.gitignore

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
-SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
+SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
-SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
+SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

.openssh.metadata

@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-bed7240bb17840b451b8f8457791c33456814d93 SOURCES/DJM-GPG-KEY.gpg
+dbb35b4e9ae3f72b930a82c6fd5e83e9dcd7b193 SOURCES/gpgkey-736060BA.gpg
-756dbb99193f9541c9206a667eaa27b0fa184a4f SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz
+8719032c1e47732c8fdb14adfb24b5e9e71de802 SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz
-a4482a050fdad1d012427e45799564136708cf6b SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3.tar.bz2
+66dd8274346fd006ff40f525c082cfb701085b5f SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4.tar.gz

SOURCES/openssh-4.3p2-askpass-grab-info.patch

@@ -1,12 +1,11 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2016-12-23 13:31:22.645213115 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.grab-info	2021-04-19 13:57:11.720113536 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:40.997216691 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2021-04-19 13:59:29.842163204 +0200
-@@ -65,9 +65,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+@@ -70,8 +70,12 @@ report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_wi
+ 
  	err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- 				     GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
+ 	    GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR, GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
- 				     GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
+-	    "Could not grab %s. A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
--				     "Could not grab %s. "
--				     "A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
 -	    "on your session.", what);
 +	    "SSH password dialog could not grab the %s input.\n"
 +	    "This might be caused by application such as screensaver, "

SOURCES/openssh-5.1p1-askpass-progress.patch

@@ -2,15 +2,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 --- openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c	2016-12-23 13:31:16.545211926 +0100
 @@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- #include <string.h>
  #include <unistd.h>
+ 
  #include <X11/Xlib.h>
 +#include <glib.h>
  #include <gtk/gtk.h>
  #include <gdk/gdkx.h>
- 
+ #include <gdk/gdkkeysyms.h>
-@@ -81,13 +82,24 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
+@@ -81,14 +82,25 @@ ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dia
- 	gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
+ 	return 1;
  }
  
 +static void
@@ -25,57 +25,59 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c.progress openssh-7.4p1/contr
 +}
 +
  static int
- passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
  {
  	const char *failed;
  	char *passphrase, *local;
  	int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ 	int buttons, default_response;
 -	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
 +	GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry, *progress, *hbox;
  	GdkGrabStatus status;
+ 	GdkColor fg, bg;
+ 	int fg_set = 0, bg_set = 0;
+@@ -104,14 +116,19 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 		gtk_widget_modify_bg(dialog, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
  
- 	grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
+ 	if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY || prompt_type == PROMPT_NONE) {
-@@ -104,14 +116,32 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 					"%s",
- 					message);
- 
 +		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
 +		    FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
 		entry = gtk_entry_new();
+		if (fg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_fg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &fg);
+		if (bg_set)
+			gtk_widget_modify_bg(entry, GTK_STATE_NORMAL, &bg);
 		gtk_box_pack_start(
--	    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
+-		    GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
--	    FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+-		    entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
-+	    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry,
++		    GTK_BOX(hbox), entry, TRUE, FALSE, 0);
-+	    TRUE, FALSE, 0);
 +		gtk_entry_set_width_chars(GTK_ENTRY(entry), 2);
  		gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
  		gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- 	gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ 		if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
- 
+@@ -130,6 +145,22 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+ 			g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "key_press_event",
+ 			    G_CALLBACK(check_none), dialog);
+ 		}
++
 +		hbox = gtk_hbox_new(FALSE, 0);
-+	gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox), hbox, FALSE,
++		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(GTK_DIALOG(dialog)->vbox),
-+	    FALSE, 8);
++		    hbox, FALSE, FALSE, 8);
 +		gtk_widget_show(hbox);
 +
 +		progress = gtk_progress_bar_new();
 +
-+	gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress), "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
++		gtk_progress_bar_set_text(GTK_PROGRESS_BAR(progress),
++		    "Passphrase length hidden intentionally");
 +		gtk_box_pack_start(GTK_BOX(hbox), progress, TRUE,
 +		    TRUE, 5);
 +		gtk_widget_show(progress);
-+
- 	gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
- 	gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
-@@ -120,6 +150,8 @@ passphrase_dialog(char *message)
- 	gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- 	g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
- 			 G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
 +		g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "changed",
 +				 G_CALLBACK(move_progress), progress);
++
+ 	}
  
- 	gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ 	/* Grab focus */
- 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-log-in-chroot.patch

@@ -1,19 +1,19 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
-@@ -250,6 +250,11 @@ debug3(const char *fmt,...)
+@@ -194,6 +194,11 @@ void
- void
+ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility,
- log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr)
+     int on_stderr)
  {
 +	log_init_handler(av0, level, facility, on_stderr, 1);
 +}
 +
 +void
-+log_init_handler(char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
++log_init_handler(const char *av0, LogLevel level, SyslogFacility facility, int on_stderr, int reset_handler) {
  #if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT)
  	struct syslog_data sdata = SYSLOG_DATA_INIT;
  #endif
-@@ -273,8 +278,10 @@ log_init(char *av0, LogLevel level, Sysl
+@@ -206,8 +211,10 @@ log_init(const char *av0, LogLevel level
  		exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -26,21 +26,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.c
  
  	log_on_stderr = on_stderr;
  	if (on_stderr)
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/log.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/log.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/log.h.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.179006811 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/log.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/log.h	2021-05-06 11:34:22.349925757 +0200
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ typedef enum {
- typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
+ typedef void (log_handler_fn)(LogLevel, int, const char *, void *);
  
- void     log_init(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
+ void     log_init(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int);
-+void     log_init_handler(char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
++void     log_init_handler(const char *, LogLevel, SyslogFacility, int, int);
  LogLevel log_level_get(void);
  int      log_change_level(LogLevel);
  int      log_is_on_stderr(void);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.311168085 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 15:16:42.154193100 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-06 11:33:37.671575348 +0200
-@@ -307,6 +307,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
+@@ -297,6 +297,8 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
  		close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
  
@@ -49,25 +49,25 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  	authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
  	memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
  	ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
-@@ -405,6 +407,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct monitor *p
+@@ -408,6 +410,8 @@ monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh,
  	close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
  	pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
  
 +	pmonitor->m_state = "postauth";
 +
  	monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- 	signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- 	signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ 	ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
-@@ -472,7 +476,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+@@ -480,7 +484,7 @@ monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonito
+ 	/* Log it */
  	if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
+ 		fatal_f("invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)", level);
- 		    __func__, level);
+-	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [preauth]", msg);
--	do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
++	sshlogdirect(level, forced, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
-+	do_log2(level, "%s [%s]", msg, pmonitor->m_state);
  
  	sshbuf_free(logmsg);
  	free(msg);
-@@ -1719,13 +1723,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
+@@ -1868,13 +1872,28 @@ monitor_init(void)
  	mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
  	monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
  
@@ -89,7 +89,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
 +		xasprintf(&dev_log_path, "%s/dev/log", chroot_dir);
 +
 +		if (stat(dev_log_path, &dev_log_stat) != 0) {
-+			debug("%s: /dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", __func__, chroot_dir);
++			debug_f("/dev/log doesn't exist in %s chroot - will try to log via monitor using [postauth] suffix", chroot_dir);
 +			do_logfds = 1;
 +		}
 +		free(dev_log_path);
@@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
  }
  
  #ifdef GSSAPI
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.330168088 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.153006607 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h	2016-12-23 15:16:28.372190424 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.h	2021-05-06 11:32:25.180006819 +0200
-@@ -83,10 +83,11 @@ struct monitor {
+@@ -80,10 +80,11 @@ struct monitor {
  	int			 m_log_sendfd;
  	struct kex		**m_pkex;
  	pid_t			 m_pid;
@@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/monitor.h
  
  struct Authctxt;
  void monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *, struct monitor *);
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/session.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.319168086 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.166006709 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/session.c	2016-12-23 15:18:18.742211853 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
 @@ -160,6 +160,7 @@ login_cap_t *lc;
  
  static int is_child = 0;
@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
  /* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
  static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
-@@ -619,6 +620,7 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -661,6 +662,7 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  	int ret;
  	const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
  	char session_type[1024];
@@ -133,7 +133,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  
  	if (options.adm_forced_command) {
  		original_command = command;
-@@ -676,6 +678,10 @@ do_exec(Session *s, const char *command)
+@@ -720,6 +722,10 @@ do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, con
  			tty += 5;
  	}
  
@@ -144,10 +144,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
  	    session_type,
  	    tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
-@@ -1486,14 +1492,6 @@ child_close_fds(void)
+@@ -1524,14 +1530,6 @@ child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	 * descriptors left by system functions.  They will be closed later.
+ 
- 	 */
+ 	/* Stop directing logs to a high-numbered fd before we close it */
- 	endpwent();
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
 -
 -	/*
 -	 * Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  }
  
  /*
-@@ -1629,8 +1627,6 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1665,8 +1663,6 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
  			exit(1);
  	}
  
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
  
  	/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
-@@ -1653,9 +1649,17 @@ do_child(Session *s, const char *command
+@@ -1691,9 +1687,17 @@ do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, co
  		argv[i] = NULL;
  		optind = optreset = 1;
  		__progname = argv[0];
@@ -187,9 +187,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  	fflush(NULL);
  
  	/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp.h	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
 @@ -97,5 +97,5 @@
  
  struct passwd;
@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp.h
 -int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *);
 +int	sftp_server_main(int, char **, struct passwd *, int);
  void	sftp_server_cleanup_exit(int) __attribute__((noreturn));
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
-@@ -1497,7 +1497,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
+@@ -1644,7 +1644,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  }
  
  int
@@ -209,16 +209,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
  {
  	fd_set *rset, *wset;
  	int i, r, in, out, max, ch, skipargs = 0, log_stderr = 0;
-@@ -1511,7 +1511,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+ 	extern char *__progname;
  
- 	ssh_malloc_init();	/* must be called before any mallocs */
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
 -	log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
 +	log_init_handler(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr, reset_handler);
  
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
-@@ -1582,7 +1582,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
+@@ -1730,7 +1730,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  		}
  	}
  
@@ -227,20 +227,20 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server.c
  
  	/*
  	 * On platforms where we can, avoid making /proc/self/{mem,maps}
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c.log-in-chroot	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sftp-server-main.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.331168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sftp-server-main.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.181006827 +0200
-@@ -49,5 +49,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+@@ -50,5 +50,5 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
  		return 1;
  	}
  
 -	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw));
 +	return (sftp_server_main(argc, argv, user_pw, 0));
  }
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2016-12-23 15:14:33.328168088 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot	2021-05-06 11:32:25.177006795 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 15:14:33.332168088 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 11:32:25.182006834 +0200
-@@ -650,7 +650,7 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -559,7 +559,7 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  	}
  
  	/* New socket pair */
@@ -249,7 +249,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.log-in-chroot openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  
  	pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
  	if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
-@@ -668,6 +668,11 @@ privsep_postauth(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -578,6 +578,11 @@ privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authct
  
  	close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
  	pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-scp-non-existing-directory.patch

@@ -10,5 +10,5 @@
 +		}
  		omode = mode;
  		mode |= S_IWUSR;
- 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) < 0) {
+ 		if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
 -- 

SOURCES/openssh-6.6.1p1-selinux-contexts.patch

@@ -34,19 +34,19 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +
 +	contexts_path = selinux_openssh_contexts_path();
 +	if (contexts_path == NULL) {
-+		debug3("%s: Failed to get the path to SELinux context", __func__);
++		debug3_f("Failed to get the path to SELinux context");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if ((contexts_file = fopen(contexts_path, "r")) == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Failed to open SELinux context file", __func__);
++		debug_f("Failed to open SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
 +	if (fstat(fileno(contexts_file), &sb) != 0 ||
 +	    sb.st_uid != 0 || (sb.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
++		logit_f("SELinux context file needs to be owned by root"
-+		    " and not writable by anyone else", __func__);
++		    " and not writable by anyone else");
 +		fclose(contexts_file);
 +		return;
 +	}
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +		if (arg && strcmp(arg, "privsep_preauth") == 0) {
 +			arg = strdelim(&cp);
 +			if (!arg || *arg == '\0') {
-+				debug("%s: privsep_preauth is empty", __func__);
++				debug_f("privsep_preauth is empty");
 +				fclose(contexts_file);
 +				return;
 +			}
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ index 8f32464..18a2ca4 100644
 +	fclose(contexts_file);
 +
 +	if (preauth_context == NULL) {
-+		debug("%s: Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
++		debug_f("Unable to find 'privsep_preauth' option in"
-+		    " SELinux context file", __func__);
++		    " SELinux context file");
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
@@ -101,10 +101,11 @@ index 22ea8ef..1fc963d 100644
  	if ((cx = index(cx + 1, ':')))
  		strlcat(newctx, cx, newlen);
 -	debug3("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
-+	debug("%s: setting context from '%s' to '%s'", __func__,
++	debug_f("setting context from '%s' to '%s'",
  	    oldctx, newctx);
  	if (setcon(newctx) < 0)
- 		switchlog("%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s", __func__,
+ 		do_log2(log_level, "%s: setcon %s from %s failed with %s",
+		    __func__, newctx, oldctx, strerror(errno));
 diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h b/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 index cb51f99..8b7cda2 100644
 --- a/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-GSSAPIEnablek5users.patch

@@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->enable_k5users = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 @@ -345,6 +346,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  #endif
  	if (options->use_kuserok == -1)
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -418,7 +421,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
+ 	sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
- 	sHostKeyAlgorithms,
+ 	sHostKeyAlgorithms, sPerSourceMaxStartups, sPerSourceNetBlockSize,
  	sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
 -	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
 +	sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssEnablek5users, sGssStrictAcceptor,
@@ -72,9 +72,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +		intptr = &options->enable_k5users;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
+	case sMatch:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
+		if (cmdline)
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
 @@ -2026,6 +2035,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
@@ -122,7 +122,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.GSSAPIEnablek5users	2016-12-23 15:18:40.616216100 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config	2016-12-23 15:18:40.631216103 +0100
 @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
- GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+ #GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
  #GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck yes
  #GSSAPIKeyExchange no
 +#GSSAPIEnablek5users no

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-ctr-cavstest.patch

@@ -1,257 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.493289018 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:22:44.504196316 +0100
-@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
-+CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -194,6 +195,9 @@ ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) l
- ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
- 
-+ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -326,6 +330,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
- 	fi
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c.ctr-cavs	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ctr-cavstest.c	2015-03-18 11:22:05.521288952 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,215 @@
-+/*
-+ *
-+ * invocation (all of the following are equal):
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6
-+ * ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt --data a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 --iv 00000000000000000000000000000000
-+ * echo -n a6deca405eef2e8e4609abf3c3ccf4a6 | ./ctr-cavstest --algo aes128-ctr --key 987212980144b6a632e864031f52dacc --mode encrypt
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/param.h>
-+#include <stdarg.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <ctype.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "log.h"
-+#include "ssherr.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+
-+/* compatibility with old or broken OpenSSL versions */
-+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
-+
-+void usage(void) {
-+        fprintf(stderr, "Usage: ctr-cavstest --algo <ssh-crypto-algorithm>\n"
-+                        "                    --key <hexadecimal-key> --mode <encrypt|decrypt>\n"
-+                        "                    [--iv <hexadecimal-iv>] --data <hexadecimal-data>\n\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal output is printed to stdout.\n"
-+                        "Hexadecimal input data can be alternatively read from stdin.\n");
-+        exit(1);
-+}
-+
-+void *fromhex(char *hex, size_t *len)
-+{
-+        unsigned char *bin;
-+        char *p;
-+        size_t n = 0;
-+        int shift = 4;
-+        unsigned char out = 0;
-+        unsigned char *optr;
-+
-+        bin = xmalloc(strlen(hex)/2);
-+        optr = bin;
-+
-+        for (p = hex; *p != '\0'; ++p) {
-+                unsigned char c;
-+
-+                c = *p;
-+                if (isspace(c))
-+                        continue;
-+
-+                if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') {
-+                        c = c - '0';
-+                } else if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'F') {
-+                        c = c - 'A' + 10;
-+                } else if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'f') {
-+                        c = c - 'a' + 10;
-+                } else {
-+                        /* truncate on nonhex cipher */
-+                        break;
-+                }
-+
-+                out |= c << shift;
-+                shift = (shift + 4) % 8;
-+
-+                if (shift) {
-+                        *(optr++) = out;
-+                        out = 0;
-+                        ++n;
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        *len = n;
-+        return bin;
-+}
-+
-+#define READ_CHUNK 4096
-+#define MAX_READ_SIZE 1024*1024*100
-+char *read_stdin(void)
-+{
-+        char *buf;
-+        size_t n, total = 0;
-+
-+        buf = xmalloc(READ_CHUNK);
-+
-+        do {
-+                n = fread(buf + total, 1, READ_CHUNK, stdin);
-+                if (n < READ_CHUNK) /* terminate on short read */
-+                        break;
-+
-+                total += n;
-+                buf = xreallocarray(buf, total + READ_CHUNK, 1);
-+        } while(total < MAX_READ_SIZE);
-+        return buf;
-+}
-+
-+int main (int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+
-+        const struct sshcipher *c;
-+        struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
-+        char *algo = "aes128-ctr";
-+        char *hexkey = NULL;
-+        char *hexiv = "00000000000000000000000000000000";
-+        char *hexdata = NULL;
-+        char *p;
-+        int i, r;
-+        int encrypt = 1;
-+        void *key;
-+        size_t keylen;
-+        void *iv;
-+        size_t ivlen;
-+        void *data;
-+        size_t datalen;
-+        void *outdata;
-+
-+        for (i = 1; i < argc; ++i) {
-+                if (strcmp(argv[i], "--algo") == 0) {
-+                        algo = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--key") == 0) {
-+                        hexkey = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--mode") == 0) {
-+                        ++i;
-+                        if (argv[i] == NULL) {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                        if (strncmp(argv[i], "enc", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 1;
-+                        } else if (strncmp(argv[i], "dec", 3) == 0) {
-+                                encrypt = 0;
-+                        } else {
-+                                usage();
-+                        }
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--iv") == 0) {
-+                        hexiv = argv[++i];
-+                } else if (strcmp(argv[i], "--data") == 0) {
-+                        hexdata = argv[++i];
-+                }
-+        }
-+
-+        if (hexkey == NULL || algo == NULL) {
-+                usage();
-+        }
-+
-+	OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms();
-+
-+	c = cipher_by_name(algo);
-+	if (c == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unknown algorithm\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        if (hexdata == NULL) {
-+                hexdata = read_stdin();
-+        } else {
-+                hexdata = xstrdup(hexdata);
-+        }
-+
-+        key = fromhex(hexkey, &keylen);
-+
-+	if (keylen != 16 && keylen != 24 && keylen == 32) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported key length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+        iv = fromhex(hexiv, &ivlen);
-+
-+        if (ivlen != 16) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: unsupported iv length\n");
-+		return 2;
-+        }
-+
-+        data = fromhex(hexdata, &datalen);
-+
-+	if (data == NULL || datalen == 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: no data to encrypt/decrypt\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_init(&cc, c, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, encrypt)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_init failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(key);
-+	free(iv);
-+
-+	outdata = malloc(datalen);
-+	if(outdata == NULL) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: memory allocation failure\n");
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((r = cipher_crypt(cc, 0, outdata, data, datalen, 0, 0)) != 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error: cipher_crypt failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
-+		return 2;
-+	}
-+
-+	free(data);
-+
-+	cipher_free(cc);
-+
-+        for (p = outdata; datalen > 0; ++p, --datalen) {
-+		printf("%02X", (unsigned char)*p);
-+	}
-+
-+        free(outdata);
-+
-+        printf("\n");
-+        return 0;
-+}
-+

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keycat.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/auth.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.c.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.158849606 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2015-06-24 11:04:23.989868638 +0200
-@@ -966,6 +966,14 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+@@ -966,6 +966,13 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
  			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
@@ -12,10 +12,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth.c.keycat openssh/misc.c
 +			_exit(127);
 +		}
 +#endif
-+
+ 		if (env != NULL)
- 		execve(av[0], av, child_env);
+ 			execve(av[0], av, env);
- 		error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
+ 		else
- 		_exit(127);
 diff -up openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat
 --- openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 +++ openssh/HOWTO.ssh-keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
@@ -36,44 +35,44 @@ diff -up openssh/Makefile.in.keycat openssh/Makefile.in
 --- openssh/Makefile.in.keycat	2015-06-24 10:57:50.152849621 +0200
 +++ openssh/Makefile.in	2015-06-24 10:57:50.157849608 +0200
 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
+ ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
+ SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
  SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
- SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-helper
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
 +SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
  SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
  PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
 @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
+ K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
  GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
- SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
  SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
 +KEYCATLIBS=@KEYCATLIBS@
  LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+ LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
  AR=@AR@
- AWK=@AWK@
 @@ -65,7 +66,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
  
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT)
+ .SUFFIXES: .lo
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
+ 
+-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
++TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  
  XMSS_OBJS=\
  	ssh-xmss.o \
 @@ -190,6 +191,9 @@ ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT)
- ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o
+ ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ldapconf.o ldapbody.o ldapmisc.o ldap-helper.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LDAPLIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
  
 +ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS) libssh.a ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o
 +	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keycat.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(KEYCATLIBS) $(LIBS)
 +
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
+ ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ 	$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
  
 @@ -321,6 +325,7 @@ install-files:
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-ldap-helper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_HELPER) ; \
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
- 		$(INSTALL) -m 0700 ssh-ldap-wrapper $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER) ; \
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	fi
+ 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
 +	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
  	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
@@ -466,16 +465,16 @@ index 3bbccfd..6481f1f 100644
  				esac
  			fi
 @@ -4042,6 +4044,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
+ 	fi ]
  )
- AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
  AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
 +AC_SUBST([KEYCATLIBS])
  
  # Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
  KRB5_MSG="no"
 @@ -5031,6 +5034,9 @@ fi
- if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
+ if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
- echo "          +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
+ echo "         +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
  fi
 +if test ! -z "${KEYCATLIBS}"; then
 +echo "   +for ssh-keycat: ${KEYCATLIBS}"

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-keyperm.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
+diff -up openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c
-index e93d867..4fc5b3d 100644
+--- openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c.keyperm	2020-02-14 01:40:54.000000000 +0100
---- a/authfile.c
++++ openssh-8.2p1/authfile.c	2020-02-17 11:55:12.841729758 +0100
-+++ b/authfile.c
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
  
  #include <errno.h>
  #include <fcntl.h>
@@ -10,17 +9,23 @@ index e93d867..4fc5b3d 100644
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <stdarg.h>
  #include <stdlib.h>
-@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
+@@ -101,7 +102,19 @@ sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filen
  #ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
  	if (check_ntsec(filename))
  #endif
++
+ 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
 +		if (st.st_mode & 040) {
 +			struct group *gr;
 +
-+		if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid))
++			if ((gr = getgrnam("ssh_keys")) && (st.st_gid == gr->gr_gid)) {
-+			st.st_mode &= ~040;
++				/* The only additional bit is read
++				 * for ssh_keys group, which is fine */
++				if ((st.st_mode & 077) == 040 ) {
++					return 0;
++				}
++			}
 +		}
-+
- 	if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
  		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
  		error("@         WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE!          @");
+ 		error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-kuserok.patch

@@ -182,7 +182,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 +	options->use_kuserok = -1;
  	options->password_authentication = -1;
  	options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
- 	options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
+	options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
 @@ -278,6 +279,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  	if (options->gss_kex_algorithms == NULL)
  		options->gss_kex_algorithms = strdup(GSS_KEX_DEFAULT_KEX);
@@ -193,8 +193,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		options->password_authentication = 1;
  	if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
 @@ -399,7 +402,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache, sKerberosUseKuserok,
@@ -217,16 +217,16 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
 @@ -1644,6 +1649,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		*activep = value;
+		}
 		break;
 
 +	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
 +		intptr = &options->use_kuserok;
 +		goto parse_flag;
 +
- 	case sPermitListen:
+	case sMatch:
- 	case sPermitOpen:
+		if (cmdline)
- 		if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
+			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
 @@ -2016,6 +2025,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
  	M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
  	M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
@@ -286,4 +286,4 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.kuserok openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config
 +#KerberosUseKuserok yes
  
  # GSSAPI options
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+ #GSSAPIAuthentication no

SOURCES/openssh-6.6p1-privsep-selinux.patch

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 --- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux	2016-12-23 18:58:52.973122201 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2016-12-23 18:58:52.974122201 +0100
 @@ -419,6 +419,28 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("done");
  }
  
 +void
@@ -25,15 +25,15 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.privsep-selinux openssh-
 +		return;
 +
 +	if (getexeccon((security_context_t *)&ctx) != 0) {
-+		logit("%s: getexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		logit_f("getexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		return;
 +	}
 +	if (ctx != NULL) {
 +		/* unset exec context before we will lose this capabililty */
 +		if (setexeccon(NULL) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setexeccon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setexeccon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		if (setcon(ctx) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: setcon failed with %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++			fatal_f("setcon failed with %s", strerror(errno));
 +		freecon(ctx);
 +	}
 +}

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-coverity.patch

@@ -1,29 +1,205 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/addr.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.coverity	2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
+--- openssh-8.5p1/addr.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-06-21 11:11:32.467290400 +0200
++++ openssh-8.5p1/addr.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
-@@ -341,15 +341,15 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
+@@ -312,8 +312,10 @@ addr_pton(const char *p, struct xaddr *n
- 		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
+ 	if (p == NULL || getaddrinfo(p, NULL, &hints, &ai) != 0)
- 		 * with other programs that follow.
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
++	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (n != NULL && addr_sa_to_xaddr(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
+ 	    n) == -1) {
+@@ -336,12 +338,16 @@ addr_sa_pton(const char *h, const char *
+ 	if (h == NULL || getaddrinfo(h, s, &hints, &ai) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL)
++	if (ai == NULL || ai->ai_addr == NULL) {
++		freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 		return -1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (sa != NULL) {
+-		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen)
++		if (slen < ai->ai_addrlen) {
++			freeaddrinfo(ai);
+ 			return -1;
++		}
+ 		memcpy(sa, &ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.724967756 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -426,6 +426,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 		umask(old_umask);
+ 		if (tmpfd == -1) {
+ 			logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 
+@@ -433,6 +434,7 @@ ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx,
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			logit("fchmod(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
+ 			close(tmpfd);
++			free(ccname);
+ 			return oerrno;
+ 		}
+ 		/* make sure the KRB5CCNAME is set for non-standard location */
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/auth-options.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.782968159 +0100
+@@ -706,6 +708,7 @@ serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char *
+ 		return r;
+ 	}
+ 	/* success */
++	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.881788686 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/channels.c	2016-12-23 16:42:36.244818763 +0100
+@@ -1875,7 +1875,7 @@ channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 		debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
+ 		    c->self, strerror(err));
+ 		/* Try next address, if any */
+-		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
++		if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) >= 0) {
+ 			close(c->sock);
+ 			c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
+ 			channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/dns.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/dns.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/dns.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ verify_host_key_dns(const char *hostname
+		    &hostkey_digest, &hostkey_digest_len, hostkey)) {
+			error("Error calculating key fingerprint.");
+			freerrset(fingerprints);
++				free(dnskey_digest);
+			return -1;
+		}
+
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c.coverity	2021-03-26 11:52:46.613942552 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/gss-genr.c	2021-03-26 11:54:37.881726318 +0100
+@@ -167,8 +167,9 @@ ssh_gssapi_kex_mechs(gss_OID_set gss_sup
+ 			enclen = __b64_ntop(digest,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5), encoded,
+ 			    ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_MD5) * 2);
+-
++#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wstringop-overflow"
+ 			cp = strncpy(s, kex, strlen(kex));
++#pragma pop
+ 			for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
+ 				(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
+ 				if (sshbuf_len(buf) != 0 &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/krl.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/krl.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/krl.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.783968166 +0100
+@@ -1209,6 +1209,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, st
+ 	sshkey_free(key);
+ 	sshbuf_free(copy);
+ 	sshbuf_free(sect);
++	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -1261,6 +1262,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA1"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1271,6 +1273,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by key SHA256"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+@@ -1282,6 +1285,7 @@ is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, cons
+ 		return r;
+ 	erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
+ 	free(rb.blob);
++	rb.blob = NULL; /* make coverity happy */
+ 	if (erb != NULL) {
+ 		KRL_DBG(("revoked by explicit key"));
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c.coverity	2021-03-24 13:18:53.793225885 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/loginrec.c	2021-03-24 13:21:27.948404751 +0100
+@@ -690,9 +690,11 @@ construct_utmp(struct logininfo *li,
  	 */
--		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ 
-+		if (rfd >= 0 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ 	/* Use strncpy because we don't necessarily want null termination */
- 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_name, li->username,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_name, li->username));
+ # ifdef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut->ut_host, li->hostname,
+ 	    MIN_SIZEOF(ut->ut_host, li->hostname));
+ # endif
+@@ -1690,6 +1692,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 
+ 	memset(&ut, 0, sizeof(ut));
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_user, username, sizeof(ut.ut_user));
+ 	strlcpy(ut.ut_line, "ssh:notty", sizeof(ut.ut_line));
+ 
+@@ -1699,6 +1702,7 @@ record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, con
+ 	ut.ut_pid = getpid();
+ 
+ 	/* strncpy because we don't necessarily want nul termination */
++	/* coverity[buffer_size_warning : FALSE] */
+ 	strncpy(ut.ut_host, hostname, sizeof(ut.ut_host));
+ 
+ 	if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/misc.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/misc.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.745967902 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/misc.c	2021-03-24 13:31:47.037079617 +0100
+@@ -1425,6 +1425,8 @@ sanitise_stdfd(void)
  	}
--		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ 	if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
-+		if (wfd >= 0 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ 		close(nullfd);
- 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
- 			set_nonblock(wfd);
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
  }
--		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ 
-+		if (efd >= 0 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
+ char *
- 			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
+@@ -2511,6 +2513,7 @@ stdfd_devnull(int do_stdin, int do_stdou
- 			set_nonblock(efd);
  	}
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c
+ 	if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
---- openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity	2021-06-21 10:59:17.282473202 +0200
+ 		close(devnull);
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c	2021-06-21 10:59:17.297473319 +0200
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE]*/
-@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/moduli.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.784968173 +0100
+@@ -476,6 +476,7 @@ write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t
+ 	else
+ 		logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
+ 		    strerror(errno));
++	/* coverity[leaked_storage : FALSE] */
+ }
+ 
+ static unsigned long
+diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.888788688 +0100
++++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
+@@ -411,7 +411,7 @@ monitor_child_preauth(Authctxt *_authctx
  	mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
  
  	/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
@@ -32,13 +208,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c.coverity openssh-8.0p1/monitor.c
  		;
  
  	if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
+@@ -1678,7 +1678,7 @@ mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock,
+ 	s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("tty %s ptyfd %d", s->tty, s->ttyfd);
+-
++	/* coverity[leaked_handle : FALSE] */
+ 	return (0);
+ 
+  error:
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.892788689 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.900788691 +0100
 @@ -525,10 +525,10 @@ mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd,
  	if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
  	    (tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
- 		error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
+ 		error_f("cannot allocate fds for pty");
 -		if (tmp1 > 0)
 +		if (tmp1 >= 0)
  			close(tmp1);
@@ -61,30 +246,67 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/bindresvport.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/open
  	int i;
  
  	if (sa == NULL) {
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/scp.c
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/scp.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.856788681 +0100
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:36:11.357288009 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/scp.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-pselect.c	2021-08-30 16:37:21.791897976 +0200
-@@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+@@ -113,13 +113,13 @@ pselect_notify_setup(void)
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_parent(void)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
+ 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
+ }
+ static void
+ pselect_notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
+ 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ }
+ static void
+@@ -127,8 +127,8 @@ pselect_notify_done(fd_set *readset)
+ {
+ 	char c;
+ 
+-	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
+-		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
++	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset)) {
++		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
+ 			debug2_f("reading");
+ 		FD_CLR(notify_pipe[0], readset);
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.778968131 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/readconf.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.785968180 +0100
+@@ -1847,6 +1847,7 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			} else if (r != 0) {
+ 				error("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
+ 				    filename, linenum, arg2);
++				free(arg2);
+ 				goto out;
+ 			}
+ 			free(arg2);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.coverity	2021-08-30 16:23:35.389741329 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-08-30 16:27:04.854555296 +0200
+@@ -186,11 +186,11 @@ killchild(int signo)
  {
  	if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
  		kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
 -		waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
 +		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
  	}
+ 	if (do_cmd_pid2 > 1) {
+ 		kill(do_cmd_pid2, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(do_cmd_pid2, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
  
  	if (signo)
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.896788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.901788691 +0100
-@@ -1547,7 +1547,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
- 			    filename, linenum);
- 		if (!*activep) {
--			arg = strdelim(&cp);
-+			/*arg =*/ (void) strdelim(&cp);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
 @@ -1638,8 +1638,9 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
  		if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
  			*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
@@ -97,38 +319,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/servconf.c
  		}
  		break;
  
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
---- openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.coverity	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.902788691 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2021-08-30 16:28:22.416226981 +0200
-@@ -125,13 +125,13 @@ notify_setup(void)
+@@ -547,7 +547,7 @@ server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
- static void
+ 		debug_f("invalid tun");
- notify_parent(void)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[1] >= 0)
- 		(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
- }
- static void
- notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
- {
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0)
- 		FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
- }
- static void
-@@ -139,8 +139,8 @@ notify_done(fd_set *readset)
- {
- 	char c;
- 
--	if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
--		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
-+	if (notify_pipe[0] >= 0 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
-+		while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) >= 0)
- 			debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
- }
- 
-@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ server_request_tun(void)
- 		debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
  		goto done;
  	}
 -	if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
@@ -136,9 +331,98 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/serverloop.c
  		if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
  		    auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
  			goto done;
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/session.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/session.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.777968124 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/session.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1223,12 +1223,14 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
+ 	/* Environment specified by admin */
+ 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
+ 		cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
++		/* coverity[overwrite_var : FALSE] */
+ 		if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
+ 			/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
+ 			fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
+ 		}
+ 		*value++ = '\0';
+ 		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
++		free(cp);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
+--- a/sftp.c	2022-06-30 10:43:13.914058913 +0200
++++ b/sftp.c	2022-06-30 10:48:17.243997888 +0200
+@@ -222,7 +222,7 @@ killchild(int signo)
+ 	pid = sshpid;
+ 	if (pid > 1) {
+ 		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+-		waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
++		(void) waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	_exit(1);
+@@ -768,6 +768,8 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
++		free(abs_dst);
++		abs_dst = NULL;
+ 	}
+ 
+ out:
+@@ -991,6 +993,7 @@ do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, co
+ 		if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
+ 			if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
+ 				error("no stat information for %s", fname);
++				free(fname);
+ 				continue;
+ 			}
+ 			lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
+diff --git a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+index 9de9afa20f..ea98d9f8d0 100644
+--- a/sftp-client.c
++++ b/sftp-client.c
+@@ -2195,6 +2195,7 @@ handle_dest_replies(struct sftp_conn *to, const char *to_path, int synchronous,
+ 		(*nreqsp)--;
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("done: %u outstanding replies", *nreqsp);
++	sshbuf_free(msg);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+diff --git a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+index 18d1949112..6380c4dd23 100644
+--- a/sftp-server.c
++++ b/sftp-server.c
+@@ -1553,6 +1553,7 @@ process_extended_expand(u_int32_t id)
+ 			npath = xstrdup(path + 2);
+ 			free(path);
+ 			xasprintf(&path, "%s/%s", cwd, npath);
++			free(npath);
+ 		} else {
+ 			/* ~user expansions */
+ 			if (tilde_expand(path, pw->pw_uid, &npath) != 0) {
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/sk-usbhid.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1256,6 +1256,7 @@ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, s
+ 		freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
+ 	}
+ 	free(rks);
++	free(device);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity	2016-12-19 05:59:41.000000000 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.903788691 +0100
+@@ -869,6 +869,7 @@ sanitize_pkcs11_provider(const char *pro
+ 
+ 		if (pkcs11_uri_parse(provider, uri) != 0) {
+ 			error("Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI");
++			pkcs11_uri_cleanup(uri);
+ 			return NULL;
+ 		}
+ 		/* validate also provider from URI */
 @@ -1220,8 +1220,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	sanitise_stdfd();
  
@@ -150,6 +434,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/ssh-agent.c
  
  	platform_disable_tracing(0);	/* strict=no */
  
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.779968138 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.786968187 +0100
+@@ -1746,6 +1746,7 @@ control_persist_detach(void)
+ 		close(muxserver_sock);
+ 		muxserver_sock = -1;
+ 		options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
++		/* coverity[leaked_handle: FALSE]*/
+ 		muxclient(options.control_path);
+ 		/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
+ 		fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
 diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity	2016-12-23 16:40:26.897788690 +0100
 +++ openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c	2016-12-23 16:40:26.904788692 +0100
@@ -175,3 +470,58 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c.coverity openssh-7.4p1/sshd.c
  }
  
  /*
+@@ -2519,8 +2524,11 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 
+ 	if (newstr)
+ 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = newstr;
+-	else
++	else {
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms");
++		free(gss);
++	     }
++	     /* coverity[leaked_storage: FALSE]*/
+ 	}
+ #endif
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c.coverity	2021-03-24 12:03:33.780968145 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -2332,6 +2332,9 @@ update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw,
+ 			r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
+ 			if (r != 0)
+ 				fatal_fr(r, "revoke key failed");
++			freezero(blob, blen);
++			blob = NULL;
++			blen = 0;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
+ 				cp += 4;
+@@ -2879,6 +2882,7 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+ 			start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
++			free(checkpoint);
+ 			checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+ 		} else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+ 			generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+@@ -2920,6 +2924,9 @@ do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, c
+ #else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++	free(checkpoint);
++	if (in != stdin)
++		fclose(in);
+ }
+ 
+ static char *
+diff -up openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c
+--- openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c.coverity	2021-03-02 11:31:47.000000000 +0100
++++ openssh-8.5p1/sshsig.c	2021-03-24 12:03:33.787968194 +0100
+@@ -515,6 +515,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, s
+ 			oerrno = errno;
+ 			error_f("read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ 			ssh_digest_free(ctx);
++			ctx = NULL;
+ 			errno = oerrno;
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-kdf-cavs.patch

@@ -1,618 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in
---- openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.346049359 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/Makefile.in	2015-03-18 11:24:20.395968445 +0100
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ SSH_LDAP_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-h
- SSH_LDAP_WRAPPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-ldap-wrapper
- SSH_KEYCAT=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat
- CTR_CAVSTEST=$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest
-+SSH_CAVS=$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs
- SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
- PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
- SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
-@@ -67,7 +68,7 @@ EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
- MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
- INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER=@INSTALL_SSH_LDAP_HELPER@
- 
--TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-ldap-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
- 
- XMSS_OBJS=\
- 	ssh-xmss.o \
-@@ -198,6 +199,9 @@ ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHD
- ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ctr-cavstest.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ctr-cavstest.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-+ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-cavs.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-cavs.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
-@@ -331,6 +335,8 @@ install-files:
- 	fi
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-keycat$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ctr-cavstest$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs$(EXEEXT)
-+	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-cavs_driver.pl $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
- 	$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs.c	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,387 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, and the entire permission notice in its entirety,
-+ *    including the disclaimer of warranties.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior
-+ *    written permission.
-+ *
-+ * ALTERNATIVELY, this product may be distributed under the terms of
-+ * the GNU General Public License, in which case the provisions of the GPL2
-+ * are required INSTEAD OF the above restrictions.  (This clause is
-+ * necessary due to a potential bad interaction between the GPL and
-+ * the restrictions contained in a BSD-style copyright.)
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
-+ * WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
-+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, ALL OF
-+ * WHICH ARE HEREBY DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE
-+ * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR
-+ * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT
-+ * OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR
-+ * BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF
-+ * LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE
-+ * USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF NOT ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH
-+ * DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+
-+#include <openssl/bn.h>
-+
-+#include "xmalloc.h"
-+#include "sshbuf.h"
-+#include "sshkey.h"
-+#include "cipher.h"
-+#include "kex.h"
-+#include "packet.h"
-+#include "digest.h"
-+
-+static int bin_char(unsigned char hex)
-+{
-+	if (48 <= hex && 57 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 48);
-+	if (65 <= hex && 70 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 55);
-+	if (97 <= hex && 102 >= hex)
-+		return (hex - 87);
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert hex representation into binary string
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin output buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of already allocated bin buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   half of hexlen -- if not, only a fraction of hexlen is converted)
-+ */
-+static void hex2bin(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+		    unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		bin[i] = bin_char(hex[(i*2)]) << 4;
-+		bin[i] |= bin_char(hex[((i*2)+1)]);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Allocate sufficient space for binary representation of hex
-+ * and convert hex into bin
-+ *
-+ * Caller must free bin
-+ * @hex input buffer with hex representation
-+ * @hexlen length of hex
-+ * @bin return value holding the pointer to the newly allocated buffer
-+ * @binlen return value holding the allocated size of bin
-+ *
-+ * return: 0 on success, !0 otherwise
-+ */
-+static int hex2bin_alloc(const char *hex, size_t hexlen,
-+			 unsigned char **bin, size_t *binlen)
-+{
-+	unsigned char *out = NULL;
-+	size_t outlen = 0;
-+
-+	if (!hexlen)
-+		return -EINVAL;
-+
-+	outlen = (hexlen + 1) / 2;
-+
-+	out = calloc(1, outlen);
-+	if (!out)
-+		return -errno;
-+
-+	hex2bin(hex, hexlen, out, outlen);
-+	*bin = out;
-+	*binlen = outlen;
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static char hex_char_map_l[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'a', 'b', 'c', 'd', 'e', 'f' };
-+static char hex_char_map_u[] = { '0', '1', '2', '3', '4', '5', '6', '7',
-+				 '8', '9', 'A', 'B', 'C', 'D', 'E', 'F' };
-+static char hex_char(unsigned int bin, int u)
-+{
-+	if (bin < sizeof(hex_char_map_l))
-+		return (u) ? hex_char_map_u[bin] : hex_char_map_l[bin];
-+	return 'X';
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Convert binary string into hex representation
-+ * @bin input buffer with binary data
-+ * @binlen length of bin
-+ * @hex output buffer to store hex data
-+ * @hexlen length of already allocated hex buffer (should be at least
-+ *	   twice binlen -- if not, only a fraction of binlen is converted)
-+ * @u case of hex characters (0=>lower case, 1=>upper case)
-+ */
-+static void bin2hex(const unsigned char *bin, size_t binlen,
-+		    char *hex, size_t hexlen, int u)
-+{
-+	size_t i = 0;
-+	size_t chars = (binlen > (hexlen / 2)) ? (hexlen / 2) : binlen;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < chars; i++) {
-+		hex[(i*2)] = hex_char((bin[i] >> 4), u);
-+		hex[((i*2)+1)] = hex_char((bin[i] & 0x0f), u);
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+struct kdf_cavs {
-+	unsigned char *K;
-+	size_t Klen;
-+	unsigned char *H;
-+	size_t Hlen;
-+	unsigned char *session_id;
-+	size_t session_id_len;
-+
-+	unsigned int iv_len;
-+	unsigned int ek_len;
-+	unsigned int ik_len;
-+};
-+
-+static int sshkdf_cavs(struct kdf_cavs *test)
-+{
-+	int ret = 0;
-+	struct kex kex;
-+	struct sshbuf *Kb = NULL;
-+	BIGNUM *Kbn = NULL;
-+	int mode = 0;
-+	struct newkeys *ctoskeys;
-+	struct newkeys *stockeys;
-+	struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
-+
-+#define HEXOUTLEN 500
-+	char hex[HEXOUTLEN];
-+
-+	memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(struct kex));
-+
-+	Kbn = BN_new();
-+	BN_bin2bn(test->K, test->Klen, Kbn);
-+	if (!Kbn) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into bignum\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	Kb = sshbuf_new();
-+	if (!Kb) {
-+		printf("cannot convert K into sshbuf\n");
-+		ret = 1;
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	sshbuf_put_bignum2(Kb, Kbn);
-+
-+	kex.session_id = test->session_id;
-+	kex.session_id_len = test->session_id_len;
-+
-+	/* setup kex */
-+
-+	/* select the right hash based on struct ssh_digest digests */
-+	switch (test->ik_len) {
-+		case 20:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA1;
-+			break;
-+		case 32:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
-+			break;
-+		case 48:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
-+			break;
-+		case 64:
-+			kex.hash_alg = SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
-+			break;
-+		default:
-+			printf("Wrong hash type %u\n", test->ik_len);
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement choose_enc */
-+	for (mode = 0; mode < 2; mode++) {
-+		kex.newkeys[mode] = calloc(1, sizeof(struct newkeys));
-+		if (!kex.newkeys[mode]) {
-+			printf("allocation of newkeys failed\n");
-+			ret = 1;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.iv_len = test->iv_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.key_len = test->ek_len;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->enc.block_size = (test->iv_len == 64) ? 8 : 16;
-+		kex.newkeys[mode]->mac.key_len = test->ik_len;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* implement kex_choose_conf */
-+	kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.key_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.block_size;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->enc.iv_len;
-+	if (kex.we_need < kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len)
-+		kex.we_need = kex.newkeys[0]->mac.key_len;
-+
-+	/* MODE_OUT (1) -> server to client
-+	 * MODE_IN (0) -> client to server */
-+	kex.server = 1;
-+
-+	/* do it */
-+	if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL){
-+		printf("Allocation error\n");
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+	ssh->kex = &kex;
-+	kex_derive_keys(ssh, test->H, test->Hlen, Kb);
-+
-+	ctoskeys = kex.newkeys[0];
-+	stockeys = kex.newkeys[1];
-+
-+	/* get data */
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.iv, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.iv, (size_t)stockeys->enc.iv_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Initial IV (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->enc.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->enc.key, (size_t)stockeys->enc.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Encryption key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(ctoskeys->mac.key, (size_t)ctoskeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (client to server) = %s\n", hex);
-+	memset(hex, 0, HEXOUTLEN);
-+	bin2hex(stockeys->mac.key, (size_t)stockeys->mac.key_len,
-+		hex, HEXOUTLEN, 0);
-+	printf("Integrity key (server to client) = %s\n", hex);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (Kbn)
-+		BN_free(Kbn);
-+	if (Kb)
-+		sshbuf_free(Kb);
-+	if (ssh)
-+		ssh_packet_close(ssh);
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
-+static void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\nOpenSSH KDF CAVS Test\n\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage:\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-K\tShared secret string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-H\tHash string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-s\tSession ID string\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-i\tIV length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-e\tEncryption key length to be generated\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "\t-m\tMAC key length to be generated\n");
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * Test command example:
-+ * ./ssh-cavs -K 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 -H d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -s d3ab91a850febb417a25d892ec48ed5952c7a5de -i 8 -e 24 -m 20
-+ *
-+ * Initial IV (client to server) = 4bb320d1679dfd3a
-+ * Initial IV (server to client) = 43dea6fdf263a308
-+ * Encryption key (client to server) = 13048cc600b9d3cf9095aa6cf8e2ff9cf1c54ca0520c89ed
-+ * Encryption key (server to client) = 1e483c5134e901aa11fc4e0a524e7ec7b75556148a222bb0
-+ * Integrity key (client to server) = ecef63a092b0dcc585bdc757e01b2740af57d640
-+ * Integrity key (server to client) = 7424b05f3c44a72b4ebd281fb71f9cbe7b64d479
-+ */
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	struct kdf_cavs test;
-+	int ret = 1;
-+	int opt = 0;
-+
-+	memset(&test, 0, sizeof(struct kdf_cavs));
-+	while((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "K:H:s:i:e:m:")) != -1)
-+	{
-+		size_t len = 0;
-+		switch(opt)
-+		{
-+			/*
-+			 * CAVS K is MPINT
-+			 * we want a hex (i.e. the caller must ensure the
-+			 * following transformations already happened):
-+			 * 	1. cut off first four bytes
-+			 * 	2. if most significant bit of value is
-+			 *	   1, prepend 0 byte
-+			 */
-+			case 'K':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.K, &test.Klen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'H':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.H, &test.Hlen);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 's':
-+				len = strlen(optarg);
-+				ret = hex2bin_alloc(optarg, len,
-+						    &test.session_id,
-+						    &test.session_id_len);
-+				if (ret)
-+					goto out;
-+				break;
-+			case 'i':
-+				test.iv_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'e':
-+				test.ek_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			case 'm':
-+				test.ik_len = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
-+				break;
-+			default:
-+				usage();
-+				goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	ret = sshkdf_cavs(&test);
-+
-+out:
-+	if (test.session_id)
-+		free(test.session_id);
-+	if (test.K)
-+		free(test.K);
-+	if (test.H)
-+		free(test.H);
-+	return ret;
-+
-+}
-diff -up openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl
---- openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl.kdf-cavs	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-+++ openssh-6.8p1/ssh-cavs_driver.pl	2015-03-18 11:23:46.348049354 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
-+#!/usr/bin/env perl
-+#
-+# CAVS test driver for OpenSSH
-+#
-+# Copyright (C) 2015, Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
-+#
-+# Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a copy
-+# of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), to deal
-+# in the Software without restriction, including without limitation the rights
-+# to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell
-+# copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is
-+# furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions:
-+#
-+# The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in
-+# all copies or substantial portions of the Software.
-+#
-+#                            NO WARRANTY
-+#
-+#    BECAUSE THE PROGRAM IS LICENSED FREE OF CHARGE, THERE IS NO WARRANTY
-+#    FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW.  EXCEPT WHEN
-+#    OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES
-+#    PROVIDE THE PROGRAM "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED
-+#    OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+#    MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  THE ENTIRE RISK AS
-+#    TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU.  SHOULD THE
-+#    PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING,
-+#    REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
-+#
-+#    IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING
-+#    WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MAY MODIFY AND/OR
-+#    REDISTRIBUTE THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES,
-+#    INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING
-+#    OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED
-+#    TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY
-+#    YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER
-+#    PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE
-+#    POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
-+#
-+use strict;
-+use warnings;
-+use IPC::Open2;
-+
-+# Executing a program by feeding STDIN and retrieving
-+# STDOUT
-+# $1: data string to be piped to the app on STDIN
-+# rest: program and args
-+# returns: STDOUT of program as string
-+sub pipe_through_program($@) {
-+	my $in = shift;
-+	my @args = @_;
-+
-+	my ($CO, $CI);
-+	my $pid = open2($CO, $CI, @args);
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+	my $len = length($in);
-+	my $first = 1;
-+	while (1) {
-+		my $rin = "";
-+		my $win = "";
-+		# Output of prog is FD that we read
-+		vec($rin,fileno($CO),1) = 1;
-+		# Input of prog is FD that we write
-+		# check for $first is needed because we can have NULL input
-+		# that is to be written to the app
-+		if ( $len > 0 || $first) {
-+			(vec($win,fileno($CI),1) = 1);
-+			$first=0;
-+		}
-+		# Let us wait for 100ms
-+		my $nfound = select(my $rout=$rin, my $wout=$win, undef, 0.1);
-+		if ( $wout ) {
-+			my $written = syswrite($CI, $in, $len);
-+			die "broken pipe" if !defined $written;
-+			$len -= $written;
-+			substr($in, 0, $written) = "";
-+			if ($len <= 0) {
-+				close $CI or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+			}
-+		}
-+		if ( $rout ) {
-+			my $tmp_out = "";
-+			my $bytes_read = sysread($CO, $tmp_out, 4096);
-+			$out .= $tmp_out;
-+			last if ($bytes_read == 0);
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close $CO or die "broken pipe: $!";
-+	waitpid $pid, 0;
-+
-+	return $out;
-+}
-+
-+# Parser of CAVS test vector file
-+# $1: Test vector file
-+# $2: Output file for test results
-+# return: nothing
-+sub parse($$) {
-+	my $infile = shift;
-+	my $outfile = shift;
-+
-+	my $out = "";
-+
-+	my $K = "";
-+	my $H = "";
-+	my $session_id = "";
-+	my $ivlen = 0;
-+	my $eklen = "";
-+	my $iklen = "";
-+
-+	open(IN, "<$infile");
-+	while(<IN>) {
-+
-+		my $line = $_;
-+		chomp($line);
-+		$line =~ s/\r//;
-+
-+		if ($line =~ /\[SHA-1\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 20;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-256\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 32;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-384\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 48;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /\[SHA-512\]/) {
-+			$iklen = 64;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[IV length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$ivlen = $1;
-+			$ivlen = $ivlen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^\[encryption key length\s*=\s*(.*)\]/) {
-+			$eklen = $1;
-+			$eklen = $eklen / 8;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^K\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$K = $1;
-+			$K = substr($K, 8);
-+			$K = "00" . $K;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^H\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$H = $1;
-+		} elsif ($line =~ /^session_id\s*=\s*(.*)/) {
-+			$session_id = $1;
-+		}
-+		$out .= $line . "\n";
-+
-+		if ($K ne "" && $H ne "" && $session_id ne "" &&
-+		    $ivlen ne "" && $eklen ne "" && $iklen > 0) {
-+			$out .= pipe_through_program("", "./ssh-cavs -H $H -K $K -s $session_id -i $ivlen -e $eklen -m $iklen");
-+
-+			$K = "";
-+			$H = "";
-+			$session_id = "";
-+		}
-+	}
-+	close IN;
-+	$out =~ s/\n/\r\n/g; # make it a dos file
-+	open(OUT, ">$outfile") or die "Cannot create output file $outfile: $?";
-+	print OUT $out;
-+	close OUT;
-+}
-+
-+############################################################
-+#
-+# let us pretend to be C :-)
-+sub main() {
-+
-+	my $infile=$ARGV[0];
-+	die "Error: Test vector file $infile not found" if (! -f $infile);
-+
-+	my $outfile = $infile;
-+	# let us add .rsp regardless whether we could strip .req
-+	$outfile =~ s/\.req$//;
-+	$outfile .= ".rsp";
-+	if (-f $outfile) {
-+		die "Output file $outfile could not be removed: $?"
-+			unless unlink($outfile);
-+	}
-+	print STDERR "Performing tests from source file $infile with results stored in destination file $outfile\n";
-+
-+	# Do the job
-+	parse($infile, $outfile);
-+}
-+
-+###########################################
-+# Call it
-+main();
-+1;

SOURCES/openssh-6.7p1-sftp-force-permission.patch

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8
---- a/sftp-server.8	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8.sftp-force-mode	2016-03-09 19:04:48.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/sftp-server.8	2022-06-20 16:03:47.892540068 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.8	2016-06-23 16:18:20.463854117 +0200
 @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- .Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
+ .Op Fl P Ar denied_requests
- .Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
+ .Op Fl p Ar allowed_requests
  .Op Fl u Ar umask
 +.Op Fl m Ar force_file_perms
  .Ek
  .Nm
  .Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
-@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@
+@@ -138,6 +139,12 @@ Sets an explicit
  .Xr umask 2
  to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
  user's default mask.
@@ -22,10 +22,10 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
  .El
  .Pp
  On some systems,
-diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
+diff -up openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c
---- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:01:26.183793633 +0200
+--- openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c.sftp-force-mode	2016-06-23 16:18:20.446854128 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-20 16:02:12.442690608 +0200
++++ openssh-7.2p2/sftp-server.c	2016-06-23 16:20:37.950766082 +0200
-@@ -65,6 +65,10 @@
+@@ -69,6 +69,10 @@ struct sshbuf *oqueue;
  /* Version of client */
  static u_int version;
  
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  /* SSH2_FXP_INIT received */
  static int init_done;
  
-@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@
+@@ -683,6 +687,7 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	Attrib a;
  	char *name;
  	int r, handle, fd, flags, mode, status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, &pflags)) != 0 || /* portable flags */
-@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@
+@@ -692,6 +697,10 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  	debug3("request %u: open flags %d", id, pflags);
  	flags = flags_from_portable(pflags);
  	mode = (a.flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS) ? a.perm : 0666;
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  	logit("open \"%s\" flags %s mode 0%o",
  	    name, string_from_portable(pflags), mode);
  	if (readonly &&
-@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@
+@@ -713,6 +722,8 @@ process_open(u_int32_t id)
  			}
  		}
  	}
@@ -64,16 +64,16 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  	if (status != SSH2_FX_OK)
  		send_status(id, status);
  	free(name);
-@@ -1555,7 +1566,7 @@
+@@ -1494,7 +1505,7 @@ sftp_server_usage(void)
  	fprintf(stderr,
  	    "usage: %s [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] "
- 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P blacklisted_requests] "
+ 	    "[-l log_level]\n\t[-P denied_requests] "
--	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask]\n"
+-	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask]\n"
-+	    "[-p whitelisted_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
++	    "[-p allowed_requests] [-u umask] [-m force_file_perms]\n"
  	    "       %s -Q protocol_feature\n",
  	    __progname, __progname);
  	exit(1);
-@@ -1581,7 +1592,7 @@
+@@ -1520,7 +1531,7 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  	pw = pwcopy(user_pw);
  
  	while (!skipargs && (ch = getopt(argc, argv,
@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
  		switch (ch) {
  		case 'Q':
  			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "requests") != 0) {
-@@ -1643,6 +1654,15 @@
+@@ -1580,6 +1591,15 @@ sftp_server_main(int argc, char **argv,
  				fatal("Invalid umask \"%s\"", optarg);
  			(void)umask((mode_t)mask);
  			break;

SOURCES/openssh-6.8p1-sshdT-output.patch

@@ -3,8 +3,8 @@ diff -up openssh/servconf.c.sshdt openssh/servconf.c
 +++ openssh/servconf.c	2015-06-24 11:44:39.734745802 +0200
 @@ -2317,7 +2317,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  	dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ 	dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
 -	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
 +	dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner != NULL ? o->banner : "none");
  	dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);

SOURCES/openssh-6.9p1-permit-root-login.patch

@@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config.root-login	2015-08-12 11:29:12.919269245 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.0p1/sshd_config	2015-08-12 11:31:03.653096466 +0200
-@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@ SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
- # Authentication:
- 
- #LoginGraceTime 2m
--#PermitRootLogin prohibit-password
-+PermitRootLogin yes
- #StrictModes yes
- #MaxAuthTries 6
- #MaxSessions 10

SOURCES/openssh-7.1p2-audit-race-condition.patch

@@ -13,33 +13,33 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/monitor_wrap.c
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +	int r, ret = 0;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+ 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	do {
 +		blen = atomicio(read, fdin, buf, sizeof(buf));
 +		if (blen == 0) /* closed pipe */
 +			break;
 +		if (blen != sizeof(buf)) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the buffer from child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the buffer from child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +
 +		msg_len = get_u32(buf);
 +		if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
-+			fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
++			fatal_f("read: bad msg_len %d", msg_len);
 +		sshbuf_reset(m);
 +		if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, NULL)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++			fatal_fr(r, "buffer error");
 +		if (atomicio(read, fdin, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to read the the buffer content from the child", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to read the the buffer content from the child");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
 +		if (atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, buf, blen) != blen || 
 +		    atomicio(vwrite, pmonitor->m_recvfd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), msg_len) != msg_len) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to write the message to the monitor", __func__);
++			error_f("Failed to write the message to the monitor");
 +			ret = -1;
 +			break;
 +		}
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/session.c.audit-race openssh-7.4p1/session.c
  }
  
 @@ -1538,6 +1565,34 @@ child_close_fds(void)
- 	endpwent();
+ 	log_redirect_stderr_to(NULL);
  }
  
 +void

SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-k5login_directory.patch

@@ -28,14 +28,15 @@ diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
 index f9d191c..c432d2f 100644
 --- a/auth.h
 +++ b/auth.h
-@@ -222,5 +222,7 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+@@ -222,6 +222,8 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(Authctxt *, const char *);
+ 
  #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
- #include <krb5.h>
  krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
 +krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb5_context ctx,
 +	char **k5login_directory);
  #endif
- #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
 diff --git a/gss-serv-krb5.c b/gss-serv-krb5.c
 index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 --- a/gss-serv-krb5.c
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +	int ret = 0;
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_k5login_directory(krb_context, &k5login_directory);
-+	debug3("%s: k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", __func__, k5login_directory, ret);
++	debug3_f("k5login_directory = %s (rv=%d)", k5login_directory, ret);
 +	if (k5login_directory == NULL || ret != 0) {
 +		/* If not set, the library will look for  k5login
 +		 * files in the user's home directory, with the filename  .k5login.
@@ -63,7 +64,7 @@ index a7c0c5f..df8cc9a 100644
 +			k5login_directory[strlen(k5login_directory)-1] != '/' ? "/" : "",
 +			pw->pw_name);
 +	}
-+	debug("%s: Checking existence of file %s", __func__, file);
++	debug_f("Checking existence of file %s", file);
  
 -	snprintf(file, sizeof(file), "%s/.k5login", pw->pw_dir);
  	return access(file, F_OK) == 0;

SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-s390-closefrom.patch

@@ -48,5 +48,5 @@ Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@de.ibm.com>
 +#endif
  	}
  	(void) closedir(dirp);
-     } else
+ 	return;
 

SOURCES/openssh-7.2p2-x11.patch

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.2p2/channels.c.x11 openssh-7.2p2/channels.c
 +	if (len <= 0)
 +		return -1;
  	sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- 	if (sock < 0)
+ 	if (sock == -1)
  		error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
  	memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
  	addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;

SOURCES/openssh-7.3p1-x11-max-displays.patch

@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/channels.c.x11max openssh-7.4p1/channels.c
  		ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
 @@ -4457,7 +4463,7 @@ x11_connect_display(void)
  		/* Connect it to the display. */
- 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 		if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
  			debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
 -			    6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
 +			    X11_PORT_MIN + display_number, strerror(errno));
@@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5.x11max openssh-7.4p1/sshd_config.5
 +.Cm X11MaxDisplays ,
  .Cm X11Forwarding
  and
- .Cm X11UseLocalHost .
+ .Cm X11UseLocalhost .
 @@ -1566,6 +1567,12 @@ Specifies the first display number avail
  X11 forwarding.
  This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.

SOURCES/openssh-7.5p1-sandbox.patch

@@ -69,29 +69,6 @@ index 6e7de31..e86aa2c 100644
  	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
  #endif
 -- 1.9.1
-
-The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
-specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
-
-Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index e86aa2c..98062f1 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -250,6 +250,8 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
-+	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
- #endif
- #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
- 	/*
--- 
 1.9.1
 diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
 --- openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox	2017-12-12 13:59:30.563874059 +0100
@@ -107,40 +84,3 @@ diff -up openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.sandbox openssh-7.6p1/sandbox-se
  	SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
  #endif
 
-
-From ef34ea4521b042dd8a9c4c7455f5d1a8f8ee5bb2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
-Date: Fri, 24 May 2019 10:11:15 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
-
-Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware acceleration
-to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
-
-Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography support with the
-help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt
-device driver and so there is a need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
-
-Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
-
-Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in that area.
-I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the patches to the openssl
-community.
-
-Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
-Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
----
- sandbox-seccomp-filter.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-index 5edbc6946..56eb9317f 100644
---- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-@@ -252,6 +252,7 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
- 	/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
- 	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
-+	SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
- #endif
- #if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
- 	/*

SOURCES/openssh-7.6p1-cleanup-selinux.patch

@@ -2,9 +2,9 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
 --- openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.188821236 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth2-pubkey.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -72,6 +72,9 @@
+ 
+ /* import */
  extern ServerOptions options;
- extern u_char *session_id2;
- extern u_int session_id2_len;
 +extern int inetd_flag;
 +extern int rexeced_flag;
 +extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
@@ -12,59 +12,59 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-pubkey.c.refactor openssh/auth2-pubkey.c
  static char *
  format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
 @@ -511,7 +514,8 @@ match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh
- 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command,
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
 @@ -981,7 +985,8 @@ user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ss
- 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", command,
- 	if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
  	    ac, av, &f,
--	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
-+	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD,
+-	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid)) == 0)
++	    runas_pw, temporarily_use_uid, restore_uid,
 +	    (inetd_flag && !rexeced_flag), the_authctxt)) == 0)
  		goto out;
  
  	uid_swapped = 1;
-diff -up openssh/auth.c.refactor openssh/auth.c
+diff -up openssh/misc.c.refactor openssh/misc.c
---- openssh/auth.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.c.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.235821686 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.c	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -756,7 +756,8 @@ auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *
-  */
  pid_t
- subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
+ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
--    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
+     int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags,
-+    int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags, int inetd,
+-    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs, privrestore_fn *restore_privs)
-+    void *the_authctxt)
++    struct passwd *pw, privdrop_fn *drop_privs,
++    privrestore_fn *restore_privs, int inetd, void *the_authctxt)
  {
  	FILE *f = NULL;
  	struct stat st;
 @@ -872,7 +873,7 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, struct passw
+ 			_exit(1);
  		}
- 
  #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 -		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables() < 0) {
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_env_variables(inetd, the_authctxt) < 0) {
  			error ("failed to copy environment:  %s",
  			    strerror(errno));
  			_exit(127);
-diff -up openssh/auth.h.refactor openssh/auth.h
+diff -up openssh/misc.h.refactor openssh/misc.h
---- openssh/auth.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
+--- openssh/misc.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.251821839 +0200
-+++ openssh/auth.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
++++ openssh/misc.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
 @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE  (1<<1)  /* Redirect stdout */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH	(1<<3)	/* Don't check for safe cmd */
- #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD  (1<<2)  /* Discard stderr */
+ #define	SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV	(1<<4)	/* Keep parent environment */
- pid_t	subprocess(const char *, struct passwd *,
+ pid_t subprocess(const char *, const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int,
--    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags);
+-    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *);
-+    const char *, int, char **, FILE **, u_int flags, int, void *);
++    struct passwd *, privdrop_fn *, privrestore_fn *, int, void *);
- 
- int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
  
+ typedef struct arglist arglist;
+ struct arglist {
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.refactor	2019-04-04 13:19:12.256821887 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2019-04-04 13:19:12.276822078 +0200
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
  	char *role;
 @@ -342,11 +339,11 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_variables(int(*set_it
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl, the_authctxt);
@@ -203,10 +203,10 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.refactor openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables(inetd, pam_setenv, authctxt)) {
  			switch (security_getenforce()) {
  			case -1:
- 				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
+ 				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ sshd_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pw
  
- 	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
+ 	debug3_f("setting execution context");
  
 -	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx, inetd, authctxt);
@@ -269,3 +269,15 @@ diff -up openssh/sshd.c.refactor openssh/sshd.c
  #endif
  #ifdef USE_PAM
  	if (options.use_pam) {
+diff -up openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor openssh/sshconnect.c
+--- openssh/sshconnect.c.refactor	2021-02-24 00:12:03.065325046 +0100
++++ openssh/sshconnect.c	2021-02-24 00:12:12.126449544 +0100
+@@ -892,7 +892,7 @@ load_hostkeys_command(struct hostkeys *h
+ 
+ 	if ((pid = subprocess(tag, command, ac, av, &f,
+ 	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_UNSAFE_PATH|
+-	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == 0)
++	    SSH_SUBPROCESS_PRESERVE_ENV, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL)) == 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 
+ 	load_hostkeys_file(hostkeys, hostfile_hostname, tag, f, 1);

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-fips.patch

@@ -1,33 +1,15 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.519877082 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/cipher-ctr.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.c	2021-05-06 12:12:10.107634472 +0200
-@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ evp_aes_128_ctr(void)
+@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@
- 	aes_ctr.do_cipher = ssh_aes_ctr;
- #ifndef SSH_OLD_EVP
- 	aes_ctr.flags = EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH |
--	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV;
-+	    EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
-+	    EVP_CIPH_FLAG_FIPS;
- #endif
- 	return (&aes_ctr);
- }
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.523877120 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/clientloop.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.620878031 +0100
-@@ -2014,7 +2014,8 @@ key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct
- {
- 	const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
- 	const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
--	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
-+	    options.hostkeyalgorithms : (FIPS_mode() ?
-+	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
  
- 	if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
- 		return 0;
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
---- openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+ 
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.c	2019-03-11 17:08:11.769763057 +0100
+ #include "dh.h"
-@@ -152,6 +152,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -164,6 +164,12 @@ choose_dh(int min, int wantbits, int max
  	int best, bestcount, which, linenum;
  	struct dhgroup dhg;
  
@@ -37,10 +19,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
 +		return (dh_new_group_fallback(max));
 +	}
 +
- 	if ((f = fopen(_PATH_DH_MODULI, "r")) == NULL) {
+ 	if ((f = fopen(get_moduli_filename(), "r")) == NULL) {
  		logit("WARNING: could not open %s (%s), using fixed modulus",
- 		    _PATH_DH_MODULI, strerror(errno));
+ 		    get_moduli_filename(), strerror(errno));
-@@ -489,4 +495,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
+@@ -502,4 +508,38 @@ dh_estimate(int bits)
  	return 8192;
  }
  
@@ -79,21 +61,29 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.c
 +}
 +
  #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/dh.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/dh.h
---- openssh-7.9p1/dh.h.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/dh.h.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/dh.h	2019-03-11 17:08:18.718828381 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/dh.h	2021-05-06 12:11:28.393298005 +0200
-@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
+@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ DH	*dh_new_group_fallback(int);
  
  int	 dh_gen_key(DH *, int);
  int	 dh_pub_is_valid(const DH *, const BIGNUM *);
 +int	 dh_is_known_group(const DH *);
  
  u_int	 dh_estimate(int);
+ void	 dh_set_moduli_file(const char *);
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kex.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.489926807 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kex.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
  
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kex.c
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
---- openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.614877975 +0100
+ #include <openssl/crypto.h>
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/kex.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
-@@ -175,7 +196,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # ifdef HAVE_EVP_KDF_CTX_NEW_ID
+ # include <openssl/kdf.h>
+@@ -203,7 +203,10 @@ kex_names_valid(const char *names)
  	for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
  	    (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
  		if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
@@ -105,18 +95,18 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kex.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kex.c
  			free(s);
  			return 0;
  		}
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/kexgexc.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
 @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@
  
  #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
  
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include <sys/types.h>
  
  #include <openssl/dh.h>
-@@ -118,6 +119,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
+@@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32
  		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
  		goto out;
  	}
@@ -127,39 +117,44 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/kexgexc.c
  	p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
  
  	/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h
---- openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h.fips	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h	2019-03-11 17:06:37.621878041 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/myproposal.h	2021-05-06 12:08:36.498926877 +0200
-@@ -116,6 +116,16 @@
+@@ -57,6 +57,18 @@
  	"rsa-sha2-256," \
  	"ssh-rsa"
  
 +#define	KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG	\
-+	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
-+	"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
 +	"rsa-sha2-512," \
-+	"rsa-sha2-256," \
++	"rsa-sha2-256"
-+	"ssh-rsa"
 +
- /* the actual algorithms */
- 
  #define	KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
-@@ -139,6 +147,38 @@
+ 	"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
+ 	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+@@ -78,6 +92,27 @@
  
  #define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
  
 +#define	KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT \
 +	"aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
 +	"aes128-cbc,3des-cbc," \
-+	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se" \
++	"aes192-cbc,aes256-cbc,rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se," \
-+	AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
++	"aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-+#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
 +#define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
++	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
++	"diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
 +	"diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
 +#define KEX_FIPS_MAC \
 +	"hmac-sha1," \
@@ -168,59 +163,47 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h.fips openssh-7.9p1/myproposal.h
 +	"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
 +	"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com"
-+#else
-+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
-+#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp521"
-+# else
-+#  define KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS		\
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
-+	"ecdh-sha2-nistp384"
-+# endif
-+#define        KEX_FIPS_MAC \
-+       "hmac-sha1"
-+#endif
 +
  /* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
  #define	SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS	\
- 	"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ 	"ssh-ed25519," \
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.601877853 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.428926336 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/readconf.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/readconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
-@@ -2178,18 +2178,19 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- 	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+ # include <glob.h>
+ #else
+@@ -2538,11 +2538,16 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
--#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
-+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_CLIENT_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_CLIENT_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
  		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
--		    defaults, all)) != 0) \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
-+		    (FIPS_mode() ? fips_defaults : defaults), \
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.463926606 +0200
-+		    all)) != 0) \
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.499926885 +0200
- 			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
+@@ -160,6 +160,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
- 	} while (0)
--	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
--	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
--	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-+	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
-+	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
-+	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
- #undef ASSEMBLE
- 	free(all_cipher);
- 	free(all_mac);
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.586877712 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
-@@ -137,6 +137,9 @@ static const struct sock_filter preauth_
  #ifdef __NR_open
  	SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
  #endif
@@ -230,102 +213,74 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sandbox-secco
  #ifdef __NR_openat
  	SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.568877543 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.455926545 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.622878050 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
-@@ -209,18 +209,19 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@
- 	all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
+ #include <limits.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <errno.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
+ #include <util.h>
+ #endif
+@@ -226,11 +226,16 @@ assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
  	all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
  	all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
--#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
+ 	/* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
-+#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, fips_defaults, all) \
+-	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+-	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+-	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+-	def_key = match_filter_allowlist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+-	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
++	def_cipher = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT), all_cipher);
++	def_mac = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_MAC : KEX_SERVER_MAC), all_mac);
++	def_kex = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS : KEX_SERVER_KEX), all_kex);
++	def_key = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG), all_key);
++	def_sig = match_filter_allowlist((FIPS_mode() ?
++	    KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS), all_sig);
+ #define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
  	do { \
--		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
+ 		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
-+		if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, (FIPS_mode() \
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c
-+		    ? fips_defaults : defaults), all)) != 0) \
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
- 			fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.500926893 +0200
- 	} while (0)
+@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@
--	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
--	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
--	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
--	ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
--	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, KEX_FIPS_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
-+	ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, KEX_FIPS_MAC, all_mac);
-+	ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, KEX_DEFAULT_KEX_FIPS, all_kex);
-+	ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_key);
-+	ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG, all_sig);
- #undef ASSEMBLE
- 	free(all_cipher);
- 	free(all_mac);
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.602877862 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
-@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
  #endif
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
-@@ -1283,6 +1294,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1516,6 +1517,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		dump_client_config(&options, host);
  		exit(0);
  	}
-+
+ 
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
- 
++
- 	if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
+ 	/* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
- 		fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
+ 	if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c
+ 	    strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
---- openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.580877655 +0100
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.623878060 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.485926777 +0200
-@@ -44,6 +44,8 @@
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.501926900 +0200
+@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@
  #include <vis.h>
  #endif
  
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
 +
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  
  #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -148,7 +150,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
+@@ -269,36 +271,41 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	 * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
- 	 * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
- 	 */
--	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
-+	oavail = avail = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
-+	    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
- 	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
- 	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
- 	last = xmalloc(maxlen);
-@@ -229,14 +232,16 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
- 		all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- 		if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
--		    KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
-+		    (FIPS_mode() ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG),
-+		    all_key) != 0)
- 			fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
- 		free(all_key);
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- 	} else {
- 		/* Enforce default */
--		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
-+		options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup((FIPS_mode()
-+		    ? KEX_FIPS_PK_ALG : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG));
- 		/* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(
-@@ -201,35 +201,40 @@ ssh_kex2(char *host, struct sockaddr *ho
  
  #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
  	if (options.gss_keyex) {
@@ -340,24 +295,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c
 -			/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
 -			 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 -			if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
--				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-				free(gss_host);
--			}
--		} else {
--			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
--		}
--
--		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
--		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
--		if (gss) {
--			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
--			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
--
--			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
--			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
--			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
--			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
--			    "%s,null", orig);
 +		if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +			logit("Disabling GSSAPIKeyExchange. Not usable in FIPS mode");
 +			options.gss_keyex = 0;
@@ -373,12 +311,28 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c
 +				/* Fall back to specified host if we are using proxy command
 +				 * and can not use DNS on that socket */
 +				if (strcmp(gss_host, "UNKNOWN") == 0) {
++					free(gss_host);
 +					gss_host = xstrdup(host);
 +				}
 +			} else {
-+				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+ 				gss_host = xstrdup(host);
-+			}
+ 			}
-+
+-		} else {
+-			gss_host = xstrdup(host);
+-		}
+ 
+-		gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
+-		    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
+-		if (gss) {
+-			debug("Offering GSSAPI proposal: %s", gss);
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,%s", gss, orig);
+-
+-			/* If we've got GSSAPI algorithms, then we also support the
+-			 * 'null' hostkey, as a last resort */
+-			orig = myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
+-			xasprintf(&myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
+-			    "%s,null", orig);
 +			gss = ssh_gssapi_client_mechanisms(gss_host,
 +			    options.gss_client_identity, options.gss_kex_algorithms);
 +			if (gss) {
@@ -395,9 +349,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshconnect2.c
  		}
  	}
  #endif
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 12:13:56.501492639 +0200
 @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
  #include <grp.h>
  #include <pwd.h>
@@ -410,11 +364,11 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
  #include <openssl/dh.h>
  #include <openssl/bn.h>
  #include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
  #endif
  
-@@ -1581,6 +1584,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1619,6 +1621,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #endif
  	__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
  
@@ -422,7 +376,21 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
  	/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
  	saved_argc = ac;
  	rexec_argc = ac;
-@@ -2036,6 +2051,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1931,6 +1931,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    &key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
+ 			do_log2_r(r, ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\"",
+ 			    options.host_key_files[i]);
++		if (FIPS_mode() && key != NULL && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519_SK
++				||  sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_ED25519)) {
++		    logit_f("sshd: Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode, skipping %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++		    sshkey_free(key);
++		    key = NULL;
++		    continue;
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -2110,6 +2113,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
  	log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
  
@@ -430,10 +398,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
 +		debug("FIPS mode initialized");
 +	}
 +
- 	/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
+ 	/*
- 	   unmounted if desired. */
+ 	 * Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
- 	if (chdir("/") == -1)
+ 	 * unmounted if desired.
-@@ -2412,10 +2431,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(void)
+@@ -2494,10 +2501,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  	if (strlen(myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS]) == 0)
  		orig = NULL;
  
@@ -452,92 +420,122 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshd.c
  
  	if (gss && orig)
  		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.617878003 +0100
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.493926838 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/sshkey.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.624878069 +0100
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshkey.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.502926908 +0200
 @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@
  #include <openssl/evp.h>
  #include <openssl/err.h>
  #include <openssl/pem.h>
-+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
  #endif
  
  #include "crypto_api.h"
 @@ -57,6 +58,7 @@
+ #define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
  #include "sshkey.h"
- #include "sshkey-xmss.h"
  #include "match.h"
 +#include "log.h"
+ #include "ssh-sk.h"
  
- #include "xmss_fast.h"
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+@@ -285,6 +285,18 @@ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plai
+ 	for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
+ 		if (kt->name == NULL || kt->type == KEY_NULL)
+ 			continue;
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++			switch (kt->type) {
++			case KEY_ED25519:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK:
++			case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
++			case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++			     continue;
++			     break;
++			default:
++			     break;
++			}
++		}
+ 		if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
+@@ -1503,6 +1503,20 @@ sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **c
+ 		return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ 	}
  
-@@ -392,7 +394,8 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
++	switch (type) {
- {
++	case KEY_ED25519:
- 	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
- 	u_char *sig = NULL;
++	case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
--	int ret, slen, len;
++	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
-+	int ret, slen;
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
-+	size_t len;
++		    sshkey_free(k);
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		break;
++	default:
++		break;
++	}
+ 	/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
+ 	ret->type = type;
+ 	if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
+@@ -1705,6 +1707,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+		goto out;
 
- 	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
+	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-@@ -411,9 +414,10 @@ sshkey_calculate_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		goto error;
- 	}
--	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
-+	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto error;
- 	}
-@@ -440,12 +444,13 @@ sshkey_verify_signature(EVP_PKEY *pkey
- 	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 	}
--	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
--	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
-+	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
-+	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
-+	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
--	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
-+	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
- 	switch (ret) {
- 	case 1:
- 		ret = 0;
-@@ -1514,6 +1516,8 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
- 	}
- 	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
- 	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
 +		if (FIPS_mode())
-+			logit("%s: the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method", __func__);
++			logit_f("the key length might be unsupported by FIPS mode approved key generation method");
  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
  		goto out;
  	}
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -2916,6 +2916,11 @@ sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
---- openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2019-03-11 17:06:37.590877750 +0100
+ 		break;
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c	2019-03-11 17:06:37.625878079 +0100
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
-@@ -230,6 +230,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
- 	    OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS : OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS;
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
- 	if (*bitsp > maxbits)
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
- 		fatal("key bits exceeds maximum %d", maxbits);
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
++		/* Fallthrough */
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ 	case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ 		r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+@@ -2973,6 +2978,10 @@ sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 		return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ 	case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		}
+ 		return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+ 		    compat, detailsp);
+ #ifdef WITH_XMSS
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips	2021-05-06 12:08:36.467926637 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-05-06 12:08:36.503926916 +0200
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #endif
+@@ -205,6 +205,12 @@ type_bits_valid(int type, const char *na
+ #endif
+ 	}
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +	if (FIPS_mode()) {
 +		if (type == KEY_DSA)
 +			fatal("DSA keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
-+		if (type == KEY_ED25519)
++		if (type == KEY_ED25519 || type == KEY_ED25519_SK)
 +			fatal("ED25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
 +	}
  	switch (type) {
  	case KEY_DSA:
  		if (*bitsp != 1024)
-@@ -1029,9 +1035,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
+@@ -1098,9 +1104,17 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
  			first = 1;
  			printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
  		}
@@ -554,16 +552,124 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c.fips openssh-7.9p1/ssh-keygen.c
  		fflush(stdout);
 -		type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
  		if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
- 			error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
+ 			error("Could not save your private key in %s: %s",
  			    prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.xxx	2023-10-30 13:01:59.150952364 +0100
+--- openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:11:21.973519913 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config	2023-10-30 13:02:56.662231354 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/kexgen.c	2022-07-11 16:25:31.172187365 +0200
-@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
+@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <signal.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
  
- HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
+ #include "sshkey.h"
- HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+ #include "kex.h"
-+#In FIPS mode Ed25519 keys are not supported, please comment out the next line
+@@ -115,10 +116,20 @@ kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
- HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_keypair(kex);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -186,11 +197,21 @@ input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -285,12 +306,22 @@ input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t s
+ 		break;
+ #endif
+ 	case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
+-		r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
+-		    &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type c25519 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
++		        &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP761X25519_SHA512:
+-		r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
+-		    &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		if (FIPS_mode()) {
++		    logit_f("Key exchange type sntrup761 is not allowed in FIPS mode");
++		    r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++		} else {
++		    r = kex_kem_sntrup761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
++		        &server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	default:
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3 openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c.fips3	2022-07-11 16:53:41.428343304 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ed25519.c	2022-07-11 16:56:09.284663661 +0200
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
  
- # Ciphers and keying
+ #include <string.h>
+ #include <stdarg.h>
++#include <openssl/fips.h>
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+@@ -52,6 +53,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *ke
+ 	    key->ed25519_sk == NULL ||
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 	smlen = slen = datalen + crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES;
+ 	if ((sig = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+@@ -108,6 +113,10 @@ ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *
+ 	    datalen >= INT_MAX - crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES ||
+ 	    signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	if (FIPS_mode()) {
++	    logit_f("Ed25519 keys are not allowed in FIPS mode");
++	    return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-gssapi-new-unique.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,26 @@
-diff --git a/auth-krb5.c b/auth-krb5.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth.h
-index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.345143341 +0200
---- a/auth-krb5.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
-+++ b/auth-krb5.c
+@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
+ 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
+ 	char		*krb5_ccname;
++	int		 krb5_set_env;
+ #endif
+ 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
+ 
+@@ -231,7 +232,7 @@ struct passwd *fakepw(void);
+ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ 
+ #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+-krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
++krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
+ #endif
+ 
+ #endif /* AUTH_H */
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/auth-krb5.c	2021-05-06 11:28:40.195242317 +0200
 @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
  #include <unistd.h>
  #include <string.h>
@@ -10,7 +29,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  
  extern ServerOptions	 options;
  
-@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -77,7 +78,7 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  #endif
  	krb5_error_code problem;
  	krb5_ccache ccache = NULL;
@@ -19,24 +38,18 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  	char *client, *platform_client;
  	const char *errmsg;
  
-@@ -163,7 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -163,8 +164,8 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  		goto out;
  	}
  
--	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx, &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
+-	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_gen(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
+-	    &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache);
 +	problem = ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(authctxt->krb5_ctx,
 +	     &authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, &authctxt->krb5_set_env);
  	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  
-@@ -172,21 +174,20 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -179,15 +180,14 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
- 	if (problem)
- 		goto out;
- 
--	problem= krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
-+	problem = krb5_cc_store_cred(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache,
- 				 &creds);
- 	if (problem)
  		goto out;
  #endif
  
@@ -57,7 +70,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  		do_pam_putenv("KRB5CCNAME", authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
  
-@@ -222,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
+@@ -223,11 +223,54 @@ auth_krb5_password(Authctxt *authctxt, c
  void
  krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  {
@@ -113,7 +126,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
  	if (authctxt->krb5_user) {
  		krb5_free_principal(authctxt->krb5_ctx, authctxt->krb5_user);
  		authctxt->krb5_user = NULL;
-@@ -237,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
+@@ -238,36 +281,188 @@ krb5_cleanup_proc(Authctxt *authctxt)
  	}
  }
  
@@ -151,7 +164,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +ssh_krb5_expand_template(char **result, const char *template) {
 +	char *p_n, *p_o, *r, *tmp_template;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called, template = %s", __func__, template);
++	debug3_f("called, template = %s", template);
 +	if (template == NULL)
 +		return -1;
 +
@@ -179,7 +192,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		} else {
 +			p_o = strchr(p_n, '}') + 1;
 +			*p_o = '\0';
-+			debug("%s: unsupported token %s in %s", __func__, p_n, template);
++			debug_f("unsupported token %s in %s", p_n, template);
 +			/* unknown token, fallback to the default */
 +			goto cleanup;
 +		}
@@ -198,16 +211,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	return -1;
 +}
 +
- krb5_error_code
++krb5_error_code
--ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
--	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
--	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(krb5_context ctx, char **ccname) {
 +	profile_t p;
 +	int ret = 0;
 +	char *value = NULL;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	ret = krb5_get_profile(ctx, &p);
 +	if (ret)
 +		return ret;
@@ -218,11 +228,14 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_expand_template(ccname, value);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: returning with ccname = %s", __func__, *ccname);
++	debug3_f("returning with ccname = %s", *ccname);
 +	return ret;
 +}
 +
-+krb5_error_code
+ krb5_error_code
+-ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache) {
+-	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno;
+-	char ccname[40];
 +ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context ctx, krb5_ccache *ccache, int *need_environment) {
 +	int tmpfd, ret, oerrno, type_len;
 +	char *ccname = NULL;
@@ -242,7 +255,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -		logit("mkstemp(): %.100s", strerror(oerrno));
 -		return oerrno;
 -	}
-+	debug3("%s: called", __func__);
++	debug3_f("called");
 +	if (need_environment)
 +		*need_environment = 0;
 +	ret = ssh_krb5_get_cctemplate(ctx, &ccname);
@@ -283,7 +296,7 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 -	close(tmpfd);
  
 -	return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
-+	debug3("%s: setting default ccname to %s", __func__, ccname);
++	debug3_f("setting default ccname to %s", ccname);
 +	/* set the default with already expanded user IDs */
 +	ret = krb5_cc_set_default_name(ctx, ccname);
 +	if (ret)
@@ -304,13 +317,13 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +	 * a primary cache for this collection, if it supports that (non-FILE)
 +	 */
 +	if (krb5_cc_support_switch(ctx, type)) {
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_new_unique(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_new_unique(%s)", ccname);
 +		ret = krb5_cc_new_unique(ctx, type, NULL, ccache);
 +		free(type);
 +		if (ret)
 +			return ret;
 +
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_switch()", __func__);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_switch()");
 +		return krb5_cc_switch(ctx, *ccache);
 +	} else {
 +		/* Otherwise, we can not create a unique ccname here (either
@@ -318,35 +331,47 @@ index a5a81ed2..63f877f2 100644
 +		 * collections
 +		 */
 +		free(type);
-+		debug3("%s: calling cc_resolve(%s)", __func__, ccname);
++		debug3_f("calling cc_resolve(%s)", ccname);
 +		return (krb5_cc_resolve(ctx, ccname, ccache));
 +	}
  }
  #endif /* !HEIMDAL */
  #endif /* KRB5 */
-diff --git a/auth.h b/auth.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c
-index 29491df9..fdab5040 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.374143558 +0200
---- a/auth.h
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
-+++ b/auth.h
+@@ -413,13 +413,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void)
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ struct Authctxt {
+ }
- 	krb5_principal	 krb5_user;
- 	char		*krb5_ticket_file;
- 	char		*krb5_ccname;
-+	int		 krb5_set_env;
- #endif
- 	struct sshbuf	*loginmsg;
  
-@@ -243,6 +244,6 @@ int	 sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *, const char *);
+ /* As user */
+-void
++int
+ ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
+ {
+ 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
+-		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
++		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
+ 	} else
+ 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
++
++	return 0;
+ }
  
- #if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
+ /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the child's environment based
- #include <krb5.h>
+@@ -499,9 +501,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds(void) {
--krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_gen(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *);
+ 	char *envstr;
-+krb5_error_code ssh_krb5_cc_new_unique(krb5_context, krb5_ccache *, int *);
  #endif
- #endif
+ 
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+-	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
---- openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.708611802 +0100
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
+-	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
++	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
+ 		return;
+ 
+ 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/gss-serv-krb5.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.387143654 +0200
 @@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_cmdok(krb5_principal pri
  /* This writes out any forwarded credentials from the structure populated
   * during userauth. Called after we have setuid to the user */
@@ -449,7 +474,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  		do_pam_putenv(client->store.envvar, client->store.envval);
  #endif
  
-@@ -361,7 +355,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
+@@ -364,7 +354,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_krb5_storecreds(ssh_gssapi_cl
  
  	client->store.data = krb_context;
  
@@ -458,43 +483,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/gss-serv-krb5.c
  }
  
  int
-diff --git a/gss-serv.c b/gss-serv.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c
-index 6cae720e..16e55cbc 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
---- a/gss-serv.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.388143662 +0200
-+++ b/gss-serv.c
+@@ -136,6 +136,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
-@@ -320,13 +320,15 @@ ssh_gssapi_getclient(Gssctxt *ctx, ssh_gssapi_client *client)
- }
- 
- /* As user */
--void
-+int
- ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void)
- {
- 	if (gssapi_client.mech && gssapi_client.mech->storecreds) {
--		(*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
-+		return (*gssapi_client.mech->storecreds)(&gssapi_client);
- 	} else
- 		debug("ssh_gssapi_storecreds: Not a GSSAPI mechanism");
-+
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /* This allows GSSAPI methods to do things to the childs environment based
-@@ -498,9 +500,7 @@ ssh_gssapi_rekey_creds() {
- 	char *envstr;
- #endif
- 
--	if (gssapi_client.store.filename == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL &&
--	    gssapi_client.store.envvar == NULL)
-+	if (gssapi_client.store.envval == NULL)
- 		return;
- 
- 	ok = PRIVSEP(ssh_gssapi_update_creds(&gssapi_client.store));
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name	2019-03-01 15:17:42.704611768 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c	2019-03-01 15:17:42.713611844 +0100
-@@ -123,6 +123,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions
  	options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
  	options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
  	options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
@@ -502,7 +494,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	options->gss_authentication=-1;
  	options->gss_keyex = -1;
  	options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
-@@ -315,6 +316,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+@@ -359,6 +360,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOption
  		options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
  	if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
  		options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
@@ -511,9 +503,9 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
  		options->gss_authentication = 0;
  	if (options->gss_keyex == -1)
-@@ -447,7 +450,8 @@ typedef enum {
+@@ -506,7 +509,8 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
+	sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
- 	sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
+	sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel, sLogVerbose,
 	sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
 -	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
 +	sKerberosGetAFSToken, sKerberosUniqueCCache,
@@ -521,7 +513,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
 	sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
 	sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
 	sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
-@@ -526,11 +530,13 @@ static struct {
+@@ -593,11 +597,13 @@ static struct {
  #else
  	{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  #endif
@@ -535,7 +527,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  	{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
  	{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-@@ -1437,6 +1443,10 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+@@ -1573,6 +1579,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerO
  		intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
  		goto parse_flag;
  
@@ -546,7 +538,7 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  	case sGssAuthentication:
  		intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
  		goto parse_flag;
-@@ -2507,6 +2517,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+@@ -2891,6 +2901,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
  # ifdef USE_AFS
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
  # endif
@@ -554,11 +546,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c.ccache_name openssh-7.9p1/servconf.c
  #endif
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h
-index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.377143580 +0200
---- a/servconf.h
++++ openssh-8.6p1/servconf.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
-+++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ typedef struct {
-@@ -123,6 +123,8 @@ typedef struct {
  						 * file on logout. */
  	int     kerberos_get_afs_token;		/* If true, try to get AFS token if
  						 * authenticated with Kerberos. */
@@ -567,13 +558,12 @@ index db8362c6..4fa42d64 100644
  	int     gss_authentication;	/* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
  	int     gss_keyex;		/* If true, permit GSSAPI key exchange */
  	int     gss_cleanup_creds;	/* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
-diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/session.c
-index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/session.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
---- a/session.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/session.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.397143729 +0200
-+++ b/session.c
+@@ -1038,7 +1038,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
-@@ -1033,7 +1033,8 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
  	/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
- 	 * the childs environment as they see fit
+ 	 * the child's environment as they see fit
  	 */
 -	ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
 +	if (s->authctxt->krb5_set_env)
@@ -581,7 +571,7 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
  #endif
  
  	/* Set basic environment. */
-@@ -1105,7 +1106,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
+@@ -1114,7 +1115,7 @@ do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s
  	}
  #endif
  #ifdef KRB5
@@ -590,33 +580,10 @@ index 85df6a27..480a5ead 100644
  		child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
  		    s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
  #endif
-diff --git a/ssh-gss.h b/ssh-gss.h
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
-index 6593e422..245178af 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
---- a/ssh-gss.h
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
-+++ b/ssh-gss.h
+@@ -2284,7 +2284,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
-@@ -83,7 +82,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
- 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
- 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
--	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
-+	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
- 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
- } ssh_gssapi_mech;
- 
-@@ -127,7 +126,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name);
- OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
- void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
- void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
--void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
-+int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
- const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
- 
- char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -2162,7 +2162,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  #ifdef GSSAPI
  	if (options.gss_authentication) {
  		temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
@@ -625,11 +592,10 @@ index edbe815c..89514e8a 100644
  		restore_uid();
  	}
  #endif
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5
-index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.380143602 +0200
---- a/sshd_config.5
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.5	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -939,6 +939,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destr
-@@ -860,6 +860,14 @@ Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
  file on logout.
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
@@ -644,3 +610,24 @@ index c0683d4a..2349f477 100644
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
  Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h
+--- openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h.ccache_name	2021-05-06 11:15:36.384143632 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/ssh-gss.h	2021-05-06 11:15:36.398143736 +0200
+@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ typedef struct ssh_gssapi_mech_struct {
+ 	int (*dochild) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*userok) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char *);
+ 	int (*localname) (ssh_gssapi_client *, char **);
+-	void (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
++	int (*storecreds) (ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ 	int (*updatecreds) (ssh_gssapi_ccache *, ssh_gssapi_client *);
+ } ssh_gssapi_mech;
+ 
+@@ -175,7 +175,7 @@ int ssh_gssapi_userok(char *name, struct
+ OM_uint32 ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
+ void ssh_gssapi_do_child(char ***, u_int *);
+ void ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds(void);
+-void ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
++int ssh_gssapi_storecreds(void);
+ const char *ssh_gssapi_displayname(void);
+ 
+ char *ssh_gssapi_server_mechanisms(void);

SOURCES/openssh-7.7p1-redhat.patch

@@ -1,19 +1,21 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config.redhat openssh/ssh_config
---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh/ssh_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
++++ openssh/ssh_config	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -44,3 +44,8 @@
+@@ -43,3 +43,10 @@
- #   VisualHostKey no
  #   ProxyCommand ssh -q -W %h:%p gateway.example.com
  #   RekeyLimit 1G 1h
+ #   UserKnownHostsFile ~/.ssh/known_hosts.d/%k
 +#
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy.
-+# To modify the system-wide ssh configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++# To modify the crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...), create a  *.conf
-+#  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++#  file under  /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/  which will be automatically
++# included below. For more information, see manual page for
++#  update-crypto-policies(8)  and  ssh_config(5).
 +Include /etc/ssh/ssh_config.d/*.conf
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat
+diff -up openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh/ssh_config_redhat
---- openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
+--- openssh/ssh_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat	2018-07-03 10:44:06.522245125 +0200
++++ openssh/ssh_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:13:39.180641839 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
 +# The options here are in the "Match final block" to be applied as the last
 +# options and could be potentially overwritten by the user configuration
 +Match final all
@@ -27,19 +29,12 @@ diff -up openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat.redhat openssh-7.7p1/ssh_config_redhat
 +# mode correctly we set this to yes.
 +	ForwardX11Trusted yes
 +
-+# Send locale-related environment variables
-+	SendEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+	SendEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+	SendEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+	SendEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
 +# Uncomment this if you want to use .local domain
 +# Host *.local
-+#   CheckHostIP no
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh/sshd_config.0
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
+--- openssh/sshd_config.0.redhat	2020-02-12 14:30:04.000000000 +0100
---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat	2018-04-02 07:39:27.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd_config.0	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0	2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
+@@ -970,9 +970,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
-@@ -872,9 +872,9 @@ DESCRIPTION
  
       SyslogFacility
               Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
@@ -52,10 +47,10 @@ diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.0
  
       TCPKeepAlive
               Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd_config.5.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5	2018-07-03 10:44:06.523245133 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd_config.5	2020-02-13 18:13:39.181641855 +0100
-@@ -1461,7 +1461,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
+@@ -1614,7 +1614,7 @@ By default no subsystems are defined.
  .It Cm SyslogFacility
  Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
  .Xr sshd 8 .
@@ -64,13 +59,17 @@ diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.5
  LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
  The default is AUTH.
  .It Cm TCPKeepAlive
-diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config.redhat openssh/sshd_config
---- openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat	2018-04-02 07:38:28.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh/sshd_config.redhat	2020-02-11 23:28:35.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config	2018-07-03 10:45:16.950782466 +0200
++++ openssh/sshd_config	2020-02-13 18:20:16.349913681 +0100
-@@ -10,20 +10,31 @@
+@@ -10,6 +10,14 @@
  # possible, but leave them commented.  Uncommented options override the
  # default value.
 
++# To modify the system-wide sshd configuration, create a  *.conf  file under
++#  /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/  which will be automatically included below
++Include /etc/ssh/sshd_config.d/*.conf
++
 +# If you want to change the port on a SELinux system, you have to tell
 +# SELinux about this change.
 +# semanage port -a -t ssh_port_t -p tcp #PORTNUMBER
@@ -78,87 +77,29 @@ diff -up openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config.redhat openssh-7.7p1/sshd_config
  #Port 22
  #AddressFamily any
  #ListenAddress 0.0.0.0
- #ListenAddress ::
+diff -up openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat openssh/sshd_config_redhat
- 
+--- openssh/sshd_config_redhat.redhat	2020-02-13 18:14:02.268006439 +0100
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
++++ openssh/sshd_config_redhat	2020-02-13 18:19:20.765035947 +0100
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
+@@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
--#HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
-+HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
- 
- # Ciphers and keying
- #RekeyLimit default none
- 
 +# This system is following system-wide crypto policy. The changes to
-+# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect here.
++# crypto properties (Ciphers, MACs, ...) will not have any effect in
-+# They will be overridden by command-line options passed to the server
++# this or following included files. To override some configuration option,
-+# on command line.
++# write it before this block or include it before this file.
-+# Please, check manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++# Please, see manual pages for update-crypto-policies(8) and sshd_config(5).
++Include /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 +
- # Logging
- #SyslogFacility AUTH
 +SyslogFacility AUTHPRIV
- #LogLevel INFO
++
- 
- # Authentication:
-@@ -56,9 +70,11 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # To disable tunneled clear text passwords, change to no here!
- #PasswordAuthentication yes
- #PermitEmptyPasswords no
-+PasswordAuthentication yes
- 
- # Change to no to disable s/key passwords
- #ChallengeResponseAuthentication yes
 +ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
- 
++
- # Kerberos options
- #KerberosAuthentication no
-@@ -67,8 +83,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- #KerberosGetAFSToken no
- 
- # GSSAPI options
--#GSSAPIAuthentication no
--#GSSAPICleanupCredentials yes
 +GSSAPIAuthentication yes
 +GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
- 
++
- # Set this to 'yes' to enable PAM authentication, account processing,
- # and session processing. If this is enabled, PAM authentication will
-@@ -79,16 +95,20 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
- # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
--#UsePAM no
 +UsePAM yes
- 
++
- #AllowAgentForwarding yes
- #AllowTcpForwarding yes
- #GatewayPorts no
--#X11Forwarding no
 +X11Forwarding yes
- #X11DisplayOffset 10
- #X11UseLocalhost yes
- #PermitTTY yes
--#PrintMotd yes
 +
 +# It is recommended to use pam_motd in /etc/pam.d/sshd instead of PrintMotd,
 +# as it is more configurable and versatile than the built-in version.
 +PrintMotd no
 +
- #PrintLastLog yes
- #TCPKeepAlive yes
- #PermitUserEnvironment no
-@@ -106,6 +126,12 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
- # no default banner path
- #Banner none
- 
-+# Accept locale-related environment variables
-+AcceptEnv LANG LC_CTYPE LC_NUMERIC LC_TIME LC_COLLATE LC_MONETARY LC_MESSAGES
-+AcceptEnv LC_PAPER LC_NAME LC_ADDRESS LC_TELEPHONE LC_MEASUREMENT
-+AcceptEnv LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_ALL LANGUAGE
-+AcceptEnv XMODIFIERS
-+
- # override default of no subsystems
- Subsystem	sftp	/usr/libexec/sftp-server
- 

SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-UsePAM-warning.patch

@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c
---- a/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.c
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd.c	2021-04-19 14:03:21.140920974 +0200
-@@ -1701,6 +1701,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+@@ -1749,6 +1749,10 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
  	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- 	    cfg, NULL);
+ 	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
  
 +	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
 +	if (! options.use_pam)
 +		logit("WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several problems.");
 +
- 	/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	fill_default_server_options(&options);
+ 	if (options.moduli_file != NULL)
- 
+ 		dh_set_moduli_file(options.moduli_file);
-diff --git a/sshd_config b/sshd_config
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config
---- a/sshd_config
+--- openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config.log-usepam-no	2021-04-19 14:00:45.098735121 +0200
-+++ b/sshd_config
++++ openssh-8.6p1/sshd_config	2021-04-19 14:00:45.099735129 +0200
-@@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ GSSAPICleanupCredentials no
+@@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ AuthorizedKeysFile	.ssh/authorized_keys
  # If you just want the PAM account and session checks to run without
  # PAM authentication, then enable this but set PasswordAuthentication
- # and ChallengeResponseAuthentication to 'no'.
+ # and KbdInteractiveAuthentication to 'no'.
 +# WARNING: 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL and may cause several
 +# problems.
- UsePAM yes
+ #UsePAM no
  
  #AllowAgentForwarding yes

SOURCES/openssh-7.8p1-role-mls.patch

@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
  	gss_buffer_desc mic, gssbuf;
  	const char *displayname;
 @@ -298,7 +299,13 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
  	mic.value = p;
  	mic.length = len;
 -	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->user, authctxt->service,
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-gss.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-gss.c
 +#endif
 +		micuser = authctxt->user;
 +	ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, micuser, authctxt->service,
- 	    "gssapi-with-mic");
+ 	    "gssapi-with-mic", ssh->kex->session_id);
  
  	if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
 @@ -311,6 +318,8 @@ input_gssapi_mic(int type, u_int32_t ple
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth2-hostbased.c.role-mls openssh/auth2-hostbased.c
 +++ openssh/auth2-hostbased.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.816430924 +0200
 @@ -123,7 +123,16 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
  	/* reconstruct packet */
- 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +	    (authctxt->role
@@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.c.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.c
 +do_pam_putenv(char *name, const char *value)
  {
  	int ret = 1;
- #ifdef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
+ 	char *compound;
 diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
 --- openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/auth-pam.h	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -154,20 +154,6 @@ diff -up openssh/auth-pam.h.role-mls openssh/auth-pam.h
  char ** fetch_pam_environment(void);
  char ** fetch_pam_child_environment(void);
  void free_pam_environment(char **);
-diff -up openssh/configure.ac.role-mls openssh/configure.ac
---- openssh/configure.ac.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/configure.ac	2018-08-22 11:14:56.820430957 +0200
-@@ -4241,10 +4241,7 @@ AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
- 			  LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
- 			],
- 			AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
--		SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
--		SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
- 		AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
--		LIBS="$save_LIBS"
- 	fi ]
- )
- AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
 diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
 --- openssh/misc.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/misc.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.817430932 +0200
@@ -193,10 +179,10 @@ diff -up openssh/misc.c.role-mls openssh/misc.c
  	}
  	return NULL;
  }
-diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
+diff -up openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c
---- openssh/monitor.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
+--- openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c.role-mls	2021-04-16 05:55:25.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/monitor.c	2018-08-22 11:19:56.006844867 +0200
++++ openssh-8.6p1/monitor.c	2021-05-21 14:21:56.719414087 +0200
-@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(int, struct sshbuf *)
+@@ -117,6 +117,9 @@ int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, st
  int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
@@ -206,7 +192,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
  int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
-@@ -189,6 +192,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
+@@ -195,6 +198,9 @@ struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[]
      {MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
      {MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
@@ -216,7 +202,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
      {MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -796,6 +802,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(int sock, struct ss
+@@ -803,6 +809,9 @@ mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, in
  
  	/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
@@ -226,7 +212,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
  
  #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -842,6 +851,26 @@ mm_answer_authserv(int sock, struct sshb
+@@ -877,6 +886,26 @@ key_base_type_match(const char *method,
  	return found;
  }
  
@@ -238,8 +224,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
 +	monitor_permit_authentications(1);
 +
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->role, NULL)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
-+	debug3("%s: role=%s", __func__, authctxt->role);
++	debug3_f("role=%s", authctxt->role);
 +
 +	if (strlen(authctxt->role) == 0) {
 +		free(authctxt->role);
@@ -253,7 +239,7 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  int
  mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
  {
-@@ -1218,7 +1247,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1251,7 +1280,7 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -262,16 +248,16 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	u_char type;
  	int r, fail = 0;
-@@ -1251,6 +1280,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_i
+@@ -1282,6 +1311,8 @@ monitor_valid_userblob(struct ssh *ssh,
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
  	    authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
  	    authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
-@@ -1286,7 +1317,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1317,7 +1348,7 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  {
  	struct sshbuf *b;
  	const u_char *p;
@@ -280,10 +266,10 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor.c.role-mls openssh/monitor.c
  	size_t len;
  	int r, fail = 0;
  	u_char type;
-@@ -1308,6 +1339,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data
+@@ -1338,6 +1370,8 @@ monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char
  		fail++;
  	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse userstyle");
 +	if ((s = strchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
 +		*s = '\0';
  	xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
@@ -319,12 +305,12 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.c.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.c
 +	int r;
 +	struct sshbuf *m;
 +
-+	debug3("%s entering", __func__);
++	debug3_f("entering");
 +
 +	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
++		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
 +	if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, role ? role : "")) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++		fatal_f("buffer error: %s", ssh_err(r));
 +	mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHROLE, m);
 +
 +	sshbuf_free(m);
@@ -338,8 +324,8 @@ diff -up openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls openssh/monitor_wrap.h
 --- openssh/monitor_wrap.h.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.818430941 +0200
 +++ openssh/monitor_wrap.h	2018-08-22 11:22:10.439929513 +0200
 @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
- int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
+     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *,
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int compat);
+     const char *, u_int compat);
  void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
 +#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
 +void mm_inform_authrole(char *);
@@ -351,7 +337,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 @@ -92,7 +92,8 @@ PORTS=	port-aix.o \
- 	port-linux.o \
+ 	port-prngd.o \
  	port-solaris.o \
  	port-net.o \
 -	port-uw.o
@@ -359,7 +345,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/Make
 +	port-linux-sshd.o
  
  .c.o:
- 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ 	$(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls	2018-08-20 07:57:29.000000000 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
@@ -371,7 +357,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 -void
 -ssh_selinux_setup_exec_context(char *pwname)
 -{
--	security_context_t user_ctx = NULL;
+-	char *user_ctx = NULL;
 -
 -	if (!ssh_selinux_enabled())
 -		return;
@@ -407,7 +393,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
  
 -	user_ctx = ssh_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname);
 +	if (getexeccon(&user_ctx) != 0) {
-+		error("%s: getexeccon: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
++		error_f("getexeccon: %s", strerror(errno));
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +
@@ -432,7 +418,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/por
 diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c
 --- openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
 +++ openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c	2018-08-22 11:14:56.819430949 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,421 @@
 +/*
 + * Copyright (c) 2005 Daniel Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
 + * Copyright (c) 2014 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com>
@@ -544,7 +530,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	access_vector_t bit;
 +	security_class_t class;
 +
-+	debug("%s: src:%s dst:%s", __func__, src, dst);
++	debug_f("src:%s dst:%s", src, dst);
 +	class = string_to_security_class("context");
 +	if (!class) {
 +		error("string_to_security_class failed to translate security class context");
@@ -706,7 +692,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +			    /* we actually don't change level */
 +			    reqlvl = "";
 +
-+			debug("%s: current connection level '%s'", __func__, reqlvl);
++			debug_f("current connection level '%s'", reqlvl);
 +
 +		}
 +
@@ -734,8 +720,8 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (r != 0) {
-+		error("%s: Failed to get default SELinux security "
++		error_f("Failed to get default SELinux security "
-+		    "context for %s", __func__, pwname);
++		    "context for %s", pwname);
 +	}
 +
 +#ifdef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
@@ -760,7 +746,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	char *use_current;
 +	int rv;
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	ssh_selinux_get_role_level(&role, &reqlvl);
 +
@@ -797,32 +783,30 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +		if (sshd_selinux_setup_pam_variables()) {
 +			switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +			case -1:
-+				fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++				fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +			case 0:
-+				error("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++				error_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
-+				    __func__);
 +			break;
 +			default:
-+				fatal("%s: SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.",
++				fatal_f("SELinux PAM variable setup failure. Aborting connection.");
-+				    __func__);
 +			}
 +		}
 +		return;
 +	}
 +
-+	debug3("%s: setting execution context", __func__);
++	debug3_f("setting execution context");
 +
 +	r = sshd_selinux_getctxbyname(pwname, &default_ctx, &user_ctx);
 +	if (r >= 0) {
 +		r = setexeccon(user_ctx);
 +		if (r < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux execution context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#ifdef HAVE_SETKEYCREATECON
 +		else if (setkeycreatecon(user_ctx) < 0) {
-+			error("%s: Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
++			error_f("Failed to set SELinux keyring creation context %s for %s",
-+			    __func__, user_ctx, pwname);
++			    user_ctx, pwname);
 +		}
 +#endif
 +	}
@@ -837,14 +821,12 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (r < 0) {
 +		switch (security_getenforce()) {
 +		case -1:
-+			fatal("%s: security_getenforce() failed", __func__);
++			fatal_f("security_getenforce() failed");
 +		case 0:
-+			error("%s: SELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.",
++			error_f("ELinux failure. Continuing in permissive mode.");
-+			    __func__);
 +			break;
 +		default:
-+			fatal("%s: SELinux failure. Aborting connection.",
++			fatal_f("SELinux failure. Aborting connection.");
-+			    __func__);
 +		}
 +	}
 +	if (user_ctx != NULL && user_ctx != default_ctx)
@@ -852,7 +834,7 @@ diff -up openssh/openbsd-compat/port-linux-sshd.c.role-mls openssh/openbsd-compa
 +	if (default_ctx != NULL)
 +		freecon(default_ctx);
 +
-+	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
++	debug3_f("done");
 +}
 +
 +#endif

SOURCES/openssh-7.9p1-ssh-copy-id.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id
---- openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id.ssh-copy-id	2018-10-17 02:01:20.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-7.9p1/contrib/ssh-copy-id	2019-01-23 20:49:30.513393667 +0100
-@@ -112,7 +112,8 @@ do
-         usage
-   }
- 
--  OPT= OPTARG=
-+  OPT=
-+  OPTARG=
-   # implement something like getopt to avoid Solaris pain
-   case "$1" in
-     -i?*|-o?*|-p?*)
-@@ -185,8 +185,8 @@
-   usage
- fi
- 
--# drop trailing colon
--USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1" | sed 's/:$//')
-+# don't drop trailing colon because it can be a valid ipv6 address
-+USER_HOST=$(printf "%s\n" "$1")
- # tack the hostname onto SSH_OPTS
- SSH_OPTS="${SSH_OPTS:+$SSH_OPTS }'$(quote "$USER_HOST")'"
- # and populate "$@" for later use (only way to get proper quoting of options)
-@@ -261,7 +262,7 @@ populate_new_ids() {
-   fi
-   if [ -z "$NEW_IDS" ] ; then
-     printf '\n%s: WARNING: All keys were skipped because they already exist on the remote system.\n' "$0" >&2
--    printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' "$0" >&2
-+    printf '\t\t(if you think this is a mistake, you may want to use -f option)\n\n' >&2
-     exit 0
-   fi
-   printf '%s: INFO: %d key(s) remain to be installed -- if you are prompted now it is to install the new keys\n' "$0" "$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)" >&2
-@@ -296,7 +297,7 @@ case "$REMOTE_VERSION" in
-     # in ssh below - to defend against quirky remote shells: use 'exec sh -c' to get POSIX;
-     #     'cd' to be at $HOME; add a newline if it's missing; and all on one line, because tcsh.
-     [ "$DRY_RUN" ] || printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | \
--      ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys ; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
-+      ssh "$@" "exec sh -c 'cd ; umask 077 ; mkdir -p .ssh && { [ -z "'`tail -1c .ssh/authorized_keys 2>/dev/null`'" ] || echo >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1; } && cat >> .ssh/authorized_keys || exit 1 ; if type restorecon >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then restorecon -F .ssh .ssh/authorized_keys ; fi'" \
-       || exit 1
-     ADDED=$(printf '%s\n' "$NEW_IDS" | wc -l)
-     ;;

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-CVE-2025-26465.patch

@@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1/krl.c b/openssh-8.0p1/krl.c
-index 8e2d5d5..e5b046d 100644
---- a/openssh-8.0p1/krl.c
-+++ b/openssh-8.0p1/krl.c
-@@ -676,6 +676,7 @@ revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
- 			break;
- 		case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
- 			if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
-+				r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 				error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
- 				goto out;
- 			}
-@@ -1011,6 +1012,7 @@ ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 		error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-diff --git a/openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c b/openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
-index ce855eb..9650b24 100644
---- a/openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
-+++ b/openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
- static int
- verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
- {
--	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
-+	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) != 0)
- 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
- 	return 0;
- }
-@@ -767,6 +767,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 
- 	if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
- 		debug("%s: server sent unknown pkalg %s", __func__, pkalg);
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 	if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
-@@ -777,6 +778,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
- 		    "for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
- 		    key->type, pktype);
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 
-@@ -796,6 +798,7 @@ input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
- 		error("%s: server replied with unknown key: %s %s", __func__,
- 		    sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
-+		r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 	ident = format_identity(id);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-avoidkillall.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
-index b66037f1..54538ff9 100644
---- a/sftp.c
-+++ b/sftp.c
-@@ -220,9 +220,12 @@ static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
- static void
- killchild(int signo)
- {
--	if (sshpid > 1) {
--		kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
--		waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
-+	pid_t pid;
-+
-+	pid = sshpid;
-+	if (pid > 1) {
-+		kill(pid, SIGTERM);
-+		(void)waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
- 	}
- 
- 	_exit(1);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-bigsshdconfig.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
-index 99c25cd2..574a566e 100644
---- a/msg.c
-+++ b/msg.c
-@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
- 		return (-1);
- 	}
- 	msg_len = get_u32(buf);
--	if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
-+	if (msg_len > sshbuf_max_size(m)) {
- 		error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
- 		return (-1);
- 	}

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-channel-limits.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.channel-limits	2021-03-16 12:17:58.905576511 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-03-16 12:17:58.925576667 +0100
-@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
- 	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
- 	u_int i, found;
- 	Channel *c;
-+	int r;
- 
- 	/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
- 	for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
-@@ -383,6 +384,8 @@ channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype
- 	    (c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
- 	    (c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_set_max_size(c->input, CHAN_INPUT_MAX)) != 0)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_set_max_size: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 	c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
- 	c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
- 	channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.channel-limits	2021-03-16 12:17:58.868576223 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h	2021-03-16 12:17:58.907576527 +0100
-@@ -215,6 +215,9 @@ struct Channel {
- /* Read buffer size */
- #define CHAN_RBUF	(16*1024)
- 
-+/* Maximum channel input buffer size */
-+#define CHAN_INPUT_MAX	(16*1024*1024)
-+
- /* Hard limit on number of channels */
- #define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS	(16*1024)
- 

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-client_alive_count_max.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
-index e16eabe2..a8c99e2e 100644
---- a/serverloop.c
-+++ b/serverloop.c
-@@ -184,7 +184,8 @@ client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	int r, channel_id;
- 
- 	/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
--	if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
-+	if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
-+	    ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
- 	    options.client_alive_count_max) {
- 		sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
- 		logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index d47cb0d2..2cddbd59 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -519,6 +519,9 @@ is set to 15, and
- .Cm ClientAliveCountMax
- is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
- will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
-+Setting a zero
-+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-+disables connection termination.
- .It Cm ClientAliveInterval
- Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
- from the client,

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policies.patch

@@ -1,55 +1,60 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5
+diff --color -ru a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-24 17:32:54.821789205 +0100
+--- a/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.550013071 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5	2020-03-24 17:59:58.174122920 +0100
++++ b/ssh_config.5	2022-07-12 15:17:20.016704545 +0200
-@@ -357,17 +357,17 @@ or
+@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
  .Qq *.c.example.com
  domains.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- .Xr ssh 1
+ If the specified list begins with a
- will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
+ .Sq +
- specified.
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-+.Pp
+@@ -445,20 +441,25 @@
- .It Cm CertificateFile
+ (the default),
- Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
- A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
-@@ -420,16 +420,21 @@ If the option is set to
- .Cm no ,
  the check will not be executed.
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
  Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
+-instead of replacing them.
- instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
  character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Bd -literal -offset indent
-@@ -445,13 +450,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -474,13 +475,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .Ed
  .Pp
@@ -63,49 +68,56 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClearAllForwardings
-@@ -800,6 +798,11 @@ command line will be passed untouched to
+@@ -874,6 +868,11 @@
  The default is
  .Dq no .
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are offered for GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -812,9 +815,8 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+@@ -886,10 +885,8 @@
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
  .Pp
 -The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
 +.Pp
  .It Cm HashKnownHosts
  Indicates that
  .Xr ssh 1
-@@ -1114,26 +1115,21 @@ it may be zero or more of:
+@@ -1219,29 +1216,25 @@
  and
  .Cm pam .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
+-instead of replacing them.
- instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
  character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
 -curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
@@ -113,36 +125,41 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
 -diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
 -diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
 -.Ed
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q kex .
-@@ -1193,33 +1189,29 @@ The default is INFO.
+@@ -1351,37 +1344,33 @@
- DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+ file.
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
  in order of preference.
  The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
+-instead of replacing them.
- instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
  character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
@@ -161,92 +178,110 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/ssh_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
-@@ -1352,27 +1344,21 @@ instead of continuing to execute and pas
+@@ -1553,37 +1542,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm no .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be used for public key
- as a comma-separated list of patterns.
+ authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
+-character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the default
-+character, then the key types after it will be appended to the built-in default
+-instead of replacing it.
- instead of replacing it.
++character, then the algorithms after it will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default instead of replacing it.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q key .
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
+diff --color -ru a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies	2020-03-24 17:32:54.802788908 +0100
+--- a/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:05:22.535012771 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5	2020-03-24 17:54:13.347740176 +0100
++++ b/sshd_config.5	2022-07-12 15:15:33.394809258 +0200
-@@ -383,16 +383,16 @@ If the argument is
+@@ -373,17 +373,13 @@
  then no banner is displayed.
  By default, no banner is displayed.
  .It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
  by certificate authorities (CAs).
 -The default is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset indent
--ecdsa-sha2-nistp256.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-ssh-ed25519,ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
- Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
+ If the specified list begins with a
- public key or host-based authentication.
+ .Sq +
-+.Pp
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
- .It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
+@@ -450,20 +446,25 @@
- Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
- PAM or through authentication styles supported in
-@@ -454,16 +454,21 @@ The default is
  indicating not to
  .Xr chroot 2 .
  .It Cm Ciphers
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the ciphers allowed.
  Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in default set
+-instead of replacing them.
- instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
  character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The supported ciphers are:
  .Pp
-@@ -490,13 +495,6 @@ aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+@@ -490,13 +491,6 @@
  chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -260,78 +295,103 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q cipher .
  .It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
-@@ -688,6 +686,11 @@ For this to work
+@@ -685,21 +679,22 @@
  .Cm GSSAPIKeyExchange
  needs to be enabled in the server and also used by the client.
  .It Cm GSSAPIKexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  The list of key exchange algorithms that are accepted by GSSAPI
  key exchange. Possible values are
  .Bd -literal -offset 3n
-@@ -700,8 +703,6 @@ gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-gex-sha1-,
+-gss-group1-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha1-,
+-gss-group14-sha256-,
+-gss-group16-sha512-,
+-gss-nistp256-sha256-,
++gss-gex-sha1-
++gss-group1-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha1-
++gss-group14-sha256-
++gss-group16-sha512-
++gss-nistp256-sha256-
  gss-curve25519-sha256-
  .Ed
- .Pp
+-.Pp
 -The default is
--.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
+-.Dq gss-group14-sha256-,gss-group16-sha512-,gss-nistp256-sha256-,
+-gss-curve25519-sha256-,gss-group14-sha1-,gss-gex-sha1- .
  This option only applies to connections using GSSAPI.
- .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm HostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for hostbased
-@@ -791,19 +791,13 @@ is specified, the location of the socket
+@@ -799,26 +794,13 @@
  .Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
  environment variable.
  .It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the host key algorithms
+ Specifies the host key signature algorithms
  that the server offers.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
- .Pp
+-.Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q key .
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
-@@ -922,16 +916,21 @@ Specifies whether to look at .k5login fi
+ .It Cm IgnoreRhosts
+@@ -965,20 +947,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
  .It Cm KexAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in default set
+-instead of replacing them.
- instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified methods will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
  character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
  The supported algorithms are:
  .Pp
  .Bl -item -compact -offset indent
-@@ -961,15 +960,6 @@ ecdh-sha2-nistp384
+@@ -1010,15 +997,6 @@
- ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+ sntrup761x25519-sha512@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
 -The default is:
@@ -340,38 +400,44 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
 -ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
 -diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
 -diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
--diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
 -.Ed
 -.Pp
  The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q kex .
+ .Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
  .It Cm ListenAddress
-@@ -1038,17 +1028,22 @@ DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
+@@ -1104,21 +1082,26 @@
- DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
+ file.
- Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
+ This option is intended for debugging and no overrides are enabled by default.
  .It Cm MACs
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
  Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
  The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
  Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
- If the specified value begins with a
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
 -character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in default set
+-instead of replacing them.
- instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
  character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
++built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
  The algorithms that contain
  .Qq -etm
-@@ -1091,15 +1086,6 @@ umac-64-etm@openssh.com
+@@ -1161,15 +1144,6 @@
  umac-128-etm@openssh.com
  .El
  .Pp
@@ -387,38 +453,50 @@ diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.crypto-policies openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
  The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
  .Qq ssh -Q mac .
  .It Cm Match
-@@ -1446,27 +1432,21 @@ or equivalent.)
+@@ -1548,37 +1522,25 @@
  The default is
  .Cm yes .
- .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
+ .It Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
 +The default is handled system-wide by
 +.Xr crypto-policies 7 .
-+To see the current defaults and how to modify them, see manual page
++Information about defaults, how to modify the defaults and how to customize existing policies with sub-policies are present in manual page
 +.Xr update-crypto-policies 8 .
 +.Pp
- Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
+ Specifies the signature algorithms that will be accepted for public key
- as a list of comma-separated patterns.
+ authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
- Alternately if the specified value begins with a
+ Alternately if the specified list begins with a
  .Sq +
--character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
+-character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
-+character, then the specified key types will be appended to the built-in default set
+-instead of replacing them.
- instead of replacing them.
++character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the built-in
- If the specified value begins with a
++openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
  .Sq -
- character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
+ character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
 -from the default set instead of replacing them.
++from the built-in openssh default set instead of replacing them.
+ If the specified list begins with a
+ .Sq ^
+ character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
+-default set.
 -The default for this option is:
 -.Bd -literal -offset 3n
+-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
--rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
 -ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+-ssh-ed25519,
 -ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
--ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+-sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+-sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+-rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
 -.Ed
-+from the built-in default set instead of replacing them.
++built-in openssh default set.
  .Pp
- The list of available key types may also be obtained using
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
- .Qq ssh -Q key .
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-crypto-policy-doc.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ru a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
---- a/sshd.8	2022-05-31 13:39:10.231843926 +0200
-+++ b/sshd.8	2022-05-31 14:34:01.460815420 +0200
-@@ -78,6 +78,7 @@
- .Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
- command-line options override values specified in the
- configuration file.
-+This mechanism is used by systemd to apply system-wide crypto-policies to ssh server.
- .Nm
- rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
- .Dv SIGHUP ,
-@@ -207,6 +208,13 @@
- rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
- .Fl C
- options.
-+The configuration does not contain the system-wide crypto-policy configuration.
-+To show the most accurate runtime configuration, use:
-+.Bd -literal -offset 3n
-+source /etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
-+source /etc/sysconfig/sshd
-+sshd -T $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
-+.Ed
- .It Fl t
- Test mode.
- Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-cve-2020-14145.patch

@@ -1,127 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c.cve-2020-14145	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.c	2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
-@@ -409,6 +409,18 @@ lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct ho
- 	    found) == HOST_FOUND);
- }
- 
-+int
-+lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int want_marker)
-+{
-+	u_int i;
-+
-+	for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
-+		if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker == (HostkeyMarker)want_marker)
-+			return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+
- static int
- write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
-     const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h.cve-2020-14145	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/hostfile.h	2021-05-17 16:53:38.694577251 +0200
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@ HostStatus check_key_in_hostkeys(struct
-     const struct hostkey_entry **);
- int	 lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *, int,
-     const struct hostkey_entry **);
-+int	 lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *, int);
- 
- int	 hostfile_read_key(char **, u_int *, struct sshkey *);
- int	 add_host_to_hostfile(const char *, const char *,
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145 openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c.cve-2020-14145	2021-05-17 16:53:38.610576561 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshconnect2.c	2021-05-17 16:54:58.169230103 +0200
-@@ -98,12 +98,25 @@ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/* Returns the first item from a comma-separated algorithm list */
-+static char *
-+first_alg(const char *algs)
-+{
-+	char *ret, *cp;
-+
-+	ret = xstrdup(algs);
-+	if ((cp = strchr(ret, ',')) != NULL)
-+		*cp = '\0';
-+	return ret;
-+}
-+
- static char *
- order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
- {
--	char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
-+	char *oavail = NULL, *avail = NULL, *first = NULL, *last = NULL;
-+	char *alg = NULL, *hostname = NULL, *ret = NULL, *best = NULL;
- 	size_t maxlen;
--	struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
-+	struct hostkeys *hostkeys = NULL;
- 	int ktype;
- 	u_int i;
- 
-@@ -115,6 +128,26 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
- 	for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
- 		load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * If a plain public key exists that matches the type of the best
-+	 * preference HostkeyAlgorithms, then use the whole list as is.
-+	 * Note that we ignore whether the best preference algorithm is a
-+	 * certificate type, as sshconnect.c will downgrade certs to
-+	 * plain keys if necessary.
-+	 */
-+	best = first_alg(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+	if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
-+	    sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(best)), NULL)) {
-+		debug3("%s: have matching best-preference key type %s, "
-+		    "using HostkeyAlgorithms verbatim", __func__, best);
-+		ret = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
-+		goto out;
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Otherwise, prefer the host key algorithms that match known keys
-+	 * while keeping the ordering of HostkeyAlgorithms as much as possible.
-+	 */
- 	oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- 	maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
- 	first = xmalloc(maxlen);
-@@ -131,11 +164,23 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
- 	while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
- 		if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
- 			fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
-+		/*
-+		 * If we have a @cert-authority marker in known_hosts then
-+		 * prefer all certificate algorithms.
-+		 */
-+		if (sshkey_type_is_cert(ktype) &&
-+		    lookup_marker_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, MRK_CA)) {
-+			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		/* If the key appears in known_hosts then prefer it */
- 		if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
--		    sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
-+		    sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL)) {
- 			ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
--		else
--			ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+		/* Otherwise, put it last */
-+		ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
- 	}
- #undef ALG_APPEND
- 	xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
-@@ -143,6 +188,8 @@ order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct soc
- 	if (*first != '\0')
- 		debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
- 
-+ out:
-+	free(best);
- 	free(first);
- 	free(last);
- 	free(hostname);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-entropy.patch

@@ -1,302 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
-index 2d483b3..b361a04 100644
---- a/entropy.c
-+++ b/entropy.c
-@@ -234,6 +234,9 @@ seed_rng(void)
- 	}
- #endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
- 
-+#ifdef __linux__
-+	linux_seed();
-+#endif /* __linux__ */
- 	if (RAND_status() != 1)
- 		fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
- 
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-index b912dbe..9206337 100644
---- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
-@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ OPENBSD=base64.o basename.o bcrypt_pbkdf.o bindresvport.o blowfish.o daemon.o di
- 	port-solaris.o \
- 	port-net.o \
- 	port-uw.o \
-+	port-linux-prng.o \
- 	port-linux-sshd.o
- 
- .c.o:
-diff -up openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h
---- openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h.entropy	2016-12-23 18:34:27.747753563 +0100
-+++ openssh-7.4p1/openbsd-compat/port-linux.h	2016-12-23 18:34:27.769753570 +0100
-@@ -34,4 +34,6 @@ void oom_adjust_restore(void);
- void oom_adjust_setup(void);
- #endif
- 
-+void linux_seed(void);
-+
- #endif /* ! _PORT_LINUX_H */
-diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 0000000..92a617c
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-linux-prng.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2011 - 2020 Red Hat, Inc.
-+ *
-+ * Authors:
-+ *  Jan F. Chadima <jchadima@redhat.com>
-+ *  Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ */
-+
-+/*
-+ * Linux-specific portability code - prng support
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <openssl/rand.h>
-+#include <sys/random.h>
-+
-+#include "log.h"
-+
-+void
-+linux_seed(void)
-+{
-+	char *env = NULL;
-+	size_t randlen = 14, left;
-+	unsigned int flags = 0;
-+	unsigned char buf[256], *p;
-+
-+	env = getenv("SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG");
-+	if (env && strcmp(env, "0") != 0) {
-+		size_t ienv = atoi(env);
-+
-+		/* Max on buffer length */
-+		if (ienv > sizeof(buf))
-+			ienv = sizeof(buf);
-+		/* Minimum is always 14 B */
-+		if (ienv > randlen)
-+			randlen = ienv;
-+		flags = GRND_RANDOM;
-+	}
-+
-+	errno = 0;
-+	left = randlen;
-+	p = buf;
-+	do {
-+		ssize_t len = getrandom(p, left, flags);
-+		if (len == -1) {
-+			if (errno != EINTR) {
-+				if (flags) {
-+					/* With the variable present, this is fatal error */
-+					fatal("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
-+				} else {
-+					/* Otherwise we log the issue drop out from here */
-+					debug("Failed to seed from getrandom: %s", strerror(errno));
-+					return;
-+				}
-+			}
-+		} else if (len > 0) {
-+			left -= len;
-+			p += len;
-+		}
-+	} while (left > 0);
-+
-+	RAND_seed(buf, randlen);
-+}
-diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
-index 4812448..16305bf 100644
---- a/ssh-add.1
-+++ b/ssh-add.1
-@@ -161,6 +161,22 @@ to make this work.)
- Identifies the path of a
- .Ux Ns -domain
- socket used to communicate with the agent.
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
- .El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds
-diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
-index 281ecbd..1a9a635 100644
---- a/ssh-agent.1
-+++ b/ssh-agent.1
-@@ -201,6 +201,26 @@ sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
- These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
- The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
-index 12e00d4..1b51a4a 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -832,6 +832,26 @@ Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
- The file format is described in
- .Xr moduli 5 .
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-add 1 ,
-diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
-index 69d0829..02d79f8 100644
---- a/ssh-keysign.8
-+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
-@@ -80,6 +80,26 @@ must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
- If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
- information corresponding with the private keys above.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Pa SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh SEE ALSO
- .Xr ssh 1 ,
- .Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
-diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
-index 929904b..f65e42f 100644
---- a/ssh.1
-+++ b/ssh.1
-@@ -1309,6 +1309,25 @@ For more information, see the
- .Cm PermitUserEnvironment
- option in
- .Xr sshd_config 5 .
-+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
-+.Pp
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh FILES
- .Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
- .It Pa ~/.rhosts
-diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
-index c2c237f..058d37a 100644
---- a/sshd.8
-+++ b/sshd.8
-@@ -951,6 +951,26 @@ concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
- started last).
- The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
- .El
-+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
-+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-+.Pp
-+.It Ev SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+The reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator is usually done from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+without any specific flags.
-+If the
-+.Cm SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG
-+environment variable is set to value other than
-+.Cm 0
-+the OpenSSL random generator is reseeded from
-+.Cm getrandom(1)
-+with GRND_RANDOM flag specified.
-+The number of bytes read is defined by the SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG value.
-+Minimum is 14 bytes.
-+This setting is not recommended on the computers without the hardware
-+random generator because insufficient entropy causes the connection to
-+be blocked until enough entropy is available.
-+.El
- .Sh IPV6
- IPv6 address can be used everywhere where IPv4 address. In all entries must be the IPv6 address enclosed in square brackets. Note: The square brackets are metacharacters for the shell and must be escaped in shell.
- .Sh SEE ALSO
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-ipv6-process.patch

@@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
-index 04881c83..03c7a5c7 100644
---- a/sftp.c
-+++ b/sftp.c
-@@ -2527,12 +2527,17 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 				port = tmp;
- 			break;
- 		default:
-+			/* Try with user, host and path. */
- 			if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
--			    &file1) == -1) {
--				/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
--				host = xstrdup(*argv);
--				host = cleanhostname(host);
--			}
-+			    &file1) == 0)
-+				break;
-+			/* Try with user and host. */
-+			if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
-+			    == 0)
-+				break;
-+			/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
-+			host = xstrdup(*argv);
-+			host = cleanhostname(host);
- 			break;
- 		}
- 		file2 = *(argv + 1);

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keygen-sha2.patch

@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-From 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 00:27:04 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default
- to
-
-a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
-the user; ok markus@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
----
- ssh-keygen.c | 14 +++++++++-----
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index 564c3c481..f2192edb9 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -1788,10 +1788,14 @@ do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
- 	}
- 	free(tmp);
- 
--	if (key_type_name != NULL &&
--	    sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type)  {
--		fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
--		    sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
-+	if (key_type_name != NULL) {
-+		if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
-+			fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
-+			    sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
-+		}
-+	} else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
-+		/* Default to a good signature algorithm */
-+		key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
- 	}
- 
- 	for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
-
-From 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 20 May 2019 00:20:35 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default
- to
-
-using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
-will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
-overridden.
-
-Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
-signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
-
-ok deraadt@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
----
- ssh-keygen.1 | 13 +++++++++++--
- sshkey.c     |  9 ++++++++-
- 2 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
-index f29774249..673bf6e2f 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
- .\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- .\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- .\"
--.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2019 $
-+.Dd $Mdocdate: May 20 2019 $
- .Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
- .Os
- .Sh NAME
-@@ -577,6 +577,15 @@ The possible values are
- .Dq ed25519 ,
- or
- .Dq rsa .
-+.Pp
-+This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
-+signing certificates using a RSA CA key.
-+The available RSA signature variants are
-+.Dq ssh-rsa
-+(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
-+.Dq rsa-sha2-256
-+.Dq rsa-sha2-512
-+(the default).
- .It Fl U
- When used in combination with
- .Fl s ,
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 9849cb237..379a579cf 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -2528,6 +2528,13 @@ sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
- 	    strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
-+	 * using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
-+	 */
-+	if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
-+		alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
-+
- 	if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
- 
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-keyscan-rsa-sha2.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2019 04:08:39 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX
- proposal;
-
-allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
-ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
----
- ssh-keyscan.c | 9 +++++++--
- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
-index d95ba1b37..d383b57b9 100644
---- a/ssh-keyscan.c
-+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
-@@ -233,7 +233,12 @@ keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
- 		break;
- 	case KT_RSA:
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
--		    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-rsa";
-+		    "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-+		    "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-+		    "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
-+		    "rsa-sha2-512,"
-+		    "rsa-sha2-256,"
-+		    "ssh-rsa";
- 		break;
- 	case KT_ED25519:
- 		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-kdf.patch

@@ -96,7 +96,7 @@ index b6f041f4..1fbce2bb 100644
 +		goto out;
 +	}
 +	r = EVP_KDF_ctrl(ctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID,
-+	    kex->session_id, kex->session_id_len);
++	    sshbuf_ptr(kex->session_id), sshbuf_len(kex->session_id));
 +	if (r != 1) {
 +		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
 +		goto out;

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-openssl-pem.patch

@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
-From eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "djm@openbsd.org" <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon, 15 Jul 2019 13:16:29 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
-
-private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
-private keys to disk.
-
-The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
-superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
-is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
-round of MD5 as a KDF).
-
-adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
----
- authfile.c   |  6 ++--
- ssh-keygen.1 |  9 +++---
- ssh-keygen.c | 25 +++++++++--------
- sshkey.c     | 78 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
- sshkey.h     | 11 ++++++--
- 5 files changed, 87 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
-index 2166c1689..851c1a8a1 100644
---- a/authfile.c
-+++ b/authfile.c
-@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
- int
- sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
-     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
--    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
-+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
- {
- 	struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
- 	int r;
-@@ -82,7 +82,7 @@ sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
- 	if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- 	if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
--	    force_new_format, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds)) != 0)
-+	    format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
-index f42127c60..8184a1797 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.1
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
-@@ -419,11 +419,12 @@ The supported key formats are:
- .Dq RFC4716
- (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
- .Dq PKCS8
--(PEM PKCS8 public key)
-+(PKCS8 public or private key)
- or
- .Dq PEM
- (PEM public key).
--The default conversion format is
-+By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
-+format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
- .Dq RFC4716 .
- Setting a format of
- .Dq PEM
-diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
-index b019a02ff..5dcad1f61 100644
---- a/ssh-keygen.c
-+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
-@@ -147,11 +147,11 @@ static char *key_type_name = NULL;
- /* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
- static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
- 
--/* Use new OpenSSH private key format when writing SSH2 keys instead of PEM */
--static int use_new_format = 1;
-+/* Format for writing private keys */
-+static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
- 
- /* Cipher for new-format private keys */
--static char *new_format_cipher = NULL;
-+static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
- 
- /*
-  * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
-@@ -1048,7 +1048,8 @@ do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
- 		snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
- 		    hostname);
- 		if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
--		    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+		    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
-+		    rounds)) != 0) {
- 			error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- 			    prv_tmp, ssh_err(r));
- 			goto failnext;
-@@ -1391,7 +1392,7 @@ do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
- 
- 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
--	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
- 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
-@@ -1480,7 +1481,7 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
--	    !use_new_format) {
-+	    private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
- 		error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
- 		    "the new format (-o).");
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
-@@ -1514,7 +1515,8 @@ do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
- 
- 	/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
--	    new_comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+	    new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
-+	    rounds)) != 0) {
- 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
-@@ -2525,11 +2527,12 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 			}
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
- 				convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
-+				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
- 				convert_format = FMT_PEM;
--				use_new_format = 0;
-+				private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
- 				break;
- 			}
- 			fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
-@@ -2567,7 +2570,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 			add_cert_option(optarg);
- 			break;
- 		case 'Z':
--			new_format_cipher = optarg;
-+			openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
- 			break;
- 		case 'C':
- 			identity_comment = optarg;
-@@ -2912,7 +2915,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
- 	if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
--	    comment, use_new_format, new_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
-+	    comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
- 		error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
- 		    identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- 		explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
-diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
-index 6b5ff0485..a0cea9257 100644
---- a/sshkey.c
-+++ b/sshkey.c
-@@ -3975,10 +3975,10 @@ sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
- 
- 
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
--/* convert SSH v2 key in OpenSSL PEM format */
-+/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
- static int
--sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
--    const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
-+sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
-+    int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
- {
- 	int success, r;
- 	int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
-@@ -3988,26 +3988,46 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- 	const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
- 	char *bptr;
- 	BIO *bio = NULL;
-+	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
- 
- 	if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
- 		return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
--	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL)
--		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+ 	if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+ 	}
-+
-+	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
-+		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
-+		goto out;
-+ 	}
- 
- 	switch (key->type) {
- 	case KEY_DSA:
--		success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
--		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
-+			success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
-+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		} else {
-+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
-+		}
- 		break;
- #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
- 	case KEY_ECDSA:
--		success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
--		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
-+			success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
-+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		} else {
-+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
-+		}
- 		break;
- #endif
- 	case KEY_RSA:
--		success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
--		    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
-+			success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
-+			    cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
-+		} else {
-+			success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
-+		}
- 		break;
- 	default:
- 		success = 0;
-@@ -4023,6 +4040,13 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
- 	}
-+	if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
-+		if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
-+		    passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
-+			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
-+			goto out;
-+		}
-+	}
- 	if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
- 		r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 		goto out;
-@@ -4035,6 +4059,7 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- 		goto out;
- 	r = 0;
-  out:
-+	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
- 	BIO_free(bio);
- 	return r;
- }
-@@ -4046,29 +4071,38 @@ sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
- int
- sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
-     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
--    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds)
-+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
- {
- 	switch (key->type) {
- #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- 	case KEY_DSA:
- 	case KEY_ECDSA:
- 	case KEY_RSA:
--		if (force_new_format) {
--			return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
--			    comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
--		}
--		return sshkey_private_pem_to_blob(key, blob,
--		    passphrase, comment);
-+		break; /* see below */
- #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- 	case KEY_ED25519:
- #ifdef WITH_XMSS
- 	case KEY_XMSS:
- #endif /* WITH_XMSS */
- 		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
--		    comment, new_format_cipher, new_format_rounds);
-+		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
- 	default:
- 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
- 	}
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-+	switch (format) {
-+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
-+		return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
-+		    comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
-+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
-+	case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
-+		return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
-+		    format, passphrase, comment);
-+	default:
-+		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
-+	}
-+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
- }
- 
- 
-diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
-index 41d159a1b..d30a69cc9 100644
---- a/sshkey.h
-+++ b/sshkey.h
-@@ -88,6 +88,13 @@ enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
- 	SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254,
- };
- 
-+/* Private key disk formats */
-+enum sshkey_private_format {
-+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
-+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
-+	SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
-+};
-+
- /* key is stored in external hardware */
- #define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT		0x0001
- 
-@@ -221,7 +228,7 @@ int	sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf,  struct sshkey **keyp);
- /* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
- int	sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
-     const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
--    int force_new_format, const char *new_format_cipher, int new_format_rounds);
-+    int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
- int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
-     const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
- int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-proxyjump-loops.patch

@@ -1,33 +0,0 @@
-From de1f3564cd85915b3002859873a37cb8d31ac9ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: "dtucker@openbsd.org" <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue, 18 Feb 2020 08:49:49 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: Detect and prevent simple configuration loops when
- using
-
-ProxyJump. bz#3057, ok djm@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 077d21c564c886c98309d871ed6f8ef267b9f037
----
- ssh.c | 10 +++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 15aee569e..a983a108b 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1208,6 +1208,14 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
- 		char port_s[8];
- 		const char *sshbin = argv0;
-+		int port = options.port, jumpport = options.jump_port;
-+
-+		if (port <= 0)
-+			port = default_ssh_port();
-+		if (jumpport <= 0)
-+			jumpport = default_ssh_port();
-+		if (strcmp(options.jump_host, host) == 0 && port == jumpport)
-+			fatal("jumphost loop via %s", options.jump_host);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-rdomain.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-commit 5481d0b4036b33b92c372ee36258ed11bff57d5d
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date:   Thu Feb 27 10:07:33 2020 +0100
-
-    Mark the RDomain configuration option unsupported on non-openbsd builds
-
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index db80e943..153d2525 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -698,7 +698,11 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
- 	{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
- 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#else
-+	{ "rdomain", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
-+#endif
- 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
- };
-@@ -2841,7 +2845,9 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
- 	    o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- 	dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
- 	    o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
-+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
- 	dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
-+#endif
- 
- 	/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
- 	dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
-diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
-index 5dca8981..766e9b90 100644
---- a/sshd_config.5
-+++ b/sshd_config.5
-@@ -1542,6 +1542,7 @@ will be bound to this
- If the routing domain is set to
- .Cm \&%D ,
- then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
-+This feature is available on OpenBSD only.
- .It Cm SetEnv
- Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
- by

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-restore-nonblock.patch

@@ -1,311 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.c	2021-06-21 10:48:47.754579151 +0200
-@@ -333,7 +333,27 @@ channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Ch
- #endif
- 
- 	/* enable nonblocking mode */
--	if (nonblock) {
-+	c->restore_block = 0;
-+	if (nonblock == CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Special handling for stdio file descriptors: do not set
-+		 * non-blocking mode if they are TTYs. Otherwise prepare to
-+		 * restore their blocking state on exit to avoid interfering
-+		 * with other programs that follow.
-+		 */
-+		if (rfd != -1 && !isatty(rfd) && fcntl(rfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD;
-+			set_nonblock(rfd);
-+		}
-+		if (wfd != -1 && !isatty(wfd) && fcntl(wfd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD;
-+			set_nonblock(wfd);
-+		}
-+		if (efd != -1 && !isatty(efd) && fcntl(efd, F_GETFL) == 0) {
-+			c->restore_block |= CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD;
-+			set_nonblock(efd);
-+		}
-+	} else if (nonblock) {
- 		if (rfd != -1)
- 			set_nonblock(rfd);
- 		if (wfd != -1)
-@@ -422,17 +442,23 @@ channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *
- }
- 
- int
--channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
-+channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int *fdp)
- {
- 	struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
--	int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
-+	int ret, fd = *fdp;
- 
--	if (fd != -1) {
--		ret = close(fd);
--		*fdp = -1;
--		if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
--			channel_find_maxfd(sc);
--	}
-+	if (fd == -1)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if ((*fdp == c->rfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD) != 0) ||
-+	   (*fdp == c->wfd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD) != 0) ||
-+	   (*fdp == c->efd && (c->restore_block & CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD) != 0))
-+		(void)fcntl(*fdp, F_SETFL, 0);	/* restore blocking */
-+
-+	ret = close(fd);
-+	*fdp = -1;
-+	if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
-+		channel_find_maxfd(sc);
- 	return ret;
- }
- 
-@@ -442,13 +468,13 @@ channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Chann
- {
- 	int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
- 
--	channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+	channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 	if (rfd != sock)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd);
- 	if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd);
- 	if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- }
- 
- static void
-@@ -681,7 +707,7 @@ channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
- 			case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
--				channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+				channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 				channel_free(ssh, c);
- 				break;
- 			}
-@@ -1487,7 +1513,8 @@ channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct
- 
- Channel *
- channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
--    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
-+    const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect,
-+    int in, int out, int nonblock)
- {
- 	Channel *c;
- 
-@@ -1495,7 +1522,7 @@ channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ss
- 
- 	c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
- 	    -1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
--	    0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    0, "stdio-forward", nonblock);
- 
- 	c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
- 	c->host_port = port_to_connect;
-@@ -1650,7 +1677,7 @@ channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ss
- 	if (c->single_connection) {
- 		oerrno = errno;
- 		debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->sock);
- 		chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
- 		errno = oerrno;
- 	}
-@@ -2087,7 +2114,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh
- 		return 1;
- 	if (len <= 0) {
- 		debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- 	} else {
- 		if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) {
- 			fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
-@@ -2119,7 +2146,7 @@ channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh,
- 	if (len <= 0) {
- 		debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
- 		    c->self, c->efd);
--		channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
-+		channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd);
- 	} else {
- 		if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
- 			debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/channels.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/channels.h.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.380559612 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/channels.h	2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
-@@ -63,6 +63,16 @@
- 
- #define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC	-1
- 
-+/* nonblocking flags for channel_new */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_LEAVE	0 /* don't modify non-blocking state */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_SET	1 /* set non-blocking state */
-+#define CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO	2 /* set non-blocking and restore on close */
-+
-+/* c->restore_block mask flags */
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_RFD	0x01
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_WFD	0x02
-+#define CHANNEL_RESTORE_EFD	0x04
-+
- /* TCP forwarding */
- #define FORWARD_DENY		0
- #define FORWARD_REMOTE		(1)
-@@ -131,6 +141,7 @@ struct Channel {
- 				 * to a matching pre-select handler.
- 				 * this way post-select handlers are not
- 				 * accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
-+	int	restore_block;	/* fd mask to restore blocking status */
- 	struct sshbuf *input;	/* data read from socket, to be sent over
- 				 * encrypted connection */
- 	struct sshbuf *output;	/* data received over encrypted connection for
-@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ void	 channel_register_filter(struct ssh
- void	 channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
- 	    channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
- void	 channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
--int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
-+int	 channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, Channel *, int *);
- void	 channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
- 
- /* mux proxy support */
-@@ -305,7 +316,7 @@ Channel	*channel_connect_to_port(struct
- 	    char *, char *, int *, const char **);
- Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
- Channel	*channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
--	    u_short, int, int);
-+	    u_short, int, int, int);
- Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
- 	    u_short, char *, char *);
- Channel	*channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.290558923 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/clientloop.c	2021-06-21 10:44:26.387559665 +0200
-@@ -1436,14 +1436,6 @@ client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pt
- 	if (have_pty)
- 		leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- 
--	/* restore blocking io */
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
--	if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
--		unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
--
- 	/*
- 	 * If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
- 	 * exit status to be returned.  In that case, clear error code if the
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/mux.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/mux.c.restore-nonblock	2019-04-18 00:52:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/mux.c	2021-06-21 10:50:51.007537336 +0200
-@@ -454,14 +454,6 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
- 	if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
- 		error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
--
- 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (cctx->want_tty) {
-@@ -471,7 +463,7 @@ mux_master_process_new_session(struct ss
- 
- 	nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
- 	    new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
--	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
- 	c->remote_id = nc->self; 	/* link control -> session channel */
-@@ -1033,13 +1025,8 @@ mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh
- 		}
- 	}
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
--	if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
--		set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
--
--	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
-+	nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1],
-+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 	free(chost);
- 
- 	nc->ctl_chan = c->self;		/* link session -> control channel */
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.388559673 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/nchan.c	2021-06-21 10:52:42.685405537 +0200
-@@ -387,7 +387,7 @@ chan_shutdown_write(struct ssh *ssh, Cha
- 			    strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd) < 0) {
-+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->wfd) < 0) {
- 			logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- 			    c->self, __func__, c->wfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
-@@ -417,7 +417,7 @@ chan_shutdown_read(struct ssh *ssh, Chan
-  			    strerror(errno));
- 		}
- 	} else {
--		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd) < 0) {
-+		if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->rfd) < 0) {
- 			logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- 			    "fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- 			    c->self, __func__, c->rfd, c->istate, c->ostate,
-@@ -437,7 +437,7 @@ chan_shutdown_extended_read(struct ssh *
- 	debug2("channel %d: %s (i%d o%d sock %d wfd %d efd %d [%s])",
- 	    c->self, __func__, c->istate, c->ostate, c->sock, c->rfd, c->efd,
- 	    channel_format_extended_usage(c));
--	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd) < 0) {
-+	if (channel_close_fd(ssh, c, &c->efd) < 0) {
- 		logit("channel %d: %s: close() failed for "
- 		    "extended fd %d [i%d o%d]: %.100s",
- 		    c->self, __func__, c->efd, c->istate, c->ostate,
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c.restore-nonblock	2021-06-21 10:44:26.389559681 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/ssh.c	2021-06-21 10:54:47.651377045 +0200
-@@ -1709,7 +1709,8 @@ ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ss
- 	    (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) < 0)
- 		fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
- 	if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
--	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
-+	    options.stdio_forward_port, in, out,
-+	    CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
- 	channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
- 	channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
-@@ -1862,14 +1863,6 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (in < 0 || out < 0 || err < 0)
- 		fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
- 
--	/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
--	if (!isatty(in))
--		set_nonblock(in);
--	if (!isatty(out))
--		set_nonblock(out);
--	if (!isatty(err))
--		set_nonblock(err);
--
- 	window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
- 	packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
- 	if (tty_flag) {
-@@ -1879,7 +1872,7 @@ ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	c = channel_new(ssh,
- 	    "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
- 	    window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
--	    "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
-+	    "client-session", CHANNEL_NONBLOCK_STDIO);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);
- 

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-scp-tests.patch

@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-index 59f1ff63..dd48a482 100644
---- a/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-+++ b/regress/scp-ssh-wrapper.sh
-@@ -51,6 +51,18 @@ badserver_4)
- 	echo "C755 2 file"
- 	echo "X"
- 	;;
-+badserver_5)
-+	echo "D0555 0 "
-+	echo "X"
-+	;;
-+badserver_6)
-+	echo "D0555 0 ."
-+	echo "X"
-+	;;
-+badserver_7)
-+	echo "C0755 2 extrafile"
-+	echo "X"
-+	;;
- *)
- 	set -- $arg
- 	shift
-diff --git a/regress/scp.sh b/regress/scp.sh
-index 57cc7706..104c89e1 100644
---- a/regress/scp.sh
-+++ b/regress/scp.sh
-@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ export SCP # used in scp-ssh-wrapper.scp
- scpclean() {
- 	rm -rf ${COPY} ${COPY2} ${DIR} ${DIR2}
- 	mkdir ${DIR} ${DIR2}
-+	chmod 755 ${DIR} ${DIR2}
- }
- 
- verbose "$tid: simple copy local file to local file"
-@@ -101,7 +102,7 @@ if [ ! -z "$SUDO" ]; then
- 	$SUDO rm ${DIR2}/copy
- fi
- 
--for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
-+for i in 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7; do
- 	verbose "$tid: disallow bad server #$i"
- 	SCPTESTMODE=badserver_$i
- 	export DIR SCPTESTMODE
-@@ -113,6 +114,15 @@ for i in 0 1 2 3 4; do
- 	scpclean
- 	$SCP -r $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
- 	[ -d ${DIR}/dotpathdir ] && fail "allows dir creation outside of subdir"
-+
-+	scpclean
-+	$SCP -pr $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-+	[ ! -w ${DIR2} ] && fail "allows target root attribute change"
-+
-+	scpclean
-+	$SCP $scpopts somehost:${DATA} ${DIR2} >/dev/null 2>/dev/null
-+	[ -e ${DIR2}/extrafile ] && fail "allows extranous object creation"
-+	rm -f ${DIR2}/extrafile
- done
- 
- verbose "$tid: detect non-directory target"
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-realpath.patch

@@ -1,273 +0,0 @@
-diff --color -ruN a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
---- a/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:31:10.168186838 +0200
-+++ b/Makefile.in	2022-06-23 11:32:19.146513347 +0200
-@@ -125,7 +125,7 @@
- 	monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
- 	auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o kexgsss.o \
- 	loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
--	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
-+	sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
- 	sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
- 	sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
- 	sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
-@@ -217,8 +217,8 @@
- ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
- 
--sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
--	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
-+	$(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
- 
- sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
- 	$(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
-diff --color -ruN a/sftp-realpath.c b/sftp-realpath.c
---- a/sftp-realpath.c	1970-01-01 01:00:00.000000000 +0100
-+++ b/sftp-realpath.c	2022-06-23 11:35:33.193244873 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,225 @@
-+/*	$OpenBSD: sftp-realpath.c,v 1.2 2021/09/02 21:03:54 deraadt Exp $ */
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2003 Constantin S. Svintsoff <kostik@iclub.nsu.ru>
-+ *
-+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+ * are met:
-+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+ *    documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+ * 3. The names of the authors may not be used to endorse or promote
-+ *    products derived from this software without specific prior written
-+ *    permission.
-+ *
-+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
-+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
-+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
-+ * ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
-+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
-+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
-+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
-+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
-+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
-+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
-+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
-+ */
-+
-+#include "includes.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/stat.h>
-+
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include <stddef.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+
-+#ifndef SYMLOOP_MAX
-+# define SYMLOOP_MAX 32
-+#endif
-+
-+/* XXX rewrite sftp-server to use POSIX realpath and remove this hack */
-+
-+char *sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved);
-+
-+/*
-+ * char *realpath(const char *path, char resolved[PATH_MAX]);
-+ *
-+ * Find the real name of path, by removing all ".", ".." and symlink
-+ * components.  Returns (resolved) on success, or (NULL) on failure,
-+ * in which case the path which caused trouble is left in (resolved).
-+ */
-+char *
-+sftp_realpath(const char *path, char *resolved)
-+{
-+	struct stat sb;
-+	char *p, *q, *s;
-+	size_t left_len, resolved_len;
-+	unsigned symlinks;
-+	int serrno, slen, mem_allocated;
-+	char left[PATH_MAX], next_token[PATH_MAX], symlink[PATH_MAX];
-+
-+	if (path[0] == '\0') {
-+		errno = ENOENT;
-+		return (NULL);
-+	}
-+
-+	serrno = errno;
-+
-+	if (resolved == NULL) {
-+		resolved = malloc(PATH_MAX);
-+		if (resolved == NULL)
-+			return (NULL);
-+		mem_allocated = 1;
-+	} else
-+		mem_allocated = 0;
-+
-+	symlinks = 0;
-+	if (path[0] == '/') {
-+		resolved[0] = '/';
-+		resolved[1] = '\0';
-+		if (path[1] == '\0')
-+			return (resolved);
-+		resolved_len = 1;
-+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path + 1, sizeof(left));
-+	} else {
-+		if (getcwd(resolved, PATH_MAX) == NULL) {
-+			if (mem_allocated)
-+				free(resolved);
-+			else
-+				strlcpy(resolved, ".", PATH_MAX);
-+			return (NULL);
-+		}
-+		resolved_len = strlen(resolved);
-+		left_len = strlcpy(left, path, sizeof(left));
-+	}
-+	if (left_len >= sizeof(left) || resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
-+		errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+		goto err;
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Iterate over path components in `left'.
-+	 */
-+	while (left_len != 0) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Extract the next path component and adjust `left'
-+		 * and its length.
-+		 */
-+		p = strchr(left, '/');
-+		s = p ? p : left + left_len;
-+		if (s - left >= (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(next_token)) {
-+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+			goto err;
-+		}
-+		memcpy(next_token, left, s - left);
-+		next_token[s - left] = '\0';
-+		left_len -= s - left;
-+		if (p != NULL)
-+			memmove(left, s + 1, left_len + 1);
-+		if (resolved[resolved_len - 1] != '/') {
-+			if (resolved_len + 1 >= PATH_MAX) {
-+				errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+				goto err;
-+			}
-+			resolved[resolved_len++] = '/';
-+			resolved[resolved_len] = '\0';
-+		}
-+		if (next_token[0] == '\0')
-+			continue;
-+		else if (strcmp(next_token, ".") == 0)
-+			continue;
-+		else if (strcmp(next_token, "..") == 0) {
-+			/*
-+			 * Strip the last path component except when we have
-+			 * single "/"
-+			 */
-+			if (resolved_len > 1) {
-+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
-+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
-+				*q = '\0';
-+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
-+			}
-+			continue;
-+		}
-+
-+		/*
-+		 * Append the next path component and lstat() it. If
-+		 * lstat() fails we still can return successfully if
-+		 * there are no more path components left.
-+		 */
-+		resolved_len = strlcat(resolved, next_token, PATH_MAX);
-+		if (resolved_len >= PATH_MAX) {
-+			errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+			goto err;
-+		}
-+		if (lstat(resolved, &sb) != 0) {
-+			if (errno == ENOENT && p == NULL) {
-+				errno = serrno;
-+				return (resolved);
-+			}
-+			goto err;
-+		}
-+		if (S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode)) {
-+			if (symlinks++ > SYMLOOP_MAX) {
-+				errno = ELOOP;
-+				goto err;
-+			}
-+			slen = readlink(resolved, symlink, sizeof(symlink) - 1);
-+			if (slen < 0)
-+				goto err;
-+			symlink[slen] = '\0';
-+			if (symlink[0] == '/') {
-+				resolved[1] = 0;
-+				resolved_len = 1;
-+			} else if (resolved_len > 1) {
-+				/* Strip the last path component. */
-+				resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
-+				q = strrchr(resolved, '/') + 1;
-+				*q = '\0';
-+				resolved_len = q - resolved;
-+			}
-+
-+			/*
-+			 * If there are any path components left, then
-+			 * append them to symlink. The result is placed
-+			 * in `left'.
-+			 */
-+			if (p != NULL) {
-+				if (symlink[slen - 1] != '/') {
-+					if (slen + 1 >=
-+					    (ptrdiff_t)sizeof(symlink)) {
-+						errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+						goto err;
-+					}
-+					symlink[slen] = '/';
-+					symlink[slen + 1] = 0;
-+				}
-+				left_len = strlcat(symlink, left, sizeof(symlink));
-+				if (left_len >= sizeof(symlink)) {
-+					errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
-+					goto err;
-+				}
-+			}
-+			left_len = strlcpy(left, symlink, sizeof(left));
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Remove trailing slash except when the resolved pathname
-+	 * is a single "/".
-+	 */
-+	if (resolved_len > 1 && resolved[resolved_len - 1] == '/')
-+		resolved[resolved_len - 1] = '\0';
-+	return (resolved);
-+
-+err:
-+	if (mem_allocated)
-+		free(resolved);
-+	return (NULL);
-+}
-diff --color -ruN a/sftp-server.c b/sftp-server.c
---- a/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:31:10.147186434 +0200
-+++ b/sftp-server.c	2022-06-23 11:32:19.147513366 +0200
-@@ -51,6 +51,8 @@
- #include "sftp.h"
- #include "sftp-common.h"
- 
-+char *sftp_realpath(const char *, char *); /* sftp-realpath.c */
-+
- /* Our verbosity */
- static LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
- 
-@@ -1185,7 +1187,7 @@
- 	}
- 	debug3("request %u: realpath", id);
- 	verbose("realpath \"%s\"", path);
--	if (realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
-+	if (sftp_realpath(path, resolvedname) == NULL) {
- 		send_status(id, errno_to_portable(errno));
- 	} else {
- 		Stat s;

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sftp-timespeccmp.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c.original	2020-12-22 17:05:02.105698989 +0900
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sftp.c	2020-12-22 17:05:42.922035780 +0900
-@@ -937,7 +937,11 @@ sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *b
- 		return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
- 	else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
- #if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
--		return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <));
-+		if (timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <)){
-+			return rmul;
-+		} else {
-+			return -rmul;
-+		}
- #elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
- 		return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
- #else

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_config.patch

@@ -1,97 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
-index ffac5d2c..340045b2 100644
---- a/servconf.c
-+++ b/servconf.c
-@@ -1042,7 +1042,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 			return -1;
- 		}
- 		if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1054,7 +1054,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
- 				    "line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1067,7 +1067,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				result = 0;
- 			}
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1079,7 +1079,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
- 				    "%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1098,7 +1098,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				return -1;
- 			}
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1124,7 +1124,7 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 				    arg);
- 				return -1;
- 			}
--			if (ci == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-@@ -1138,10 +1138,12 @@ match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
- 			else
- 				result = 0;
- 		} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
--			if (ci == NULL || ci->rdomain == NULL) {
-+			if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
- 				result = 0;
- 				continue;
- 			}
-+			if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
-+				match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
- 			if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
- 				result = 0;
- 			else
-diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
-index 54e0a8d8..5483da05 100644
---- a/servconf.h
-+++ b/servconf.h
-@@ -221,6 +221,8 @@ struct connection_info {
- 	const char *laddress;	/* local address */
- 	int lport;		/* local port */
- 	const char *rdomain;	/* routing domain if available */
-+	int test;		/* test mode, allow some attributes to be
-+				 * unspecified */
- };
- 
- 
-diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
-index cbd3bce9..1fcde502 100644
---- a/sshd.c
-+++ b/sshd.c
-@@ -1843,6 +1843,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		 */
- 		if (connection_info == NULL)
- 			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
-+		connection_info->test = 1;
- 		parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
- 		dump_config(&options);
- 	}

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-sshd_include.patch

@@ -1,805 +0,0 @@
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/auth.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/auth.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.740331098 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/auth.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@
- 
- /* import */
- extern ServerOptions options;
-+extern struct include_list includes;
- extern int use_privsep;
- extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
-@@ -573,7 +574,7 @@ getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
- 
- 	ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
- 	ci->user = user;
--	parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
-+	parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
- 	log_change_level(options.log_level);
- 	process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:21:43.541848103 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/readconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.302046768 +0200
-@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **
- static void
- rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
- {
--	int i, j;
-+	int i, j, onum_send_env = options->num_send_env;
- 	char *cp;
- 
- 	/* Remove an environment variable */
-@@ -734,6 +734,11 @@ rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg
- 		options->num_send_env--;
- 		/* NB. don't increment i */
- 	}
-+	if (onum_send_env != options->num_send_env) {
-+		options->send_env = xrecallocarray(options->send_env,
-+		    onum_send_env, options->num_send_env,
-+		    sizeof(*options->send_env));
-+	}
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile
---- openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.742331115 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/Makefile	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
-@@ -82,6 +82,7 @@ LTESTS= 	connect \
- 		principals-command \
- 		cert-file \
- 		cfginclude \
-+		servcfginclude \
- 		allow-deny-users \
- 		authinfo
- 
-@@ -118,7 +119,7 @@ CLEANFILES=	*.core actual agent-key.* au
- 		sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
- 		ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
- 		ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
--		sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
-+		sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
- 		sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
- 		t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
- 		t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh
---- openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.744331132 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/servcfginclude.sh	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
-@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
-+#	Placed in the Public Domain.
-+
-+tid="server config include"
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aa
-+
-+Match host b
-+	Banner /bb
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+Match host c
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+	Banner /cc
-+
-+Match host m
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+Match Host d
-+	Banner /dd
-+
-+Match Host e
-+	Banner /ee
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+Match Host f
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+	Banner /ff
-+
-+Match Host n
-+	Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+_EOF
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
-+Match host xxxxxx
-+_EOF
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aaa
-+
-+Match host b
-+	Banner /bbb
-+
-+Match host c
-+	Banner /ccc
-+
-+Match Host d
-+	Banner /ddd
-+
-+Match Host e
-+	Banner /eee
-+
-+Match Host f
-+	Banner /fff
-+_EOF
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aaaa
-+
-+Match host b
-+	Banner /bbbb
-+
-+Match host c
-+	Banner /cccc
-+
-+Match Host d
-+	Banner /dddd
-+
-+Match Host e
-+	Banner /eeee
-+
-+Match Host f
-+	Banner /ffff
-+
-+Match all
-+	Banner /xxxx
-+_EOF
-+
-+trial() {
-+	_host="$1"
-+	_exp="$2"
-+	_desc="$3"
-+	test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
-+	trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
-+	${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
-+	    -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
-+		fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
-+	_got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
-+	if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
-+		fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
-+	fi
-+}
-+
-+trial a /aa
-+trial b /bb
-+trial c /ccc
-+trial d /dd
-+trial e /ee
-+trial f /fff
-+trial m /xxxx
-+trial n /xxxx
-+trial x none
-+
-+# Prepare an included config with an error.
-+
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
-+Banner xxxx
-+	Junk
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
-+    -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
-+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
-+
-+trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
-+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
-+	fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
-+
-+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+
-+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
-+Banner /aa
-+_EOF
-+
-+trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
-+
-+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
-+Match host x
-+_EOF
-+
-+trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
-+
-+# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
-+Include
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x -T \
-+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
-+	fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
-+
-+# Ensure the Include before any Match block works as expected (bug #3122)
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+Banner /xx
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aaaa
-+_EOF
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
-+Match host a
-+	Banner /aa
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "Include before match blocks"
-+trial a /aa "included file before match blocks is properly evaluated"
-+
-+# Port in included file is correctly interpretted (bug #3169)
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
-+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2
-+Port 7722
-+_EOF
-+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
-+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
-+_EOF
-+
-+trace "Port after included files"
-+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
-+    -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out || \
-+	fail "failed to parse Port after included files"
-+_port=`grep -i '^port ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
-+if test "x7722" != "x$_port" ; then
-+	fail "The Port in included file was intertepretted wrongly. Expected 7722, got $_port"
-+fi
-+
-+# cleanup
-+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh
---- openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.746331150 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2021-10-20 15:19:41.324781344 +0200
-@@ -220,6 +220,7 @@ echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE}
- 
- chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
- REAL_SSH="$SSH"
-+REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
- SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
- 
- # Some test data.  We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.748331167 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.c	2021-10-20 15:22:06.303046777 +0200
-@@ -40,6 +40,11 @@
- #ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
- #include <util.h>
- #endif
-+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
-+# include <glob.h>
-+#else
-+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
-+#endif
- 
- #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
- #include "xmalloc.h"
-@@ -70,6 +75,9 @@ static void add_listen_addr(ServerOption
-     const char *, int);
- static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
-     const char *, int);
-+static void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options,
-+    const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
- 
- /* Use of privilege separation or not */
- extern int use_privsep;
-@@ -528,7 +536,7 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
- 	sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
- 	sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
--	sHostCertificate,
-+	sHostCertificate, sInclude,
- 	sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
- 	sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
- 	sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
-@@ -540,9 +548,11 @@ typedef enum {
- 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
- } ServerOpCodes;
- 
--#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL	0x01	/* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
--#define SSHCFG_MATCH	0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
--#define SSHCFG_ALL	(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
-+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL		0x01	/* allowed in main section of config */
-+#define SSHCFG_MATCH		0x02	/* allowed inside a Match section */
-+#define SSHCFG_ALL		(SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
-+#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH	0x04  /* Match never matches; internal only */
-+#define SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY	0x08  /* Match only in conditional blocks; internal only */
- 
- /* Textual representation of the tokens. */
- static struct {
-@@ -687,6 +697,7 @@ static struct {
- 	{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
-+	{ "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
- 	{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
-@@ -1259,13 +1270,14 @@ static const struct multistate multistat
- 	{ NULL, -1 }
- };
- 
--int
--process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-+static int
-+process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-     const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
--    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int *inc_flags, int depth,
-+    struct include_list *includes)
- {
- 	char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
--	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
-+	int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
- 	SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
- 	LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
- 	ServerOpCodes opcode;
-@@ -1274,6 +1286,8 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 	long long val64;
- 	const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
- 	const char *errstr;
-+	struct include_item *item;
-+	glob_t gbuf;
- 
- 	/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
- 	if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
-@@ -1300,7 +1314,7 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 		cmdline = 1;
- 		activep = &cmdline;
- 	}
--	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
-+	if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
- 		debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
- 	if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
- 		if (connectinfo == NULL) {
-@@ -1980,15 +1994,112 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 			*intptr = value;
- 		break;
- 
-+	case sInclude:
-+		if (cmdline) {
-+			fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
-+			    "command-line option");
-+		}
-+		value = 0;
-+		while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') {
-+			value++;
-+			found = 0;
-+			if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
-+				xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg2);
-+			} else
-+				arg = xstrdup(arg2);
-+
-+			/*
-+			 * Don't let included files clobber the containing
-+			 * file's Match state.
-+			 */
-+			oactive = *activep;
-+
-+			/* consult cache of include files */
-+			TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
-+				if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
-+					continue;
-+				if (item->filename != NULL) {
-+					parse_server_config_depth(options,
-+					    item->filename, item->contents,
-+					    includes, connectinfo,
-+					    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
-+					        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
-+					            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
-+					    activep, depth + 1);
-+				}
-+				found = 1;
-+				*activep = oactive;
-+			}
-+			if (found != 0) {
-+				free(arg);
-+				continue;
-+			}
-+
-+			/* requested glob was not in cache */
-+			debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
-+			    filename, linenum, arg);
-+			if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
-+				if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
-+					fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" "
-+					    "glob failed", filename,
-+					    linenum, arg);
-+				}
-+				/*
-+				 * If no entry matched then record a
-+				 * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
-+				 */
-+				debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
-+				    filename, linenum, arg);
-+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
-+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
-+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
-+				    item, entry);
-+			}
-+			if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
-+				fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__);
-+			for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
-+				debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
-+				    filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
-+				item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
-+				item->selector = strdup(arg);
-+				item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
-+				if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
-+					fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
-+					    __func__);
-+				}
-+				load_server_config(item->filename,
-+				    item->contents);
-+				parse_server_config_depth(options,
-+				    item->filename, item->contents,
-+				    includes, connectinfo,
-+				    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY
-+				        ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : (oactive
-+				            ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH)),
-+				    activep, depth + 1);
-+				*activep = oactive;
-+				TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
-+			}
-+			globfree(&gbuf);
-+			free(arg);
-+		}
-+		if (value == 0) {
-+			fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument",
-+			    filename, linenum);
-+		}
-+		break;
-+
- 	case sMatch:
- 		if (cmdline)
- 			fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
- 			   "option");
--		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
-+		value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum,
-+		    (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? NULL : connectinfo));
- 		if (value < 0)
- 			fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
- 			    linenum);
--		*activep = value;
-+		*activep = (*inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
-+		/* The MATCH_ONLY is applicable only until the first match block */
-+		*inc_flags &= ~SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY;
- 		break;
- 
- 	case sKerberosUseKuserok:
-@@ -2275,6 +2386,18 @@ process_server_config_line(ServerOptions
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+int
-+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
-+    const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
-+{
-+	int inc_flags = 0;
-+
-+	return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
-+	    linenum, activep, connectinfo, &inc_flags, 0, includes);
-+}
-+
-+
- /* Reads the server configuration file. */
- 
- void
-@@ -2313,12 +2436,13 @@ load_server_config(const char *filename,
- 
- void
- parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
--   struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+   struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
- {
- 	ServerOptions mo;
- 
- 	initialize_server_options(&mo);
--	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo);
-+	parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
-+	    connectinfo);
- 	copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
- }
- 
-@@ -2464,28 +2588,44 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *d
- #undef M_CP_STROPT
- #undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
- 
--void
--parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
--    struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH	16
-+static void
-+parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
-+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
- {
--	int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
-+	int linenum, bad_options = 0;
- 	char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
- 
--	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
-+	if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
-+		fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
-+
-+	debug2("%s: config %s len %zu%s", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf),
-+	    (flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH ? " [checking syntax only]" : ""));
- 
- 	if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
--	active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
- 	linenum = 1;
- 	while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
--		if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
--		    linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
-+		if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
-+		    filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, &flags,
-+		    depth, includes) != 0)
- 			bad_options++;
- 	}
- 	free(obuf);
- 	if (bad_options > 0)
- 		fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
- 		    filename, bad_options);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
-+    struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
-+    struct connection_info *connectinfo)
-+{
-+	int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
-+	parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
-+	    connectinfo, (connectinfo ? SSHCFG_MATCH_ONLY : 0), &active, 0);
- 	process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
- }
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h
---- openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.750331185 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/servconf.h	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
-@@ -16,6 +16,8 @@
- #ifndef SERVCONF_H
- #define SERVCONF_H
- 
-+#include <sys/queue.h>
-+
- #define MAX_PORTS		256	/* Max # ports. */
- 
- #define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS		256	/* Max # subsystems. */
-@@ -234,6 +236,15 @@ struct connection_info {
- 				 * unspecified */
- };
- 
-+/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
-+struct include_item {
-+	char *selector;
-+	char *filename;
-+	struct sshbuf *contents;
-+	TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
-+};
-+TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
-+
- 
- /*
-  * These are string config options that must be copied between the
-@@ -273,12 +284,13 @@ struct connection_info *get_connection_i
- void	 initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
- void	 fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
- int	 process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
--	     int *, struct connection_info *);
-+	     int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
- void	 process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
- void	 load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
- void	 parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
--	     struct connection_info *);
--void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
-+	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
-+void	 parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
-+	     struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
- int	 parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
- int	 server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
- void	 copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.754331220 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd_config.5	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
-@@ -825,7 +825,20 @@ during
- and use only the system-wide known hosts file
- .Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
- The default is
--.Cm no .
-+.Dq no .
-+.It Cm Include
-+Include the specified configuration file(s).
-+Multiple path names may be specified and each pathname may contain
-+.Xr glob 7
-+wildcards.
-+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
-+.Pa /etc/ssh .
-+A
-+.Cm Include
-+directive may appear inside a
-+.Cm Match
-+block
-+to perform conditional inclusion.
- .It Cm IPQoS
- Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
- Accepted values are
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c.sshdinclude	2021-10-20 15:18:49.752331202 +0200
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshd.c	2021-10-20 15:19:41.325781353 +0200
-@@ -257,6 +257,9 @@ struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
- /* sshd_config buffer */
- struct sshbuf *cfg;
- 
-+/* Included files from the configuration file */
-+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
-+
- /* message to be displayed after login */
- struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
- 
-@@ -927,30 +930,45 @@ usage(void)
- static void
- send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
- {
--	struct sshbuf *m;
-+	struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
-+	struct include_item *item = NULL;
- 	int r;
- 
- 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
- 	    sshbuf_len(conf));
- 
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+
-+	/* pack includes into a string */
-+	TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Protocol from reexec master to child:
- 	 *	string	configuration
--	 *	string rngseed		(only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
-+	 *	string	included_files[] {
-+	 *		string	selector
-+	 *		string	filename
-+	 *		string	contents
-+	 *	}
-+	 *	string	rng_seed (if required)
- 	 */
--	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
--		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
--	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
--
- #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
- 	rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
- #endif
--
- 	if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
- 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
- 
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
-+	sshbuf_free(inc);
- 
- 	debug3("%s: done", __func__);
- }
-@@ -958,14 +976,15 @@ send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
- static void
- recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
- {
--	struct sshbuf *m;
-+	struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
- 	u_char *cp, ver;
- 	size_t len;
- 	int r;
-+	struct include_item *item;
- 
- 	debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
- 
--	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+	if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- 	if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
- 		fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
-@@ -973,14 +992,28 @@ recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- 	if (ver != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
--	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
--		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
--	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
-+	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
-+	    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
- 		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+
- #if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
- 	rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
- #endif
- 
-+	if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
-+		fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+
-+	while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
-+		item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
-+		if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
-+			fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
-+		if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
-+		    (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
-+			fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+		TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
-+	}
-+
- 	free(cp);
- 	sshbuf_free(m);
- 
-@@ -1661,7 +1694,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		case 'o':
- 			line = xstrdup(optarg);
- 			if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
--			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
-+			    "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
- 				exit(1);
- 			free(line);
- 			break;
-@@ -1692,7 +1725,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
- 	    options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
- 	    SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
--	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
-+	    log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
-@@ -1725,12 +1758,11 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 			 */
- 			(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
- 		}
--	}
--	else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
-+	} else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
- 		load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
- 
- 	parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
--	    cfg, NULL);
-+	    cfg, &includes, NULL);
- 
- 	/* 'UsePAM no' is not supported in RHEL */
- 	if (! options.use_pam)
-@@ -1946,7 +1978,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		if (connection_info == NULL)
- 			connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
- 		connection_info->test = 1;
--		parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
-+		parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
- 		dump_config(&options);
- 	}
- 
-diff -up openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
---- openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c.stringb	2022-12-21 12:18:43.274799163 +0100
-+++ openssh-8.0p1/sshbuf-getput-basic.c	2022-12-21 12:19:19.758081516 +0100
-@@ -371,6 +371,9 @@ sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, c
- int
- sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
- {
-+	if (v == NULL)
-+		return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
-+
- 	return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
- }
- 

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1-upstream-ignore-SIGPIPE.patch

@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
-From d33ff14309e33aa79fdf95e1bc4facafa80b90a9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Stepan Broz <sbroz@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 25 Jun 2024 17:38:22 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] upstream: ignore SIGPIPE earlier in main(), specifically
- before
-
-muxclient() which performs operations that could cause one; Reported by Noam
-Lewis via bz3454, ok dtucker@
-
-OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 63d8e13276869eebac6d7a05d5a96307f9026e47
----
- ssh.c | 3 ++-
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
-index 786e26d..e037c66 100644
---- a/ssh.c
-+++ b/ssh.c
-@@ -1115,6 +1115,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 		}
- 	}
- 
-+	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Initialize "log" output.  Since we are the client all output
- 	 * goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
-@@ -1545,7 +1547,6 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
- 	    options.num_system_hostfiles);
- 	tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
- 
--	signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
- 	signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- 
- 	/* Log into the remote system.  Never returns if the login fails. */
--- 
-2.45.2
-

SOURCES/openssh-8.0p1.tar.gz.asc

@@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
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-
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-Ii3VKhIdE8i4K3fC19uDkf7xL8UVvRVXjgM7i+GNndh1ou/vDYxmEAsW9IR/D3XC
-HM/jMdq+UewAiRG46aI5rsi/A8J8/A==
-=YtoH
------END PGP SIGNATURE-----

SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-visibility.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+index dca158de..afdcb1d2 100644
+--- a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
++++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ #endif
+ }
+ 
+-uint32_t
++uint32_t __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_api_version(void)
+ {
+ 	return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+     const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+     struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+@@ -467,7 +467,7 @@ sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen,
+     const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+     uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-int
++int __attribute__((visibility("default")))
+ sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+     struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+ {

SOURCES/openssh-8.2p1-x11-without-ipv6.patch

@@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
  				sock_set_v6only(sock);
  			if (x11_use_localhost)
  				set_reuseaddr(sock);
- 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
+ 			if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
- 				debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
+ 				debug2_f("bind port %d: %.100s", port,
- 				    port, strerror(errno));
+ 				    strerror(errno));
  				close(sock);
 +
 +				/* do not remove successfully opened

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-CVE-2023-25136.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+diff --git a/compat.c b/compat.c
+index 46dfe3a9c2e..478a9403eea 100644
+--- a/compat.c
++++ b/compat.c
+@@ -190,26 +190,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
+ char *
+ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
+ {
+-	char *cp = NULL;
++	char *cp = NULL, *cp2 = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+ 		return xstrdup(p);
+ 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+-		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
++		if ((cp = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
+-		cp = p;
+-		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
++		if ((cp2 = match_filter_denylist(cp ? cp : p,
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ 		free(cp);
++		cp = cp2;
+ 	}
+-	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
+-	if (*p == '\0')
++	if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
+ 		fatal("No supported key exchange algorithms found");
+-	return p;
++	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", cp);
++	return cp;
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-UTC-time-parse.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,323 @@
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
+index a8e87430..f2135803 100644
+--- a/misc.c
++++ b/misc.c
+@@ -2399,15 +2399,26 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
+ 	struct tm tm;
+ 	time_t tt;
+ 	char buf[32], *fmt;
++	const char *cp;
++	size_t l;
++	int is_utc = 0;
+ 
+ 	*tp = 0;
+ 
++	l = strlen(s);
++	if (l > 1 && strcasecmp(s + l - 1, "Z") == 0) {
++		is_utc = 1;
++		l--;
++	} else if (l > 3 && strcasecmp(s + l - 3, "UTC") == 0) {
++		is_utc = 1;
++		l -= 3;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
+ 	 * is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
+ 	 * any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
+ 	 */
+-	switch (strlen(s)) {
++	switch (l) {
+ 	case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */
+ 		fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
+ 		snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
+@@ -2427,10 +2438,15 @@ parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
+-	if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
++	if ((cp = strptime(buf, fmt, &tm)) == NULL || *cp != '\0')
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++	if (is_utc) {
++		if ((tt = timegm(&tm)) < 0)
++			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++	} else {
++		if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
++			return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
++	}
+ 	/* success */
+ 	*tp = (uint64_t)tt;
+ 	return 0;
+diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
+index ef6fd77d..4794dbd9 100644
+--- a/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
++++ b/regress/unittests/misc/test_convtime.c
+@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "misc.h"
++#include "ssherr.h"
+ 
+ void test_convtime(void);
+ 
+@@ -27,6 +28,7 @@ void
+ test_convtime(void)
+ {
+ 	char buf[1024];
++	uint64_t t;
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("misc_convtime");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("0"), 0);
+@@ -56,4 +58,64 @@ test_convtime(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(convtime("3550w5d3h14m8s"), -1);
+ #endif
+ 	TEST_DONE();
++
++	/* XXX timezones/DST make verification of this tricky */
++	/* XXX maybe setenv TZ and tzset() to make it unambiguous? */
++	TEST_START("misc_parse_absolute_time");
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345", &t), 0);
++
++	/* forced UTC TZ */
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101Z", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223Z", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345Z", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTC", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946684800);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001011223UTC", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729380);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101122345UTC", &t), 0);
++	ASSERT_U64_EQ(t, 946729425);
++
++	/* Bad month */
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20001301", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000001", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	/* Incomplete */
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("2000010", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	/* Bad day, hour, minute, second */
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000199", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001019900", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("200001010099", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101000099", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	/* Invalid TZ specifier */
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101ZZ", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101PDT", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101U", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++	ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_absolute_time("20000101UTCUTC", &t),
++	    SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT);
++
++	TEST_DONE();
+ }
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
+index 5f429813..6aeab1cb 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.1
++++ b/ssh-keygen.1
+@@ -511,8 +511,11 @@ Print the full public key to standard output after signature verification.
+ .It Cm verify-time Ns = Ns Ar timestamp
+ Specifies a time to use when validating signatures instead of the current
+ time.
+-The time may be specified as a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time
+-in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
++The time may be specified as a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or
++in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
++Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
++suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the
++UTC time zone.
+ .El
+ .Pp
+ The
+@@ -603,31 +606,67 @@ A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
+ certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
+ of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
+ .Pp
+-The start time may be specified as the string
++The start time may be specified as:
++.Bl -bullet -compact
++.It
++The string
+ .Dq always
+-to indicate the certificate has no specified start time,
+-a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format,
+-a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
+-an interval in the format described in the
++to indicate the certificate has no specified start time.
++.It
++A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
++YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
++.It
++A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
++.It
++A relative time before the current system time consisting of a minus sign
++followed by an interval in the format described in the
+ TIME FORMATS section of
+ .Xr sshd_config 5 .
++.It
++A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
++number beginning with
++.Dq 0x .
++.El
+ .Pp
+-The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time,
+-a relative time starting with a plus character or the string
++The end time may be specified similarly to the start time:
++.Bl -bullet -compact
++.It
++The string
+ .Dq forever
+-to indicate that the certificate has no expiry date.
++to indicate the certificate has no specified end time.
++.It
++A date or time in the system time zone formatted as YYYYMMDD or
++YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS].
++.It
++A date or time in the UTC time zone as YYYYMMDDZ or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z.
++.It
++A relative time after the current system time consisting of a plus sign
++followed by an interval in the format described in the
++TIME FORMATS section of
++.Xr sshd_config 5 .
++.It
++A raw seconds since epoch (Jan 1 1970 00:00:00 UTC) as a hexadecimal
++number beginning with
++.Dq 0x .
++.El
+ .Pp
+ For example:
+-.Dq +52w1d
+-(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
+-.Dq -4w:+4w
+-(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
+-.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
+-(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
+-.Dq -1d:20110101
+-(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011),
+-.Dq -1m:forever
+-(valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
++.Bl -tag -width Ds
++.It +52w1d
++Valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now.
++.It -4w:+4w
++Valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now.
++.It 20100101123000:20110101123000
++Valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011.
++.It 20100101123000Z:20110101123000Z
++Similar, but interpreted in the UTC time zone rather than the system time zone.
++.It -1d:20110101
++Valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011.
++.It 0x1:0x2000000000
++Valid from roughly early 1970 to May 2033.
++.It -1m:forever
++Valid from one minute ago and never expiring.
++.El
+ .It Fl v
+ Verbose mode.
+ Causes
+@@ -1206,7 +1245,10 @@ signature object and presented on the verification command-line must
+ match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable.
+ .It Cm valid-after Ns = Ns "timestamp"
+ Indicates that the key is valid for use at or after the specified timestamp,
+-which may be a date in YYYYMMDD format or a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format.
++which may be a date or time in the YYYYMMDD[Z] or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] formats.
++Dates and times will be interpreted in the current system time zone unless
++suffixed with a Z character, which causes them to be interpreted in the UTC
++time zone.
+ .It Cm valid-before Ns = Ns "timestamp"
+ Indicates that the key is valid for use at or before the specified timestamp.
+ .El
+diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
+index 20b321cc..9b2beda0 100644
+--- a/ssh-keygen.c
++++ b/ssh-keygen.c
+@@ -1916,6 +1916,21 @@ parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
+ 	return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
+ }
+ 
++static void
++parse_hex_u64(const char *s, uint64_t *up)
++{
++	char *ep;
++	unsigned long long ull;
++
++	errno = 0;
++	ull = strtoull(s, &ep, 16);
++	if (*s == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
++		fatal("Invalid certificate time: not a number");
++	if (errno == ERANGE && ull == ULONG_MAX)
++		fatal_fr(SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, "Invalid certificate time");
++	*up = (uint64_t)ull;
++}
++
+ static void
+ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
+ {
+@@ -1938,8 +1953,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * from:to, where
+-	 * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always"
+-	 *   to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever"
++	 * from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "always"
++	 *   to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | 0x... | "forever"
+ 	 */
+ 	from = xstrdup(timespec);
+ 	to = strchr(from, ':');
+@@ -1951,6 +1966,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
+ 		cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
+ 	else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
+ 		cert_valid_from = 0;
++	else if (strncmp(from, "0x", 2) == 0)
++		parse_hex_u64(from, &cert_valid_from);
+ 	else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
+ 		fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
+ 
+@@ -1958,6 +1975,8 @@ parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
+ 		cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
+ 	else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
+ 		cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
++	else if (strncmp(to, "0x", 2) == 0)
++		parse_hex_u64(to, &cert_valid_to);
+ 	else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
+ 		fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
+ 
+diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
+index 2b50514e..8ccc5bc0 100644
+--- a/sshd.8
++++ b/sshd.8
+@@ -533,8 +533,9 @@ controlled via the
+ option.
+ .It Cm expiry-time="timespec"
+ Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.
+-The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time
+-in the system time-zone.
++The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD[Z] date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS][Z] time.
++Dates and times will be interpreted in the system time zone unless suffixed
++by a Z character, in which case they will be interpreted in the UTC time zone.
+ .It Cm from="pattern-list"
+ Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
+ name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-dh.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/dh.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/dh.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:01:23.295627077 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/dh.c	2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
+@@ -37,6 +37,9 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "dh.h"
+ #include "pathnames.h"
+@@ -290,10 +293,15 @@
+ int
+ dh_gen_key(DH *dh, int need)
+ {
+-	int pbits;
+-	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *pub_key;
++	const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
++	BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	int pbits, r = 0;
+ 
+-	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, NULL);
++	DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
+ 
+ 	if (need < 0 || dh_p == NULL ||
+ 	    (pbits = BN_num_bits(dh_p)) <= 0 ||
+@@ -301,19 +309,85 @@
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	if (need < 256)
+ 		need = 256;
++
++	if ((param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL) {
++		OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	}
++
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, dh_p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, dh_g) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set p,q,g parameters");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Pollard Rho, Big step/Little Step attacks are O(sqrt(n)),
+ 	 * so double requested need here.
+ 	 */
+-	if (!DH_set_length(dh, MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)))
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-
+-	if (DH_generate_key(dh) == 0)
+-		return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+-	DH_get0_key(dh, &pub_key, NULL);
+-	if (!dh_pub_is_valid(dh, pub_key))
+-		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+-	return 0;
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_int(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_DH_PRIV_LEN,
++		MINIMUM(need * 2, pbits - 1)) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_KEY_PARAMETERS, params) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed key generation");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* reuse context for key generation */
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not create or init context");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not generate keys");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("The public key is incorrect");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	    &pub_key) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_get_bn_param(pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	    &priv_key) != 1 ||
++	    DH_set0_key(dh, pub_key, priv_key) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not set pub/priv keys to DH struct");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* transferred */
++	pub_key = NULL;
++	priv_key = NULL;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	BN_clear_free(pub_key);
++	BN_clear_free(priv_key);
++	return r;
+ }
+ 
+ DH *
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kex.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:01:23.299627122 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.c	2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
+@@ -1603,3 +1603,47 @@
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++/* 
++ * Creates an EVP_PKEY from the given parameters and keys.
++ * The private key can be omitted.
++ */
++int
++kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **pkey, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *q,
++    const BIGNUM *g, const BIGNUM *pub, const BIGNUM *priv)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	int r = 0;
++
++	/* create EVP_PKEY-DH key */
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DH", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++		error_f("EVP_PKEY_CTX or PARAM_BLD init failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing params to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (priv != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed pushing private key to OSSL_PARAM_BLD");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL)
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++out:
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	return r;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kexdh.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/kexdh.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:01:23.237626425 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kexdh.c	2023-05-25 09:03:21.817957988 +0200
+@@ -35,6 +35,10 @@
+ 
+ #include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+ #include <openssl/dh.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+@@ -83,9 +87,12 @@
+ kex_dh_compute_key(struct kex *kex, BIGNUM *dh_pub, struct sshbuf *out)
+ {
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
++	const BIGNUM *pub, *priv, *p, *q, *g;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+ 	size_t klen = 0;
+-	int kout, r;
++	int kout, r = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+ 	fprintf(stderr, "dh_pub= ");
+@@ -100,24 +107,59 @@
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = DH_size(kex->dh);
++
++	DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub, &priv);
++	DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &p, &q, &g);
++	/* import key */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&pkey, p, q, g, pub, priv);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* import peer key 
++	 * the parameters should be the same as with pkey
++	 */
++	r = kex_create_evp_dh(&dh_pkey, p, q, g, dh_pub, NULL);
++	if (r != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not import peer key for dh");
++		ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not init EVP_PKEY_CTX for dh");
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Could not get key size");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+ 	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((kout = DH_compute_key(kbuf, dh_pub, kex->dh)) < 0 ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, kout, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1 ||
++	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not derive key");
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
+-	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, kout);
++	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
+ 	r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(out, shared_secret);
+  out:
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/kex.h openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:01:23.299627122 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/kex.h	2023-05-25 09:00:56.519332820 +0200
+@@ -33,6 +33,9 @@
+ # include <openssl/bn.h>
+ # include <openssl/dh.h>
+ # include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
++# include <openssl/evp.h>
++# include <openssl/core_names.h>
++# include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ # else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+@@ -278,6 +281,8 @@
+     const u_char pub[CURVE25519_SIZE], struct sshbuf *out, int)
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, CURVE25519_SIZE)))
+ 	__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 2, CURVE25519_SIZE)));
++int	kex_create_evp_dh(EVP_PKEY **, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *,
++    const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *);
+ 
+ #if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
+ void	dump_digest(const char *, const u_char *, int);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-ecdh.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c ./kexecdh.c
+--- ../openssh-8.7p1/kexecdh.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ ./kexecdh.c	2023-04-13 14:30:14.882449593 +0200
+@@ -35,17 +35,57 @@
+ #include <signal.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/ecdh.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/err.h>
+ 
+ #include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "kex.h"
+ #include "sshbuf.h"
+ #include "digest.h"
+ #include "ssherr.h"
++#include "log.h"
+ 
+ static int
+ kex_ecdh_dec_key_group(struct kex *, const struct sshbuf *, EC_KEY *key,
+     const EC_GROUP *, struct sshbuf **);
+ 
++static EC_KEY *
++generate_ec_keys(int ec_nid)
++{
++	EC_KEY *client_key = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	const char *group_name;
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL)
++		goto out;
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ec_nid)) == NULL ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not create OSSL_PARAM");
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_generate(ctx, &pkey) != 1 ||
++	    (client_key = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pkey)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Could not generate ec keys");
++		goto out;
++	}
++out:
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++	return client_key;
++}
++
+ int
+ kex_ecdh_keypair(struct kex *kex)
+ {
+@@ -55,11 +95,7 @@
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	if ((client_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(client_key) != 1) {
++	if ((client_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -101,11 +137,7 @@
+ 	*server_blobp = NULL;
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+-	if ((server_key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+-		goto out;
+-	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(server_key) != 1) {
++	if ((server_key = generate_ec_keys(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+@@ -140,11 +172,21 @@
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *shared_secret = NULL;
+-	EC_POINT *dh_pub = NULL;
+-	u_char *kbuf = NULL;
+-	size_t klen = 0;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL, *dh_pkey = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++	u_char *kbuf = NULL, *pub = NULL;
++	size_t klen = 0, publen;
++	const char *group_name;
+ 	int r;
+ 
++	/* import EC_KEY to EVP_PKEY */
++	if ((r = ssh_create_evp_ec(key, kex->ec_nid, &pkey)) != 0) {
++		error_f("Could not create EVP_PKEY");
++		goto out;
++	}
++
+ 	*shared_secretp = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+@@ -153,45 +195,82 @@
+ 	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, ec_blob)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	if ((dh_pub = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
++
++	/* the public key is in the buffer in octet string UNCOMPRESSED
++	 * format. See sshbuf_put_ec */
++	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &pub, &publen)) != 0)
++		goto out;
++	sshbuf_reset(buf);
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(buf, dh_pub, group)) != 0) {
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(kex->ec_nid)) == NULL) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY, pub, publen) != 1 ||
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME, group_name, 0) != 1 ||
++	    (params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++		error_f("Failed to set params for dh_pkey");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &dh_pkey,
++	        EVP_PKEY_PUBLIC_KEY, params) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_public_check(ctx) != 1) {
++		error_f("Peer public key import failed");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	sshbuf_reset(buf);
+ 
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	fputs("public key:\n", stderr);
+-	sshkey_dump_ec_point(group, dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_print_public_fp(stderr, dh_pkey, 0, NULL);
+ #endif
+-	if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(group, dh_pub) != 0) {
+-		r = SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	ctx = NULL;
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(NULL, pkey, NULL)) == NULL ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, dh_pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &klen) != 1) {
++		error_f("Failed to get derive information");
++		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	klen = (EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8;
+-	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL ||
+-	    (shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++	if ((kbuf = malloc(klen)) == NULL) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (ECDH_compute_key(kbuf, klen, dh_pub, key, NULL) != (int)klen ||
+-	    BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL) {
++	if (EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, kbuf, &klen) != 1) {
+ 		r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ #ifdef DEBUG_KEXECDH
+ 	dump_digest("shared secret", kbuf, klen);
+ #endif
++	if ((shared_secret = BN_new()) == NULL ||
++	    (BN_bin2bn(kbuf, klen, shared_secret) == NULL)) {
++		r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++		goto out;
++	}
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(buf, shared_secret)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+ 	*shared_secretp = buf;
+ 	buf = NULL;
+  out:
+-	EC_POINT_clear_free(dh_pub);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(dh_pkey);
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++	OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
+ 	BN_clear_free(shared_secret);
+ 	freezero(kbuf, klen);
++	freezero(pub, publen);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	return r;
+ }

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-fips-compl-sign.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,468 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-dss.c ./ssh-dss.c
+--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-dss.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
++++ ./ssh-dss.c	2023-03-08 15:34:33.508578129 +0100
+@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/bn.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -72,9 +74,8 @@
+ 	    sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_DSA)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+-	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+-	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1)
+-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
++    		return ret;
+ 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &sigb, &len,
+ 	    data, datalen);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+@@ -201,11 +202,8 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+-	    EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa) != 1) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_dss(key, &pkey)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	}
+ 	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, data, datalen,
+ 	    sigb, slen);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+@@ -221,4 +219,63 @@
+ 		freezero(sigblob, len);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++
++int
++ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub = NULL, *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++  	if (k == NULL)
++  		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "DSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
++  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	  	goto out;
++  	}
++
++  	DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &p, &q, &g);
++  	DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub, &priv);
++
++  	if (p != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_P, p) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (q != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_Q, q) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (g != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_FFC_G, g) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (pub != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++	        pub) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (priv != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
++	        priv) != 1) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++  		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	return ret;
++}
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c ./ssh-ecdsa.c
+--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
++++ ./ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-03-08 15:40:52.628201267 +0100
+@@ -34,6 +34,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+@@ -72,9 +74,8 @@
+ 	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+-	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+-	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
+-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
++		return ret;
+ 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
+ 	    datalen);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+@@ -193,11 +194,8 @@
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+-	    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1) {
+-		ret =  SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if (ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	}
+ 	ret = sshkey_verify_signature(pkey, hash_alg, data, datalen, sigb, len);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+@@ -212,4 +210,76 @@
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
++int
++ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *k, int ecdsa_nid, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	BN_CTX *bn_ctx = NULL;
++  	uint8_t *pub_ser = NULL; 
++  	const char *group_name;
++  	const EC_POINT *pub = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *priv = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++
++	if (k == NULL)
++    		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL ||
++      	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL ||
++      	    (bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++	if ((group_name = OSSL_EC_curve_nid2name(ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
++     	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_utf8_string(param_bld,
++                OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_GROUP_NAME,
++                group_name,
++                strlen(group_name)) != 1) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++	}
++  	if ((pub = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k)) != NULL) {
++    		const EC_GROUP *group;
++    		size_t len;
++
++		group = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
++		len = EC_POINT_point2oct(group, pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
++		if ((pub_ser = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		EC_POINT_point2oct(group,
++		    pub,
++		    POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len,
++		    bn_ctx);
++		if (OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_octet_string(param_bld,
++		    OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
++		    pub_ser,
++		    len) != 1) {
++			ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++			goto out;
++		}
++	}
++  	if ((priv = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k)) != NULL &&
++	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld,
++               OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY, priv) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++    		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++    		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
++  	free(pub_ser);
++  	return ret;
++}
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c ./sshkey.c
+--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.702943628 +0100
++++ ./sshkey.c	2023-03-08 15:39:03.354082015 +0100
+@@ -35,6 +35,8 @@
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/pem.h>
+ #include <openssl/fips.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+ #include "crypto_api.h"
+@@ -492,13 +494,14 @@
+ {
+ 	EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
+ 	u_char *sig = NULL;
+-	int ret, slen, len;
++	int ret, slen;
++	size_t len;
+ 
+ 	if (sigp == NULL || lenp == NULL) {
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	slen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey);
++	slen = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
+ 	if (slen <= 0 || slen > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 
+@@ -511,9 +514,10 @@
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto error;
+ 	}
+-	if (EVP_SignInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+-	    EVP_SignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0 ||
+-	    EVP_SignFinal(ctx, sig, &len, pkey) <= 0) {
++	if (EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
++	        NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &len) != 1) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto error;
+ 	}
+@@ -540,12 +544,13 @@
+ 	if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+ 		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 	}
+-	if (EVP_VerifyInit_ex(ctx, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg), NULL) <= 0 ||
+-	    EVP_VerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) <= 0) {
++	if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, NULL, ssh_digest_to_md(hash_alg),
++	    NULL, pkey) != 1 ||
++	    EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(ctx, data, datalen) != 1) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
+-	ret = EVP_VerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen, pkey);
++	ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigbuf, siglen);
+ 	switch (ret) {
+ 	case 1:
+ 		ret = 0;
+@@ -5038,3 +5043,27 @@
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ #endif /* WITH_XMSS */
++
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++EVP_PKEY *
++sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
++{
++  	EVP_PKEY *ret = NULL;
++  	OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
++  	if (param_bld == NULL || ctx == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("param_bld or ctx is NULL");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if ((params = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_to_param(param_bld)) == NULL) {
++  		debug2_f("Could not build param list");
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	if (EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init(ctx) != 1 ||
++  	    EVP_PKEY_fromdata(ctx, &ret, EVP_PKEY_KEYPAIR, params) != 1) {
++  		debug2_f("EVP_PKEY_fromdata failed");
++  		OSSL_PARAM_free(params);
++  		return NULL;
++  	}
++  	return ret;
++}
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.h ./sshkey.h
+--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.h	2023-03-08 15:35:14.702943628 +0100
++++ ./sshkey.h	2023-03-08 15:34:33.509578138 +0100
+@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ #include <openssl/rsa.h>
+ #include <openssl/dsa.h>
++#include <openssl/evp.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
+ # ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ #  include <openssl/ec.h>
+ #  include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+@@ -293,6 +295,13 @@
+ 
+ void	 sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
+ 
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++EVP_PKEY  *sshkey_create_evp(OSSL_PARAM_BLD *, EVP_PKEY_CTX *);
++int   ssh_create_evp_dss(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
++int   ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *, EVP_PKEY **);
++int   ssh_create_evp_ec(EC_KEY *, int, EVP_PKEY **);
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
++
+ #ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+ int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
+     u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c ./ssh-rsa.c
+--- ../../openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-03-08 15:35:14.669943335 +0100
++++ ./ssh-rsa.c	2023-03-08 15:34:33.509578138 +0100
+@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
+ 
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
++#include <openssl/core_names.h>
++#include <openssl/param_build.h>
+ 
+ #include <stdarg.h>
+ #include <string.h>
+@@ -172,9 +174,8 @@
+ 	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+-	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+-	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
+-		return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
++		return ret;
+ 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
+ 	    datalen);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+@@ -285,11 +286,8 @@
+ 		len = modlen;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
+-	    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1) {
+-		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
+ 		goto out;
+-	}
+ 	ret = openssh_RSA_verify(hash_alg, data, datalen, sigblob, len, pkey);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+ 
+@@ -306,11 +304,9 @@
+     u_char *sigbuf, size_t siglen, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+ {
+ 	size_t rsasize = 0;
+-	const RSA *rsa;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey);
+-	rsasize = RSA_size(rsa);
++	rsasize = EVP_PKEY_get_size(pkey);
+ 	if (rsasize <= 0 || rsasize > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM ||
+ 	    siglen == 0 || siglen > rsasize) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+@@ -323,4 +319,87 @@
+ done:
+ 	return ret;
+ }
++
++int
++ssh_create_evp_rsa(const struct sshkey *k, EVP_PKEY **pkey)
++{
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD *param_bld = NULL;
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++  	int ret = 0;
++  	const BIGNUM *n = NULL, *e = NULL, *d = NULL, *p = NULL, *q = NULL;
++  	const BIGNUM *dmp1 = NULL, *dmq1 = NULL, *iqmp = NULL;
++
++  	if (k == NULL)
++  	  	return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
++  	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL ||
++  	    (param_bld = OSSL_PARAM_BLD_new()) == NULL) {
++  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++  	  	goto out;
++  	}
++
++  	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, &e, &d);
++  	RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, &q);
++  	RSA_get0_crt_params(k->rsa, &dmp1, &dmq1, &iqmp);
++
++  	if (n != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_N, n) != 1) {
++  	  	ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++  		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (e != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_E, e) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (d != NULL &&
++  	    OSSL_PARAM_BLD_push_BN(param_bld, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_D, d) != 1) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++
++  	if ((*pkey = sshkey_create_evp(param_bld, ctx)) == NULL) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++
++  	/* setting this to param_build makes the creation process fail */
++  	if (p != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR1, p) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'p' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (q != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_FACTOR2, q) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'q' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (dmp1 != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
++  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT1, dmp1) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmp1' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (dmq1 != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
++  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_EXPONENT2, dmq1) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'dmq1' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++  	if (iqmp != NULL &&
++  	    EVP_PKEY_set_bn_param(*pkey,
++  	        OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_RSA_COEFFICIENT1, iqmp) != 1) {
++		debug2_f("failed to add 'iqmp' param");
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++  	}
++
++out:
++  	OSSL_PARAM_BLD_free(param_bld);
++  	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++  	return ret;
++}
+ #endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evp-pkcs11.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-05-24 09:39:45.002631174 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-ecdsa.c	2023-05-24 09:09:34.400853951 +0200
+@@ -74,8 +74,18 @@
+ 	if ((hash_alg = sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(key->ecdsa_nid)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+-  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
+-		return ret;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++	if (is_ecdsa_pkcs11(key->ecdsa)) {
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++		    EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa) != 1)
++			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	} else {
++#endif
++		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_ec(key->ecdsa, key->ecdsa_nid, &pkey)) != 0)
++			return ret;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++	}
++#endif
+ 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sigb, &len, data,
+ 	    datalen);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.c	2023-05-24 09:33:59.153866357 +0200
+@@ -775,8 +775,24 @@
+ 
+ 	return (0);
+ }
++
++int
++is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
++{
++	if (EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ecdsa, ec_key_idx) != NULL)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ 
++int
++is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
++{
++	if (RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx) != NULL)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* remove trailing spaces */
+ static void
+ rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11-client.c	2023-05-24 09:31:16.139092673 +0200
+@@ -225,8 +225,36 @@
+ static RSA_METHOD	*helper_rsa;
+ #ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
+ static EC_KEY_METHOD	*helper_ecdsa;
++
++int
++is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa)
++{
++	const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth;
++	ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen,
++		const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey) = NULL;
++
++	meth = EC_KEY_get_method(ecdsa);
++	EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(meth, NULL, NULL, &sign_sig);
++	if (sign_sig == ecdsa_do_sign)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
+ #endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
+ 
++int
++is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa)
++{
++	const RSA_METHOD *meth;
++	int (*priv_enc)(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
++        	unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) = NULL;
++
++	meth = RSA_get_method(rsa);
++	priv_enc = RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(meth);
++	if (priv_enc == rsa_encrypt)
++		return 1;
++	return 0;
++}
++
+ /* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
+ static void
+ wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-05-24 09:39:44.950630607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-pkcs11.h	2023-05-24 09:36:49.055714975 +0200
+@@ -39,6 +39,11 @@
+ 	    u_int32_t *);
+ #endif
+ 
++#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
++int is_ecdsa_pkcs11(EC_KEY *ecdsa);
++#endif
++int is_rsa_pkcs11(RSA *rsa);
++
+ #if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
+ #undef ENABLE_PKCS11
+ #endif
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-05-24 09:39:45.003631184 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh-rsa.c	2023-05-24 09:31:37.019319860 +0200
+@@ -174,8 +174,18 @@
+ 	if (RSA_bits(key->rsa) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 
+-  	if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
+-		return ret;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++	if (is_rsa_pkcs11(key->rsa)) {
++		if ((pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL ||
++		    EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa) != 1)
++			return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
++	} else {
++#endif
++		if ((ret = ssh_create_evp_rsa(key, &pkey)) != 0)
++			return ret;
++#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
++	}
++#endif
+ 	ret = sshkey_calculate_signature(pkey, hash_alg, &sig, &len, data,
+ 	    datalen);
+ 	EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-evpgenkey.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,110 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c.evpgenrsa	2022-06-30 15:14:58.200518353 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshkey.c	2022-06-30 15:24:31.499641196 +0200
+@@ -1657,7 +1657,8 @@ sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
+ static int
+ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
+ {
+-	RSA *private = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+@@ -1667,20 +1668,42 @@ rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA
+ 	    bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 	*rsap = NULL;
+-	if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "RSA", NULL)) == NULL
++		|| (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL || !BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4)) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
+-	    !RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, bits) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_rsa_keygen_pubexp(ctx, f4) <= 0)
++		goto out;
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++
++	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
++	*rsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(res);
++	if (*rsap) {
++		ret = 0;
++	} else {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	*rsap = private;
+-	private = NULL;
+-	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	RSA_free(private);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+ 	BN_free(f4);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+@@ -1820,7 +1820,8 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
+ static int
+ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
+ {
+-	EC_KEY *private;
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL;
++	EVP_PKEY *res = NULL;
+ 	int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
+@@ -1828,20 +1829,29 @@ ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, i
+ 	if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
+ 	*ecdsap = NULL;
+-	if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
++
++	if ((ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL)) == NULL) {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
++
++	if (EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_group_name(ctx, OBJ_nid2sn(*nid)) <= 0
++	   || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ctx, &res) <= 0) {
++		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
++		goto out;
++	}
++	/* This function is deprecated in OpenSSL 3.0 but OpenSSH doesn't worry about it*/
++	*ecdsap = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(res);
++	if (*ecdsap) {
++		EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(*ecdsap, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
++		ret = 0;
++	} else {
+ 		ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+-	*ecdsap = private;
+-	private = NULL;
+-	ret = 0;
+  out:
+-	EC_KEY_free(private);
++	EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
++	EVP_PKEY_free(res);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ # endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-find-principals-fix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c.find-princ	2021-11-29 15:27:03.032070863 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2021-11-29 15:27:34.736342968 +0100
+@@ -2700,7 +2700,8 @@ sig_process_opts(char * const *opts, siz
+ 	time_t now;
+ 
+ 	*verify_timep = 0;
+-	*print_pubkey = 0;
++	if (print_pubkey)
++		*print_pubkey = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ 		if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "verify-time=", 12) == 0) {
+ 			if (parse_absolute_time(opts[i] + 12,

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-gssapi-auth.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+diff --color -rup a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
+--- a/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:11:28.146863144 +0200
++++ b/monitor.c	2022-07-11 15:15:35.726655877 +0200
+@@ -376,8 +376,15 @@ monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, s
+ 		if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
+ 			auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
+ 			    auth_method, auth_submethod);
+-			if (!partial && !authenticated)
++			if (!partial && !authenticated) {
++#ifdef GSSAPI
++				/* If gssapi-with-mic failed, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC is disabled.
++				 * We have to reenable it to try again for gssapi-keyex */
++				if (strcmp(auth_method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0 && options.gss_keyex)
++					monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
++#endif
+ 				authctxt->failures++;
++			}
+ 			if (authenticated || partial) {
+ 				auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
+ 				    auth_method, auth_submethod);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-host-based-auth.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-11 17:00:02.618575727 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-11 17:03:05.096085690 +0200
+@@ -2288,9 +2288,9 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 			if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
+ 			    authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
+ 				continue;
+-			if (match_pattern_list(
++			if (!sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(
+ 			    sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
+-			    authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
++			    authctxt->active_ktype))
+ 				continue;
+ 			/* we take and free the key */
+ 			private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
+@@ -2316,7 +2316,8 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		error_f("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+-	debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
++	debug_f("trying hostkey %s %s using sigalg %s",
++		sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp, authctxt->active_ktype);
+ 
+ 	/* figure out a name for the client host */
+ 	lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
+diff --color -rup a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+--- a/sshkey.c	2022-07-11 17:00:02.609575554 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.c	2022-07-11 17:12:30.905976443 +0200
+@@ -252,6 +252,29 @@ sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *n
+ 	return -1;
+ }
+ 
++int
++sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *keyname, const char *sigalgs)
++{
++	int ktype;
++
++	if (sigalgs == NULL || *sigalgs == '\0' ||
++	    (ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(keyname)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
++		return 0;
++	else if (ktype == KEY_RSA) {
++		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", sigalgs, 0) == 1;
++	} else if (ktype == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
++		return match_pattern_list("ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com",
++		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
++		    sigalgs, 0) == 1 ||
++		    match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
++		    sigalgs, 0) == 1;
++	} else
++		return match_pattern_list(keyname, sigalgs, 0) == 1;
++}
++
+ char *
+ sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
+ {
+diff --color -rup a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+--- a/sshkey.h	2022-07-11 17:00:02.603575438 +0200
++++ b/sshkey.h	2022-07-11 17:13:01.052556879 +0200
+@@ -194,6 +194,10 @@ int	 sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey
+ int	 sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
+ int	 sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
+ int	 sshkey_type_plain(int);
++
++/* Returns non-zero if key name match sigalgs pattern list. (handles RSA) */
++int	 sshkey_match_keyname_to_sigalgs(const char *, const char *);
++
+ int	 sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
+ int	 sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
+ int	 sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
+diff --color -rup a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
+--- a/ssh-keysign.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/ssh-keysign.c	2022-07-11 17:00:23.306973667 +0200
+@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@
+ extern char *__progname;
+ 
+ static int
+-valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
++valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret, char **pkalgp,
+     u_char *data, size_t datalen)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *b;
+@@ -75,6 +75,8 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
+ 
+ 	if (ret != NULL)
+ 		*ret = NULL;
++	if (pkalgp != NULL)
++		*pkalgp = NULL;
+ 	fail = 0;
+ 
+ 	if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+@@ -122,8 +124,6 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
+ 		fail++;
+ 	} else if (key->type != pktype)
+ 		fail++;
+-	free(pkalg);
+-	free(pkblob);
+ 
+ 	/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+@@ -154,8 +154,19 @@ valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *h
+ 
+ 	if (fail)
+ 		sshkey_free(key);
+-	else if (ret != NULL)
+-		*ret = key;
++	else {
++		if (ret != NULL) {
++			*ret = key;
++			key = NULL;
++		}
++		if (pkalgp != NULL) {
++			*pkalgp = pkalg;
++			pkalg = NULL;
++		}
++	}
++	sshkey_free(key);
++	free(pkalg);
++	free(pkblob);
+ 
+ 	return (fail ? -1 : 0);
+ }
+@@ -170,7 +181,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+ 	int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
+ 	u_char *signature, *data, rver;
+-	char *host, *fp;
++	char *host, *fp, *pkalg;
+ 	size_t slen, dlen;
+ 
+ 	if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
+@@ -258,7 +269,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "%s: buffer error", __progname);
+-	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
++	if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, &pkalg, data, dlen) < 0)
+ 		fatal("%s: not a valid request", __progname);
+ 	free(host);
+ 
+@@ -279,7 +290,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
+-	    NULL, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
++	    pkalg, NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_r(r, "%s: sshkey_sign failed", __progname);
+ 	free(data);
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ibmca.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+--- openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c.orig	2022-04-12 15:47:03.815044607 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c	2022-04-12 15:48:12.464963511 +0200
+@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
+ 
+ #include "includes.h"
+ 
+-#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
++#if (!defined HAVE_CLOSEFROM) || (defined __s390__)
+ 
+ #include <sys/types.h>
+ #include <sys/param.h>
+

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-man-hostkeyalgos.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+diff --color -ru -x regress -x autom4te.cache -x '*.o' -x '*.lo' -x Makefile -x config.status -x configure~ -x configure.ac openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5 openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh_config.5
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh_config.5	2023-06-02 09:14:40.279373577 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1-patched/ssh_config.5	2023-05-30 16:01:04.533848172 +0200
+@@ -989,6 +989,17 @@
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++The proposed
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
++during KEX are limited to the set of algorithms that is defined in
++.Cm PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms
++and therefore they are indirectly affected by system-wide
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 .
++.Xr crypto_policies 7 can not handle the list of host key algorithms directly as doing so
++would break the order given by the
++.Pa known_hosts
++file.
+ .It Cm HostKeyAlias
+ Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
+ real host name when looking up or saving the host key
+@@ -1564,6 +1575,9 @@
+ .Pp
+ The list of available signature algorithms may also be obtained using
+ .Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms .
++.Pp
++This option affects also
++.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
+ .It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
+ Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
+ The argument to this keyword must be

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-mem-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,156 @@
+diff --color -rup a/compat.c b/compat.c
+--- a/compat.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/compat.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.770268440 +0200
+@@ -157,11 +157,12 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
+ }
+ 
++/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+ char *
+ compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *cipher_prop)
+ {
+ 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_BIGENDIANAES))
+-		return cipher_prop;
++		return xstrdup(cipher_prop);
+ 	debug2_f("original cipher proposal: %s", cipher_prop);
+ 	if ((cipher_prop = match_filter_denylist(cipher_prop, "aes*")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+@@ -171,11 +172,12 @@ compat_cipher_proposal(struct ssh *ssh,
+ 	return cipher_prop;
+ }
+ 
++/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+ char *
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *pkalg_prop)
+ {
+ 	if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5))
+-		return pkalg_prop;
++		return xstrdup(pkalg_prop);
+ 	debug2_f("original public key proposal: %s", pkalg_prop);
+ 	if ((pkalg_prop = match_filter_denylist(pkalg_prop, "ssh-rsa")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+@@ -185,21 +187,26 @@ compat_pkalg_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, c
+ 	return pkalg_prop;
+ }
+ 
++/* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+ char *
+ compat_kex_proposal(struct ssh *ssh, char *p)
+ {
++	char *cp = NULL;
++
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & (SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD|SSH_OLD_DHGEX)) == 0)
+-		return p;
++		return xstrdup(p);
+ 	debug2_f("original KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_CURVE25519PAD) != 0)
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
+ 	if ((ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX) != 0) {
++		cp = p;
+ 		if ((p = match_filter_denylist(p,
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,"
+ 		    "diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1")) == NULL)
+ 			fatal("match_filter_denylist failed");
++		free(cp);
+ 	}
+ 	debug2_f("compat KEX proposal: %s", p);
+ 	if (*p == '\0')
+diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.241496549 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 17:39:23.772268479 +0200
+@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ 	char *s, *all_key;
++	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+@@ -252,10 +253,9 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 
+ 	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+-	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
++	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
+@@ -264,12 +264,12 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
+ 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
+ 		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
+ 	} else {
+ 		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
++		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+ 		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -383,6 +383,10 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "send packet");
+ #endif
++	/* Free only parts of proposal that were dynamically allocated here. */
++	free(prop_kex);
++	free(prop_enc);
++	free(prop_hostkey);
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+diff --color -rup a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+--- a/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:38:43.242496568 +0200
++++ b/sshd.c	2022-07-14 17:42:07.616388978 +0200
+@@ -2493,14 +2493,15 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
+ 	struct kex *kex;
++	char *hostkey_types = NULL;
++	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	int r;
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
+ 	    options.kex_algorithms);
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
+-	    options.ciphers);
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(ssh,
+-	    options.ciphers);
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
++	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
++	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ 
+@@ -2513,8 +2514,10 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 		ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
+ 		    options.rekey_interval);
+ 
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
+-	    ssh, list_hostkey_types());
++	hostkey_types = list_hostkey_types();
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
++	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, hostkey_types);
++	free(hostkey_types);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	{
+@@ -2606,6 +2609,9 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
+ 	    (r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "send test");
+ #endif
++	free(prop_kex);
++	free(prop_enc);
++	free(prop_hostkey);
+ 	debug("KEX done");
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minimize-sha1-use.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,109 @@
+diff --color -ru a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
+--- a/clientloop.c	2022-06-29 16:35:06.677597259 +0200
++++ b/clientloop.c	2022-06-29 16:40:29.737926205 +0200
+@@ -116,6 +116,9 @@
+ #include "ssh-gss.h"
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Permitted RSA signature algorithms for UpdateHostkeys proofs */
++#define HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS	"rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
++
+ /* import options */
+ extern Options options;
+ 
+@@ -2110,8 +2113,10 @@
+ 	struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
+ 	size_t i, ndone;
+ 	struct sshbuf *signdata;
+-	int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
++	int r, plaintype;
+ 	const u_char *sig;
++	const char *rsa_kexalg = NULL;
++	char *alg = NULL;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
+ 	if (ctx->nnew == 0)
+@@ -2122,9 +2127,9 @@
+ 		hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+-	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
+-	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
+-
++	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
++	    ssh->kex->hostkey_alg)) == KEY_RSA)
++		rsa_kexalg = ssh->kex->hostkey_alg;
+ 	if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new failed");
+ 	/*
+@@ -2135,6 +2140,7 @@
+ 	for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
+ 		if (ctx->keys_match[i])
+ 			continue;
++		plaintype = sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type);
+ 		/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
+ 		sshbuf_reset(signdata);
+ 		if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
+@@ -2148,19 +2154,33 @@
+ 			error_fr(r, "parse sig");
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &alg)) != 0) {
++			error_fr(r, "server gave unintelligible signature "
++				"for %s key %zu", sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
++			goto out;
++		}
+ 		/*
+-		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
+-		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
++		 * Special case for RSA keys: if a RSA hostkey was negotiated,
++		 * then use its signature type for verification of RSA hostkey
++		 * proofs. Otherwise, accept only RSA-SHA256/512 signatures.
+ 		 */
+-		use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
+-		    sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
+-		debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using %s sigalg",
+-		    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i,
+-		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : "default");
++		if (plaintype == KEY_RSA && rsa_kexalg == NULL &&
++		    match_pattern_list(alg, HOSTKEY_PROOF_RSA_ALGS, 0) != 1) {
++			debug_f("server used untrusted RSA signature algorithm "
++				"%s for key %zu, disregarding", alg, i);
++			free(alg);
++			/* zap the key from the list */
++			sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
++			ctx->keys[i] = NULL;
++			ndone++;
++			continue;
++		}
++		debug3_f("verify %s key %zu using sigalg %s",
++			sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i, alg);
++		free(alg);
+ 		if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
+ 		    sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
+-		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
+-		    NULL)) != 0) {
++		    plaintype == KEY_RSA ? rsa_kexalg : NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
+ 			error_fr(r, "server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
+ 			    sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
+ 			goto out;
+diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
+index a035b381..bd49e3ac 100644
+--- a/hostfile.c
++++ b/hostfile.c
+@@ -642,7 +642,7 @@ hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
+ 	/* Re-add the requested keys */
+ 	want = HKF_MATCH_HOST | (ip == NULL ? 0 : HKF_MATCH_IP);
+ 	for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+-		if ((want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
++		if (keys[i] == NULL || (want & ctx.match_keys[i]) == want)
+ 			continue;
+ 		if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
+ 		    SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
 diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
---- a/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.529922670 +0200
+--- a/kex.c	2022-06-29 16:35:06.775599179 +0200
-+++ b/kex.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.911762100 +0200
++++ b/kex.c	2022-06-29 16:42:00.839710940 +0200
-@@ -906,6 +906,18 @@
+@@ -959,6 +959,18 @@
  	return (1);
  }
  
@@ -20,7 +122,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
  static int
  kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
  {
-@@ -941,6 +953,16 @@
+@@ -994,6 +1006,16 @@
  		free(ext);
  	}
  
@@ -38,9 +140,9 @@ diff --color -ru a/kex.c b/kex.c
  	if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
  	    sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
 diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
---- a/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.511922322 +0200
+--- a/kex.h	2022-06-29 16:35:06.766599003 +0200
-+++ b/kex.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.902761926 +0200
++++ b/kex.h	2022-06-29 16:42:24.199168567 +0200
-@@ -117,6 +117,8 @@
+@@ -116,6 +116,8 @@
  
  #define KEX_INIT_SENT	0x0001
  #define KEX_INITIAL	0x0002
@@ -50,9 +152,9 @@ diff --color -ru a/kex.h b/kex.h
  struct sshenc {
  	char	*name;
 diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
---- a/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.537922825 +0200
+--- a/serverloop.c	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
-+++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.918762235 +0200
++++ b/serverloop.c	2022-06-29 16:45:05.902336428 +0200
-@@ -736,16 +736,17 @@
+@@ -684,16 +684,18 @@
  	struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
  	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
  	struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
@@ -64,8 +166,8 @@ diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
  	size_t blen, slen;
  
  	if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("sshbuf_new");
--
+ 
 -	kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
 -	    sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
 +	if (sshkey_type_plain(sshkey_type_from_name(
@@ -74,7 +176,7 @@ diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
  	while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
  		sshkey_free(key);
  		key = NULL;
-@@ -780,16 +781,24 @@
+@@ -726,16 +728,24 @@
  		 * For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
  		 * during KEX to the default (SHA1).
  		 */
@@ -89,78 +191,17 @@ diff --color -ru a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
 +			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
 +				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
 +		}
-+		debug3("%s: sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s", __func__,
++		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
 +		sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
  		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
  		    "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
- 		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
+ 		    (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sigbuf,
- 		    ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
+ 		    ssh->kex->session_id)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
 -		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
 -		    use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
 +		    sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf), sigalg)) != 0 ||
  		    (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
- 			error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
+ 			error_fr(r, "assemble signature");
- 			    __func__, ssh_err(r));
-diff --color -ru a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
---- a/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:25:29.532922728 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.c	2022-06-23 10:26:12.914762158 +0200
-@@ -82,7 +82,6 @@
-     struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
- static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
-     struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
--static int get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep);
- 
- /* Supported key types */
- struct keytype {
-@@ -2092,7 +2091,8 @@
- 	if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
- 	    sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
  			goto out;
--	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig, slen, &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
-+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
-+	    &key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 
- 	/* Success */
-@@ -2394,8 +2394,8 @@
- 	return r;
- }
- 
--static int
--get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
-+int
-+sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
- {
- 	int r;
- 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
-@@ -2477,7 +2477,7 @@
- 		return 0;
- 	if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
--	if ((r = get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
-+	if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
- 		return r;
- 	r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
- 	free(sigtype);
-@@ -2739,7 +2739,7 @@
- 	    sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
--	if ((ret = get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
-+	if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
- 		goto out;
- 	if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
- 		ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
-diff --color -ru a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
---- a/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:25:29.521922515 +0200
-+++ b/sshkey.h	2022-06-23 10:26:12.907762022 +0200
-@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@
-     const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
- int	 sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
- const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
-+int      sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
- 
- /* for debug */
- void	sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-minrsabits.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,446 @@
+diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
+index 36b9d2f5..6b517db4 100644
+--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
++++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
+@@ -119,6 +119,11 @@ userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
++	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
++		goto done;
++	}
+ 
+ 	if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
+ 		debug2_f("disabled because of invalid user");
+diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
+index 962fd342..5d59febc 100644
+--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
++++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
+@@ -175,6 +175,11 @@ userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
+ 		    "(null)" : key->cert->signature_type);
+ 		goto done;
+ 	}
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key,
++	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++		logit_r(r, "refusing %s key", sshkey_type(key));
++		goto done;
++	}
+ 	key_s = format_key(key);
+ 	if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
+ 		ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
+diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
+index 7f26c680..42be690b 100644
+--- a/readconf.c
++++ b/readconf.c
+@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
+ 	oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedAcceptedAlgorithms,
+ 	oPubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
+-	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand,
++	oSecurityKeyProvider, oKnownHostsCommand, oRequiredRSASize,
+ 	oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
+ } OpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -320,6 +320,8 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
+ 	{ "knownhostscommand", oKnownHostsCommand },
++	{ "requiredrsasize", oRequiredRSASize },
++	{ "rsaminsize", oRequiredRSASize }, /* alias */
+ 
+ 	{ NULL, oBadOption }
+ };
+@@ -2176,6 +2177,10 @@ parse_pubkey_algos:
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case oRequiredRSASize:
++		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case oDeprecated:
+ 		debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
+ 		    filename, linenum, keyword);
+@@ -2423,6 +2428,7 @@ initialize_options(Options * options)
+ 	options->hostbased_accepted_algos = NULL;
+ 	options->pubkey_accepted_algos = NULL;
+ 	options->known_hosts_command = NULL;
++	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -2619,6 +2625,8 @@ fill_default_options(Options * options)
+ 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+ #endif
++	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
++		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	/* Expand KEX name lists */
+ 	all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
+@@ -3308,6 +3316,7 @@ dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
++	dump_cfg_int(oRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
+ 
+ 	/* String options */
+ 	dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
+diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
+index f647bd42..ffb5ec4f 100644
+--- a/readconf.h
++++ b/readconf.h
+@@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ typedef struct {
+ 
+ 	char   *known_hosts_command;
+ 
++	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
++
+ 	char	*ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
+ }       Options;
+ 
+diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
+index 29df0463..423772b1 100644
+--- a/servconf.c
++++ b/servconf.c
+@@ -195,6 +195,7 @@ initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 	options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
+ 	options->disable_forwarding = -1;
+ 	options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
++	options->required_rsa_size = -1;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
+@@ -441,6 +442,8 @@ fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
+ 		options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
+ 	if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ 		options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
++	if (options->required_rsa_size == -1)
++		options->required_rsa_size = SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE;
+ 
+ 	assemble_algorithms(options);
+ 
+@@ -517,6 +520,7 @@ typedef enum {
+ 	sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
+ 	sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
+ 	sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
++	sRequiredRSASize,
+ 	sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
+ } ServerOpCodes;
+ 
+@@ -676,6 +680,8 @@ static struct {
+ 	{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ 	{ "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
++	{ "requiredrsasize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL },
++	{ "rsaminsize", sRequiredRSASize, SSHCFG_ALL }, /* alias */
+ 	{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
+ };
+ 
+@@ -2438,6 +2443,10 @@ process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ 			*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
+ 		break;
+ 
++	case sRequiredRSASize:
++		intptr = &options->required_rsa_size;
++		goto parse_int;
++
+ 	case sDeprecated:
+ 	case sIgnore:
+ 	case sUnsupported:
+@@ -2610,6 +2619,7 @@ copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
+ 	M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
++	M_CP_INTOPT(required_rsa_size);
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
+@@ -2874,6 +2884,7 @@ dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
+ 	dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
++	dump_cfg_int(sRequiredRSASize, o->required_rsa_size);
+ 	dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
+ 
+ 	/* formatted integer arguments */
+diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
+index 8a04463e..9346155c 100644
+--- a/servconf.h
++++ b/servconf.h
+@@ -229,6 +229,7 @@ typedef struct {
+ 	int	expose_userauth_info;
+ 	u_int64_t timing_secret;
+ 	char   *sk_provider;
++	int	required_rsa_size;	/* minimum size of RSA keys */
+ }       ServerOptions;
+ 
+ /* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
+diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
+index 559bf2af..25be53d5 100644
+--- a/ssh.c
++++ b/ssh.c
+@@ -516,14 +516,22 @@ resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+- * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
+- * fatal()ing for others.
++ * Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and either
++ * discarding the key or fatal()ing for others.
+  */
+ static void
+-check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
++check_load(int r, struct sshkey **k, const char *path, const char *message)
+ {
+ 	switch (r) {
+ 	case 0:
++		/* Check RSA keys size and discard if undersized */
++		if (k != NULL && *k != NULL &&
++		    (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(*k,
++		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++			error_r(r, "load %s \"%s\"", message, path);
++			free(*k);
++			*k = NULL;
++		}
+ 		break;
+ 	case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
+ 	case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
+@@ -1578,7 +1586,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+ 		fatal_f("pubkey out of array bounds"); \
+ 	check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
+-	    p, "pubkey"); \
++	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "pubkey"); \
+ } while (0)
+ #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
+ 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+@@ -1586,7 +1594,8 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ #define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
+ 	if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
+ 		fatal_f("cert out of array bounds"); \
+-	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
++	check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), \
++	    &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), p, "cert"); \
+ } while (0)
+ 
+ 		if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
+@@ -2244,7 +2253,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 		filename = default_client_percent_dollar_expand(cp, cinfo);
+ 		free(cp);
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+-		    filename, "pubkey");
++		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+ 		debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
+ 		    public ? public->type : -1);
+ 		free(options.identity_files[i]);
+@@ -2284,7 +2293,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 			continue;
+ 		xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
+-		    filename, "pubkey");
++		    &public, filename, "pubkey");
+ 		debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
+ 		    public ? public->type : -1);
+ 		if (public == NULL) {
+@@ -2315,7 +2324,7 @@ load_public_identity_files(const struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
+ 		free(cp);
+ 
+ 		check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
+-		    filename, "certificate");
++		    &public, filename, "certificate");
+ 		debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
+ 		    public ? public->type : -1);
+ 		free(options.certificate_files[i]);
+diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+index f9bd19ea..58fe98db 100644
+--- a/sshconnect2.c
++++ b/sshconnect2.c
+@@ -96,6 +96,11 @@ static const struct ssh_conn_info *xxx_conn_info;
+ static int
+ verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
+ {
++	int r;
++
++	if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(hostkey,
++	    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0)
++		fatal_r(r, "Bad server host key");
+ 	if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey,
+ 	    xxx_conn_info) == -1)
+ 		fatal("Host key verification failed.");
+@@ -1606,6 +1611,13 @@ load_identity_file(Identity *id)
+ 			private = NULL;
+ 			quit = 1;
+ 		}
++		if (!quit && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(private,
++		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++			debug_fr(r, "Skipping key %s", id->filename);
++			sshkey_free(private);
++			private = NULL;
++			quit = 1;
++		}
+ 		if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
+ 		    !(id->key && id->isprivate))
+ 			maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
+@@ -1752,6 +1764,12 @@ pubkey_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
+		close(agent_fd);
+	} else {
+ 		for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
++			if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(idlist->keys[j],
++			    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++				debug_fr(r, "ignoring %s agent key",
++				    sshkey_ssh_name(idlist->keys[j]));
++				continue;
++			}
+ 			found = 0;
+ 			TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
+ 				/*
+diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
+index 17eee9d8..395ef493 100644
+--- a/sshd.c
++++ b/sshd.c
+@@ -1870,6 +1870,13 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 				fatal_r(r, "Could not demote key: \"%s\"",
+ 				    options.host_key_files[i]);
+ 		}
++		if (pubkey != NULL && (r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(pubkey,
++		    options.required_rsa_size)) != 0) {
++			error_fr(r, "Host key %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++			sshkey_free(pubkey);
++			sshkey_free(key);
++			continue;
++		}
+ 		sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
+ 		sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
+ 
+diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
+index ed2b5dff..77093235 100644
+--- a/sshkey.c
++++ b/sshkey.c
+@@ -2365,18 +2365,24 @@ cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+-static int
+-check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
++int
++sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *k, int min_size)
+ {
++#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
++	int nbits;
+ 
+-	RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
+-	if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
++	if (k == NULL || k->rsa == NULL ||
++	    (k->type != KEY_RSA && k->type != KEY_RSA_CERT))
++		return 0;
++	RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
++	nbits = BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
++	if (nbits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
++	    (min_size > 0 && nbits < min_size))
+ 		return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
++#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-#endif
+ 
+ static int
+ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
+@@ -2439,7 +2445,7 @@ sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
+-		if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
++		if ((ret = sshkey_check_rsa_length(key, 0)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ #ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ 		RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
+@@ -3642,7 +3648,7 @@ sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 		rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
+-		if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
++		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(k, 0)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+@@ -4644,7 +4650,7 @@ sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ 			r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
++		if ((r = sshkey_check_rsa_length(prv, 0)) != 0)
+ 			goto out;
+ 	} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
+ 	    (type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
+diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
+index 094815e0..be254e6b 100644
+--- a/sshkey.h
++++ b/sshkey.h
+@@ -273,6 +273,7 @@ int	sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
+ int	sshkey_parse_pubkey_from_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob,
+     int type, struct sshkey **pubkeyp);
+ 
++int sshkey_check_rsa_length(const struct sshkey *, int);
+ /* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
+ int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
+ 
+diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+index b4956aec..e255b9b9 100644
+--- a/ssh.1
++++ b/ssh.1
+@@ -571,6 +571,7 @@ For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RequiredRSASize
+ .It SendEnv
+ .It ServerAliveInterval
+ .It ServerAliveCountMax
+diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
+index 24a46460..d1ede18e 100644
+--- a/ssh_config.5
++++ b/ssh_config.5
+@@ -1634,6 +1634,17 @@ and
+ .Fl T
+ flags for
+ .Xr ssh 1 .
++.It Cm RequiredRSASize
++Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
++.Xr ssh 1
++will accept.
++User authentication keys smaller than this limit will be ignored.
++Servers that present host keys smaller than this limit will cause the
++connection to be terminated.
++The default is
++.Cm 1024
++bits.
++Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
+ .It Cm RevokedHostKeys
+ Specifies revoked host public keys.
+ Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
+diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
+index 867a747d..f5a06637 100644
+--- a/sshd_config.5
++++ b/sshd_config.5
+@@ -1596,6 +1596,16 @@ is
+ .Cm default none ,
+ which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
+ of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
++.It Cm RequiredRSASize
++Specifies the minimum RSA key size (in bits) that
++.Xr sshd 8
++will accept.
++User and host-based authentication keys smaller than this limit will be
++refused.
++The default is
++.Cm 1024
++bits.
++Note that this limit may only be raised from the default.
+ .It Cm RevokedKeys
+ Specifies revoked public keys file, or
+ .Cm none

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-negotiate-supported-algs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+diff --color -rup a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh	2022-07-14 11:58:12.172786060 +0200
+@@ -13,8 +13,12 @@ r=$?
+ grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
+ 
++PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS=`$SSH -G "example.com" | \
++    grep -i "PubkeyAcceptedAlgorithms" | cut -d ' ' -f2- | tr "," "|"`
++SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | egrep "$PUBKEY_ACCEPTED_ALGOS"`
++
+ trace "load hostkeys"
+-for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 	${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
+ 	(
+ 		printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
+@@ -31,7 +35,7 @@ cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_host
+ unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+ 
+ for ps in yes; do
+-	for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
++	for k in $SSH_ACCEPTED_KEYTYPES ; do
+ 		verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
+ 		cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ 		echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+diff --color -rup a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
+--- a/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:07.262975710 +0200
++++ b/sshconnect2.c	2022-07-14 10:10:32.068452067 +0200
+@@ -222,6 +222,7 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ {
+ 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
+ 	char *s, *all_key;
++	char *hostkeyalgs = NULL, *pkalg = NULL;
+ 	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
+ 	int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
+ 
+@@ -264,14 +265,19 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
+ 	if (use_known_hosts_order) {
+ 		/* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+-		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh,
+-		    order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo));
++		if ((hostkeyalgs = order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port, cinfo)) == NULL)
++			fatal_f("order_hostkeyalgs");
++		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(hostkeyalgs, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
++		free(hostkeyalgs);
+ 	} else {
+-		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
+-		myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
+-		    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, options.hostkeyalgorithms);
++		/* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms */
++		pkalg = match_filter_allowlist(options.hostkeyalgorithms, options.pubkey_accepted_algos);
+ 	}
++	if (pkalg == NULL)
++		fatal_f("match_filter_allowlist");
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = prop_hostkey =
++	    compat_pkalg_proposal(ssh, pkalg);
++	free(pkalg);
+ 
+ #if defined(GSSAPI) && defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
+ 	if (options.gss_keyex) {

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-nohostsha1proof.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.338710923 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.357711165 +0100
+@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ void
+ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const char *version)
+ {
+ 	int i;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 	static struct {
+ 		char	*pat;
+ 		int	bugs;
+@@ -145,16 +146,21 @@ compat_banner(struct ssh *ssh, const cha
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	/* process table, return first match */
++	forbid_ssh_rsa = (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA);
+ 	ssh->compat = 0;
+ 	for (i = 0; check[i].pat; i++) {
+ 		if (match_pattern_list(version, check[i].pat, 0) == 1) {
+ 			debug_f("match: %s pat %s compat 0x%08x",
+ 			    version, check[i].pat, check[i].bugs);
+ 			ssh->compat = check[i].bugs;
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ 			return;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 	debug_f("no match: %s", version);
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
+ }
+ 
+ /* Always returns pointer to allocated memory, caller must free. */
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/compat.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/compat.h.sshrsacheck	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/compat.h	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
+@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@
+ #define SSH_BUG_UTF8TTYMODE	0x00000001
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE		0x00000002
+ #define SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE74	0x00000004
+-/* #define unused		0x00000008 */
++#define SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA	0x00000008
+ #define SSH_OLD_SESSIONID	0x00000010
+ /* #define unused		0x00000020 */
+ #define SSH_BUG_DEBUG		0x00000040
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.279676981 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/monitor.c	2023-01-20 15:01:07.007821379 +0100
+@@ -660,11 +660,12 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	struct sshkey *key;
+ 	struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
+ 	u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
+-	char *alg = NULL;
++	char *alg = NULL, *effective_alg;
+ 	size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
+ 	int r, is_proof = 0;
+ 	u_int keyid, compat;
+ 	const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
++	const char safe_rsa[]  = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 
+ 	debug3_f("entering");
+ 
+@@ -719,18 +720,30 @@ mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
+-		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
++		if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, effective_alg,
+ 		    options.sk_provider, NULL, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "sign");
+ 	} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
+ 	    auth_sock > 0) {
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && strcmp(alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0
++				&& (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)) {
++			effective_alg = safe_rsa;
++		} else {
++			effective_alg = alg;
++		}
+ 		if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
+-		    p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0)
++		    p, datlen, effective_alg, compat)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "agent sign");
+ 	} else
+ 		fatal_f("no hostkey from index %d", keyid);
+ 
+-	debug3_f("%s %s signature len=%zu", alg,
++	debug3_f("%s (effective: %s) %s signature len=%zu", alg, effective_alg,
+ 	    is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", siglen);
+ 
+ 	sshbuf_reset(m);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:26:52.885963113 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/cert-userkey.sh	2023-01-25 14:27:25.757219800 +0100
+@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/us
+ cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
+ cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
+ 
+-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
++#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
++PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss' | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+ EXTRA_TYPES=""
+ rsa=""
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.169676051 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/Makefile	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
+@@ -2,7 +2,8 @@
+ 
+ tests:		prep file-tests t-exec unit
+ 
+-REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
++#ssh-dss tests will not pass on DEFAULT crypto-policy because of SHA1, skipping
++REGRESS_TARGETS=	t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
+ 
+ # File based tests
+ file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 14:24:54.778040819 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/test-exec.sh	2023-01-25 14:26:39.500858590 +0100
+@@ -581,8 +581,9 @@ maybe_filter_sk() {
+ 	fi
+ }
+ 
+-SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+-SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
++#ssh-dss keys are incompatible with DEFAULT crypto policy
++SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
++SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | grep -v 'ssh-dss'`
+ 
+ for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
+ 	# generate user key
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 13:34:52.645743677 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.c	2023-01-26 13:36:56.220745823 +0100
+@@ -97,7 +97,8 @@ do_kex_with_key(char *kex, int keytype,
+ 	memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
+ 	if (kex != NULL)
+ 		kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = kex;
+-	keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private));
++	keyname = (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name(private), "ssh-rsa")) ?
++		strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(private)) : strdup("rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
+ 	kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
+@@ -180,7 +181,7 @@ do_kex(char *kex)
+ {
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_RSA, 2048);
+-	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024);
++	/* do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_DSA, 1024); */
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	do_kex_with_key(kex, KEY_ECDSA, 256);
+ #endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:04:55.946343408 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.c	2023-01-26 12:06:35.235164432 +0100
+@@ -110,6 +110,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA1 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha1"), &k2), 0);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(k2, NULL);
+@@ -117,7 +118,7 @@ sshkey_file_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal_public(k1, k2), 1);
+ 	ASSERT_STRING_EQ(k2->cert->signature_type, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k2);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE(); */
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("load RSA cert with SHA512 signature");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1_sha512"), &k2), 0);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:10:37.533168013 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c	2023-01-26 12:15:35.637631860 +0100
+@@ -333,13 +333,14 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
+ #ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+ 	sshbuf_free(buf);
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+-	TEST_DONE();
++	TEST_DONE();*/
+ 
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("rsa_1");
+@@ -357,6 +358,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
+ 	buf = load_file("dsa_1");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
+@@ -364,6 +366,7 @@ sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
+ 	sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
+ 	sshkey_free(k1);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
++	*/
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 11:02:52.339413463 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c	2023-01-26 11:58:42.324253896 +0100
+@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	u_char *sigblob;
+ 	size_t siglen;
+ 
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg == NULL || strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++
+ 	ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
+@@ -101,8 +104,9 @@ build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshk
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
+-	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
++	    sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0)
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
+ 
+ 	free(sigblob);
+ 	sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
+@@ -119,16 +123,22 @@ signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct
+ {
+ 	size_t len;
+ 	u_char *sig;
++	/* ssh-rsa implies SHA1, forbidden in DEFAULT cp */
++	int expected = (sig_alg && strcmp(sig_alg, "ssh-rsa") == 0) ? SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : 0;
++	if (k && (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT))
++		expected = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ 
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg,
+-	    NULL, NULL, 0), 0);
+-	ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
+-	ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
+-	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+-	/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
+-	sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
+-	ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	    NULL, NULL, 0), expected);
++	if (expected == 0) {
++		ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
++		ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
++		ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++		/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
++		sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
++		ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
++	}
+ 	free(sig);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -514,7 +524,7 @@ sshkey_tests(void)
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
+ 	    NULL), 0);
+ 	k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
+-	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
++	build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
+ 	ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
+ 	    SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
+ 	ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-26 12:19:23.659513651 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/regress/unittests/sshsig/tests.c	2023-01-26 12:20:28.021044803 +0100
+@@ -102,9 +102,11 @@ tests(void)
+ 	check_sig("rsa.pub", "rsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
+ 
++	/* Skip this test, SHA1 signatures are not supported
+ 	TEST_START("check DSA signature");
+ 	check_sig("dsa.pub", "dsa.sig", msg, namespace);
+ 	TEST_DONE();
++	*/
+ 
+ #ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ 	TEST_START("check ECDSA signature");
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 14:57:08.118400073 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/serverloop.c	2023-01-12 14:59:17.330470518 +0100
+@@ -737,6 +737,10 @@ server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *
+ 			else if (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_RSA_SHA2_256_SUPPORTED)
+ 				sigalg = "rsa-sha2-256";
+ 		}
++		if (ssh->compat & SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA && sigalg == NULL) {
++			sigalg = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("SHA1 signature is not supported, falling back to %s", sigalg);
++		}
+ 		debug3_f("sign %s key (index %d) using sigalg %s",
+ 		sshkey_type(key), ndx, sigalg == NULL ? "default" : sigalg);
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-25 15:33:29.140353651 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshconnect2.c	2023-01-25 15:59:34.225364883 +0100
+@@ -1461,6 +1464,14 @@ identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_cha
+ 			retried = 1;
+ 			goto retry_pin;
+ 		}
++		if ((r == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) && strcmp("ssh-rsa", alg)) {
++			char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-512";
++			debug3_f("trying to fallback to algorithm %s", rsa_safe_alg);
++
++			if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
++				rsa_safe_alg, options.sk_provider, pin, compat)) != 0)
++				debug_fr(r, "sshkey_sign - RSA fallback");
++		}
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-12 13:29:06.355711140 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-01-12 13:29:06.358711178 +0100
+@@ -1640,6 +1651,7 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 	int keytype;
+ 	Authctxt *authctxt;
+ 	struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
++	int forbid_ssh_rsa = 0;
+ 
+ #ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
+ 	(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
+@@ -1938,6 +1950,33 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 		    key = NULL;
+ 		    continue;
+ 		}
++		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA_CERT)) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			verbose_f("sshd: SHA1 in signatures is disabled for RSA keys");
++		    	forbid_ssh_rsa = 1;
++		    }
++		}
++		if (key && (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA || sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_DSA_CERT)) {
++		    size_t sign_size = 0;
++		    u_char *tmp = NULL;
++		    u_char data[] = "Test SHA1 vector";
++		    int res;
++
++		    res = sshkey_sign(key, &tmp, &sign_size, data, sizeof(data), NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);
++		    free(tmp);
++		    if (res == SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR) {
++			logit_f("sshd: ssh-dss is disabled, skipping key file %s", options.host_key_files[i]);
++			key = NULL;
++			continue;
++		    }
++		}
+ 		if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ 		    key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ 			debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+@@ -2275,6 +2306,9 @@ main(int ac, char **av)
+ 
+ 	check_ip_options(ssh);
+ 
++	if (forbid_ssh_rsa)
++		ssh->compat |= SSH_RH_RSASIGSHA;
++
+ 	/* Prepare the channels layer */
+ 	channel_init_channels(ssh);
+ 	channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
+diff -Nur openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c openssh-8.7p1_patched/ssh-keygen.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-keygen.c	2023-01-18 17:41:47.894515779 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1_patched/ssh-keygen.c	2023-01-18 17:41:44.500488818 +0100
+@@ -491,6 +491,8 @@
+ 	BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
+ 	BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
++	char rsa_safe_alg[] = "rsa-sha2-256";
++	char *alg = NULL;
+ 
+ 	if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "parse magic");
+@@ -590,6 +592,7 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b
+ 		if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "generate RSA parameters");
+ 		BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
++		alg = rsa_safe_alg;
+ 		break;
+ 	}
+ 	rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
+@@ -598,9 +601,9 @@ do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b
+ 
+ 	/* try the key */
+ 	if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
+-	    NULL, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
++	    alg, NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
+ 	    sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
+-	    NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
++	    alg, 0, NULL) != 0) {
+ 		sshkey_free(key);
+ 		free(sig);
+ 		return NULL;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c.sshrsacheck	2023-01-20 13:07:54.180676144 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/ssh-rsa.c	2023-01-20 13:07:54.290677074 +0100
+@@ -254,7 +254,8 @@ ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+-		if (hash_alg != want_alg) {
++		if (hash_alg != want_alg && want_alg != SSH_DIGEST_SHA1) {
++			debug_f("Unexpected digest algorithm: got %d, wanted %d", hash_alg, want_alg);
+ 			ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-recursive-scp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2022-02-07 12:31:07.407740407 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.409740424 +0100
+@@ -1324,7 +1324,7 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ 				src, abs_dst);
+ 			errs = 1;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.c	2022-02-07 12:47:59.117516131 +0100
+@@ -971,7 +971,7 @@ do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 
+ /* Implements both the realpath and expand-path operations */
+ static char *
+-do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand)
++do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int expand, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_int expected_id, count, id;
+@@ -1012,9 +1012,38 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
+ 
+ 		if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
+ 			fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
+-		error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
+-		sshbuf_free(msg);
+-		return NULL;
++		if ((status == SSH2_FX_NO_SUCH_FILE) && create_dir)  {
++			memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
++			if ((r = do_mkdir(conn, path, &a, 0)) != 0) {
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++
++			send_string_request(conn, id, SSH2_FXP_REALPATH,
++					path, strlen(path));
++
++			get_msg(conn, msg);
++			if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0 ||
++					(r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &id)) != 0)
++				fatal_fr(r, "parse");
++
++			if (id != expected_id)
++				fatal("ID mismatch (%u != %u)", id, expected_id);
++
++			if (type == SSH2_FXP_STATUS) {
++				u_int status;
++
++				if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &status)) != 0)
++					fatal_fr(r, "parse status");
++				error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
++				sshbuf_free(msg);
++				return NULL;
++			}
++		} else {
++			error("Couldn't canonicalize: %s", fx2txt(status));
++			sshbuf_free(msg);
++			return NULL;
++		}
+ 	} else if (type != SSH2_FXP_NAME)
+ 		fatal("Expected SSH2_FXP_NAME(%u) packet, got %u",
+ 		    SSH2_FXP_NAME, type);
+@@ -1039,9 +1067,9 @@ do_realpath_expand(struct sftp_conn *con
+ }
+ 
+ char *
+-do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
++do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int create_dir)
+ {
+-	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, create_dir);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1055,9 +1083,9 @@ do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, c
+ {
+ 	if (!can_expand_path(conn)) {
+ 		debug3_f("no server support, fallback to realpath");
+-		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0);
++		return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 0, 0);
+ 	}
+-	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1);
++	return do_realpath_expand(conn, path, 1, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ int
+@@ -1807,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src)) == NULL) {
++	if ((src_canon = do_realpath(conn, src, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", src);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2115,12 +2143,12 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+ int
+ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst)) == NULL) {
++	if ((dst_canon = do_realpath(conn, dst, create_dir)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", dst);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -2557,7 +2585,7 @@ crossload_dir(struct sftp_conn *from, st
+ 	char *from_path_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+ 
+-	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path)) == NULL) {
++	if ((from_path_canon = do_realpath(from, from_path, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 		error("Unable to canonicalize path \"%s\"", from_path);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp-client.h	2022-02-07 12:31:07.410740433 +0100
+@@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ int do_fsetstat(struct sftp_conn *, cons
+ int do_lsetstat(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, Attrib *a);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalise 'path' - caller must free result */
+-char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
++char *do_realpath(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int);
+ 
+ /* Canonicalisation with tilde expansion (requires server extension) */
+ char *do_expand_path(struct sftp_conn *, const char *);
+@@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+ int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
+-    int, int);
++    int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c.scp-sftpdirs	2021-08-20 06:03:49.000000000 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/sftp.c	2022-02-07 12:31:07.411740442 +0100
+@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+@@ -1577,7 +1577,7 @@ parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn
+ 		if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
+ 			path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
+ 		path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
+-		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
++		if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1, 0)) == NULL) {
+ 			err = 1;
+ 			break;
+ 		}
+@@ -2160,7 +2160,7 @@ interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn,
+ 	}
+ #endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
+ 
+-	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
++	remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".", 0);
+ 	if (remote_path == NULL)
+ 		fatal("Need cwd");
+ 	startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-clears-file.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,304 @@
+diff --color -rup a/scp.c b/scp.c
+--- a/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.560120817 +0200
++++ b/scp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.118213004 +0200
+@@ -1324,12 +1324,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 
+ 	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+-		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) != 0) {
++		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1, 1) != 0) {
+ 			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ 				src, abs_dst);
+ 			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+-	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
++	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
+ 		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
+ 		errs = 1;
+ 	}
+@@ -1566,11 +1566,11 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 		debug("Fetching %s to %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && iamrecursive) {
+ 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+-			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
++			    pflag, SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1, 1) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+-			    pflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    pflag, 0, 0, 1) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
+ 		free(abs_dst);
+diff --color -rup a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
+--- a/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
++++ b/sftp.c	2022-07-26 14:52:37.119213023 +0200
+@@ -666,12 +666,12 @@ process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
+ 		free(abs_dst);
+@@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 		if (globpath_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
+ 			if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0, 0, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		} else {
+ 			if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
+ 			    pflag || global_pflag, resume,
+-			    fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
++			    fflag || global_fflag, 0) == -1)
+ 				err = -1;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.c b/sftp-client.c
+--- a/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
++++ b/sftp-client.c	2022-07-26 15:09:54.825295533 +0200
+@@ -1454,7 +1454,7 @@ progress_meter_path(const char *path)
+ int
+ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *remote_path,
+     const char *local_path, Attrib *a, int preserve_flag, int resume_flag,
+-    int fsync_flag)
++    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	u_char *handle;
+@@ -1498,8 +1498,8 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0)
+ 		return -1;
+ 
+-	local_fd = open(local_path,
+-	    O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | (resume_flag ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
++	local_fd = open(local_path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT |
++	((resume_flag || inplace_flag) ? 0 : O_TRUNC), mode | S_IWUSR);
+ 	if (local_fd == -1) {
+ 		error("Couldn't open local file \"%s\" for writing: %s",
+ 		    local_path, strerror(errno));
+@@ -1661,8 +1661,11 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ 	/* Sanity check */
+ 	if (TAILQ_FIRST(&requests) != NULL)
+ 		fatal("Transfer complete, but requests still in queue");
+-	/* Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt */
+-	if (read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
++	/*
++	 * Truncate at highest contiguous point to avoid holes on interrupt,
++	 * or unconditionally if writing in place.
++	 */
++	if (inplace_flag || read_error || write_error || interrupted) {
+ 		if (reordered && resume_flag) {
+ 			error("Unable to resume download of \"%s\": "
+ 			    "server reordered requests", local_path);
+@@ -1724,7 +1727,7 @@ do_download(struct sftp_conn *conn, cons
+ static int
+ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int depth, Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag,
+-    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
++    int resume_flag, int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	int i, ret = 0;
+ 	SFTP_DIRENT **dir_entries;
+@@ -1781,7 +1784,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
+ 			if (download_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ 			    depth + 1, &(dir_entries[i]->a), preserve_flag,
+ 			    print_flag, resume_flag,
+-			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
++			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
+ 				ret = -1;
+ 		} else if (S_ISREG(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ||
+ 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm))) {
+@@ -1793,7 +1796,8 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
+ 			if (do_download(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ 			    S_ISLNK(dir_entries[i]->a.perm) ? NULL :
+ 			    &(dir_entries[i]->a),
+-			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag) == -1) {
++			    preserve_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
++			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
+ 				error("Download of file %s to %s failed",
+ 				    new_src, new_dst);
+ 				ret = -1;
+@@ -1831,7 +1835,7 @@ download_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *
+ int
+ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     Attrib *dirattrib, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume_flag,
+-    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag)
++    int fsync_flag, int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	char *src_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+@@ -1843,26 +1847,25 @@ download_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, con
+ 
+ 	ret = download_dir_internal(conn, src_canon, dst, 0,
+ 	    dirattrib, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume_flag, fsync_flag,
+-	    follow_link_flag);
++	    follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
+ 	free(src_canon);
+ 	return ret;
+ }
+ 
+ int
+ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *local_path,
+-    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag)
++    const char *remote_path, int preserve_flag, int resume,
++    int fsync_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	int r, local_fd;
+-	u_int status = SSH2_FX_OK;
+-	u_int id;
+-	u_char type;
++	u_int openmode, id, status = SSH2_FX_OK, reordered = 0;
+ 	off_t offset, progress_counter;
+-	u_char *handle, *data;
++	u_char type, *handle, *data;
+ 	struct sshbuf *msg;
+ 	struct stat sb;
+-	Attrib a, *c = NULL;
+-	u_int32_t startid;
+-	u_int32_t ackid;
++	Attrib a, t, *c = NULL;
++	u_int32_t startid, ackid;
++	u_int64_t highwater = 0;
+ 	struct request *ack = NULL;
+ 	struct requests acks;
+ 	size_t handle_len;
+@@ -1913,10 +1916,15 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
++	openmode = SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT;
++	if (resume)
++		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_APPEND;
++	else if (!inplace_flag)
++		openmode |= SSH2_FXF_TRUNC;
++
+ 	/* Send open request */
+-	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", SSH2_FXF_WRITE|SSH2_FXF_CREAT|
+-	    (resume ? SSH2_FXF_APPEND : SSH2_FXF_TRUNC),
+-	    &a, &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
++	if (send_open(conn, remote_path, "dest", openmode, &a,
++	    &handle, &handle_len) != 0) {
+ 		close(local_fd);
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+@@ -1999,6 +2007,12 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 			    ack->id, ack->len, (unsigned long long)ack->offset);
+ 			++ackid;
+ 			progress_counter += ack->len;
++			if (!reordered && ack->offset <= highwater)
++				highwater = ack->offset + ack->len;
++			else if (!reordered && ack->offset > highwater) {
++				debug3_f("server reordered ACKs");
++				reordered = 1;
++			}
+ 			free(ack);
+ 		}
+ 		offset += len;
+@@ -2017,6 +2031,14 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 		status = SSH2_FX_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (inplace_flag || (resume && (status != SSH2_FX_OK || interrupted))) {
++		debug("truncating at %llu", (unsigned long long)highwater);
++		attrib_clear(&t);
++		t.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_SIZE;
++		t.size = highwater;
++		do_fsetstat(conn, handle, handle_len, &t);
++	}
++
+ 	if (close(local_fd) == -1) {
+ 		error("Couldn't close local file \"%s\": %s", local_path,
+ 		    strerror(errno));
+@@ -2041,7 +2063,7 @@ do_upload(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ static int
+ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int depth, int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag)
++    int follow_link_flag, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	int ret = 0;
+ 	DIR *dirp;
+@@ -2119,12 +2141,13 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+ 
+ 			if (upload_dir_internal(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+ 			    depth + 1, preserve_flag, print_flag, resume,
+-			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag) == -1)
++			    fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag) == -1)
+ 				ret = -1;
+ 		} else if (S_ISREG(sb.st_mode) ||
+ 		    (follow_link_flag && S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode))) {
+ 			if (do_upload(conn, new_src, new_dst,
+-			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag) == -1) {
++			    preserve_flag, resume, fsync_flag,
++			    inplace_flag) == -1) {
+ 				error("Uploading of file %s to %s failed!",
+ 				    new_src, new_dst);
+ 				ret = -1;
+@@ -2144,7 +2167,7 @@ upload_dir_internal(struct sftp_conn *co
+ int
+ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
+     int preserve_flag, int print_flag, int resume, int fsync_flag,
+-    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir)
++    int follow_link_flag, int create_dir, int inplace_flag)
+ {
+ 	char *dst_canon;
+ 	int ret;
+@@ -2155,7 +2178,7 @@ upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	ret = upload_dir_internal(conn, src, dst_canon, 0, preserve_flag,
+-	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag);
++	    print_flag, resume, fsync_flag, follow_link_flag, inplace_flag);
+ 
+ 	free(dst_canon);
+ 	return ret;
+diff --color -rup a/sftp-client.h b/sftp-client.h
+--- a/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:51:40.561120836 +0200
++++ b/sftp-client.h	2022-07-26 14:52:37.120213042 +0200
+@@ -138,28 +138,29 @@ int do_fsync(struct sftp_conn *conn, u_c
+  * Download 'remote_path' to 'local_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    Attrib *, int, int, int);
++int do_download(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
++    int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively download 'remote_directory' to 'local_directory'. Preserve
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
+-    Attrib *, int, int, int, int, int);
++int download_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, Attrib *,
++    int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Upload 'local_path' to 'remote_path'. Preserve permissions and times
+  * if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int);
++int do_upload(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
++    int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Recursively upload 'local_directory' to 'remote_directory'. Preserve
+  * times if 'pflag' is set
+  */
+-int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *, int, int, int,
+-    int, int, int);
++int upload_dir(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, const char *,
++    int, int, int, int, int, int, int);
+ 
+ /*
+  * Download a 'from_path' from the 'from' connection and upload it to

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-scp-kill-switch.patch

@@ -30,10 +30,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.kill-scp	2021-09-16 11:42:56.013650519 +0200
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2021-09-16 11:53:03.249713836 +0200
 @@ -596,6 +596,14 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
- 	argc -= optind;
+ 	if (iamremote)
- 	argv += optind;
+ 		mode = MODE_SCP;
  
-+	{
++	if (mode == MODE_SCP) {
 +		FILE *f = fopen(_PATH_SCP_KILL_SWITCH, "r");
 +		if (f != NULL) {
 +			fclose(f);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftp-default-protocol.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
+index 68aac04b..a96e95ad 100644
+--- a/scp.1
++++ b/scp.1
+@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
+ .\"
+ .\" Created: Sun May  7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
+ .\"
+-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.100 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $
++.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.101 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $
+ .\"
+-.Dd $Mdocdate: August 11 2021 $
++.Dd $Mdocdate: September 8 2021 $
+ .Dt SCP 1
+ .Os
+ .Sh NAME
+@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
+ .Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
+ .Sh SYNOPSIS
+ .Nm scp
+-.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrsTv
++.Op Fl 346ABCOpqRrTv
+ .Op Fl c Ar cipher
+ .Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
+ .Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
+@@ -37,9 +37,6 @@ It uses
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
+ same security as a login session.
+-The scp protocol requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
+-.Xr glob 3
+-pattern matching.
+ .Pp
+ .Nm
+ will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
+@@ -79,7 +76,9 @@ The options are as follows:
+ Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
+ Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
+ hosts.
+-Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (the default), this option
++Note that, when using the legacy SCP protocol (via the
++.Fl O
++flag), this option
+ selects batch mode for the second host as
+ .Nm
+ cannot ask for passwords or passphrases for both hosts.
+@@ -146,9 +145,10 @@ Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
+ .It Fl O
+ Use the legacy SCP protocol for file transfers instead of the SFTP protocol.
+ Forcing the use of the SCP protocol may be necessary for servers that do
+-not implement SFTP or for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
+-wildcard patterns.
+-This mode is the default.
++not implement SFTP, for backwards-compatibility for particular filename
++wildcard patterns and for expanding paths with a
++.Sq ~
++prefix for older SFTP servers.
+ .It Fl o Ar ssh_option
+ Can be used to pass options to
+ .Nm ssh
+@@ -258,16 +258,6 @@ to use for the encrypted connection.
+ The program must understand
+ .Xr ssh 1
+ options.
+-.It Fl s
+-Use the SFTP protocol for file transfers instead of the legacy SCP protocol.
+-Using SFTP avoids invoking a shell on the remote side and provides
+-more predictable filename handling, as the SCP protocol
+-relied on the remote shell for expanding
+-.Xr glob 3
+-wildcards.
+-.Pp
+-A near-future release of OpenSSH will make the SFTP protocol the default.
+-This option will be deleted before the end of 2022.
+ .It Fl T
+ Disable strict filename checking.
+ By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
+@@ -299,11 +289,23 @@ debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
+ .Xr ssh_config 5 ,
+ .Xr sftp-server 8 ,
+ .Xr sshd 8
++.Sh CAVEATS
++The original scp protocol (selected by the
++.Fl O
++flag) requires execution of the remote user's shell to perform
++.Xr glob 3
++pattern matching.
++This requires careful quoting of any characters that have special meaning to
++the remote shell, such as quote characters.
+ .Sh HISTORY
+ .Nm
+ is based on the rcp program in
+ .Bx
+ source code from the Regents of the University of California.
++.Pp
++Since OpenSSH 8.8 (8.7 in Red Hat/Fedora builds),
++.Nm
++has use the SFTP protocol for transfers by default.
+ .Sh AUTHORS
+ .An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
+ .An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
+diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
+index e039350c..c7cf7529 100644
+--- a/scp.c
++++ b/scp.c
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.232 2021/08/11 14:07:54 naddy Exp $ */
++/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.233 2021/09/08 23:31:39 djm Exp $ */
+ /*
+  * scp - secure remote copy.  This is basically patched BSD rcp which
+  * uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
+@@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	const char *errstr;
+ 	extern char *optarg;
+ 	extern int optind;
+-	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SCP;
++	enum scp_mode_e mode = MODE_SFTP;
+ 	char *sftp_direct = NULL;
+ 
+ 	/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
+@@ -1983,7 +1983,7 @@ void
+ usage(void)
+ {
+ 	(void) fprintf(stderr,
+-	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrsTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
++	    "usage: scp [-346ABCOpqRrTv] [-c cipher] [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config]\n"
+ 	    "           [-i identity_file] [-J destination] [-l limit]\n"
+ 	    "           [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program] source ... target\n");
+ 	exit(1);

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-sftpscp-dir-create.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,167 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs openssh-8.7p1/scp.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/scp.c.sftpdirs	2022-02-02 14:11:12.553447509 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/scp.c	2022-02-02 14:12:56.081316414 +0100
+@@ -130,6 +130,7 @@
+ #include "misc.h"
+ #include "progressmeter.h"
+ #include "utf8.h"
++#include "sftp.h"
+ 
+ #include "sftp-common.h"
+ #include "sftp-client.h"
+@@ -660,7 +661,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	 * Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
+ 	 * and no error has occurred yet
+ 	 */
+-	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
++	if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && (mode == MODE_SFTP || errs == 0)) {
+ 		if (remin != -1)
+ 		    (void) close(remin);
+ 		if (remout != -1)
+@@ -1264,13 +1265,18 @@ tolocal(int argc, char **argv, enum scp_
+ static char *
+ prepare_remote_path(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
+ {
++	size_t nslash;
++
+ 	/* Handle ~ prefixed paths */
+-	if (*path != '~')
+-		return xstrdup(path);
+ 	if (*path == '\0' || strcmp(path, "~") == 0)
+ 		return xstrdup(".");
+-	if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0)
+-		return xstrdup(path + 2);
++	if (*path != '~')
++		return xstrdup(path);
++	if (strncmp(path, "~/", 2) == 0) {
++		if ((nslash = strspn(path + 2, "/")) == strlen(path + 2))
++			return xstrdup(".");
++		return xstrdup(path + 2 + nslash);
++	}
+ 	if (can_expand_path(conn))
+ 		return do_expand_path(conn, path);
+ 	/* No protocol extension */
+@@ -1282,10 +1288,16 @@ void
+ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *targ, struct sftp_conn *conn)
+ {
+ 	char *target = NULL, *filename = NULL, *abs_dst = NULL;
+-	int target_is_dir;
+-
++	int src_is_dir, target_is_dir;
++	Attrib a;
++	struct stat st;
++
++	memset(&a, '\0', sizeof(a));
++	if (stat(src, &st) != 0)
++		fatal("stat local \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
++	src_is_dir = S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
+ 	if ((filename = basename(src)) == NULL)
+-		fatal("basename %s: %s", src, strerror(errno));
++		fatal("basename \"%s\": %s", src, strerror(errno));
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * No need to glob here - the local shell already took care of
+@@ -1295,8 +1307,12 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 		cleanup_exit(255);
+ 	target_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, target);
+ 	if (targetshouldbedirectory && !target_is_dir) {
+-		fatal("Target is not a directory, but more files selected "
+-		    "for upload");
++		debug("target directory \"%s\" does not exist", target);
++		a.flags = SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
++		a.perm = st.st_mode | 0700; /* ensure writable */
++		if (do_mkdir(conn, target, &a, 1) != 0)
++			cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */
++		target_is_dir = 1;
+ 	}
+ 	if (target_is_dir)
+ 		abs_dst = path_append(target, filename);
+@@ -1306,14 +1322,17 @@ source_sftp(int argc, char *src, char *t
+ 	}
+ 	debug3_f("copying local %s to remote %s", src, abs_dst);
+ 
+-	if (local_is_dir(src) && iamrecursive) {
++	if (src_is_dir && iamrecursive) {
+ 		if (upload_dir(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag,
+ 		    SFTP_PROGRESS_ONLY, 0, 0, 1) != 0) {
+-			fatal("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
++			error("failed to upload directory %s to %s",
+ 				src, abs_dst);
++			errs = 1;
+ 		}
+-	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0)
+-		fatal("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
++	} else if (do_upload(conn, src, abs_dst, pflag, 0, 0) != 0) {
++		error("failed to upload file %s to %s", src, abs_dst);
++		errs = 1;
++	}
+ 
+ 	free(abs_dst);
+ 	free(target);
+@@ -1487,14 +1506,15 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 	char *abs_dst = NULL;
+ 	glob_t g;
+ 	char *filename, *tmp = NULL;
+-	int i, r, err = 0;
++	int i, r, err = 0, dst_is_dir;
++	struct stat st;
+ 
+ 	memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
++
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Here, we need remote glob as SFTP can not depend on remote shell
+ 	 * expansions
+ 	 */
+-
+ 	if ((abs_src = prepare_remote_path(conn, src)) == NULL) {
+ 		err = -1;
+ 		goto out;
+@@ -1510,11 +1530,24 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 		goto out;
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !local_is_dir(dst)) {
+-		error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
+-		    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
+-		err = -1;
+-		goto out;
++	if ((r = stat(dst, &st)) != 0)
++		debug2_f("stat local \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
++	dst_is_dir = r == 0 && S_ISDIR(st.st_mode);
++
++	if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && !dst_is_dir) {
++		if (r == 0) {
++			error("Multiple files match pattern, but destination "
++			    "\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
++			err = -1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		debug2_f("creating destination \"%s\"", dst);
++		if (mkdir(dst, 0777) != 0) {
++			error("local mkdir \"%s\": %s", dst, strerror(errno));
++			err = -1;
++			goto out;
++		}
++		dst_is_dir = 1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
+@@ -1525,7 +1558,7 @@ sink_sftp(int argc, char *dst, const cha
+ 			goto out;
+ 		}
+ 
+-		if (local_is_dir(dst))
++		if (dst_is_dir)
+ 			abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
+ 		else
+ 			abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
+@@ -1551,7 +1584,8 @@ out:
+ 	free(tmp);
+ 	globfree(&g);
+ 	if (err == -1) {
+-		fatal("Failed to download file '%s'", src);
++		error("Failed to download '%s'", src);
++		errs = 1;
+ 	}
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-ssh-manpage.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+diff --color -ru a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
+--- a/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:47:51.307295880 +0200
++++ b/ssh.1	2022-07-12 11:50:28.793363263 +0200
+@@ -493,6 +493,7 @@
+ .It AddressFamily
+ .It BatchMode
+ .It BindAddress
++.It BindInterface
+ .It CanonicalDomains
+ .It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
+ .It CanonicalizeHostname
+@@ -510,6 +511,7 @@
+ .It ControlPath
+ .It ControlPersist
+ .It DynamicForward
++.It EnableSSHKeysign
+ .It EscapeChar
+ .It ExitOnForwardFailure
+ .It FingerprintHash
+@@ -538,6 +540,8 @@
+ .It IdentitiesOnly
+ .It IdentityAgent
+ .It IdentityFile
++.It IgnoreUnknown
++.It Include
+ .It IPQoS
+ .It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
+ .It KbdInteractiveDevices
+@@ -546,6 +550,7 @@
+ .It LocalCommand
+ .It LocalForward
+ .It LogLevel
++.It LogVerbose
+ .It MACs
+ .It Match
+ .It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
+@@ -566,6 +571,8 @@
+ .It RemoteCommand
+ .It RemoteForward
+ .It RequestTTY
++.It RevokedHostKeys
++.It SecurityKeyProvider
+ .It RequiredRSASize
+ .It SendEnv
+ .It ServerAliveInterval
+@@ -575,6 +582,7 @@
+ .It StreamLocalBindMask
+ .It StreamLocalBindUnlink
+ .It StrictHostKeyChecking
++.It SyslogFacility
+ .It TCPKeepAlive
+ .It Tunnel
+ .It TunnelDevice

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1-upstream-cve-2021-41617.patch

@@ -1,15 +1,15 @@
-diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
+diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
 index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
---- a/auth.c
+--- a/misc.c
-+++ b/auth.c
++++ b/misc.c
 @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@
+ #ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
  # include <paths.h>
- #endif
  #include <pwd.h>
 +#include <grp.h>
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
- #include <login.h>
  #endif
+ #ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
+ #include <net/if.h>
 @@ -2695,6 +2696,12 @@ subprocess(const char *tag, const char *command,
  		}
  		closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
@@ -20,6 +20,6 @@ index b8d1040d..0134d694 100644
 +			    pw->pw_name, (u_int)pw->pw_gid, strerror(errno));
 +			_exit(1);
 +		}
-		/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
+ 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
- 		if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) != 0) {
  			error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
+ 			    strerror(errno));

SOURCES/openssh-8.7p1.tar.gz.asc

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEcWi5g4FaXu9ZpK39Kj9BTnNgYLoFAmEfKn8ACgkQKj9BTnNg
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++9UnYKVm0OAU8jpbGXd1D2REuXRspRU6NPNW/3MkO2I46sG+KHhD6OMipOaiY8p2
+WrCsryadBThUqSKAo/zdIAJgVVt23Y7ykIIkhxebaRBIS4v6fdXg4aIjHfOjlsDX
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++Plovu62bBUXeVhXhLC76vdQo7geRpBs0RQV0gtj6HlZL5BReEKwApPEVce8K9F5
++ZYbmF5ZQNMcdR9zZ+QV+ykv6y4SG1+rPI9/Ufo/ZZp5jRnsq+M=
+=xI/+
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

SOURCES/openssh-9.1p1-sshbanner.patch

@@ -30,3 +30,28 @@ index d29a03b4..d7283136 100644
  	if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
  		error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
  		confree(s);
+diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
+index 1e3b6398..eb2a931e 100644
+--- a/sshsig.c
++++ b/sshsig.c
+@@ -491,7 +491,7 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
+ {
+ 	char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ 	ssize_t n, total = 0;
+-	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
++	struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx = NULL;
+ 	int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ 	struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ 
+@@ -549,9 +548,11 @@ hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
+ 	/* success */
+ 	r = 0;
+  out:
++	oerrno = errno;
+ 	sshbuf_free(b);
+ 	ssh_digest_free(ctx);
+ 	explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
++	errno = oerrno;
+ 	return r;
+ }
+ 

SOURCES/openssh-9.3p1-openssl-compat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+--- openssh-9.3p1/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-03-15 22:28:19.000000000 +0100
++++ /home/dbelyavs/work/upstream/openssh-portable/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c	2023-05-25 14:19:42.870841944 +0200
+@@ -33,10 +33,10 @@
+ 
+ /*
+  * OpenSSL version numbers: MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status
+- * We match major, minor, fix and status (not patch) for <1.0.0.
+- * After that, we acceptable compatible fix versions (so we
+- * allow 1.0.1 to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed
+- * within a patch series.
++ * Versions >=3 require only major versions to match.
++ * For versions <3, we accept compatible fix versions (so we allow 1.0.1
++ * to work with 1.0.0). Going backwards is only allowed within a patch series.
++ * See https://www.openssl.org/policies/releasestrat.html
+  */
+ 
+ int
+@@ -48,15 +48,17 @@
+ 	if (headerver == libver)
+ 		return 1;
+ 
+-	/* for versions < 1.0.0, major,minor,fix,status must match */
+-	if (headerver < 0x1000000f) {
+-		mask = 0xfffff00fL; /* major,minor,fix,status */
++	/*
++	 * For versions >= 3.0, only the major and status must match.
++	 */
++	if (headerver >= 0x3000000f) {
++		mask = 0xf000000fL; /* major,status */
+ 		return (headerver & mask) == (libver & mask);
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, major,minor,status must match and library
+-	 * fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
++	 * For versions >= 1.0.0, but <3, major,minor,status must match and
++	 * library fix version must be equal to or newer than the header.
+ 	 */
+ 	mask = 0xfff0000fL; /* major,minor,status */
+ 	hfix = (headerver & 0x000ff000) >> 12;
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac
+--- openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac.check	2023-11-27 14:54:32.959113758 +0100
++++ openssh-8.7p1/configure.ac	2023-11-27 14:54:49.467500523 +0100
+@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
+ 				;;
+ 			101*)   ;; # 1.1.x
+ 			200*)   ;; # LibreSSL
+-			300*)   ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
++			30*)   ;; # OpenSSL 3.x series
+ 		        *)
+ 				AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
+ 		                ;;

SOURCES/openssh-9.4p2-limit-delay.patch

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ diff -u -p -r1.166 auth2.c
  	double elapsed = monotime_double() - start, req = seconds, remain;
  
 +	if (elapsed > MAX_FAIL_DELAY_SECONDS) {
-+		debug3("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
++		debug3_f("elapsed %0.3lfms exceeded the max delay "
 +		    "requested %0.3lfms)", elapsed*1000, req*1000);
 +		return;
 +	}

SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-48795.patch

@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
 +		ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "strict KEX violation: "
 +		    "unexpected packet type %u (seqnr %u)", type, seq);
 +	}
-+	error("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
++	error_f("type %u seq %u", type, seq);
  	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
@@ -115,9 +115,9 @@ index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
  		if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
  			return r;
 @@ -681,7 +705,7 @@ kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
- 	if (kex == NULL)
+ 		error_f("no kex");
- 		return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ 		return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- 
+ 	}
 -	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
 +	ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_protocol_error);
  	ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
@@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ index aa5e792d..d478ff6e 100644
 +			    "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com");
 +		}
 +		if (kex->kex_strict) {
-+			debug3("will use strict KEX ordering");
++			debug3_f("will use strict KEX ordering");
 +			if (seq != 0)
 +				ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
 +				    "strict KEX violation: "
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
  	sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
  
 +	if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		debug("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
++		debug_f("resetting send seqnr %u", state->p_send.seqnr);
 +		state->p_send.seqnr = 0;
 +	}
 +
@@ -263,12 +263,12 @@ index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
  	/* reset for next packet */
  	state->packlen = 0;
 +	if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS && ssh->kex->kex_strict) {
-+		debug("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
++		debug_f("resetting read seqnr %u", state->p_read.seqnr);
 +		state->p_read.seqnr = 0;
 +	}
  
- 	/* do we need to rekey? */
+ 	if ((r = ssh_packet_check_rekey(ssh)) != 0)
- 	if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
+ 		return r;
 @@ -1720,10 +1716,39 @@ ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
  		r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
  		if (r != 0)
@@ -352,7 +352,7 @@ index 52017def..beb214f9 100644
  	vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
  	va_end(args);
  
-+	debug2("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
++	debug2_f("sending SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT: %s", buf);
  	if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
  	    (r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
@@ -361,14 +361,14 @@ index df6caf81..0cccbcc4 100644
 --- a/sshconnect2.c
 +++ b/sshconnect2.c
 @@ -253,7 +253,8 @@ ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, st
- 	xxx_host = host;
+ 		fatal_fr(r, "kex_assemble_namelist");
- 	xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ 	free(all_key);
  
 -	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
 +	if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms,
 +	    "ext-info-c,kex-strict-c-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
- 		fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
+ 		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, s);
  	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
 @@ -358,7 +358,6 @@ struct cauthmethod {
  };
@@ -412,22 +412,22 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
 --- openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict	2023-11-27 13:19:18.855433602 +0100
 +++ openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c	2023-11-27 13:28:10.441325314 +0100
 @@ -2531,10 +2531,14 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- {
- 	char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
  	struct kex *kex;
+ 	char *hostkey_types = NULL;
+ 	char *prop_kex = NULL, *prop_enc = NULL, *prop_hostkey = NULL;
 +	char *cp;
  	int r;
  
--	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
+-	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh,
 -	    options.kex_algorithms);
 +	if ((cp = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, 
 +	   "kex-strict-s-v00@openssh.com")) == NULL)
-+		fatal("kex_names_cat");
++		fatal_f("kex_names_cat");
 +
-+	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(cp);
++	myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = prop_kex = compat_kex_proposal(ssh, cp);
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
- 	    options.ciphers);
+ 	    myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = prop_enc =
- 	myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
+ 	    compat_cipher_proposal(ssh, options.ciphers);
 @@ -2586,7 +2586,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
  	if (gss && orig)
  		xasprintf(&newstr, "%s,%s", gss, orig);
@@ -438,10 +438,10 @@ diff -up openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c.kexstrict openssh-8.7p1/sshd.c
  		newstr = orig;
  
 @@ -2650,6 +2654,7 @@ do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
- 	packet_send();
- 	packet_write_wait();
  #endif
+ 	free(prop_kex);
+ 	free(prop_enc);
 +	free(cp);
+ 	free(prop_hostkey);
  	debug("KEX done");
  }
- 

SOURCES/openssh-9.6p1-CVE-2023-51385.patch

@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@ index 35c48e62..48d93ddf 100644
 --- a/ssh.c
 +++ b/ssh.c
 @@ -626,6 +626,41 @@ ssh_conn_info_free(struct ssh_conn_info *cinfo)
- 	}
+ 	free(cinfo);
  }
  
 +static int

SOURCES/openssh-server-systemd-sysusers.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#Type Name ID  GECOS                     Home directory        Shell
+u     sshd 74  "Privilege-separated SSH" /usr/share/empty.sshd -

SOURCES/openssh-systemd-sysusers.conf

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+#Type Name     ID
+g     ssh_keys 101

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent-rmheaders

@@ -9,7 +9,6 @@ buffer.c
 cleanup.c
 cipher.h
 compat.h
-defines.h
 entropy.c
 entropy.h
 fatal.c

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.2-compat.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c	2018-08-24 10:22:56.281930322 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/get_command_line.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
   * or implied, of Jamie Beverly.
   */
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openss
  #include <stdio.h>
  #include <errno.h>
  #include <string.h>
-@@ -65,8 +66,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
+@@ -66,8 +67,8 @@ proc_pid_cmdline(char *** inargv)
                  case EOF:
                  case '\0':
                      if (len > 0) { 
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openss
                          strncpy(argv[count++], argbuf, len);
                          memset(argbuf, '\0', MAX_LEN_PER_CMDLINE_ARG + 1);
                          len = 0;
-@@ -105,9 +106,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
+@@ -106,9 +107,9 @@ pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(char *
  {
      size_t i;
      for (i = 0; i < n_args; i++)
@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/get_command_line.c.psaa-compat openss
      return;
  }
  
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/identity.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -30,8 +30,8 @@
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -55,9 +55,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/identity.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ss
      char    *filename;      /* comment for agent-only keys */
      int tried;
      int isprivate;      /* key points to the private key */
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2018-08-24 10:18:05.007393297 +0200
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.421001434 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2018-08-24 10:18:32.937612513 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -36,8 +36,8 @@
  #include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
  #include "xmalloc.h"
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
                                  const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
  {
      u_char *cookie = NULL;
-@@ -114,22 +116,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+@@ -114,22 +120,23 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
      char ** reported_argv = NULL;
      size_t count = 0;
      char * action_logbuf = NULL;
@@ -147,13 +147,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
          }
          cookie[i] = (u_char) rnd;
          rnd >>= 8;
-@@ -139,12 +141,13 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+@@ -144,7 +151,8 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
-     if (count > 0) { 
-         free_logbuf = 1;
-         action_logbuf = log_action(reported_argv, count);
--        agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
-+        agent_action(&action_agentbuf, reported_argv, count);
-         pamsshagentauth_free_command_line(reported_argv, count);
      }
      else {
          action_logbuf = "unknown on this platform";
@@ -163,7 +157,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
      }
      
      /*
-@@ -161,35 +163,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
+@@ -161,35 +169,39 @@ pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(Buffer *
      retc = getcwd(pwd, sizeof(pwd) - 1);
      time(&ts);
  
@@ -207,6 +201,14 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_free(&action_agentbuf);
 +        free(action_logbuf);
 +        sshbuf_free(action_agentbuf);
++    }
++    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
++    if (reti >= 0) {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
++    } else {
++        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
++            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
      }
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
 -    if(reti >= 0)
@@ -215,21 +217,13 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
 -        pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_cstring(session_id2, "");
 -    /* pamsshagentauth_debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
 -    pamsshagentauth_buffer_put_int64(session_id2, (uint64_t) ts);
-+    /* debug3("hostname: %s", hostname); */
-+    if (reti >= 0) {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, hostname)) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    } else {
-+        if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(*session_id2, "")) != 0)
-+            fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-+    }
 +    /* debug3("ts: %ld", ts); */
 +    if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(*session_id2, (uint64_t) ts)) != 0)
 +        fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
  
      free(cookie);
      return;
-@@ -278,7 +280,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+@@ -278,7 +290,8 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
  
  	auth = xmalloc(sizeof(*auth));
  	auth->fd = sock;
@@ -239,7 +233,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
  	auth->howmany = 0;
  
  	return auth;
-@@ -287,43 +289,42 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
+@@ -287,9 +300,9 @@ ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_ui
  int
  pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(const char * user, const char * ruser, const char * servicename)
  {
@@ -251,11 +245,8 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
      AuthenticationConnection *ac;
      char *comment;
      uint8_t retval = 0;
-     uid_t uid = getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid;
+@@ -299,31 +312,30 @@ pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(con
- 
+     pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
-     OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
--    pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
-+    pamsshagentauth_session_id2_gen(&session_id2, user, ruser, servicename);
  
      if ((ac = ssh_get_authentication_connection_for_uid(uid))) {
 -        pamsshagentauth_verbose("Contacted ssh-agent of user %s (%u)", ruser, uid);
@@ -294,10 +285,10 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/iterate_ssh_agent_keys.c.psaa-compat
      EVP_cleanup();
      return retval;
  }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2018-08-24 10:18:05.008393305 +0200
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat	2020-09-23 10:52:16.423001461 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c	2020-09-23 10:53:10.631727657 +0200
-@@ -104,7 +104,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
   * a patch 8-)
   */
  #if ! HAVE___PROGNAME || HAVE_BUNDLE
@@ -306,7 +297,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat open
  #endif
  
      for(i = argc, argv_ptr = (char **) argv; i > 0; ++argv_ptr, i--) {
-@@ -130,11 +130,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -132,11 +132,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
  #endif
      }
  
@@ -320,7 +311,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat open
  
      if(ruser_ptr) {
          strncpy(ruser, ruser_ptr, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -149,12 +149,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -151,12 +151,12 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
  #ifdef ENABLE_SUDO_HACK
          if( (strlen(sudo_service_name) > 0) && strncasecmp(servicename, sudo_service_name, sizeof(sudo_service_name) - 1) == 0 && getenv("SUDO_USER") ) {
              strncpy(ruser, getenv("SUDO_USER"), sizeof(ruser) - 1 );
@@ -335,7 +326,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat open
                  goto cleanexit;
              }
              strncpy(ruser, getpwuid(getuid())->pw_name, sizeof(ruser) - 1);
-@@ -163,11 +163,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -165,11 +165,11 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
  
      /* Might as well explicitely confirm the user exists here */
      if(! getpwnam(ruser) ) {
@@ -349,7 +340,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat open
          goto cleanexit;
      }
  
-@@ -177,8 +177,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -179,8 +179,8 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
           */
          parse_authorized_key_file(user, authorized_keys_file_input);
      } else {
@@ -360,7 +351,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat open
      }
  
      /*
-@@ -187,19 +187,19 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
       */
  
      if(user && strlen(ruser) > 0) {
@@ -368,11 +359,26 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat open
 +        verbose("Attempting authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
  
          /*
+          * Attempt to read data from the sshd if we're being called as an auth agent.
+@@ -197,10 +197,10 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
+         const char* ssh_user_auth = pam_getenv(pamh, "SSH_AUTH_INFO_0");
+         int sshd_service = strncasecmp(servicename, sshd_service_name, sizeof(sshd_service_name) - 1);
+         if (sshd_service == 0 && ssh_user_auth != NULL) {
+-            pamsshagentauth_verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
++            verbose("Got SSH_AUTH_INFO_0: `%.20s...'", ssh_user_auth);
+             if (userauth_pubkey_from_pam(ruser, ssh_user_auth) > 0) {
+                 retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
+-                pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++                logit("Authenticated (sshd): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+                 goto cleanexit;
+             }
+         }
+@@ -208,13 +208,13 @@ pam_sm_authenticate(pam_handle_t * pamh,
           * this pw_uid is used to validate the SSH_AUTH_SOCK, and so must be the uid of the ruser invoking the program, not the target-user
           */
          if(pamsshagentauth_find_authorized_keys(user, ruser, servicename)) { /* getpwnam(ruser)->pw_uid)) { */
--            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
+-            pamsshagentauth_logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
-+            logit("Authenticated: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
++            logit("Authenticated (agent): `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
              retval = PAM_SUCCESS;
          } else {
 -            pamsshagentauth_logit("Failed Authentication: `%s' as `%s' using %s", ruser, user, authorized_keys_file);
@@ -384,9 +390,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_ssh_agent_auth.c.psaa-compat open
      }
  
  cleanexit:
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.009393312 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -66,8 +66,8 @@
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "match.h"
@@ -451,9 +457,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.c.psaa-compa
  {
      return
          pamsshagentauth_user_key_allowed2(getpwuid(authorized_keys_file_allowed_owner_uid),
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_authorized_keys.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
  
@@ -463,9 +469,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_authorized_keys.h.psaa-compa
  void parse_authorized_key_file(const char *, const char *);
  
  #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -45,44 +45,46 @@
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "ssh.h"
@@ -740,9 +746,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.c.psaa-compat o
 +    restore_uid();
      return found_key;
  }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/pam_user_key_allowed2.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
  #define _PAM_USER_KEY_ALLOWED_H
  
@@ -753,9 +759,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/pam_user_key_allowed2.h.psaa-compat o
 +int pamsshagentauth_user_key_command_allowed2(char *, char *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *);
  
  #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/secure_filename.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -53,8 +53,8 @@
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "match.h"
@@ -797,9 +803,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/secure_filename.c.psaa-compat openssh
  			    buf);
  			break;
  		}
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2018-08-24 10:22:13.202657025 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -37,10 +37,11 @@
  #include "xmalloc.h"
  #include "ssh.h"
@@ -814,7 +820,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat
  #include "pathnames.h"
  #include "misc.h"
  #include "secure_filename.h"
-@@ -48,54 +48,59 @@
+@@ -48,54 +49,59 @@
  #include "identity.h"
  #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
  
@@ -833,8 +839,8 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat
      char           *pkalg = NULL;
      u_char         *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL;
 -    u_int           blen = 0, slen = 0;
-+    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
 -    int             authenticated = 0;
++    size_t          blen = 0, slen = 0;
 +    int             r, authenticated = 0;
  
 -    pkalg = (char *) key_ssh_name(id->key);
@@ -879,7 +885,7 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat
  
      /* test for correct signature */
 -    if(pamsshagentauth_key_verify(id->key, sig, slen, pamsshagentauth_buffer_ptr(&b), pamsshagentauth_buffer_len(&b)) == 1)
-+    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) == 0)
++    if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)
          authenticated = 1;
  
    user_auth_clean_exit:
@@ -896,9 +902,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.psaa-compat
      CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data();
      return authenticated;
  }
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@
  #ifndef _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
  #define _USERAUTH_PUBKEY_FROM_ID_H
@@ -909,9 +915,9 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/userauth_pubkey_from_id.h.psaa-compat
 +int userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *, Identity *, struct sshbuf *);
  
  #endif
-diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c
+diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c
---- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2016-11-13 04:24:32.000000000 +0100
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c.psaa-compat	2019-07-08 18:36:13.000000000 +0200
-+++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c	2018-08-24 10:18:05.010393320 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/uuencode.c	2020-09-23 10:52:16.424001475 +0200
 @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ pamsshagentauth_uudecode(const char *src
  	/* and remove trailing whitespace because __b64_pton needs this */
  	*p = '\0';
@@ -937,3 +943,50 @@ diff -up openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/uuencode.c.psaa-compat openssh/pam_ss
 -	pamsshagentauth_xfree(buf);
 +	free(buf);
  }
+--- openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c.compat	2020-09-23 11:32:30.783695267 +0200
++++ openssh/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_pam.c	2020-09-23 11:33:21.383389036 +0200
+@@ -33,7 +33,8 @@
+ #include <string.h>
+ 
+ #include "defines.h"
+-#include "key.h"
++#include <includes.h>
++#include "sshkey.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ 
+ #include "pam_user_authorized_keys.h"
+@@ -42,28 +42,28 @@
+     int authenticated = 0;
+     const char method[] = "publickey ";
+ 
+-    char* ai = pamsshagentauth_xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
++    char* ai = xstrdup(ssh_auth_info);
+     char* saveptr;
+ 
+     char* auth_line = strtok_r(ai, "\n", &saveptr);
+     while (auth_line != NULL) {
+         if (strncmp(auth_line, method, sizeof(method) - 1) == 0) {
+             char* key_str = auth_line + sizeof(method) - 1;
+-            Key* key = pamsshagentauth_key_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
++            struct sshkey* key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
+             if (key == NULL) {
+                 continue;
+             }
+-            int r = pamsshagentauth_key_read(key, &key_str);
++            int r = sshkey_read(key, &key_str);
+             if (r == 1) {
+                 if (pam_user_key_allowed(ruser, key)) {
+                     authenticated = 1;
+-                    pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++                    sshkey_free(key);
+                     break;
+                 }
+             } else {
+-                pamsshagentauth_verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
++                verbose("Failed to create key for %s: %d", auth_line, r);
+             }
+-            pamsshagentauth_key_free(key);
++            sshkey_free(key);
+         }
+         auth_line = strtok_r(NULL, "\n", &saveptr);
+     }

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4-rsasha2.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+diff -up openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2 openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c
+--- openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c.rsasha2	2022-07-15 15:08:12.865585410 +0200
++++ openssh-8.7p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.4/userauth_pubkey_from_id.c	2022-07-15 15:16:25.164282372 +0200
+@@ -87,8 +87,13 @@ userauth_pubkey_from_id(const char *ruse
+         (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
+         fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ 
+-    if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
+-        goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA
++	&& ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), "rsa-sha2-256", 0) == 0) {
++	/* Do nothing */
++    } else {
++        if (ssh_agent_sign(id->ac->fd, id->key, &sig, &slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0) != 0)
++            goto user_auth_clean_exit;
++    }
+ 
+     /* test for correct signature */
+     if (sshkey_verify(id->key, sig, slen, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), NULL, 0, NULL) == 0)

SOURCES/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.9.3-build.patch

@@ -159,21 +159,23 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-
  LIBS=@LIBS@
  AR=@AR@
  AWK=@AWK@
-@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
+@@ -61,8 +61,8 @@ INSTALL=@INSTALL@
  PERL=@PERL@
  SED=@SED@
  ENT=@ENT@
 -LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+-LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
 +LDFLAGS=-L.. -L../openbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
- LDFLAGS_SHARED = @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
++LDFLAGS_SHARED =-Wl,-z,defs @LDFLAGS_SHARED@
  EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
  
+ INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS=@INSTALL_SSH_PRNG_CMDS@
 @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ SSHOBJS=xmalloc.o atomicio.o authfd.o bu
  
  ED25519OBJS=ed25519-donna/ed25519.o
  
--PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o
+-PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o
-+PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o secure_filename.o
++PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS=pam_user_key_allowed2.o iterate_ssh_agent_keys.o userauth_pubkey_from_id.o pam_user_authorized_keys.o get_command_line.o userauth_pubkey_from_pam.o secure_filename.o
  
  
  MANPAGES_IN	= pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod
@@ -189,8 +191,8 @@ diff -up openssh-7.4p1/pam_ssh_agent_auth-0.10.3/Makefile.in.psaa-build openssh-
  
 -pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o
 -	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(ED25519OBJS) $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o $(LIBS) -lpam
-+pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o
++pam_ssh_agent_auth.so: $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS)  pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o ../ssh-sk-client.o
-+	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
++	$(LD) $(LDFLAGS_SHARED) -o $@ $(PAM_SSH_AGENT_AUTH_OBJS) ../ssh-sk-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat pam_ssh_agent_auth.o ../uidswap.o $(LIBS) -lpam
  
  $(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
  	pod2man --section=8 --release=v0.10.3 --name=pam_ssh_agent_auth --official --center "PAM" pam_ssh_agent_auth.pod > pam_ssh_agent_auth.8

SOURCES/ssh-agent.service

@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+# Requires SSH_AUTH_SOCK="$XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/ssh-agent.socket"
+# set in environment, handled for example in plasma via
+# /etc/xdg/plasma-workspace/env/ssh-agent.sh
+[Unit]
+ConditionEnvironment=!SSH_AGENT_PID
+Description=OpenSSH key agent
+Documentation=man:ssh-agent(1) man:ssh-add(1) man:ssh(1)
+
+[Service]
+Environment=SSH_AUTH_SOCK=%t/ssh-agent.socket
+ExecStart=/usr/bin/ssh-agent -a $SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+PassEnvironment=SSH_AGENT_PID
+SuccessExitStatus=2
+Type=forking

SOURCES/sshd.service

@@ -6,9 +6,8 @@ Wants=sshd-keygen.target
 
 [Service]
 Type=notify
-EnvironmentFile=-/etc/crypto-policies/back-ends/opensshserver.config
 EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/sshd
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS $CRYPTO_POLICY
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/sshd -D $OPTIONS
 ExecReload=/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
 KillMode=process
 Restart=on-failure

SOURCES/sshd.sysconfig

@@ -5,13 +5,3 @@
 # example using  systemctl enable sshd-keygen@dsa.service  to allow creation
 # of DSA key or  systemctl mask sshd-keygen@rsa.service  to disable RSA key
 # creation.
-
-# Do not change this option unless you have hardware random
-# generator and you REALLY know what you are doing
-
-SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=0
-# SSH_USE_STRONG_RNG=1
-
-# System-wide crypto policy:
-# To opt-out, uncomment the following line
-# CRYPTO_POLICY=