_logbuf);
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
 +        free(action_logbuf);
 +        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
     }
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
 -    if(reti >= 0)
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, hostname);
 -    else
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
 +    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
 +    if (reti >= 0) {
 +        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
 +            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +    } else {
 +        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
 +            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 +    }
 +    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
 +    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
 +        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
     free(cookie);
     return;
@@ -278,7 +280,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
 	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
 	auth->fd = sock;
 -	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
 +	if ((auth->identities = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 +           fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 	auth->howmany = 0;
 	return auth;
@@ -287,43 +289,42 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
 int
 pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
 {
 -    Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
 +    struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
     Identity *id;
 -    Key *key;
 +    struct sshkey *key;
     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
     char *comment;
     uint8_t retval = 0;
     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
 -    pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
 +    pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
 +        verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
         {
             if(key != NULL) {
 -                id = pamsshagentauth_xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
 +                id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
                 id->key = key;
                 id->filename = comment;
                 id->ac = ac;
 -                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, &session_id2)) {
 +                if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
                     retval = 1;
                 }
 -                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id->filename);
 -                pamsshagentauth_key_free(id->key);
 -                pamsshagentauth_xfree(id);
 +                free(id->filename);
 +                key_free(id->key);
 +                free(id);
                 if(retval == 1)
                     break;
             }
         }
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&session_id2);
 +        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
         ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
     }
     else {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
 +        verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
     }
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_xfree(session_id2); */
     EVP_cleanup();
     return retval;
 }
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2018-08-24 10:18:05.008393305 +0200
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
  * a patch 8-)
  */
 #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
 -    __progname = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(servicename);
 +    __progname = xstrdup(servicename);
 #endif
     for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
 #endif
     }
 -    pamsshagentauth_log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
 +    log_init(__progname, log_lvl, facility, getenv("PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_DEBUG") ? 1 : 0);
     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void *) &user);
     pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_RUSER, (void *) &ruser_ptr);
 -    pamsshagentauth_verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
 +    verbose("Beginning pam_ssh_agent_auth for user %s", user);
     if(ruser_ptr) {
         strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
 #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
         if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
             strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
 -            pamsshagentauth_verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
 +            verbose( "Using environment variable SUDO_USER (%s)", ruser );
         } else
 #endif
         {
             if( ! getpwuid(getuid()) ) {
 -                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
 +                verbose("Unable to getpwuid(getuid())");
                 goto cleanexit;
             }
             strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
     /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
     if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
 +        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", ruser);
         goto cleanexit;
     }
     if( ! getpwnam(user) ) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
 +        verbose("getpwnam(%s) failed, bailing out", user);
         goto cleanexit;
     }
@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
          */
         parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
     } else {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
 -        authorized_keys_file = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
 +        verbose("Using default file=/etc/security/authorized_keys");
 +        authorized_keys_file = xstrdup("/etc/security/authorized_keys");
     }
     /*
@@ -187,19 +187,19 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
      */
     if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
 +        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
         /*
          * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
          */
         if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
 -            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
 +            logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
             retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
         } else {
 -            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
 +            logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
         }
     } else {
 -        pamsshagentauth_logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
 +        logit("No %s specified, cannot continue with this form of authentication", (user) ? "ruser" : "user" );
     }
 cleanexit:
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
@@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "log.h"
 -#include "buffer.h"
 -#include "key.h"
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "secure_filename.h"
 -#include "identity.h"
 #include "pam_user_key_allowed2.h"
 extern char *authorized_keys_file;
@@ -117,12 +116,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
         } else {
             slash_ptr = strchr(auth_keys_file_buf, '/');
             if(!slash_ptr)
 -                pamsshagentauth_fatal
 +                fatal
                     ("cannot expand tilde in path without a `/'");
             owner_uname_len = slash_ptr - auth_keys_file_buf - 1;
             if(owner_uname_len > (sizeof(owner_uname) - 1))
 -                pamsshagentauth_fatal("Username too long");
 +                fatal("Username too long");
             strncat(owner_uname, auth_keys_file_buf + 1, owner_uname_len);
             if(!authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)
@@ -130,11 +129,11 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
                     getpwnam(owner_uname)->pw_uid;
         }
         authorized_keys_file =
 -            pamsshagentauth_tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
 +            tilde_expand_filename(auth_keys_file_buf,
                                                   authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid);
         strncpy(auth_keys_file_buf, authorized_keys_file,
                 sizeof(auth_keys_file_buf) - 1);
 -        pamsshagentauth_xfree(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
 +        free(authorized_keys_file)        /* when we
                                                               percent_expand
                                                               later, we'd step
                                                               on this, so free
@@ -150,13 +149,13 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *us
     strncat(hostname, fqdn, strcspn(fqdn, "."));
 #endif
     authorized_keys_file =
 -        pamsshagentauth_percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
 +        percent_expand(auth_keys_file_buf, "h",
                                        getpwnam(user)->pw_dir, "H", hostname,
                                        "f", fqdn, "u", user, NULL);
 }
 int
 -pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, Key * key)
 +pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
 {
     return
         pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
 #include "identity.h"
 -int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, Key *);
 +int pam_user_key_allowed(const char *, struct sshkey *);
 void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
 #endif
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 -#include "buffer.h"
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 -#include "key.h"
 +#include "digest.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "secure_filename.h"
 #include "uidswap.h"
 -
 -#include "identity.h"
 +#include <unistd.h>
 /* return 1 if user allows given key */
 /* Modified slightly from original found in auth2-pubkey.c */
 static int
 -pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, Key * key)
 +pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE * f, char *file, struct sshkey * key)
 {
 -    char line[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
 +    char *line = NULL;
     int found_key = 0;
     u_long linenum = 0;
 -    Key *found;
 +    struct sshkey *found;
     char *fp;
 +    size_t linesize = 0;
     found_key = 0;
 -    found = pamsshagentauth_key_new(key->type);
 +    found = sshkey_new(key->type);
 -    while(read_keyfile_line(f, file, line, sizeof(line), &linenum) != -1) {
 +    while ((getline(&line, &linesize, f)) != -1) {
         char *cp = NULL; /* *key_options = NULL; */
 +        linenum++;
         /* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
         for(cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
         if(!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
             continue;
 -        if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
 +        if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
             /* no key? check if there are options for this key */
             int quoted = 0;
 -            pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
 +            verbose("user_key_allowed: check options: '%s'", cp);
             /* key_options = cp; */
             for(; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
                 if(*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
@@ -92,26 +94,27 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
             }
             /* Skip remaining whitespace. */
             for(; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++);
 -            if(pamsshagentauth_key_read(found, &cp) != 1) {
 -                pamsshagentauth_verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
 +            if(sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
 +                verbose("user_key_allowed: advance: '%s'", cp);
                 /* still no key? advance to next line */
                 continue;
             }
         }
 -        if(pamsshagentauth_key_equal(found, key)) {
 +        if(sshkey_equal(found, key)) {
             found_key = 1;
 -            pamsshagentauth_logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
 +            logit("matching key found: file/command %s, line %lu", file,
                                   linenum);
 -            fp = pamsshagentauth_key_fingerprint(found, SSH_FP_MD5, SSH_FP_HEX);
 -            pamsshagentauth_logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
 -                                  pamsshagentauth_key_type(found), fp);
 -            pamsshagentauth_xfree(fp);
 +            fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, SSH_FP_BASE64);
 +            logit("Found matching %s key: %s",
 +                                  sshkey_type(found), fp);
 +            free(fp);
             break;
         }
     }
 -    pamsshagentauth_key_free(found);
 +    free(line);
 +    sshkey_free(found);
     if(!found_key)
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("key not found");
 +        verbose("key not found");
     return found_key;
 }
@@ -120,19 +123,19 @@ pamsshagentauth_check_authkeys_file(FILE
  * returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
  */
 int
 -pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, Key * key, char *file)
 +pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey * key, char *file)
 {
     FILE *f;
     int found_key = 0;
     struct stat st;
 -    char buf[SSH_MAX_PUBKEY_BYTES];
 +    char buf[256];
     /* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
 -    pamsshagentauth_verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
 +    verbose("trying public key file %s", file);
     /* Fail not so quietly if file does not exist */
     if(stat(file, &st) < 0) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("File not found: %s", file);
 +        verbose("File not found: %s", file);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -144,7 +147,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
     if(pamsshagentauth_secure_filename(f, file, pw, buf, sizeof(buf)) != 0) {
         fclose(f);
 -        pamsshagentauth_logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
 +        logit("Authentication refused: %s", buf);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct
 int
 pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *authorized_keys_command,
                           char *authorized_keys_command_user,
 -                          struct passwd *user_pw, Key * key)
 +                          struct passwd *user_pw, struct sshkey * key)
 {
     FILE *f;
     int ok, found_key = 0;
@@ -187,44 +190,44 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
     else {
         pw = getpwnam(authorized_keys_command_user);
         if(pw == NULL) {
 -            pamsshagentauth_logerror("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
 +            error("authorized_keys_command_user \"%s\" not found: %s",
                  authorized_keys_command_user, strerror(errno));
             return 0;
         }
     }
 -    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 +    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
     if(stat(authorized_keys_command, &st) < 0) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror
 +        error
             ("Could not stat AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\": %s",
              authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
         goto out;
     }
     if(pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path
        (authorized_keys_command, &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
 +        error("Unsafe AuthorizedKeysCommand: %s", errmsg);
         goto out;
     }
     /* open the pipe and read the keys */
     if(pipe(p) != 0) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 +        error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
         goto out;
     }
 -    pamsshagentauth_debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
 +    debug("Running AuthorizedKeysCommand: \"%s\" as \"%s\" with argument: \"%s\"",
                           authorized_keys_command, pw->pw_name, username);
     /* 
      * Don't want to call this in the child, where it can fatal() and
      * run cleanup_exit() code.
      */
 -    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
 +    restore_uid();
     switch ((pid = fork())) {
     case -1:                                              /* error */
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 +        error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
         close(p[0]);
         close(p[1]);
         return 0;
@@ -234,13 +237,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
         /* do this before the setresuid so thta they can be logged */
         if((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
 -            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
 +            error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__, _PATH_DEVNULL,
                                      strerror(errno));
             _exit(1);
         }
         if(dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 || dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1
            || dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
 -            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 +            error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
             _exit(1);
         }
 #if defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) && !defined(BROKEN_SETRESGID)
@@ -248,7 +251,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
 #else
         if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) != 0 || setegid(pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
 #endif
 -            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
 +            error("setresgid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_gid,
                                      strerror(errno));
             _exit(1);
         }
@@ -258,7 +261,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
 #else
         if (setuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0 || seteuid(pw->pw_uid) != 0) {
 #endif
 -            pamsshagentauth_logerror("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
 +            error("setresuid %u: %s", (u_int) pw->pw_uid,
                                      strerror(errno));
             _exit(1);
         }
@@ -270,18 +273,18 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
         /* pretty sure this will barf because we are now suid, but since we
            should't reach this anyway, I'll leave it here */
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
 +        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exec failed: %s",
                                  authorized_keys_command, strerror(errno));
         _exit(127);
     default:                                              /* parent */
         break;
     }
 -    pamsshagentauth_temporarily_use_uid(pw);
 +    temporarily_use_uid(pw);
     close(p[1]);
     if((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
 +        error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
         close(p[0]);
         /* Don't leave zombie child */
         while(waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR);
@@ -292,22 +295,22 @@ pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed
     while(waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
         if(errno != EINTR) {
 -            pamsshagentauth_logerror("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
 +            error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__,
                                      strerror(errno));
             goto out;
         }
     }
     if(WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
 +        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s exited on signal %d",
                                  authorized_keys_command, WTERMSIG(status));
         goto out;
     } else if(WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_logerror("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
 +        error("AuthorizedKeysCommand %s returned status %d",
                                  authorized_keys_command, WEXITSTATUS(status));
         goto out;
     }
     found_key = ok;
   out:
 -    pamsshagentauth_restore_uid();
 +    restore_uid();
     return found_key;
 }
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
 #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
 #include "identity.h"
 -int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, Key *, char *);
 -int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, Key *);
 +int pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, char *);
 +int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
 #endif
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "match.h"
 #include "log.h"
 -#include "buffer.h"
 -#include "key.h"
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 #include "misc.h"
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
 	int comparehome = 0;
 	struct stat st;
 -    pamsshagentauth_verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
 +    verbose("auth_secure_filename: checking for uid: %u", uid);
 	if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
 		snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
 			snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
 			return -1;
 		}
 -		pamsshagentauth_strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
 +		strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
 -		pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
 +		verbose("secure_filename: checking '%s'", buf);
 		if (stat(buf, &st) < 0 ||
 		    (st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != uid) ||
 		    (st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_auth_secure_path(const c
 		/* If are passed the homedir then we can stop */
 		if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0) {
 -			pamsshagentauth_verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
 +			verbose("secure_filename: terminating check at '%s'",
 			    buf);
 			break;
 		}
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2018-08-24 10:22:13.202657025 +0200
@@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
 #include "xmalloc.h"
 #include "ssh.h"
 #include "ssh2.h"
 -#include "buffer.h"
 +#include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "log.h"
 #include "compat.h"
 -#include "key.h"
 +#include "sshkey.h"
 +#include "ssherr.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 #include "secure_filename.h"
@@ -48,54 +48,59 @@
 #include "identity.h"
 #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
 +#define SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST          54
 +
 /* extern u_char  *session_id2;
 extern uint8_t  session_id_len;
  */
 int
 -userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, Buffer * session_id2)
 +userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruser, Identity * id, struct sshbuf * session_id2)
 {
 -    Buffer          b = { 0 };
 +    struct sshbuf  *b = NULL;
     char           *pkalg = NULL;
     u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
 -    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
 +    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
 -    int             authenticated = 0;
 +    int             r, authenticated = 0;
 -    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
 +    pkalg = (char *) sshkey_ssh_name(id->key);
     /* first test if this key is even allowed */
     if(! pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, id->key))
 -        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
 +        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
 -    if(pamsshagentauth_key_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) == 0)
 -        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
 +    if(sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &pkblob, &blen) != 0)
 +        goto user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer;
     /* construct packet to sign and test */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_init(&b);
 +    if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
 +        fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, session_id2->buf + session_id2->offset, session_id2->end - session_id2->offset);
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST); 
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, ruser);
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth");
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, "publickey");
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_char(&b, 1);
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(&b, pkalg);
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_string(&b, pkblob, blen);
 +    if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, sshbuf_ptr(session_id2), sshbuf_len(session_id2))) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_TRUST_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, ruser)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "pam_ssh_agent_auth")) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
 +        (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
 +        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 -    if(ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) != 0)
 +    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
     /* test for correct signature */
 -    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
 +    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) == 0)
         authenticated = 1;
   user_auth_clean_exit:
     /* if(&b != NULL) */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&b);
 +    sshbuf_free(b);
 +  user_auth_clean_exit_without_buffer:
     if(sig != NULL)
 -        pamsshagentauth_xfree(sig);
 +        free(sig);
     if(pkblob != NULL)
 -        pamsshagentauth_xfree(pkblob);
 +        free(pkblob);
     CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
     return authenticated;
 }
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
 #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
 #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
 -#include <identity.h>
 -int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, Buffer *);
 +#include "identity.h"
 +int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
 #endif
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
 	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
 	*p = '\0';
 	len = pamsshagentauth___b64_pton(encoded, target, targsize);
 -	pamsshagentauth_xfree(encoded);
 +	xfree(encoded);
 	return len;
 }
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
 		fprintf(fp, "dump_base64: len > 65536\n");
 		return;
 	}
 -	buf = pamsshagentauth_xmalloc(2*len);
 +	buf = malloc(2*len);
 	n = pamsshagentauth_uuencode(data, len, buf, 2*len);
 	for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
 		fprintf(fp, "%c", buf[i]);
@@ -79,5 +79,5 @@ pamsshagentauth_dump_base64(FILE *fp, co
 	}
 	if (i % 70 != 69)
 		fprintf(fp, "\n");
 -	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
 +	free(buf);
 }
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-dereference.patch
@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
 diff --git a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
 --- a/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
 +++ b/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
@@ -158,11 +158,12 @@ parse_authorized_key_file(const char *user,
 int
 pam_user_key_allowed(const char *ruser, struct sshkey * key)
 {
 +    struct passwd *pw;
     return
 -        pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
 -                                          key, authorized_keys_file)
 -        || pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(0), key,
 -                                             authorized_keys_file)
 +        ( (pw = getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid)) &&
 +            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
 +        || ((pw = getpwuid(0)) &&
 +            pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(pw, key, authorized_keys_file))
         || pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(authorized_keys_command,
                                                      authorized_keys_command_user,
                                                      getpwnam(ruser), key);
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3-seteuid.patch
@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-seteuid	2017-02-07 15:41:53.172334151 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 15:41:53.174334149 +0100
@@ -238,17 +238,26 @@ ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(ui
 	}
 	errno = 0; 
 -	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
 -	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
 -	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
 +	/* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
 +	   above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
 +	if (seteuid(uid) == -1) {
 		close(sock);
 -        if(errno == EACCES)
 -		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
 +		error("seteuid(%lu) failed with error: %s",
 +		    (unsigned long) uid, strerror(errno));
 		return -1;
 	}
 +	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
 +		close(sock);
 +		sock = -1;
 +		if(errno == EACCES)
 +			fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
 +	}
 -	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
 -
 +	/* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
 +	if (0 != seteuid(0)) {
 +		fatal("setuid(0) failed with error: %s", strerror(errno));
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 	return sock;
 }
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.2-visibility.patch
@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
 --- openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-visibility	2014-03-31 19:35:17.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-7.1p2/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2016-01-22 15:22:40.984469774 +0100
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ char           *__progname;
 extern char    *__progname;
 #endif
 -PAM_EXTERN int
 +PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
 pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
 {
     char          **argv_ptr;
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ cleanexit:
 }
 -PAM_EXTERN int
 +PAM_EXTERN int __attribute__ ((visibility ("default")))
 pam_sm_setcred(pam_handle_t * pamh, int flags, int argc, const char **argv)
 {
     UNUSED(pamh);
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-agent_structure.patch
@ -1,96 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-agent	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@
 typedef struct identity Identity;
 typedef struct idlist Idlist;
 +typedef struct {
 +       int     fd;
 +       struct sshbuf *identities;
 +       int     howmany;
 +}      AuthenticationConnection;
 +
 struct identity {
     TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
     AuthenticationConnection *ac;   /* set if agent supports key */
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.421739027 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include "sshbuf.h"
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "authfd.h"
 +#include "ssherr.h"
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include "ssh2.h"
@@ -291,36 +292,43 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
 {
     struct sshbuf *session_id2 = NULL;
     Identity *id;
 -    struct sshkey *key;
     AuthenticationConnection *ac;
 -    char *comment;
     uint8_t retval = 0;
     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
 +    struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
 +    int r;
 +    unsigned int i;
     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
     if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
         verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
 -        for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
 -        {
 -            if(key != NULL) {
 +        if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(ac->fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
 +            if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
 +               fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities for "
 +                               "protocol %d: %s\n", 2, ssh_err(r));
 +        } else {
 +            for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++)
 +            {
 +              if (idlist->keys[i] != NULL) {
                 id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
 -                id->key = key;
 -                id->filename = comment;
 +                id->key = idlist->keys[i];
 +                id->filename = idlist->comments[i];
                 id->ac = ac;
                 if(userauth_pubkey_from_id(ruser, id, session_id2)) {
                     retval = 1;
                 }
 -                free(id->filename);
 -                key_free(id->key);
                 free(id);
                 if(retval == 1)
                     break;
 -            }
 -        }
 +              }
 +            }
 -        sshbuf_free(session_id2);
 -        ssh_close_authentication_connection(ac);
 +            sshbuf_free(session_id2);
 +            ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
 +        }
 +        ssh_close_authentication_socket(ac->fd);
 +        free(ac);
     }
     else {
         verbose("No ssh-agent could be contacted");
 diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
 --- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-agent	2017-09-27 14:25:49.420739021 +0200
 +++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2017-09-27 14:25:49.422739032 +0200
@@ -84,7 +85,7 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
 -    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b)) != 0)
 +    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
         goto user_auth_clean_exit;
     /* test for correct signature */
--- a/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch
@ -1,196 +0,0 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2017-02-07 14:29:41.626116675 +0100
@@ -43,12 +43,31 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include "ssh2.h"
 #include "misc.h"
 +#include "ssh.h"
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +#include <sys/stat.h>
 +#include <sys/socket.h>
 +#include <sys/un.h>
 +#include <unistd.h>
 +#include <stdlib.h>
 +#include <errno.h>
 +#include <fcntl.h>
 #include "userauth_pubkey_from_id.h"
 #include "identity.h"
 #include "get_command_line.h"
 extern char **environ;
 +/* 
 + * Added by Jamie Beverly, ensure socket fd points to a socket owned by the user 
 + * A cursory check is done, but to avoid race conditions, it is necessary 
 + * to drop effective UID when connecting to the socket. 
 + *
 + * If the cause of error is EACCES, because we verified we would not have that 
 + * problem initially, we can safely assume that somebody is attempting to find a 
 + * race condition; so a more "direct" log message is generated.
 + */
 +
 static char *
 log_action(char ** action, size_t count)
 {
@@ -85,7 +104,7 @@ void
 pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer * session_id2, const char * user,
                                 const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
 {
 -    char *cookie = NULL;
 +    u_char *cookie = NULL;
     uint8_t i = 0;
     uint32_t rnd = 0;
     uint8_t cookie_len;
@@ -112,7 +131,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
         if (i % 4 == 0) {
             rnd = pamsshagentauth_arc4random();
         }
 -        cookie[i] = (char) rnd;
 +        cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
         rnd >>= 8;
     }
@@ -177,6 +196,86 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
 }
 int
 +ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid_t uid)
 +{
 +	const char *authsocket;
 +	int sock;
 +	struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
 +	struct stat sock_st;
 +
 +	authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
 +	if (!authsocket)
 +		return -1;
 +
 +	/* Advisory only; seteuid ensures no race condition; but will only log if we see EACCES */
 +	if( stat(authsocket,&sock_st) == 0) {
 +		if(uid != 0 && sock_st.st_uid != uid) {
 +			fatal("uid %lu attempted to open an agent socket owned by uid %lu", (unsigned long) uid, (unsigned long) sock_st.st_uid);
 +			return -1;
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 +	/* 
 +	 * Ensures that the EACCES tested for below can _only_ happen if somebody 
 +	 * is attempting to race the stat above to bypass authentication.
 +	 */
 +	if( (sock_st.st_mode & S_IWUSR) != S_IWUSR || (sock_st.st_mode & S_IRUSR) != S_IRUSR) {
 +		error("ssh-agent socket has incorrect permissions for owner");
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
 +	sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 +	strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
 +
 +	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
 +	if (sock < 0)
 +		return -1;
 +
 +	/* close on exec */
 +	if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 1) == -1) {
 +		close(sock);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
 +	errno = 0; 
 +	seteuid(uid); /* To ensure a race condition is not used to circumvent the stat
 +	             above, we will temporarily drop UID to the caller */
 +	if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof sunaddr) < 0) {
 +		close(sock);
 +        if(errno == EACCES)
 +		fatal("MAJOR SECURITY WARNING: uid %lu made a deliberate and malicious attempt to open an agent socket owned by another user", (unsigned long) uid);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +
 +	seteuid(0); /* we now continue the regularly scheduled programming */
 +
 +	return sock;
 +}
 +
 +AuthenticationConnection *
 +ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid_t uid)
 +{
 +	AuthenticationConnection *auth;
 +	int sock;
 +
 +	sock = ssh_get_authentication_socket_for_uid(uid);
 +
 +	/*
 +	 * Fail if we couldn't obtain a connection.  This happens if we
 +	 * exited due to a timeout.
 +	 */
 +	if (sock < 0)
 +		return NULL;
 +
 +	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
 +	auth->fd = sock;
 +	buffer_init(&auth->identities);
 +	auth->howmany = 0;
 +
 +	return auth;
 +}
 +
 +int
 pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
 {
     Buffer session_id2 = { 0 };
@@ -190,7 +289,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
 -    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection(uid))) {
 +    if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
         pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
         for (key = ssh_get_first_identity(ac, &comment, 2); key != NULL; key = ssh_get_next_identity(ac, &comment, 2)) 
         {
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in
 --- openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in	2017-02-07 14:40:14.407566921 +0100
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ PATHS=
 CC=@CC@
 LD=@LD@
 CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
 -CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
 +CPPFLAGS=-I.. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
 LIBS=@LIBS@
 AR=@AR@
 AWK=@AWK@
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
 PERL=@PERL@
 SED=@SED@
 ENT=@ENT@
 -LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
 +LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
 LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
 EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
 ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
 -PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o
 +PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o secure_filename.o
 MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
@@ -94,13 +94,13 @@ $(PAM_MODULES): Makefile.in config.h
 .c.o:
 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
 -LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
 +LIBCOMPAT=../openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
 $(LIBCOMPAT): always
 	(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
 always:
 -pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
 -	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
 +pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
 $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
 	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8
--- a/SOURCES/sshd.tmpfiles
+++ b/SOURCES/sshd.tmpfiles
@ -1 +0,0 @@
 d /var/empty/sshd 711 root root -
--- a/SOURCES/sshd@.service
+++ b/SOURCES/sshd@.service
@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
 [Unit]
 Description=OpenSSH per-connection server daemon
 Documentation=man:sshd(8) man:sshd_config(5)
 Wants=sshd-keygen.target
 After=sshd-keygen.target
 [Service]
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
 ExecStart=-/usr/sbin/sshd -i $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
 StandardInput=socket
--- a/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
+++ b/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch
@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
 	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
 -	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
 -	    "on your session.", what);
 +	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
 +	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "
 +	    "however it could also mean that someone may be eavesdropping "
 +	    "on your session.\n"
 +	    "Either close the application which grabs the %s or "
 +	    "log out and log in again to prevent this from happening.", what, what);
 	gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
 	gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
--- a/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
+++ b/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch
@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <X11/Xlib.h>
 +#include <glib.h>
 #include <gtk/gtk.h>
 #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
 #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
 	return 1;
 }
 +static void
 +move_progress(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer progress)
 +{
 +	gdouble step;
 +	g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
 +	
 +	step = g_random_double_range(0.03, 0.1);
 +	gtk_progress_bar_set_pulse_step(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), step);
 +	gtk_progress_bar_pulse(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress));
 +}
 +
 static int
 passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
 {
 	const char *failed;
 	char *passphrase, *local;
 	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
 	int buttons, default_response;
 -	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
 +	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
 	GdkGrabStatus status;
 	GdkColor fg, bg;
 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
 +		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
 +		    FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
 		if (fg_set)
 			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
 		if (bg_set)
 			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
 		gtk_box_pack_start(
 -		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
 -		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
 +		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
 		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
 		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
 			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
 		}
 +
 +		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
 +		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
 +		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
 +
 +		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
 +		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
 +		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
 +		    TRUE, 5);
 +		gtk_widget_show(progress);
 +		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
 +				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
 +
 	}
 	/* Grab focus */
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.8p2-sigpipe.patch
@ -1,12 +1,14 @@
 diff -up openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c
 --- openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c.sigpipe	2011-08-23 18:30:33.873025916 +0200
 +++ openssh-5.8p2/ssh-keyscan.c	2011-08-23 18:32:24.574025362 +0200
-@@ -715,6 +715,8 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -715,6 +715,9 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
 		fdlim_set(maxfd);
 	fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
- 
+ 
 +	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
 +
- 	read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
+	read_wait = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(struct pollfd));
- 	read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
+	for (j = 0; j < maxfd; j++)
 		read_wait[j].fd = -1;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-5.9p1-ipv6man.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.4p1-fromto-remote.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch
@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
- void
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+     int on_stderr)
 {
 +	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
 +}
 +
 +void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
+log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
 #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
 	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
 #endif
-@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
 		exit(1);
 	}
@ -26,21 +26,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
 	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
 	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.544843434 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-04-19 14:56:46.931042176 +0200
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
+void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
 LogLevel log_level_get(void);
 int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
 int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.526843298 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-04-19 14:55:25.286424043 +0200
-@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
 		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
 	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
@ -49,25 +49,25 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
 	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
 	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
 	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
 	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
 +	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
 +
 	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
 	/* Log it */
 	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
- 		    __func__, level);
+-	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
-	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
+	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
 +	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
 	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
 	free(msg);
-@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
 	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
 	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 +		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
 +
 +		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
+			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
 +			do_logfds = 1;
 +		}
 +		free(dev_log_path);
@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 }
 #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.527843305 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
 	int			 m_log_sendfd;
 	struct kex		**m_pkex;
 	pid_t			 m_pid;
@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
 struct Authctxt;
 void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.534843358 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
 static int is_child = 0;
@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
 static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
 	int ret;
 	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
 	char session_type[1024];
@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
 		original_command = command;
-@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
 			tty += 5;
 	}
@ -144,10 +144,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
 	    session_type,
 	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	 * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed later.
+ 
- 	 */
+ 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
- 	endpwent();
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
 -
 -	/*
 -	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 }
 /*
-@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
 			exit(1);
 	}
@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
 	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
 		argv[i] = NULL;
 		optind = optreset = 1;
 		__progname = argv[0];
@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	fflush(NULL);
 	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
@@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
 struct passwd;
@ -197,28 +197,28 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
 -int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
 +int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
 void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
 }
 int
 -sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw)
 +sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv, struct passwd *user_pw, int reset_handler)
 {
- 	fd_set *rset, *wset;
+	int i, r, in, out, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
- 	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
+	ssize_t len, olen;
-@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 	extern char *__progname;
 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
 	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 -	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
 +	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 		}
 	}
@ -227,21 +227,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
 	/*
 	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 		return 1;
 	}
 -	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
 +	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
 }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-19 14:43:08.543843426 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:43:08.545843441 +0200
-@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- 	}
+ #endif
 	/* New socket pair */
 -	monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
 	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
 	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
 	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch
@ -10,5 +10,5 @@
 +		}
 		omode = mode;
 		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
 -- 
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch
@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +
 +	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
 +	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
+		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
+		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
 +	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
+		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
+		    " and not writable by anyone else");
 +		fclose(contexts_file);
 +		return;
 +	}
@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
 +			arg = strdelim(&cp);
 +			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
+				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
 +				fclose(contexts_file);
 +				return;
 +			}
@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +	fclose(contexts_file);
 +
 +	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
+		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
+		    " SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
@ -93,18 +93,17 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 #endif
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
-index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
+--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	(date 1703108053912)
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
+@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@
-@@ -179,7 +179,7 @@ ssh_selinux_change_context(const char *newname)
+ 	xasprintf(&newctx, "%.*s%s%s", (int)(cx - oldctx + 1), oldctx,
- 	strlcpy(newctx + len, newname, newlen - len);
+ 	    newname, cx2 == NULL ? "" : cx2);
- 	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
+
- 		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
+-	debug3_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
-	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
+	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'", oldctx, newctx);
 +	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
 	    oldctx, newctx);
 	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ 		do_log2_f(log_level, "setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
 		    newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
@ -117,10 +116,10 @@ index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 #endif
 #ifdef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+diff --git a/sshd-session.c b/sshd-session.c
 index 2871fe9..39b9c08 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd-session.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd-session.c
@@ -629,7 +629,7 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	demote_sensitive_data();
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch
@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
@@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
 #endif
 	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
@ -38,16 +38,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 	if (options->password_authentication == -1)
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
-@@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -578,7 +578,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sPerSourcePenalties, sPerSourcePenaltyExemptList,
 	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 	sGssKeyEx, sGssKexAlgorithms, sGssStoreRekey,
 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
-@@ -497,14 +500,16 @@ static struct {
+@@ -600,14 +600,16 @@ static struct {
 	{ "gssapikeyexchange", sGssKeyEx, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapistorecredentialsonrekey", sGssStoreRekey, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "gssapikexalgorithms", sGssKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
+	case sMatch:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
+		if (cmdline)
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
@@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
@ -122,10 +122,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
 #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
 #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
 +#GSSAPIEnablek5users no
 # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
 # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
 diff -up openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c.xxx	2024-07-11 13:51:19.969960781 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.8p1/servconf.c	2024-07-11 13:51:30.938231250 +0200
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-allow-ip-opts.patch
@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.ip-opts	2016-07-25 13:58:48.998507834 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2016-07-25 14:01:28.346469878 +0200
-@@ -1507,12 +1507,29 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -1507,12 +1507,32 @@ check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
 	    &option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
@ -21,11 +21,14 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.ip-opts openssh/sshd.c
 +				case 130:
 +				case 133:
 +				case 134:
-+					i += opts[i + 1];
+					if (i + 1 < option_size && opts[i + 1] >= 2) {
-+					break;
+						i += opts[i + 1];
 +						break;
 +					}
 +					/* FALLTHROUGH */
 +				default:
 +				/* Fail, fatally, if we detect either loose or strict
-+			 	 * source routing options. */
+			 	 * or incorrect source routing options. */
 +					text[0] = '\0';
 +					for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
 +						snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-force_krb.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch
@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
--- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
+++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
 			_exit(1);
 		}
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
-+
+ 		if (env != NULL)
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+ 		else
 		_exit(127);
 diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 --- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 +++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
@ -36,44 +35,44 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
 --- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
 +++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
 ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
 SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
 SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
 SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
 SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
 SSHD_SESSION=$(libexecdir)/sshd-session
 SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
 SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
 K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
 GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
 SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
 SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
 LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
 LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
 AR=@AR@
 AWK=@AWK@
@@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
 MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
 INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 
 -TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
 +TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) sshd-session$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 XMSS_OBJS=\
 	ssh-xmss.o \
@@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LDAPLIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2) $(CHANNELLIBS)
 +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS) $(CHANNELLIBS)
@@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
@ -96,8 +95,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.150849626 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2015-06-24 10:57:50.159849603 +0200
@@ -54,6 +54,20 @@ extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern int inetd_flag;
 extern int rexeced_flag;
 +/* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 +int
@ -132,7 +131,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.keycat openssh/openbsd-compat/
 -	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
- 	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+ 	if (inetd_flag) {
 		use_current = "1";
 	} else {
 		use_current = "";
@ -466,16 +465,16 @@ index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
 				esac
 			fi
@@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
 	fi ]
 )
 AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
 AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
 +AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
 # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
 KRB5_MSG="no"
@@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "          +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
 fi
 +if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
 +echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch
@ -155,8 +155,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 	 * because if they are on a krb5-protected filesystem, user credentials
 	 * to access these files aren't available yet. */
 -	if (krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name) && k5login_exists) {
-+	if (ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)
+	if (k5login_exists &&
-+			&& k5login_exists) {
+	    ssh_krb5_kuserok(krb_context, princ, name, k5login_exists)) {
 		retval = 1;
 		logit("Authorized to %s, krb5 principal %s (krb5_kuserok)",
 		    name, (char *)client->displayname.value);
@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
 	options->password_authentication = -1;
 	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
@@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
 	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
 		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
@ -193,14 +193,14 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 		options->password_authentication = 1;
 	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
@@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
- 	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
@@ -478,12 +481,14 @@ static struct {
 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
@ -217,16 +217,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
@@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*activep = value;
+		}
- 		break;
+		break;
- 
+
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
+	case sMatch:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
+		if (cmdline)
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
@@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
 	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
 	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
@ -266,8 +266,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +The default is
 +.Cm yes .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ offer to clients.
@@ -1078,6 +1082,7 @@ Available keywords are
 .Cm IPQoS ,
 .Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
@ -286,4 +286,4 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
 +#KerberosUseKuserok yes
 # GSSAPI options
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
@@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("done");
 }
 +void
@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 +		return;
 +
 +	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		return;
 +	}
 +	if (ctx != NULL) {
 +		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
 +		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		freecon(ctx);
 +	}
 +}
@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	platform_setusercontext(pw);
 -	if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
-+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && (!is_child || !use_privsep)) {
+	if (platform_privileged_uidswap() && !is_child) {
 #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
 		if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
 		    (LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
@ -96,8 +96,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	}
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
+--- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 18:59:13.808124269 +0100
@@ -540,6 +540,10 @@ privsep_preauth_child(void)
 	/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
 	demote_sensitive_data();
@ -109,13 +109,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 	/* Demote the child */
 	if (privsep_chroot) {
 		/* Change our root directory */
-@@ -633,6 +637,9 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
- {
+ 	 * fd passing, as AFAIK PTY allocation on this platform doesn't require
- #ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
+ 	 * special privileges to begin with.
- 	if (1) {
+ 	 */
-+#elif defined(WITH_SELINUX)
+-#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
-+	if (0) {
+#if defined(DISABLE_FD_PASSING) && !defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) && !defined(WITH_SELINUX)
-+		/* even root user can be confined by SELinux */
+ 	skip_privdrop = 1;
 #else
 	if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
 #endif
--- a/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
+++ b/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch
@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
 		umask(old_umask);
 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 +			free(ccname);
 			return oerrno;
 		}
@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
 			oerrno = errno;
 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 			close(tmpfd);
 +			free(ccname);
 			return oerrno;
 		}
 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
 -
 +#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
 +#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
 		return r;
 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
 	free(rb.blob);
 +	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
 	if (erb != NULL) {
 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
 		return r;
 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
 	free(rb.blob);
 +	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
 	if (erb != NULL) {
 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
 		return r;
 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
 	free(rb.blob);
 +	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
 	if (erb != NULL) {
 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
 	 */
 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
 +	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
 # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
 +	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
 # endif
@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
 +	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
 +	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
 	}
 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
 		close(nullfd);
 +	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
 +	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
 }
 char *
@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
 	}
 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
 		close(devnull);
 +	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
 	return ret;
 }
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
 	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
 	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
 -	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
 +	while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd >= 0 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
 		;
 	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
 -
 +	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
 	return (0);
  error:
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr
 	struct sockaddr_in6 *in6;
 	u_int16_t *portp;
 	u_int16_t port;
 -	socklen_t salen;
 +	socklen_t salen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_storage);
 	int i;
 	if (sa == NULL) {
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
 static void
 pselect_notify_parent(void)
 {
 -	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
 }
 static void
 pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
 {
 -	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
 }
 static void
@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
 {
 	char c;
 -	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
 -		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
 +	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
 +		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
 			debug2_f("reading");
 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
 	}
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
 			} else if (r != 0) {
 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
 +				free(arg2);
 				goto out;
 			}
 			free(arg2);
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
@@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
 		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
 			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
 			/* increase optional counter */
 -			if (intptr != NULL)
 -				*intptr = *intptr + 1;
 +			/* DEAD CODE intptr is still NULL ;)
 +  			 if (intptr != NULL)
 +				*intptr = *intptr + 1; */
 		}
 		break;
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
 		debug_f("invalid tun");
 		goto done;
 	}
 -	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
 +	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device >= 0) {
 		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
 		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
 			goto done;
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
 +			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
 			return NULL;
 		}
 		/* validate also provider from URI */
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd-session.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@@ -691,8 +691,10 @@ privsep_preauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
 		privsep_preauth_child(ssh);
 		setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
 -		if (box != NULL)
 +		if (box != NULL) {
 			ssh_sandbox_child(box);
 +			free(box);
 +		}
 		return 0;
 	}
@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (newstr)
 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
 -	else
 +	else {
 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
 +		free(gss);
 +	     }
 +	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
 	}
 #endif
 diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
 --- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
 			if (r != 0)
 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
 +			freezero(blob, blen);
 +			blob = NULL;
 +			blen = 0;
 		} else {
 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
 				cp += 4;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch
@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
--- a/sftp-server.8	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/sftp-server.8	2022-06-20 16:03:47.892540068 +0200
+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
 .Op Fl u Ar umask
 +.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
 .Ek
 .Nm
 .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
 .Xr umask 2
 to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
 user's default mask.
@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
 .El
 .Pp
 On some systems,
-diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
--- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:01:26.183793633 +0200
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:02:12.442690608 +0200
+++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
+@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
 /* Version of client */
 static u_int version;
@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
 /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
 static int init_done;
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
 	Attrib a;
 	char *name;
 	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
 	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
 	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
 	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
 	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
 	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
 	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
 			}
 		}
 	}
@ -64,16 +64,16 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
 	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
 		send_status(id, status);
 	free(name);
-@@ -1555,7 +1566,7 @@
+@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
 	fprintf(stderr,
 	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
-	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
+	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
 	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
 	    __progname, __progname);
 	exit(1);
-@@ -1581,7 +1592,7 @@
+@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
 	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
 		switch (ch) {
 		case 'Q':
 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1643,6 +1654,15 @@
+@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
 				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
 			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
 			break;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch
@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
 +++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
@@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
 -	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
 +	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
 	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch
@ -13,33 +13,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	int r, ret = 0;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
+	debug3_f("entering");
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	do {
 +		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
 +			break;
 +		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
+			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +
 +		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 +		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
+			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
 +		sshbuf_reset(m);
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
+			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
 +		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
+			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
@@ -717,6 +728,8 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
 	}
 	if (s->command != NULL && s->ptyfd == -1)
- 		s->command_handle = PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(ssh, s->command));
+ 		s->command_handle = mm_audit_run_command(ssh, s->command);
 +	if (pipe(paudit) < 0)
 +		fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
 #endif
@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
 +	close(paudit[1]);
-+	if (use_privsep && ret == 0) {
+	if (ret == 0) {
 +		/*
 +		 * Read the audit messages from forked child and send them
 +		 * back to monitor. We don't want to communicate directly,
@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	return ret;
 }
-@@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1538,6 +1565,33 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 	endpwent();
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
 }
 +void
@ -147,12 +147,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 +	int pparent = paudit[1];
 +	close(paudit[0]);
 +	/* Hack the monitor pipe to avoid race condition with parent */
-+	if (use_privsep)
+	mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +		mm_set_monitor_pipe(pparent);
 +#endif
 +
 +	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, use_privsep);
+	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 +	/*
 +	 * We can audit this, because we hacked the pipe to direct the
 +	 * messages over postauth child. But this message requires answer
@ -176,7 +175,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
 	sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
 -	/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh, 1);
+-	destroy_sensitive_data(ssh);
 -	ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
 -	/* Don't audit this - both us and the parent would be talking to the
 -	   monitor over a single socket, with no synchronization. */
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch
@ -28,14 +28,15 @@ diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
 index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,5 +222,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
 #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
 #include <krb5.h>
 krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
 +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
 +	char **k5login_directory);
 #endif
- #endif
+ 
 #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
+	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
 +	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
 +		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
 +		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
 +			pw->pw_name);
 +	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
+	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
 -	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
 	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch
@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
 +#endif
 	}
 	(void) closedir(dirp);
-     } else
+ 	return;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch
@ -1,21 +1,23 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
+diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
--- openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
+--- a/channels.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
-+++ openssh-7.2p2/channels.c	2016-06-03 10:42:04.775164520 +0200
+++ b/channels.c	(date 1703026069921)
-@@ -3990,21 +3990,24 @@ x11_create_display_inet(int x11_display_
+@@ -5075,11 +5075,13 @@
 }
- 
+
 static int
 -connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
 +connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname, int len)
 {
 	int sock;
 	struct sockaddr_un addr;
- 
+
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
 	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock < 0)
+ 	if (sock == -1) {
 		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
@@ -5087,11 +5089,12 @@
 	}
 	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
 	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
 -	strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
@ -29,8 +31,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 -	error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
 	return -1;
 }
- 
+
-@@ -4012,8 +4015,18 @@ static int
+@@ -5099,8 +5102,18 @@
 connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
 {
 	char buf[1024];
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch
@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.071506625 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
@@ -152,8 +152,8 @@ static int all_opens_permitted = 0;
- #define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST	"*"
+ #define	NUM_SOCKS	10
 /* -- X11 forwarding */
 -/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
@ -10,8 +10,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 +/* Minimum port number for X11 forwarding */
 +#define X11_PORT_MIN 6000
- /* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
+ /* Per-channel callback for pre/post IO actions */
- typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
+ typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c);
@@ -4228,7 +4228,7 @@ channel_send_window_changes(void)
  */
 int
@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
 		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
@@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
 		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
 			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
 -			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
 +			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.h.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.h
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.h	2016-12-23 15:46:32.139506636 +0100
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ int	 permitopen_port(const char *);
- void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
+ void	 channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, time_t);
 int	 x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
 -int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
 +int	 x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
@ -110,9 +110,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 		options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
 	if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
@@ -419,7 +422,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok, sPasswordAuthentication,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
 -	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
 +	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11MaxDisplays, sX11UseLocalhost,
 	sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
@ -191,13 +191,13 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max	2016-12-23 15:46:32.134506635 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5	2016-12-23 15:46:32.141506636 +0100
@@ -1133,6 +1133,7 @@ Available keywords are
 .Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
 .Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
 .Cm UnusedConnectionTimeout ,
 .Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
 +.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
 .Cm X11Forwarding
 and
- .Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+ .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
@@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
 X11 forwarding.
 This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch
@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ index ca75cc7..6e7de31 100644
 +	SC_ALLOW(__NR_flock),
 +#endif
 #ifdef __NR_futex
- 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
+ 	SC_FUTEX(__NR_futex),
 #endif
@@ -178,6 +181,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
 #ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
@ -69,29 +69,6 @@ index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
 #endif
 -- 1.9.1
 The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
 specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
 Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
 ---
 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 index e86aa2c..98062f1 100644
 --- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 +++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
 +	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
 +	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
 #endif
 #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
 	/*
 -- 
 1.9.1
 diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 --- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
@ -107,40 +84,3 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-se
 	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
 #endif
 From ef34ea4521b042dd8a9c4c7455f5d1a8f8ee5bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
 Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:11:15 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
 Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware acceleration
 to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
 Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography support with the
 help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt
 device driver and so there is a need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
 Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
 Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in that area.
 I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the patches to the openssl
 community.
 Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
 Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
 ---
 sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 1 +
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
 diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 index 5edbc6946..56eb9317f 100644
 --- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 +++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
 	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
 +	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
 #endif
 #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
 	/*
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-audit.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch
@ -1,70 +1,69 @@
 diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+@@ -72,6 +72,8 @@
 /* import */
 extern ServerOptions options;
 extern u_char *session_id2;
 extern u_int session_id2_len;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 extern struct authmethod_cfg methodcfg_pubkey;
 static char *
 format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
@@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
 	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 	uid_swapped = 1;
@@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
 	    ac, av, &f,
-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
+	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    inetd_flag, the_authctxt)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
--- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
  */
 pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
-    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
-+    void *the_authctxt)
+    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
 +    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
 {
 	FILE *f = NULL;
 	struct stat st;
@@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
 			_exit(1);
 		}
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
 			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
 			    strerror(errno));
 			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
--- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
+++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
-    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
+    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
 int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
 typedef struct arglist arglist;
 struct arglist {
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@ -82,14 +81,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
-@@ -49,11 +49,6 @@
+@@ -49,10 +49,6 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #endif
 -extern ServerOptions options;
 -extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 -extern int inetd_flag;
 -extern int rexeced_flag;
 -
 /* Wrapper around is_selinux_enabled() to log its return value once only */
 int
@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 	if (r == 0) {
 		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-		if (inetd_flag) {
 +		if (inetd) {
 			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
@ -145,14 +143,14 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 	char *role;
@@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 -	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
 	rv = set_it("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
-	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+-	if (inetd_flag) {
 +	if (inetd) {
 		use_current = "1";
 	} else {
@ -203,10 +201,10 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
 			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
@@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 -	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
@ -216,56 +214,58 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 diff -up openssh/platform.c.refactor openssh/platform.c
 --- openssh/platform.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.204821389 +0200
 +++ openssh/platform.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.277822088 +0200
-@@ -32,6 +32,9 @@
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
 #include "openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h"
 extern int use_privsep;
 extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
- void
+ /* return 1 if we are running with privilege to swap UIDs, 0 otherwise */
- platform_pre_listen(void)
+ int
@@ -183,7 +186,9 @@ platform_setusercontext_post_groups(stru
 	}
 #endif /* HAVE_SETPCRED */
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
 #endif
 }
-diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor openssh/sshd-session.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.275822068 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2019-04-04 13:19:51.270195262 +0200
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int debug_flag = 0;
- static int test_flag = 0;
+ int debug_flag = 0;
 /* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
 -static int inetd_flag = 0;
 +int inetd_flag = 0;
- /* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
+ /* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
- static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
+ static int log_stderr = 0;
@@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ static char **saved_argv;
 static int saved_argc;
 /* re-exec */
 -static int rexeced_flag = 0;
 +int rexeced_flag = 0;
 static int rexec_flag = 1;
 static int rexec_argc = 0;
 static char **rexec_argv;
@@ -2192,7 +2192,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	}
 #endif
 #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name);
 +	sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(authctxt->pw->pw_name,
-+	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
+	    inetd_flag, do_pam_putenv, the_authctxt,
 +	    options.use_pam);
 #endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (options.use_pam) {
 diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
 --- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
 -	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
 +	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
 		goto out;
 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch
@ -0,0 +1,715 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-05-06 12:12:10.107634472 +0200
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "dh.h"
 #include "pathnames.h"
@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
 	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
 	struct dhgroup dhg;
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		verbose("Using arbitrary primes is not allowed in FIPS mode."
 +		    " Falling back to known groups.");
 +		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 +	}
 +
 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
 		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
 	return 8192;
 }
 +/*
 + * Compares the received DH parameters with known-good groups,
 + * which might be either from group14, group16 or group18.
 + */
 +int
 +dh_is_known_group(const DH *dh)
 +{
 +	const BIGNUM *p, *g;
 +	const BIGNUM *known_p, *known_g;
 +	DH *known = NULL;
 +	int bits = 0, rv = 0;
 +
 +	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &p, NULL, &g);
 +	bits = BN_num_bits(p);
 +
 +	if (bits <= 3072) {
 +		known = dh_new_group14();
 +	} else if (bits <= 6144) {
 +		known = dh_new_group16();
 +	} else {
 +		known = dh_new_group18();
 +	}
 +
 +	DH_get0_pqg(known, &known_p, NULL, &known_g);
 +
 +	if (BN_cmp(g, known_g) == 0 &&
 +	    BN_cmp(p, known_p) == 0) {
 +		rv = 1;
 +	}
 +
 +	DH_free(known);
 +	return rv;
 +}
 +
 #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-05-06 12:11:28.393298005 +0200
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
 int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
 int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
 +int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
 u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
 void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/kex-names.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #endif
@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
 	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
 	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
 		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
 -			error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
 +			if (FIPS_mode())
 +				error("\"%.100s\" is not allowed in FIPS mode", p);
 +			else
 +				error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
 			free(s);
 			return 0;
 		}
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 		goto out;
 	}
 +	if (FIPS_mode() && dh_is_known_group(kex->dh) == 0) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
 	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
 	"rsa-sha2-512," \
 	"rsa-sha2-256"
 +#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
 +	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
 +	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
 +	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-512," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-256"
 +
 #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
 #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
 +#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
 +	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
 +	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
 +	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
 +	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
 +#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
 +	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
 +	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
 +	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
 +	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
 +	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
 +#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
 +	"hmac-sha1," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-256," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-512," \
 +	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
 +
 /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
 #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
 	"ssh-ed25519," \
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.428926336 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
 # include <glob.h>
 #else
@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
 -	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
 -	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
 -	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
 -	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
 -	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
 +	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
 +	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
 +	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
 +	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
 +	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
 #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
 	do { \
 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.463926606 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
 #ifdef __NR_open
 	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
 #endif
 +#ifdef __NR_socket
 +	SC_DENY(__NR_socket, EACCES),
 +#endif
 #ifdef __NR_openat
 	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
 #endif
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.455926545 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
 #include <limits.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <errno.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
 #include <util.h>
 #endif
@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
 	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
 	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
 -	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
 -	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
 -	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
 -	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
 -	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
 +	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
 +	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
 +	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
 +	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
 +	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
 +	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
 #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
 	do { \
 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #endif
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		exit(0);
 	}
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
 +
 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
 #include <vis.h>
 #endif
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 +
 #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
 #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
 #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 -		/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
 -		 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
 -		orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 -
 -		if (options.gss_server_identity) {
 -			gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
 -		} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
 -			gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
 -			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
 -			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 -			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
 -				free(gss_host);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
 +			options.gss_keyex = 0;
 +		} else {
 +			/* Add the GSSAPI mechanisms currently supported on this
 +			 * client to the key exchange algorithm proposal */
 +			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
 +
 +			if (options.gss_server_identity) {
 +				gss_host = xstrdup(options.gss_server_identity);
 +			} else if (options.gss_trust_dns) {
 +				gss_host = remote_hostname(ssh);
 +				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
 +				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 +				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
 +					free(gss_host);
 +					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 +				}
 +			} else {
 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 			}
 -		} else {
 -			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 -		}
 -		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 -		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 -		if (gss) {
 -			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
 -			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
 -			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 -
 -			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
 -			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
 -			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
 -			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
 -			    "%s,null", orig);
 +			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 +			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 +			if (gss) {
 +				debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
 +				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
 +				    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 +
 +				/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
 +				 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
 +				orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
 +				xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
 +				    "%s,null", orig);
 +			}
 		}
 	}
 #endif
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #endif
 #include <pwd.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 +#include <syslog.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <stdlib.h>
@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #endif
@@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
 +		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
 +				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
 +		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
 +		    sshkey_free(key);
 +		    key = NULL;
 +		    continue;
 +		}
 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
 	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
 +
 	/*
 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
 	 * unmounted if desired.
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
 --- a/sshd-session.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
 +++ b/sshd-session.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
@@ -78,6 +79,7 @@
 #include <openssl/bn.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/rand.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #endif
@@ -2506,10 +2513,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
 	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
 		orig = NULL;
 -	if (options.gss_keyex)
 -		gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
 -	else
 -		gss = NULL;
 +	if (options.gss_keyex) {
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
 +			options.gss_keyex = 0;
 +		} else {
 +			gss = ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms();
 +		}
 +	}
 	if (gss && orig)
 		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #endif
 #include "crypto_api.h"
@@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
 #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "match.h"
 +#include "log.h"
 #include "ssh-sk.h"
 #ifdef WITH_XMSS
@@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
 		impl = keyimpls[i];
 		if (impl->name == NULL || impl->type == KEY_NULL)
 			continue;
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			switch (impl->type) {
 +			case KEY_ED25519:
 +			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
 +			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
 +			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
 +			     continue;
 +			     break;
 +			default:
 +			     break;
 +			}
 +		}
 		if (!include_sigonly && impl->sigonly)
 			continue;
 		if ((certs_only && !impl->cert) || (plain_only && impl->cert))
@@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
 	}
 +	switch (type) {
 +	case KEY_ED25519:
 +	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
 +	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
 +	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    sshkey_free(k);
 +		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		}
 +		break;
 +	default:
 +		break;
 +	}
 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
 	sshkey_free_contents(ret);
 	*ret = *k;
@@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
 		*lenp = 0;
 	if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
 +	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
 +	/* Fallthrough */
 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
 	if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
@@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 		*detailsp = NULL;
 	if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	if (FIPS_mode() && ((key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK) || (key->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT))) {
 +	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
 	if ((impl = sshkey_impl_from_key(key)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
 	return impl->funcs->verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include <openssl/pem.h>
 #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
 #endif
@@ -69,6 +69,7 @@
 #include "cipher.h"
 #define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
 +#define FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
 /*
  * Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys.  These value can be
@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
 #endif
 	}
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		if (type == KEY_DSA)
 +			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
 +			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	}
 	switch (type) {
 	case KEY_DSA:
 		if (*bitsp != 1024)
@@ -266,7 +267,7 @@ ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const ch
 	char *name = NULL;
 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
 -		name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
 +		name = FIPS_mode() ? _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA : _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
 	else {
 		switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
 #ifdef WITH_DSA
@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
 			first = 1;
 			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
 		}
 +		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
 +
 +		/* Skip the keys that are not supported in FIPS mode */
 +		if (FIPS_mode() && (type == KEY_DSA || type == KEY_ED25519)) {
 +			logit("Skipping %s key in FIPS mode",
 +			    key_types[i].key_type_display);
 +			goto next;
 +		}
 +
 		printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
 		fflush(stdout);
 -		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
 		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
 			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
@@ -3830,7 +3831,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
 	}
 	if (key_type_name == NULL)
 -		key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
 +		key_type_name = FIPS_mode() ? FIPS_DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME : DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
 	type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
 	type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
 diff -up openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c
 --- openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.3p1/ssh-rsa.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@
 #include <openssl/err.h>
 #include <openssl/core_names.h>
 #include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 #include <string.h>
@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ ssh_rsa_generate(u_int bits, RSA
 		goto out;
 	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
 +		if (FIPS_mode())
 +			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 		goto out;
 	}
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
 #include <stdio.h>
 #include <string.h>
 #include <signal.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "sshkey.h"
 #include "kex.h"
@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
 -		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
 +		}
 		break;
 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
 -		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
 +		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
 -		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
 -		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
 -		    &shared_secret);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
 +		        &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
 		break;
 #endif
 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
 -		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
 -		    &shared_secret);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
 +		        &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
 -		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
 -		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		} else {
 +		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
 +		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
 +		}
 		break;
 	default:
 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:53:41.428343304 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c	2022-07-11 16:56:09.284663661 +0200
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
 #include <string.h>
 #include <stdarg.h>
 +#include <openssl/fips.h>
 #include "log.h"
 #include "sshbuf.h"
@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *ke
 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
 	    dlen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
 	    sig == NULL || siglen == 0)
 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +	}
 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch
@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
-index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.820744325 +0200
--- a/auth-krb5.c
+++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.853744569 +0200
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
 	char		*krb5_ccname;
 +	int		 krb5_set_env;
 #endif
 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
 int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
 #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
 -krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
 +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
 #endif
 #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:40:55.142832954 +0200
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include <unistd.h>
 #include <string.h>
@ -10,7 +29,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 extern ServerOptions	 options;
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 #endif
 	krb5_error_code problem;
 	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@ -19,24 +38,18 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 	char *client, *platform_client;
 	const char *errmsg;
-@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 		goto out;
 	}
-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
 -	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
 +	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
 +	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
-@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
 -	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
 +	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
 				 &creds);
 	if (problem)
 		goto out;
 #endif
@ -57,7 +70,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
 #endif
-@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
 void
 krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
 {
@ -113,7 +126,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
 		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
 		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
 	}
 }
@ -151,7 +164,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
 +	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
+	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
 +	if (template == NULL)
 +		return -1;
 +
@ -179,7 +192,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		} else {
 +			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
 +			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
+			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
@ -198,16 +211,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	return -1;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
+krb5_error_code
 -ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
 -	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
 -	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
 +	profile_t p;
 +	int ret = 0;
 +	char *value = NULL;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
+	debug3_f("called");
 +	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
 +	if (ret)
 +		return ret;
@ -218,11 +228,14 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
+	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
-+krb5_error_code
+ krb5_error_code
 -ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
 -	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
 -	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
@ -242,7 +255,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 -		return oerrno;
 -	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
+	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
@ -283,7 +296,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -	close(tmpfd);
 -	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
+	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
 +	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
 +	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
 +	if (ret)
@ -304,13 +317,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
 +	 */
 +	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
+		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
 +		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
 +		free(type);
 +		if (ret)
 +			return ret;
 +
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
+		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
 +		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
 +	} else {
 +		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
@ -318,35 +331,47 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		 * collections
 +		 */
 +		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
+		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
 +		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
 +	}
 }
 #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
 #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
-index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.844744503 +0200
--- a/auth.h
+++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ }
 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
 	char		*krb5_ccname;
 +	int		 krb5_set_env;
 #endif
 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
-@@ -243,6 +244,6 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ /* As user */
 -void
 +int
 ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
 {
 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
 -		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
 +		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
 	} else
 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
 +
 +	return 0;
 }
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
- #include <krb5.h>
+@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+ 	char *envstr;
 +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
 #endif
- #endif
+ 
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
 		return;
 	ok = mm_ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
 /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
  * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
@ -449,7 +474,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
 #endif
-@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
 	client->store.data = krb_context;
@ -458,43 +483,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
 }
 int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
-index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
--- a/gss-serv.c
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.854744577 +0200
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
 }
 /* As user */
 -void
 +int
 ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
 {
 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
 -		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
 +		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
 	} else
 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
 +
 +	return 0;
 }
 /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
 	char *envstr;
 #endif
 -	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
 -	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
 -	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
 +	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
 		return;
 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
 diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
 	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
 	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
 	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@ -502,7 +494,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	options->gss_authentication=-1;
 	options->gss_keyex = -1;
 	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
 		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
 	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
 		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@ -511,17 +503,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
 		options->gss_authentication = 0;
 	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -506,7 +509,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
- 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
+	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+-	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sPasswordAuthentication,
-+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
+	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sPasswordAuthentication,
-+	sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
+	sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
- 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
- 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
+	sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
- 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
+@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
 #else
 	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 #endif
@ -535,7 +526,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 #endif
 	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
 		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
 		goto parse_flag;
@ -546,7 +537,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	case sGssAuthentication:
 		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
 		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
 # ifdef USE_AFS
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
 # endif
@ -554,11 +545,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 #endif
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
-index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.848744532 +0200
--- a/servconf.h
+++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
 						 * file on logout. */
 	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
 						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@ -567,13 +557,12 @@ index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
 	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
 	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
 	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
-index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
--- a/session.c
+++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
 	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- 	 * the childs environment as they see fit
+ 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
 	 */
 -	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
 +	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
@ -581,7 +570,7 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
 #endif
 	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
 	}
 #endif
 #ifdef KRB5
@ -590,33 +579,10 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
 		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
 #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c
-index 6593e422..245178af 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
--- a/ssh-gss.h
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
 -	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
 +	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
 -void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
 +int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
 const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
 char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
 diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
 index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
 --- a/sshd.c
 +++ b/sshd.c
@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 #ifdef GSSAPI
 	if (options.gss_authentication) {
 		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@ -625,11 +591,10 @@ index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
 		restore_uid();
 	}
 #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
-index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.849744540 +0200
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-04-19 14:05:10.856744592 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
 file on logout.
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
@ -642,5 +607,26 @@ index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
 +can lead to overwriting previous tickets by subseqent connections to the same
 +user account.
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
- Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
+ Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
- Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+ offer to clients.
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
 --- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-04-19 14:05:10.852744562 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-04-19 14:05:10.855744584 +0200
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
 -	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
 +	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
 } ssh_gssapi_mech;
@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
 OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
 void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
 void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
 -void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
 +int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
 const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
 char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
--- a/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch
@ -0,0 +1,109 @@
 diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
 --- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
 #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
 #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
 #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
 +#
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
 +# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
 +#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
 +# included below. For more information, see manual page for
 +#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
 diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
 --- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
 +++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
 +Match final all
 +	# Follow system-wide Crypto Policy, if defined:
 +	Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/openssh.config
 +
 +	GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +
 +# If this option is set to yes then remote X11 clients will have full access
 +# to the original X11 display. As virtually no X11 client supports the untrusted
 +# mode correctly we set this to yes.
 +	ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
 diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
 --- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
      SyslogFacility
              Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
 -             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
 -             LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.  The
 -             default is AUTH.
 +             sshd(8).  The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV,
 +             LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
 +             The default is AUTH.
      TCPKeepAlive
              Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
 diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
 .It Cm SyslogFacility
 Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
 .Xr sshd 8 .
 -The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
 +The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, AUTHPRIV, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
 LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
 The default is AUTH.
 .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
 diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
 --- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
 # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
 # default value.
 +# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
 +#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
 +Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
 +
 +# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
 +# SELinux about this change.
 +# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
 +#
 #Port 22
 #AddressFamily any
 #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
 diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
 --- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
 +
 +ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
 +
 +GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
 +
 +UsePAM yes
 +
 +X11Forwarding yes
 +
 +# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
 diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
 --- openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
 +++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat_cp	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
 +# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
 +# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
 +# write it before this block or include it before this file.
 +# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
 +Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +
--- a/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
+++ b/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch
@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd-session.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 			    "enabled authentication methods");
 	}
 +	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in our builds */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several problems.");
 +
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
 diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
 --- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
 # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
 # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
 # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
 +# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in this build and may cause several
 +# problems.
 #UsePAM no
 #AllowAgentForwarding yes
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch
@ -23,23 +23,20 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2.c.role-mls openssh/auth2.c
 	if ((style = strchr(user, ':')) != NULL)
 		*style++ = 0;
-@@ -296,8 +304,15 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
+@@ -314,7 +314,13 @@ input_userauth_request(int type, u_int32
- 		    use_privsep ? " [net]" : "");
+ 		setproctitle("%s [net]", authctxt->valid ? user : "unknown");
 		authctxt->service = xstrdup(service);
 		authctxt->style = style ? xstrdup(style) : NULL;
 -		if (use_privsep)
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		authctxt->role = role ? xstrdup(role) : NULL;
 +#endif
-+		if (use_privsep) {
+ 		mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 			mm_inform_authserv(service, style);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+			mm_inform_authrole(role);
+         	mm_inform_authrole(role);
 +#endif
 +		}
 		userauth_banner(ssh);
- 		if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0)
+ 		if ((r = kex_server_update_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
- 			ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "kex_server_update_ext_info failed");
 diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 --- openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-gss.c	2018-08-22 11:15:42.459799171 +0200
@ -50,9 +47,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +	char *micuser;
 	struct sshbuf *b;
 	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
- 	const char *displayname;
+ 	u_char *p;
@@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 	mic.value = p;
 	mic.length = len;
 -	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
@ -63,7 +60,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +#endif
 +		micuser = authctxt->user;
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
 	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
@@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
@ -74,13 +71,13 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +		free(micuser);
 	free(mic.value);
- 	if ((!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) &&
+ 	authctxt->postponed = 0;
 diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 --- openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
 	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	    (authctxt->role
@ -93,7 +90,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
 +#endif
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
- 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
+ 	    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, method)) != 0 ||
 	    (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
 diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
@ -141,33 +138,19 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
 +do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
 {
 	int ret = 1;
- #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+ 	char *compound;
 diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
 --- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ u_int do_pam_account(void);
 void do_pam_session(struct ssh *);
- void do_pam_setcred(int );
+ void do_pam_setcred(void);
 void do_pam_chauthtok(void);
 -int do_pam_putenv(char *, char *);
 +int do_pam_putenv(char *, const char *);
 char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
 char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
 void free_pam_environment(char **);
 diff -up openssh/configure.ac.role-mls openssh/configure.ac
 --- openssh/configure.ac.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/configure.ac	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
@@ -4241,10 +4241,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
 			  LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
 			],
 			AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
 -		SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
 -		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
 -		LIBS="$save_LIBS"
 	fi ]
 )
 AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
 diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
 --- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@ -193,10 +176,10 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
 	}
 	return NULL;
 }
-diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
--- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
+++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
+@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
 int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
 int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
 int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@ -206,7 +189,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
 int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
 int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
     {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
     {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@ -216,7 +199,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
     {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
+@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
 	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@ -226,7 +209,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
 #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
+@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
 	return found;
 }
@ -238,8 +221,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 +	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
+	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
 +
 +	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
 +		free(authctxt->role);
@ -253,25 +236,25 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 int
 mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
 {
-@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
 {
 	struct sshbuf *b;
 	struct sshkey *hostkey = NULL;
 	const u_char *p;
 -	char *userstyle, *cp;
 +	char *userstyle, *s, *cp;
 	size_t len;
 	u_char type;
- 	int r, fail = 0;
+ 	int hostbound = 0, r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
 		fail++;
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
 	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
 	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
 {
 	struct sshbuf *b;
 	const u_char *p;
@ -280,10 +263,10 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 	size_t len;
 	int r, fail = 0;
 	u_char type;
-@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
 		fail++;
 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
 	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@ -319,12 +302,12 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	int r;
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
+	debug3_f("entering");
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
@ -338,8 +321,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
 --- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
 +++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
@@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
- int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int compat);
+     const char *, u_int compat);
 void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
@ -351,7 +334,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
- 	port-linux.o \
+ 	port-prngd.o \
 	port-solaris.o \
 	port-net.o \
 -	port-uw.o
@ -359,7 +342,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
 +	port-linux-sshd.o
 .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@ -371,7 +354,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 -void
 -ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 -{
-	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
 -
 -	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
 -		return;
@ -407,7 +390,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 -	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
 +	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
@ -432,7 +415,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,420 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@ -486,7 +469,6 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +extern ServerOptions options;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +
 +/* Send audit message */
 +static int
@ -544,7 +526,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	access_vector_t bit;
 +	security_class_t class;
 +
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
+	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
 +	class = string_to_security_class("context");
 +	if (!class) {
 +		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
@ -692,7 +674,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +
 +	if (r == 0) {
 +		/* If launched from xinetd, we must use current level */
-+		if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+		if (inetd_flag) {
 +			security_context_t sshdsc=NULL;
 +
 +			if (getcon_raw(&sshdsc) < 0)
@ -706,7 +688,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +			    /* we actually don't change level */
 +			    reqlvl = "";
 +
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
+			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
 +
 +		}
 +
@ -734,8 +716,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
+		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
+		    "context for %s", pwname);
 +	}
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
@ -760,13 +742,13 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	char *use_current;
 +	int rv;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +
 +	rv = do_pam_putenv("SELINUX_ROLE_REQUESTED", role ? role : "");
 +
-+	if (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag) {
+	if (inetd_flag) {
 +		use_current = "1";
 +	} else {
 +		use_current = "";
@ -797,32 +779,30 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
 +			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +				    __func__);
 +			break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
+				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
 +				    __func__);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	if (r >= 0) {
 +		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
 +		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
+			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
 +		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
+			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
+			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +	}
@ -837,14 +817,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (r < 0) {
 +		switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
+			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
 +			    __func__);
 +			break;
 +		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
+			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
 +			    __func__);
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
@ -852,7 +830,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (default_ctx != NULL)
 +		freecon(default_ctx);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+	debug3_f("done");
 +}
 +
 +#endif
@ -871,8 +849,8 @@ diff -up openssh/platform.c.role-mls openssh/platform.c
 }
 diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
--- openssh/sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd-session.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
+++ openssh/sshd-session.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
@@ -2186,6 +2186,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 		restore_uid();
 	}
@ -882,4 +860,4 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.role-mls openssh/sshd.c
 +#endif
 #ifdef USE_PAM
 	if (options.use_pam) {
- 		do_pam_setcred(1);
+ 		do_pam_setcred();
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-scp-ipv6.patch
--- a/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch
@ -0,0 +1,640 @@
 diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5
 --- openssh-9.3p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.284590156 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.623052194 +0200
@@ -378,17 +378,13 @@
 causes no CNAMEs to be considered for canonicalization.
 This is the default behaviour.
 .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
 by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
 (the default),
 the check will not be executed.
 .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
 Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Bd -literal -offset indent
@@ -479,13 +480,6 @@
 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
 .Ed
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
 -aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
 -aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
 .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
@@ -885,6 +879,11 @@
 The default is
 .Dq no .
 .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
 key exchange. Possible values are
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
@@ -897,10 +896,8 @@
 gss-curve25519-sha256-
 .Ed
 .Pp
 -The default is
 -.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
 +.Pp
 .It Cm HashKnownHosts
 Indicates that
 .Xr ssh 1
@@ -919,36 +916,25 @@
 but may be manually hashed using
 .Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for hostbased
 authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
 Alternately if the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended
 -to the default set instead of replacing them.
 +to the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
 -will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed
 -at the head of the default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +at the head of the built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The
 .Fl Q
@@ -1001,6 +987,17 @@
 .Pp
 The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
 +.Pp
 +The proposed
 +.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 +during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
 +.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
 +.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
 +.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
 +would break the order given by the
 +.Pa known_hosts
 +file.
 .It Cm HostKeyAlias
 Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
 real host name when looking up or saving the host key
@@ -1330,6 +1330,11 @@ it may be zero or more of:
 and
 .Cm pam .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that will be used and
 their preference order.
 The selected algorithm will the the first algorithm in this list that
@@ -1338,28 +1343,17 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
 .Pp
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -.Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
 -diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
 .Pp
 +built-in openssh default set.
 The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q kex .
 .It Cm KnownHostsCommand
@@ -1365,37 +1357,33 @@
 file.
 This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
 .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
 in order of preference.
 The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
 calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
 These are considered safer and their use recommended.
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
 -umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q mac .
 .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
@@ -1567,39 +1555,31 @@
 The default is
 .Cm no .
 .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
 authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
 -instead of replacing it.
 +character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default instead of replacing it.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
 +.Pp
 +This option affects also
 +.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
 Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
 The argument to this keyword must be
@@ -2265,7 +2245,9 @@
 This file must be world-readable.
 .El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 -.Xr ssh 1
 +.Xr ssh 1 ,
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
 .Sh AUTHORS
 .An -nosplit
 OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
 diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5 openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5
 --- openssh-9.3p1/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:48.277590077 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.3p1-patched/sshd_config.5	2023-06-07 10:26:00.592051845 +0200
@@ -379,17 +379,13 @@
 then no banner is displayed.
 By default, no banner is displayed.
 .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
 by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
@@ -525,20 +521,25 @@
 indicating not to
 .Xr chroot 2 .
 .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the ciphers allowed.
 Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The supported ciphers are:
 .Pp
@@ -565,13 +566,6 @@
 chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
 -aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
 -aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
 .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
@@ -766,53 +760,43 @@
 .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
 needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
 .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
 key exchange. Possible values are
 .Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -gss-gex-sha1-,
 -gss-group1-sha1-,
 -gss-group14-sha1-,
 -gss-group14-sha256-,
 -gss-group16-sha512-,
 -gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 +gss-gex-sha1-
 +gss-group1-sha1-
 +gss-group14-sha1-
 +gss-group14-sha256-
 +gss-group16-sha512-
 +gss-nistp256-sha256-
 gss-curve25519-sha256-
 .Ed
 -.Pp
 -The default is
 -.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
 -gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
 This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
 .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
 authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 Alternately if the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 character, then the specified signature algorithms will be appended to
 -the default set instead of replacing them.
 +the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified signature algorithms (including wildcards)
 -will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +will be removed from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified signature algorithms will be placed at
 -the head of the default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +the head of the built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms .
@@ -879,25 +863,14 @@
 .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
 environment variable.
 .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the host key signature algorithms
 that the server offers.
 The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
 .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
@@ -1025,6 +1025,11 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
 .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the permitted KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms that the server will
 offer to clients.
 The ordering of this list is not important, as the client specifies the
@@ -1033,16 +1038,16 @@ Multiple algorithms must be comma-separa
 .Pp
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The supported algorithms are:
 .Pp
@@ -1075,16 +1080,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp521
 sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com,
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
 -diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of supported key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
 .It Cm ListenAddress
@@ -1184,21 +1152,26 @@
 file.
 This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
 .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
 The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
 Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The algorithms that contain
 .Qq -etm
@@ -1241,15 +1214,6 @@
 umac-128-etm@openssh.com
 .El
 .Pp
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
 -umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
 -hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
 The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q mac .
 .It Cm Match
@@ -1633,36 +1597,25 @@
 The default is
 .Cm yes .
 .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
 +Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
 Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
 authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
 Alternately if the specified list begins with a
 .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
 -instead of replacing them.
 +character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
 +openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq -
 character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
 +from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
 If the specified list begins with a
 .Sq ^
 character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
 -default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
 -ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
 -sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
 -sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
 -rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 +built-in openssh default set.
 .Pp
 The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
 .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
@@ -2131,7 +2084,9 @@
 .El
 .Sh SEE ALSO
 .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
 -.Xr sshd 8
 +.Xr sshd 8 ,
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 ,
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8
 .Sh AUTHORS
 .An -nosplit
 OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-gssapi-keyex.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-strip-doseol.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch
@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ index 2a455e4e..e01c3d43 100644
 		HMAC_CTX_init \
 		RSA_generate_key_ex \
 		RSA_get_default_method \
-+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id \
+		EVP_KDF_CTX_new \
 	])
 	# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
@ -20,33 +20,35 @@ diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
 index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 --- a/kex.c
 +++ b/kex.c
-@@ -38,6 +38,9 @@
+@@ -38,6 +38,11 @@
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 #include <openssl/crypto.h>
 #include <openssl/dh.h>
-+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
+# ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
 +# include <openssl/kdf.h>
 +# include <openssl/param_build.h>
 +# include <openssl/core_names.h>
 +# endif
 #endif
 #include "ssh.h"
-@@ -942,6 +945,95 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
+@@ -942,6 +945,107 @@ kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
 	return r;
 }
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW
-+static const EVP_MD *
+static const char *
 +digest_to_md(int digest_type)
 +{
 +	switch (digest_type) {
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA1:
-+		return EVP_sha1();
+		return SN_sha1;
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA256:
-+		return EVP_sha256();
+		return SN_sha256;
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA384:
-+		return EVP_sha384();
+		return SN_sha384;
 +	case SSH_DIGEST_SHA512:
-+		return EVP_sha512();
+		return SN_sha512;
 +	}
 +	return NULL;
 +}
@ -56,52 +58,62 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +    const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
 +{
 +	struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
 +	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = NULL;
 +	u_char *key = NULL;
 +	int r, key_len;
 +
-+	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
+	EVP_KDF *kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "SSHKDF", NULL);
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+	EVP_KDF_CTX *ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new();
 +	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
 +       const char *md = digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg);
 +       char keytype = (char)id;
 +
 +	EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
 +	if (!ctx) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	if (md == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (param_bld == NULL) {
 +		EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
 +		return -1;
 +	}
 +	if ((key_len = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
 +	key_len = ROUNDUP(need, key_len);
 +	if ((key = calloc(1, key_len)) == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
-+	ctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SSHKDF);
+	r =     OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
-+	if (!ctx) {
+		                md, strlen(md)) && /* SN */
 +		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY,
 +				sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret)) &&
 +		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH,
 +				hash, hashlen) &&
 +		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
 +				sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id)) &&
 +		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE,
 +				&keytype, 1);
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, digest_to_md(kex->hash_alg));
+	params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld);
-+	if (r != 1) {
+	if (params == NULL) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
-+	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
+	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len, params);
 +	    sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret));
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, hash, hashlen);
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE, id);
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
 +	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_derive(ctx, key, key_len);
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;
@ -115,6 +127,8 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +	r = 0;
 +
 +out:
 +	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
 +	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
 +	free (key);
 +	EVP_KDF_CTX_free(ctx);
 +	if (r < 0) {
@ -130,7 +144,7 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 	ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
 	return r;
 }
-+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID */
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW */
 #define NKEYS	6
 int
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-pkcs11-uri.patch
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-preserve-pam-errors.patch
@ -27,16 +27,15 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c.preserve-pam-errors openssh-8.0p1/auth-pam.c
 	else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
 		ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
 	else
-@@ -856,10 +862,12 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
+@@ -856,9 +862,11 @@ sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, cha
 			plen++;
 			free(msg);
 			break;
 +		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
 +		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
 		case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
 +			sshpam_account_status = 0;
 +			/* FALLTHROUGH */
 		case PAM_MAXTRIES:
 +		case PAM_USER_UNKNOWN:
 +		case PAM_PERM_DENIED:
 -			if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
 -				sshpam_account_status = 0;
 			if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
--- a/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch
@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
 diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
 index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
 --- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
 +++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
 #endif
 }
 -uint32_t
 +uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
 sk_api_version(void)
 {
 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
 	return 0;
 }
 -int
 +int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
 sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
 	return ret;
 }
 -int
 +int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
 sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
 	return ret;
 }
 -int
 +int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
 sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
 {
--- a/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch
@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
 				sock_set_v6only(sock);
 			if (x11_use_localhost)
 				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				    strerror(errno));
 				close(sock);
 +
 +				/* do not remove successfully opened
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-audit-hostname.patch
@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
 diff --color -ruNp a/audit-linux.c b/audit-linux.c
 --- a/audit-linux.c	2024-05-09 12:38:08.843017319 +0200
 +++ b/audit-linux.c	2024-05-09 12:47:05.162267634 +0200
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ extern u_int utmp_len;
 const char *audit_username(void);
 static void
 -linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username,
 +linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const char *username, const char *hostname,
     const char *ip, const char *ttyn, int success, int event)
 {
 	int audit_fd, rc, saved_errno;
@@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ linux_audit_user_logxxx(int uid, const c
 	}
 	rc = audit_log_acct_message(audit_fd, event,
 	    NULL, "login", username ? username : "(unknown)",
 -	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, NULL, ip, ttyn, success);
 +	    username == NULL ? uid : -1, hostname, ip, ttyn, success);
 	saved_errno = errno;
 	close(audit_fd);
@@ -181,9 +181,11 @@ audit_run_command(struct ssh *ssh, const
 {
 	if (!user_login_count++)
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
 	return 0;
@@ -193,10 +195,12 @@ void
 audit_end_command(struct ssh *ssh, int handle, const char *command)
 {
 	linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 	    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 	    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 		    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 		    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 }
@@ -211,19 +215,27 @@ void
 audit_session_open(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 	if (!user_login_count++)
 -		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 -	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_START);
 }
 void
 audit_session_close(struct logininfo *li)
 {
 -	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +	linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +	    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 	    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 	if (user_login_count && !--user_login_count)
 -		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL, li->hostname,
 +		linux_audit_user_logxxx(li->uid, NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? li->hostname : NULL,
 +		    options.use_dns ? NULL : li->hostname,
 		    li->line, 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 }
@@ -236,6 +248,7 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 		linux_audit_user_auth(-1, audit_username(),
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, event);
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
 +			options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 		break;
 	case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PASSWD:
@@ -254,9 +267,11 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 		if (user_login_count) {
 			while (user_login_count--)
 				linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +				    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 				    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 				    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_END);
 			linux_audit_user_logxxx(the_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, NULL,
 +			    options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 			    ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
 			    "ssh", 1, AUDIT_USER_LOGOUT);
 		}
@@ -265,6 +280,7 @@ audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_e
 	case SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON:
 	case SSH_INVALID_USER:
 		linux_audit_user_logxxx(-1, audit_username(),
 +			options.use_dns ? remote_hostname(ssh) : NULL,
 			ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), "ssh", 0, AUDIT_USER_LOGIN);
 		break;
 	default:
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch
@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
 --- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c.orig	2022-04-12 15:47:03.815044607 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c	2022-04-12 15:48:12.464963511 +0200
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
 #include "includes.h"
 -#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM)
 +#if !defined(HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || defined(BROKEN_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
 #include <sys/types.h>
 #include <unistd.h>
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch
@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
 diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
 --- a/readconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
 +++ b/readconf.c	(date 1703169891147)
@@ -326,6 +326,7 @@
 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
 	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
 +	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
 	{ "enableescapecommandline", oEnableEscapeCommandline },
 	{ "obscurekeystroketiming", oObscureKeystrokeTiming },
 	{ "channeltimeout", oChannelTimeout },
 diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
 --- a/servconf.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
 +++ b/servconf.c	(date 1703169891148)
@@ -691,6 +691,7 @@
 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
 +	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
 	{ "channeltimeout", sChannelTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "unusedconnectiontimeout", sUnusedConnectionTimeout, SSHCFG_ALL },
 	{ "sshdsessionpath", sSshdSessionPath, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch
@ -0,0 +1,118 @@
 diff -up openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
 --- openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh.xxx	2023-05-29 18:15:56.311236887 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.3p1/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2023-05-29 18:16:07.598503551 +0200
@@ -17,8 +17,21 @@ trace "make CA key"
 ${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ed25519 -f $OBJ/agent-ca -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen CA"
 +PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
 +    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
 +SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
 +echo $PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS | grep "rsa"
 +r=$?
 +if [ $r == 0 ]; then
 +echo $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES | grep "rsa"
 +r=$?
 +if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
 +SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES="$SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ssh-rsa"
 +fi
 +fi
 +
 trace "load hostkeys"
 -for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
 	${SSHKEYGEN} -s $OBJ/agent-ca -qh -n localhost-with-alias \
 		-I localhost-with-alias $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub || \
@@ -32,12 +48,16 @@ rm $OBJ/agent-ca # Don't need CA private
 unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
 -for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
 	verbose "key type $k"
 +	hka=$k
 +	if [ $k = "ssh-rsa" ]; then
 +	   hka="rsa-sha2-512"
 +	fi
 	cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 -	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 +	echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $hka" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 -	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
 +	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$hka -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
 	( printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 ' ;
 	  cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
@@ -50,15 +70,16 @@ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
 done
 SSH_CERTTYPES=`ssh -Q key-sig | grep 'cert-v01@openssh.com'`
 +SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES=`echo "$SSH_CERTTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
 # Prepare sshd_proxy for certificates.
 cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 HOSTKEYALGS=""
 -for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
 	test -z "$HOSTKEYALGS" || HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS},"
 	HOSTKEYALGS="${HOSTKEYALGS}${k}"
 done
 -for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
 	echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 	echo "HostCertificate $OBJ/agent-key.${k}-cert.pub" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
 	test -f $OBJ/agent-key.${k}.pub || fatal "no $k key"
@@ -70,7 +93,7 @@ echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $HOSTKEYALGS" >>
 ( printf '@cert-authority localhost-with-alias ' ;
   cat $OBJ/agent-ca.pub) > $OBJ/known_hosts
 -for k in $SSH_CERTTYPES ; do
 +for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_CERTTYPES ; do
 	verbose "cert type $k"
 	opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
 	SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
 diff -up openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c
 --- openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c.xxx	2023-04-26 17:37:35.100827792 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.3p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-04-26 17:50:31.860748877 +0200
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
     const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
 {
 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX];
 -	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL;
 +	char *all_key, *hkalgs = NULL, *filtered_algs = NULL;
 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
 #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
@@ -260,10 +260,22 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
 	if (use_known_hosts_order)
 		hkalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo);
 +	filtered_algs = hkalgs ? match_filter_allowlist(hkalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos)
 +		               : match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms,
 +				 options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +	if (filtered_algs == NULL) {
 +		if (hkalgs)
 +			fatal_f("No match between algorithms for %s (host %s) and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
 +			       hkalgs, host, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +		else
 +			fatal_f("No match between host key algorithms %s and pubkey accepted algorithms %s",
 +			        options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
 +	}
 +
 	kex_proposal_populate_entries(ssh, myproposal,
 	    options.kex_algorithms, options.ciphers, options.macs,
 	    compression_alg_list(options.compression),
 -	    hkalgs ? hkalgs : options.hostkeyalgorithms);
 +	    filtered_algs);
 #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
 	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -303,6 +315,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
 #endif
 	free(hkalgs);
 +	free(filtered_algs);
 	/* start key exchange */
 	if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch
@ -0,0 +1,338 @@
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.338710923 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.357711165 +0100
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ void
 compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
 {
 	int i;
 +	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
 	static struct {
 		char	*pat;
 		int	bugs;
@@ -145,16 +146,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
 	};
 	/* process table, return first match */
 +	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
 	ssh->compat = 0;
 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
 +	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
 +		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
 			return;
 		}
 	}
 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
 +	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
 +		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
 }
 /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
 --- openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
 #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
 #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
 #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
 -/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
 +#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
 #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
 /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
 #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.279676981 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2023-01-20 15:01:07.007821379 +0100
@@ -660,11 +660,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
 	struct sshkey *key;
 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
 -	char *alg = NULL;
 +	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
 	int r, is_proof = 0;
 	u_int keyid, compat;
 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
 +	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
 	debug3_f("entering");
@@ -719,18 +720,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
 	}
 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
 -		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
 +		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
 +				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
 +			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
 +		} else {
 +			effective_alg = alg;
 +		}
 +		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
 	    auth_sock > 0) {
 +		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
 +				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
 +			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
 +		} else {
 +			effective_alg = alg;
 +		}
 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
 -		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
 +		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
 	} else
 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
 -	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
 +	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
 	sshbuf_reset(m);
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh	2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
 cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
 cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
 -PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
 +#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
 +PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
 EXTRA_TYPES=""
 rsa=""
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
 tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
 -REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
 +#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
 +REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
 # File based tests
 file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
 	fi
 }
 -SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
 -SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
 +#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
 +SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
 +SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
 for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
 	# generate user key
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype,
 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
 	if (kex != NULL)
 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
 -	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
 +	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
 +		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	sshkey_free(k2);
 	TEST_DONE();
 +	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
 	sshkey_free(k2);
 -	TEST_DONE();
 +	TEST_DONE(); */
 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:10:37.533168013 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c	2023-01-26 12:15:35.637631860 +0100
@@ -333,13 +333,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
 	TEST_DONE();
 #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
 	sshbuf_free(buf);
 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
 	sshkey_free(k1);
 -	TEST_DONE();
 +	TEST_DONE();*/
 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
 	u_char *sigblob;
 	size_t siglen;
 +	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
 +	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
 +
 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
@@ -101,8 +104,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
 -	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
 -	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
 +	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
 +	if (expected == 0)
 +		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
 	free(sigblob);
 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
@@ -119,16 +123,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct
 {
 	size_t len;
 	u_char *sig;
 +	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp in RHEL, permitted in Fedora */
 +	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0) : 0;
 +	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
 +		expected = sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0);
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
 -	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
 -	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
 -	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
 -	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
 -	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
 -	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
 -	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
 -	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
 +	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
 +	if (expected == 0) {
 +		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
 +		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
 +		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
 +		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
 +		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
 +		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
 +		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
 +	}
 	free(sig);
 }
@@ -514,7 +524,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
 	    NULL), 0);
 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
 -	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
 +	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
 #include "auth-options.h"
 #include "serverloop.h"
 #include "ssherr.h"
 +#include "compat.h"
 extern ServerOptions options;
@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
 		}
 +		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
 +			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
 +			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
 +		}
 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
 		    sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-01-25 15:59:34.225364883 +0100
@@ -1461,6 +1464,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_cha
 			retried = 1;
 			goto retry_pin;
 		}
 +		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
 +			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
 +			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
 +
 +			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
 +			rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
 +				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
 +		}
 		goto out;
 	}
 diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
 			goto out;
 		}
 -		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
 +		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
 +			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
 			goto out;
 		}
 diff -up openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c
 --- openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c.xxx	2024-07-23 15:08:14.794350818 +0200
 +++ openssh-9.8p1/sshd-session.c	2024-07-23 15:40:21.658456636 +0200
@@ -1305,6 +1305,27 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
 	check_ip_options(ssh);
 +	{
 +		struct sshkey *rsakey = NULL;
 +		rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA, 0, ssh);
 +		if (rsakey == NULL)
 +			rsakey = get_hostkey_private_by_type(KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, ssh);
 +
 +		if (rsakey != NULL) {
 +		    size_t sign_size = 0;
 +		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
 +		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
 +		    int res;
 +
 +		    res = sshkey_sign(rsakey, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
 +		    free(tmp);
 +		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
 +			verbose_f("SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
 +		    	ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
 +		    }
 +		}
 +	}
 +
 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
--- a/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
+++ b/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch
@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
 diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
 --- a/scp.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
 +++ b/scp.c	(date 1703111453316)
@@ -1372,7 +1372,7 @@
 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
 		if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
 -		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
 +		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s", src, targ);
 			errs = 1;
 		}
 diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
 --- a/sftp-client.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
 +++ b/sftp-client.c	(date 1703169614263)
@@ -1003,7 +1003,7 @@
 /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
 static char *
 -sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
 +sftp_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
 {
 	struct sshbuf *msg;
 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
@@ -1049,11 +1049,43 @@
 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
 		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
 -		error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
 -		    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
 -		free(errmsg);
 -		sshbuf_free(msg);
 -		return NULL;
 +		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
 +			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
 +			if ((r = sftp_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
 +				sshbuf_free(msg);
 +				return NULL;
 +			}
 +			debug2("Sending SSH2_FXP_REALPATH \"%s\" - create dir", path);
 +			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
 +					path, strlen(path));
 +
 +			get_msg(conn, msg);
 +			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
 +			    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
 +				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
 +
 +			if (id != expected_id)
 +				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
 +
 +			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
 +				free(errmsg);
 +
 +				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0 ||
 +				    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &errmsg, NULL)) != 0)
 +					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
 +				error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
 +				    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
 +				free(errmsg);
 +				sshbuf_free(msg);
 +				return NULL;
 +			}
 +		} else {
 +			error("%s %s: %s", expand ? "expand" : "realpath",
 +			    path, *errmsg == '\0' ? fx2txt(status) : errmsg);
 +			free(errmsg);
 +			sshbuf_free(msg);
 +			return NULL;
 +		}
 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
@@ -1078,9 +1110,9 @@
 }
 char *
 -sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
 +sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
 {
 -	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
 +	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
 }
 int
@@ -1094,9 +1126,9 @@
 {
 	if (!sftp_can_expand_path(conn)) {
 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
 -		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
 +		return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
 	}
 -	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
 +	return sftp_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
 }
 int
@@ -2016,7 +2048,7 @@
 	char *src_canon;
 	int ret;
 -	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
 +	if ((src_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
 		error("download \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", src);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -2365,12 +2397,12 @@
 int
 sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
 -    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
 +    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag, int create_dir)
 {
 	char *dst_canon;
 	int ret;
 -	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
 +	if ((dst_canon = sftp_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
 		error("upload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed", dst);
 		return -1;
 	}
@@ -2825,7 +2857,7 @@
 	char *from_path_canon;
 	int ret;
 -	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
 +	if ((from_path_canon = sftp_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
 		error("crossload \"%s\": path canonicalization failed",
 		    from_path);
 		return -1;
 diff --git a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
 --- a/sftp-client.h	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
 +++ b/sftp-client.h	(date 1703111691284)
@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@
 int sftp_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
 /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
 -char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
 +char *sftp_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
 /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
 char *sftp_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@
  * times if 'pflag' is set
  */
 int sftp_upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
 -    int, int, int, int, int, int);
 +    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
 /*
  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
 diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
 --- a/sftp.c	(revision 8241b9c0529228b4b86d88b1a6076fb9f97e4a99)
 +++ b/sftp.c	(date 1703168795365)
@@ -807,7 +807,7 @@
 		    (rflag || global_rflag)) {
 			if (sftp_upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
 -			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
 +			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
 				err = -1;
 		} else {
 			if (sftp_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
@@ -1642,7 +1642,7 @@
 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
 		path1 = sftp_make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
 -		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
 +		if ((tmp = sftp_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
 			err = 1;
 			break;
 		}
@@ -2247,7 +2247,7 @@
 	}
 #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
 -	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".")) == NULL)
 +	if ((remote_path = sftp_realpath(conn, ".", 0)) == NULL)
 		fatal("Need cwd");
 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
--- a/Show More
+++ b/Show More